DOCUMENT RESUME CS 507 781 AUTHOR Kluver, Randy TITLE … · DOCUMENT RESUME ED 344 257 CS 507 781 AUTHOR Kluver, Randy TITLE The Primary Stage of Socialism: Marxism Redefined in

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 344 257 CS 507 781

AUTHOR Kluver, RandyTITLE The Primary Stage of Socialism: Marxism Redefined in

Contemporary Chinese Political Rhetoric.PUB DATE Nov 91NOTE 22p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the

Speech Communication Association (77th, Atlanta, GA,October 31-November 3, 1991).

PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.DESCRIPTORS Discourse Analysis; Economic Change; Foreigli

Countries; *Marxism; Rhetorical Criticism; SocialAction; *Social Change; *Socialism

IDENTIFIERS *China; *Political Rhetoric; RhetoricalEffectiveness; *Rhetorical Strategies

ABSTRACTDeng Xiaopeng's rise to leadership in the People's

Republic of China has been accompanied by massive economic andstructural reforms. Some claim that these reforms led to the rise ofthe pro-democracy student movements of 1987 and 1989, and there hasbeen a notable amount of scholarly investigation into their politicaland economic consequences. Deng and his pre-Tiananmen protege, ZhaoZlyang, employed a variety of rhetorical strategies that weredesigned to justify and legitimate the reforms in the face oforthodox Marxist opposition. The catch phrase, "primary stage ofsocialism," is a redefinition of orthodox Marxist theory whichenabled the reforms to continue in the face of Chinese culturalconstraints on political rhetoric. It enabled the reform faction inChina to demonstrate loyalty to ortnodox Marxism, while introducingquasi-capitalistic measures into the centrally planned Chineseeconomy. Part of the reason for the failure of the reforms was theinability to fully legitimate the reform program without a completerevamping of Marxist orthodoxy. Any future challenge to the statusquo in China will either have to demonstrate a linkage to traditionalmarxist theory or overcome the theory's stronghold on Chinesesociety. (Fifty notes are included.) (SG)

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Reproductions supplied by EDRS Lre the best that can be madefrom the original document.

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Student Paper

The Primary Stage of Socialism:Marxism Redefined in Contemporary Chinese Political Rhetoric

Randy KluverCommunication Arts and Sciences, GFS 344

University of Southern CaliforniaLos Angeles, CA 90089-1694

Paper presented to the Intercultural Division,Speech Communication Association, Atlanta, GA.

November, 1991

Running head: Chinese Political Rhetoric

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ABSTRACT

Deng Xiaopeng's rise tu leadership in the People's Republic ofChina has been accompanied by massive economic and structural reforms.This essay examines the rhetorical strategies employed by Deng and hispre-Tiananmen protege, Zhao Ziyang, to justify and legitimate thereforms in the face of orthodox Marxist opposition. It is the argumentof this paper that the catch phrase, "primary stage of socialism", is aredefinition of orthodox Marxist theory which enabled the reforms tocontinue in the face of Chinese cultural constraints on politicalrhetoric. It enabled the reform faction in China to demonstrate loyaltyto orthodox Marxism, while introducing quasi-capitalistic measures intothe centrally-planned Chinese economy. ?inally, the essay argues thatpart of the reason for the failure of the reforms was the inability tofully legitimate the reform program vithout a complete revamping ofMarxist orthodoxy.

