Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR000006

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H0080)

ON A

GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF

SDR 12.10 MILLION (US$17.39 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO

AFGHANISTAN

FOR AN

EMERGENCY EDUCATION REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

March 23, 2007

South Asia Region Human Development Unit

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate: Effective February 1, 2007)

Currency Unit = Afghani (Af) Af 1.00 = US$0.01998 US$1.00 = Afghani 50.05

FISCAL YEAR

March 21 – March 20

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AACA Afghanistan Assistance Coordinating Authority AFMIS Afghanistan Financial Management Unit AIA Afghanistan Interim Authority CGSDP Community Grants to School Development Program CNA Comprehensive Needs Assessment DLC Distance Learning Center ECD Early Childhood Development EERDP Emergency Education Rehabilitation and Development Project EMIS Education Management Improvement System EQUIP Education Quality Improvement Project ERL Emergency Reconstruction Loan GDLN Global Distance Learning Network GIC Girls' Internet Café GMU Grant Management Unit HE Higher Education IP Implementing Partner M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MOC Ministry of Communications MOE Ministry of Education MOF Ministry of Finance MOHE Ministry of Higher Education NFE Nonformal Education NGO Non-Governmental Organization O&M Operations and Maintenance PED Provincial Education Department PTA Parent Teacher Association QAG Quality Assurance Group SDR Special Drawing Rights SDU Special Disbursement Unit SHEP Strengthening Higher Education Project SMC School Management Committee SOE Statement of Expenditure TTA Teacher Training Allowance

Vice President: Praful C. Patel

Country Director: Alastair J. McKechnie Sector Manager: Michelle Riboud

Project Team Leader: Habibullah Wajdi ICR Team Leader: Susan E. Hirshberg

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AFGHANISTAN Emergency Education Rehabilitation and Development Project

CONTENTS

Page

A. Basic Information........................................................................................................iB. Key Dates ....................................................................................................................iC. Ratings Summary ........................................................................................................iD. Sector and Theme Codes ...........................................................................................iiE. Bank Staff...................................................................................................................ii.F. Results Framework Analysis .....................................................................................iiiG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ...................................................................viH. Restructuring (if any)................................................................................................viI. Disbursement Profile ................................................................................................vii1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design............................................... 12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 33. Assessment of Outcomes ............................................................................................ 74. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 135. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 146. Lessons Learned (both project-specific and of wide general application)............... 177. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 18Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing.......................................................................... 19Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 20Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis................................................................. 24Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 26Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 28Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................... 29Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR..................... 33Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders....................... 38Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 39

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A. Basic Information Country: Afghanistan Project Name:

Emergency Education Rehabilitation & Development Project

Project ID: P077896 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H0080 ICR Date: 03/23/2007 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: AFGHANISTAN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION

Original Total Commitment:

XDR 12.1M Disbursed Amount: XDR 12.0M

Environmental Category: C Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Communication Ministry of Education Ministry of Higher Education Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: 04/03/2002 Effectiveness: 06/11/2002 06/11/2002

Appraisal: 02/22/2002 Restructuring(s): 11/19/2002 03/16/2003

Approval: 06/06/2002 Mid-term Review: 02/25/2004 Closing: 12/31/2004 06/30/2006 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Adult literacy/non-formal education 33 General education sector 30 79 General public administration sector 6 3 Other social services 31 18

Theme Code (Primary/Secondary) Administrative and civil service reform Primary Secondary Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction Primary Primary Gender Primary Primary Participation and civic engagement Primary Primary Vulnerability assessment and monitoring Primary Secondary E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Praful C. Patel Mieko Nishimizu Country Director: Alastair J. McKechnie Alastair J. McKechnie Sector Manager: Michelle Riboud Michelle Riboud Project Team Leader: Habibullah Wajdi William B. Herbert ICR Team Leader: Susan E. Hirshberg ICR Primary Author: Susan E. Hirshberg

