The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaSanjeev SabhlokDraft, 20 September 2012

Become a Freedom Partner

Unleash India! Join me on Facebook

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaSanjeev Sabhlok i

Freedom Team of India

Breaking Free of Nehru

Join

the Facebook Group

for this bookto keep in touch with the progress of this manuscript

Please do not comment! And do not citeThis is a VERY preliminary draft. It is not yet ready for comment, but I’m putting it out, nevertheless, as I keep working on it as time permits.Thanks for your patience.Sanjeev

ii The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012

Contents

1. Life and liberty, and the purpose of democracy...............................11.1 Why this preliminary discussion is important........................................................11.2 The two ultimate values.........................................................................................21.3 A government for the defence of our life and liberty.............................................21.4 The most important feature of a republic: its constitution....................................21.5 Once we have a strong constitution we don’t need too many decisions...............3

1.5.1 Ideal government: a Jinn...........................................................................31.6 But there is no ideal government...........................................................................51.7 Equality of voice in selection of government.........................................................51.8 Hence we need democracy....................................................................................61.9 Democracy is a means for securing justice, not an end in itself.............................71.10 But no democracy automatically protects liberty..................................................91.11 Tyranny of democracy: why utilitarianism is wrong and the USA Bill of Rights is

right 101.12 The tyranny of democracy, and how we can protect liberty................................101.13 The tyranny of democracy: Massive debts for future generations.......................121.14 Why do we care to subject ourselves to democracy (majority rule)?..................131.15 Electoral systems don’t protect liberty. The constitution, and the kind of people

who goven, do......................................................................................................151.16 All democracies tend to lead to socialist outcomes.............................................151.17 Arrow’s impossibility theorem: The difficult of getting agreement......................16

2. So now we are ready to consider electoral systems.......................172.1 So what is the role of the legislature, and of government?..................................172.2 The purpose of electoral systems.........................................................................172.3 What kind of people want to become representives?.........................................172.4 Objectives of our electoral system.......................................................................172.5 Speed in decision making is of the essence..........................................................182.6 A representative must represent the constituency..............................................182.7 FPTP also leads to socialist tendencies, but PR’s tendencies are overwhelming..182.8 The gravest danger of PR: the Balkanisation of India...........................................20

3. Second order arguments aganst PR................................................223.1 PR leads to socialist tendencies............................................................................223.2 PR representatives avoid meeting their constituents...........................................223.3 PR systems tend to lead to more political parties................................................223.4 Instablity...............................................................................................................223.5 Strategic voting contrary to one's own preferences.............................................233.6 PR systems harden identities and can foster separatism.....................................233.7 There is no easy choice........................................................................................233.8 Disadvantages pointed out by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral

Assistance.............................................................................................................24

4. Why India should keep the first past the post system....................27

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaSanjeev Sabhlok iii

4.1 Cameron’s defence of FPTP in UK........................................................................274.2 Reforming our electoral system is better than replacing it..................................314.3 Stick with FIRST PAST THE POST, India!................................................................334.4 PR lowers barriers to entry into politics, and can help FTI...................................35

5. References......................................................................................36

iv The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012

1. Life and liberty, and the purpose of democracy

The rebuttal of PR as a sensible electoral system needs to start at the very beginning: why do we have a government in the first place, and why do we care to have a democratic form of government?

1.1 Why this preliminary discussion is importantThis preliminary discussion is crucial for it shows wow one’s view about the state affects views about electoral systems.

I've prepared a simple diagram to illustrate how one's views about the state affects the kind of

I've prepared a simple diagram to illustrate how one's views about the state affects the kind of government we want, as well as the electoral system (in case we prefer democracy to monarchy).

[Click for larger image. The associated PPT)

You might be surprised to note that I have put Gandhi along with Hobbes and Chanakya, on the right extreme.

That is because he wanted self-governing villages. Hobbes's strong state defends us from each other (and invaders), but otherwise leaves us alone.

So also Gandhi's Ram Rajya needs a a strong king to defend borders, leaving the villages alone. A Ram is needed, a king who understands the Mahabharata's

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 1

message. In Ramayana Ram is not a socialist maniac, and does not intervene unnecessarily; just assures justice.

Ram ran a tight ship; a minimalist state. He fought evil and was known as a man of great integrity. That is ALL that a king must do.

Democracy was NEVER Gandhi's ideal, Ram Rajya was.

Democracy was, instead, Nehru's ideal. Nehru came to it from well to the left of John Stuart Mill – through a Fabian socialist model. To him democracy was a tool for legitimising all-encompassing, maximalist state. The state would achieve commanding heights. In his democratic society, liberty would be lost entirely. We would become minions of the state.Gandhi and Nehru were poles apart!

1.2 The two ultimate valuesThere two ultimate values (elaborated in detail in chapter 2 of DOF) are life and liberty. Every social action or design must advance these two values, else we will be setting up society for failure.

1.3 A government for the defence of our life and libertyTo protect these fundamental values, we create a social contract which includes a government.

1.4 The most important feature of a republic: its constitutionAs this cartoon illustrates:

(Source: Facebook. Perhaps the Independent Institute)

2

1.5 Once we have a strong constitution we don’t need too many decisionsIt is a myth that governments are important. Once a strong constitution is in place (and justice system), we can pretty much let any government operate. If the rules are sufficiently strong, no government can harm us.

1.5.1 Ideal government: a JinnStatists and collectivists have a common characteristic. To them government and democracy are goals in themselves, things society must have for the sake of government and democracy.

The classical liberal believes that BOTH government and democracy are TOOLS, instruments to just one goal: our life and liberty.

If one could assure life and liberty by hiring Martians, so be it. We should do so. The goal of liberty is paramount. Nothing can come between that goal and us. Our instruments are not objects of worship. They don't count. Only the outcome: liberty, matters.

Statists, on the other hand, believe that we exist for the sake of the state, hence the nation/ government is the raison d'être of our existence. Such sentiment underpins statements like: "Ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country".

This kind of sentiment is a dead give away of the person's statist theory of state. In such a theory we are merely cogs of the state. The king is our "god". The extreme form of statism is displayed by communists/socialists like the Nazis. Hindutva theoreticians also fall in this group. According to them the Muslims must accept a second class status, for this land (I'm referring to India) "belongs" to the Hindus. The statist glorifies the state. A government is a big deal - to such thinkers.

"Soft" collectivists (unlike hard statists such as Nazis) can have a strange fascination with democracy for the sake of democracy. To them the society is supreme. Everyone must have a say in what happens (they are blissfully aware of the baleful implications of Arrow's impossibility theorem, that even three people can't EVER agree to any consistent ordering, leave along a billion). Direct democracy is their preferred mode of "public" decision making. We need democracy that is "representative". The environmental fanatics, right wing crazies, leftists, classical liberals, and libertarians must ALL get a voice at the "decision making" table of this great "society". Irreconcilable views MUST be "honored" and "reconciliation" attempted. Proportional representation is the next best to direct democracy, for such thinkers.

But what exactly is government, and why do we need democracy?

The ONLY reason we need government is to defend us from invasion/ internal crime, to ensure justice, and to provide things like roads which are hard for us (in our private capacities) to organise. PERIOD.

A government is a Big Servant. Its ambit is limited through the Constitution, and its discretion limited to dealing with matters of urgency (such as war). All else is

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 3

constrained by due process, e.g. the judicial system. Our Big Servant is like the Jinn in Aladdin's stories. Its job is to OBEY US, not to tell us what to do.

If we could find a Jinn that PERFECTLY protects us and ensures our liberty, and provides public goods at a cheap cost, we would NEVER need democracy. We would simply let the Jinn do its job.

When we consider this obvious (!) approach – that the role of a government is PURELY to defend our life and liberty – then everything falls into place.

For instance, what should this Jinn charge for its services? Well, it is a monopoly provider of these services, so it must charge as a monopolist should.

And what is the ONLY method by which a monopolist will charge a price that the perfectly competitive market would supply? First degree price discrimination (ie. everyone charged separately, based on ability to pay). So that's what should form the underlying principle of the taxation system. That principle is hard to implement, but it should remain at the back of our mind.

What about democracy? Given that the Jinn is NOT a decision making body (nor should it be!); merely an implementing body, what is the importance of democracy to us? Why do we care about democracy at all?

In fact, that's a very good question. Democracy got a very bad rap for thousands of years. And for good reason. Socrates is cited as one of its victims. And indeed, there is little to distinguish democracy from mob rule. RATIONAL people (our ancestors were not irrational!) CHOSE to have a king to protect them and their liberties. That was not as stupid an idea as it may sometimes appear to us today.

The greatest work in this regard is that of Hobbes who showed how an absolute king is best placed to defend our liberties. He was basically referring to a Jinn.

But Jinns aren't practical.

We need to a method to get a good king. That is clearly a problem. For there are good kings and bad kings. There are good dictators and bad dictators. There is no "one size fits all".

And the key problem with kings is that good kings often have BAD children. It is very hard to get good kings.

So the idea of democracy was revived after being condemned for thousands of years. Not by the Marxists, but by classical liberals. John Locke should be credited with reviving democracy as a major political idea. But of course, it was not his idea. It had a history in the Magna Carta. And the experience of Cromwell's revolution that failed.