Chinese Political Rhetoric 1

Since the rise of Deng Xiaopeng to the position of China's supreme

leader, he has led the People's Republic of China in a long and arduous period

of economic reform. These reforms have been m .sive and sustained, and hence

have been dubbed "China's Second Revolution".1 The recent reforms of the

Soviet Union have far overshadowed China's steps at reform, but as recently as

two years ago, Deng's reform program was seen as a model for that of the

Soviet Union.2

There can be little doubt that these reforms have had profound

implications upon the existing social structures and institutions of the

Peoples' Republic of China. Some claim that these reforms led to the rise of

the pro-democracy student movements of 1987 and 1989,3 and there has been a

notable amount of scholarly investigation into their political and economic

consequences. To the intercultural communication researcher, these reforms

provide a direct look into societal change in China, and the rhetorical

strategies that have accompanied the changes give significant insight into

variations across cultures in the implementation of policy. This data is

invaluable for developing a true understanding of cultural variation in

communication.4

As stated previously, Deng Xiaopeng, China's paramount leader, is

primarily responsible for the implementation of the reforms.5 Throughout the

1Harry Harding, China's Second . (Washingtor,, D. C,: The Brookings Institution, 1987); Bian Fa, "Reform-China's Second Revolution", China Reconstructs, Vol. xxxvi, *10, October, 1987, p. 16.2Sophie Quinn-Judge, "A Model br Reform: China's Example Inspires Soviet Reformers", Exiakern_EgszazaigReview, May 25, 1989, p. 16.3Jonathan D. Spence, "Introduction" in Han Minzhu, (Ed.', Cejes for Democracy: Writings and Sp_eeches from the1289 Chinese Democracy Movement, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. xv-xvi.

4Robert Shuter, in "The Centrality of Culture", Southern Communication Journal, 55, (1990), issues an earnest appealfor more extensive intracuttural research. Similarly, Stephen E. Lucas, "Coming to Terms with Movement Studies",Central States Speech Journal, 31, (1980), p. 265; calls for more extensive research in European, Asian, and Africansocial movements; both needs which hopefully this essay will begin to address.50fficially, Deng has resigned from all positions of power. But unofficially, his previous position as Chairman of theParty, as well as his influence, has secured for him the position as paramount leader, a fact that was madeclearduring the 1989 student uprising.


reform process, however, Deng and his political allies have faced resistance

among Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials and cadres at all levels of the

social hierarchy. The reason for this resistance is that in their attempt to

revitalize economic growth, the reformers have proposed measures that resemble

market-oriented capitalism, and thus the measures have been considered

anathema to a political hierarchy committed to the tenets of classical

Marxism. In order for Deng and the reformers to accomplish this profound

societal change and re-structurati.on, it has been necessary to provide Chinese

society with a unifying vision of society grounded in Marxist thought. This

has been attempted through a redefinition of Marxism that would allow the

implementation of the reforms. Moreover, the strategies used to provide this

vision have powerfully illustrated the role of rhetoric in sustained societal

change. This essay wil1 explore the constraints on political discourse

provided by Chinese culture in a manner such as presented by Lloyd Bitzer6,

examine the challenge before the reformers to justify the introduction of the

reforms, and explore the ways in which a unifying vision was provided through

the use of this rhetoric.

The Rhetorical Exigence

The proposition that a unifying vision must be present for the movement

or change of Chinese society is not a new one. In China's past, whenever one

dynasty was overthrown by another, the ideological justification of the

"Mandate of Heaven" was given for the new rulers.7 Indeed, Lam has noted that

6Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation", philosophy and Rhetoric, 1, (1968). It should be noted that Bitzer'sconcept of a rhetorical situation has been heavily criticized. Richard Vatz has argued that the situation does notcreate the response, but rather that the rhetor defines the situafion. He also argues that meaning is not inherent inthe situation, but the situation is given meaning by the rhetorical response of the rhetor. Athough there may be nomeaning inherent in an event, there are certainly situations in which there is an expectation on the part of anaudience for meaning to be ascribed to the event.7Hok-lam Chan, Liwitimationjaimperial China: Discussions under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty, (Seattle: University ofWashington Press, 1985; Lance Eccles, 'The Seizure of the Mandate: Establishment of the Legitimacy of the Liang


'all Chinese rulers have been obsessed with ideology."8 Throughout China's

history, Chinese emperors and leaders have sought court philosophers who might

provide this philosophical vision in order to give the ruler the justification

to impose authority over the breadth of the Chinese nation. Furthermore, the

idea that the leader is the source of correct doctrine is deeply rooted within

Chinese culture.9 With the establishment of the Peoples' Republic of China in

1949, this pattern became secularized, with Mao playing the role of the source

of correct doctrine.10 This might be contrasted with a cerl.ain pragmatism

present in the political system of the United States, in which strict

adherence to ideology is always somewhat suspect. In modern China, this vision

is articulated to the people through the careful cultivation of a public

orthodoxy, especially through required political meetings.11

However, the people to whom the reformers must appeal for the adoption

and implementation of reform are the officials and cadres of the Chinese

Communist Party. It is this group that has been at the forefront of most of

the significant social movements in China, and is most responsible for the

local implementation of national policy. Deng saw these cadres as primarily

responsible for the failure in the early years of the reforms because of a

lack of sincere follow-through. Fo l. example, in a 1982 address, he stated

that previous policy decisions had been correct. However, "because the Party

was not adequately prepared ideologically for all-round socialist construction

Dynasty", Journal of Asian History, 23, 2, 1989, p. 169-180. The mandate of Heaven, or decree of Heaven, isunderstood as the sanction of Heaven upon the ruling dynasty.

lly Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Zhao Ziyang, (Hong Kong: A.B. Books & Stationary Ltd., 1989), p. 30.

