Dodds - Geopolitics in the Foreign Office British Representations of Argentina 1945-1961

Geopolitics in the Foreign Office: British Representations of Argentina 1945-1961Author(s): Klaus-John DoddsSource: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1994),pp. 273-290Published by: The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/622323 .

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273

Geopolitics in the Foreign Office: British representations of Argentina 1945-1961

Klaus-John Dodds

Existing studies of Anglo-Argentine relations tend to neglect the period 1945-61. The paper presents a critical geopolitical analysis of British representations of Argentina within foreign policy discourse. Geopolitical and geoeconomic representations, including those based on science, mapping and surveying, are understood as crucial to the legitimation of foreign policies. Government records are used to explore how a long-standing trading relationship was being replaced by relations based increasingly on conflict and geopolitical competition in the Antarctic and the South Atlantic.

key words Anglo-Argentine relations archival research cartography science critical geopolitics representation

Lecturer in Geography, CEDAR, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 OEX

revised manuscript received 21 December 1993

Introduction

There are many and varied accounts of Anglo- Argentine relations tracing patterns of commercial relationships, colonization and exploration, and geopolitical conflict'. In this paper, it is suggested that Anglo-Argentine relations in the 1950s have not received the extensive study and investigation char- acteristic of previous (e.g. the immediate postwar) and subsequent (e.g. 1968-1982 and the Falklands/ Malvinas War) periods. An important part of the Anglo-Argentine relationship has thereby been neglected. The 1950s, for instance, was a time when Anglo-Argentine trade had virtually collapsed and a period when geopolitical competition over the Falkland Islands and Antarctica was to change from pressing legal claims to outbreaks of violence. These conflicts were later neutralized by the emergence of the Antarctic Treaty System in 1959-61.

This paper attempts to link the research strategies of critical geopolitics to a detailed archival-based investigation of British government records. Anglo-

Argentine relations in the 1940s and 1950s were characterized by a decisive shift away from a (declining) trading-based relationship to one based on geopolitical competition in the South Atlantic. I hope to illustrate how existing critical geopolitical studies of foreign policy imaginations and representations may be utilized to investigate Anglo- Argentine history (see, for example, Slater 1993). It is suggested that, in spite of the significant changes to the Anglo-Argentine connection, official British geopolitical and geoeconomic representations of Argentina were surprisingly reactionary. Over a period of fifteen years, the paper charts in detail how those representations were linked to changing trading and geopolitical circumstances. Ultimately, I would argue that the stereotypical representations of 'Argentina' led British officials on the one hand to exaggerate Argentina as a site of danger yet paradoxically, on the other hand, to trivialize Argentina's counter-claims to disputed territory such as the Falklands/Malvinas Islands or Antarctica. Tragically, the failure of British governments to address those long standing territorial

Trans Inst Br Geogr NS 19 273-290 1994 ISSN: 0020-2754 Printed in Great Britain



274 K-J Dodds

claims ultimately contributed to the outbreak of the 1982 Falklands/Mavlinas War (Beck 1988, Dodds 1993b).

Historical context and archival sources

The immediate postwar context for Anglo- Argentine affairs was shaped by several distinctive developments. First, the rapid disintegration of Anglo-Argentine trading relations (which had been so decisive in shaping previous Anglo-Argentine history) fundamentally altered the dynamics of that relationship (see Bulmer-Thomas 1989, Hennessy and King 1992). The nationalization of the Argentine railways in 1947 by the Peron regime, for example, confirmed that trend. Secondly, the rise of Colonel Peron in Argentine politics from the 1940s onwards had a decisive impact on Anglo-Argentine relations. Peron's promotion of Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas and the Antarctic increased the tension between Britain and Argentina.

In a broader context, the period in question was shaped by two developments. The first was the consolidation of the United States as the major great power within Latin America in the immediate postwar period (see Morris 1990, Parkinson 1990). The rise of pan-Americanism during the Second World War and its consolidation with the 1947 Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assist- ance) on collective defence confirmed that trend (Dieguez 1989). Secondly, the impact of the second World War on the British economy had a profound impact on British overseas investment and defence commitments. British defence spending increased significantly in the 1950s largely as a consequence of involvements in conflicts such as Korea and in an evolving nuclear weapons programme (Dockrill 1988). However, in terms of Britain's global priorities, Latin America continued to be ascribed a low strategic or military importance. As Calvert (1990) notes, the promotion of trade in the region was to be the central priority, notwithstanding the long-standing territorial disputes in British Guiana, Belize and the Falklands/Malvinas.

This paper is based on a reading of records of the Foreign Office (also Cabinet and Admiralty records) and on interviews with officials attached to the American Department of the Foreign Office in the 1950s and 1960s.2 Secondary literatures were used to supplement this primary data base. The paper explores how certain Foreign Office officials were

making sense of Anglo-Argentine relations. As such, there is no explicit claim to completeness; my interpretation of a range of Foreign Office records does not enable me to claim to be able to (re)present the Foreign Office view. The complex webs of interaction between civil servants, ministers and other influential individuals can only be inferred. This reliance on inference reflects the restrictions that exist on access under current legislation gov- erning public records. Most records of the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and the Dominions Office which relate to the Falkland Islands or Antarctic claims after 1940 are closed for 50 years, sometimes even 75 years. Indeed some of the most controversial records on assessments of British sovereignty are closed indefinitely.

By using available archival records, the paper attempts to highlight the existence of remarkably durable representations of 'Argentina', as a particular type of place within the discourse of British foreign policy. It is argued that those (geopolitical) representations (and/or imaginations) were crucial to the enframing of the meanings and relations of Anglo-Argentine relations. For our purposes, therefore, archival research has the advantage of allowing the possibility of reasonably detailed interpretations of this period, 1954-1960. The paper is thus con- fined to elite representations of 'Argentina' and does not link these to popular sites of representation (e.g. the media, but see Howells 1992 on the British press and the Perons). However, it is suggested that Argentina is represented by elites in a number of different ways: as a place with which Britain has enjoyed a long trading history and which is now attempting to renegotiate that relationship; as a place inscribed as a source of danger to British colonial possessions in the South Atlantic; and as a place populated by hysterical and hyperbolic political leaders. These representations are significant because they enabled British elites to pursue policies which were remarkably reactionary and which, in turn, contributed little to renegotiating Anglo-Argentine relations in the second half of the twentieth century.

The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. First, a brief discussion of critical geopolitics, cartography and representation aims to situate the paper within contemporary debates in human geography; the subsequent historical narra- tive will be used to illustrate such issues. Secondly, the period immediately after the Second World War (1945-51) is explored because many of the



Geopolitics in the Foreign Office 275

processes and patterns that can be detected in the 1950s have their origins in the 1940s (and earlier). The third section explores the period between 1950 and 1959. In doing so it is suggested that two competing scripts of Argentina were used to (re)present 'Argentina' as a place: on the one hand as a potential economic partner (with an associated history of commercial and cultural relationships with Britain); on the other hand as a geopolitical rival intent on threatening British sovereign claims in the Antarctic and the South Atlantic. The final section focuses on the importance of the Antarctic Treaty System in suspending possible conflict in Antarctica in the late 1950s and early 1960s at a time when trading relations had virtually disappeared.