But the democracy that was revived was very limited: for the EXPLICIT purpose of getting a good government, a good Jinn. It was not an exercise in "representation". And there were good reasons why it was not elevated to the pedestal that it often is elevated to, today. It was widely recognised that democracy is not a end in itself. It is not a public good. It means NOTHING, really. It is just a tool to get good government, a good Jinn, and to ensure that we are not stuck with a bad government.

Because every few years we can change the government that performs badly.

4

When we elect a government we elect a Big Servant, a Jinn. We then constrain this servant and ensure it doesn't go outside its bounds. Then, if it doesn't perform well, we throw it out and get a new Servant. That's the role of democracy. To help us CHANGE our government without violence. Not for us to get a seat at the "decision making table" of the Jinn, the government.

That, in brief, is the reason why democracy exists. To blow up democracy beyond this minimalist role as an INSTRUMENT of our liberty, is PURELY STATIST. Such veneration of democracy is inconsistent with our main goal: liberty.

What about public consultation? Well, ALL government decisions must be made transparently and with adequate consultation. Thereafter a government must DECIDE. The Jinn must do its job.

If we don't like what a government does, we can throw it out after three/four (in Australia) or five (in India) years. But WE don't get to decide. The Jinn decides. The government is an abstract concept, a servant limited by the Constitution. It must remain constrained. It must not become an object of veneration.

1.6 But there is no ideal governmentUnfortunately, a Jinn does not exist. So we need a government that does not become a tyrant. The main feature of such a government should be the ability of citizens to overthrow the government should it become a tyrant. Second, we all must get a voice in selecting who forms government.

1.7 Equality of voice in selection of governmentThe following extract from the draft manuscript DOF clarifies

Many early liberals advocated a restriction on the right to vote only to those who can (apparently) do so responsibly. ‘Locke in the Second Treatise on Government makes clear that suffrage depends on property: only parts of the public that pay taxes have a right to vote, in proportion to the assistance which they afford the public.’1

It is not to the classical liberals but to a ‘pragmatic’ branch of liberals: the utilitarians, that we owe universal suffrage. Bentham argued that it ‘is the only way of promoting “the greatest happiness for the greatest number”‘2. James Mill (1773-1836), the father of J.S. Mill also advocated widespread democracy. J.S. Mill agreed in relation to women but did not think that those who live off charity (parish relief) should be so entitled. Thus, ‘the receipt of parish relief should be a peremptory disqualification for the franchise. He who cannot by his labour suffice for his own support has no claim to the privilege of helping himself to the money of others.’3

Mill’s argument, however, is not tenable. We come together as a nation to protect our life and equal liberty. We agree that members of the society whose resources fall below a social

1 Gordon, David, ‘The Attempt at Vindicating Lincoln’, Mises.org, 26 November 2008. [http://mises.org/story/3224]2 Heywood, Andrew, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p.45.3, Chapter VIII (OF THE EXTENSION OF THE SUFFRAGE), in .Mill, J.S. [1861], ‘Considerations on Representative Government’, On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, World Classics Paperback 1991, p.322.

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 5

minimum will be provided frugal relief until they or their children can stand on their feet. Such payments are not to be thought of as charity but payouts based on the premiums paid in advance through taxes. At the minimum the recipient may have paid taxes in the past, or his parents may have done so; or his children will do so in the future.

For equal freedom to be achieved, every normal adult (without significant mental disabilities) should have the right to vote. If the poor are not permitted to vote, they will lose the ability to oppose laws that discriminate against them or destroy their liberty. Fortunately, modern societies have by now have broadened the franchise to all adults (generally over 18).

1.8 Hence we need democracyIn general, collective choice (for public goods provision) should be based on democratic decision making under constitutional constraints.

The following extract from the draft manuscript DOF clarifies:

The real issue before us is of [social] contract design, fully aware that our design will always be imperfect, its consequences informing further change. To minimise the likelihood of designing an ineffective contract, we must firmly ground it in an understanding of human nature – such as our moral sense and altruistic tendencies but also the human tendency to be opportunistic, and the risk of rebellion should equal opportunity not be fostered. It will also need to be aware of the natural inclination of politicians to throw largesse at voters, and build institutional checks and balances to minimise this tendency. Only when the assumptions underpinning the contract are compatible with actual human behaviour, can the contract work tolerably well. This is where liberal democracy succeeds and other models fail. Pure (not constitutional) monarchies assume that kings are perfect, while religious theocracies ask that people be perfect (even as priests might engage in questionable behaviour). Liberal democratic republics, on the other hand, do not exhort, but build checks and balances to avoid the excesses of human nature (Figure WW).

The liberal democratic contract produces larger, healthier, and wealthier populations. Competition through market forces fosters innovation and gives them an economic advantage over others. Since success tends to crowd out failure, people across the world are increasingly indicating a preference for liberal democratic republics. This form of social contract has therefore been spreading faster than others, and may well replace these other forms.

The liberal democratic social contract enables the rules of accountability and methods of enforcement to be determined through consent. Democratic decision-making must be compatible with the principle of subsidiarity – with decisions taken

6

Figure WW. The evolving human social contract

Kingdoms with incipient

rule of law

Kingdoms with liberal democracy

Cruel, whimsical justice by tribal chiefs

Democratically governed societies with rule of law, systematic justice, andfreedom

Greater, but not complete representation of people, e.g. England today

Attempted control over whimsical justice, e.g. England with its Magna Carta

Liberal democratic republics

Tribal chiefs

Kingdoms or totalitarian

states

Whimsical ‘justice’ – with possible genocides as kingdoms become larger

by the level of government proximal to the geography or technology of the decision. Citizens are thus more likely to abide even by rules they may personally disagree with. Citizens also get some comfort from the fact that they retain the option of democratically altering the laws, should such a change be important to them. Such social contracts are more legitimate, hence durable.

1.9 Democracy is a means for securing justice, not an end in itselfF.A. Hayek demolished all arguments the consider democracy to be a value. Democracy has NOTHING to do with justice, and little to do with liberty. These goals must be secured by democracy if it has to serve any purpose. I can do no better than to extract from his greatest book: The Constitution of Liberty.

EXTRACTS

1. Equality before the law leads to the demand that all men should also have the same share in making the law. This is the point where traditional liberalism and the democratic movement meet. Their main concerns are nevertheless different. Liberalism (in the European nineteenth-century meaning of the word, to which we shall adhere throughout this chapter) is concerned mainly with limiting the coercive powers of all government, whether democratic or not, whereas the dogmatic democrat knows only one limit to government—current majority opinion.

2. The current undiscriminating use of the word "democratic" as a general term of praise is not without danger. It suggests that, because democracy is a good thing, it is always a gain for mankind if it is extended. This may sound self-evident, but it is nothing of the kind.

There are at least two respects in which it is a most any particular issue the case for democracy is commonly presented as if the desirability of extending it as far as possible were indisputable.

That this is not so is implicitly admitted by practically everybody so far as the right to vote is concerned. It would be difficult on any democratic theory to regard every possible extension of the franchise as an improvement. We speak of universal adult suffrage, but the limits of suffrage are in fact largely determined by considerations of expediency. The usual age limit of twenty-one and the exclusion of criminals, resident foreigners, non-resident citizens, and the inhabitants of special regions or territories are generally accepted as reasonable. It is also by no means obvious that proportional representation is better because it seems more democratic.' It can scarcely be said that equality before the law necessarily requires that all adults should have the vote; the principle would operate if the same impersonal rule applied to -all. If only persons over forty, or only income-earners, or only heads of households, or only literate persons were given the vote, this would scarcely be more of an infringment of the principle than the restrictions which are generally accepted. It is also possible for reasonable people to argue that the ideals of democracy would be better served if, say, all the servants of government or all re-cipients of public charity were excluded from the vote. If in the Western world universal adult suffrage seems the best arrangement, this does not prove that it is required by some basic principle.

These remarks are meant only to show that even the most dogmatic democrat can hardly claim that every extension of democracy is a good thing. However strong the

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 7

general case for democracy, it is not an ultimate or absolute value and must be judged by what it will achieve. It is probably the best method of achieving certain ends, but not an end in itself. Though there is a strong presumption in favor of the democratic method of deciding where it is obvious that some collective action is required, the problem of whether or not it is desirable to extend collective control must be decided on other grounds than the principle of democracy as such.

3. The democratic and the liberal traditions thus agree that whenever state action is required, and particularly whenever coercive rules have to be laid down, the decision ought to be made by the majority. They differ, however, on the scope of the state action that is to be guided by democratic decision. While the dogmatic democrat regards it as desirable that as many issues as possible be decided by majority vote, the liberal believes that there are definite limits to the range of questions which should be thus decided.

The crucial conception of the doctrinaire democrat is that of popular sovereignty. This means to him that majority rule is unlimited and unlimitable. The ideal of democracy, originally intended to prevent all arbitrary power, thus becomes the justification for a new arbitrary power.

4. If democracy is a means rather than an end, its limits must be determined in the light of the purpose we want it to serve. There are three chief arguments by which democracy can be justified, each of which may be regarded as conclusive.

The first is that, whenever it is necessary that one of several conflicting opinions should prevail and when one would have to be made to prevail by force if need be, it is less wasteful to determine which has the stronger support by counting numbers than by fighting. Deocracy is the only method of peaceful change that man has yet discovered.