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F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objectives were to selectively support the Transitional State of Afghanistan (subsequently the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) in its efforts to reconstruct and develop the education sector to: (a) increase access to education opportunities in the formal and non-formal systems for under-served groups, especially women and girls; (b) support the development of a policy framework and the reform of education management at all levels, in partnership with civil society, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and the private sector; and (c) introduce modern information technologies for communications in and among the ministries, and distance learning for capacity building of civil servants. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) N/A (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Improved access to education

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

Emergency situation: not available. Not quantified

Increased enrollments Increased number of schools Increased teachers, especially females

Primary Enrollment +35.5%M +16% F +79.9% F = 39.3% of cohort Primary Schools +20.7% Teachers +49.9% F +75.5% 20% of cohort HE M +27% F + 36% F profs +157%

Date achieved 06/11/2002 12/31/2005 11/06/2003 12/31/2005 Comments (incl. % achievement)

EERDP provinces only for primary/secondary levels based on EMIS data 2003-2005

Indicator 2 : Improved education sector management Value quantitative or Qualitative)

No policy framework in the education sector.

Medium-term policy framework agreed and

Technical assistance provided to draft Medium

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implemented. Term Policy Framework. Policy not adopted or costed. EMIS developed. No out-of-school measurement, thus no accurate NER or GER data.

Date achieved 06/11/2002 06/30/2006 06/30/2006

Comments (incl. % achievement)

TA provided for policy development, but not agreed or costed by government. Analytical work to inform policy (baseline and household survey, accreditation of teachers, and regulatory guidelines for NGO/private sector provision of schools) not undertaken.

Indicator 3 : Improved communication network in key government agencies

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

No intra-ministerial communications or internet access in the country.

Eight government agencies connected to internet. DLC operational

Completed within one year.

Date achieved 06/11/2002 08/28/2005 10/28/2004

Comments (incl. % achievement)

Tech for network and internet upgraded. Tech used in proj sent to provinces to create network/links to central govt. DLC moved to MOC 3/06. Now more accessible, thus more sustainable if govt allows retaining revenues for own use. 100% achieved.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : School places Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

Emergency Project N/A 100 schools to be built 84 schools built

Date achieved 06/11/2002 11/06/2003 06/30/2006 Comments (incl. % achievement)

84% achieved

Indicator 2 : Appropriate institutional arrangements in place. Institutional capacity strengthened.

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

N/A

Capacity to manage education project and education development in place

SMCs School/district/provincial officials trained

Capacity of line ministries for project management, FM and procurement built over time. Still needs work.

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Capacity in line ministries (financial management, procurement, project management)

SMCs established in 100% schools in Bamiyan and Logar, 30% in Kapisa and Parwan, 10 schools in Badakshan.

Date achieved 06/11/2002 12/31/2004 11/06/2003 06/30/2006 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Project used a GMU within ministries at first. Project offices established under follow-on projects, EQUIP and SHEP.

Indicator 3 : Sub-grants have been used in accordance with plans (quality of proposal, timeliness of disbursement, and transparent utilization of funds).

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

N/A

100% of grants disbursed on schedule Community college established and running Female internet café established and financially viable

All higher education faculty members have received a training allowance for six months each.

Higher education block and capitation grants utilized across 18 institutions. Girls’ internet café at Kabul University. Community college built, not functional. 2200 faculty given $50/mo x 8 mo 'training allowance.'

Date achieved 06/11/2002 12/31/2004 10/01/2005 06/30/2006 Comments (incl. % achievement)

Grants 100% disbursed. Utilized for inputs to ‘jump start’ the system. “Training allowance” created confusion: some saw it as subsidy which raised expectations. MOHE used it to leverage from MOF higher salary scale to keep faculty.

Indicator 4 :

Strengthened capacity of the SMCs. Effective utilization of the grant. Improved quality of educational input at the school level.

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

N/A N/A

NGOs contracted in EERDP provinces for establishing SMCs, community construction, stimulating girls enrollments.

NGO 1 in Bamiyan and Logar provinces: 100% SMCs functional and received grants, training provided to provincial and district officials. NGO 2 in Kapisa and Parwan

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provinces SMCs in 30% of schools. No schools received direct funding.

