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DOCUMENT RELEASE AND CHANGE FORM Prepared For the U.S. Department of Energy, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management By Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC., PO Box 850, Richland, WA 99352 Contractor For U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection, under Contract DE-AC27-08RV14800
1a. Doc No: RPP-RPT-58920 Rev. 00
1b. Project Number: T2R02☐ N/A
1 SPF-001 (Rev.0)
TRADEMARK DISCLAIMER: Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States government or any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors. Printed in the United States of America.
Release Stamp
2. Document Title
241-A-285 Safety Significant Compressed Air System Pressure Relieving Device Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
3. Design Verification Required
☒ Yes ☐ No
4. USQ Number ☒ N/A 5. PrHA Number ☐ N/A
N/A-8 PRHA-02040 Rev. 00
6. USQ Screening:
a. Does the change introduce any new failure modes to the equipment? ☐ Yes ☒ No
Basis is required for Yes:
b. Does the change increase the probability of existing failure modes? ☐ Yes ☒ No
Basis is required for Yes:
c. For Safety Significant equipment, does the change require a modification to Chapter 4 of the DSA and/or FRED? ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A
Basis is required for Yes: New safety-significant PRV needs to be referenced with the new air compressor.
7. Description of Change and Justification (Use Continuation pages as needed)
Original Release. Design verification performed in accordance with ARES QAP 3.5, Design Verification. Problem Evaluation Request (PER) WRPS-PER-2015-2546 was generated as a result of the recommendations of this document to ensure a PM is generated to address the service life of the PRV once installed.
8. Approvals
Title Name Signature Date
Checker HAGENSEN, ALAN R HAGENSEN, ALAN R 01/26/2016
Design Authority WITHERSPOON, JP P WITHERSPOON, JP P 03/09/2016
Document Control Approval RAYMER, JULIA R RAYMER, JULIA R 03/10/2016
Originator FELDMANN, MONIKA J FELDMANN, MONIKA J 02/01/2016
Other Approver WHITE, MICHAEL A WHITE, MICHAEL A 02/16/2016
Other Approver BELLOMY, JIM BELLOMY, JIM 02/18/2016
Other Approver SMITH, RYAN D SMITH, RYAN D 03/09/2016
Other Approver GOESSMANN, GLEN E GOESSMANN, GLEN E 02/22/2016
PrHA Lead SMITH, RYAN D SMITH, RYAN D 03/09/2016
Responsible Manager BAUER, ROGER E BAUER, ROGER E 03/09/2016
Please see continuation sheet
9. Clearance Review:
Restriction Type:
☒ Public
☐ Undefined
☐ Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI)
☐ Export Control Information (ECI)
☐ Official Use Only Exemption 2-Circumvention of Statute (OUO-2)
☐ Official Use Only Exemption 3-Statutory Exemption (OUO-3)
☐ Official Use Only Exemption 4-Commercial/Proprietary (OUO-4)
☐ Official Use Only Exemption 5-Privileged Information (OUO-5)
☐ Official Use Only Exemption 6-Personal Privacy (OUO-6)
☐ Official Use Only Exemption 7-Law Enforcement (OUO-7)
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Mar 10, 2016DATE:
DOCUMENT RELEASE AND CHANGE FORM Doc No: RPP-RPT-58920 Rev. 00
2 SPF-001 (Rev.0)
10. Distribution:
Name Organization
BAUER, ROGER E A/AX RETRIEVAL ENGRNG
BELLOMY, JIM A/AX RETRIEVAL ENGRNG
GOESSMANN, GLEN E ENGINEERING PROGRAMS
HAGENSEN, ALAN R
QUAM, PAUL R
SMITH, RYAN D NUCLEAR SAFETY
WITHERSPOON, JP P A/AX RETRIEVAL ENGRNG
ZINTER, DONALD D DESIGN ENGINEERING
11. TBDs or Holds ☒ N/A
12. Impacted Documents – Engineering ☒ N/A
Document Number Rev. Title
13. Other Related Documents ☐ N/A
Document Number Rev. Title
RPP-13033 06 TANK FARM DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS
RPP-RPT-58493 00 241-A-285 Safety - Significant Compressed Air System Pressure Relieving Device - Functions and Requirements Evaluation Document
14. Related Systems, Structures, and Components:
14a. Related Building/Facilities ☐ N/A
241-A-285
14b. Related Systems ☐ N/A
241-PA
14c. Related Equipment ID Nos. (EIN) ☐ N/A
A285-PA-PRV-034
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3 SPF-001 (Rev.0)
DOCUMENT RELEASE AND CHANGE FORM CONTINUATION SHEET
Document No: RPP-RPT-58920 Rev. 00
8. Approvals
Title Name Signature Date
USQ Evaluator SMITH, RYAN D SMITH, RYAN D 03/09/2016
This page not used.
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A-6002-767 (REV 3)
RPP-RPT-58920 Rev. 0
241-A-285 Safety-Significant Compressed Air System Pressure Relieving Device Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Author Name:
MJ Feldmann
PR Quam
ARES Corporation for Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC
Richland, WA 99352 U.S. Department of Energy Contract DE-AC27-08RV14800
EDT/ECN: DRCF UC:
Cost Center: Charge Code:
B&R Code: Total Pages: 46
Key Words: Compressed Air System, Pressure Relief Valve, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, FMEA,
Failure Mode, Failure Mechanism, 241-A, 241-AX, Retrieval, Infrastructure, 241-A-285 Air and Water
Service Building
Abstract: This document presents the results of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of the
241-AX safety-significant compressed air system pressure relieving device. The focus of this evaluation
was to identify potential failures for each of the components that comprise the pressure relieving device
that may lead to unsafe conditions or operational issues.
