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Does Speaker's Reference Have Semantic Relevance? Author(s): David Lumsden Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Jan., 1985), pp. 15-21 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319726 . Accessed: 25/06/2014 01:15 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 185.2.32.90 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 01:15:59 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Does Speaker's Reference Have Semantic Relevance?

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Does Speaker's Reference Have Semantic Relevance?Author(s): David LumsdenSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Jan., 1985), pp. 15-21Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319726 .

Accessed: 25/06/2014 01:15

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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DAVID LUMSDEN

DOES SPEAKER'S REFERENCE HAVE

SEMANTIC RELEVANCE? *

(Received 23 November, 1983)

1. INTRODUCTION

Suppose a woman attending the trial for the murder of Smith says 'Smith's murderer is insane', while observing the behaviour of the (male) defendant, whomn she takes to be the murderer, and intending to make a remark about that man.' Saul Kripke would say of this example that the defendant is the

speaker's referent. He says, "the speaker's referent is given by a specific intention, on a given occasion, to refer to a certain object" (Kripke, p. 664). We could say that speaker's reference concerns the speaker's communicative inteptions of the moment.

Semantic reference, on the other hand concerns general intentions, Kripke says. We could say that they are those long term intentions to use the relevant words and constructions according to prevailing usage. Some appropriate general intentions would underly the utterance of 'Smith's murderer' in the circumstances I described. In this case it seems reasonable that those general intentions specify a particular individual, the semantic referent. The speaker's referent and the semantic referent can be distict. In the example that would be so if the defendant is innocent and another person is the murderer. The defendant is the speaker's referent and the real murderer is the semantic referent.

We can ask of those general intentions that determine semantic reference, which we could say involve semantic conventions prevailing in the communi- ty, whether they could in some cases include systematic consideration of speaker's reference. If so, a speaker's referent would, in such a case, contribute to the determination of the semantic referent. When Keith Donnellan asks whether speaker's reference has semantic relevance he is asking pretty much that question (Donnellan, 1978). His answer is, 'Yes'.2 My inclination is to say, 'No', in common with Kripke and Rod Bertolet, but I shall not be able to argue for that conclusion comprehensively here. I shall examine one line

Philosophical Studies 47 (1985) 15-21. 0031-8116/85/0471-0015$00.70 ?) 1985 by D. Reidel Publishing Company

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16 DAVID LUMSDEN

of argument which may represent the force of that gut feeling but which proves not to settle the issue. I shall then concentrate on definite descriptions and shall claim that at least we should rule out the convention that specifies the semantic referent simply as being the speaker's referent.

2. ONE APPROACH TO THE NATURE OF SEMANTICS

My intuition is clear that the very nature of semantics is such that speaker's reference could not be relevant to it in any systematic way. I envisage that an argument that overthrows that picture of things would be one that would attack the very distinctness of semantics and pragmatics, one that removes semantics as a distinct linguistic level. I shall proceed to suggest an assump- tion that might be used to explain why semantics must be kept free from contamination by pragmatics in this sort of way.

Let us consider how it is that a hearer can come to understand the com- municative intentions of a speaker.3 He has various resources which might be employed in achieving that understanding. He has knowledge of the semantic conventions governing the words and grammatical constructions employed, a knowledge he presumes she shares. He has background beliefs about the world, perhaps specific knowledge of the speaker's beliefs, appreciation of the drift of conversation or the requirements of a task in hand, and so forth.

Sometimes words are redundant. He knows what her communicative intentions are even before she opens her mouth. Here, knowledge of semantic conventions is not necessary to explain understanding. But it is clearly not generally so. Our main interest will lie in cases where the words, and the semantic conventions in solving them, assist the hearer in understanding the speaker's communicative intentions.

There is a whole variety of ways in which the hearer's knowledge of the semantic conventions interacts with his other kinds of resources to bring about comprehension of the speaker's communicative intentions. We could say, to emphasize that interaction, that the semantic conventions must, in these cases, be providing the hearer with some new clues about the speaker's intentions.

Of course, for any given semantic convention there will be cases where it fails to provide the hearer with such a new clue. But one is inclined to think the following basic assumption can be made.

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SPEAKER'S REFERENCE 17

The helpfulness assumption: any semantic convention must be capable of providing hearers with a new clue about the speaker's communicative intention.

The intuition is that the very function of semantic conventions is to assist communication. A convention that could not do so would be a functionless tool. A new speaker would have neither the motivation nor the occasion to learn it.

Notice the implications the helpfulness assumption has for the semantic relevance of speaker's reference. Consider the semantic convention for singular terms that just fixes the semantic referent as being whatever is the speaker's referent. With such a convention speaker's reference has semantic relevance in a very obvious way.