Date achieved 06/11/2002 12/31/2004 12/15/2003 06/30/2006 Comments (incl. % achievement)

NGO 1 districts 100% achieved. NGO 2 districts 30% achieved. Badakshan model first time in Afghanistan that a Provincial Education Department was provided non-salary development budget.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP

Actual Disbursements (USD millions)

1 08/15/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 04/08/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.89 3 10/31/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.65 4 12/08/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.65 5 03/17/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.65 6 09/16/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.04 7 03/16/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 12.52 8 09/13/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 15.30 9 03/10/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.48

10 08/08/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 17.39 H. Restructuring (if any)

ISR Ratings at RestructuringRestructuring

Date(s)

Board Approved

PDO Change DO IP

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in USD millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

11/19/2002 S S 2.19 US$1.66 million reallocated to new Category C to finance the equipment for the DLC.

03/16/2003 N S S 4.89

Government decided NFE, Literacy and ECD were not priorities. Shifted to increasing enrollments (especially girls) and community participation.

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I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal Afghanistan emerged from more than two decades of conflict in fall of 2001. Even before the conflict began in 1979, Afghanistan was one of the least developed countries in the world. Occupation by the Soviet Union and subsequent rule primarily by war lords (1989-1992) left the economic situation in even worse condition. During the five years under Taliban rule (1996-2001), the country was plagued by continuing conflict, international isolation and sanctions for the Taliban's treatment of women and harboring of international terrorists, and severe drought. Although the mid-1990s saw unprecedented growth in unofficial economic activity, most notably in cross-border trade and opium poppy cultivation (which subsequently declined during the Taliban rule), by 2002 when the project was prepared, most of the pre-1979 infrastructure had been destroyed, crop production had been halved and livestock herds depleted, and the country had been experiencing a two year drought. Large numbers of people had lost their livelihoods and become displaced internally or to neighboring countries. The country was in arrears to international financial institutions with the total debt amounting to US$51 million. The education system was virtually dismantled: girls were officially excluded from the system and boys in school were taught a curriculum limited, to a large extent, to religious content. The net enrollment rate for boys was estimated at 43 percent and 3 percent for girls. There were approximately 21,000 largely under-educated teachers for a school age population estimated at 5 million, which proved to be considerably higher during project implementation, although the exact number is still not known. At that time, females had been forbidden to teach for five years.

Following the fall of the Taliban and the Bonn conference in 2001, a National Development Framework and IDA's Transitional Support Strategy were developed. Donors and government identified education, especially at the primary level, as one of the priorities for the country reconstruction. A joint Comprehensive Needs Assessment (CNA) was carried out in February/March 2002 by the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) and several donors, including IDA. An estimated US$130 million was committed to finance the education sector for the first two years. The primary education sub-sector was well subscribed to by different donors and recurrent costs were to be financed by the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) established in 2002. It was decided by the broader donor group that the World Bank would assist the development of a medium-term policy framework, assisting the Higher Education sub-sector and supporting female participation and enrollment through nonformal education mechanisms and Early Childhood Development (ECD) activities.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators The project development objectives were to selectively support the Transitional State of Afghanistan (subsequently the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) in its efforts to reconstruct and develop the education sector to: (a) increase access to education opportunities in the formal (Higher Education) and nonformal systems for under-served groups, especially women and girls; (b) support the development of a policy framework and the reform of education management at all levels, in partnership with civil society, NGOs and the private sector; and (c) introduce modern information technologies for communications in and among the ministries, and distance learning for capacity building of civil servants.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification Not applicable.

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1.4 Main Beneficiaries The beneficiaries of the project were (a) disadvantaged children and young adults who had been denied access to all levels of education, with particular emphasis on girls and women; (b) returning teachers and faculty; and (c) parents and communities. At the institutional level the beneficiaries included: (i) the Ministries of Education and Higher Education at the national and sub-national levels; (ii) tertiary institutions and their returning faculty; (iii) primary and secondary schools; (iv) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and other civil society organizations; and (v) a network of eight Ministries.

