PAPER PREPARED FOR THE ECPR JOINT SESSIONS, 10-15 APRIL 2014

WORKSHOP: REGIME LEGITIMISATION THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: ANALYSING

ITS DIMENSIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS

Power sharing and political dissatisfactions: A multilevel analysis of the impact of institutional power sharing on kinds of political

dissatisfaction in 24 European democracies Author: Henrik Serup Christensen (Henrik.christensen@abo.fi) The Social Science Research Institute (SAMFORSK) Department Of Political Science, Åbo Akademi University

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INTRODUCTION Previous studies have found a relationship between the institutional structure and the

prevailing political attitudes and behaviour among citizens (Lijphart, 1999; Powell, 2000;

Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Criado & Herreros, 2007; Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Freitag &

Bühlmann, 2009; Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Marien & Christensen, 2013). Not only can

the institutional setting have a direct impact on political attitudes, it can also shape how policy

dissatisfaction affects these same attitudes by dispersing responsibility for political decisions

(Criado & Herreros, 2007). It is generally argued that power-sharing institutions promote

greater citizen satisfaction by increasing the inclusiveness of the political decision-making

(Lijphart, 1999; Cridao & Herreros, 2007; Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009; Kittilson & Schwindt-

Bayer, 2010).

However, while previous efforts have focused on the effect of power sharing on different

attitudes, others maintain that it is important to distinguish different citizen profiles with

different mixes of political attitudes (Almond & Verba, 1963/1965; Geissel, 2008; Webb, 2013).

This approach entails that political dissatisfaction becomes a question of kind rather than

degree. For example, some scholars argue that critical attitudes may be beneficial for democracy

since it helps keep citizens alert to any wrongdoings by elected decision makers (Norris, 1999;

Rosanvallon, 2008) while others contend that political disenchantment entails political apathy

and resignation (Stoker, 2006; Hay, 2007). This calls attention to the importance of

distinguishing different kinds of political dissatisfaction with different implications for political

legitimacy.

While the institutional structure has been recognised as an important contextual factor in

determining levels of political dissatisfaction, the links to different kinds of political

dissatisfaction remain unexplored. This is important to examine, since the impact of the

institutional structures may well be somewhat more ambivalent when it comes to assessing

kinds of satisfaction rather than degree, since contradictory results from power sharing have

been encountered depending on the type of attitude under consideration (Karp & Banducci,

2007; Aarts & Thomassen, 2008).

For this reason, this paper examines the link between institutional power sharing and four

different citizen profiles that differ on the extent of political support and their subjective

political empowerment. This includes three different kinds of political dissatisfaction, which are

likely to have different consequences for political legitimacy. The data for this study come from

the fourth round of the European Social Survey (ESS 2008) and comprise 39376 respondents

from 24 democracies. The link between horizontal and vertical power sharing and kinds of

political dissatisfaction are examined with multinomial logistic regression analysis to examine

how power sharing affects the likelihood of a satisfied citizen reverting to either kind of

dissatisfaction. Furthermore, it is examined how power sharing affects the link between policy

dissatisfaction and the kinds of political dissatisfaction. The results suggest that power sharing

may reduce certain kinds of political dissatisfaction. Furthermore, institutional power sharing

plays an important role in shaping the impact of policy dissatisfaction on the kinds of political

dissatisfaction.

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THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND POLITICAL DISSATISFACTION Several studies have found that citizens are increasingly negative in their evaluations of the

political systems in many democracies. As a consequence, fears over disaffected democracies

(Pharr & Putnam, 2000), political disaffection (Torcal & Montero, 2006) and that we hate politics

(Hay, 2007) have been widespread. This situation may at least partly be attributed to the

institutional context. By shaping the inclusiveness and accountability of the political decision-

making (Powell, 2000), the institutional context play a central role in determining the levels and

consequences of central political attitudes such as political trust, efficacy and satisfaction with

democracy (Karp & Banducci, 2007; Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009;

Marien & Christensen, 2013). For this reason, institutional reforms have been proposed as a

solution to problems of the contemporary representative democracies (Cain et al., 2003; Zittel &

Fuchs, 2007).

Although different labels are used, scholars usually distinguish between two opposed

democratic models: Powers-sharing and power-concentrating systems (Lijphart, 1999; Powell,

2000; Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). These two models seek to fulfil different democratic

ideals and consequently involve different degrees of power sharing with consequences for

political attitudes towards the authorities (cf. Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009: 1543-1547). The

power-concentrating system – epitomised by the Westminster model – concentrates decision-

making powers in the hands of a narrow political elite and thereby allows citizens to punish or

reward the responsible decision-makers in elections by clarifying who is responsible for policy

decisions (Powell 2000). This model was long considered a superior representative system by

delivering effective government and ensuring that all decisions reflect the will of the democratic

majority (cf. Lijphart, 1999: 9-10, 258-259).

However, more recent studies argue that power-sharing systems create greater citizen

satisfaction. Not only does the power-concentrating model face difficulties in fulfilling its very

demanding ideals that may be unattainable in practice (cf. Aarts & Thomassen, 2008: 6). The

power-sharing model also has inherent qualities that promote citizen satisfaction even if it does

not have the same clarity of responsibility as the power concentrating model, since it

emphasizes inclusion and aims to be responsive towards a broad array of interests (Lijphart,

1999; Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010: 991). Consequently, the power-sharing model generally

represents the median voter better (Powell, 2000; Aarts & Thomassen, 2008). Furthermore, by

including a diverse range of interests this model does not create clear winners and losers,

thereby potentially disempowering large minorities (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Goodin, 1996).