I hope that this paper will be considered not only in terms of its modest contribution to the existing literature on Anglo-Argentine history. As a geographical study, it has been informed by ongoing debates within political geography and it attempts to explore how places such as Argentina or Antarctica are specified within the narratives of British foreign policy professionals (whether ministers or civil servants). The sorts of stories that are recounted about places and peoples are crucial to the justification and legitimation of certain foreign policies. Furthermore, the paper attempts to highlight geographical practices such as mapping and surveying in the legitimation of sovereign claims to territory; in this context the case of the Falkland Islands Dependency Survey is briefly considered.

Critical geopolitics, cartography and representation The recent literature on 'critical geopolitics' has been a major source of inspiration for this paper. By drawing on theories of representation, cartography and discourse, writers such as Dalby (1990, 1991), O Tuathail (1992a, 1993) and 6 Tuathail and Agnew (1992) have attempted to reconstitute geopolitics as an academic practice. Rather than con- ceptualizing 'geopolitics' as a seemingly self-evident academic preoccupation (which produces authori- tive readings of international politics), critical geopolitics has sought to investigate how geopolitical discourse is constituted by a series of specialized languages, grammars and rhetorics. Academic geopolitics has had a lengthy interest in (re)presenting other places and peoples within (often) grand geopolitical schemes but, for critical geopolitics, the concept of representation (see Duncan and Sharp

1993) is crucial. Following writers such as Barnes and Duncan (1992), critical geopolitical scholars have suggested that the academic practice of geopolitics is not simply about recording the 'realities' of the earth (or international politics): the representation of earthly descriptions reveals as much about our theories and positionalities as it does about any external realities. In an epistemological context, therefore, critical geopolitics attempts to acknowledge the specificities of those representations.

Cartography is an important element of representation. The map (whether it be, for instance, a depiction of a region or the world under a Heartland-Rimland scheme) had been considered capable of faithfully representing geopolitical realities save for the impossibility posed by scale (Natter and Jones 1993). Echoing the sentiments of the late Brian Harley, critical geopolitical writers such as 6 Tuathail (1989, 1994), have argued that cartography and geopolitics are far from 'innocent tools' of representation and are heavily implicated with author(ity) and power. The map and the survey have been important components in the contribution of geography and geopolitics to the consolidation and legitimation of territorial sovereignty (Harley 1992). Critical geopolitical writers have tried to investigate how and with what effect the representational practices employed more recently by geopoliticians have contributed to the legitimation of territorial forms of reasoning and claims to territory and resources.

More specifically, the representation of 'foreign places and people could be considered within the wider debates on representation within human geography (e.g. Dalby 1990, O Tuathail and Agnew 1992, Duncan and Sharp 1993). In one respect, geopolitical writers have long recognized that the practices of foreign policy have obvious geographical connotations (e.g. Spykman 1944, Cohen 1973, Gray 1988). However, an important distinguishing feature between earlier writers and critical geopolitical writers is that the geographical depictions in the narratives of foreign policy are investigated within a context that is also sensitive to the material circumstances from which those depictions arose (see, for example, O Tuathail 1992b). The depictions of place and the politics sustaining forms of territorial reasoning are influ- enced by historical discourses on the nation-state, territorial politics and (often popular) representations (see O Tuathail 1992a, 1992b, 1993; Sharp 1993).



276 K-J Dodds

Within those analyses of the geographical and geopolitical components of the practices of foreign policy lie the development of the concepts of the script and story-telling. The former has been defined as a 'set of representations, a collection of descriptions, scenarios and attributes deemed to define a place in foreign policy' within the utterances of foreign policy professionals (see 0 Tuathail 1992a, 156). Critical geopolitical writers attempt to investigate carefully how descriptions of places and peoples are stitched together to narrate and 'explain' events. Foreign policy professionals are understood as the 'master' story-tellers; their interpretations and utterances are crucial to the legitimation and justification of the practices of foreign policy (see Slater 1993 on experts, representation and development theory). The public (and private) stories of foreign policy professionals con- tribute to the public expositions that effectively constitute the practices of foreign policy (Dalby 1990, 0 Tuathail and Agnew 1992).3 In their detailed investigations of US decision-making during the Vietnam conflict, Sylvan and Majeski (1994), for example, have explored practical forms of geopolitical reasoning employed in foreign-policy- making. They suggest that a crucial component of the problem-solving culture of US foreign policy are the descriptions of specific places. Geographical depictions of Indo-China (as a place, for example, infiltrated by communists or anti-imperialists) altered as the US expanded its involvement in the region (Sylvan and Majeski 1994). The descriptions and representations of places can be far more nested (regions, states, sections), far more complex (people, history, borders) and far more subtle (locations, places, internal features) than descriptions of geopolitical circumstances investigated thus far by critical geopolitical analyses.

As a consequence, this study focuses on a range of geopolitical and geoeconomic representations made by Foreign Office mandarins (in the main) and by the subsequent actions of British governments. The primary concern of this investigation is how places such as Argentina or the South Atlantic are represented (as particular types of places) within the changing and evolving narratives of foreign policy professionals based in London. Within those narratives on Anglo-Argentine relations lay three major components: first, British Officials faced a difficult dilemma: how was Britain (an economically fragile state in 1945) going to maintain relations with Argentina, and, more generally, with Latin America?

In the heyday of Anglo-Argentine relations, trade and commerce had been important and largely mutually beneficial for political and economic elites (see Thompson 1992). Faced with severe shortages of meat in 1945, however, the British government looked to Argentina for additional supplies. A new economic relationship with Argentina had to be developed within the existing historical discourses on trade, commerce and resources. Secondly, with the emergence of Colonel Peron from the 1940s onwards, British officials were faced with an indi- vidual able effectively to mobilize discourses of territorial reasoning to justify support for nationalistic politics. Territorial politics between Britain and Argentina entered its most important phase in the 1950s and 1960s. Thirdly, in terms of policy pre- scription, British officials were attempting to juggle the promotion of trade, the protection of the colonies such as Belize, British Guyana and the Falkland Islands on reduced defence budgets, and the changing international politics of Antarctica (explored later in the paper). Discourses of science further complicated the contradictory relations between geoeconomics and geopolitics and led to the privileging of traditional territorial reasoning which emphasized British 'sovereign' territory. Cartographic agencies such as the Falkland Islands Dependency Survey played an active role in legitimating such claims.