1.5 Original Components Component 1: Promoting Skills Development and Learning (US$5. 8 million). The aim of this component was to support those who had not been able to access education. Increasing the Number of Girls in School (US$3.7 million). A demand-side financing mechanism would be developed for: (i) girls and young women to enroll in and complete a secondary and/or tertiary-level institution course of study; and (ii) children, especially girls of disadvantaged women, to participate in schooling through a stipend program. Literacy Learning and Early Childhood Development (ECD) (US$1.1 million). To address the literacy and basic education requirements of youth, particularly young women and adolescent girls. An assessment of needs of young children, women and communities would be undertaken to develop an ECD policy and a national program of NFE. Skills Development for Underserved Groups (US$1.0 million). To provide demand-driven skills development training to disadvantaged groups. It would support training instructors, provision of materials, textbooks, training modules and learner stipends through to technical and vocational centers. Component 2: Education Sector Management Reform (US$5.7 million). To develop capacities for effective design and management of the primary, secondary and tertiary education sub-sectors. Policy Development for the Education Sector (US$1.0 million). To support development of a new policy based on principles of social and gender equity, access and quality, to include (i) the definition of standards and qualifications of teachers; (ii) curriculum requirements; (iii) learning assessment; (iv) accreditation; (v) and regulatory guidelines for NGOs and private providers. It was also intended to support institutional analysis and AAA to gain indepth knowledge of the sector requirements, including a baseline survey, which would allow measurement of the impact of sector investments. Skills Development for Quality Schools and Institutions (US$4.7 million). To address the urgent skills capacity building requirements at all levels of the education sector and provide material support for its functioning. It would support most immediate needs to upgrade the quality of teaching and learning. Activities to be funded would be designed and driven by the end users/institutions.

Component 3: Distance Learning and Communications (US$3.5 million). The aims were: (i) to strengthen the capacity of the AIA and Afghanistan Assistance Coordinating Authority (AACA) through information and communications technology for planning, implementation and monitoring of the restructuring process; and (ii) to provide distance learning to support management reform and capacity building through a Distance Learning Center (DLC) (US$1.7 million), and a Government Internet (US$1.8 million).

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1.6 Revised Components Shortly after project approval, the government determined that NFE, literacy and EDC programs were not immediate priorities. These were dropped from the project, and it was restructured to focus on assistance to communities for general education, especially for girls. The first component was restructured to support a Community Grants for School Development Program (CGSDP) whereby NGOs were contracted in four provinces to establish School Management Committees (SMC), give grants to communities to improve the schooling environment through constructing buildings and other civil works and promote girls education. The key indicators were increases in enrollments and female staffing at all levels of the education sector.

1.7 Other significant changes Due to delays in the early phase when the project was being restructured, the original closing date was extended for one year. Later, it was extended for six additional months to allow the government to address a financial management issue, which had caused the Bank to suspend processing of Statement of Expenditures (SOE), that government resolved with Bank assistance. Appreciation of the SDR resulted in an additional US$2.3 million, which the project extension allowed the government to fully utilize.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry There was no Quality at Entry Review by the Quality Assurance Group. Since the project was prepared in a very challenging emergency environment and processed as an Emergency Reconstruction Loan (ERL) under OP/BP 8.50, there was little analytical work available during project preparation. Its design was based on the CNA carried out in February/March 2002. During the education donor/AIA round table donors agreed to finance, through separate projects, the physical rehabilitation of schools, development of teaching and learning materials, teacher training, capacity building of MOE and MOHE staff, monitoring and evaluation and more. A two-year financing plan was agreed A specific request was made to provide communications technology for capacity building of government officials. To be responsive to requests from the AIA and donors, the project was prepared within two months and approved one month later. Project Objectives: The project objectives of improving access to all levels of education, especially for women and girls, developing a medium-term policy framework to promote quality, and strengthening government's capacity through improved technology emerged from the National Development Framework and the World Bank (WB) Transitional Support Strategy. The situation in Afghanistan was fragile and fluid, so it was appropriate to have a project with broad objectives underpinned by principles of participation, coordination among donors and with government agencies, and the focus on females. Project Components: The outcomes of the CNA, donor dialogue and stated financial commitments were the key factors influencing the components’ selection and design, as was the government’s decision shortly after the project approval that literacy, ECD and NFE were not immediate priorities given the status of general education in the country. The third component of building communications and civil servants’ capacity by introducing the intra-ministerial network, internet connectivity and a DLC was a specific request, which fit more logically in EERDP than in any other project being developed at the time. An Emergency Communication Development Project subsequently became effective in December 2003.