Lijphart (1999) finds that his consensual model, where power sharing is an inherent trait, is

associated with “kinder, gentler” policies, which may also enhance citizen satisfaction.

That the power sharing model is expected to promote citizen satisfaction has implications for

the idea of using institutional reforms to promote greater political legitimacy (Cain et al., 2003;

Zittel & Fuchs, 2007). The findings of the above mentioned studies suggest that creating more

power-sharing political systems could support political legitimacy by stimulating more positive

attitudes to the authorities.

Nevertheless, central aspects of the link between the institutional structures and political

attitudes remain unresolved. First of all, previous research suggests that different institutional

aspects do not necessarily have similar effects (Christensen, 2013; Marien & Christensen, 2013).

A central distinction can here be made between horizontal and vertical power-sharing

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institutions (Christensen, 2013: 109; Vráblíková, 2014).1 Horizontal power sharing concerns

power sharing among actors at the state level, while vertical power sharing designates the

territorial dispersion of powers between different levels of government (Vráblíková, 2014: 213-

214). It is necessary to examine the separate effects of these two institutional dimensions to

ascertain the link between the institutional structures and political attitudes.

Furthermore, and more important for the present purposes, previous studies have focused on

institutional effects on specific attitudes such as satisfaction with democracy (Aarts &

Thomassen, 2008), social trust (Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009), political engagement (Kittilson &

Schwindt-Bayer, 2010) and political support (Criado & Herreros, 2007). They hereby ignore the

possibility that power sharing may have different effects for different mixes of political attitudes.

At least since the Civic Culture study (Almond & Verba, 1963/1965), it has been recognised that

different mixes of political attitudes can have very different outcomes for democracy (see also

Geissel, 2008; Webb, 2013). According to Almond and Verba (1963/1965: 29-30), the civic

culture is a mixed political culture, where citizens combine a participant culture with parochial

orientations. They hereby draw attention to the existence of different groups of citizens with

different attitudinal profiles. While more recent studies frequently focus on specific attitudes,

some studies have developed typologies along this line of thinking. Geissel (2008) examines

differences between five types of citizens based on their preferences for a democratic system,

political attentiveness and satisfaction with democracy. Webb (2013) distinguishes between

dissatisfied democratic and stealth democrats and find important differences in their

characteristics and behaviour. While both of the typologies have their merits, they are based on

single country studies and are not necessarily valid in a broader European context. This is all the

more the case since they do not necessarily adequately include all possible citizen profiles.

Other studies have identified attitudinal profiles such as critical (1999) or disenchanted citizens

(Stoker, 2006, 2010; Hay 2007) involving different accounts of what negative political attitudes

entail for democratic legitimacy. While critical citizens are portrayed as a democratic asset since

they help keep the authorities accountable (Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 1999; Rosanvallon, 2008),

political disenchantment entails an anti-political culture including intuitive and emotional

responses to politics that are increasingly negative in tone and character (Hay & Stoker, 2009).

These citizens alienated and confused rather than critical (Stoker, 2006: 52-54). Political

disenchantment therefore constitutes a potential democratic problem since it can erode support

for democracy (Mair, 2006; Stoker, 2006: 44-46). As Rosanvallon (2008: 267-273) notes, a

healthy critical attitude towards the political authorities can turn into excessive scepticism. This

distinction highlights the importance of separating a healthy scepticism towards the political

elites from an unhealthy political disenchantment to understand the implications for democratic

legitimacy. While political legitimacy is a multifaceted concept, a central aspect concerns

citizens’ attitudes towards the political authorities and their role in the political system (Easton,

1965; Almond & Verba, 1963/1965; Kurtén & Herzberg, 2011). Hence, it is helpful to examine

how the institutional structures affect different kinds of political dissatisfaction, since this may

offer new insights into the causes and consequences of the negative sentiments.

This approach implies that political dissatisfaction is considered a multi-dimensional concept.

Although previous studies have hinted at the multidimensionality of political dissatisfaction (cf.

Torcal & Montero, 2006), most uses the framework developed by David Easton (1965) as the 1 Lijphart (1999) makes a similar distinction, but he has been criticised for including aspects that designates elite behaviour rather than institutions (more on this below).

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starting point and focuses on political support as the central underlying dimension (Dalton,

2004; Norris, 2011). Easton distinguishes between diffuse and specific support, where the

former comprises deep rooted attitudes towards the political system that constitutes a reservoir

of support for the political system whereas the latter involves attitudes towards the authorities

and their specific actions (Easton, 1965: 249). However, it has been difficult to separate kinds of

political support empirically (Citrin, 1974; Dalton, 2004: 57-62), and political support has

consequently been measured with one or more variables tapping the same underlying

dimension. Although this approach has its merits, it cannot help us understand the differences

between critical and disenchanted citizens. Both groups have low levels of political support, but

Stoker (2010: 50-51) contends that the surge of political disenchantment stems primarily from

loss of confidence among citizens in the ability to influence decisions.

This shows the need to consider a second dimension of political dissatisfaction, which is here

referred to as the subjective political empowerment of citizens. This dimension is neglected by

most scholars (cf. Geissel, 2008: 39-40). While some contend that citizens do not want to be

involved in politics (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002), subjective political empowerment entails

that citizens should be confident they can affect political decisions and be interested in doing so,

which is important for a vibrant democratic citizenship (cf. Almond & Verba, 1963/1965).