The second argument, which historically has been the most important and which is still very important, though we can no longer be sure that it is always valid, is that democracy is an important safeguard of individual liberty. It was once said by a seventeenth-century writer that "the good of democracy is liberty, and the courage and industry which liberty begets.' This view recognizes, of course, that democracy is not yet liberty; it contends only that it is more likely than other forms of government to produce liberty.

The third argument rests on the effect which the existence of democratic institutions will have on the general level of understanding of public affairs. This seems to me the most powerful. It is the burden of the argument of Tocqueville's great work, Democracy in America, that democracy is the only effective method of educating the majority. This is as true today as it was in his time. Democracy is, above all, a process of forming opinion.

The old liberal is in a much better friend of democracy than the dogmatic democrat, for he is concerned with preserving the conditions that make democracy workable. If it is to survive, democracy must recognize that it is not the fountainhead of justice and that it needs to acknowledge a conception of justice which does not necessarily manifest itself in the popular view on every particular issue. The danger is that we mistake a means of securing justice for justice itself.

There is little reason to expect that any people will succeed in successfully operating or preserving a democratic machinery of government unless they have first become familiar with the traditions of a government of law.

8

1.10 But no democracy automatically protects liberty India’s case is a classic. We have had democracy, even as liberty has been chipped away from all sides.

Extarct from DOF

Democracy does not guarantee the absence of tyranny. India’s being a democracy did not prevent Indira Gandhi from declaring emergency on frivolous grounds. Also, Hitler’s Germany was (notionally) a democracy – albeit (in hindsight) with major design flaws. Thus, the Nazis secured only 12 seats in 1928 in the Reichstag, increasing their tally to 230 out of 608 in 1932 through strong-arm tactics. Nazi seats reduced to 196 subsequently. While his party was at no time close to a majority, Hitler undertook devious machinations with Chancellor Franz von Papen in order to come to power.4 Once in power, he was unstoppable.

Hitler could not have come to power in England with the few seats he commanded. This points to the importance of identifying and closing loopholes in the design of democratic institutions. In BFN I have detailed many of the loopholes that allow corrupt Indians to rise to the top. In addition, some methods to hold democracies to account are suggested, below.

Citizen assertion, and vigilance

Citizens need to supervise thier democratic government, even though it is not practicable to exercise direct oversight. But the key point is the assertion of citizens sovereignty, at all times, over representives. Citizens are the principalsm, political representatives their agents. Calling political leaders by their first names is a good start. There is no case for glorifying politicians with honorifics. If they want to use titles, call them ‘Dear Citizens’ Agent’ or something similar to make sure they know their place – but definitely not ‘Your Highness’ or ‘Your Honour’ which give them an inflated ego, and primes them to look down upon the rest of the people.

It will be very foolish on our part, also, to treat a government as a benevolent agency. Being vigilant, even suspicious about potential misuse of government power is all-important. ‘Trust but verify’ must be our motto. Demand full accounts at all times. Fortunately, modern governments generally publish detailed reports to let us know how our money is being spent. But unnecessary secrecy is another problem. The media must shine the light of truth on the government’s actions, subject only to the nondisclosure of defence secrets. Mechanisms to seek accountability can include requiring Local Boards to be established by each government office. Implementing this, however, requires a level of sophistication not evident even in the best of societies today.5

Leading the society: forming government

Only those who understand human nature, namely the classical liberals, realise that power is a heady brew. Now, if those who understand temptations of power don’t aim to form government, then our governments are likely to turn against us (because they are least self-aware). The liberal is obliged to deliver the social

4 see [http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/L-hitlerdemo.htm]5 See Appendix xxx of Online Notes – details.

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 9

contract he talks about, and offer himself as a representative to elected bodies. Once liberals form government, they must deliver good governance. Such governments, controlled by freedom-loving citizens, cannot become rogue governments.

India has been bereft of classical liberal leadership since the demise of the Swatantra Party in 1973. The freedoms of its citizens have therefore been significantly truncated by its socialist governments over the past six decades. Intense corruption characterises the Indian democratic system, which is only notionally accountable to is citizens. Changing governments every few years is not enough. The liberal must become a doer. It is time for Indian liberals to get involved in the governance of their nation. Only when India genuinely adopts the system of natural liberty will security and justice – and freedom – be ensured.

1.11 Tyranny of democracy: why utilitarianism is wrong and the USA Bill of Rights is rightA government can take away private property only for public use (and that must explicitly be public, not benefit any private individual or restricted group of individuals).

Benthmite utilitarianism is useful, but only up to a point. The moment its conclusions encroach on liberty, utilitarianism is dangerous. FTI's policy framework explicitly gives cost-benefit analysis a lower level of power in decision making than liberty. It becomes relevant only after liberty has been protected.

Majorities quickly tend to become tyrannies unless strongly restrained by a constitution. It affirms that Constitutions must be SHORT, CRISP AND TO THE POINT: and firmly prevent government encroachments on liberty. No qualifications. No ifs and buts. No "subject to the law". The law MUST NOT violate liberty. Period.

(The Indian Constitution, by the way, is a total mess – but I don't see people like Shailesh Saraf/ Arvind Kejriwal/ Anna Hazare, etc. talking about the destruction of liberties in our Constitution. For these people democracy is the main goal of a government. For me liberty is.)

The day democracy is seen as a tool for decision-making within the confines of a strong constitution, we'll stop unnecessary fights regarding "FPTP/PR/presidential" etc. systems. The way we elect representatives is far less important than what the constitution says and the way our courts defend liberty.

To most people, government seems to be about power. Therefore they want "people's power" or democracy. But that is mistaken. Government is designed SOLELY for the defence of liberty. It is not about power. If a democratic government goes outside this strict bound, then democracy itself must be shunned. It must be reformed. Even overthrown violently, and replaced by a stronger constitutional restriction on the majority.

1.12 The tyranny of democracy, and how we can protect libertyThe diagram (below) visualises various forms of government and their (likely) effect on individual liberty.

10

To the extreme left and right are ideal models. Both can work IF certain conditions are met.

1) A constitutional dictator (jinn) who defends the country’s constitution and does not dabble in any unnecessary thing is likely to be the best for defence of life and liberty. However, this is an unlikely outcome, since dictators who will comply with the law simply don’t exist.

2) On the other extreme (right) is direct democracy in which every public decision is made directly by all the people sitting at a single table and deciding everything. Theoretically this sounds enticing (everyone gets an equal voice). However, it is, in practical terms, the worst of all form of government since it will lead to confusion, mob rule, flip-flopping on policy positions, significant focus on redistribution, and potentially the end of all liberty as the country is weakened and annexed by its enemies.

The real choices available are therefore much narrower. We need a strong ruler who defends our liberty, closes debates as quickly as possible, is perceived to be legitimate, and can be thrown out quickly if he turns into a tyrant.

Systems that can do this job competently are forms either of the Westminster or Presidential systems of government.

The Presidential deliberately creates a dictator (bound by the Constitution): the President. In principle, this system should be superior to the FPTP system. And it has worked quite well in the USA. However, there are risks under this system of Presidents who over-reach their power and are not accountable to anyone for four years.

The Westminster FPTP system allows for greater accountability since the Parliament can vote out the government midway through its term (through a vote of no confidence – and provided defections are allowed: I strongly support the freedom of representatives to defect). True, Indira Gandhi short-circuited the parliament and became a dictator. But in general, FPTP systems can change governments more quickly than in any other system (I do advocate reducing the term of India’s governments from five to three, or at least four, years).

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 11

It could be argued that PR allows even quicker change in government. Most PR governments are chronically unstable. But an excess of change is a weakness, the tyranny of democracy – which derives from Arrow’s impossibility theorem. And the practicality of electing a PR government – which can take days, even months – makes the change even slower.

We need the right balance between stability, strength, and voice. The FPTP Westminster system comes close to the optimum. It has some properties of constitutional dictatorship but also accountability and capacity to incorporate popular beliefs into public policy (I believe the Upper House in India needs to be reviewed from first principles. We may not really need an Upper House once all things are considered.)

If India ever gets tired of FPTP, it should try the presidential system, not PR. Any form of government that India uses must strengthen its unity, not support divisive forces.

Having said that, I seen no reason to abandon FPTP. Instead, there are simple ways to improve its functioning to give us governments that can better defend our liberty.

1.13 The tyranny of democracy: Massive debts for future generationsRecently I discussed the tyranny of democracy and cautioned those who are blindly enamoured with direct democracy (or its proxy: proportional representation).

Democracy has its inevitable tendencies: middle class welfare (median voter theorem), lack of fiscal discipline (always convenient to borrow for one's term of government and let the future generations pay), and never ending intervention by government into our affairs. Everyone wants the government to do this or do that. No one is happy to leave others alone.

Most noticeable across the world today is the tendency of democracies to accumulate MASSIVE AMOUNTS of debt. Buttonwood (in The Economist) has summarised this well. [Does anyone know who is Buttonwood?].

Buchanan thought a lot about these issues. Not many have spent similar time trying to resolve the fundamental problems of democracy. I don't expect Indians to provide such insights, since they are generally unthinking and jump to conclusions.

Extracts from The Economist

For a long time, democracy was a dirty word among political philosophers. One reason was the fear that democratic rule would lead to ruin.

Plato warned that democratic leaders would “rob the rich, keep as much of the proceeds as they can for themselves and distribute the rest to the people”.