In spite of the significant changes to Anglo- Argentine relations in the 1940s and 1950s, British elites perpetuated representations of Argentina based on 'familiar' stereotypes of Latin personalities and nation-states (Gooch 1990a, 1990b). As the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster concluded in July 1960:

One has been warned about making generalizations about Latin America ... On the east side of the Andes you will find all the vigour, speed and brashness traditionally associated with North America . . . But on the west side the tempo is more subdued, more European, and the gracious architecture of the Spanish colonial era is not yet subdued.4

The durable representation of Argentina, as a place dominated by Latin exaggeration and/or grandeur, was an important component in the British elite visualization of Anglo-Argentine relations. In consequence British intransigence over territorial claims in the South Atlantic and Antarctica could be justified as a reaction to the dangers posed by the Argentine state.




Anglo-Argentine relations between 1945-51

Geoeconomic competition Anglo-Argentine relations during the period immediately after the Second World War compare unfavourably to the first decades of the twentieth century (see Hennessy and King 1992). The decades before the Great Depression of the 1930s represented the final chapter of a financial and commercial relationship that had witnessed the creation of a rail network, a banking system and trading relations based on Argentine imports of manufactured goods and British imports of primary products such as beef. Furthermore, the existence of a large Anglo- Argentine community (with, for example, its own clubs and newspapers) ensured a British (elite) 'sense of familiarity' for a place not formally incorporated into the British Empire (see Graham-Yooll 1981). As Harry Ferns (1953) reminds us, Argentina was part of Britain's 'informal empire' (although see the critical review of Thompson 1992 on this concept of 'informal empire').

Sir Neville Henderson, a former British ambassador to Argentina in the 1930s, recalled a series of meetings with the Minister of Agriculture (Senor Carcano). The latter was described by Henderson (1945) as 'one of the best types of landowners and politicians'. On another occasion, he noted that the Minister of Marine was 'a useful friend... especially when it was a question of contracts for the Argentine navy .. .'. The familiarity with which British officials described 'The Argentine' in the 1930s was replaced by uneasiness in the 1940s. By 1945, Anglo-Argentine commerce and trade had entered a phase of decline (Lewis 1975, Rock 1987, MacDonald 1992). Argentina's declar- ation of neutrality during the Second World War disturbed American and British political elites who, although suspicious of Peron's military regime, had enjoyed relatively safe shipping lanes in the South Atlantic. However, as the former British Ambassador to Argentina, Sir David Kelly noted,

Their policy of liberal neutrality is an indication that the people of Argentina, forgetting their past glorious history, have not fully appreciated the true nature of the conflict now being waged by the forces of tyranny ... Latin Americans are temperamental creatures, in dealing with them, effects are often quite out of all proportion ... they experience little hesitation in acting contrary to common sense.6

British elite representations of Argentina in the 1940s were (consistently) hostile and based largely on stereotypical representations of Latin 'personalities': unpredictable, hysterical and irrational. Such dehistoricized and a-geographical representations of Argentina were largely a product of frustration within the British elite over declining trade performance and of fears about Argentine involvement in the Antarctic. The sources of that unease were several-fold. First, foreign policy professionals were concerned that a rather nostalgic 'sense of history' between Argentina and Britain had been replaced by more immediate and pragmatic priorities (like Peron's interest in strengthening an 'independent' Argentine economy). Secondly, and as a consequence, British elites were aware that, for some Argentines, the source of danger to their country was not Nazi Germany but Britain and the unpopu- lar Roca-Runciman trade pact of 1933 which had shattered Argentina's export earning potential. As Crawley (1984, 58) reminds us:

With Britain imposing protective measures in favour of the export trade of its Dominions, Argentina's hard currency revenue was falling rapidly ... the Roca-Runciman pact ... read like little more than a list of unilateral concessions by Argentina.

Thus Argentina's eventual policy of neutrality upset sections of the British political elite who hoped that Argentina would explicitly support the Allied forces and the British war effort. At the same time, however, the eventual overthrow of the Costas presidency by a group of Army officers led by Colonel Peron in June 1943 opened a new chapter in Anglo-Argentine relations that was further to alter Foreign Office representations. The immediate reaction of the Foreign Office in London to the Argentine military coup of 1943 was hostile. As one official noted:

From our point of view the older generation are definitely an advantage at the head of affairs, the meat growers of Buenos Aires province especially. So I see no reason to wish matters were otherwise ...7

A group of mysterious army officers who are led by Colonel Peron (of whom we known nothing) has taken political power.8

The Argentine government is controlled by a gang of Anti-US nationalistic and totalitarian colonels ... there is no sign in Argentina of the emergence of any political opposition capable of overthrowing the present government.9



278 K-J Dodds

These years, therefore, confirmed Argentina as a source of tension for the British state. Familiar British elite stereotypes about 'Latin' personalities permeated Foreign Office records as did a fasci- nation for the President's wife, Eva Peron. As one official noted:

Ministers trailed through the corridors of the Casa Rosada after the petticoat of the First Lady of the Land transacting business with her on the principle of the Mad Hatter's Tea Party.io

The tension between Britain and Argentina increased over the following years as officials at the Foreign Office struggled to make sense of the Peron regime. The subsequent electoral victory of Peron in 1946 and the initiation of a Five Year Plan (1947-52) for the industrialization of Argentina provoked angry and remarkably reactionary geopolitical and geoeconomic responses. As the British Ambassador, Sir Rex Leeper, noted in December 1947:

There is no sign of dawning recognition that the traditional customers for Argentine primary produce may be estranged or impoverished by these selfish designs, or that the costs of these unsound enterprises must eventually impede the republic's ability to maintain her agricultural costs at competitive levels.I"

British unhappiness over the Peron regime in the period after the Second World War was revealed most clearly over two major issues: the supply of meat from Argentina to Britain, and the question of sovereignty claims in the Antarctic and South Atlantic. As Lewis (1975, 121) reminds us, meat was one of Argentina's major exports to Britain between 1945-52 but rising domestic consumption and a decline in slaughterings reduced exports to Britain (from 1295 million pesos per year between 1940-44 to 1000 million pesos a year between 1945-49: figures adjusted for inflation). The Foreign Office in London was deeply concerned that:

Since the War, Anglo-Argentine relations have turned upon the price of meat ... and that a hungry world could be forced to pay whatever Argentina choose to demand.i2

Between 1946 and 1952 the British government sent six trade missions to Argentina to discuss the situation. Underlying these events, however, were elite representations of Argentina which display a remarkable bitterness over the changing economic

circumstances of Anglo-Argentine relations. The disputes over meat supplies were not just over finance but were also about how British elites defined Britain and Argentina's place in a postwar world. Having defeated Nazism in Europe, British elites were having difficulty coping with the chal- lenges (such as any attempt to take advantage of temporary British economic weakness) that Peron's Argentina posed to the traditions which supposedly characterized Anglo-Argentine connections.