Combining these two dimensions make it possible to identify different categories of citizens

shown in figure 1.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The upper left cell contains satisfied citizens with a high level of political support combined with

a high level of subjective competence. The three other cells contain citizens with mixes of

political attitudes indicating different kinds of political dissatisfaction, but with different

implications for democratic legitimacy. The lower left cell contains unsupportive citizens, who

combine a low extent of political support combined with a high degree of subjective

empowerment and thereby resemble the profile of the critical citizen that has been considered a

democratic benefit (Norris, 1999; Inglehart, 1997; Dalton, 2004; Rosanvallon, 2008). The upper

right cell contains disempowered citizens, who trust the political system but doubt their abilities

to affect political decisions. This kind of political dissatisfaction resembles the description of

citizens found in Stealth Democracy (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Webb, 2013) who do not

want to be involved in the political decision-making and would rather not know the details

about it. While Hibbing and Theiss-Morse do not consider this to constitute a democratic

problem, it endangers democratic legitimacy when citizens are uncertain about their capabilities

to be involved in politics. The final lower right cell contains the disenchanted citizens who are

less supportive of the political system and have a low level of subjective political empowerment

and thereby threaten democratic legitimacy (Hay, 2007; Stoker, 2006).

Based on previous research, it is not clear what kinds of political dissatisfaction are promoted by

power-sharing institutions since it cannot be taken for granted that the same factors that explain

a healthy critical attitude can also account for the harmful political disenchantment. For

example, while power-sharing institutions may increase political support (Criado & Herreros,

2007; Aarts & Thomassen, 2008), they can decrease the level of political efficacy by masking

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who is responsible for political decisions (Karp & Banducci, 2007). While these deviating results

show that the effects of power sharing may depend on the type of attitude under consideration,

they also suggest that any effects may be more intricate for the different kinds of political

dissatisfaction.

This also entails that the ability to place blame for policy outcomes becomes a central question

(Criado & Herreros, 2007). A failing performance of the democratic regimes has been argued to

be a central determinant for the decline in citizens’ belief in their governments (Norris, 2011:

188-189). Policy performance has here occupied a central position, since citizens seek to

evaluate whether the authorities have been able to deliver economic well-being and welfare

more broadly defined (Norris, 2011: 202-209). The degree of power sharing in the institutional

structures may affect economic performance directly, and thereby create more positive political

attitudes (Crepaz, 1996; Lijphart, 1999). However, it can also shape how policy dissatisfaction

affects political dissatisfaction by affecting how hard it is to determine who is responsible for the

policy outputs. Policy dissatisfaction may have a stronger impact on political attitudes in power-

concentrating regimes, where the clarity of responsibility makes it straightforward to blame or

credit the incumbent government (Powell & Whitten, 1993; Powell, 2000; Criado & Herreros,

2007: 1515-6). Hence, power-sharing institutions can make it harder to attribute blame for

unwanted policy outcomes and may therefore weaken the effect of policy dissatisfaction on the

propensity to become dissatisfied (cf. Criado & Herreros, 2007: 1516).

DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODS The aim of this study is to examine whether institutional power sharing affects particular kinds

of political dissatisfaction. Since the link between institutional power sharing and kinds of

dissatisfaction is unchartered territory, no specific hypotheses are specified, but the following

research questions are examined:

R1: How does horizontal and vertical power sharing affect the propensity to become either

kind of politically dissatisfied citizen?

R2: How does horizontal and vertical power sharing affect the effect of policy satisfaction on

the tendency to become either kind of politically dissatisfied citizen?

The data for the study comes from the fourth round of the European Social Survey (ESS4, 2008).

Some countries were excluded to restrict the study to European democracies, while other

respondents had to be excluded from the regression analyses due to missing data, leaving us

with 39376 respondents in 24 countries.2 To ensure that the attitudes do not affect the

institutional setting rather than vice versa, all values for the institutional variables are from

before 2008 where the collection of data for the ESS4 began, thereby ensuring the direction of

causality. The following presents the central variables of the study (more information on coding

and descriptive statistics is found in the appendix).

2 Turkey, Russia and Ukraine are excluded since they are not democracies; Israel is excluded since it is outside a European context and has a disputed democratic record when it comes to the Palestinian segment of the population. Croatia had to be excluded from the regression analyses since it was not possible to obtain data for the institutional variables. Furthermore, all respondents with missing values had to be deleted before performing the regression analyses.

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The dependent variable is a categorical variable grouping respondents according to different

kinds of political orientations. This was constructed with the help of a cluster analysis of four

variables all coded 0-1 with 1 indicating the highest value: Political trust (index measuring trust

in national parliament, politicians and political parties (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91)), Satisfaction

with democracy (Scored 0-10), Political interest (Measured Very low-Very high), and Internal

political efficacy (Index based on two questions).3 Although cluster analysis is an exploratory

technique which does not provide definitive answers, it can help determine how citizens are

clustered based on their political attitudes. The technique used is two-step cluster analyses,

which is appropriate for large datasets such as the current one (Norušis, 2012, 380-389). There

is no established rule for determining the number of clusters that should be used to classify

respondents, but the one used in the analyses is Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (BIC). The distance

measure used is log-likelihood, which means cases are assigned to the cluster that leads to the

largest log-likelihood. The results are presented in table 1.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The results correspond closely to the typology presented in figure 1. In the first cluster the mean

scores for all four variables are above both the absolute mean (0.5) and the mean scores for the

whole population, indicating a high level of political support and subjective empowerment. This

group resembles the satisfied citizens from figure 1. The second cluster has relative low values

when it comes to political support (political trust = 0.27; satisfaction with democracy = 0.36)

and high levels of subjective empowerment (internal political efficacy = 0.63; political interest =

0.71). This group resembles the unsupportive citizens. In the third cluster the mean value for

political trust (0.45) is above the population mean (0.37) even if it is not above the absolute

mean. The mean score for satisfaction with democracy is 0.62 showing that this group has high

scores of political support, which is combined with low levels of subjective empowerment

(internal political efficacy = 0.36; political interest = 0.24). Hence, this group represents the

disempowered citizens. The respondents in cluster four have low values on all four indicators,

and hereby resemble the disenchanted citizens since they neither support the political system

nor believe it is possible to influence political decisions. These four groups of citizens are

subsequently coded as a nominal categorical variable indicating the classification of each

respondent.

