Does Pure or Simple Presence Exist

8/6/2019 Does Pure or Simple Presence Exist

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DOES PUREOR SIMPLE PRESENCEEXIST?

JUD EVANS

INTRODUCTION

Question:Does Simple or Pure Presence Exist?

Answer: No. Not at all. Only that which is present exists. The presence of that

which is present does not exist.

Question: Does Existence orBeingexist?

Answer: No. Not at all. Only that which exists exists. The existence ofthat which

exists does not exist. The so-called presence, existence or beingof that which is

what it is does not exist.

Question: Does nuclear fission exist?

Answer: No. Not at all. Only the energised, fissionable material itself exists. What

exists is splittable, nuclear reactive material in which a massive nucleus

separates into smaller energetic nuclei which are simultaneously released.

THE CONCEPTS OFACTIONAND CHANGEARE A MEDIEVAL MYTH

A lot of people [not all] have great difficulty in grasping what is going on here -

Even when the underlying principle is explained in the most simple manner. The

theory that no action of any kind exists in the cosmos is so counter-intuitive, that

when someone is first exposed to eliminative materialist ideas, it seems so

illogical that one wonders how anyone could have ever conceived of it in the first

place.


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There is a theory going around that is a variant of the nature or nurture argument,

that some people are born with a genetical make-up which renders them

incapable of ever understanding it. The story goes that there are some who are

just neuro-physically incapable of dealing with the idea at all. There is a similar

yarn that some are born with a gene that predisposes them towards religious and

transcendentalist appetites as you probably know.

Logically eliminative materialism is compellingly simple. Only material entities

exist. Thus a standing tree exists (is present in a form we call *tree*) and if it falls

it exists as a falling tree. When it lies on the ground it exists as a fallen tree. It can

be described as a fallen tree because it exists (or is present in the world) in the

existential modality or manner of what in the English language we refer to as: a

fallen tree.

But beware! That is not to say that existential modality itself actually exists, for

only the existent tree, the human descriptor and the material world and greater

cosmos actually exist.

Because whilst it is falling a tree is described as a falling tree is not because it

has assumed, taken-on, adopted or acquired the characteristics of a Platonic-

style abstract template of fallingness, for fallingness, and the falling of a tree

does not exist as a separate entity. Only the standing, falling, or fallen tree really

exists.

Only the upright, falling or fallen object exists. The reader who is perusing these

words right now exists - but his readingdoes not. If I travelled to wherever you

live and met the reading you, or the you who read, I would never ever meet up

with or listen to your reading- I would meet the reading you - not your reading. -

even if you read out loud to me.


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Humans refer to a falling tree as a falling tree because that is the way that we

describe the way an object exists whilst it is descending from the upright

position under the influence of gravitational force. But the coming down (orthe

descent) does not exist - only the descending tree exists. Gravitational force

doesn't exist - only the gravitating object [the tree] exists in the state or mode of

changing its spatial position under the influence of gravitons. But change and

changing does not exist either - the ontologically corrupt language (the useful

fiction) I have been imprinted in infancy to use causes me (as I write this) to

correct each phrase which suggests that action and change exists dualisticlly as

well as the actor or the changing material entity.

The seamless change by/of the tree from existing as an upright tree to that of

being present as a horizontally prone tree is simply the way that the tree changes

the position in which it exists, but that does not mean that either the seamless

change, the uprightness, the falling, the lying horizontally prone , or even change

itselfactually exists. Only the changing tree exists.

A COMPLETE REJECTION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES.

I am an Eliminative Determinist or Material-Determinist and such a position holds

that not one of Aristotle's usefully fictitious categorical mentalisations is

ontologically viable though they make excellent grammatical categorial fictions

for use in human communication - but that is as far as they can be said to be

meaningful to eliminative ontologists.

En passant, two of the most ontologically abused signs in human communication

are the *is* sign (and its conjugates of *am/are*) which were originally labelled

*copulae* by medieval thinkers.


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Such is also the case with the equally notorious ontologically dissolute, and

semantically unrestrained existentialiser - the backward E () of so-called

Predicative "Logic."

1. Therefore ontologically the terms *is* and *exists* are terms are both at the

same time syncategorematic and redundancies - for:

(a) no object in the cosmos does not exist.

(b) No object lacks any existential modalities.