TRADEMARK DISCLAIMER. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors.
Release Approval Date Release Stamp
Approved For Public Release
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By Julia Raymer at 8:09 am, Mar 10, 2016
Mar 10, 2016DATE:
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241-A-285 SAFETY-SIGNIFICANT COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM PRESSURE
RELIEVING DEVICE FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)
January 2016
prepared by
ARES Corporation
Energy Services Division 1100 Jadwin Avenue, Suite 400
Richland, Washington 99352
(509) 946-3300
prepared for
Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this document is to present the results of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
of the 241-A-285 Air and Water Service Building compressed air system pressure relieving
device, which is safety significant. The focus of this evaluation was to identify unsafe failure
modes and associated failure mechanisms for each of the components that comprise the pressure
relief device and perform an effects analysis if credible failure modes were identified
The evaluation process and methodology documented in this report were conducted in
accordance with the guidance provided in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45, “Control Development
Process for Safety-Significant Structures, Systems, and Components.” The failure mode
evaluation session took place July 22, 2015. The meeting attendees included Retrieval Air and
Water Systems Design Authority, Nuclear Safety Engineering, Procurement Engineering,
Operations, the Mechanical Engineering Discipline Lead, a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
facilitator, and other subject matter experts.
This analysis only considers the failure modes and mechanisms that lead to a failure of the
structure, system, and component to perform its safety function. The failure mechanisms
evaluated are identified in Steps 13 and 14.a of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45 and include loadings,
process conditions, environmental conditions and other miscellaneous failure mechanisms. The
mechanisms evaluated are documented in Section 4.0. The scope of this evaluation is limited to
the compressed air pressure relieving device which includes the pressure relief valve assembly
and associated discharge piping.
No credible failure modes or mechanisms were identified for the given operating conditions for
the pressure relieving device. Additionally, the service life of the pressure relief valve is two
years and will be replaced for service needs beyond two years. A recommendation to have a
preventative maintenance that performs inspection of the discharge piping when the pressure
relief valve is replaced at the two year interval was identified during the Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis. This recommendation is being tracked in the Washington River Protection
Solutions, LLC Problem Evaluation Request (PER) by PER number WRPS-PER-2015-2546.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................1
2.0 SCOPE ....................................................................................................................................1
3.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ......................................................................................................4
4.0 SYSTEM EVALUATION ......................................................................................................5
4.1 Loadings .........................................................................................................................6
4.2 Process conditions ..........................................................................................................8
4.3 Environmental Condition ...............................................................................................8
4.4 Miscellaneous Failure Modes and Mechanisms ..........................................................10
5.0 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..........................................................................10
6.0 REFERENCES .....................................................................................................................11
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix A
Appendix B
–
–
FMEA Meeting Attendance Record
FMEA Table
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2-1. PRV Assembly. ............................................................................................................3
Figure 2-2. PRV Assembly and Discharge Piping (H-14-110033, Sheet 9). .................................4
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1. PRV Assembly Components Evaluated. .......................................................................2
Table 4-1. Loading Mechanisms Evaluated. (2 Sheets) ................................................................6
Table 4-2. Process Conditions Mechanisms Evaluated. .................................................................8
Table 4-3. Environmental Condition Mechanisms Evaluated. .......................................................9
Table 4-4. Miscellaneous Failure Modes and Mechanisms Evaluated. ........................................10
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LIST OF TERMS
Abbreviations, Initialisms, and Acronyms
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
B&PVC Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
DID Defense-in-Depth
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
KDA Key Design Attribute
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
PER Problem Evaluation Request
PH Precipitation Hardened
PRV Pressure Relief Valve
SS Stainless Steel
SSC Structure, System, and Component
UV Ultraviolet
WRPS Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC
Units
°F degrees Fahrenheit
FNPT Female National Pipe Thread
in. inch(es)
MNPT Male National Pipe Thread
psi pounds per square inch
psig pounds per square inch gauge
scfm standard cubic feet per minute
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this document is to present the results of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) of the 241-A-285 Air and Water Service Building compressed air system pressure
relieving device, which is safety significant as identified in Section 2.0. The focus of this
evaluation was to identify unsafe failure modes and associated failure mechanisms for each of
the components that comprise the pressure relief device and perform an effects analysis if
credible failure modes were identified.
The evaluation process and methodology documented in this report were conducted in
accordance with the guidance provided in TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45, “Control Development
Process for Safety Significant Structures, Systems and Components.”
2.0 SCOPE
This evaluation was performed to identify any potential unsafe failure modes and credible failure
mechanisms that may lead to failure of the safety-significant pressure relieving device. This
FMEA considers the failure modes and mechanisms that lead to a failure of the structure, system,
and component (SSC) to perform its safety function. The failure mechanisms evaluated are
identified in Steps 13 and 14.a of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45 and include loadings, process
conditions, environmental conditions, and other miscellaneous failure mechanisms. The
mechanisms evaluated are documented in Section 4.0. The scope of this evaluation is limited to
the compressed air pressure relieving device which includes the pressure relief valve (PRV)
assembly and associated discharge piping.