The regression analyses are multinomial multilevel regression analyses as is appropriate for an

unordered categorical variable where the respondents are nested in groups (Hedeker, 2008). By

using the satisfied citizens as a reference group, all coefficients indicate the likelihood of a kind

of political dissatisfaction in comparison to being satisfied. While analysing each type of citizen

separately as done by Webb (2013) simplifies the analyses, it would also entail that the results

for each category would be compared to different reference groups consisting of the other

groups of citizens. All regression analyses are performed with MLwiN 2.29 (Rasbach et al., 2012).

3 A confirmatory factor analysis ascertained that the four variables constitute two distinct dimensions as hypothesized in the theory (results not shown). Political trust and Satisfaction with democracy constitute a common dimension of Political support while Political interest and Internal political efficacy constitute a second dimension of Subjective political empowerment.

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The central independent variables are horizontal and vertical power sharing. This is

operationalized with the help of two central institutional variables that measure the horizontal

and vertical degree of power sharing. For horizontal power sharing, a variable based on

Lijphart’s (1999) executive-parties dimension, taken from the Comparative Political Data Set III

(Armingeon et al., 2013). Contrary to Lijphart’s own dimension, this variable only includes the

institutional traits ‘number of parties’ and ‘electoral disproportionality’. A higher score on the

index indicates a greater degree of horizontal power sharing.4 Different kinds of vertical

decentralization have been identified (Schneider, 2003). The measure used here is fiscal

decentralisation, which has been used in a number of previous studies (Morales, 2009; Marien &

Christensen 2013; Vráblíková, 2014). This measure captures the proportion of local and regional

spending in relation to the total spending (Morales, 2009: 170) and the data comes from IMF

Government finance statistics. A greater proportion of local/regional spending indicates a greater

extent of vertical power sharing.

For policy satisfaction the focus is on satisfaction with the economy, which has been a central

concern in recent years that has also received attention in previous literature (Mcallister, 1999;

Dalton, 2004: 112-127; Criado & Herrreros, 2007; Norris, 2011). The response was measured on

a scale 0-10 subsequently recoded 0-1 with 1 indicating high degree of satisfaction.

A number of control variables are included to verify that any significant effects are not spurious.

At the individual level, this includes the socio-demographic characteristics age, gender,

education, adequacy of household income, formal citizenship or not, level of urbanity and

religiosity. Other variables that control for the social and political integration of the respondent

are social connectedness, voted or not in the latest national election, life satisfaction, party

identification and social trust (cf. Norris, 2011: 126-136; Armingeon & Guthmann, 2013). At the

country level, the possibilities for including control variables are limited by the relatively small

number of countries. For this reason, only a single additional variable is included at the country

level to control for the level of corruption to control for the performance of the political regime

(Norris, 2011: 195-196).

ANALYSIS To start the analysis, table 2 shows differences in the country level distributions of the four

groups of citizens together with information on the institutional variables and satisfaction with

the economy.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

There are substantial variations in the distribution of the four kinds of citizens. Although the

group of satisfied citizens is the largest group overall, the three kinds of dissatisfied citizens

form the majority in most countries. Nevertheless, there are important differences in what kind

of dissatisfaction dominates in the countries. The disenchanted tend to be numerous in Southern 4 The variable is composed of moving averages of 10 years which were z-standardized and added up. The sum was again z-standardized, which yields the value of the proxy variable. The z-standardization was done across nations for each time point (Armingeon et al., 2013).

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Europe and several East and Central European democracies. The disempowered citizens are

common in many Northern European countries, while the unsupportive are the largest group of

citizens in many new democracies, but also in Ireland, the United Kingdom and France. The

ensuing question is to what extent this variation can be attributed to institutional power

sharing?

Table 3 contains a number of regression models examining the first research question

concerning the direct effects of horizontal and vertical power sharing institutions on the kinds of

dissatisfaction. The first model M0 is an empty model decomposing the variance between

individual and country levels. The second model M1 introduces the two institutional variables,

while M2 also includes the control variables.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

M0 shows that there is substantial variation at the country level (ICC=0.06-0.16), meaning the

multilevel approach is warranted. The country level variance around the constant is significant,

showing there are substantial differences among the countries in the likelihood of becoming

either kind of dissatisfied.

The inclusion of the institutional variables in M1 suggests that both horizontal power sharing

measured with Lijphart’s index and vertical power sharing in the form of fiscal decentralization

have negative effects on the likelihood of becoming dissatisfied. Hence both types of power

sharing make it less likely that a satisfied citizen becomes disempowered, unsupportive or

disenchanted. However, there are important differences in the effect sizes for the kinds of

dissatisfaction, suggesting that both kinds of power sharing works better for avoiding political

disenchantment while the effects for political disempowerment are less pronounced.

