Does Rasa Have Any Contemporary Relevance

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Does the "Rasa" Theory Have Any Modern Relevance?Author(s): R. B. Patankar

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Jul., 1980), pp. 293-303Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399189

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R. B. Patankar Does the Rasa theoryhave any modernrelevance?

In modern times the rasa theory appears to have suffered at the hands of twogroups of critics. (a) Those who are totally ignorant of the literary thought inpre-British India do not feel the need to develop any acquaintance with it.They find the Western critical framework adequate for their purposes. In hisThe Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry, R. S. Crane couldargue convincingly for the readoption of the Aristotelian approach to theproblem of poetic structure on the ground that the modern contrastive andassimilative methods do not lead to the discovery of the particular structuringprinciples underlying individual literaryworks as does the Aristotelian method.Readoption of the rasa theory cannot be recommended on similar grounds,although the moderns might find something thought-provoking in it. It doesnot appear to satisfy an urgent need of Westernized people as perhaps doesyoga. (b) Most of the Sanskritists have started looking upon the theory as asacred relic of the past which has to be studied, labeled, and preserved in amuseum but which is not supposed to be put to mundane uses like analysisand evaluation of modern literary works, even of works produced in Indianlanguages.

However, a comparative study of the Western and the ancient Indiancritical traditions is worth attempting. It will show that there are significantpoints of contact between the two, and this might lend support to the viewthat there is a universal human mind which responds to similar situations insimilar ways, irrespective of age and country. The comparison might alsomake an interaction between the two traditions possible. Modern Indianthinkers would profit a great deal if this were to take place. A bridge wouldthereby be built, not only between India and the West but also, betweenancient India and modern India.

When we study a conceptual structure like the rasa theory across manycenturies, we find that it contains parts which are completely unintelligible tous, and others which possess only historical interest. Consider, for example,the lists Bharata has given of sthayibhivas and vyabhicaribhivas.The first listincludes mental occurrents like fear and mental dispositions like love. Andthe second includes mental states like joy and bodily states like languor andsleep. If we take into account the all around intellectual achievement of theancient Indians we shall see why it would be wrong to dismiss the precedingclassification as patently absurd. All that we shall be justified in saying is thatwe are unable to understand the principles of classification that Bharata used.The problem regarding the number of rasas is one of historical significanceonly. On one view, Bharata studied the dramatic compositions which wereavailable to him and saw that most of them expressed eight (or nine) emotions/sentiments. On another view, the number is based on psychological findingsR. B. Patankar is Head of the Departmentof English, University of Bombay,India.PhilosophyEast and West 30, no. 3, July 1980. ? by The University Press of Hawaii. All rights reserved.


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about what constitutes the relatively permanent part of the structure of thehuman mind. Much has happened in the fields of literature and psychologysince Bharata wrote; and perhaps he would have changed his views if he hadknown all that later critics and psychologists know about dramatic works andthe human mind.But the rasa theory also contains a part which is not restrictedin like manner

