Doing Less With More - Ward

8/8/2019 Doing Less With More - Ward

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Defense AT&L: November-December 2004 30

Ward is assigned to the Air Force Research Lab in Rome, N.Y. He holds degrees in electrical engineering and engineering management. He is Level III

certified in SPRDE and Level I in PM, T&E, and IT.

B E S T P R A C T I C E S

Doing Less With MoreThe Pitfalls of Overfunding

Capt. Dan Ward, USAFAUTHORS WARNING

This article may offend the pro-fessional opinions and sensibil-ities of certain individuals. Dis-continue reading if any of thefollowing occur: itching, aching,dizziness, ringing in ears, vom-iting, giddiness, auditory or vi-sual hallucinations, loss of bal-ance, slurred speech, blindness,

drowsiness, insomnia, profusesweating, shivering, or heart pal-pitations. May be too intense forsome readers and not intenseenough for others. No programmanagers were harmed duringthe production of this article.Some restrictions apply.

L

et me get right to it: theDepartment of Defenseacquisition community

today has too muchmoney. There, Ive saidit, and it feels good. It may bea career-limiting opinion, butafter 10 years in this business,I can confidently (albeit navely)conclude we have too muchmoney. More important, I con-tend this overfunding is limit-ing our ability to innovate,which has negative conse-quences for Americas warfight-

ing capabilities. Now that I haveyour attention, let me explainhow I reached this conclusion.

In a word, research. As I lookedfor common threads within in-novative development projects,I quickly discovered somethingmany readers probably knew


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already: I am not the first to contend DoD overfunding isa problem.

Its Been Said BeforeAir Force Col. John Boyd and his collection of military re-formers sounded a similar call in the early 1980s. In fact,

Pierre Sprey, one of Boyds acolytes, wroteA Case for Bet-ter and Cheaper Weapons, published in 1984. He com-pared cheap winners like the highly lethal AIM-9D/GSidewinder ($14,000 each) to expensive losers such asthe less effective AIM-7D/E Sparrow ($44,000 each). Heargued that increased spending will yield less capability,particularly if we continue to buy complex, vulnerableweapons that are costly to operate. My research didntstop there.

Navy commanders James Fitzsimonds and Jan van Tolobserved in the Spring 1994 issue ofJoint Force Quarterly

that revolutionary changes [in technology and conceptof operations (CONOPS)] do not generally occur duringwar. Militaries are driven to innovate during peacetimeby the need to make more efficient use of shrinking re-sources. The article concludes: Innovation is not nec-essarily or even primarily a function of budget. Many ofthe interwar innovations came at a time oflow budgetsand small forces (emphasis added).

On the other side of the ledger we have the Cold War tac-tic of large defense spending, which was apparently aneffective weapon against the now-defunct U.S.S.R. How-

ever, high rates of military research and development

spending in that time period did not exactly produce theanticipated technological innovationsStrategic DefenseInitiative, anyone? Instead, we find things like the Co-manche helicopters expenditure of 21 years and $8 bil-lion with zero actual helicopters to show for it. And theresalso the recently cancelled $11 billion Crusader, the on-

again-off-again-on-again B-1, the on-again-off-again-on-again V-22, and so on. While the newspapers in the 1980snever did get those $900 hammer stories quite right, itsnot clear that large Cold War R&D budgets delivered whatwas promised. Fortunately, the Soviets were able to ac-complish even lessperhaps in part because they out-spent the United States by $300 billion between 1970and 1980.

A Tale Of Two WeaponsWilber D. Jones outstanding bookArming The Eagle lendsfurther support to the overfunding thesis. First published

in 1999, this book rigorously documents the history ofU.S. weapons development and acquisition since 1775.It is full of fascinating snapshots and stories about suc-cesses and failures in military technology development.Lets take a look at the very different stories it tells abouttwo infantry weapons: the Bazooka and the M16.

Early in World War II, the Bazooka went from drawingboard to battlefield in 30 dayssurely some kind ofrecord. A contemporary article inLiberty magazine breath-lessly opined the $19 rocket rifle can almost duplicatethe devastation wrought by a 155-mm howitzer that costs

$25,000! While the assessment of this weapons effec-

31 Defense AT&L: November-December 2004


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tiveness is undoubtedly overstated, the Bazookas impacton the battlefield was undeniable, and the cost was ridicu-lously low.

In contrast, the M16 took 20 years to go from concept tocapability, at a pricetag many orders of magnitude be-yond the 30-day wonder. It turns out both weapons hadsimilar operational limitations upon deployment: neither

performed as advertised. The important thing to note isthe Bazookas problems came to light quickly and wereaddressed quickly (the first major Bazooka upgrade wasaccomplished in six months). The M16s bugs took longerto find, longer to fix, and cost considerably more.