2. Because of (a) and (b) above, in sentential or propositional forms such usefully

fictional syncategoremes as: /is/ and /exist/ have no meanings other than

facilitating ontological truth claims. When standing by themselves, as contrasted

with a categorematic terms like *elephant, cat and soup spoon* which are

cognitive instantiations (nominata) of objects which CAN be found in the real

world - they are ontologically meaningless.

As Sten Ebbesen writes in:

Logic - Philosophy of Language and a Whetstone for the Philosopher's Linguistic

Tools, Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Qu'est-ce que la philosophie au moyen

ge? What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages? Ed. by Aertsen, Jan A. / Speer,

Andreas. 1998.

A medieval logic book can serve as a list of reminders, reminders of things we

ought to do one day. Like writing a logic of each languages syncategorematic

terms ... or how they work (Ebbesen p. 46)


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(For even more curious forms of exercise in reification and useful fiction

employed in modern philosophy and elsewhere to wittingly/unwittingly

perpetuate ontological dualism please read my dissertation here: :

THE REIFICATION OF THE UNREAL

http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/reification_of_the_unreal.htm

What is important is what actually exists. It is ontological nonsense to claim that

one can show what is actually is present in the world by arguing that the

existence or presence of something needs to be assumed by the employment of

useful fictions in order to justify, resolve or vindicate certain inherited pseudo-

existential instantiatives and override ontologically counterfeit grammatical or

semantic sense regarding such putative "existence claims."

In other words it is far more important for humans to be aware of what is actually

present in the world rather than to transcendentally existentialise the actantial

tool or legitimise a semantically primitive linguistic model used to analyze or

describe some objective material actant by concocting ontological fictions in

order to comply with the grammar of an ontologically corrupt system of semantic

description.

Kant was also aware of the dangers of transcendentalism, for he wrote:

I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with

objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of

knowledge is to be possible a priori.

( Kant. Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?. P. 220)

Here is a rsum of Aristotle's treatment of the subject from wikipedia


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http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Categories_(Aristotle

THE ANTEPRAEDICAMENTA [2] AND [3]

The text begins with an explication of what is meant by "synonymous," or

univocal words, what is meant by "homonymous," or equivocal words, and what

is meant by "paronymous," or denominative

(sometimes translated "derivative") words.

It then divides forms of speech as being:

(a) Either simple, without composition or structure, such as "man," "horse,"

"fights," etc.

(b) Or having composition and structure, such as "a man fights," "the horse

runs," etc.

Only composite forms of speech can be true or false.

Next, he distinguishes between what is said "of" a subject and what is "in" a

subject. What is said "of" a subject describes the kind of thing that it is as a

whole, answering the question "what is it?". What is said to be "in" a subject is a

predicate that does not describe it as a whole but cannot exist without the

subject, such as the shape of something. The latter has come to be known as

inherence.

Of all the things that exist,


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1. Some may be predicated of a subject, but are in no subject; as man may be

predicated of James or John, but is not in any subject.

2. Some are in a subject, but cannot be predicated of any subject. Thus a certain

individual point of grammatical knowledge is in me as in a subject, but it cannot

be predicated of any subject; because it is an individual thing.

3. Some are both in a subject and able to be predicated of a subject, for example

science, which is in the mind as in a subject, and may be predicated of geometry

as of a subject.

4. Last, some things neither can be in any subject nor can be predicated of any

subject. These are individual substances, which cannot be predicated, because

they are individuals; and cannot be in a subject, because they are substances.

THE PRAEDICAMENTA [4] and [5] Then we come to the categories themselves,

whose definitions depend upon these four forms of predication. Aristotle's own

text at in Ackrill's standard English version is: Of things said without any

combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a

relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-

affected. To give a rough idea, examples of substance are man, horse; of

quantity: four-foot, five-fold; of qualification: white, grammatical; of a relative:

double, half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in the market-place; of when:

yesterday, last- year; of being-in-a-position: is-lying, is-sitting; of having: has-

shoes-on, has-armour-on; of doing: cutting, burning; of being-affected: being-cut,

being-burned. (1b25-2a4) A brief explanation (with some alternative translations)

is as follows:

1. Substance (ousia, essence or substance).[6]


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Substance is that which cannot be predicated of anything or be said to be in

anything. Hence, this particular man or that particular tree are substances. Later

in the text, Aristotle calls these particulars "primary substances", to distinguish

them from secondary substances, which are universals and can be predicated.