to a particular age. It consists of certain clusters of concepts which are verybasic to the theory. I propose to discuss two such clusters, one at some length,and the other rather briefly at the end. I shall also try to show that theseclusters have their counterparts in the Western critical tradition, and indicatethe points where a fruitful interaction between the two traditions can takeplace today.The first cluster centers round the concept of sadharanmkaranauniversali-zation). On this concept is based Abhinavagupta's triple claim that (a) therasa experience is alaukika (sui generis), that (b) it is essentially pleasurableand that (c) the spectator does not contemplate it as something outside him-self but undergoes it. Universalization can be interpreted as (i) a one-wayprocess, from a particular to the universal which subsumes it, or as (ii) a two-way process, from a particularto the universal,and back again to a particular-the second particular not being the same as the first particular. That Abhin-avagupta most probably had the second interpretation in mind is indicatedby the example of Samba cited by Hemacandra, who follows Abhinavaguptavery closely. The three stages in the process are as follows: (a) Samba wor-shipped the sun and was restored to good health; (b) everyone who worshipsthe sun is restored to good health; (c) if I worship the sun, I too will be restoredto good health. Subsumption of particular human beings under a commonuniversal explains the possibility of communication between them. They havea common meeting ground in their humanity. All that is human is, at leastpotentially, followable/sharable by all men. This explanation can be extendedto the act of watching a play. Although the characters on the stage differ fromthe spectator in one important respect, they have in common their humanqualities. The spectator can understand and/or undergo the experiencespresented on the stage because they are universally sharable/followable.Sddharanlkarana,as we saw, can also be regarded as a one-way processfrom a particular to the universal (interpretation 1). The best example of thisis available in the empirical sciences. Scientists are primarily concerned withthe discovery of universal laws, in the formulation of which particulars asparticulars have no place. If sidhiirankarana is interpreted as a one-wayprocess, the characters in literary works will become abstractions on accountof the sadharanTkaranahich they undergo. It is a fact that charactersansweringto this description do exist in literary works; it is also a fact that some ofthese works are good. On the other hand, it will be wrong to say that literaryworks cannot be good unless the characters are abstractions. For, in a very


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large number of literary works the characters are individualized. This is parti-cularly true of literary works produced during and after the Romantic age.As a matter of fact the presence of individualized characters is often regardedas a source of literary value.It is true that the example of Samba suggests that Abhinavagupta mostprobably had in mind the second interpretation of sadhiirankarana. It is alsolikely that there is something in the distinction such Sanskritists as R. Gnolihave made between sadharanya and smiinya, that is, between the universalin literature and the universal in logic.' But these two facts do not constitutea sufficient reason for completely rejecting the first interpretation of sadhir-anikarana. For, as we shall see later in this article, some claims made aboutthe nature of the rasa experience cannot be sustained if the first interpretationis totally rejected.Let us now see how the concept of universalization has fared in the Westerncritical tradition. In the ninth chapter of his Poetics, Aristotle has said:"Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history:for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular.By the universalI mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, accordingto the law of probability or necessity."2 That Aristotle is taking a universaliststand is clear. The question is whether he wants particularity of charactersto be completely transcended, and abstractions to be presented on the stage.If it is found that particularity cannot be completely transcended, at whatdegree of universalization does he expect the poet to aim? Aristotle has notmade any explicit statement about these issues.The problem of reconciling the claims of universality and particularity hasbeen exercising the minds of critics during and after the Romantic age. Forexample, S. H. Butcher, a post-Hegelian interpreterof Aristotle, writes,But though it [poetry]has a philosophic character it is not philosophy: It tendsto express the universal ... Philosophy seeks to discover the universal in theparticular; its end is to know and to possess the truth, and in that possessionit reposes. The aim of poetry is to representthe universalthrough the particular,to give a concrete and living embodiment of a universal truth. The universalof poetry is not an abstract idea; it is particularized to sense, it comes beforethe mind clothed in the form of the concrete, presented under the appearanceof a living organism ... The meaning is not that a general idea is embodiedin a particularexample-that is the method of allegory ratherthan of poetry-but that the particular case is generalized by artistic treatment.3The problem continues to exercise the minds of modern critics also. Dr. AvnerZis, a Marxist critic, writing in 1977, has taken a position similar to that ofButcher, when he says,... the artistic image presents us with an indivisible unity of features of cogni-tion intrinsic both to immediate contemplation and abstract thought ....Yet concepts do not enjoy an independent life of their own in art. They cannotreplace images .... The artist as it were 'divests' the phenomenon which