James Madison feared that democracy would lead to “a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property and for any other improper or wicked projects”.

John Adams worried that rule by the masses would lead to heavy taxes on the rich in the name of equality. As a consequence, “the idle, the vicious, the intemperate would rush into the utmost extravagance of debauchery, sell and spend all their share, and then demand a new division of those who purchased from them.”

For a long time, there did not seem to be any limit to the amount democracies could borrow. Creditors have been more patient with democratic governments than with other regimes, probably because the risk of abrupt changes of policy are reduced. But this has postponed the crunch point, rather than eliminated it—and allowed stable democracies to accumulate higher debt, relative to their GDP, than many, more volatile countries ever achieved.

12

Democracies cannot make foreign lenders extend credit.

1.14 Why do we care to subject ourselves to democracy (majority rule)?John Stuart Mill was smitten by the proportional system of representation, and while I believe he made many useful contributions to economics and political theory, on this he was wrong.

The reason he was wrong was he forgot why we have a state in the first place.

There is no better analyst of the state than Hobbes. Despite the many misunderstandings about his work, he was above all a defender of individual liberty. But he averred, and rightly so, that this could not be defended without a really strong state.

Recently I found an old edition of Sabine's History of Political Theory in a used bookshop, and while browsing through it today, I found a fascinating piece which deserves careful scrutiny.

EXTRACT

[Hobbes's] resulting estimate of government was wholly secular and quite coolly utilitarian. Its value consists solely in what it does, but since the alternative is anarchy, there can be no doubt which a utilitarian will choose. The choice has little sentiment behind it. The advantages of government are tangible and they must accrue quite tangibly to individuals, in the form of peace and comfort and security of person and property. This is the only ground upon which government can be justified or even exist. A general or public good, like a public will, is a figment of the imagination; there are merely individuals who desire to live and to enjoy protection for the means of life. [Sanjeev: Note that the concept of public good that is used in economic theory is not intended in this sense.]

This individualism is the thoroughly modern element in Hobbes and the respect in which he caught most clearly the note of the coming age. For two centuries after him self-interest seemed to most thinkers a more obvious motive than disinterestedness, and enlightened self-interest a more applicable remedy for social ills than any form of collective action. The absolute power of the sovereign—a theory with which Hobbes's name is more generally associated—was really the necessary complement of his individualism. [Sanjeev: It is a shame that people forget that the REASON why Hobbes advocated a strong state was purely self-interested - for the sake of the individual. Hobbes is, in my opinion, the world's most misunderstood philosopher.]

Except as there is a tangible superior to whom men render obedience and who can, if necessary, enforce obedience, there are only individual human beings, each actuated by his private interests. There is no middle ground between humanity as a sand-heap of separate organisms and the state as an outside power holding them precariously together by the sanctions with which it supplements individual motives. That Hobbes made them the premises of his system and followed them through with relentless logic is the true measure of his philosophical insight and of his greatness as a political thinker.

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 13

The reason I want us to focus on Hobbes is because through him we will better understand WHY there is a state. Once we appreciate this, we can then ask WHAT FORM government should take.

On this, Hobbes had no particular opinion, although through his actions he preferred monarchy. In that sense, Hobbes and the Mahabharata are on the same page.

And when we think of Locke we will do well to remember that, as Kendall wrote, "on the really crucial issues Locke is a Hobbesian, a fairly docile pupil of Hobbes" (John Locke Revisited, by Willmoore Kendall).

So why democracy?

Well, Locke was merely trying to fit Hobbes's Leviathan into a majority-rule sovereign. As Kendall notes:

Locke is, when the chips are down, pretty straight Hobbes: the denizens of Locke's civil society have, "operationally" speaking, no "indefeasible" or "inherent" or "natural" or "in alienable" rights; to suppose them to have such rights is to overlook the character of the "deal" they make when they emerge from the state of nature into civil society, and the character of the arrangements under which they live in civil society. For their "rights" in civil society are merely the rights that are conferred by the majority, and withdrawn at its pleasure—or worse still, by the legislature in which the majority, perhaps a majority long dead, has chosen to repose its trust. The majority or the majority's government, moreover, creates those rights and their correlative duties; it is not only under no obligation to make those rights and duties congruent with the rights and duties of the state of nature (i.e., of the law of nature), but it is also free to set completely aside any supposed "standards" of right and wrong laid down by the law of nature.

This is serious stuff, for as Kendall notes, Locke is NOT the "spokesman for unalienable individual rights" but the "philosopher of majority-rule authoritarianism".

Locke's individual member of society is duty-bound to obey every law of the legislature in which the majority has placed its trust, and because, and only because, it emanates from that source. No one can relieve him of this duty except a revolutionary majority, by withdrawal of its "trust" from the existing legislature and replacement of that legislature with another.

There is, in this formulation, very little difference between Hobbes and Locke. And while I may differ in some detail, I agree with the key argument.

This, then, is the reason we have democracy: to substitute the Leviathan with majoritarian rule – WHICH WE WILL THEN OBEY.

Yes, we need Jeffersonian reinforcement of individual liberty, and the right to rebel (which Lock also maintained), but in the end we are stuck with the laws made by a majoritarian government (hence the CRITICAL importance of the constitution).

Locke, of course, broke tradition – of thousands of years – by justifying majoritarian rule. Democracy had been (in many cases justifiably) rejected by leading philosophers. Indeed, till relatively recently in human history, it has been hard to find anyone to accept democracy as a viable form of government. [E.g. "By the start of the twentieth century, then, writers on both the left and the right were calling

14

into question the efficacy of representative democracy." A Short History of Western Political Thought, W. M. Spellman, p.136.]

Once we recognise this simple link: SOCIAL CONTRACT > LEVIATHAN > MAJORITARIAN LEVIATHAN, then we are done. True, checks and balances are needed. But the basic purpose of democracy is to create a Leviathan.

I trust readers (particularly PR votaries) now have a far better understanding of the role and purpose of democracy which is purely the following:

a) ability to vote out a sovereign without killing him; and

b) greater legitimacy of the government.

It is in this context that any discussion of the system to elect a democratic government can be undertaken. The system must deliver us a Leviathan.

Remember that there is NO theory of democracy which arises naturally from the state of nature. Democracy is not a "natural right", either. It is MERELY a TOOL OF LIBERTY, like a pair of scissors is a tool of a tailor. The sharper the scissors the better.

The faith we repose in democracy is reminiscent of the Levellers.

Addressing small tradesmen, artisans, soldiers, and poor urban laborers, between 1645 and 1649 the Levellers called for universal manhood suffrage without property requirements, a written constitution, freedom of religion, equality before the law, and an end to military conscription. They also demanded a representative assembly that held lawmaking and executive power, and defended the right to resist any magistrate who failed to carry out his delegated trust. [A Short History of Western Political Thought, W. M. Spellman, p.80]

This was NOT what Hobbes and Locke were arguing for.

I'm quite comfortable with the Levellers, and have praised them here. But it is important to not get enamoured by democracy for its own sake. That is the key message of classical liberalism. Democracy is valuable only to the extent it gives us a state which can defend our life and liberty. If it fails to do that, we owe it no allegiance.

1.15 Electoral systems don’t protect liberty. The constitution, and the kind of people who goven, doIndia’s is a classic case in point. A weak constitution and bad people promoted to the top. The primary issue therefore is a) a bad Constitution and court system and b) an electoral system that gives us bad representatives.

1.16 All democracies tend to lead to socialist outcomesAll democracies have inbult mechanisms for populism and that means redistribution from the rich to the poor. That is socialism. It is one thing to have a social insurance scheme, quite another to have redistribution.

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 15

1.17 Arrow’s impossibility theorem: The difficult of getting agreementThe fact that highly educated and competent people continue to debate things like FPTP/PR is itself proof of the impossibility of getting total agreement on any issue in life.

Getting people to agree, even when it looks like there should not be differences is a mammoth task. In a eeting where every one has equal say and there is no hierarchy, getting agreement on simple things becomes a nightmare. People keep finding ways to disagree. [I’ve cited Vishal Singhs’s views here].

This tells us that we will be totally paralysed if we have systems that allow all views proportional representation.

16

2. So now we are ready to consider electoral systems

2.1 So what is the role of the legislature, and of government?The legislature should be tightly constrained and not have any capacity to undermine liberty. If that’s accepted, then its role is really very small. Laws are merely a derivative of the Constitution.

When I talk about government I mean the executive. That’s what we normally mean in the classical liberal sense when we talk about the role of government. While important, laws are merely details.

Re: the legislature Hayek proposed an outstanding model that needs to be explored. Please see http://sabhlokcity.com/2010/07/hayeks-1973-wincott-memorial-lecture/

The grave danger of PR system is that decision making will become extremely costly and will stall.

2.2 The purpose of electoral systemsWithin this framework we are now ready to consider electoral systems. [I’ve described this in detail in BFN.]

We have an electoral system NOT to represent “all” opinions, but to ensure a system whereby all opinions are protected.

2.3 What kind of people want to become representives?We need high calibre citizens who are clear about the purpose of government, and prepared to defend our liberty.

2.4 Objectives of our electoral systemThe system should therefore ensure:

a) a government (constrained by the constitution) that can act rapidly to defend liberty and

b) good quality people are motivated to join politics.