Hence, Socrates is a primary substance, while man is a secondary substance.

Man is predicated of Socrates, and therefore all that is predicated of man is

predicated of Socrates.

2. Quantity (poson, how much).

This is the extension of an object, and may be either discrete or continuous.

Further, its parts may or may not have relative positions to each other. All

medieval discussions about the nature of the continuum, of the infinite and the

infinitely divisible, are a long footnote to this text. It is of great importance in the

development of mathematical ideas in the medieval and late Scholastic period.

Examples: two cubits long, number, space, (length of) time.

3. Qualification or Quality (poion, of what kind or quality).

This determination characterizes the nature of an object. Examples: white, black,

grammatical, hot, sweet, curved, straight.

4. Relative or Relation (pros ti, toward something).

This is the way one object may be related to another. Examples: double, half,

large, master, knowledge.

5. Where or Place (pou, where).


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Position in relation to the surrounding environment. Examples: in a marketplace,

in the Lyceum. When or Time (pote, when). Position in relation to the course of

events. Examples: yesterday, last year.

6. When or Time (pote, when).

Position in relation to the course of events. Examples: yesterday, last year.

7. Being-in-a-position, posture, attitude (keisthai, to lie).

The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting

from an action: 'Lying', 'sitting', 'standing'. Thus position may be taken as the end

point for the corresponding action. The term is, however, frequently taken to

mean the relative position of the parts of an object (usually a living object), given

that the position of the parts is inseparable from the state of rest implied.

8. Having or state, condition (echein, to have or be).

The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting

from an affection (i. e. being acted on): 'shod', 'armed'. The term is, however,

frequently taken to mean the determination arising from the physical

accoutrements of an object: one's shoes, one's arms, etc. Traditionally, this

category is also called a habitus (from Latin habere, to have).

9. Doing or Action (poiein, to make or do).

The production of change in some other object (or in the agent itself qua other).

10. Being-affected or Affection (paschein, to suffer or undergo).


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The reception of change from some other object (or from the affected object itself

qua other). Aristotle's name paschein for this category has traditionally been

translated into English as "affection" and "passion" (also "passivity"), easily

misinterpreted to refer only or mainly to affection as an emotion or to emotional

passion. For action he gave the example, 'to lance', 'to cauterize'; for affection, 'to

be lanced', 'to be cauterized.' His examples make clear that action is to affection

as the active voice is to the passive voice - as acting is to being acted on.

(wikipedia)

THE ELIMINITIVIST REJECTION.

Eliminative determinism holds that not one of Aristotle's categorical

mentalisations are ontologically viable. They make excellent grammatical

categories - but that is as far as they can be said to be meaningful to eliminative

ontologists.

No object in the cosmos undergoes change of any sort whatsoever - there are no

temporal interstices of existential modality - existential modality does not exist -

only the modulating object is extant- only changing objects can be found to be

present. Doing things and being something do not exist. Only the stative acting

object exists. There is no spurious ontological duality. Such transcendentalist

occultish nonsense is an insidious misapprehension that continues to stalk

science and philosophy like some ontological Banquo's ghost.

The stage direction, "exit ghost" appears in three of William Shakespeare's plays:

Hamlet, Macbeth and Julius Caesar. Only when similar directions to rid our

thinking of such primitive ontological categories will humanity understand the

social, academic, political and ghastly intellectual damage such ignorance has

wreaked upon our world whilst reification rules.


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Predicationally language allows us to describe changing objects in uncountable

sentential variations- but none of these grammatico-semantic "properties"

actually exist. Such communicative signification is no more than the currently

existing neurological network of the addressor and the addressee to which the

communication is directed, received and understood.

The Existential Noctet (which of course does not actually exist in itself) is a

simplified version of Aristotle's ontological fantasies. It is an attempt to update

precisely what the "IS" word actually does in in relation to the nominatum (the

object referred to) of a sentence from a onto-linguistic point of view. It is meant

as an essay at a further critique of the Russell/Frege view of the *be-function*

function and not as a modernisation or replacement for the Aristotelian

categories.