Furthermore, after the control variables are included in M3, both forms of power sharing only

have significant effects for becoming a disenchanted citizen. Hence, power sharing may help

avoid satisfied citizens becoming politically disenchanted, which is the most damaging form of

dissatisfaction from a democratic perspective. It does not, however, necessarily serve to subdue

all forms of political dissatisfaction, since the satisfied citizens are no less likely to become

neither disempowered nor unsupportive after taking into consideration all other possible

factors.

The models in table 4 examine the second research question concerning the mediating effect of

institutional power sharing on the effect of policy dissatisfaction. The models include two

interaction effects that consist of the two institutional factors and the variable measuring

satisfaction with the present state of the economy in the country. To ease the interpretation, the

interaction effects are included in two separate models M3 and M4. The tables do not display the

estimates for all control variables even though they are included in the models.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

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Both of the included interaction effects are significant for unsupportive and disenchanted

citizens, showing that the effect of policy dissatisfaction on the propensity to become either form

of dissatisfied citizen depends on the degree of vertical and horizontal power sharing.

To see what the significant interaction effects entail, a customised prediction was made to

explore the differences in the probabilities of belonging to a certain group of citizens depending

on satisfaction with the economy and the degree of power sharing. These were plotted in figures

showing the developments in the probabilities of belonging to either category of citizens when

satisfaction with the economy increases at the highest and lowest levels of horizontal and

vertical power sharing. The results for horizontal power sharing are shown in figure 2.

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

The first chart shows the predicted developments when there is the highest extent of power

concentration (here equal to France), while the second chart shows the developments with the

highest extent of power sharing (here Belgium). In both scenarios, an average individual on all

other variables is least likely to be a satisfied citizen with a low level of satisfaction with the

economy, but with rising satisfaction, the probability increases so the same person with the

highest level of satisfaction is most likely to be a satisfied citizen.

Although the developments might look similar, there are nonetheless noticeable differences

depending on the degree of power sharing. The probability of being satisfied is initially slightly

higher when there is a high degree of power sharing (0.12 compared to 0.05), but this changes

as the level of satisfaction increases, and at the highest degree of satisfaction, the probability is

higher when there is a high extent of power concentration (0.45 compared to 0.54). Hence,

policy satisfaction has a stronger impact on political satisfaction when decision-making powers

are concentrated.

With a high extent of power concentration, political disenchantment is the most likely kind of

dissatisfaction for people with a low degree of satisfaction with the economy, while the most

likely kind when there is a high extent of power sharing is an unsupportive citizen. This implies

that when there is a high extent of power sharing, policy dissatisfaction promotes a critical

attitude that may be healthy for democracy while it promotes an unhealthy political

disenchantment when there is a high extent of power concentration.

Contrary to expectations, the probability of becoming a disempowered citizen increases with

rising policy satisfaction. A likely interpretation is that when policy satisfaction increases people

feel less of a need to be involved in political matters, and as a consequence subjective political

empowerment decreases while the probability of becoming disempowered increases. When

there is a high degree of power concentration, this effect weakens at the highest levels of policy

satisfaction, which could entail that the relative ease of placing responsibility means people are

more likely to retain subjective political empowerment, therefore becoming satisfied rather than

disempowered citizens.

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The results for vertical power sharing are shown in figure 3. The first chart here shows the

predicted developments in the probabilities as a function of satisfaction with the economy in a

situation of high vertical power concentration (Greece), while the second chart shows the same

developments in a situation of high vertical power sharing (Switzerland).

[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

The average citizen with a high extent of policy satisfaction in a situation of high vertical power

concentration is more likely to be a disempowered citizen rather than a satisfied citizen. This

suggests that a high degree of satisfaction with the economy entails that citizens are more likely

to be detached from politics – in the sense of having low subjective empowerment – when there

is a high extent of power concentration. Contrary to this, the satisfied citizen is clearly the most

likely kind of citizen when there is a high degree of power sharing, suggesting that citizens are

more likely to maintain a high degree of subjective empowerment even when they are satisfied

with how the economy is going.

A low level of satisfaction with the economy is more likely to promote political disenchantment

in a power-concentrating system, while the most likely profile is the unsupportive citizen when

there is a high extent of power sharing. Hence, power sharing entails that policy dissatisfaction is

more likely to be expressed in a healthy critical attitude rather than an unhealthy political

disenchantment.

DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS These findings have a number of potential implications for the relationship between

institutional power sharing and kinds of political dissatisfaction. While the results generally

support the notion that power sharing promotes positive political attitudes, they also provide

new insights into whether institutional reforms may help strengthen democratic legitimacy (cf.

Cain et al., 2003; Zittel & Fuchs, 2007).

The first research question concerned the direct effect of power sharing on the different kinds of

political dissatisfaction. While previous research has noted that the effects of power sharing is

not necessarily positive for all political attitudes (Karp & Banducci, 2007; Aarts & Thomassen,

2008), it has so far not been clear what citizen profiles can be expected to blossom under

different degrees of power sharing. Here the results show that both vertical and horizontal

power sharing only have significant effects on the propensity to become politically disenchanted

after controlling for other factors (Stoker, 2006; Hay, 2007; Hay & Stoker, 2009). While this

shows the difficulties involved in settling the effects of institutions (cf. Christensen, 2013), it also

entails that while institutional reforms may help limit the most problematic form of political

dissatisfaction, it does not necessarily mean that citizens become satisfied. Instead, they may

turn to other forms of political dissatisfaction that are less severe, but not necessarily

unproblematic for democratic legitimacy. While the unsupportive citizens may constitute a

democratic asset (cf. Norris, 1999; Rosanvallon, 2008), the disempowered citizens have no

interest in politics although they tend to have confidence in the functioning of the system

(Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Webb, 2013). Although this attitudinal profile is not necessarily

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damaging for the functioning of the political system in the short term, it may in the long run

undermine democratic legitimacy (cf. Stoker, 2006; Mair, 2006). Promoting power sharing

reforms is therefore unlikely to eliminate all existing problems with political dissatisfaction.