The first meeting on meat supplies in 1946, for instance, proposed that the 1933 Roca-Runciman Treaty be updated and provide for more favourable trading relations. At the same time, however, Sir Rex Leeper suggested in September 1946 that:

It is important that these people should be stopped in their present course in order to put them in their proper place in the world and in our interests as a country considerably dependent on the purchase of their products during the next two years.3

Nevertheless, in spite of The Economist's reaction that Peron's tactics were 'obviously not learnt at public school' (a popular motif of British elite resentment of Peron's government) a bulk buying agreement was signed between the two states in September 1946 (Lewis 1975, MacDonald 1992).14 The resentment of British political elites to these changing trading conditions was ironic (if predict- able) given the previous arrangements with the estancieros in the 1930s.'5 Whilst Anglo-Argentine trading relations were being renegotiated in this period, British elite representations appeared unable to react in ways that were radically different from representations of earlier periods. As Sir John Balfour noted in August 1949:

the Argentines seem incapable of drafting an agreement themselves but they are finished experts at twisting contractual terms in such a way as to deprive all, and more, of their own benefits, while depriving the other side of their share of the advantage as far as possible."6

Geopolitical competition There were also fears that Antarctica and the South Atlantic might emerge as a site of geopolitical and territorial competition (see Beck 1984, Child 1985). Argentina was increasingly represented as a dangerous place led by 'irrational' and 'unstable' military leaders who were against US and British imperial involvement in the region (unlike the estancieros of




the 1930s who were empowered by their contacts with foreign capital investment and export earn- ings). Thus, characterized by some as a place of grandeur and hyperbole, Argentina was also represented as a dangerous threat to British sovereign claims in the South Atlantic. As Beck (1986, 32) notes, British anxieties over legal, political and strategic interests led to the British War Cabinet approving that:

all possible steps should be taken to strengthen our title over the Antarctic Dependencies of the Falkland Islands against which the Argentines are encroaching.

Operation Tabarin (1943-45) aimed to restore British Antarctic interests in the region: by remov- ing rival marks of sovereignty (e.g. plaques), by deploying naval forces in the region and by the funding of expeditions to the Antarctic.'7 It was funded by the Churchill government on the basis of representations of Argentina as a dangerous place committed to overturning British sovereign claims to the region. In spite of the severe financial pres- sures facing the British government during the Second World War, monies were found in order that Operation Tabarin could establish permanent bases on the continent during the 1943-44 season. After the end of the Second World War this operation was transformed into a civilian organization, the Falkland Islands Dependency Survey (FIDS), funded by the Colonial Office and dedicated to protecting the sovereign claims of the British state.'8

British resentment over Argentine interest in Antarctica and the South Atlantic led to a series of protests, counter-protests and limited engagements. British officials at the Foreign Office attempted to justify their militarized operations in the South Atlantic by appealing to scientific research and to legal pedantry. Such appeals also contributed to Foreign Office representations of Britain as inher- ently rational and orderly compared to the aggressive and childishly ambitious Argentine state. Following the launch of the second expedition of Operation Tabarin, for instance, an official at the Colonial Office noted that:

the British view is that the discovery of polar territories, followed by periodic visits and the exercise of administrative functions, is a sufficient basis for a title to such territories.i"9

The creation of FIDS in 1947 confirmed the importance of the 'scientific' activities of cartography and surveying as vital components in the confirmation

and legitimation of territorial claims (see, for example, Harley 1992). As the FIDS base commander in Antarctica was reminded,

the primary object of the Survey is to strengthen His Majesty's title to the sector of Antarctica ... The secondary objective of the Survey is to continue scientific work in the Antarctic.20

In the summer season of 1947-48, the new Attlee government despatched HMS Sheffield from South Africa to the South Atlantic in response to the provocative presence of Argentine naval 'exercises' in the region (cited in Calvert 1992, 49). Ironically, therefore, the scientific (and civilian) activities of the FIDS were having to be supported by a British warship reacting against the 'self-evidently' threatening presence of Argentina.

The importance of cartographic and surveying activities on behalf of the British government was considerable. The maintenance of the FIDS's activities was a priority for those attached to the American Department in the Foreign Office. As Figure I suggests, British claims to the Antarctic (formally dating from 1908) had been legally challenged by Argentina in 1943 (Chile had made an Antarctic claim in 1940). Within Argentina, the Military Geographical Institute received financial support from the Peron regime in order to promote the cartographic annexation of the 'Argentine Antarctic' from 1947 onwards (see Peron 1947, Aramayo 1949).21 In addition, the Argentine Antarctic Institute (formally created in 1951) launched annual expeditions to the Antarctic as well as publishing results of these 'scientific' activities in several journals: Antartida, Boletin and Contribuciones Cientificas. As a consequence, officials at the Foreign Office were concerned that Argentine pretensions had to be countered by geographical activities that supported British sovereign claims in the South Atlantic.

In 1948, further fears were expressed inside the Foreign Office and in other government departments that conflict might erupt in the Antarctic. Indeed in 1948 an agreement was signed in London by Britain, Argentina and Chile preventing the use of warships south of 60?S in response to fears of naval clashes.22 As Vice Admiral Sir William Tennant noted in a remarkable letter to the First Sea Lord, Sir John Cunningham, dated 5 May 1948:

I would hold onto the Falklands and South Georgia at all costs, even to the extent of going to war . .. and



280 K-J Dodds

2ISLAS

& ?XFALKLAND

V MALVINAS ISLANDS BIRD

, ISLAND ISLAS SOUTH

-

o GEORGIAS O GEORGIA DELSUR CAPEHORN

ISLAS .

SOUTH SANDWICH SANDWICH

j MAR DE o .. WEDELL

SDELWE DELL

060's 6.

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Antirtida Argentina British Antarctic Territory

0 km 800 (defined as 25?W

- 74?W

0 km 800 (defined as 20?

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m

,south of 60?S) SOUTH POLE south of 60?S) 'I

Figure 1. Rival Antarctic claims. Source: Beck 1988

discuss the question of internationalizing the Antarctic ... if the Argentines are too stupid to listen to any of this then I see no alternative to continue the rather childish performance that has gone on between our ships.23

This Naval Agreement was renewed each year (Beck 1990) until the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) took over the demilitarization of the continent and surrounding water, so subsuming the Agreement. The interplay between geopolitics, law and science within Foreign Office discussions of Anglo- Argentine relations in Antarctica has been remarked upon by other scholars (e.g. Beck 1989, 1990; Joyner 1985). However, neither the citing of science by the British authorities as the raison d'itre for sending warships (such as HMS Nigeria in 1948) to defend the imperial fantasies in the South Atlantic, nor the use of science by the British polar authorities to castigate (in private at least) the Argentines and Chileans for their 'unscientific' activities in the region, has been fully appreciated.24 A popular point of comparison employed by British polar experts, for example, was to compare and contrast

the research publications of British and South American scientists. This process was undoubtedly aided by the very close co-operation that existed between the Polar regions office within the Foreign Office and scientists attached to the Falkland Islands Dependency Survey. The partnership in the 1950s between Dr Brian Roberts of the FO and Dr (later Sir) Vivian Fuchs of the FIDS is a case in point.