In the main there should be a clear line of accountability between a government’s election commitments and results produced. FPTP ensures a clearer line of accountability than PR. If people don’t like Party 1 they can reject and choose Party 2 or Party 3.

This is not about action alone.

Vishal wrote:

FPTP has done a lot of damage by letting Nehru, Indira and others take swift decisions. ‘Activity is not progress’. Our governments have done so much but mostly in the wrong direction.

To the extent it slows decisions, PR is good since the default of ‘no movement’ is better than recklessly moving in some direction.

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 17

Areas requiring quick decisions (national defence, internal security, etc.) are/can be anyways delegated to the executive. In rare urgent cases requiring legislative action, an ordinance can be issued (atleast when the parliament is not in session).

2.5 Speed in decision making is of the essence PR tends – universally –towards socialist confusion. That doesn’t mean PR won’t give us socialist parties that destroy

Shailesh argues that “In a Republic, where Constitution guarantees individual liberty, LEGISLATIVE action and the speed of it is NOT crucial. Swift EXECUTIVE action is important and there are ways to ensure that both in PR and FPTP systems.”

I am unable to agree that a government should be deliberately constrained in its speed. Both legislative and executive arms need to be responsive. Although legislative action must be tightly constrained, the government ought to have the power to enforce its will.

For instance, if actions proposed in BFN can’t be implemented within three years (and this includes very significant legislative change), then execution will entirely fail.

I am concerned about bicameral systems which slow down legislative change. To further cripple India through PR would lead to total disaster.

2.6 A representative must represent the constituencyThe great advantage of the FTPT is also that it yields a clear winner, who is declared representative of the constitutency.

It is possible under FPTPT to get elected even with 30 or 35 per cent votes (should be 51 per cent ideally). Political views that can’t even obtain such low levels of support do not deserve a seat at the decision making table.

FPTP entry barriers are therefore high but not very high. An alternative to FPTP is the Australian system (AV), but this system has allowed a very large number of candidates who received the second highest number of votes to win the seat through preferences.

2.7 FPTP also leads to socialist tendencies, but PR’s tendencies are overwhelming PR tends – universally –towards socialist confusion. That doesn’t mean PR won’t give us socialist parties that destroy wealth and freedom. In the case of India all parties were socialist and are socialist. FPTP can’t change what people think.

However, FPTP gave Narsamiha Rao the power to implement change rapidly in 1991. Under PR India would STILL have been 100 per cent socialist.

And UK would have been a total basket case today without the conclusive actions to overturn socialism that Thatcher undertook.

All parties even today are socialists. I’ve I’ve had extensive conversations over the phone with two key members of the erstwhile Team Anna, and from everything I gather, Arvind Kejriwal is entirely confused and has uncritically absorbed India’s socialist model in its entirity.

Despite my efforts (and I’m putting in a good amount of time into this job) to influence Arvind, I don’t expect any freedom party to be started in India soon. Anna Hazare and Baba Ramdev have a violent gut reaction to the idea of FDI in retail, and such basic liberties.

18

I don’t blame Arvind for being a socialist. He has been through a shoddy educational system (IIT may teach technology but it doesn’t reduce socialist indoctrination) and been in the company of a rabble of socialists for many years. He has not met nor come across people like me, and when I offer to speak to him, he doesn’t yet get the point that I might have something of value to suggest.

So it is India’s culture of socialism that has led to the mess in India. PR or FPTP India will still get socialist policies in India.

It is incorrect to attribute to FPTP the sad state of affairs of India. Universally, there is a tendency for PR governments to be far more socialist than FPTP. That’s the nature of compromise expected. Basic economic theory and intuition will prove it.

Until the minds of Indians are changed and educated, India can’t change. Once that is done, FPTP will give the best results, as it allows major views to compete and dominate. Within these major competing frameworks, further debate can occur. But to have all kinds of vague, ill-educated, confused views available at the table is a sure recipe for disaster.

Shailesh states that: “ FPTP, by discouraging competition (high entry barriers), tends to perpetuate the dominant culture (socialist or liberal) . This is one of the likely reasons for India being more socialist now than 65 yrs ago. PR, by allowing more competition, gives minority ideas a better/fair chance to reverse the existing culture.”

This view is only apparently valid. It seems natural to suggest that if classical liberal views had representation at the decision making table in India, they would have been somehow influential. It forgets that it would have been hard (or even impossible) for any liberal to get a seat – even under PR - given the prevailing culture. There simply weren’t any liberals.

Liberals need a free press, not PR. The free press is the greatest influencer of change in culture. Liberals (who still are fewer than a few hundred) should use the press to change the culture.

Once the culture is changed, things will change rapidly. India’s fragmented political system allows parties to win even with a small proportion of votes.

Shailesh said: “A good part of the freedom India has now is because of the 1991 liberalization – my understanding is it was more forced (by IMF) and less voluntary”.

Well, everything is voluntary at such a level. Nations are sovereign. In Greece, if you recall, no amount of pressure, IMF or otherwise, could make the government sign any order.

Having a clear majority in parliament allowed N.Rao to implement the reforms. Only he and his cabinet needed to agree. Not a rigmarole of splintered PR groups/parties. Only a government with clear mandate has a hope of implementing reforms. All other governments will inevitably tip into welfare state/ Keynesianism/ socialism.

FPTP tends to encourage two largest groups of political opinion, regardless of whether these are socialist or otherwise. It so happens that in India to two largest “sides” of opinion were socialist.

Except for the mid-1960s, when Swatantra Party (classical liberal) did become the second largest party in Parliament. But it only had 44 seats, and most of its MPs were totally confused and didn’t understand Rajaji. Most were conservative Hindus and later joined Jan Sangh/BJP.

India has therefore had two dominant political parties under FPTP – as predicted. But both were socialist (one was Hindu socialist, the other “secular” socialist).

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 19

Should any genuine classical liberal opposition actually emerge in India, it will displace one of these two parties, as socialists are forced to combine, and those less inclined to socialism join this new group.

Entry barriers are serious, but not insurmountable at all. Mere 30 per cent of the vote will usually win a seat.

If classical liberals can’t even get 30 per cent of the votes they should not waste time trying to contest elections.

I’m interested in long term reform, not in short term marketing analysis. There is simply no point in joining politics without forming government. Hence FPTP is not a barrier. Shortage of leaders is the barrier. Shortage of funds to progagate the message of liberty is the barrier.

Indians are not stupid. Once they understand the message they will vote.

I don’t have any interest in half-baked “strategic” thinking about “fair that any potential new supplier has to be good enough to gain 30% market share”. I want at least 50 per cent market share. To me politics is not about “market share”.

I’m not running a company. I’m trying to TOTALLY reform India’s governance. Total success or total failure. I won’t pick any intermediate position.

2.8 The gravest danger of PR: the Balkanisation of IndiaFPTP gives at least SOME chance for majority governments to get established. PR gives no chance at all for that to happen.

That means governments become more confused, confounded and impotent. We get weak governments that can't deliver anything.

Scenario three is in the Planning Commission paper for 12th plan talks about “policy logjam”. It reflects a situation where for one reason or another, most of the policies needed are not taken. If this continues for any length of time, vicious cycles begin to set in and growth could easily collapse.

Mamata Banerjee recently qui UPA. The Congress coalition was being hijacked, prevented from introducing FDI in retail. One of the greatest economics illiterates of India, Mamata is determined to block India's success. Not content with destroying West Bengal (along with the communists), she is now determined to destroy India as well.

This should ring a CLEAR WARNING (even for "tubelights") about the dangers of PR.

Had India been following PR, we would have been unable even to have the 1991 reforms. India would have by now splintered (or be in the process of splintering) into many pieces.

I should know. By early 1990s I was working as Joint Secretary/ Addl. Secretary in Assam and what had become clear was that INDIA HAD NO MONEY. India had no money to pay government officials, teachers, even defence. It was being bankrupted at an alarming rate. And insurgency in Assam and NE was becoming out of control.

Had the 1991 reforms not come in, and some credit extended to state governments, the states would have gone bankrupt.

At that stage, the North East would have almost certainly split from India. Like USSR split into its constituent parts, India would have gone back to some form of pre-1947 disorder.

Let us all remember one thing: Without a strong police and armed force, India can't survive in one piece for long. India is prone to Balkanisation (it is after all a sub-continent). That's a basic message every policy maker should thoroughly understand. It was first suggested by

20

Chanakya. When the Mauryan empire forgot this lesson, India splintered and became vulnerable to all kinds of foreign attacks.

Although the chances of India's Balkanisation appear low today, they were VERY HIGH in the early 1990s, and were getting higher. How can you run a country without ANY money? Wild inflation would have come in, and in the unrest, the country would have splintered.

With proportional representation India will Balkanise faster than you can blink your eyes.

Sardar Patel was in favour of a STRONG steel frame for India (IAS, etc.) and that principle must ALWAYS be followed in India. India' constituent assembly also deliberately picked a quasi-federal system with an exceptionally strong centre. For the same reason. India is not yet ready for total federalism. It needs to operate a tight ship for at least another century, and then more powers can be given to the states. (That having been said, local government must be very significantly strenghthened).

To this our response should be that we need a government that has a clear mandate and so can be held to account. FPTP is not perfect. If socialist parties gain majorities, they can destroy India, too. But PR is guaranteed to paralyse and destroy India.