The second research question involved how power sharing shapes the effect of policy

dissatisfaction on different kinds of political dissatisfaction. The results here show that power

sharing shapes how policy dissatisfaction affects the probability of the different forms of

political dissatisfaction. Concentration of decision-making powers entails that policy satisfaction

has a stronger impact on political satisfaction in line with the arguments of Criado and Herreros

(2007). However, the interplay between power sharing and policy satisfaction in promoting

different kinds of political dissatisfaction was more intricate. The results show that

concentrating powers in few hands does not necessarily entail that policy satisfaction

automatically leads to political satisfaction since power concentration promotes

disempowerment to a larger extent than satisfaction even with high levels of policy satisfaction.

In this sense, a concentration of decision-making powers may even exclude satisfied citizens

from following political matters. When there is little incentive to be involved, some citizens tend

to withdraw from politics altogether. While this is not necessarily detriment to democratic

legitimacy in the short run, it entails that they may not be prepared to intervene should the need

arise since they pay little attention to political matters nor feel they can make a difference.

Furthermore, policy dissatisfaction may have more dire consequences when powers are

concentrated, since these institutional arrangements make it more likely that policy

dissatisfaction promotes an unhealthy political disenchantment (Stoker, 2006; Hay, 2007; Stoker

& Hay, 2009). Conversely, when powers are shared, the consequences of policy dissatisfaction

may even be positive for democracy, since policy dissatisfaction was more likely to sustain a

critical attitude towards authorities that may be beneficial for democracy (cf. Norris, 1999;

Inglehart, 1997; Rosanvallon, 2008).

All of this shows that while institutional power sharing may not be able to remove all forms of

political dissatisfaction, it can at least alleviate the most acute problems and thereby strengthen

democratic legitimacy.

12

APPENDIX – CODING OF VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable Coding Descriptive statistics

N Mean/ mode

SD min max VIF

Dependent variable

Political attitudes used in cluster analysis

Political trust 2 questions indicating level of trust in [Country]’s parliament, Politicians, and Political parties. Each scored scale 0—10. Index coded 0-1 (1= highest political trust).

45617 0.37 0.23 0.00 1.00 N/A

Satisfaction democracy ‘How satisfied are you with the way democracy works?’. Coded 0-1 (1=highest satisfaction).

45771 0.50 0.25 0.00 1.00 N/A

Political interest ‘How interested in politics?’. Coded 0-1 (1 = Very interested). 47355 0.45 0.30 0.00 1.00 N/A

Internal efficacy

2 questions: ‘How often politics so complicated that you can't understand what is going on?’ + ‘How difficult to make mind up about political issues?’. Each scored 0-5, Index coded 0-1(1= highest internal political efficacy).

45904 0.48 0.23 0.00 1.00 N/A

Kinds of political dissatisfaction

Kinds of political dissatisfaction

Categorises respondents based on results from cluster analysis. Four categories Coded: 1: Satisfied; 2: Disempowered; 3: Unsupportive; 4: Disenchanted.

39376 1.00 N/A 1.00 4.00 N/A

Independent variables and controls

Horizontal power sharing (HPS)

Lijphart’s proxy variable: Time-variant proxy for Lijphart’s first dimension ‘Parties-executives’ based on ‘number of parties’ and ‘electoral disproportionality’ (see Armingeon et al., 2013 for details).

39376 0.03 1.12 -2.56 2.15 1.23

Vertical power sharing (VPS)

Fiscal decentralisation: Subnational share of expenditures. Data from IMF Government finance statistics (2008).

39376 0.17 0.11 0.01 0.44 1.52

Satisfaction with economy ‘On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?’ Coded 0-1 (1=extremely satisfied).

39376 0.40 0.25 0.00 1.00 1.47

Age Age in years divided by 100. 39376 0.47 0.18 0.15 1.23 1.27

Gender Gender of respondent; Dichotomous 0/1 (1=male). 39376 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.04

Feelings about household income

‘Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?’ Coded 0-1 (1 living comfortably on present income)

39376 0.65 0.29 0.00 1.00 1.52

Education ‘Highest level of education achieved’? Coded 0-1 (1 Highest education)

39376 0.53 0.33 0.00 1.00 1.19

Citizenship (1=yes) ‘Are you a citizen of [country]?’ Dichotomous 0/1(1=yes) 39376 0.96 0.20 0.00 1.00 1.13

Urbanity ‘Which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live?’ Coded 01 (1= Big city).

39376 0.53 0.31 0.00 1.00 1.06

Religiosity ‘Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?’ Coded 0-1 (1=very religious).

39376 0.47 0.30 0.00 1.00 1.12

Socialness ‘How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?’ Coded 0-1 (1=every day)

39376 0.65 0.26 0.00 1.00 1.15

Voted last election (1=yes) ‘Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]?’ Coded dichotomous 0/1 (1=yes).

39376 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.35

Life satisfaction ‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?’ Coded 0-1 (1=Extremely satisfied)

39376 0.68 0.23 0.00 1.00 1.47

Party identification ‘Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?’ Dichotomous 0/1 (1=yes).