The construction by British political elites of Argentina as a 'threat' or a 'danger' to British sovereign claims was most intense at a time when Anglo-Argentine trading links were declining in significance. The strategic importance of Antarctica for the British authorities in the 1950s was largely understood with reference to Argentine (and Chilean) activities that compromised British sovereign claims in the region. However, as the decade unfolded Antarctica gradually became encoded as a place of potential conflict or tension within the wider drama of the Cold War. This in turn was crucial to the eventual transformation of the Antarctic continent by the creation of the Antarctic Treaty System in the final years of the 1950s.




Anglo-Argentine relations between 1950-5 9

The first decade after the Second World War was characterized by further tensions within Anglo- Argentine relations. In July 1951 the British Embassy in Buenos Aires reminded officials at the Foreign Office that:

Politically and culturally Argentina aspires to the leadership of Latin America and invariably lays stress on her cultural and racial links, with the civilization of Spain and Italy ... the Argentine assumption of superiority is universally resented.25

The characterization of Argentina as a place of mainly Southern European heritage enabled further stereotypical characterizations and representations about assumed superiority and territorial aggrandise- ment. In addition, at a time of continued commercial and trading decline between the two states, these representations intensified British fears that Argentina was attempting to take over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and British Antarctic territories (Antartida Argentina).26 Reactionary geopolitical assessments of Anglo-Argentine relations enabled further British financial and discursive investment in scientific activities and general intransigence over colonial possessions. However, as we shall see, this did not deter British elites from trying to sell arms to Argentina in the 1950s even though they were concerned that such sales might compromise British claims!

Geopolitical conflict In 1951, for instance, the British Ambassador to Argentina reported that Peron had despatched six ships to the Antarctic region. In spite of the assurance of the Ambassador that no offensive action was contemplated, Churchill ordered the despatch of a 'company of British infantry to the Falkland Islands at once' (Hennessy 1984).27 Despite the advice of the Foreign Office, Churchill felt that any challenge (however remote) to British sovereignty had to be repulsed in order not to compromise those claims.28

During the following year, the Argentine government of Peron initiated a major campaign in the Antarctic region (Beck 1989). As Calvert (1992) has argued, the Falklands/Malvinas and the Antarctic had become central planks in Peron's 'Third Position' approach (i.e. developing policies independent of the interests of the Superpowers) to foreign

policy and international relations (see Milensky 1978). The outbreak of a number of incidents on the continent served to confirm that Anglo-Argentine relations were increasingly characterized by conflict and tension rather than cooperation. The most celebrated incident was at Hope Bay in 1952. An Argentine polar expedition established a base in the region after the British had abandoned an earlier base. The arrival of the British ship John Biscoe on 30 January 1952 provoked an immediate protest as the British found Argentine personnel at their former base. The following day, a British team led by George Marsh and Frank Elliot proceeded to land stores in order to re-establish a new base. However, according to official records, the Argentine base commander reportedly told the British that 'I am instructed by my commander to prevent you from building a base here, using force, if necessary' (Beck 1989, 36). Shortly afterwards, machine-gun fire was directed over the heads of the British personnel who were then forcefully escorted back to the John Biscoe. On hearing the news, the then Governor of the Falkland Islands, Sir Miles Clifford, sent a telegram to the Colonial Office suggesting that 'this presum- ably constitutes an act of war'. Without waiting for a reply from the Colonial Office, the Governor ordered the John Biscoe to wait at Hope Bay and await the arrival of HMS Burghead Bay. Later in February 1952, the British were able to rebuild their base at Hope Bay.

The reactions of officials at the Foreign Office to such an incident were predictably filled with anger and concern. As an official noted on 16 February 1952:

the Foreign Office view is that the Argentines have overreached themselves in the recent Hope Bay incident ... Argentina intends to increase the number and permanency of bases in Antarctica for prestige reasons.29

Indeed the 1950s was a period of unprecedented activity in Argentina over the question of pursuing Argentine Antarctic claims. As President Peron argued in May 1952

We entered into agreements under which we cannot occupy these regions militarily, but these scientific expeditions will step by step take possession of them ... those who discuss our' rights have thousands of years behind, but perhaps a very few ahead. We have a century behind, but many in front of us.30

As a consequence, Peron had encouraged official surveys, commissioned reports on the polar



282 K-J Dodds

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Moon Bay, Livingston Island ADMIRALTY BAY C

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,P , - o S E A __ ,0________. . .._________ Nautical Miles

ArBentine **......... Pecked coastline is based on rough recconaissance

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70 60S RESEARCH DEPT., F.O., MAY. 1951

Figure 2. Antarctic activity in the FID, 1951. Source: PRO (FO) 371/90440

continent (e.g. International Service of Argentine Publications 1955) and increased funding to the Argentine Antarctic Institute. Furthermore, the expansion of geographical and geopolitical studies in Argentina in the 1950s created academic and public interest in the South Atlantic region (see Isola and Berra 1950). The increase in Argentine activity in the Antarctic worried officials at the Foreign Office. In spite of attempts to resolve these overlapping territorial claims at the International Court of Justice (which Argentina rejected), the foreign Office was concerned that Argentina's surveying and cartographic activities were compromising British claims. As Brian Roberts noted:

The hydrographer told me last week that he thought it was most unsatisfactory that the Admiralty should have to correct their charts of the Falkland Island Dependencies from Argentine and Chilean surveys and have to acknowledge this in print... We must act now if there is any hope of stepping up FIDS activity.31

Within the records of the Foreign Office, there are many examples of Brian Roberts and his (influential)

research department expressing concern over Argentine activities. It is evident from Foreign Office maps, for example, that there is concern for the number and location of Argentine and Chilean bases in the Falkland Islands Dependencies (see Fig. 2). For instance, Figure 2 purports to illustrate the location of 'Bases in the Falkland Islands Depen- dencies, 1951'. There were also fears that Argentina might militarily (as opposed to cartographically) annexe British Antarctic possessions. In one case, for instance, an official at the Colonial Office reported that an appeal had been made to the Admiralty for a batch of marines to be left at Deception Island because:

The Argentines in some force may assert their 'rights' to Deception Island... We might next year hear of the survivors in an Argentine prison.32

However, the background to such fears was based largely on the British authorities forcefully remov- ing Argentine and Chilean personnel from Decep- tion Island earlier in the year. In a telegraph (10 February 1953) to the British High Commissioner in




Ottawa, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, notes that

after very careful consideration decision has been reached that the only possible course is to remove latest Argentine and Chilean intruders from [Deception] Island and to dismantle their instal- lations ... With object of avoiding resistance and possible bloodshed our aim is to take South American parties by surprise.33

British concern that Argentine and Chilean activities in the Antarctic were compromising British sovereign claims surfaces later in the telegraph:

we are already outclassed by Argentina in the Antarctic .. We have only one obsolescent vessel... We have no aircraft in the region... To go on as we are would merely encourage the Argentines to continue their encroachments until they force us out completely: thereafter they would probably launch a heightened campaign against the Falkland Islands themselves.34

The Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Office later proposed to the Foreign Office that HMS Snipe should remain around Deception Island to deter any further incursions given that the Argentine Navy was responsible for all Antarctic expeditions. How- ever, there appears to have been some disagreement between government departments over these deployments.35 Indeed the Foreign Office later indicated with government approval in 1954 that

it has been suggested that we might make some show of naval force and welcome the Argentine party as our guests, thus demonstrating our claim to sovereignty.

