DoDI 5000.02 and Resource-Informed Army Modernization

Prepared for the RMS PartnershipGovernment-Industry Training Seminar, November 17-18, 2009

“DoDI 5000.02 and You: The Impact on RMS/L & Systems Engineering”

Dr. Russell Vacante, President

William D. Bajusz, Ph.D.Senior Logistics ConsultantWilliam.Bajusz@goldbeltwolf.comwww.LinkedIn.com/in/williambajusz

Goldbelt Wolf, LLC.An SDB 8(a) Alaska Native Corporation5500 Cherokee AvenueSuite 100Alexandria, VA 22312www.goldbeltwolf.com

2

Purpose

• To provide a basis for discussion of how DoDI 5000.02 relates to resource-informed Army modernization – from an RMS, logistics, and systems engineering perspective

RMS Partnership’s President’s Editorial• Are there “lessons learned” from less than a year’s

application of DoDI 5000.02?• Is there a common understanding between Services and

industry partners?• How compatible is technology insertion with Performance

Based Life Cycle Product Support requirements?

Fluid Environment• Downward pressures on DoD budget• Reexamination of Product Support

• Level of troop commitment to, and strategy in Afghanistan• Retrograde from Iraq

• Imperatives for full scale Army modernization

3

Agenda

• DoDI 5000.02 – Selected Excerpts• Future of Performance Based Life Cycle

Support• Resource-Informed Army Modernization• Precepts• Concluding Observations

4

DoDI 5000.02 – Selected Excerpts“Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred DoD strategy for the rapid

acquisition of mature technology for the user. An evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments, recognizing up front the need for future

capability improvements.”Enclosure 2, 2.a

“PMs for all programs shall formulate a viable Reliability, Availability,and Maintainability (RAM) strategy that includes a reliability growth programas an integral part of design and development. RAM shall be integrated withthe Systems Engineering processes, documented in the program’s Systems Engin-eering Plan (SEP) and Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP), and assessed duringtechnical reviews, test and evaluation (T&E), and Product Support Reviews (PSRs). Enclosure 2, 5, d (5)

“Life-cycle sustainment planning shall be considered during Materiel Solution Analysis, and shall mature throughout Technology Development. An LCSPshall be prepared for Milestone B.”

Enclosure 2, 8, c (1), (a)“The PM shall work with the user to document performance and sustain-

ment requirements in performance agreements specifying objective outcomes, measuresResource commitments, and stakeholder responsibilities. The PM shall employ effective Per-formance Based Life-Cycle Product Support (PBL) planning, development, implementa-tion and management.” Enclosure 2, 8, c (1), (d)

5

Total Life Cycle Product Support Cost Reduction

• Hon Jack Bell (DUSD L&MR) Delivered the Defense Department’s Keynote Address on “Maintaining Warfighter Readiness” at the Annual DoD Maintenance Symposium – October 28, 2008

• Army Business Case Analysis Policy issued 18 Aug 2005– Implements guidance necessary to conform with USD/ATL BCA Policy Memos issued in

2004– Identifies Type I (Feasibility) and Type II (Formal) BCAs

• Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (ATL) PBL Guidance Document on “Implementing a Life Cycle Management Framework” Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Services – July 2008

Weapon System Acquisition Reform Product Support Assessment

• Life Cycle Product Support Vision and Guiding Principles

• New Business Model• Resource Misalignment• Governance• Partnership Sub-optimization

Emphasizes and reinforces the use of Performance-Based Product Support strategies

Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-23), signed May 22, 2009

DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, signed December 8, 2008

6

Driving Costs Down, Performance Up

The Process OSD PBL Maturity Model

7

Perspective on the Army

Enterprise-Wide

“Whole of G

overnment”H

olis

tic

Sustain Prepare Reset Transform

Core Enterprises •Readiness (FORSCOM)•Human capital (TRADOC)•Services and infrastructure (IMCOM)•Materiel (AMC)

Organizing Principle: What are pragmatic RMS, logistics, and engineering actions to enable Readiness and Strategic Flexibility and to continue to meet rapidly changing current

demands at lowest possible cost?

Resource-Informed Modernization Strategy

8

Defense Acquisition Management System

9

First Principles

Congressional FundingFinancial

Infrastructure

WarfighterNeeds Accountability

?