Failure modes of the components of the system are identified to ensure that failure mechanisms
are identified, and that necessary key design attributes (KDAs) and controls are applied to the
safety system. The compressed air pressure relieving device is comprised of a PRV and the
discharge piping off of the PRV. The components that comprise the safety-significant PRV
assembly and discharge piping included in this evaluation are identified in Table 2-1 and shown
in Figure 2-1.
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Table 2-1. PRV Assembly Components Evaluated.
Part No. Description
1. Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2. Disk, 316 SS
3. Disk Holder, 316 SS
4. Guide, 316 SS
5. Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6. Spindle, 316 SS
7. Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8. Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9. Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10. Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
11. Gag Bolt, Carbon Steel
12. Sealing Plug, Carbon Steel
13. Sealing Plug Gasket, Soft Iron
14. Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
15. Screwed Cap, Carbon Steel
23. Release Nut Carbon Steel
24. Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25. Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26. Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27. Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28. Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
N/A Discharge Piping, Carbon Steel
MNPT = Male National Pipe Thread
PH = precipitation hardened
SS = stainless steel
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Figure 2-1. PRV Assembly.
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Figure 2-2. PRV Assembly and Discharge Piping (H-14-110033, Sheet 9).
3.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
A compressed air system is provided to blow down the lines to purge remaining water from the
system in support of the 241-A and 241-AX tank retrievals. The compressed air system provides
oil free air to the hot/cold water system distribution piping. The compressed air system is
located in the 241-A-285 Air and Water Service Building. The compressed air lines tie in to the
water lines inside the water and air service building. A compressed air distribution line is
provided to each farm to facilitate local connection for line purging and other miscellaneous
tasks. The overall piping arrangement for the compressed air system can be found on Hanford
Drawing H-14-110033, “A/AX Retrieval Air & Water Piping Arrangement.”
The compressed air system consists of a packaged electric air compressor system with the
necessary equipment for operation including an air receiver tank. Additionally, applicable valves
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and regulators are provided to ensure maximum allowable pressure and flow is not exceeded. To
mitigate an air blow accident, a safety-significant PRV, PRV-034, and 1-inch discharge piping
are provided on the air receiver tank to ensure the air delivery pressure does not exceed 190 psig.
Defense in Depth (DID) temperature controls are provided to ensure the air delivery temperature
does not exceed 180°F per RPP-SPEC-57481, “Level 2 Specification for the 241-AX Tanks
Modified Sluicing-Saltcake Dissolution and Hard Heel Retrieval Systems,” Section 3.1.2.1.
The PRV for the compressed air line and the 1-inch PRV discharge piping and components are
safety significant. The PRV is a Consolidated Model 1/2-19110LcF-2-CC-MS-34-MT-FT-GS,
with an orifice area of 0.110 square inches, with a ½-inch MNPT inlet and a 1-inch FNPT outlet,
with 316 SS trim, and a rated flow of 319 scfm at 150 psig and 60°F.
The PRV is an American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code stamped assembly.
The PRV is set at 150 psig per RPP-CALC-60082, “Air Compressor Pressure Relief Valve
Sizing Calculation.” The discharge piping is designed to ASME B31.9, “Building Services
Piping.”
4.0 SYSTEM EVALUATION
To help identify failure modes and failure mechanisms of the safety system, and to help identify
potential KDAs and controls to address failures, a FMEA meeting was held. The FMEA
meeting took place July 22, 2015. The meeting attendees included Retrieval Air and Water
Systems Design Authority, Nuclear Safety Engineering, Procurement Engineering, Operations,
the Mechanical Engineering Discipline Lead, a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis facilitator
and other subject matter experts. A list of those in attendance and their designated roles is
provided in Appendix A, “FMEA Meeting Attendance Record.”
A failure mode is the manner in which a component of the system may fail. A failure
mechanism is the cause of the failure mode. A failure mode may have several failure
mechanisms. When the mechanisms for failure are understood, critical characteristics and/or
controls may be applied to ensure that the safety system performs its safety function, without
failure. A list of potential failure mechanisms is provided in Attachment A of
TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45. The safety-significant compressed air system pressure relieving
device was evaluated against this list to ensure the SSC can perform adequately considering the
mechanisms noted in Attachment A of TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45:
Loadings,
Process conditions,
Environmental Condition, and
Miscellaneous Failure Modes and Mechanisms.
The results of the FMEA evaluation are documented in Appendix B, “FMEA Table.” This table
was used to ensure that all potential failure modes and mechanisms were considered. Key design
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attributes and controls are also identified in the FMEA table where failure modes that could
affect the ability of the safety system to perform its safety function were identified.
4.1 LOADINGS
The list of loadings that were considered during the evaluation of failure modes and failure
mechanisms of a safety-significant pressure relieving device is presented in Table 4-1. Several
loading failure mechanisms were determined to be not applicable and are summarized in
Table 4-1.
Table 4-1. Loading Mechanisms Evaluated. (2 Sheets)
Loading Mechanisms Summary of Evaluation
Dead loads
(weights of all permanent materials and equipment,
including the SSC’s own weight)
Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable;
the PRV and discharge piping are supported and
protected by the receiver tank and the building. Piping
is Schedule 40 or greater and more than adequate to
support the expected weights.