It is easy to see that such a semantic convention offends against the helpfulness assumption. For speaker's reference is determined by the speaker's intentions of the moment. One cannot know what the speaker's reference is without knowing something of those intentions. Thus the convention could not possibly provide the hearer with a new clue about the speaker's inten- tions.

I suggest that the helpfulness assumption is closely related to the gut feeling that speaker's reference has no semantic relevance. But we cannot accept the assumption as it stands. We can allow that the system of semantic conventions, as a whole, is in the business of providing hearers with clues about the speaker's communicative intentions. But it does not follow that each convention is liable to provide a clue. Some convention might play a certain role in enabling the system as a whole to function smoothly without ever, by itself, providing the hearer with a clue about the speaker's intentions.

Consider the role of the blank tablets in Scrabble. The game involves forming words out of the letters inscribed on tablets in one's hand, in conjunction with tablets already on the board. If one is the fortunate posses- sor of a blank tablet one can place that instead of any letter. Suppose, contra- ry to the true rules, that one does not declare which letter the blank is standing in for. The blank does not provide the other players with a clue as to which letter one intends it to replace. But it serves a certain function in the process of letting the other players know which word one has in mind. For all the other tablets provide perfectly explicit clues. The blank tablet does not add a further clue of the same kind. It shows the other players there is a

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18 DAVID LUMSDEN

letter they need to guess (with the help of the other letters) and in that way helps them determine which word one has in mind.

Conversational language has forms which have something in common with Scrabble blanks, such as 'what's-' is-name', 'thingummy', and certain uses of 'you know'. But our interest lies not with such particular forms, but rather with the possibility that, for example, all definite descriptions under one interpretation have something in common with them.

Consider the idea that certain semantic conventions are only able to supply redundant clues about the speaker's intentions. Remember the hypothetical semantic convention for singular terms that fixes the semantic referent as being the speaker's referent. We can say this convention supplies only a redundant clue about the speaker's intentions, for a hearer needs to know independently something of her intentions for the clue to be effective. We have seen that the assumption of helpfulness rules out such a convention. But now we have reason to doubt that assumption. We cannot rule out the possibility of this convention on such general grounds.

3. DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS

Now we should take a closer look at this kind of redundant convention. Take the case where the singular term is a definite description. It will be helpful to consider, for comparison, how a non-redundant convention for definite descriptions can provide the hearer with a new clue as to the speaker's com- municative intentions. In particular it will be interesting to consider the kind of case where Donnellan would say that we have a 'referential use' of the definite description, where the speaker uses it to indicate an individual she has in mind (Donnellan, 1966). Let's say the non-redundant convention is one in which the semantic referent of 'the F' is the unique F, provided there is a unique F.

We can return to the earlier example involving an utterance of 'Smith's murderer'. I shall assume that the speaker is not so ill-mannered as to be pointing in the direction of the accused. I shall further assume that the defendant is not alone in behaving in a bizarre manner, the judge is as well. The speaker intends to make a remark about the defendant. How might the semantic conventions for 'Smith's murderer' help the hearer understand her intentions? He might be (unconciously) reasoning something like this: "Suppose she were using 'Smith's murderer' referentially, whom might she

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SPEAKER'S REFERENCE 19

have in mind? Now I happen to know that the accused standing over there is not guilty, but she likely thinks he is. Moreover he is behaving in a strange way such as to lead one to think him insane. So I conclude she is using 'Smith's murderer' referentially, with the accused in mind."

I shall take it that this is a plausible enough account of the hearer's reasoning in at least one kind of circumstance. Notice how the semantics for 'Smith's murderer' is providing the hearer with a clue as to the speaker's intentions and allows him to realize she has the defendant rather than, say, the judge in mind. The hearer uses his knowledge of a semantic convention in conjunction with his suspicion that the speaker believes of a certain individual that he is the semantic referent according to that convention.

Now let's look at the semantic convention for definite descriptions in which the semantic referent is fixed as being the speaker's referent. The main problem with this convention is that it is hard to see how it could form part of the explanation of how the hearer in our example could come to compre- hend the speaker's intentions with regard to the description 'Smith's murder- er'. If this were the convention the hearer would be thrown back on his other resources. Let's assume the hearer has no resources that are not evident from the description of the situation that has been given already. In particular, he doesn't know in advance which individual is the speaker's referent.