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interests him from random and particular features that might obscure theessence of what he is seeking to portray. He does not reproduce phenomenaof life in their actual entirety, but only those characteristic features whichconstitute their 'living soul'.4The balance between the universal and the particular is not easy to maintain;there is always the danger of slipping into either the universalist position, orthe Crocean particularist position that the function of art is to reveal theindividual physiognomy of things.5 Every individual combines both, theuniversal and the particular. The dispute between universalists like Aristotleand particularists like Croce may therefore be regarded as a dispute about therelative importance of the two, the Aristotalians subordinating the particularto the universal, the Croceans doing exactly the opposite. This shows thatuniversalization, like particularizationmight be obtainable in differentdegrees.What degree of universalization do the defenders of sadharanTkaranaxpect?This is an important issue because not only the characters(vibhavas),emotions,and so on, but also the spectators (rasikas) are supposed to undergo sadhar-antkarana. That excessive preoccupation with his own personal problemswould come in the way of the spectator's aesthetic experience may be readilygranted. It would also come in the way of various other activities like watchinga cricket match, solving a mathematicalproblem, or taking part in a discussion.Excessive preoccupation with oneself is an obstacle because it makes concen-tration on anything other than the self practically impossible. But this doesnot mean that complete transcendence of the empirical self is a preconditionof literary experience. Careful observation will reveal that our empirical selfis actively involved in the literary experience in varying degrees. In his well-known paper on "The Relation of the Poet to Day-dreaming,"6 Freud hasshown that readers of one variety of literaryworks derive vicarious satisfactionthrough the fantasy world the writer has created. Such literature is a univer-salized and beautified version of the writer'sdaydream. Owing to the reductionof what is too personal in it, a daydream becomes universally shareable. Ofcourse, this shareability is also dependent on the reader's capacity for partialself-transcendence. If he is excessively preoccupied with his own self he mayfind it impossible to slip into the role designed for him by the writerto facilitatevicarious wish-fulfillment. This cannot, of course, mean complete self-trans-cendence; for wish-fulfillment presupposes the presence of mundane wishesin the reader.It might be objectedthat the Freudiantheory covers only escapist,and therefore valuationally inferior, literature; what is true of it might not betrue of great literature. In reply, it may be pointed out that escapist literaturedoes not cease to be literature because it is escapist. Again, self-involvementmay be present even in the experience of great literature. At the consciouslevel we remain detached spectators, hence we do not easily become aware ofthis fact. We know that we are in the auditorium watching an emotional dramain the life of characters being enacted on the stage. But this does not rule outthe possibility of our being involved at a deeper level in that emotional drama.


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Different parts of our personality might react in strikingly different ways toa complex object of experience like a literary work. If we analyze our reactionto Satan's character in Paradise Lost we realize the truth of this. On the con-scious plane we do not belong to Satan's party; and, as a religious man, Miltoncould not have espoused Satan's cause. Nevertheless, Satan's character fasci-nates the reader. We realize that a strong emotional force must have gone intothe making of the character. Perhaps in the depth of our psyche there is aprimitive, unsocialized element, which resents restraint of any sort; and it isthis element which dervies satisfaction from Satan's rebellion. This shows thatwe might be detached on one level and deeply involved on another.