Snow loads, if not protected from snow by an enclosure Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable;
the PRV and discharge piping are supported and
protected by the building.
Wind loads, if not protected from wind by an enclosure Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable;
the PRV and discharge piping are supported and
protected from high winds by the building.
Earthquake loads, if operation during or after a seismic
event is required of this SSC
Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable
since any damage to the PRV and discharge piping
would be readily detectable because of the damage to the
surroundings as well.
Ashfall loads, if not protected from ashfall loading by an
enclosure
Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable;
the PRV and discharge piping are supported and
protected by the building.
Earth and groundwater pressures, as appropriate to
in-ground structures
Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable;
there are no below-grade components.
Thermal forces
(stresses and movements resulting from variations in
temperature)
Thermal Forces of all building piping, including the air
piping, were evaluated during the ASME B31.9 analysis,
RPP-CALC-60217, “241-A-285 Air and Water Service
Building ASME Piping Analysis.” The thermal forces
on the PRV components were determined to be not
applicable. The components are enclosed within the
housing and protected such that thermal forces are not
expected to negatively affect the components in any
way.
Creep and shrinkage loads
(for concrete structures and masonry)
The components were not considered for failure
mechanism. Creep and shrinkage were determined to
not be appropriate for further evaluation.
Hose-whip Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable
since all installed hoses are too short and too far away to
reach the PRV.
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Table 4-1. Loading Mechanisms Evaluated. (2 Sheets)
Loading Mechanisms Summary of Evaluation
Vehicle traffic
(loads on ground level or buried SSCs)
Failure mechanism was determined to be not applicable
since the PRV is located above grade and not accessible
to vehicle traffic.
Vehicle collision
(direct impact to structures or equipment)
The components were not considered for the failure
mechanism. The failure mechanism is readily
detectable. In addition, the PRV is not accessible to
vehicle traffic. Above-ground barriers and vehicle
restrictions provide an additional layer of defense-in-
depth against vehicle collisions. The pressure relieving
device is not designed to function during or after a
vehicle collision.
Load drop or impact
(load handling accident)
The components were not considered for the failure
mechanism since other building components are
installed either lower down or too far away from the
PRV.
Undermining from proximate failed waterlines The components were not considered for failure
mechanism; failure mode was determined to be readily
detectable.
Blast effects/missiles from propane/LPG tank explosions Components not considered for failure mechanism;
failure mode was determined to be readily detectable.
Impacts/damage from excavation activities The components were not considered for failure
mechanism; failure mode was determined to be readily
detectable.
Cycle Fatigue Components not considered for failure mechanism, since
the PRVs have a two-year service life and the air system
will only be used intermittently following a completed
waste transfer.
Vibration
(from nearby pumps, jets, other SSCs)
The components were not considered for failure
mechanism, components are not exposed to significant
or frequent vibrations.
LPG = Liquefied Petroleum Gas
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4.2 PROCESS CONDITIONS
The list of process condition failure mechanisms that were considered during the evaluation of
failure modes and failure mechanisms of a safety-significant compressed air system pressure
relieving device is presented in Table 4-2 below. Several process condition failure mechanisms
were determined to be not applicable as summarized in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2. Process Conditions Mechanisms Evaluated.
Process Condition Mechanisms Summary of Evaluation
Process pressure/vacuum (including water hammer,
pump shutoff head, control system failures, and
accident conditions)
Identified as appropriate for further evaluation. The
evaluation and corresponding calculation are
documented in Appendix B.
Process temperature (maximum low) Components are not considered for failure mechanism.
All components were determined to be rated for
temperatures below the process temperature.
Process temperature (maximum high) Identified as appropriate for further evaluation. The
evaluation is documented in Appendix B.
Process chemistry (chemical attack by waste,
headspace vapors, etc.)
The component was not considered for failure
mechanism. The components are only exposed to
process air. The components were determined to be
rated for service.
Fluid expansion effects (e.g., thermal transient) The component was not considered for failure
mechanism. The pressure relieving device was
determined to be rated for the service and operating
pressure. The components are designed under ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII and
ASME B31.9.
Erosion The component was not considered for failure
mechanism. The components are only exposed to
process air. Inlet filtration provided on compressor.
Corrosion Identified as appropriate for further evaluation. The
evaluation is documented in Appendix B.
Radiation Fields The component was not considered for failure
mechanism. The components are installed in a
radiation field free environment.
Plugging by waste (including precipitation) Identified as appropriate for further evaluation. The
evaluation is documented in Appendix B.
Plugged filters (high delta pressure) Failure mechanism was determined to be not
applicable. System scope does not have filters.
Flammable gas deflagrations/detonations within
process equipment
Failure mechanism was determined to be not
applicable. No flammable gases are present.
4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITION
The list of environmental condition mechanisms that were considered during the evaluation of
failure modes and failure mechanisms of the safety-significant compressed air pressure relieving
device is presented in Table 4-3 below. Environmental conditions refer to the conditions that the
safety-significant SSC is exposed to (is installed in) including consideration for natural
phenomena (climatic conditions), normal conditions, off-normal operation of equipment, and
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environments created by the accident for which the safety function is credited. Several failure
mechanisms were determined to be not applicable as summarized in Table 4-3.