9S. R. Schram, "China After the 13th Congress" China Quarterly 14, (1988) pp. 178-197.

10 See James T. Myers, "Whatever Happened to Chairman Mao? Myth and Charism in the Chinese Revolution" inChinese_Politics tram Mao to Dog, ed. Victor C. Falkenheim (New York; Paragon House, 1989). See also, RamNaresh Sharma, "Mao's Concepts of Power, Authority, and Legitimacy", China Report, 25, 2, 1989, 135-145; and

Ralph Thaxton, - I:0;01 0: 4 ::0 4Ii :4.4111-41 I I: -I A* (New Haven: Yala

University Press, 1983).11For a more complete analysis of the role of small group communication for the purposes of indoctrination, seeGodw,n Chu, Radical Change through Communication in_Mao's China, (Honolulu, University Press of Hawaii, 1977).

6


at that time, that line and the many cotrect opinions put forward at that

Congress were not adhered to in practice."12 In order to bring about the type

of cooperation needed from the cadres, a new understanding of China's

development was needed, one that would provide a theoretical justification for

the reform policies. At this point, it is important to explore the political

context of the reforms, and then examine the rhetorical constraints inherent

in Chinese political discourse.

Bitzer has defined the exigence of a rhetorical situation as "an

imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting

to be done, a thing which is other than it should be."13 In contemporary

China, two exigencies of this type can be identified; one is the presence of

poverty, and the second is t sense of confusion over the incompatibility of

theoretical models of economic development and reality. First, the most

difficult problem facing the 1,,ders of Chinese society has been the presence

and persistence of poverty. The Marxist leaders of the 1949 Revolution

promised a quick end to the cycles of poverty that continually besieged the

nation, but after nearly forty years with a centrally-planned economy, there

continues to be a tremendous gap between theoretical models and the actual

economic situation. As Ethridge has noted, "By the time Mao died, both the

Soviet-style economy that inspired the Great Leap Forward and the Marxist

model that Mao envisioned in his later years had been tried, and both had

blighted the country with chaos and stagnation....Thus, there were many urgent

reasons in 1978 for seeking a new way to deal with China's problemo, even if

the change meant a reinterpretation of its former understanding of Marxism."14

12Deng Xiaopeng, Opening Speech, DILI= IfftliatignstcancjaasilhiLLEL, (Beijing, Foreign Language Press,1982), p. 2.13Bitzer, p. 6.14James M. Ethridge, China's Unfinished Revolution. (San Francisco: China books and Periodicals, 1990), p. 73.

7

Chinese Pditical Rhetoric 5

The frustration was evident in a statement of Deng's that "poverty is

not socialism...we must first rid ourselves of the socialism of poverty."15

At another point, Deng stated "Poverty has nothing to do with socialism, still

less with communinm. The superiority of socialism should be manifested in the

gradual improvement of the peoples' material life."16 Deng regarded the

presence of poverty in China as an ugly embarrassment to the rule of the

Communist Party, and saw the elimination of poverty as a preeminent goal of

the reforms.

However, in order to eliminate the poverty, a second exigence was

introduced; that is, the incompatibility of orthodox Marxism with the reform

program instituted by Deng, which was characterized by elements such as a

market-oriented economy and the rise of entrepreneurship. Although Deng and

others repeatedly stressed that the introduction of capitalistic measures

would not necessitate the nation becoming purely capitalistic, and that

socialist public ownership would always be the mainstay of the Chinese

economy, these elements of reform were greatly distrusted by those within the

party who remained staunchly Leftist and committed to the traditional Marxist

orthodoxy. As Dittmer has noted, "The problem arises when a sizable private

sector-and-market mechanism is introduced into a planned economy. In part it

is a problem of definition and identity: What is capitalist? What is

socialist? How far can the reforms go without trespassing the line of

demarcation?"17

The reformers within the party felt that this sense of confusion was

primarily responsible for the lack of progress of the reforms. One party

16Scram, p. 180.16Asian Recorder, September 2-8, 1984.