The Attlee government later agreed to send a frigate to Deception Island to meet the Argentine Antarctic expedition of 1954.36

Geoeconomic cooperation: the arms trade When 'Argentina' was not being encoded as a threat or source of danger to British territorial claims, officials at the Foreign Office attempted to encourage Anglo-Argentine trade. The trade figures for 1952-56 (see Lewis 1975) reveal the poor performance of British exports to Argentina (see Table I). This was due in part to increased competition from the USA, Germany and other South American states but it was also due to the fact that Argentina's economy needed raw materials and semi-finished goods rather than expensive manufac-

Table I. Anglo-Argentine trade 1950-60

Imports Exports Year From UK Total To UK Total

1945 30 301 189 720 1950 113 965 211 1177 1951 111 1480 200 1169 1952 70 1117 97 688 1953 49 795 218 1125 1954 72 979 188 1027 1955 76 1173 201 929 1956 53 1128 212 944 1957 101 1310 237 975 1958 102 1233 237 994 1959 90 993 235 1009 1960 113 1249 221 1079

(Figures in millions of dollars, adjusted) Source: Lewis 1975 120

tured items. As MacDonald (1992, 190) notes, the then Head of the Instituto Argentino de Promocion de InterCambio (IAPI) Miguel Miranda wanted 'coal and raw materials such as caustic soda and soda ash. Argentina could not live on whisky or lipstick'.37 Peron's policy of import-substitution meant that local industries were replacing the traditional dependencies on British exports.

However, one growth area in British exports seemed to be the arms trade. Foreign Office records indicate that there was a concern that such sales might have a detrimental impact on British territorial claims in the South Atlantic but few officials seemed able to detect the irony of their concern for possible Argentine 'penetration' in the Antarctic whilst at the same time trying to sell weapons and aircraft to Argentina. As Sir Ian KirkPatrick at the Foreign Office noted:

Sir Henry Mack (the then British Ambassador to Argentina) might be instructed to tell the Argentines that we should like to sell them the helicopters ... it would be very awkward if they were to be sub- sequently used in Argentine adventures in the Antarctic.38

The fears over helicopters were replicated later when the subject of the possibility of the sale of a few Shackleton aircraft was raised. As an official at the Foreign Office noted: 'The point for us is whether Shackletons would, like the helicopters, assist the Argentine penetration of our Antarctic sector'.39 In both cases, however, the sales were



284 K-J Dodds

eventually refused because there was no agreement amongst departments as to whether these aircraft constituted a threat to British sovereign interests (even though the Treasury was anxious that such trade deals should be completed).

Two years later, in 1956, the possibility of a sale of arms and an aircraft carrier to Argentina dominated cabinet business of the Churchill government. On the advice of his officials, the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, recommended that:

No attempt should be made to evict the Argentines and Chileans from their bases in Antarctic. The new government in Argentina (i.e. led by a military admin- istration under General Aramburu) were pursuing a less aggressive policy in the Antarctic ... it was doubtful whether political and strategic considerations made it necessary for us to forgo the trade.40

The removal of the Peron government in 1955 by the Argentine military had, therefore, significantly altered perceptions of British officials. It was now thought that the interim military regime was less concerned with pressing sovereign claims in the southern oceans. In spite of the protestations of the Admiralty that 'the strategic issues involved were perhaps more open to argument, for this carrier might increase the power of the Argentines to threaten our bases in Antarctica', the Churchill government approved the sale.41

The return of a civilian government of Argentina under the leadership of Arturo Frondizi in 1958 coincided with two major developments which affected Anglo-Argentine relations. First, the improvement in trade between the two states (in the period between 1957-60) meant that British officials reassessed their views on the new Argentine government, even if those representations of Argentina as a place remained remarkably stable within foreign policy discourse. As Sir Jack Ward noted in his annual review of Argentina in 1958:

Despite some routine anti-British remarks ... Dr Frondizi was at pains to reassure me that he wanted good relations ... Argentina appears to have played an adult and constructive role.42

British representations of Argentina, thus, remained wedded to 'familiar' dualisms about personalities (rational v. irrational) and maturity (adult v. child). Regardless of the changing circumstances of Anglo- Argentine relations, British officials at the Foreign Office felt justified in articulating British policies

towards Argentina by drawing on such stereotypical representations.

Secondly and perhaps more importantly, the decision to launch a global scientific programme under the auspices of the International Geophysical Year (IGY 1957-58) created new possibilities and tensions for British officials in London. The participation of the British government in a major Antarctic programme was considered vital to counter Argentine and Chilean initiatives even though the issue of sovereignty was officially sus- pended (as a possible point of contention). The IGY's Antarctic scientific programme (involving 12 countries, including the USA and USSR) was based at over 60 stations (Mitchell 1981, Klotz 1990). The Argentine and British expeditions were restricted to their respective sectors. Furthermore, the substan- tive involvement of the two superpowers in the Antarctic research programme raised fears that the territorial claims of Britain might be caught up in the geopolitical dramas of the Cold War. Fur- thermore, as the last section of this paper briefly notes, the changes in the international politics of Antarctica provoked additional geopolitical fears that Argentina would either wreck the Antarctic Treaty negotiations or annexe British possessions.

Anglo-Argentine relations and the Antarctic Treaty (1959-1961)

The final chapter of Anglo-Argentine relations in the 1950s was undoubtedly dominated by the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The decision by President Eisenhower to invite 'interested parties' for a conference to 'internationalize' Antarctica was based on fears that conflict could erupt over that continent (Beck 1986). As a place within the strategic drama of the Cold War, Antarctica had become encoded as a place of possible missile sitings, atomic bomb testing and armed conflict. As the American delegate Paul Daniels recalled:

It was generally agreed to convene an international conference dealing with such novel and controversial questions would be unwise, and possibly dangerous, unless adequate preparations were made ... It was decided to hold preparatory talks in Washington: (cited in Beck 1985, 654)

As a consequence, the American government invited a total of twelve states to attend a meeting in Washington DC in May 1958 (see Beck 1985).



Geopolitics in the Foreign Office 285 British elite representations of Argentina in this

period were increasingly paradoxical. On the one hand, Argentina was consistently written and seen as a place characterized as a source of danger. Officials at the Foreign Office were convinced that Argentine territorial militarism could derail the Antarctic Treaty negotiations and threaten the possibilities for a demilitarized Antarctic continent. However, for the British, the proposed Antarctic Treaty provided a possible mechanism for de- fusing fears that overlapping territorial claims (in Antarctica) could lead to conflict between Britain and Argentina. Furthermore, the British were concerned that the Falkland Islands could emerge (once again) as a major source of tension. It was feared that Argentina might take advantage of an Antarctic agreement to pursue such claims rather than encourage entirely peaceful negotiations. On the other hand, however, Argentina was increasingly being seen as a possible place which could resist the 'spread' of communism in Latin America. Whilst the military (and civilian) regimes of Argentina (and Latin America) drew contempt and despair from British elites, they had their uses.