Table 4-3. Environmental Condition Mechanisms Evaluated.
Environmental Condition Mechanisms Summary of Evaluation
Temperature – low
(cold weather including freezing, exposure to cold
fluids in the enclosure, off-normal operation of HVAC)
Components are not considered for failure mechanism.
All components were determined to be rated for
temperatures below the process temperature.
Temperature – high
(hot weather, solar heating, off-normal operation of
heat trace/heaters, loss of HVAC or cooling)
Components are not considered for failure mechanism.
All components were determined to be rated for
temperatures above the process temperature.
Thunderstorms Failure mechanism was determined to be not
applicable; the pressure relieving device is protected by
building 241-A-285.
Dust Components not considered for failure mechanism, not
a credible failure.
Glaze
(icing that seals openings in SSCs)
Identified as appropriate for further evaluation. The
evaluation is documented in Appendix B.
Solar radiation
(direct effects/damage due to exposure to UV)
Failure mechanism was determined to be not
applicable; the pressure relieving device is protected by
building 241-A-285.
Atmospheric pressure Components not considered for failure mechanism, not
a credible failure.
Ash
(exposure to ash particulates, when wet ash is
electrically conductive)
Components not considered for failure mechanism, not
a credible failure.
Exposure to water
(humidity/condensation, precipitation, flooding by
process or utility water)
Identified as appropriate for further evaluation. The
evaluation is documented in Appendix B.
Exposure to leaked fluids other than water
(e.g., hydraulic fluid)
Components not considered for failure mechanism, not
a credible failure. Components are not exposed to
fluids other than air and water. See Exposure to Water
in Appendix B.
Exposure to/submergence in leaked waste Components not considered for failure mechanism, not
a credible failure. Components are not exposed a
waste service system.
Fires
(range fires, vehicle fires, refueling fires, other fires)
Components not considered for failure mechanism;
failure mode was determined to be readily detectable.
High radiation fields The component was not considered for failure
mechanism. The components are installed in a
radiation field free environment.
Flammable gas deflagrations in enclosures Failure mechanism was determined to be not
applicable. No flammable gases are present.
Mechanical abrasion Identified as appropriate for further evaluation. The
evaluation is documented in Appendix B.
HVAC = heating, ventilation and air conditioning
UV = ultraviolet
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4.4 MISCELLANEOUS FAILURE MODES AND MECHANISMS
The list of miscellaneous failure modes and mechanisms were considered during the evaluation
of the safety-significant PRV and discharge piping. The evaluation for these failure modes and
mechanisms are jumper misalignment and general aging and are summarized below.
Table 4-4. Miscellaneous Failure Modes and Mechanisms Evaluated.
Environmental Condition Mechanisms Summary of Evaluation
Jumper Misalignment Failure mechanism was determined to be not
applicable. System scope does not have jumpers.
General Aging Components are not considered for failure mechanism.
The PRV service life is 2 years and will be replaced
every 24 months after installation. A recommendation
was identified to inspect the discharge piping when the
PRV is replaced.
5.0 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There are no new credible failure modes or mechanisms identified for the given operating
conditions for the pressure relieving device. Additionally, the service life of the PRV is two
years and will be replaced for service needs beyond two years. A recommendation to have a
preventative maintenance that performs inspection of the discharge piping when PRV is replaced
at the two-year interval was identified during the FMEA. This recommendation is being tracked
in the Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) Problem Evaluation Request (PER)
by PER number WRPS-PER-2015-2546.
Two action items were identified in the meeting. These action items have been resolved and are
summarized below:
1) An action was identified to verify with nuclear safety that the basis given for the Process
temperature (High) failure mechanism not being a credible failure mechanism, is
acceptable.
It was determined that it would take multiple independent failures for the process
temperature to exceed the design temperature of 800°F; therefore, high temperature is not
plausible. There are multiple temperature sensors throughout the compressor cycle
monitored by the PLC which if any one detected high temperature (~130°F) would shut
the air compressor down. In addition, either intercooler would have to fail followed by
complete failure of the PLC without shutting down, and PRV failure. Furthermore, there
is a separate independent DID control to protect 180°F air temperature.
2) An action item was identified to verify the requirements for third party Section VIII
pressure vessel and discharge piping.
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11
Standard TFC-ENG-STD-17, “Third Party Inspections,” provides requirements for third
party (independent) specialized equipment inspections including pressure vessels. This
standard identifies the minimum inspection criteria for third party inspections consistent
with the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR), American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) codes identified in
Section 5 of the standard. Third Party inspection requirements for unfired pressure
vessels are identified in Figure 1. For unfired pressure vessels with an operating pressure
greater than 15 psig; as required by ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sections I,
VI, and VIII; shall be every 24 months.
6.0 REFERENCES
ASME B31.9, 2014, “Building Services Piping,” American Society of Mechanical Engineers,
New York, New York.
ASME B&PVC, 2013, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (B&PVC), American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, New York, New York.
H-14-110033, “Process Air System (PA) Air Compressor P&ID,” Revision 0, Washington River
Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.
RPP-13033, “Tank Farms Documented Safety Analysis,” current revision, as amended,
Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.
RPP-CALC-60082, “Air Compressor Pressure Relief Valve Sizing Calculation,” Revision 0,
Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.