17Dittmer, p. 62.

nrtT MIPY AVIII F

Chinese Political Mato& 6

voice stated, "In the last eight years, despite genuine progress, numerous

problems have arisen because of inexperience, lack of understanding of the

reforms on the part of the people, and hidebound thinking."18 Until this

confusion could be resolved, the reform policies were at a standstill.

Because of these strong situational exigencies, it became increasingly

important for the reformers to rhetorically account for these incongruities

and to provide justification for the continuance of the reforms given the

constraints provided by the situation. As Bitzer has argued, "rhetorical

discourse comes into existence as a response to situation, in the same se,se

that an answer comes into existence in response to a question, or a sol on

in response to a problem".19 The reform faction responded to this need with a

rhetoric of definition to justify the reforms. By a rhetoric of definition, I

mean the use of rhetorical definition to alter widely held perceptions,

understandings, or assumptions, or, in Bitzer's words, to "change reality

through the mediation of thought and action."2° A rhetoric of definition can

attempt to change the beliefs, attitudes, or common understandings of the

audience either through redefinition of an existing reality or by providing a

common understanding of reality. As Vatz has noted, "situations obtain their

character fram the rhetoric which surrounds them."21 A rhetoric of definition

acts upon a situation to give it its character and to provide a common

understanding of a rhetorical situation.

The sense of confusion among the people of China regarding the reforms

was a result of a common understanding of reality based upon classical

Marxism, as interpreted by the Chinese Communist Party, and reinforced by

18Bian Fa, "Reform-China's Second Revolution", China Reconstructs, Vol. xxxvi, #10, October, 1987, p. 19.

18Bitzer, p. 5.20Bitzer, p. 4.21Vatz, p. 59.

Chinese Pada Rhetoric 7

years of political indoctrination. By redefining or changing that

understanding, the reformers could eliminate or at least diminish the sense of

confusion, and get about the business of reform. As Lam has noted, the

reformers "were gunning for nothing less than a metamorphosis in worldview."22

The remainder of this essay will discuss some of the constraints provided by

Chinese political culture, and then trace the rhetorical response of the

reformers as they sought to achieve this metamorphosis within the Party. I

will not att to fully detail all of the addresses in which the reformers

attempted to redefine tne existing reality in China, but will instead try to

explain in broad strokes how one key address; specifically, Zhao Ziyang's

address to the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987, served as a rhetorical

keystone in the political and economic goals of the reformers.

Chineae._13.hetsuical_Ssulatrainta

Bitzer has identified as the constituents of a rhetorical situation the.:

exigence, the audience, and the constraints which influence the audience.23

The next part of this discussion will examine more closely some of the

constraints upon political discourse in China that have the power to

"constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence".24 I wish to

extend the definition of constraint to include patterns of behav4or that are

common to a culture, and are passed on through the general transference of

culture across generations. In the context of Chinese political culture, I

will argue that a constraint exists which prevents rhetors from action that is

seen as contradictory to the established patterns of the past.

22Lam. p. 22.238itzer, p. 6.24Bitzer, p. 8.


As Crump and Dreher have noted, pol:tical discourse during the Warring

Kingdoms Period placed a great value on "loyalty to the legitimate

emperor...and the reverent observance of the advice of great men of the

past."25 The appeal to past authori,..y probably had its origin in the teaching

of Confucius, who spent his life urging the people to emulate the virtues of e.

kingdom that might or might not have ever existed, and this appeal continues

to be a vital part of political discourse. Thus a constraint upon any

rhetorical strategy used is that it must demonstrate a loyalty to "correct"

thought while still incorporating the elements of change which the politician

hopes to introduce.

This constraint manifests itself in Chinese political rhetoric by an

unwillingness to criticize those in power and by a tremendous i.nsistence that

the ideas being advocated are not new ones; rather, they are merely the

logical implications of the theories of the major theorists of Chinese

Marxism: Marx, Lenin, and Mao.26 Thus, in a political address, Deng himself,

as the current leader of China, consistently relies on quotes from Mao, and

lesser leaders rely on quotes from Deng, in order to show how theit words do

not differ substantially from those of Deng himself.