39376 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.13

Social trust

Index based on 3 questions: 1)’Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful’; 2) ‘Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance’; 3) People try to be helpful’. Each scored 0-10; Index coded 0-1 (1=highest social trust; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79)

39376 0.51 0.20 0.00 1.00 1.36

Level of corruption Corruptions perception index, Data from Transparency International. 39376 6.83 1.81 3.70 9.40 1.82

13

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16

Table 1 Cluster analysis to form groups of citizens

Centroids

Political trust

Satisfaction w. democracy

Internal Political Efficacy

Political Interest TOTAL

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD n %

Cluster

1 0.59 0.13 0.73 0.14 0.63 0.18 0.71 0.19 10555 26.8

2 0.27 0.16 0.36 0.20 0.55 0.21 0.72 0.14 9668 24.6

3 0.45 0.16 0.63 0.16 0.36 0.18 0.24 0.16 10486 26.6

4 0.16 0.13 0.26 0.17 0.42 0.23 0.22 0.17 8667 22.0

TOTAL 0.38 0.22 0.51 0.25 0.49 0.23 0.48 0.29 39376 100.0

Note: The entries are the results of a two-step cluster analysis with log likelihood distance measure and Schwarz’s Bayesian criterion as clustering criterion. All variables coded 0-1 with 1 indicating a high positive attitude. The cluster analysis was performed before deleting data for the regression analysis to include as many respondents as possible, but the figures refer to the numbers available for the regression analyses.

Table 2 Distribution of central variables across countries

N

Satisfied

Dise

mp

ow

ered

Un

sup

po

rtive

Dise

nch

ante

d

Lijph

art

Fiscal

de

cen

tralisation

Satisfaction

e

con

om

y

BE 1658 26.4 33.8 23.5 16.3 2.15 0.14 0.43 (0.20)

BG 1657 4.2 5.1 47.3 43.5 -0.06 0.09 0.23 (0.18)

CH 1502 55.3 28.6 11.9 4.1 0.98 0.44 0.59 (0.20)

CY 1041 44.8 34.9 12.0 8.4 0.46 0.03 0.49 (0.21)

CZ 1660 9.1 40.5 12.9 37.5 -0.18 0.15 0.38 (0.22)

DE 2518 34.0 21.1 31.6 13.4 0.30 0.33 0.42 (0.23)

DK 1489 70.0 19.4 8.7 1.9 1.10 0.35 0.62 (0.23)

EE 1311 19.1 25.4 29.2 26.2 0.76 0.14 0.36 (0.22)

ES 2097 19.3 48.0 14.1 18.6 -0.63 0.25 0.36 (0.20)

FI 1972 42.8 37.8 11.9 7.5 0.89 0.25 0.61 (0.18)

FR 1932 21.3 25.7 32.5 20.5 -2.56 0.14 0.30 (0.19)

GB 2133 26.8 21.7 33.5 18.0 -2.36 0.09 0.31 (0.21)

GR 1940 11.7 27.6 21.5 39.2 -0.96 0.01 0.24 (0.19)

HU 1263 5.8 13.0 35.1 46.2 -0.74 0.14 0.18 (0.18)

IE 1645 20.7 18.7 37.0 23.7 -0.42 0.09 0.26 (0.20)

LV 1551 3.5 14.4 35.3 46.7 0.74 0.18 0.19 (0.19)

NL 1662 53.2 25.5 17.0 4.3 1.23 0.12 0.55 (0.19)

NO 1491 44.0 38.2 11.2 6.6 0.82 0.16 0.65 (0.21)

PL 1305 12.8 22.7 34.7 29.8 -0.38 0.18 0.45 (0.20)

PT 1904 9.5 27.0 23.1 40.4 -0.58 0.08 0.29 (0.19)

RO 1466 17.7 19.6 31.0 31.7 -0.16 0.20 0.36 (0.23)

SE 1647 50.0 28.5 14.6 6.9 0.72 0.35 0.50 (0.22)

SI 1045 21.8 26.8 32.6 18.8 0.80 0.10 0.43 (0.22)

SK 1489 22.0 29.7 27.1 21.3 0.72 0.08 0.48 (0.22)

n / % / mean 39378 26.8 26.6 24.6 22.0 0.03 (1.12) 0.17 (0.11) 0.40 (0.25)

Note: N refers to the unweighted number of respondents available for the regressions analyses. The four groups of citizens are weighted percentages in each country. Institutional variables and satisfaction with present state of economy are means scores with standard deviations (SD) in parenthesis where appropriate.

17

Table 3 Multinomial logistic regression of effects of power-sharing institutions on kinds of political

dissatisfaction

M0 M1 M2

Reference category: Satisfied citizens

Dise

mp

ow

ered

Un

sup

po

rtive

Dise

nch

ante

d

Dise

mp

ow

ered

Un

sup

po

rtive

Dise

nch

ante

d

Dise

mp

ow

ered

Un

sup

po

rtive

Dise

nch

ante

d

B

(SE) Sig.

B (SE)

Sig. B

(SE) Sig.

B (SE)

Sig. B

(SE) Sig.

B (SE)

Sig. B

(SE) Sig.

B (SE)

Sig. B

(SE) Sig.