RPP-CALC-60217, “241-A-285 Air and Water Service Building ASME Piping Analysis,”
Revision 0, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.
RPP-SPEC-57481, 2014, “Level 2 Specification for the 241-AX Tanks Modified Sluicing-
Saltcake Dissolution and Hard Heel Retrieval Systems,” Revision 0, Washington River
Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.
TFC-ENG-DESIGN-C-45, 2014, “Control Development Process for Safety Significant
Structures, Systems and Components,” Revision E-1, Washington River Protection
Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.
TFC-ENG-STD-17, 2012,“Third Party Inspections,” Rev A-5, Washington River Protection
Solutions, LLC, Richland, Washington.
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A-1
APPENDIX A
FMEA MEETING ATTENDANCE RECORD
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Appendix A – FMEA Meeting Attendance Record
A-2
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B-1
APPENDIX B
FMEA TABLE
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-2
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Process Conditions
Process Pressure/Vacuum
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Process Pressure/Vacuum
Inability to
relieve to set
pressure
Yes High
Pressure
PRV Sizing
PVC
RPP-CALC-
60082
Correct Part No.
Materials of
Const
ASME B&PV
Sect VIII
ASME B31.9
2 Discharge Piping Process Pressure/vacuum
Inability to
relieve to set
pressure
Yes High
Pressure
PRV Sizing
Calc
RPP-CALC-
60082
Correct Part No.
Materials of
Const
ASME B&PV
Sect VIII
ASME B31.9
RPP-CALC-60082 calculates that
the added back pressure of the
discharge piping is acceptable.
Process Temperature (Low)
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Process Temperature (Low) No Rated for -75 deg. F
Rated for service.
2 Discharge Piping Process Temperature (Low) No Not applicable.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-3
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Process Temperature (High)
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Process Temperature (High) No, Incredible
to exceed 800F
DID control to protect 180F (air
temperature)
Multiple general service shut downs
on Air Compressor
Verify Temp Elements TE-015 and
TE-018 are hard shutdowns
Rated for 800F
Rated for service
ACTION: Verify with Nuclear
Safety basis is OK.
RESOLUTION: It was determined
that it would take multiple
independent failures for the process
temperature to exceed the design
temperature of 800°F; therefore
high temperature is not plausible.
There are multiple temperature
sensors throughout the compressor
cycle monitored by the PLC which
if any one detected high temperature
(~130°F) would shut the air
compressor down. In addition,
either intercooler would have to fail
followed by complete failure of the
PLC without shutting down, and
PRV failure. Furthermore, there is a
separate independent DID control to
protect 180°F air temperature.
2 Discharge Piping Process Temperature (High) No Fail Safe
Process Chemistry
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Process Chemistry No Exposed to Process Air
Rated for service
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-4
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
2 Discharge Piping Process Chemistry No Exposed to Process Air
Rated for service
Fluid Expansion Effects
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Fluid Expansion Effects No
ASME B&PV
Sect VIII
ASME B31.9
Rated for service and pressure
2 Discharge Piping Fluid Expansion Effects No
ASME B&PV
Sect VIII
ASME B31.9
Rated for service and pressure
Erosion
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Erosion No
Only exposed to process air.
Inlet Filtration provided on
compressor
2 Discharge Piping Erosion No
Only exposed to process air.
Inlet Filtration provided on
compressor
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-5
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Corrosion
1
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½” Corrosion No
Limited
service life
of 2 years.
Moisture
sep. at
outlet of
compressor.
Location of
PRV on top
of tank.
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
Stainless Steel material selection for
critical components in PRV.
Rated for service
2: Disk, 316 SS Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
Stainless Steel material selection for
critical components in PRV.
Rated for service
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
Stainless Steel material selection for
critical components in PRV.
Rated for service
4: Guide, 316 SS Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
Stainless Steel material selection for
critical components in PRV.
Rated for service
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
Phosphated Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
Stainless Steel material selection for
critical components in PRV.
Rated for service
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
Phosphated Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
Stainless Steel material selection for
critical components in PRV.
Rated for service
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
Stainless Steel material selection for
critical components in PRV.
Rated for service
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
Stainless Steel material selection for
critical components in PRV.
Rated for service
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-6
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel28 Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel Corrosion No
NACE requirements
MR0103-2003
except Valve Spring
2 Discharge Piping, SS Corrosion No
Discharge
piping
orientated to
prevent
corrosion
products from
reaching the
PRV.
Radiation Fields
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Radiation Fields No Not applicable. Failure mechanism
was determined to be not applicable.
2 Discharge Piping, SS Radiation Fields No Not applicable. Failure mechanism
was determined to be not applicable.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-7
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Plugging by Waste
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Plugging by Waste
Prevents PRV
from
discharging
Yes
Plugging
from
particulates
Orientation of
the PRV.
Filters
provided on
inlet of
compressor.
Limited
service life
Located on top of tank.
Orientation of PRV prevents
buildup of particulates
2 Discharge Piping, SS Plugging by Waste or other Increased
back pressure Yes
Failure to
relieve
pressure
Screen on
outlet.
Periodic
inspection
ASME B&PV
Sect I, VI, and VIII
TFC-ENG-STD-17
Plugging due to insects, birds or
rodents
ACTION: Verify requirements for
inspection of 3rd party Section VIII
pressure vessel and discharge piping
Recommendation: include PM to
inspect discharge piping when PRV
is changed out.