This doesnt establish a causal relationship between largebudgets and low capability/low innovationbut hang on,well get there. It does show the M16s decades-long, dis-ciplined, neat, orderly, and well-funded development ef-fort didnt guarantee the systems operational effective-ness over the Bazookas month-long, quick-and-dirty,

low-cost approach. The key to field success in both situ-ations was (drumroll please) actual field experience anddirect user feedback. The inexpensive, rapid develop-mental approach of the Bazooka got the users involvedmuch sooner, which may very well be the key to thiswhole thing.

War and Peace, Fact and FantasyLets return to the assertion of Fitzsimonds and van Tolthat most innovation happens during times of peace andsmall budgets. Specifically, lets focus on the peacetimedimension. Why would wartime not be a cauldron of in-

novation? What leads to peaceful innovation? And whatsthe connection to small budgets?

During wartime, new military technology developmentis left largely to technologists and engineers like me. Wetend to know a lot about technology and its limitationsand relatively little about combat environments and theirrequirements. Only when the shooting stops do adequatenumbers of combat-experienced individuals have the op-portunity to spend their intellectual capital on new sys-tem requirements and developments. Of course, in thecase of the Bazooka, its absurdly short development time-

line gave soldiers an opportunity to provide real-time com-bat truth to the developers, who could then address theweapons shortfalls. But this is clearly an exception to thepeacetime-innovation trend.

The principle behind the parable is this: technology de-velopers tend to have facts about technology and fan-tasies about the operational (i.e., combat) environment.In contrast, users tend to have facts about the operationalenvironment, and fantasies about what technology cando. Innovation seems to require the latter combination,which accepts the limitations of the foxhole and puts in-

novative pressure on technology, not the other way

around. It leads to creative technologies and approachesthat are well-suited for the environs in which they will beused. The alternative (and unfortunately, traditional) ap-proachtechnology facts and operational environmentfantasiestends to be neither as creative nor as effectiveand it often makes absurd assumptions or demands oncombatants as they try to integrate new, rigid technolo-gies.

Back To the BazookaWhat would have happened if the Bazooka budget hadbeen larger? For starters, its development would havetaken longer if only because it takes time to spend money.Larger budgets get more oversight, which takes moretime, whichin a cruel ironyincreases the overall cost.(More people overseeing more dollars requires more peo-ple and more dollarsa financial snowball effect). Also,the risk of analysis paralysis increases in direct propor-tion to the size of the R&D budget.

What does this have to do with low budgets? Just abouteverything. When something is expensive, there is a nat-ural and understandable tendency to keep it away fromthe kids. Exquisite artifacts are treated with great careand shielded from those with grubby hands who mightdamage or break them. But a $19 piece of steel pipe witha few doodads welded to it (a Bazooka) can be sent intoa rigorous combat environment without fear of breakage,in part because it is simple and robust, and in part be-cause it is inexpensive enough that its builders dont mindif it breaks.

The conclusion is unavoidable: increased developmentcosts tend to have an isolating effect, even for suppos-edly rugged military technology, because users are keptat arms length and development times stretch intodecades. This unfortunate attempt to disinvolve usersmay be rooted in good intentions, but ultimately it lim-its the systems effectiveness by keeping ground truth outof the equation. Early user involvement is a prime driverfor innovation and effectiveness, and rapid, cheap sys-tems tend to bring users on board sooner. Large wallets

just get in the way, blocking one of the key elements ofsuccessful technology development.

Reforming Rewards and RecognitionFor the sake of argument lets say Ive convinced some-one that overfunding is a problem. The logical next ques-tion is What do you propose we do about it?

Im glad you asked!

Most readers have probably noticed the DoD acquisitionprofession tends to use dollar figures to quantify job pro-gression, equating increased program costs with profes-sional maturity. If you managed a program worth $1 mil-

lion last year, your chances for promotion are better if



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you manage a program worth $10 million this year. Thatsa problem. We need a different set of values and metricswhere dollar figures and professional maturity are not au-tomatically equivalent, where an up-and-coming officerhears instead, Well, Capt. Smith, you did good thingswith $10 million last year. Now lets see what you can dowith $1 million.

The idea is not simply to slash budgets on existing pro-grams, although that is often a good idea too. The pointis to avoid turning our noses up at a program just becauseits inexpensive, or overvaluing a program just because itcosts a lot of money.

Redefining MDAPsThe situation is more pronounced at the higher levels. Forexample, take major defense acquisition programs(MDAPs). In order to be an MDAP, an acquisition programmust either be designated by the under secretary of de-fense (acquisition, technology and logistics) as an MDAP

or be estimated to require an eventual total expenditurefor research, development, test, and evaluation of morethan $365 million in fiscal 2000 constant dollars or morethan $2.190 billion in procurement in fiscal 2000 con-stant dollars. That essentially means a system becomesan MDAP when it reaches a particular dollar value (Fig-ure 1).

Shouldnt capability come into the equation somewhere?At the moment, it does not, and that is kind of embar-rassing. Would it not make sense to designate a systemas major based on the degree to which it contributes

to national security, provides a new/necessary function-ality, or otherwise makes our forces more effective? Cur-rently, all it takes to be major is a big price tag, no mat-ter how much or how little the system improves the userscapabilities.