How might he come to know which is the speaker's referent? In other circumstances the rest of the sentence, 'is insane', might provide sufficient clue. But on this occasion two people are behaving strangely so that does not specify a unique individual. We cannot explain how the hearer would come to understand the speaker's intentions because the convention we are consider- ing strips the words of anything like their standard semantic significance. The hearer needs as input to his reflections something about the standard meaning of 'murderer', at least. We should conclude that the putative semantic con- vention for definite descriptions that we are considering is such as to prevent us accounting for the communication that occurs in this case.

At this point someone might say one can't imagine the speaker having just any old intentions in saying 'Smith's murderer'.4 It could be that the conven- tion says the semantic referent is the speaker's referent, but still the hearer can rely on an understanding of what is the range of possible intentions that could lie behind the utterance of the singular term. The short answer to this is that the range of possible intentions depends on a semantic convention other than the one we are considering. If the convention were really just that

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20 DAVID LUMSDEN

the semantic referent is the speaker's referent, there wouldn't be a restr -'tion to such a range.

The convention we have been looking at is not the only conceivable one that gives semantic significance to speaker's reference. Consider the conven- tion that the semantic referent of 'the F' (as uttered on some occasion) is a just in case a is an F and a is the speaker's referent.' Such a partly redundant convention is also of interest. It is a proposal that might seem promising for dealing with the problem of indefinite definite descriptions. For example I might use 'the chair' in some utterance, where it's clear to both me and my audience that there are many chairs. It might be felt that the speaker's referent is required to narrow the class down to one as being the semantic referent.

An objection to this kind of partly redundant convention clearly cannot follow precisely the same course as the objection to the wholly redundant convention. The part of the convention that requires the semantic referent to be a table, or a murderer of Smith, or whatever, can provide the hearer with a clue as to the speaker's communicative intentions. So the first objec- tion to the wholly redundant convention, that it does not permit an account of communicative success in a range of 'referential' cases, just does not seem to apply to this only partly redundant convention. I also want to argue against the view that we have this kind of convention. But that takes me away from my main theme.

4. CONCLUSION

My immediate conclusion, therefore, is a modest one. I only specifically rule out the semantic convention for definite descriptions in which the semantic referent just is the speaker's referent. In arguing for that I carefully avoided relying on the helpfulness assumption. But I did, implicitly, make use of the following procedure.

In examining a claim that C is the semantic convention (or form of convention) for a term (or class of term), check to see that C is capable of being helpful to the extent that an inspection of cases of successful communication employing that term shows it must be.

My broader moral is that such a procedure should be employed in determining what are our semantic conventions.

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SPEAKER'S REFERENCE 21

NOTES

* This paper was presented at the Australian Association of Philosophy conference in Auckland in May 1983. 1 In my examples the speaker will be female while the hearer and referent(s) will be male. This allows pronouns to be used unambiguously in many places and involves abandoning the perhaps dubious practice of employing male pronouns as if they were sex neutral. 2 There is reason to attribute a similar view to Michael Devitt when he says that Donnellan's (1966) distiction between the 'referential' and 'attributive' uses of definite distinction has semantic significance and explains the former use in the same kind of way as he explains speaker's reference. I I speak here of the intentions that are contemporary with and are most intimately bound up with the utterance. M.J. Moore mentions the kind of intention a person might have prior to and during an interrogation of referring to Smith as the culprit, thereby shielding the truly guilty one, Jones. Such an intention might not be carried out if, under torture, she revealed that Jones was the one. Even if the intention to refer to Smith could be said still to persist, while defeated, right through the utterance, that's not the communicative intention I am concerned with. 4 This general line of thought is to be found in Donnellan,(1968) but it would bewrong to attribute this to Donnellan as a response in precisely this context. 5 The requirement that the description be true of the referent appears in Mackay, for example, though the notions of 'speaker's reference' and 'semantic reference' do not appear as such.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bertolet, R.: 1980, 'The semantic significance of Donnellan's distinction', Philosophical Studies 37, pp. 281-288.

Devitt, M.: 1981, 'Donnellan's distinction', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6, pp. 511- 524.

Donnellan, K.: 1966, 'Reference and definite descriptions', The Philosophical Review 75, pp. 281-304.

Donnellan, K.: 1968, 'Putting Humpty Dumpty together again', The Philosophical Review 77, pp. 203-215.

Donnellan, K.: 1978, 'Speaker reference, descriptions and anaphora', Syntax and Semantics 9, pp. 47-68.

Kripke, S.: 1977, 'Speaker's reference and semantic reference', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2, pp. 255-276.

Mackay, A. F.: 1968, 'Mr Donnellan and Humpty Dumpty on referring', The Philosophical Review 77, pp. 197-202.

Moore, M. J.: 1982, 'Demonstratives and intentions again', Philosophical Studies 41, pp. 193-196.

Department of Philosophy, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand.

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