Abhinavagupta also could not have expected complete self-transcendenceon the part of the rasika. First of all, he does not want him to lose theconsciousness that he is watching a play. Further he wants the rasika to bringwith him the traces of past experiences (visaniirupasariskiras). It is reasonableto suppose that these include traces of past emotional experiences, enduringdispositions, moral evaluations, knowledge of the world and men, ideologicalcommitments, and world views. If the spectator brings all this structure tothe theatre with him, how can he be said to transcend his empirical ego com-pletely, or even to an appreciable extent?The defenders of Abhinavagupta point out that although activization ofpast experiences is expected to take place, the experiences undergo a qualitativechange because of sddhdranTkarana. ur everyday experience, we are told byfollowers of Abhinavagupta, depends upon egocentric relations betweenindividuals; these individuals are related to our ego in three ways, and theserelations determine our attitudes to them: (a) they belong to us or to ourfriends, (b) they belong to our enemies, (c) they are such as do not concernus. Our attitude to people and things in category (a) is friendly; to those incategory (b), it is hostile; and to those in (c) it is completely indifferent. Therasa experience is said to be sui generis because it is not based on these ego-centric relations. The first objection to this argument is that the threefolddivision of human relations is too cynical to be acceptable. Although manyhuman attitudes are egocentric, there are many others which are not so. Onlya cynic will interpret altruism as egocentric. Again, if we analyze the presup-positions of our moral life we shall realize the importance of universalizationin our everyday life. Universalizability of principles of human action is oftenregarded as the very condition of the possibility of moral experience.The preceding discussion shows that (a) universalization in literature in thesense in which we have taken the term admits of degrees, (b) it is not alwaysthe highest degree of universalization that is expected either of characters orof the spectator, nor is it desirable to achieve it; (c) universalization is notpeculiar to literary experience; (d) if universalization explains how the rasaexperience becomes shareable, it also explains how any experience is renderedshareable.

Two further claims are made on behalf of the rasa experience. It is said to


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be (a) necessarily pleasurable, and (b) in a class by itself (alaukika). Boththese claims are, in Abhinavagupta's system, ultimately based on sidhar-anmkarana.We have examined the second claim and seen that it cannot bemaintained because sadharanTkaranas not peculiar to the rasa experiencealone. We shall now briefly examine the first claim. If sddhdranTkaranafexperience means rendering it universally shareable it is obvious that sadhar-anTkarana y itself cannot make an experience pleasurable; this is particularlytrue of experiences which are indifferentin their affective tone and those whichare decidedly unpleasant. The following example of the repulsive (the bTbhatsa)will make this amply clear. Bhartrhari says in his Nrtisataka "A woman'sbreasts really are only protruberances of flesh, but the poets have likenedthem to golden pitchers; her face is a place filled with saliva and mucus, butthe poets have compared it to the moon; her hips and loins are made wet byurine, but the poets have compared them with the frontal globe on the fore-head of an elephant. That which is repulsive in reality has been shown to begreat by the poets." The description is universalized and made applicable toall women. The feeling of disgust, thus universalized and transformed into theb7bhatsa rasa cannot be said to have become in any way pleasurable. It isindeed doubtful whether the bibhatsarasa can everbe pleasurableif experiencedby itself. It might become bearable, and perhaps even pleasurable only if itgives rise to the feeling of indifference to worldly objects (nirveda)and leadsto the creation of santa rasa. It therefore appears that at least some rasas arenot pleasurable by themselves; they can, however, become pleasurable bybeing subordinatedto other rasas or to ends which are not peculiarto literature,for example, moral or religious values.Another way of making the rasa experience pleasurable is to raise it to aqualitatively higher level, where it acquires a universal significance. Hereuniversalization does take place, but not in the limited sense of making some-thing universally shareable. Some problems are universally shareable but theyare not called universal problems. Losing a job is an example of a universallyshareable problem. But "What is the place of human goodness in the ultimatescheme of the world?" is a universal problem, a problem with a universalsignificance.A universal problem is not necessarilya problem which is actuallyraised by all men; it is such as can be raised by all men, but is actually raisedonly by a few mature men with a philosophical bent of mind when confrontedwith the central mysteries of human life. The fear of the young deer describedin act one of Sakuntala is often cited as an example of the bhayanaka rasa.The experience is universal in the sense that it is universally communicable;but it does not have the universal significance of the anguish of Oedipus. Thisdiscussion shows that in the context of literature "universalization" can betaken to mean (i) "making something universally followable, shareable/applicable" or (ii) "endowing something with universal significance." Butchermost probably wants to emphasize the second meaning when he writes about