The figures illustrate this point. In Figure 1, which sys-tem, A or B, is more prestigious and better for your ca-reer? The more expensive one ( System A) of course, eventhough it provides the same increase in capability as the

less expensive one (System B). In fact, a cost overrun forSystem B could push it over the line and turn it into amajor program. This causes subtle (and not-so-subtle)environmental pressure (E) in the direction of increasedcost, as depicted by the arrow. This may not be the onlyreason for the 18 percent average cost growth, but it iscertainly a contributing factor.

There is a better way. You see it in Figure 2. In this ap-proach, all the statutory requirements for reporting, test-ing, oversight, and so forth of programs costing more than$365 million would still apply, but we would now callthose programs what they areexpensive. Not goodor bad, not major or minor. Simply expensive defenseacquisition programs. EDAPs. Even if they are worth everypenny or are a bargain at twice the price, they cost a lotof money and everyone knows it. What a refreshingchange it would be to acknowledge that reality.

This wouldnt fix all our problems, nor would it guaran-

tee innovation all the time, but it would be a step in theright direction. For example, in this proposed paradigm,which program (A, B, or C) is more prestigious and bet-ter for ones career? The MDAP (C) of course, which de-livers a significant improvement in capability at a lowcost. Who would want to be the manager of System A(the EDAP)? One implication of this approach is that costoverruns could result in the loss of MDAP status, unlessthere is a corresponding improvement in capability. En-vironmental pressure in this scenario is down and to theright, in the direction of lower costs and improved capa-bilities, as it should be.

In an interview with NASAsASK magazine, Terry Little,(acquisition advisor of the Missile Defense Agency) ad-dressed a common misconception that if you empha-size something like speed or cost, everything else goesin the toilet. Contrary to that often-held belief, Littlesexperience indicates that people working the problemwont let that happen. What you give up [by focusingon speed or cost] is very modest in comparison to whatyou gain. All I can say is, Amen, Mr. Little. Amen.

33 Defense AT&L: November-December 2004

Capability Improvement (%)

ProgramCost($M)

A

BE

Major Defense Acquisition Programs

365

Average Cost Growth for Acquisition Programs: 18.2%-OSD(AT&L), 11 Apr 02

FIGURE 1. MDAP Defined

Capability Improvement (%)

ProgramCost($M)

365

Expensive Programs

E

A

B

C

MajorDefenseAcquisitionPrograms

FIGURE 2. MDAP Redefined


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Time To ActThe history of military innovation clearly points to thevalue of small budgets and the dangers of large ones. Ithink the M16 and the Bazooka are interesting examples,but the 21st century is already full of similar situationswe could have discussed, particularly in the areas of in-formation technology and unmanned aerial vehicles.

High technology is not terribly expensive these days, and

maybe it never was. But this whole thing is really notabout high or low tech. Our mission is to deliver innova-tive, effective capabilities to our users, and its amazingwhat you can do with $19 worth of steel pipe and as-sorted parts. I dont expect ever to see a $19 aircraft car-rier; there will always be a need for expensive systems.I simply contend the DoDs current value system tendsto drive costs upward, while reducing innovation. And itis high time we did something about it.

My own, admittedly limited, experience with both ex-pensive and inexpensive development efforts resonates

with the academic research. My teams and I typically didmore with less and the most when we had the least. Thatis to say, our innovation and our impact on operationswere most significant when our resources were the mostlimited. It is hard to avoid concluding that small teams+ thin budgets + short timelines tends to = significantinnovation and combat effectiveness. If the DoD as awhole is aiming to maximize bang for the buck, it helpsto recognize that bang and buck are often inversely pro-portional.

This is not a call for fiscal discipline in a political sense,

and its not about the governments spending less money

for thrifts sake, although thats not a bad idea. It is aboutspending less money for technologys sake and for thewarfighters sake. Counterintuitive though it may be, ifwe want to provide Americas soldiers, sailors, airmen,and Marines with innovative capabilities, we need to spendless money developing systems.

Reducing R&D budgets is not a cheap fix, but nor is in-creasing spending. Frankly, there is no sure-fire way to

produce innovative technologies, and spending lots ofmoney is perhaps the least effective approach imagin-able. Getting actual feedback from combat-experiencedusers tends to be highly productive, and large budgetsusually get in the way of that communication.

How much should we cut from the budget? More thanwe will. The longstanding cultural standards within theDoD acquisition community place such high value onlarge budgets that any effort to decrease them will be metwith fierce opposition. One way to begin influencing theculture is by redefining MDAPs as outlined here. One

might reasonably ask how we would recognize and re-ward our people for doing good work if dollar figures areno longer used to measure professional competence. Lookagain at Figure 2. The top performers should be movingdown and to the right (or at the very least, to the right)as their careers progress.

What should we do with the money we save? Frankly, Idont care, as long as nobody tries to give it to me.

Editors note: The author welcomes comments and ques-tions (but not budget increases). He can be contacted at

daniel.ward@ rl.af.mil.


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Doing Less With More - Ward