Thus the inclusion of the is-word in a sentence points to the object's:

1. Existential modality.

2. Existential state.

3. Existential numerosity.

4. Existential relative positionality.

5. Existential identification.

6. Existential classification

7. Existential nominality.

8. Existential transcendentality.

9. Existential spatial occupancy.

For an "IS-word" equivalent substitute any of the above terms in the following

sentence in place of the "IS" word:

" features the anthropocentrically attributed inexistent existential modality of ."


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Example:

"The leaf is green." becomes...

"The leaf features the anthropocentrically attributed existential modality of

greeness(or being green) ."

"The apple is red."

becomes...

"The apple features the anthropocentrically attributed existential modality of

being red."

"The tree is falling." becomes...

"The tree features the anthropocentrically attributed existential modality of

falling."

Therefore redness, greenness, and falling are no more than homocentric

attributions of modality, state, numerosity, positionality, identification,

classification, nominality, transcendentality, spatial occupancy and do not exist

as the (so-called) medieval properties owned by the tree.

Plainly the photonic wavelengths which bounce off the surface of an observed

object (such as a tree) are neurologically moderated perceptions of the

transactions of the human sensorium as to the way that certain wave-lengths of

light are reflected from the surface of the tree onto the lens of the observers eye.

This visual data is then transported as electro-chemical signals attributed to the


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observed object which (if required for communication to other humans ) is

converted into liguistic signs as adjectival descriptives and claimed to be

inherent or intrinsic feastures of the manner in which the tree exists.

In fact the so-called properties of objects are in reality no more than neuronal

verbalisations of the manner in which humans perceive different wavelengths of

light.

The same pattern and attribution of properties is true of the other four senses of

mankind - touch, taste, hearing, and smell.

ARE ALL PEOPLE CAPABLE OF GRASPING THIS CONCEPT?

I do not personally subscribe to the belief that some eliminativists hold - that

there are people who are congenitally incapable of ever grasping the ontological

principle involved here. My own view is that for tens of thousands of years the

human race has been imprinted in infancy by their parents and society as to

believe in a non-existent duality of object and action and have internalised the

fiction of action as an apparent obviousness of action as a "fact of the cosmos."

To find the "fact" challenged at first seems utterly incredible. In my experience of

meeting many people who have at first rejected eliminativism as preposterous,

and who have later seen the light, they all admit that it was the hardest

intellectual problem that they have ever experienced, and that it took a lot of

concentration.

One man described the experience as being as if his brain was rebelling against

thinking about it - as if it was "intentionally avoiding the strain" [his words.] An

"occurrence" cannot happen because "occurrences" do not exist to be able to

happen. "Accidents" do not exist. What exists are the two cars that collide - not

the "collision." Put another way both cars exist in a modality of colliding - but the


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"modality of colliding" does not exist - only the colliding cars exist. I realise that

this is a VERY DIFFICULT concept to grasp and there is absolutely no shame to

be felt if one cannot understand it immediately.

Eliminative materialists are the most extreme anti-reificationalists you will ever

encounter. They are in fact ontological revolutionaries. One way of coming

towards an understanding of the idea is to look at the semantic value of words -

because it is the words we use that cloak and obscure the ontological reality that

lies behind our imperfect view of the world around us. This is where I part

company with Hume. You will notice that the eliminativist assiduously avoids

certain states of the verb. It is a constant struggle for me to achieve - for I have

been exposed to the old way of thinking all my life and I have been as much

brain-washed as the next man.

The way we think about the IS-word is a very important part of the confusion - I

constructed a whole website on the BE-Mechanism alone. (Analytical Indicant

Theory.)

But the BE-word apart, many innocent-looking words are fraught with ontological

problems. For example verbs that have been turned into nouns which we call

gerunds, or adjectives [less common] that we turn into gerunds [adjectival

nouns] Gerundive: Passive verbal adjective - Gerund: Active verbal noun.

The insidious nature of language and the way in which it affects our

understanding of ontological actuality can be seen in these following examples:

I. The gerund is a verbal noun, just as the participle is a verbal adjective. That is,

just as the participle is a verbal form that functions as an adjective, the gerund is

a verbal form that functions as a noun. You must be careful, however, because in

English both the gerund and the present participle end in -ing. You will have no


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problem, however, if you ask yourself whether the verbal form is adjectival or

substantive. Noun or Adjective?