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the tragic hero, "So much human nature must there be in him that we areable in some sense to identify ourselves with him, to make his misfortunesour own. At the same time he is raised above us in external degree and station... there is a gain in the hero being placed at an ideal distance from thespectator. We are not confronted with outward conditions of life too like ourown .... [The tragic emotions] are disengaged from the petty interests of self,and are on the way to being universalized .... In the spectacle of another'serrors or misfortunes, in the shocks and blows of circumstance, we read the'doubtful doom of human kind' .... The spectator who is brought face toface with grander sufferings than his own experiences a sympathetic ecstasy,or lifting out of himself .... The tragic katharsis requires that suffering shallbe exhibited in one of its comprehensive aspects; that the deeds and fortunesof the actors shall themselves to larger issues, and the spectator himself belifted above the special case and brought face to face with universal law andthe divine plan of the world."7 Universalization in the sense of investing anexperience with universal significance can plausibly be regarded as a way ofmaking it pleasurable; that which elevates us mentally is often a source ofpleasure. The satisfaction which attends a moral experience can be cited as anexample. (Incidentally, this shows that "universalization" in Butcher's sensealso does not make the literary experience sui generis.)The Sanskritists do not appear to use sadharanTkaranan Butcher's sense.But then if we take sadharanTkarana s a process which depersonalizes anexperience or renders it universally shareable/followable we shall not be ableto prove either that the rasa experience is necessarily pleasurable or that it issui generis, or that it is valuationally superior to everyday experiences.We shall now consider two other arguments put forward to prove that therasa experience is sui generis. The substance of the first argument is that themeans-end category has no application in the context of rasa experience.Where this category has an application, the means can be discarded after theend is achieved. But vibhavasand so on are not the means to achieve the end,namely, the rasa experience. For the rasa experience is coterminus with thepresence of the vibhivas and so on before us. It is vibhviidijivitavadhi.It comesinto existence with the vibhdvas,and ends when the vibhivas are removedfrom the stage. The argument perhaps aims at distinguishing between thesthdyibhdvas,which are permanently there in the human mind in a dormantstate, and the rasa experience, which occurs only when the vibhdvasare presentbefore us. But then this distinction holds good even outside the literarycontext,for it is the distinction between dispositions and occurrents which is familiarto all psychologists. An irascible man is not angry all the time; he has a dis-position to get angry at the least provocation; and the anger, which is anoccurrent and not a disposition, lasts only so long as the cause for provocationlasts. When we say that "X enjoys music" we are talking about X's disposition;we can use this expression even if, at the moment, no musical concert is in