FPTP can create a "policy logjam". PR can entirely split the log-raft (India) into component logs.

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 21

3. Second order arguments aganst PR

3.1 PR leads to socialist tendenciesAn argument made against FPTP is that it would have allowed India to shrug off socialism much earlier.

This argument is incorrect. It is PR that tends – universally – across the world – towards socialist confusion. There are robust data to prove it. [CITE]

In the case of India all parties were socialist and are socialist. FPTP can’t change what people think. Even the party to be floated by Arvind Kejriwal is almost certainly going to be socialist. Anna Hazare and Baba Ramdev have a violent gut reaction to the idea of FDI in retail, and such basic liberties. Therefore, PR or FPTP we’ll still get socialist policies in India.

However, FPTP gave Narsamiha Rao the power to implement change RAPIDLY in 1991. Under PR India would STILL have been 100 per cent socialist.

Similarly, UK would have been a total basket case today without the CONCLUSIVE actions to overturn socialism that Thatcher undertook.

FPTP also leads to socialist tendencies (median voter theorem), but PR’s tendencies towards socialism are overwhelming. If we are interested in freedom we’ll build a freedom based party, not worry about FPTP/PR.

3.2 PR representatives avoid meeting their constituentsFPTP "decreases the absenteeism rate by about one third". If at least one of the key purposes of democracy is to listen to the voice of the people, PR is definitely not the way to do it. [Source: Electoral Rules and Politicians’ Behavior: A Micro Test, by Stefano Gagliarducci, Tommaso Nannicini, and Paolo Naticchioni]

The greatest fans of PR in India are urban voters who dislike the idea of visiting constituencies and meeting villagers.

3.3 PR systems tend to lead to more political partiesIn general, proportional representation tends to yield more political parties than plurality voting (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989), [Source: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONS by Roger B. Myerson, March 2000]

3.4 Instablity"unpredictable and unstable coalition formation in multiparty parliamentary systems with proportional representation (Lijphart, 1992, Linz and Valenzuela, 1994)." [Source: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONS by Roger B. Myerson, March 2000]

22

3.5 Strategic voting contrary to one's own preferences"Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) used a rather different model, but again taking account of voter's concerns about which party is most likely to form a governing coalition in a multiparty democracy, to explain how a small centrist party could persistently hover at the threshold of extinction in a proportional-representation parliament (as happened to the Free Democrats in Germany for many years) even when a majority of voters would actually prefer its policy positions. The problem highlighted in this model is that voters care most of all about which party gets the largest number of seats in the parliament, because the largest party is assumed to get the first chance of forming a government, and so a voter may rationally vote for a large leftist or rightist party even when the voter would actually prefer to have the small centrist party lead the government. In this scenario, the expectation that this centrist party will get only a small number of seats becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. This model of Austen-Smith and Banks also explains why the two large parties in Israel lost seats in 1994 when a constitutional reform there cut the link between being the largest single party and getting the first chance to form a government. [Source: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONS by Roger B. Myerson, March 2000]

3.6 PR systems harden identities and can foster separatism"Systems based on PR are more likely to exacerbate fault lines of conflict than to generate compromise because they encourage fragmentation and the hardening of narrow identities (Horowitz 2003). In a setting with multiple social cleavages, this magnifies rather than compresses differences, makes it difficult to build sturdy government (coalitions), and can lead to immobilism and even polarization." [Source: Why electoral systems matter: an analysis of their incentives and effects on key areas of governance, by Alina Rocha Menocal]

3.7 There is no easy choiceThis argument is something I've been making for a long time. I believe that FPTP can do very well in India with a few minor tweaks. PR is not just not an improvement, but will actually harm.

For advocates of responsible party government the most important considerations are that elections (not the subsequent process of coalition-building) should be decisive for the outcome. The leading party should be empowered to try to implement their programme during their full term of office, without depending upon the support of minority parties. The government, and individual MPs, remain accountable for their actions to the public. And at periodic intervals the electorate should be allowed to judge their record, and vote for alternative parties accordingly. Minor parties in third or fourth place are discriminated against for the sake of governability. In this perspective proportional elections can produce indecisive outcomes, unstable regimes, disproportionate power for minor parties in "kingmaker" roles, and a lack of clear-cut accountability and transparency in decision-making.

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 23

In contrast, proponents of proportional systems argue that the electoral system should promote a process of conciliation and coalition-building within government. Parties above a minimum threshold should be included in the legislature in rough proportion to their level of electoral support. The parties in government should there-fore craft policies based on a consensus among the coalition partners. Moreover, the composition of parliament should reflect the main divisions in the social composition of the electorate, so that all citizens have voices articulating their interests in the legislature. In this view majoritarian systems over-reward the winner, producing "an elected dictatorship" where the government can implement its programmes without the need for consultation and compromise with other parties in parliament. The unfairness and disproportionate results of the electoral system outside of two-party contests means that some voices in the electorate are systematically excluded from representative bodies. [Sanjeev: This is nice. Indeed, the liberal wants a government that is a "dictatorship" bound by the constitution to defend our liberty. This feature of FPTP - that it gives overwhelming power to the largest party - is its most desirable feature: provided the largest party doesn't start violating liberty.]

Therefore there is no single "best" system: [Sanjeev: I disagree. FPTP should be preferred, and constitutional constraints in favour of liberty strengthened] these arguments represent irresolvable value conflicts. For societies which are riven by deep-rooted ethnic, religious, or ethnic divisions, like Mali, Russia, or Israel, the proportional system may prove more inclusive (Lijphart, 1984), but it may also reinforce rather than ameliorate these cleavages. For states which are already highly centralized, like Britain or New Zealand, majoritarian systems can insulate the government from the need for broader consultation and democratic checks and balances. In constitutional design, despite the appeal of "electoral engineering", there appear to be no easy choices.

[Source: Norris, Pippa, Choosing electoral systems: Proportional, majoritarian and mixed systems, International Political Science Review July 1997, Vol. 18 Issue 3, p297]

3.8 Disadvantages pointed out by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

is, or does, but here's what it says are the key disadvantages of PR. Unfortunately, this institute is focused on democracy, not liberty, and hasn't questioned the BASICS problems of PR.

Most of the criticisms of PR in general are based around the tendency of PR systems to give rise to coalition governments and a fragmented party system. The arguments most often cited against PR are that it leads to:

a. Coalition governments, which in turn lead to legislative gridlock and consequent inability to carry out coherent policies. There are particularly high risks during an immediate post-conflict transition period, when popular expectations of new

24

governments are high. Quick and coherent decision making can be impeded by coalition cabinets and governments of national unity which are split by factions.

b. A destabilizing fragmentation of the party system. PR can reflect and facilitate a fragmentation of the party system. It is possible that extreme pluralism can allow tiny minority parties to hold larger parties to ransom in coalition negotiations. In this respect, the inclusiveness of PR is cited as a drawback of the system. In Israel, for example, extremist religious parties are often crucial to the formation of a government, while Italy endured many years of unstable shifting coalition governments. Democratizing countries are often fearful that PR will allow personality-based and ethnic-cleavage parties to proliferate in their undeveloped party systems.

c. A platform for extremist parties. In a related argument, PR systems are often criticized for giving a stage in the legislature to extremist parties of the left or the right. It has been argued that the collapse of Weimar Germany was in part due to the way in which its PR electoral system gave a toehold to extremist groups of the extreme left and right.

d. Governing coalitions which have insufficient common ground in terms of either their policies or their support base. These coalitions of convenience are sometimes contrasted with coalitions of commitment produced by other systems (e.g. through the use of AV), in which parties tend to be reciprocally dependent on the votes of supporters of other parties for their election, and the coalition may thus be stronger.

e. Small parties getting a disproportionately large amount of power. Large parties may be forced to form coalitions with much smaller parties, giving a party that has the support of only a small percentage of the votes the power to veto any proposal that comes from the larger parties.

f. The inability of the voter to enforce accountability by throwing a party out of power. Under a PR system it may be very difficult to remove a reasonably-sized centre party from power. When governments are usually coalitions, some political parties are ever-present in government, despite weak electoral performances from time to time. The Free Democratic Party (FDP) in Germany was a member of the governing coalition for all but eight of the 50 years from 1949 to 1998, although it never gained more than 12 per cent of the vote.

g. Difficulties either for voters to understand or for the electoral administration to implement the sometimes complex rules of the system. Some PR systems are considered to be more difficult than non-PR systems and may require more voter education and training of poll workers to work successfully.

I'm assembling a wide range of arguments, both of the first and second order, against the idea of proportional representation.

This issue (in this blog post) is a lower order issue, but still worth noting – that FPTP is ALSO a proportional system – but its proportion refers to geography, not policy.

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 25

For EACH constituency the candidate who polls the highest votes is elected. This allows EACH constituency to be represented in proportion to its population.

FPTP, overall, also reflect dominant policy preferences of an entire state or nation.

We don't want FRINGE policy preferences at the decision making table. FPTP effectively excises them from the system.

The PR system, on the other hand, is about proportion in policy preference. Thus, a person in Delhi who believes in communism is combined with a person in Kanyakumari who prefers communism. They both get a common "representative" who is selected by the communist party, not by either of these two citizens.