(1) Leaving the theatre, we ran into our friends. ("Leaving" = adj. modifying "we")

(2) I like running. ("running" = a noun, the direct object of "like")

(3) We saw a man running across the field. ("running" = an adj. modifying "man")

(4) Swimming is fun. ("Swimming" = a noun, modified by the adj. "fun")

So if we look above and pick one example out at random, we can see that our use

of certain forms of language reinforces our illusion that action exists, for in (2)

the use of the word running as a noun [the name of something] suggests that

what is named exists - when plainly it does not - only the running runner exists. It

is all fine and dandy to use the present participle [continuous present] form of a

verb but because in English in the gerundial form of a NOUN the gerund ALSO

ends in -ing it continually confuses our ontologically grasp of what really exists

and what does not. The same problem is now recognised in the field of

computerology and ontology-talk is all the rage within the world of computer

programmers and AI experts and theorists.

NUCLEAR REACTION

Fig. 1: Fusion of Hydrogen into Helium A star is like a gigantic nuclear furnace.

The nuclear reactions inside convert hydrogen into helium by means of a process

known as fusion. But does the 'Process exist' or is it 'that which is processed or

that which processes' that exists?


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It is this nuclear reaction that gives a star its energy. Fusion takes place when the

nuclei of hydrogen atoms with one proton each fuse together to form helium

atoms with two protons. But does this nuclear reaction' or 'fusion' exist? Or is it

that which reacts and fuses that exists? A standard hydrogen atom has one

proton in its nucleus. There are two isotopes of hydrogen which also contain one

proton, but contain neutrons as well. Deuterium contains one neutron while

Tritium contains two. Deep within the star, A deuterium atom combines with a

tritium atom. This forms a helium atom and an extra neutron. In the process, an

incredible amount of energy is released.

So if we now turn again to nuclear fission and apply the same analysis the

original sentence string which I produced to describe it, we can see that I totally

avoid any gerund or abstract noun:

Here it is again...

What exists is nuclear reactive material in which a massive nucleus splits into

smaller nuclei with the simultaneous release of energy.

We see that when I was forming the sentence I selected present perfect and

present continuous forms of verbs but avoided any word-form which would

suggest that anything else extra existed over and beyond the actual fissionable

material itself.

As I have my linguists-hat on at the moment I shall be extra-nit-picking and

observe that even in this sentence there is an ontological mistake, for technically

speaking:

the simultaneous release of energy doesn't exist either - what exists is energetic

material (matergy) which is simultaneously released.


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So the final eliminative materialist sentence which is designed to render an

accurately scientific ontological description of how the fissionable material exists

as it changes its existential modality from a stable macro-community into a

number of micro-communities of energised concretia can now be expressed as:

What exists is nuclear reactive material in which a dissevering atomic nucleus

splits into smaller energetic nuclei which are simultaneously released.

DO NUMBERS EXIST?

Do abstract numbers exist? No - only numerate humans are present in the world.

Numbers are a brilliantly conceived useful fiction which has helped us move from

the cave to Cape Canaveral. They allow us to carry out all kinds of operations and

create all kinds of things that we could not do if we had not created them.

Originally men used stones or their fingers as counters - then they made the giant

step for mankind of awarding names to the amount of stones or fingers that were

held up. As time went by man abstractionalised and distanced number away from

stones and fingers [broke the link of cognitive dependency.] But, since numbers

(being abstract names created by man) change in shape or position from one

digit to another, and since change is a condition that only real things experience,

doesn't that make numbers real? If so, what's wrong with considering that

numbers exist -- especially, since they also have changing relationships to each

other?

No - it does not make the abstract meaning of numbers real - it does not make

them present in the world. It just means that the material medium [the pixels, ink

stains, graphite, paint, wood and plastic etc.,] changes its existential

representational configuration on the page, screen or chequebook.


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Only real mathematicians or enumerators are ontologically present - abstractive

numbers do not - only abstracting humans and the ink, paint and plastic which

represent them exist:

CONCLUSION

Eliminative materialism seeks to DESCRIBE the way entities exist WITHOUT

reifying the WAY that they exist into pseudo-entities in themselves.

Thus whilst the exploding massive nucleus undoubtedly exists, and the multi-

versioned smaller energetic nuclei that are the new modality of what was once a

singleton exist - the actual process or action or occurrence does not exist for

those sorts of words are just useful linguistic short-cuts or useful fictions that we

employ to avoid using a long sentence such as...