Sub-optimized Tracking Systems Cause Needless Environmental Instability for the Government PM

10

LMP

GCSS-A F/T

AESIP

SALE

IT Infrastructure•Legacy Systems•CLOE•AILA•BCS3•LIW

•IUID•SIM•RFID

CBM+

Decision Support Tools, e.g., PFSA,

CASA

GTA

• ABCTM•Ground Combat Vehicle

AC/RCRebalance

Support to Other Services

Support From Other

Services

Balance CSS

(AC/RC)

Current Global Commitments

OPLANS

CONPLANS• NSS• NMS• GDF• DODD• DODI

Concepts

…

QDR

JCS• Joint Staff• JPG• JROC• JCIDS

…

UCCs• Regional• Functional

Logistics CPM

OSD, e.g.,• USD AT&L • USD P&R•Director, PA&E

Other Army Logistics Initiatives &

Programs, e.g.,• PBL

• Adaptive Logistics• ILAR• FLS

OSD Initiatives, e.g.,

• DoD Logistics Roadmap• HCS• IUID• RFID• CBM+• RBS

DLA(BRAC 2005)

Other Defense Agencies, e.g., • DCMA• DFAS

• APS• Army Strategy

• ASPG• ACP• ARPL• FMs• ARs

• Memoranda

Army Staff

Army Secretariat, e.g.,• ASA(ALT)• DUSA B/T

AMC

ILS (TLCMS)ASCC

DRU

AP3

FY 2010 DoD PresBud

• Base Budget• Overseas Contingency Ops

Off-Year PPBE• PCPs• PDM• BCPs• PBDs

• OMB Submission• Execution Review

PII (GPRA)• E.O. 13450• OMB PBB

•Outcome goals and objectives• PART

• Logistics Portfolio

AWCFDWCF G

AO

Congress

• DoS• DHS• DoJ• DoA• MNF-I

• NATO ISAF• (UN), (GOI), (GOA),

(GOP)

Public Private Partnerships

An RMS Perspective: Issues, Processes, Programs & Stakeholders

FORSCOM

TRADOC

Distribution

IMCOM

11

Pivot Points

• November 17, 2008: Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Government of Iraq calls for withdrawal of all US forces by 12/31/2011– Redeployment– Equipment retrograde

• April 06, 2009: Secretary Gates cancels vehicle component of Army’s Future Combat Systems program– Officially cancelled on June 23rd by Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition Carter• Creation of Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization effort

– Technology insertion increments– For FCS “spin outs”

• Creation of new Ground Combat Vehicle Program

12

Army Force Development: Parallel Streams

Reset• 300,000+ items of

equipment being retrograded from Iraq

• Depots have had a 3-year backlog for 4 years running

• Equipment being Reset to “zero miles” standard

• Should Reset incorporate technology insertion?

• Are the most cost-effective product support strategies in place for items being Reset?

Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Modernization• Increment 1 well

underway• Increment 2 in

definition• Is the product support

for each element of the increments the most cost-effective from Total System Life Cycle standpoint?

• Optimization of partnerships?

Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Modernization• Industry will play a

major role in defining options

• Initial focus on GCV Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)

• 2017• Product Support

Concept for family of vehicles

Technology insertion arrangements for some vehicles sub-optimized – e.g., Stryker S Mod

13

Precepts

• Current and emerging commitments drive Army acquisition (and organizational structure)– FCS: counterinsurgency and close-quarters combat issues invalidated the engineering trade-space where lower weight, higher

fuel efficiency and greater information awareness were judged adequate to compensate for less armor– MRAP: “urgent need” ~6,400 procured– M-ATV: “urgent need” – JROC Requirement for 5,200, with ~2,200 now being produced

• Systems engineering process needs to be proactive and the SEP adaptive– QDR and new GDF will help but– Burden will be on the PM to be attuned to emerging issues

• Army PM needs to have greater stability in funding– In macro: improved funding accountability systems and processes that are responsive to Congressional oversight requirements– In micro: longer duration (5-10 years) contracts with performance incentives that induce industry to bear greater share of the

risk• Incremental development with technology insertion is key in current environment• Army PM has no ready access to technology maturation plan relevant to his/her program

– Distributed technology development• In Army, e.g., LIA, RDECOM, PEOs• Across Industry

– Information gathering and assimilation processes have been outstripped by the pace of technology• Army PM doesn’t have a convenient “window” into all relevant Army guidance, related Army program developments, and

stakeholders• Army PM does not have the ability to readily access pertinent information about OSD or other Service programs and

initiatives– DoD Logistics Roadmap

14

Concluding Observations

• Given the “unusual” experience of the Army in the past year, it is difficult to draw any durable “lessons learned” from the application of DoDI 5000.02– Secretary Gates’ decision on FCS certainly consistent with tenets of DoDI 5000.02

• However, have learned that DoDI 5000.02 provides sound framework for acquisition and RMS in an environment where the “unusual” has become the norm– Incremental modernization through technology insertion– Up front consideration of product support in the acquisition cycle

• Is there a common understanding between the Services and their industry partners?– It depends on who you ask– PM and PSI may agree on need for longer duration contract, but that perception may not be

shared by Service’s contracting authority or the Congress• Technology insertion and product support are not only compatible, they are

inseparable in a resource-constrained environment• Need to be paying greater attention to technology insertion and product support in

Reset, and product support in BCT Modernization• GCV is an opportunity to “get it right” from a DoDI 5000.02 perspective

15

Quo Vadis?

DoDI 5000.02

DoD Weapon System Product Support

Assessment

PSAT FY 10 Work

Program