Dombrowski-Argument From Marginal Cases (JHI 45.1 [1984])

8/13/2019 Dombrowski-Argument From Marginal Cases (JHI 45.1 [1984])

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VEGETARIANISM AND THE ARGUMENT FROMMARGINAL CASES IN PORPHYRY

BY DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI

It is well known that many of the philosophers from antiquity were vege-tarian: Pythagoras, Empedocles, Theophrastus, Seneca, Ovid, Plutarch, Plotinus,Porphyry, and others.1 And Plato, although apparently not a vegetarian, wasnonetheless greatly impressed by vegetarian thought.2 What is not so well knownby classicists is that there has been a rebirth in philosophical vegetarianism inthe last decade that has generated an enormous debate of at least one hundredarticles and books.3 As may be suspected, this debate has also rekindled someinterest in Greek vegetarian thought,4 one inadequacy of which will be treated

in this article.The aforementioned ancient thinkers were vegetarians for at least four dif-ferent reasons, three of which have been noticed by several recent commentators.(1) Many of the ancient vegetarians believed in transmigration, eading them tospare animals in the belief that animals were, or will be, human beings. Thefamous story in Diogenes Laertius (VIII. 36) of Pythagoras asking a man todiscontinue beating a dog because he recognized the voice of a deceased friendin the yelp of the animal is indicative of this tendency. (2) Another reason forancient abstention from meat was the belief that flesh-eating was injurious to

the health of either body or soul. The former belief was tied to ancient medicalthought, while the latter was often associated with a more general commitmentto moderation or asceticism. (3) But there was also among the ancients a concernfor animals themselves: since they suffer when they are killed (or are deprived

1 See my The Philosophy of Vegetarianism or a full treatment of the vegetarian thoughtof these thinkers.

2 See e.g., the ideal diet at Republic 369D-373E; the vegetarianism of the golden agein the Statesman

269-274;and Laws 781E-783B and

Epinomis974D-975B.

3See e.g., Stephen R.L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1977); the many articles of Tom Regan, soon to be published by University ofCalifornia Press; and perhaps most important, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (N.Y.Review, 1975).

4 Robert S. Brumbaugh, "Man, Animals, and Morals: A Brief History," in On theFifth Day, ed. by Richard Knowles Morris; M. Detienne, "La cuisine de Pythagore,"Archives de Sociologie des Religions 29 (1970), 141-162; M. Detienne, "Entre betes etDieux," Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse IV (Fall, 1972), 230-246; U. Dierauer, Tier undMensch im Denken der Antike (Amsterdam, 1977); J. Donald Hughes, "Ecology in

Ancient Greece", Inquiry 18 (1975), 115-125; J. Donald Hughes, "The EnvironmentalEthics of the Pythagoreans", Environmental Ethics 3 (1980), 195-213; Gareth B. Mat-thews, "Animals and the Unity of Psychology", Philosophy 53 (Oct., 1978), 437-454;John Passmore, "The Treatment of Animals", Journal of The History of Ideas 36 (1975),195-218; John Rodman, "The Other Side of Ecology in Ancient Greece: Comments on

Hughes," Inquiry 19 (1976), 108-112; P. Vidal-Naquet, "Plato's Myth of the Statesman,the Ambiguities of the Golden Age and of History," The Journal of Hellenic Studies 98(1978), 132-141. All of these studies add to the work done decades ago by JohannesHaussleiter, Der Vegetarismus n der antike (Berlin, 1935).

141Copyright Jan. 1984 by JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, INC.



142 DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI

of a life which is theirs if killed painlessly),5 and since we can live healthy liveson vegetal food, eating meat is cruel and ought to be avoided.

There is a fourth reason, however, that at least one ancient philosopher used.

Porphyry's use of this argument has neven been mentioned before, to my knowl-edge, which is curious since this argument is perhaps the most important andforceful one in the contemporary debate. This is the argument from marginalcases, which is described by Singer (p. 265) as follows:

The catch is that any such characteristic hat is possessed by all human beings will notbe possessed nly by human beings. For example, all humans, but not only humans, arecapable of feeling pain; and while only humans are capable of solving complex mathe-matical problems, not all humans can do this. So it turns out that in the only sense inwhich we can

truly say,as an assertion f fact, that all humans are equal, at least some

members f other species are also "equal"-equal, that is, to some humans.