1...his is not to say that there is never a change'in the c;Tounding of

authority. When a ruler's status has grown to a point of overtaking that of

the older rulers, there will be a change in the authority the is cited for

legitimation. For example, immediately after the death Mao Zedong, Hua

Kuo-feng became the Chairman of the CCP. However, his, 5.01tus was not such

25J. I. Crump and J. J. Dreher. Peripatetic Rhetors of the Warring Kingdoms". Central States Speechilournal 22(1951) pp. 15-16.z6However, after sr .eone has fallen from power, they often Li used as a scapegoat (in Burke's term) for thefailures of past policy This is especially exemplified by the fall of the Gang of Four and the official recognition of thedisastrous results of the Cultural Revolution. See, for example, Rethinking the Cultural Revolutio, (Beijing: BeijingReview Publications, 1987).

1 1


that he was seen as the fountain of doctrine. Therefore, his speeches

extensively quoted Mao Zedong, thereby building upon Mao's authority.27 But

Zhao Ziyang, speaking nine years later, after Deng had built up his status as

chairman, paid greater homage to Deng Xiaopeng, while still stressing that

China would never depart from Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought. Deng's

status by that time had grown to the point where it was possible to criticize

some of Mao's theory, but not to the point that Mao had no relevance to the

discussion.

A relatd aspect of this constraint on Chinese political rhetoric is the

necessity for theoretical grounding. Changes in policy must be dictated by

Marxist theory, and there is never any room for deviation. This constraint

also dictates that the fundamental truth of Marxism and the role of the party

in China nwier be questioned.28 Deng himself has demonstrated his intolerance

of anyone who criticizes the fundamentals of the Chinese political system by

his willingness to sacrifice leaders and intellectuals after periods of

political upheaval.29 Thus for the reformers, there is a tremendous teasion

between the policies of Deng X.i.aopeng and the orthodoxy that has been in place

for so long. Deng's status has not reached the point where he can disregard

the teachings of Marx and Mao, so he must attribute the reform policies

themselves to the theories of Marx and Mao in order to gain wide acceptance.

27See, for example, Hue Kuo-feng, "Political Report to the Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party ofChina", PA., uti I: :1 1 tel. ,11/ : ii (Beijing: Foreign LanguagePress, 1977), pp. 1-112; and "Unite and Strive to Build a Modern, Powerful Socialist Country", Documents of the First

.4.014,0 A :iple's Republic of China, (Beijing: Foreign Language Press,1978), pp. 1-118.28For example, the official verdict of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission following the 1989 demonstrationswas that "party members who deviated from the correct political stand and violated the party's discipline...should bestrictly punished....including expelling them from the party' Lps.Amales Times, p. 1, June 26, 1989. (italics mine)

281-larding, p. 92. When student demonstrations have caused Deng's reforms to come into question, he hasresponded by allowing those reformers closest to him be taken from office. This is the case of Hu Yaobang in 1987and Zhao Ziyang in 1989. It could be argued that Deng is only protecting the fate of the reforms, but it is more likely

Deng wants to allow no possibility of moving beyond the dictatorship of the party.

12

A second constraint of Chinese political rhetoric is due to a cultural

erphasis on harmony, both in interpersonal relationships as well as in

political and cultural institutions. For this reason, open discussion of

division or factionalism is rare in Chinese politics, as the party wants to

maintain an aura of unity and harmony.30 However, especially with the advent

of the policies of the economic reform, factionalism and disharmony have been

a pattern of the political climate.31 Most of the controversy has involved

clashes between the reform faction of Deng Xiaopeng and the more conservative

Party members that have traditionally held power in Chinese politics. This

constraint is rhetorically manifested by a refusal to acknowledge differences

of op.tnion within the party leadership. Any official recognition of differing

perspectives will be noted as due to an inadequate understaading of theory.

Marxism Redefinad

With an understanding of these rhetorical constraints upon Chinese

political rhetoric, I will now discuss the specific attempts at redefinition

by the reformers. The first of these was an address by Deng Xiaopeng at the

Twelfth National Congress of the CCP in September of 1982 entitled "Socialism

with Chinese Characteristics". The address not only served as a major

official policy statement regarding the reforms but also provided a political

slogan, "socialism with Chinese characteristics", that would serve as a

guiding force in building an understanding of the reforms among the populace

of China.