There is no reason why proportion by policy preference is more desirable to proportion by geographical area. Indeed, by allowing fringe and potentially dangerous policy preferences a seat at the table, FPTP threatens both stability and liberty. A nation is a combination of people AND land. Local issues matter. Policy is not just national. Politics should therefore be as local, as well. FPTP allows local policy issues to be brought to the table, as well.

The Australian system is SLIGHTLY different to the FPTP system. Its electoral system is known as "alternative vote" system.

In 2011, the UK held a national referendum on this matter and SOUNDLY REJECTED AV. It reaffirmed FPTP.

Although PR was not under consideration, it is important to note many of the arguments in favour of a simple FPTP model. Please visit to the official website for the "No" campaign for details, but let me reproduce UK Prime Minster Cameron's entire article on this subject.

26

4. Why India should keep the first past the post system

4.1 Cameron’s defence of FPTP in UK[Source, 30 April 2011]

In four days, Britain votes in a referendum that is critical to our democracy and our future.

Normally, when we vote, those votes have a use-by-date. We elect Councillors, Mayors, MPs and governments for four or five years.

But the referendum on AV is about voting in a change that is permanent.

Unless enough people turn out to vote on Thursday, Britain is in real danger of exchanging an electoral system that works for one we would come to regret profoundly.

To me there are four important reasons to save the First-Past-the-Post system we use today.The first is its simplicity. It’s so simple it can be summed up in one sentence: the candidate who gets the most votes wins.

Just compare that to AV: a confusing mess of preferences, probabilities and permutations.

Leaving aside the clear danger that this complexity could encourage negative campaigning – as in Australia, where voters are greeted at polling stations by party apparatchiks with 'How to Vote’ cards, telling people the exact order in which to rank each candidate – it would also throw up some patently unfair results.

Under AV, the person who comes third in people’s first preferences can end up coming first in the race.

It makes winners of losers and losers of winners.

The result could be a Parliament full of second-choices who no one really wanted but didn’t really object to either.

The second major strength of First-Past-the-Post is its effectiveness.

Throughout history, it has risen to the demands of the time, often with a brutal decisiveness.

That’s what happened when it brought in the Thatcher government in 1979.

The British people recognised it was time for change – and the electoral system didn’t let them down.

On other occasions, when the public has felt that none of the major parties have all of the answers, it has led to a hung Parliament – as it did last year.

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 27

Under AV, such decisiveness is much less likely. It will make hung Parliaments more commonplace and make it more difficult to kick out tired governments.

Indeed, if it had been in place at the election last year, Gordon Brown could still be Prime Minister today.

I can’t imagine anything much worse than a voting system that leaves half-dead governments living on life support.

The third reason to save First-Past-the-Post is its efficiency.

Everyone knows this country needs to cut spending and get back to living within its means.

At this time, we need to protect those things that provide our country with real value for money.

Our current voting system does that – it’s cheap to administer and comes with little bureaucracy.

There is a real danger that AV could come with additional costs, from public information campaigns explaining the complexities of AV to the extra expense of counting votes at election time.

At this time I think our money is better spent on public services than on our political system.

The fourth reason to save First-Past-the-Post is to do with our history.

Each democracy in the world has its own story, shaped by its own chain of events.

The American system, with its strong checks and balances, was born of revolution – designed to avoid the possibility of over-mighty government.

In Europe, both after the Second World War and the fall of Communism, many countries adopted other more plural voting systems, again constructed to avoid the experience of being dominated by over-mighty governments.

Britain’s democracy has its own story. Two centuries ago, voting was limited to a privileged few.

Generations of campaigners fought and died to change that. Their struggle gave us the principle that sits at the heart of our democracy today: we are all equal, therefore we all have an equal say at the polls. One person, one vote.

So First-Past-the-Post isn’t just one way of counting votes; it is an expression of our fairness as a country.

It is enshrined in our constitution and integral to our history – and AV flies in the face of all that because it destroys one person, one vote.

If you vote for a mainstream candidate who comes top in the first round, your other preferences will never be counted.

But if you vote for a fringe candidate who gets knocked out early, your other votes will be counted.

That means the second, third, even fourth votes of someone who supports the Monster Raving Looney Party can count as much as the first vote of someone who supports a mainstream party. That is unfair and undemocratic.

28

Don’t take all this from me. You can judge the relative merits of First-Past-the-Post and AV by how popular they are overseas.

Our current system is one of Britain’s most successful exports – used by almost half the electors on the planet, embraced and understood by 2.4 billion people from India to America.

So in the next few days ask yourself a few questions: do you want to switch to a voting system that is hopelessly unclear, unfair and indecisive?

Do you want elections that are – as Churchill put it – “determined by the most worthless votes given for the most worthless candidates”?

And do you want to rip up a valuable part of our constitution and centuries of British history for a system that is unpopular the world over? If the answer is no, make sure you get out to the polling station on 5th May – and vote no to AV.

I've prepared a simple diagram to illustrate how one's views about the state affects the kind of government we want, as well as the electoral system (in case we prefer democracy to monarchy).

[Click for larger image. The associated PPT)

You might be surprised to note that I have put Gandhi along with Hobbes and Chanakya, on the right extreme.

That is because he wanted self-governing villages. Hobbes's strong state defends us from each other (and invaders), but otherwise leaves us alone.

So also Gandhi's Ram Rajya needs a a strong king to defend borders, leaving the villages alone. A Ram is needed, a king who understands the Mahabharata's

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 29

message. In Ramayana Ram is not a socialist maniac, and does not intervene unnecessarily; just assures justice.

Ram ran a tight ship; a minimalist state. He fought evil and was known as a man of great integrity. That is ALL that a king must do.

Democracy was NEVER Gandhi's ideal, Ram Rajya was.

Democracy was, instead, Nehru's ideal. Nehru came to it from well to the left of John Stuart Mill – through a Fabian socialist model. To him democracy was a tool for legitimising all-encompassing, maximalist state. The state would achieve commanding heights. In his democratic society, liberty would be lost entirely. We would become minions of the state.

Gandhi and Nehru were poles apart!

Reforming our electoral system is better than replacing it

The grave dangers of the proportional system of representation

Government is our servant, and democracy the way to elect the servant: nothing more!

Recent notes are listed below:1. Notes – arguments against proportional representation #12. Notes – arguments against proportional representation #2

3. Why do we care to subject ourselves to democracy (majority rule)?

4. A simple diagram: How one's view about the state affects views about electoral systems

5. FPTP is a proportional system – by geography; and accommodates local policies.

For the most part, Britain has used the tried and tested FPTP system. In the past, this system and the whole structure of elections, created absurd anomalies with the existence of "rotten boroughs" such as Old Sarum, Dunwich and Gatton. Old Sarum was by local reckoning "one man, two cows and a field" and yet returned two MP’s to Westminster! Gatton, a village in Surrey, returned one MP yet had just one voter in it.

The 1832, 1867 and 1884 Reform Acts changed a lot of the more absurd abuses that surrounded the electoral system so vividly described by Charles Dickens in "Pickwick Papers". However, the principle of FPTP was kept.

Lord Hailsham once referred to this system as an "elective dictatorship" in that a powerful government can be created with overwhelming Parliamentary power which can usually push through its required legislation6

6 http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/first_past_the_post.htm

30

4.2 Reforming our electoral system is better than replacing it

A range of electoral systems can provide some form of democratic representation.[1] These include proportional, first-past-the-post and the presidential. India’s follows the Westminster first-past-the-post model (which I refer to as WFPTP).

Every few years someone or the other raises a demand for replacing our system with something else. But as Robert Dahl observed, “A country where the underlying conditions are highly favourable can preserve its basic democratic institutions under a great variety of constitutional arrangements”[2]. Electoral systems are less important than the democratic culture of a society.

The great importance of incentives

But this is not enough. In Breaking Free of Nehru (BFN), I argued that incentives are more important than electoral systems. “The quality of governance in a society”, I suggested, “ultimately depends on the design of the incentives deep inside the entrails of these models” (p.89). Two electoral models that look alike on the surface can deliver dramatically different outcomes based only on slight differences in their incentives.

A good system should create incentives for good people to contest elections. It should ensure that if good people do step forward to contest elections, that they have a reasonable chance of getting elected. (By a “good” person I mean someone who obeys the laws of the land, does not use illegal money during elections, does not lodge false electoral expense accounts, and is reasonably competent on matters of policy.)

I believe that what matters the most in this regard is whether: a system imposes electoral expenditure limits (imposing limits violates freedom of expression

and strongly encourages the use of illicit influence); the government funds elections (if not, then the corrupt or the rich will step forward since

only they can afford to huge expense of contesting elections); and

representatives are paid well (not doing so will attract only the incompetent).

Advantages of the Westminster FPTP model

Not all models are alike, either. The WFPTP system is actually quite a good model. It gives a strong mandate to the party that is supported by the largest number of voters, regardless of whether the majority supports the party. Where necessary, the largest party can align with a few small parties or independents to form a coalition. The WFPTP system therefore ensures stability.

But far more important to democratic evolution of the society is the ability of the WFPTP system to allow fresh blood and new ideas by keeping the barrier to entry quite low. Thus, the BJP could enter Indian politics even though its vote share never

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 31

crossed 37 per cent nationally. Indeed, an Indian liberal party can also succeed under the current splintered polity by securing fewer votes than it would otherwise need.