Fixed part

Constant -0.024

-0.074

-0.179

0.096

0.028

-0.163

1.246 *** 0.323 *** 0.334 ***

(0.098)

(0.117)

(0.163)

(0.095)

(0.103)

(0.143)

(0.0839

(0.090)

(0.072)

Horizontal power sharing (HPS)

-0.239 ** -0.412 *** -0.470 *** -0.067

-0.107

-0.131 ***

(0.093)

(0.101)

(0.140)

(0.061)

(0.063)

(0.033)

Vertical power sharing (VPS)

-2.794 ** -4.326 *** -6.626 *** -1.350

-0.949

-2.034 ***

(0.935)

(1.021)

(1.415)

(0.701)

(0.733)

(0.394)

Satisfaction with economy

-0.651 *** -3.342 *** -4.532 ***

(0.060)

(0.063)

(0.063)

Age -1.198 *** 0.440 *** -0.714 ***

(0.069)

(0.073)

(0.069)

Gender (1=male) -0.728 *** -0.216 *** -0.624 ***

(0.023)

(0.023)

(0.023)

Feelings about household income

-0.478 *** -0.111 * -0.229 ***

(0.046)

(0.048)

(0.045)

Education -1.482 *** -0.020

-1.130 ***

(0.039)

(0.039)

(0.039)

Citizenship (1=yes) 0.281 *** 0.318 *** 0.878 ***

(0.058)

(0.067)

(0.065)

Urbanity -0.349 *** -0.095 * -0.278 ***

(0.037)

(0.038)

(0.036)

Religiosity -0.272 *** -0.471 *** -0.780 ***

(0.041)

(0.043)

(0.041)

Socialness -0.224 *** -0.085

-0.056

(0.044)

(0.045)

(0.043)

Voted last election (1=yes)

-0.548 *** -0.140 *** -0.682 ***

(0.027)

(0.031)

(0.027)

Life satisfaction -0.136 * -0.847 *** -0.864 ***

(0.059)

(0.057)

(0.054)

Party identification -0.976 *** -0.418 *** -1.285 ***

(0.024)

(0.025)

(0.025)

Social trust -0.721 *** -1.510 *** -2.173 ***

(0.065)

(0.066)

(0.062)

Level of corruption -0.060

-0.184 *** -0.277 ***

(0.040)

(0.041)

(0.022)

Random Part

Country level variance

0.225 *** 0.326 *** 0.631 *** 0.209 *** 0.249 *** 0.479 *** 0.087 *** 0.094 *** 0.022 **

0.066

0.095

0.183

0.061

0.073

0.140

(0.026)

(0.028)

0.008)

Intraclass correlation (ICC)

0.06 0.09 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.01

n: countries (individuals)

24 (39312)

Note: Entries are coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression with standard errors in parenthesis. Significance: * <0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001.

18

Table 4 Multinomial logistic regression of how power-sharing institutions mediate the effect of

satisfaction with the economy on kinds of political dissatisfaction

M3 M4

Dise

mp

ow

ered

Un

sup

po

rtive

Dise

nch

ante

d

Dise

mp

ow

ered

Un

sup

po

rtive

Dise

nch

ante

d

B

(SE) B

(SE) B

(SE) B

(SE) B

(SE) B

(SE)

Fixed part

Constant 1.325*** 0.415*** 0.446*** 1.322*** 0.416*** 0.458***

(0.087) (0.096) (0.076) (0.087) (0.095) (0.077)

Horizontal power sharing (HPS) -0.043 -0.048 -0.030

(0.066) (0.070) (0.043)

Vertical power sharing (VPS)

-1.579* -1.022 -1.959***

(0.772) (0.801) (0.497)

Satisfaction w. economy -0.753*** -3.435*** -4.645*** -0.666*** -3.334*** -4.472***

(0.102) (0.102) (0.114) (0.102) (0.095) (0.122)

HPS x satisfaction w. economy 0.143 0.366*** 0.599***

(0.092) (0.092) (0.103)

VPS x satisfaction w. economy

0.526 2.654** 3.129**

(0.939) (0.886) (1.189)

Random part

Country level variance 0.104*** 0.119*** 0.040** 0.105*** 0.117*** 0.042**

(0.031) (0.036) (0.013) (0.031) (0.035) (0.014)

Satisfaction w. economy slope variance 0.158* 0.152* 0.197** 0.161* 0.119* 0.236**

(0.065) (0.065) (0.080) (0.066) (0.056) (0.091)

Covariance 0.002 0.061 0.052* 0.004 0.048 0.060*

(0.032) (0.037) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033) (0.029)

ICC 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01

n: countries (individuals) 24 (39312) Note: Entries are coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression with standard errors in parenthesis. Control variable estimates not shown (see table 3). Significance: * <0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001.

Figure 1 Citizen categories based on political attitudes

Subjective political empowerment

High Low

Political support

High Satisfied Disempowered

Low Unsupportive Disenchanted

19

Figure 2 Horizontal power sharing and the effect of satisfaction with the economy on political

dissatisfaction

HIGH HORIZONTAL POWER CONCENTRATION (LIJPHART=-2.56) HIGH HORIZONTAL POWER SHARING (LIJPHART = 2.15)

Figure 3 Vertical power sharing and the effect of satisfaction with the economy on political

dissatisfaction

HIGH VERTICAL POWER CONCENTRATION (FISC. DEC..=0.01) HIGH VERTICAL POWER SHARING (FISC. DEC.=0.44)

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

Pe

dic

ted p

ro

ba

bility

Satisfaction with economy

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

Pre

dic

ted p

ro

ba

bility

Satisfaction with economy

SatisfiedDisempowered

UnsupportiveDisenchanted

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

Pre

dic

ted p

ro

ba

bility

Satisfaction with economy

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

Pre

dic

ted p

ro

ba

bility

Satisfaction with economy

SatisfiedDisempowered

UnsupportiveDisenchanted