In this address, Deng showed the first signs of backing away from a

dogmatic application of orthodox Marxism by pointing out the limitations of

300ne of the consequences of the 1989 student demonstrations was the exposure of factionalism within the ranks ofleadership, which caused some to speculate that China was on the brink of civil war. Los _Angeles Times, p. 1, June6, 1989.31Lam, p. 9.


classical Marxist theory, specifically that Marxism did not contain all of the

answers to China's problems. Deng stated "mechanical copying and application

of foreign experience and models will get us nowhere....To integrate the

universal truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of China, blaze a path

of our own and build socialism with Chinese characteristics-this is the basic

conclusion we have reached in summing up long, historical experience."32

An elaboration of this slogan is found in a rebruary, 1985, article in

ReAalag, the Party's theoretical journal and a principle source of party

thought. The article stated that while the fundamental principles of Marxism

were correct, not all elements of Marxism were.33 Without denying the

validity, or the core truths, of Marxism, this new doctrine stated that the

Chinese version of Marxism is inevitably bound to be different from what Marx

had envisioned. Marx could not have fully envisioned Chinese socialism

because he did not experience the Chinese situation. Thus, China's model for

economic development is no longer a dogmatic understanding of Marxism, but

rather a modified Marxism developed and integrated with the actual social

conditions in China. In this address, the role of Marxism in China is

redefined. Marxism itself is still considered a "universal truth" in keeping

with the constraint of loyalty, but the manifestation of that truth in China

is different thdn in other socialist nations.

It is important to note that Mao himself had talked of sinicizing

Marxism, and stressed that China should not have to answer to any other nation

for their interpretation of Marxism. However, Mao's version of socialism with

Chinese characteristics was probably more of an attempt to justify political

32Dong, 3.

33Asian Recorder, April 9-15, 1985. Regd. No. D-(c)-92 vol xxxi, no. 15.

14

Chinese Polkical Rhetoric 12

and strategic breakage with the Soviet Union than it was an attempt to alter

fundamental Marxist tenet5.34

The importance of Deng's redefinition is that now the reformers were

free to look beyond classical Marxism for policy. They were no longer

accountable to the classical understandings of Marxism for ideas on ways to

stimulate economic development. Up to this point, accountability to Marxist

theory had served as a leash which prevented the theorists from straying too

far from the anchor of previous theorists. Reforms that were never dreamed of

by Marx, Lenin, or Mao could now be appropriated as needed, without apology to

Marx or the Communist Party.

The key address, though, in the implementation of the reforms occurred

at the 13th Party Congress in October of 1987, and like Deng's earlier speech,

was quickly disseminated throughout the nation. At this Congress, Zhao Ziyang

made a keynote speech that underlined the theoretical underpinnings of the

economic reform.35 In his address, Zhao paid homage to the leaders and the

theorists of the past by noting that China is a socialist society and that the

nation must never devia...: from that socialism.36 The key element of the

speech, however, is that China is only in the primary stage of socialism, and

thus Chinese society can not be expected to fully encapsulate all of the

characteristics of a fully developed socialistic state, thus giving an

explanation for the continued presence of poverty in China.37 Furthermore,

the incompatibility of the new reforms with classical Marxism is addressed and

explained using this same slogan:

34Jonathan D. Spence, Ihgagargiikalksifiarihka (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Co., 1990), p. 584.35Schram, p. 178; Hsiang Nai-kuang, "Commentary on "Early Stage of Socialism"" Asian Outlook , vol. 22, no. 12(1987) pp. 17-19.i6Zhao, p. 10.37Zhao, p. 6.

15


A correct understanding of the present historical stage of

Chinese society is of prime importance for building socialism with

Chinese characteristics, and it is the essential basis on which to

formulate and implement a correct line and correct

policies Under the specific historical conditions of

contemporary China to believe that it is possible to jump over

the primary stage of socialism, in which the productive forces are

to be highly developed, is to take a utopian position on this

question, and that is the major cognitive root of "Left"

mistakes.38

To fully explain the significance of this new slogan, "the primary stage

of socialism", it is necessary to explore the evolution of society as

envisioned by Marx and understood by Chinese economic theorists. In this

understanding, socialism is brought about by stages, througu the development

of a higher order of civilization on top of an older, inferior order.39

Du-ing these stages, certain elements develop in a society that enable it to

move on to the next stage, most notably economic elements. For example, in

the Soviet Union, as in mast other socialist nations, the productive forces

(means of production; or all industrial and commercial forces) were fully

developed during the stage of capitalism which preceded the Communist

revolutions of those nations. But China attempted to jump from a semi-

colonial, semi-feudal state into a fully developed socialist state, when in

actuality socialism can only be attained through a procession of stages,

38Zhao, p. 1038Zhao, p. 10.