On the other hand, the proportional system precludes powerful reforms of the sort that Margaret Thatcher undertook. Its coalition cabinet is generally a rabble of competing interests. Compromise and horse-trading are its hallmark. As a result, no party’s electoral promises are ever fulfilled, making a mockery of democratic accountability. Proportional is the worst of all systems.

The presidential system is very stable, but stability is not the only virtue. Responsiveness is equally important, and in this regard the presidential system performs the worst since a president can’t be removed before his tenure ends. Jokers and dunces, once elected, are free to squander taxes till the end of their tenure. The proportionate is the most responsive of all, allowing re-alignment of governments even within a given parliament. But this is chaotic, and at the expense of stability.

The WFPTP model walks the fine balance. “No confidence motions” allow the people some ongoing control on the government should it stray too far. While the US Senate can’t vote out a non-performing president, the WSFPTP can easily get rid of a non-performing Prime Minister, as well as re-align an entire government through defections. The WFPTP system is therefore the most reasonable of all; a system India is advised not to let go of!

Reforms needed

Of course, we all know that our WFPTP model is in shambles. Indeed, our entire democracy is a sham. Thus, for the last many decades, the corrupt have most successfully contested elections. But this is not a mandatory requirement of the WFPTP system. It is the result of misaligned incentives that we have chosen to create in India. We have damaged our system and so it is we who must fix it.

The relative performance of the Indian and Australian systems[3] clearly demonstrates that incentives matter. The Australian system elects brilliant and honest representatives but the Indian system prevents honest candidates from contesting.

We impose election expenditure limits – which should not exist in the first place – but more problematically, which are shamelessly and heavily breached by all the major parties. And no one in India ever audits electoral expenses! Citizens can readily obtain a copy of these records for one rupee, but they don’t care about this, either! Hypocrisy rules. In Australia and USA, on the other hand, electoral expenditure limits are not imposed. Instead, transparency and disclosure of receipts and expenses is enforced. That encourages honesty.

A good candidate in India can lose huge amounts of money in elections and even go bankrupt. On the other hand, Australia reimburses candidates on the basis of the votes polled, thus reducing the risk of losing huge amounts of money during the electoral contest. This allows good people to contest.

Finally, to totally make sure that no honest person can ever dram of entering politics (after ensuring that they will first go bankrupt!), India pays its representatives very

32

poorly. Australia pays its representatives quite well, instead. That allows good people to join politics, something that can’t happen in India.

Indeed, with such incentives, nothing would change even if we had a presidential system. For then, instead of our most corrupt citizen becoming Prime Minster, our most corrupt citizen will become President!

These badly designed incentives have totally destroyed the WFPTP system in India. The suggested improvements will definitely enhance the performance of our electoral system, as thousands of currently disenfranchised good people start entering politics for the first time since independence.

Of course, these reforms won’t be a panacea for India’s problems. These reforms can’t ensure that elected representatives won’t abuse their powers. That will requires many other things including citizen vigilance. But of this we should be very sure: without implementing these reforms, we will always remain a banana republic.

Freedom Team of India

None of these reforms will be implemented by the current crop of Indian politicians, for they will instantly lose their seats if good people enter politics. So it is now up to the Indian liberals to (finally!) take responsibility for their country, contest elections and form a government, so these reforms can be implemented. You can do so by joining the Freedom Team of India (http://freedomteam.in/).

[1]See the International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design on the internet.

[2]Dahl, Robert A., On Democracy, New Haven: Yale Nota Bene, 2000 (1998), p.139.

[3]I’m making certain simplifying assumptions here about the Australian system which is a preferential voting system, not strictly an FPTP system.

4.3 Stick with FIRST PAST THE POST, India!I'm extracting from a brilliant article by Janet Albrechtsen on the grave dangers of the proportional system of representation.

The proportional pathway to policy paralysis

by JANET ALBRECHTSEN The Australian July 04, 2012

IT is difficult to think of a more disgraceful week in politics than the past one. Unfortunately, too few have delved into the real reason for last week's policy paralysis and the concomitant disgraceful antics. This is what minority government delivers – hopeless policy compromise. Not just in the past week but every week. Endless back room deals shrouded in secrecy; a handful of people holding policy making to ransom.

We ought to etch the events of the week in our memory. There are plenty of opportunistic people who like the idea of minority governments because it empowers their fringe politics.

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 33

Hence, one day soon enough we will once again hear the dangerous call for proportional representation, which effectively entrenches minority government.

When talk of PR comes, just remember this past week. This is a tiny morsel of what that misguided voting system delivers by the bucket load.

Yet, even as the appalling reality of minority government was sinking in, an academic, Klaas Woldring, wrote last year in The Sydney Morning Herald (of course) that "in most other representative democracies a number of parties seek co-operation to form a majority government". This was "a better way" he promised. While Europe was lurching from one crisis to the next, with genuine economic reform stymied by politics, the deluded associate professor was espousing "the European model of proportional representation".

This kind of talk emerges with depressing regularity. Proportional representation sits in the Greens manifesto (of course) where they promise "participatory democracy". It sounds so friendly and inclusive.

Here's Woldring, executive member of something called the Progressive Labor Party, again: "Apart from being co-operative, (proportional representation) also ensures diverse and democratic representation. There are no by-elections, pork-barrelling or horse-trading on preferences behind closed doors."

This is beyond laughable. Proportional representation will only entrench these chaotic coalitions.

The truth is that PR is a complete con. After the 2010 election in The Netherlands, which follows a proportional voting system, there were 10 parties in parliament and it took months of horse-trading and backroom deals to form a new government.

Even worse, under PR, voters can't know, when they vote, what the future governing coalition will look like.

PR produces even lower-quality policy and politics as odd coalitions end up agreeing on lowest common denominator policies.

The critical flaw of PR is that mainstream views in the electorate are held to ransom by these balance of power parties on the extremes of Left and Right.

While no system is perfect, by ensuring parties on the extremities get representation, PR actually widens the gap between the voters and those who govern them – a backward step for democracy.

34

It is bad enough that in the Australian Senate [Sanjeev: which follows proportional representation], past and present fringe parties and independents have been and are more powerful than their voting base warrants.

In "co-operative" Europe, extremist parties prosper.

A few years ago, Boris Johnson, the mayor of London, best summed up the mess of PR pointing out that in the "50 years since the war there were 103 elections in Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, Belgium, The Netherlands and Sweden – all countries that favour PR and its endless stream of buggins-turn coalitions. And how often, in those 103 elections, did voters actually succeed in producing a change of government? Six times!" Not one to mince words, Johnson revealed PR as a fraud upon voters "because it will always tend to erode the sovereign right of the people to kick the rascals out."

4.4 PR lowers barriers to entry into politics, and can help FTI

Shailesh said:

I wonder why, of all people, YOU don’t understand this basic issue: You know what India needs. You are capable. You are willing to do all it takes. YET, you haven’t made ANY difference to India. Why?

Its because FPTP requires that you either compromise and be part of the Top 2 parties OR be a pressure group with all its limitations OR do what FTI is doing to break the Cong-BJP duopoly over this industry (politics).

EVEN IF fti is eventually successful, your and FTIs efforts and failures should atleast tell you that the entry barriers are unreasonably high. Which other industry has such massive entry barriers that you would justify? Which other trade or profession requires you to know everything, have all qualities, assemble 1500 capable and willing leaders who broadly agree with you on such complex issues, raise so much money, etc, BEFORE you can open your shop?

You first create/justify entry barriers (FPTP) and then fight for govt. subsidy to lower those barriers (State funding of elections). Isn’t this exactly what socialists do Sanjeev?

The FPTP system has, over a period of time, made it rational for people to stay away from politics. That is why despite your noble intentions you have chosen, as a rational person, to live outside India and will likely retire there.

Shailesh does have a point here. But he forgets that state funding of elections is relevant even in PR (although possibly to a lesser extent).

What it does, though, is to create a mess at the decision making table – as I’ve repeatedly pointed out. My goal is to promote a good system regardless of its direct impacts on me or people like me.

The dangers of proportional representation in IndiaDraft, 20 September 2012 35

5. References

An Economic Theory of Electoral Systems, by Diego Aboal and Centro de Investigaciones EconÛmicas

Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems, Pippa Norris, International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique , Vol. 18, No. 3, Contrasting Political Institutions. Institutions politiques contrastées (Jul., 1997), pp. 297-312

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONS by Roger B. Myerson, March 2000

Electoral Rules and Politicians’ Behavior: A Micro Test, by Stefano Gagliarducci, Tommaso Nannicini, and Paolo Naticchioni

Electoral System Reform and Party Systems: Analyzing the Consequences of Institutional Change, by Philipp Harfst

Political parties, electoral systems and democracy: A cross-national analysis, by AMANDA L. HOFFMAN

The Evolution of the British Electoral System 1832-1987

THEORETICAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS by Roger B. Myerson, European Economic Review 43 (1999), 671-697

What are the effects of electoral rules? (how economists analyse the UK electoral system from the viewpoint of the role of elections in democratic systems), by Klingelhofer J, Economic Review (UK), Nov 2011, Volume: 29 Issue: 2 pp.28-30

Why electoral systems matter: an analysis of their incentives and effects on key areas of governance, by Alina Rocha Menocal

36