What exists is nuclear reactive material in which a massive nucleus splits into

smaller energetic nuclei which are simultaneously released.

... when we can throw actual reality out of the window in favour of brevity, and

just use three words and say...

"Nuclear fission exists."

When Marie Curie first heard about the advent of nuclear fission she changed the

way she existed [specifically her neuronal networks modified their existential

configuration] from that of a human ignorant of the way in which nuclear reactive

material exists at the moment when a massive nucleus splits into smaller nuclei

with the simultaneous release of energy, to a human with a brain which was

cognisant of the way in which nuclear reactive material exists at the moment


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when a massive nucleus splits into smaller nuclei with the simultaneous release

of energy

If we had the technology to take a super-dooper electron magnetic microscopic

picture before and after shot of the relevant parts of the net where the templates

are stored you would detect a configurational difference twixt Shot 01 before the

new information became available to her and Shot 02 after the new information

became available to her.

Like Heidegger's phantasy of the existence of simple presence - the word

existence is an abstract noun. Existence itself does not exist. What exists are the

ACTUAL OBJECTS in the cosmos. Put another way - Being does not exist, and

like the metaphysical manikin Dasein neither does simple presence.

Only objects that BE [are] the objects they are - exist.

Communicating humans exist. The methods they use to communicate are

gestures, signs symbols and sounds. We can even communicate with taste and

smell. Examples?

An unfaithful wife says to her lover who sometimes visits the cafe where she

works:

If I put sugar in your tea you will know it is safe to come tonight - no sugar means

that my husband will be at home.

In this case the medium of communication whereby the message My husband will

be away tonight [the dissolved grains of sugar which impart the taste-message]

to the lover exist. But what about the lack of sugar which does not exist in the

cup when the message is the opposite?


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Now what about the other customers who have or do not have sugar in their tea?

Does the sweet sugar taste in their cups carry a message?

You perhaps will see now that symbols like sugar, or the scent a woman wears as

a signal that she is available sexually whenever she wears it HAVE TO BE agreed

in advance in order to have any meaning in the brain of the addressor and the

addressee. It is the same with letters and words and signs and symbols of all

types - there has got to be antecedally agreed.

So while sugar exists, and scent exists, and the configured graphite particles or

dried ink particles exist on a paper page [or as pixelations on a screen etc.] in the

shape of previously agreed shapes of letters the meaning of those shapes only

exists as an existential modality of the writer's and the reader's brain. The words

themselves are MEANINGLESS - like the sugar and the scent they contain no

meaning. The meaning is attributed to them by the communicators. Only the

meaningfully communicating addressee exists and the meaningfully updated

human addressor between which the meaning of one can be conveyed to the

other.

Ontologically debt does not exist. What exists is the human debtor who owes X-

amount of money. You could certainly try to claim to your bank manager that your

debt did not exist, but I would not advise it. Bank managers like scientists are

notoriously uneducated in ontology - he would probably press the secret bell

under his desk which signals for the men in white-coats. ;-)

The reification of money like the reification of number, mind, consciousness,

time, speed, motion, space and all the rest of the importantly helpful abstractions

which we have dreamed up and created as essentially useful fictions to make our


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lives a lot easier are human ways of existing which set us apart from the animals

and have allowed us to emerge from the caves to Cape Canaveral.

We exist as numerative humans - but numbers themselves do not exist.

Notes:

1. Smith, Robin 1995 "Logic". In J. Barnes (ed) The Cambridge companion to

Aristotle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 55.

2. The forms of predication were called by the medieval scholastic philosophers

the antepraedicamenta.

3. Note, however, that although Aristotle has apparently distinguished between

"being in a subject", and "being predicated truly of a subject", in the Prior

Analytics these are treated as synonymous. This has led some to suspect that

Aristotle was not the author of the Categories[citation needed].

4. Aristotle (1995)

5. The Oxford Translation is universally recognized as the standard English

version of Aristotle. See the publisher's blurb

6. Note that while Aristotle's use of ousia is ambiguous between 'essence' and

substance' there is a close link between them. See his Metaphysics This part was

probably not part of the original text, but added by some unknown editor, Ackrill

(1963) pp. 69-70.

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Does Pure or Simple Presence Exist