The desire for an agreement to demilitarize the Antarctic continent was widespread (Beck 1990, Klotz 1990).43 Officials from the Foreign Office, for instance, argued that the meeting should attempt to secure the non-militarization of Antarctica, the promotion of scientific activities in the region ...44 The mini-conference in Washington held informal (and secret) talks in June 1958. After 60 sessions the participants agreed to hold a formal conference in October 1959. By that time a formal treaty had been drafted which was later signed by the twelve states in December 1959. However, an important element of these meetings was a series of private meetings between Argentine, British and Chilean delegates to discuss the pressing issue of overlapping sovereign claims.

The signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 (and eventual ratification in 1961 by those twelve states) was an important moment in Antarctic affairs and Anglo-Argentine relations. The territorial rivalry over Antarctica, while not diffused entirely, had been contained by Article IV of the Treaty which prevented any state from changing or improving upon its existing territorial claims. As a former official at the American Department of the Foreign Office noted, the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, was under great pressure to 'keep out of trouble' and to seek to improve trade and commerce in

South America rather than worry about Argentine claims to Antarctica.45

On the British side, however, there was a hope that other disputes in Latin America could also be solved with a mixture of diplomacy and goodwill. The records of the Foreign Office for 1959 and 1960 reveal many references that confirm intense Argentine interest in the Antarctic Treaty. The British Ambassador, Sir Jack Ward, sent a number of reports to officials in London detailing Argentine pronouncements on the subject. Indeed, Sir Henry Brain warned Sir Jack Ward in January 1960 that 'we do not want to leave the Argentines any excuse for misunderstanding our attitude.'46 The British government ordered the Embassy in Buenos Aires to issue reminders to the Argentine government over erroneous' claims over the Falkland Islands and the Antarctic. Furthermore, during the middle of the negotiations of the Washington Treaty, the British embassy in Buenos Aires had to report that there were problems between Argentina and Chile over the former's insistence on conducting artillery practice in and around the disputed waters of the Beagle Channel. The records of the Foreign Office record concern:

This is just the sort of incident that is likely to effect any hopes of an agreement over Antarctica even though the area in question would be beyond the scope of such an agreement.47

The major territorial concern for Foreign Office officials in the early 1960s, however, had shifted from Antarctica to the Falkland Islands. At the precise moment when Foreign Office officials were trying to promote an increase in trade with Argentina, Sir Jack Ward noted in January 1960 that fears over Argentine interests in the Falklands might derail the Antarctic Treaty proceedings. As he noted:

There is some evidence that there are some people in Argentine officialdom who may be trying to work up a little campaign on this issue ... The Falklands were quite a separate matter from Antarctica ... in the light of this I judge that with claims and counter claims to Antarctic territory effectively sealed up by the Washington Treaty, the Argentines are thinking of raising the issue with us ... More recently a wild and rather speculative piece was published in our deplor- able local English newspaper the Buenos Aires Herald.48

Yet at the time, officials in the Foreign Office were acutely aware that Argentina might be an important



286 K-J Dodds

'stalwart' against. '[T]he dangers of Soviet subver- sion . . . We need powerful friends in all continents and should not forget South America'.49 As events in Cuba in the early 1960s (the emergence of Castro and the Cuban Missile Crisis) were to demonstrate, this sentiment was genuinely felt within the Foreign Office. Later events, however, showed that the Falkland Islands did emerge as a major policy issue in Anglo-Argentine relations in the 1960s (ultimately leading to war in 1982: see Dodds 1993b).s50

The fears of the Foreign Office were such that they had been prepared to draw up an agreement between Britain, Argentina and Chile creating a special region dedicated to peaceful research and exploration if the Antarctic Treaty could not resolve the problems of territorial claims and nuclearization (Beck 1986).s1 Commercial and trading links between Britain and Argentina had been replaced by territorial competition and conflict in the South Atlantic.

Conclusions

This paper has charted the changing British elite representations of Anglo-Argentine relations in the 1940s and 1950s. I have argued that a shift from trade and commercial cooperation towards geopolitical competition to the South Atlantic and Antarctica characterized the period. By employing a mixture of stereotypical characterizations of Latin American nations and by utilizing historical discourses on territory, science and rationality, officials at the Foreign Office were depicting Anglo- Argentine relations in surprisingly reactionary terms. At a moment of great change, therefore, British elites seemed unable to represent that relationship in a progressive way which recognized changing political-economic and strategic circumstances in Argentina and Latin America.

One of the (implicit) purposes of this paper has been to demonstrate that foreign policy can be interpreted through its representations of the 'Other'. I have not claimed to be able better to represent 'Argentina' or 'Anglo-Argentine relations' than British officials. Rather, the analysis has attempted to provide an interpretation of a neglected but particularly difficult period of Anglo- Argentine history and to illustrate how the representational politics of British (foreign policy) elites needs to be taken seriously and not dismissed as mere 'rhetoric'. I would suggest that those types of representations of 'Argentina' in the 1940s and

1950s (with their earlier historical precedents) have important ramifications for British intransigence over the Falklands issue in later decades.

The paper has also attempted to illustrate how some of the research strategies of critical geopolitics might have a wider relevance for more traditional diplomatic historical studies and political geography. Critical geopolitics offers new forms of research strategies which attempt to highlight the connections between geographical practices, knowl- edges, identity formation and power. In a wide range of studies, scholars such as Dalby (1990, 1991), 6 Tuathail (1992a, 1993), Sharp (1993) and Slater (1993) have demonstrated that such 'critical pathways' (Slater's phrase) have been exploited to illustrate how foreign policy professionals employ geographical reasoning in their (textual) (re)construction and (re)presentations of world politics; how those (re)presentations are themselves tied to forms of 'popular' geopolitical understandings; how Cold War militarism and postwar development theory depended on (often simple) geographical depictions and representations of the Third World; and, finally, how those forms of geographical reasoning are challenged and resisted by social movements. If in this paper, I have concentrated on Anglo-Argentine history during the 1940s and 1950s, there is sufficient momentum within the critical geopolitical literature to believe that there are real possibilities for reconstituting the research strategies of political geography more generally.

Acknowledgements I am very grateful for the comments of Paul Glennie, Leslie Hepple and Nigel Thrift at the Department of Geography, University of Bristol. The ESRC supported this research through a post- graduate studentship. Thanks are also due to Roger Lee and the referees of this paper for their excellent comments and advice. Jonathan Barton was kind enough to provide trade figures for Anglo- Argentine trade. In addition, a retired senior Foreign Official also offered detailed comments on the text. The usual disclaimers apply.