6

r Unv 1"1211BRIF


stages that have to be endured in order to pave the way for the later

implementation of socialism."

Zhao further developed Deng's theory of socialism with Chinese

characteristics by explaining that the formation of a socialist state in a

nation like China is something that has never been done before, ahd something

that Marx and Engels never foresaw. Thus the rules describing how it is to be

achieved elsewhere don't apply on the Chinese mainland. Without denigrating

or belittling the value of Marxism, Zhao explained:

We cannot blindly follow what the books say, nor can we

mechanically imitate the examples of other countries. Rather,

proceeding from China's actual conditions and integrating the

basic principles of Marxism.... we must find a way to build

socialism with Chinese characteristics through practice.41

With this disclaimer, Zhao again stressed that there is nothing

inherently flawed in Marxism, or the way that Marxism has been applied in

other nations, but rather that Marxism must be applied to the actual

historical, economic, and cultural situation of a nation in order to bripg

about a socialist state, and that in this way, through practice rather than

dogma, Marxism will come to its fullest fruition.

Zhao repeatedly stressed the correctness of Marxism and met the demand

of ',le constraint of loyalty by emphasizing that the theoretical developments

are completely in line with Marxism. "Nine years practice has proved that our

Party is truly a great, glorious and correct party and that the line

°Zhao, p. 10-11.41Zhao, p. 12.

I 7


followed....is a correct Marxist line."42 Furthermore, those who do not

understand that the primary stage is an essential one are doomed to repeat

"leftist mistakes" and by implication, have an immature underscanding of

socialism, thus providing an account for opinions that vary from that of the

reformers, while refusing to note that the disharmony in the party is due to

differences in mature interpretation of Marxist theory.43

Furthermorer Zhao pointed out that this primary stage would probably

take at least 100 years, or until the middle of the twenty-first century to

complete. Thus Zhao not only justified the extension of reform measures, but

he also gave the reforms Y.alf a century to bring about the changes which he

envisioned, and turns the constraint of loyalty upon those who disagreed with

him by pointing out that they would be guilty of "incorrect" thought.

Interestingly enough, this time frame also coincides with the Chinese takeover

of Hong Kong, and thus provides theoretical grounding for the "One country,

two systems" doctrine which guarantees Hong Kong's autonomy and capitalistic

way of life for fifty years after the takeover. With this speech, Zhao

rhetorically justified the introduction of a western-style market-oriented

economy to contemporary Chinese society by identifying and defining previously

unidentified historical forces. The reformers presented a reason for China's

lack of development, and a theoretical basis for the reforms which were meant

to alleviate the conditions which the nation had heretofore been unable to

shake off, thus responding to the exigencies present in the society.

The significance of this redefinition is illustrated by the response of

critics in Taiwan, who quickly identified the theoretical development as a new

42Zhao, p. 6.43Zhao, p. 10.

s


name for an old notion, revisionism.44 Revisionism is the name given to those

who attempted to altar the fundamentals of Marxism in order to maintain

capitalism in China during the 1950's and 60's. As such, revisionism is

"incorrect thought" to the theorists on the mainland, and those who held to

it, or were accused of holding to it, were severely disciplined or punished,

especially during the period of the cultural revolution. Thus, to the critics

on the island of Taiwan, Zhao's advancement of the concept of the primary

stage of socialism is just a "theoretical excuse."45 The reformers, in a

sense, have given a new name to thought that was considered heretical, and

have made it the new orthodoxy, without overthrowing the old orthodoxy,

However, the key distinction is that the new revisionism has found its

grounding in orthodoxy, and is no longer "heretical".