RESOLUTION: Standard TFC-
ENG-STD-17, “Third Party
Inspections,” provides requirements
for third party (independent)
specialized equipment inspections
including pressure vessels. This
standard identifies the minimum
inspection criteria for third party
inspections consistent with the Code
of Federal Regulation (CFR),
American National Standards
Institute (ANSI), and American
Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) codes identified in Section
5 of the standard. Third Party
inspection requirements for unfired
pressure vessels are identified in
Figure 1. For unfired pressure
vessels with an operating pressure
greater than 15 psig; as required by
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code, Sections I, VI, and VIII; shall
be every 24 months.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-8
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Plugged Filters
1 Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½” Plugged filters No
Not applicable. No filter on PRV.
If filters on compressor plug,
pressure is limited.
2 Discharge Piping, SS Corrosion No
Not applicable. No filter on PRV.
If filters on compressor plug,
pressure is limited.
Flammable Gas
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Flammable Gas Deflagration within
process equipment No
Not applicable. Failure mechanism
was determined to be not applicable.
No flammable gases are present.
2 Discharge Piping Flammable Gas Deflagration within
process equipment No
Not applicable. Failure mechanism
was determined to be not applicable.
No flammable gases are present.
Environmental
Conditions
Mechanical Abrasion
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Mechanical Abrasion No Not applicable.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-9
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
2 Discharge Piping Mechanical Abrasion No Rubbing on sleeve that exits the
building will not cause failure.
Environmental Temperature (Low)
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Environmental Temperature (Low) No No TFC-ENG-STD-18 Rated for -75F
2 Discharge Piping Environmental Temperature (Low) No TFC-ENG-STD-19 Not a credible failure
Environmental Temperature (High)
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Environmental Temperature (High) TFC-ENG-STD-02 Rated for 800F
2 Discharge Piping Environmental Temperature (High) No Not a credible failure
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-10
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Thunderstorms
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Thunderstorms No Protected by building
2 Discharge Piping Thunderstorms No Protected by building
Dust
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Dust No Not a credible failure mechanism
2 Discharge Piping Dust No
Elbow is
orientated in
downward
position to
prevent
buildup of
dust.
Elbow is orientated downward.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-11
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Glaze
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Glaze No Not a credible failure mechanism,
protected by building.
2 Discharge Piping Glaze No
Elbow is
orientated in
downward
position to
prevent
buildup of ice.
Protected from run off from
building
Solar Radiation
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Solar Radiation No
Not applicable, not a credible failure
mechanism. Protected by the
building
2 Discharge Piping Solar Radiation No
Not applicable, not a credible failure
mechanism. Protected by the
building
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-12
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Atmospheric Pressure
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Atmospheric Pressure No Not a credible failure mechanism
2 Discharge Piping Atmospheric Pressure No Not a credible failure mechanism
Ash
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Ash No Not a credible failure mechanism.
Protected by building.
2 Discharge Piping Ash No
Not a credible failure mechanism.
Protected by building.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-13
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Exposure to Water
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Exposure to Water No Protected by the building.
Not a credible failure
2 Discharge Piping Exposure to Water No
Orientated
downward to
prevent water
retention in the
elbow.
Not a credible failure
Exposure to Leaked Fluids (other
than water)
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Exposure to Leaked Fluids (other than
water) No
Not applicable. Not exposed to
fluids other than water. See water
table.
2 Discharge Piping Exposure to Leaked Fluids (other than
water) No
Not applicable. Not exposed to
fluids other than water. See water
table.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-14
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Exposure to Leaked Waste
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Exposure to Leaked Waste No Not applicable. Not in a waste
service system
2 Discharge Piping Exposure to Leaked Waste No Not applicable. Not in a waste
service system
Fires
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Fires No Readily detectable.
2 Discharge Piping Fires No Readily detectable.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-15
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
High Radiation Fields
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
High Radiation Fields No Not applicable. Not exposed.
2 Discharge Piping High Radiation Fields No Not applicable. Not exposed.
Flam Gas in Enclosures
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Flam Gas in Enclosures
No
Not applicable, not exposed.
2 Discharge Piping Flam Gas in Enclosures No Not applicable, not exposed.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-16
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Mechanical Abrasion
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Mechanical Abrasion No Not applicable. Not exposed.
2 Discharge Piping Mechanical Abrasion No Rubbing on sleeve that exits the
building wouldn’t cause failure.
Miscellaneous
General Aging
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
General Aging No 2-year
service life Not a credible failure
2 Discharge Piping General Aging No Not a credible failure
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-17
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Jumper Misalignment
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Jumper Misalignment
No
Not applicable.
2 Discharge Piping Jumper Misalignment No Not applicable.
Loadings
Conditions
Dead Loads
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Dead Loads No Not applicable. Not exposed.
2 Discharge Piping Dead Loads No
Protected and supported by the
building.
Not a credible failure.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-18
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Snow Loads
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Snow Loads No Not applicable. Not exposed.
2 Discharge Piping Snow Loads No
Protected and supported by the
building.
Oriented in the downward position.
Not a credible failure.
Wind Loads
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Wind Loads No Not applicable. Not exposed.
2 Discharge Piping Wind Loads No
Protected and supported by the
building.