Theological statements of man's privileged status cannot be philosophicallyjustified. But to say that we can legitimately eat animals because human beingsare rational, or autonomous, or just, or language-users, etc., is not true of manyhuman beings. These "marginal cases" include infants, the mentally enfeebled,and the like. If we "lower" our standard to that of sentiency (e.g., the abilityto experience pain) so as to protect these people,6 we must also protect manyanimals, including those that we eat.

Or, as Regan puts it,7 if an animal has characteristics a,b, c . .. n but lacksautonomy (or reason or language) and a human being has characteristics a,b,c

. . n but lacks autonomy (or reason or language), then we have as muchreason to believe that the animal has rights as the human.

Now let us consider Porphyry's De abstinentia,8 which is a book length letterto a Firmus Castricius, a former vegetarian and fellow student of Plotinus whohad fallen away from vegetarianism. Porphyry intends his arguments to bringFirmus back within the fold. The relevant text can be found at III. 19:

To compare plants, however, with animals, s doing violence o the order of things. Forthe latter are naturally ensitive aisthanesthai), nd adapted o feel pain, to be terrifiedand hurt (kai algein kai phobeisthai ai blaptesthai); n which account also they maybe injured adikeisthali. But the former are entirely destitute of sensation, and in con-sequence f this, nothing oreign, r evil (kakon), or hurtful blabe), or injurious adikia),

5See Plutarch's "Of Eating the Flesh" in his Moralia for a clear expression of

compassion for animals as a basis for vegetarianism.6 And we do

surelywant to

protectthese

people, althoughnot all of the Greeks did,

as is evidenced by the practice of infanticide.7 Tom Regan, "Fox's Critique of Animal Liberation", Ethics 88 (Jan. 1978), 126-

133; also see Dale Jamieson and Tom Regan, "Animal Rights: A Reply to Frey", Analysis38 (Jan. 1978), 32-36. Critics of the argument from marginal cases include R. G. Frey,"Animal Rights", Analysis 37 (June, 1977), 186-189; and Jan Narveson, "Animal Rights",Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (Mar. 1977), 161-178.

8 See the recent edition of J. Bouffartigue and M. Patillon, Porphyre de l'abstinence

(Paris, 1977), 3 vols., with French and Greek on facing pages, and helpful notes andintroductions. Also, a new edition of the Thomas Taylor translation is available, Porphyry,

On Abstinence rom Animal Food (London: Centaur Press, 1965). The following quoteis taken from this translation.



VEGETARIANISM: PORPHYRY'S MARGINAL CASES 143

can befall them. For sensation s the principle of all alliance Kai gar oikeioseos aseskai allotrioseos arche to aisthanesthai) . . . And is it not absurd (alogon), since we seethat many of our own species (anthropon) ive from sense alone (aisthesei monon), but

do not possess intellect (noun) and reason (logon). . . . but that no justice is shownfrom us to the ox that ploughs, he dog that is fed with us, and the animals hat nourishus with their milk, and adorn our bodies with their wool? Is not such an opinion mostirrational nd absurd?

Indeed. Zeno and the Stoics are the ones who held such an opinion, but thecontinued popularity of meat-eating indicates that Porphyry's followers still havetheir work cut out for them.

Zeno and his followers assert that alliance or intimacy (oikeioseos) is the

principleto be used in

determiningwhich

beingsdeserve

ustice,but for

Porphyrythis begs the question. What is needed is some criterion for alliance, some wayof determining how we will group nature into the various households of edibleand inedible beings. For all those beings who think that unnecessary sufferingought to be avoided (i.e., for at least all rational human beings) sensation(aisthanesthal) is a principle of alliance that must be considered. Porphyry'scomparison of plants and animals on this criterion is instructive. If we suggestthat sentiency is an insufficient condition for being treated with justice weeliminate many of our own species that live from sense alone, without reason

(alogon). And if we "lower" our standards so as to include all human beings,we must therefore be willing to include animals capable of sensation.9 At thispoint the defender of the Stoics would either have to admit his inconsistencyor give up an opposition to infanticide, "mercy" killings of the retarded, etc.Hardly a nice position to be in In any event, Porphyry's status as the discovererof the vegetarian argument from marginal cases ought to be acknowledged.

Creigton University.

9 These would include cows, pigs, chickens, fish, and others all the way "down" the

evolutionary scale until we reach beings like mollusks. See Peter Singer, Animal Liber-ation, 183-189.

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Dombrowski-Argument From Marginal Cases (JHI 45.1 [1984])