Nor was the definitional nature of the new development lost on the

Taiwanese; "this definition is a theoretical weapon for power struggle to

oppose the Leftists and is used as a countermeasure to open up and

reform, (sic)46 In other words, the definition is a rhetorical strategy to

give the revisionist reform measures an official blessing. What is

significant about the Taiwanese response is that it centers on defining the

reforms as revisionism, and identifying them with the revisionism of previous

decades, which would question the basis of the reforms, In other words, the

Taiwanese critics sought to fight definition with definition; to counter th

re-definition of the reformers by providing another definition that, if

recognized, would discredit the reforms.

"Hsiang, pp 17-19.45Hsiang, p. 18.46Hsiang p. 18.

Chinese Po aim! Rhetoric 17

Western observers also have noted the significance of t'') new

understanding brought about by the rhetorical redefinition. Schram (1988)

describes "the primary stage of sociailsm" as a "term which is taken to evoke

the whole range of characteristics defining this existing reality. ,17 It has0

also been noted that the theoretical development of the primary stage of

socialism is "the key to understand.... the coming political structural

reforms."48 Through the reformers' rhetorical strategy of redefining the

existing theoretical framework, the reformers had, at least temporarily, met

the demands of the constraint of loyalty inherent in Chinese political

rhetoric, and thus were able to implement new veforms that would not have been

ideologically "correct" before the new understanding. Within two months, the

"broad commitment to economic reform was no longer at issue among the party

members."'" Thus, at least for the short term, the definitions provided by

the reformers provided the impetus needed for the continuance of the reform

policies.

Even beyond their value as policy declarations, it must be remembered

that both of these theoretical developments; "the primary stage of socialism"

and "socialism with Chinese characteristics", took on a life of their Own as

popular slogans. These slogans became watchwords throughout the nation as the

definition of what was acceptable economic stewardship.

It is apparent that rhetorical redefinition provided the basis from

which to continue to implement the reforms. However, these slogans have not

been able to sustain the reforms much further. The redefinitions were able to

bridge the gap between classical Marxism and certain capitalistic reforms, but

47Schram, p. 177."Los Angeles Timea October 24, 1987. Section I, pg. 8."Andrew J. Nathan, Politics: Reform at the Crossroad", in Anthony J. Kane, ed. China briefing: 1989, (Boulder:Westview Press, 1989), p. 7. oik

?


soon the reforms came to the point of no return, when there was no longer any

possibility of compatibility between the reforms and Marxism. Nathan har..4

stated that the reforms became stagnant when it became apparent that "official

ideology would have to be thoroughly overhauled to find a way to justify what

is essentially an abandonment of socialism in favor of private ownership."50

Marxism itself would have to be discarded in order to continue the reform

policies. In other words, the constrint of loyalty to the past thinkers and

theories has prevented the Chinese leadership from being able tt. redefine the

reforms so that true reform, economic and political, might be made possible.

Thus this rhetorical constraint of loyalty to great men and to Marxist

doctrine has prevented the rhetoric of change from altering the basic

structures of Chinese society. This is especially apparent when one reflects

upon the ill-fated pro-democracy movements which sought to push the reforms

into areas of political reform. This example provides tremendous insight into

Chinese political legitimation, and it becomes apparent that any profound

societal change to occur in China will have to be legitimized by its

relationship to "official thought."

When contrasted with the reforms that have swept over Eastern Europe in

the last two years, the significance of the cultural constraints on Chinese

political discourse is highlighted. In several formerly Communist states, the

new governments have gone to great lengths to distance themselves from Marxism

and even the Soviet Union has implemented policies that fly in the face of

classical Marxism. A major difference between the Chinese example and the

Eastern European examples is that since the Europeans felt no need to identify

50tsiathan, p. 17.

21

Chinese RAW Rhein tic 19

reform movements as being derived from Marxist theory, they were able to

completely alter their societies.

Thus, the power of the cultural constraint is tremendously significant

in contemporary Chinese political rhetoric. The Chinese emphasis on

"correctness" in ideology has brought about an impasse in the ability of the

reformers to fully implement all of the designs of the reformers. Deng

Xiaopeng and the reform movement in China have attempted to redefine Marxism

in China, but have not yet been able to counter the authority of Marx himself.

The authority of Marxist theory developed over the years since the 1949

revolution which brought the CCP to power still serves as the dominant

ideology and any future challenge to the status quo in China will either have

to demonstrate a linkage to this theory or overcome the theory's stronghold on

Chinese society.

1)2