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progress.Butit would be logicallyoddto say"X is enjoyinga musicalconcertwhichis not now in progress."The sameis true aboutunjoyinga particularperformance f a playthatisjust not there.According o the logicof theverb"to enjoy"whenused in the contextof an episode,enjoymentand the thingwhich s enjoyedare coterminus.At onestagein this article t wasshownthatsddhdranTkaranas not peculiarto the rasa experience, or universalizations a preconditionof the ethicalexperiencealso. But the supportersof Abhinavaguptamightsay that despitethis similarity he two experiences redifferentbecause he ethicalexperienceissues nto action butthe rasaexperiences an endin itself.It mightbe readilyconceded hatthe rasaexperience oesnot giverise to immediateovertaction.But that is becausethe peculiarontologicalstatusof vibhivasrulesout theverypossibilityof any such actionwith regard o them.Evenif we wish to,it is logicallyimpossible or us to interferen the lives of the 'characters' nthe stage.Theworldin whichthe charactersmoveis structuredikethe worldin which realmen move; but thereis no continuitybetweenthe two worlds.Thatwe shouldbe ableto see the formerandthat it should be able to induceemotionalstatesin us createspeculiarepistemological nd ontologicalprob-lems. Sri Safikuka's heory of citraturagapratTtihows that the Sanskritistswereawareof these problems.We see a configurationof pigmentsto be ahorse,althoughwe know that a real horse is not made of pigments.In thesamewaywe seeanactorasa characterikeRama.Seeingonethingasanotherthingis not a varietyof ordinaryseeing.As Sri Saiikukahas shown,it doesnot belongto thefourknowncategoriesof perception:a)veridicalperception(b) illusoryperception c) perceiving omethingas resembling omethingelse(d) perceptionwhich eavesus in doubtabout the identityof whatwe perceive.Whatwe see hasa peculiarontologicalstatus;the statuswouldnot have beenpeculiar f we had beforeus an actormerelyas a man followinga particularprofession.Again, therewould have been no problemif Rama, whose rolethe actoris supposed o play,wereactuallypresentbeforeus. What we see onthestage s suigeneris;and ourseeing t is alsosuigeneris.It should be evidentthat Sri Sankuka's heorybearsa strikingresemblanceto the Kantiantheoryof "distinterestedness"nd Aldrich's heoryof "cate-goricalaspection." t is truethat neitherof these theorieshas anything o dowithwatchingaplayonthestage;buttheyareboth concernedwiththepeculiarontologicalstatusof the objectof aestheticcontemplation.And one cannotavoidfacing hisproblemwhenone triesto givea logicalaccountof "watchingaplay."SincePlato,Western estheticians avebeendiscussingheontologicalstatus of the aestheticobject. Plato concludedthat the aestheticobject isontologically nferiorto things in the phenomenalworld and is thus twiceremovedfrom the ultimatereality.Kant removedthe aestheticobjectfromthe Platonic ontological order by declaringthat the aesthetic delight is"disinterested"n the sense that it does not dependupon the actualexistence


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of the aesthetic object.8We neitheraffirmnor deny that it exists. In the aestheticcontext we contemplate not a physical object but an "aesthetic semblance."That which is an "aesthetic semblance" in the aesthetic context may turn outto be an actually existing physical object in the cognitive or the practicalcontext. While determining the ontological status of the aesthetic object, wemust see that the contexts are not confused. The world of imagination is notan imaginary, false world to be contrasted with the "real" world. It is oneaspect of the same world whose other aspect is the so-called "real" world.The knower, the practical agent, and the aesthetic contemplator deal withthe same world under different aspects. About the phenomenon of changingthe aspects Aldrich writes, "What I am approaching is the phenomenon ofcategorical aspection .... Categorical aspection involves a change of categoricalaspects; the same material thing is perceived now as a physical object, now asan aesthetic object, neither of which involves seeing it as another thing. Thedifference between categorial aspects has to do with modes of perception andthe kinds of space in which their objects are realized."9 To see a configurationof pigments only as a configuration of pigments is to see it under one aspect;to see it as a horse is to see it under a different aspect. This theory can beextended to cover the act of "watching a play on the stage." To see an actor asan actual human being and to see him as a "character" are two differentvarieties of seeing, although the same sense organs are involved in the twoseeings; the difference between the two is based on categorical aspection.Sri Safikuka was laying a foundation for an autonomist theory of art when hepropounded the theory of citraturagapratTti.Of course, this by itself cannotprove the validity of the autonomist stand. For that we also need the decon-ceptualization of the aesthetic experience, as Kant has maintained.10The first step which Sri Safikuka took in the direction of autonomism wasretracted by Abhinavagupta. For once the actor, the character, the spectator,and the emotional experiences are universalized, the concepts of "playing arole," "seeing" a real human being "as a character" lose all meaning. Forif all share the same universalized emotion, who can be said to imitate, to playthe role of, whom? Abhinavagupta reallyhas no use for the notion of imitation,which is so central to the world of drama, and to the world of representationalart as a whole. Not only does Abhinavagupta retract the step taken by SriSankuka, he actually takes a step in the opposite direction. For throughsidhdranikaranawe can go from the world of art back to the world of "real"men and women. For although the "characters" in a play do not inhabit the"real" world, "real" men who resemble the "characters"in many respects dolive in the same "real" world in which we live. "Characters" thus direct ourattention to "real" men. That is why we often exclaim "How true " whilewatching a play. Futher, if the rasa experience is claimed to be an end in itself,why does the Abhinavagupta school attach importance to the ultimate goalsof human life (the purusirthas) while deciding upon the number of rasas?