In addition, I owe thanks to the Librarians of the Scott Polar Research Institute at Cambridge and at the Public Records Office in Kew for helping me with references and records. Peter Beck of Kingston University was also kind enough to share his notes on records of the Canadian archives on Antarctic




affairs. Nicola Exley at the Department of Geogra- phy, Edinburgh University redrew the maps for this paper.

Notes

1. See, for example, Ferns 1973, 1992; Rock 1975; Beck 1983, 1988; Child 1985; Danchev 1992; Hennessy and King 1992; MacDonald 1992; Thompson 1992.

2. The records cited in this paper are held at the Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, Surrey. The following series of records were examined: Admiralty (ADM), Cabinet (CAB), Colonial Office (CO) and Foreign Office (FO). The interview material cited in this paper was granted on the condition that it should remain anonymous and untaped.

3. Slater (1993), however, has cautioned critical geopolitics over its collective assumptions on a centred geopolitical subjectivity. His deployment of the term 'geopolitical imagination' invokes a careful distinction between different levels of geopolitical analysis and deployment and, moreover, a distinction between geopolitics and the geopolitical. This can be interpreted as a useful contribution to the ongoing critiques made by critical geopolitical writers of the often simplistic assumptions over geopolitical reasoning within political discourse.

4. PRO (CAB) 129/102 July 1960. 5. Cited in Henderson 1945, 205-6. The familiarity

and uneasiness of such meetings stand in marked contrast with a later posting to Germany (despite Henderson's sympathies for Nazi Germany).

6. PRO (FO) 371 33518 February 1943. 7. PRO (FO) A3015/11/2 1943 Sir David Kelly to the

Foreign Office. 8. PRO (CAB) 66/21 July 1943. 9. See note 7.

10. See note 7. 11. PRO (FO) 371/51778 1947 Sir Rex Leeper letter to

the Foreign Office. 12. PRO (FO) 371/90475 1949. 13. PRO (FO) 371/51775 1947. 14. Cited in Howells 1992, 227-47. 15. One irony that might be borne in mind is that for

much of the nineteenth century British imperialists, speculators and travellers complained that Argentina was under-developed, that it wasted its resources and was unprepared for the expansion of the capitalist world-economy. As a consequence, it was argued that British investment and endeavour was needed to overcome such obstacles (see Pratt 1992).

16. PRO (FO) 371/74375 1949. 17. See Friedrich (1980) for details of the 1938-39

German Polar Expedition.

18. The records of the Admiralty provide some details of expeditions to the Antarctic. HMS William Scoresby, for instance, was despatched in 1944 to the Antarctic in order to erect British flags and distrib- ute boards marked 'British Crown Lands'. PRO (ADM) 1/19509 1946.

19. PRO (CO) 78/198/2 1945. 20. Cited in Beck 1986, 23. 21. Escude (1987), however, has noted that, even in the

1920s, the concept of an 'Argentine Antarctic' had been incorporated into Argentine geography text- books for primary and secondary education.

22. The National Security Council Records of 1958 recall that the United States' government had approached Argentina and Britain (as well as four other claimant nations) about the possibility of creating an international agreement for the Antarctic. This agreement aimed to '... remove the area from the field of present and potential future contention, at the same time preserving to the interested nations control over strategic use ... The draft agreement was not enacted upon. US government (NSC) 5804/1 8 March 1958.

23. PRO (ADM) 1/21126 1948. Sir William Tennant identified several reasons for defending the South Atlantic islands including the importance of mari- time resources such as whaling and the possibility for strategic bases in the south-west Atlantic.

24. I have used the provocative term 'imperial fantasies' to highlight the significant expenditure on military and civilian activities of the British state to 'defend' South Atlantic and Antarctic claims against possible annexation. However, the endeavours of polar explorers held sway over an imperial imagination which understood events such as the 1943 Trans- Antarctic Expedition or the mapping of Antarctica as the continuation of a glorious tradition of British (white) masculinity, patriotism (never nationalism) and science.

25. PRO (FO) 371/90475 1951. 26. Child (1988) has noted that in 1948, for instance,

Argentina and Chile began to articulate the concept of a sector called the 'South American Antarctic' (between 0 and 90 degrees) which had to be defended from external presences (e.g. Britain). Geo- political writers were important supporters of this concept.

27. PRO (ADM) 1/25082 1951. See also Hennessy 1984.

28. An approach later adopted by the Callaghan government in 1977 which despatched a nuclear submarine to the Falkland Islands in response to fears that the Argentines were interested in a possible invasion.

29. PRO (FO) 371/97397 1952. 30. PRO (FO) 371/90440 1952. 31. See note 30.



288 K-J Dodds

32. PRO (ADM) 1 25082 1952. 33. Telegraph to the High Commissioner to the United

Kingdom from the Secretary for State for Common- wealth Relations, 10 February 1953. Copy of this previously secret telegraph was provided by Professor Peter Beck of Kingston University.

34. Op. cit. (note 33). 35. PRO (ADM) 1/25082 1951. These records from the

Admiralty chart the difficulties between the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the Admiralty. The Admiralty was the most reluctant to commit ships to the region because of costs and logistics.

36. PRO (CAB) 128/27 1954. 37. The IAPI was created by Peron in 1945. It was

designed to establish state monopolies in Argentina and was specifically charged with purchasing the entire grain harvest and selling it to Europe. The IAPI paid domestic producers low prices so that income generated from overseas sales could be reinvested in capital machinery necessary for Peron's industrialization plans.

38. PRO (FO) 371/108815 1954. (See also The Times 1954).

39. See note 38. 40. PRO (CAB) 128/30 June 1956. 41. PRO (CAB) 128/30 September 1956. 42. PRO (FO) 371/147755 1958. 43. As Beck (1985) notes, the Geneva discussion on

nuclear weapons testing in 1958 and Krushchev's visit to the USA in 1959 had helped to created a favourable environment for the first meeting of the Washington conference in October 1959.

44. See note 42. 45. Interview with retired Foreign Office official

attached to the Polar Regions Department 15 August 1992 Cambridge.

46. PRO (FO) 371/147713 1960. 47. PRO (FO) 371/139142 1959. 48. See note 46. 49. PRO (CAB) 129/102 1960. 50. Shortly after the 1959 Antarctic Treaty had effec-

tively frozen territorial claims, the British government created a new administrative territory called British Antarctic Territory (BAT) under the direc- tion of a High Commissioner. This was formed out of the old Falkland Island Dependencies (FID) region. In so doing, British territorial claims were split into two groupings: BAT and the Falkland Islands instead of being linked to one another.

51. PRO (FO) 3711147732 1960. Henry Hankey, the Head of the American Department of Foreign Office, noted 'We cannot exclude the possibility of elements in Argentina opposed to the Treaty suc- ceeding in deliberately trying to wreck the ratification'.

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Documents

Dodds - Geopolitics in the Foreign Office British Representations of Argentina 1945-1961