Not a credible failure.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-19
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Earthquake Loads
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Earthquake Loads No Readily detectable.
2 Discharge Piping Earthquake Loads No Readily detectable.
Ashfall Loads
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Ashfall Loads No Not applicable. Not exposed.
2 Discharge Piping Ashfall Loads No
Protected and supported by the
building.
Not a credible failure.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-20
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Earth and Groundwater Loads
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Earth and Groundwater Loads No Not applicable. Installed above
ground
2 Discharge Piping Earth and Groundwater Loads No Not applicable. Installed above
ground
Thermal Forces
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Thermal Forces No
Not applicable. PRV components
are enclosed within the housing and
protected such that thermal forces
are not expected to negatively affect
them in any way.
2 Discharge Piping Thermal Forces No
Thermal Forces of all building
piping, including the air piping,
were evaluated during the ASME
B31.9 analysis, RPP-CALC-60127,
“241-A-285 Air and Water Service
Building ASME Piping Analysis.”
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-21
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Creep and Shrinkage Loads
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Creep and Shrinkage Loads No
Not applicable. Not concrete.
Determined to not be appropriate
for further evaluation.
2 Discharge Piping Creep and Shrinkage Loads No
Not applicable. Not concrete.
Determined to not be appropriate
for further evaluation.
Hose Whip
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Hose Whip No
Not a credible failure. All installed
hoses are too short and too far away
to reach the PRV.
2 Discharge Piping Hose Whip No
Not a credible failure. All installed
hoses are too short and too far away
to reach the discharge piping.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-22
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Vehicle Traffic
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Vehicle Traffic No Not applicable. Not accessible to
vehicle traffic.
2 Discharge Piping Vehicle Traffic No Not applicable. Not accessible to
vehicle traffic.
Vehicle Collision
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Vehicle Collision No Readily detectable. Protected by the
building.
2 Discharge Piping Vehicle Collision No Readily detectable. Protected by the
building.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-23
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Load Drop or Impact
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Load Drop or Impact No
Not applicable or readily detectable.
Other building components are
installed either lower down or too
far away from the PRV.
2 Discharge Piping Load Drop or Impact No
Not applicable or readily detectable.
Other building components are
installed either lower down or too
far away from the discharge piping.
Undermining from Failed Water
Lines
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Undermining from Failed Water Lines No Not applicable. Installed above
ground
2 Discharge Piping Undermining from Failed Water Lines No Not applicable. Installed above
ground
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-24
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Blast Effects - Missiles from
Propane/LPG explosions
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Blast Effects - Missiles from
Propane/LPG explosions No
Readily detectable. Protected by the
building.
2 Discharge Piping Blast Effects - Missiles from
Propane/LPG explosions No
Readily detectable. Protected by the
building.
Impact/Damage from Excavation
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Impact/Damage from Excavation No Readily detectable. Protected by the
building.
2 Discharge Piping Impact/Damage from Excavation No Readily detectable. Protected by the
building.
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Appendix B – FMEA Table (cont.)
B-25
Item Component/Part Item No. Failure Mechanism
Effect on
(System)
Safety
Function
Consider for
Failure
Mechanisms?
Failure
Mode
Potential Key
Design
Attributes
Potential
Critical
Characteristics
Potential
Controls Codes/Standards Notes
Cycle Fatigue
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Cycle Fatigue No 2-year
service life.
Procured per
RPP-RPT-58493.
Not a credible failure. PRVs have a
2-year service life and the air
system will only be used
intermittently following a
completed waste transfer.
2 Discharge Piping Cycle Fatigue No Not applicable.
Vibration
1
PRV Components:
1: Inlet, MNPT 316 SS, ½”
2: Disk, 316 SS
3: Disk Holder, 316 SS
4: Guide, 316 SS
5: Bonnet, Carbon Steel
6: Spindle, 316 SS
7: Spring Washer, Carbon Steel
8: Spring, 17-7 PH SS
9: Adjusting Screw, 316 SS
10: Adjusting Screw Locknut, 316 SS
14: Cap Gasket, Soft Iron
23: Release Nut Carbon Steel
24: Release Lock Nut, Carbon Steel
25: Plain Lever Cap, Malleable Iron
26: Lifting Lever (Plain), Malleable Iron
27: Cap Screw, Carbon Steel
28: Lever Pin, Carbon Steel
Vibration No
Not applicable. The components
are not exposed to significant or
frequent vibrations, since they are
isolated from any equipment that
might produce vibration.
2 Discharge Piping Vibration No Not applicable.
RPP-CALC-60217, “241-A-285 Air and Water Service Building ASME Piping Analysis,” Revision 0, Washington River Protection Service, LLC, Richland, WA.
RPP-RPT-58493, “241-A-285 Safety - Significant Compressed Air System Pressure Relieving Device - Functions and Requirements Evaluation Document,” Revision 0, Washington River Protection Service, LLC, Richland, WA.
TFC-ENG-STD-02, Environmental/Seasonal Requirements for TOC Systems, Structures, and Components, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC, Richland, WA.
MR0103, “Materials Resistant to Sulfide Stress Cracking in Corrosive Petroleum Refining Environments,” NACE International, Houston, TX.
ASME B31.9, 2014, “Building Services Piping,” American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY.
ASME B&PVC, 2013, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (B&PVC), American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, NY.
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