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If the rasas are expected to be condusive to the basic goals of life, the long-term conative-affective effects of the rasa experience will have to be takeninto account while discussing the intrinsic nature of that experience. Thisposition is different from A. C. Bradley's stand in his well-known article"Poetry for Peotry's Sake." ' Bradley admits that poetry may have ulteriorends like softening of passions in addition to its sole legitimate end of being"a satisfying imaginative experience." However, for Bradley these ulteriorends of poetry are totally irrelevant in a discussion of poetry as poetry. Thecase of Abhinavagupta is entirely different. For him the rasas depend onsthayibhivas; and sthayibhavasare sthdyi, that is, permanent and dominantsentiments/emotions because they promote the basic goals of life. Somebhavasare not given the status of sthdyin, and are not regarded as sources ofrasas only because they are not conducive to these goals. This connectionbetween rasas and the basic goals of life goes counter to the autonomist stand.To accept the theory of sadharanlkaranaand to insist on the close connectionbetween rasas and the basic goals of life is to weaken the claim that the rasaexperience is in a class by itself (alaukika).That there are points of close similaritybetween the Western and the ancientSanskrit traditions should be evident from the proceding discussion. Topicssuch as watching a theatricalperformance, emotionality of literature,autonomyof the world of literature, degree of universalization involved in literaryexperience, aesthetic pleasure, and the nature of aesthetic perception are ofliving interest today. About all of them the ancient Sanskritists have saidsomething that the moderns will find relevant and thought-provoking, if notacceptable. Of course, to be relevant, it is not necessary for a theory to beacceptable. The modern Sanskritistscan, and should, take part in the dialoguebetween India and the West. They can contribute something to the moderntheory of literature, if they stop being mere exponents of the ancient criticalthought. Let them continue to owe allegiance to Sri Safikuka and Abhinava-gupta. But let them also take on the task of restating and defending the ancienttheories in the context of contemporary literary thought. They will then berequired to meet new objections and give an adequate account of modernaesthetic data. They might also realize that it is necessaryto modify the ancienttheories. For example, a mere juxtaposition of the ways Abhinavagupta andButcher have treated the problem of universalization in literature will forcethem to do radical rethinking about the whole issue. If the modern Sanskritistswant to be part of the world critical tradition, they will have to assume a newrole; they will have to become molders and not merely discoverers of criticalconcepts. An active dialogue with Western aestheticians will bring themclose, as living minds, to their own past. The past in its turn will become livingif they approach it in this way.


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NOTES1. R. Gnoli, The Aesthetic Experience Accordingto Abhinavagupta, Rome: 1956), p. 44.2. S. H. Butcher, ed. and trans., Aristotle's Theoryof Poetry and Fine Art, 4th ed. (New York:Dover Publications, 1951), p. 35.3. Ibid., pp. 191-194.4. Avner Zis, Foundationsof Marxist Aesthetics (Moscow, 1977), pp. 77, 79, 82.5. Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic, trans. Douglas Ainslie (London: Vision Press, Peter Owen,1953), p. 5.6. Sigmund Freud, CollectedPapers (London: Hogarth Press, 1925), Vol. IV, pp. 173-183.7. Butcher, op. cit., pp. 260-271.8. Immanuel Kant, Critiqueof Aesthetic Judgement,First Moment.9. VirgilC. Aldrich, Philosophyof Art (Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 21-22.10. Immanuel Kant, op. cit., Second Moment.11. A. C. Bradley, Oxford Lectureson Poetry (London: Macmillan, reprinted., 1962), pp. 4-5.

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Does Rasa Have Any Contemporary Relevance