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Donor and government dialogue immediately following the Bonn Conference and during project preparation was the main factor affecting the preparation and design. The education donors preferred to develop separately managed projects and adopt specific technical areas such as teacher training, textbook development and curriculum development. As a participating donor partner and “lender of last resort,” the Bank was requested to support specific activities such as NFE and literacy, which did not capitalize on the Bank’s comparative advantage in the sector. Issues in the design of EERDP resulted in the need for significant restructuring and implementation delays.

2.2 Implementation Factors outside the control of government: The two main factors not subject to government control that influenced implementation of the project were: (i) the fragility of the implementation environment as a post-conflict country coping with security risks, lack of infrastructure and capacity; and (ii) education donor planning and financing mechanisms. The implementation environment created by Afghanistan’s post-conflict situation was, and continues to be, highly unstable. The number of displaced Afghans has decreased since 2002, but still skills and capacity to establish systems and deliver services remain weak. Hence, projects continue to be processed under OP/BP 8.50. Some broad donor coordination was in place, and joint discussions took place with government and improved over time. However, the modality of financing separate projects outside government’s budget has not allowed for an integrated approach to school development and improvement. Nor has it contributed to building the capacity of government systems of management, planning and service delivery, particularly at the local level. For example, textbooks may have been developed, but government lacked the distribution systems. The result was delays in textbook delivery, inaccurate numbers of textbooks delivered - or worse - no books delivered to schools, which the ICR mission often saw in the field. Each donor originally had TA in the MOE’s Grant Management Unit (GMU) assisting with their project inputs, but when the GMU was dismantled in early 2005, donors established separate project offices inside the MOE. At the provincial level, Provincial Education Departments (PED) have seldom known which donors were working in their districts. This has resulted in lack of planning or equitable distribution of resources ranging from physical infrastructure to teacher training opportunities. In the provinces/schools of EERDP, the consequence has been less ability for the project to influence quality aspects of schooling. A contributing factor to successful project implementation was the Bank’s decision to provide ongoing, indepth supervision and support to the MOE and MOHE to implement the project. Early on, supervision missions would provide two to three months of support at a time. In 2004, the Bank placed a technical specialist in the field, and subsequently hired more national staff. This resulted in helping build government’s capacity for and understanding of the day-to-day management of projects. Documentation on file shows that processing time decreased over time. The Bank could have provided more guidance on building the broader capacity and vision of government to manage the education process as envisioned in Component 2 to inform longer-term policy and planning for the sector. Factors within control of government: A key factor of the project, which was in the purview of government, was the frequent changing of ministers over the life of the project. There were six Ministers of Education between 2002 and project closing. Each minister brought in a new team, which created setbacks and delays in implementation, as well as the inability to establish clear management systems. In the MOHE, there were two ministers during the project period. Government also had a tendency to centralize decision making to Kabul, and within the national government, to the MOF. Getting systems into place whereby the MOF was able to support the line ministries and disburse funds efficiently took time to establish. The systems and capacity were developed

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over time. One especially constructive occurrence under EERDP was the protocol established among the MOF - MOE-Badakshan PED which allowed project/development funds to be released directly to the provincial line department. This may have set the foundation for decentralization and community management of school funds. The provinces and districts had little input or role in project activities initially, except in Badakshan. A third factor which will influence sustainability is the requirement that all revenues or funds generated by any government entities must be given back to the MOF. This will influence three activities under the project: (i) the DLC; (ii) institutions of higher education; and (iii) the girls’ internet café (GIC). The DLC will likely be generating enough money to cover its operating costs and required technology upgrades. The more it generates the better services it would be able to provide. The same is true with any revenue generation to be undertaken by HE institutions within legal boundaries. The GIC will not have the ability to make direct budgetary requests to the MOF for its Operations and Maintenance or equipment, and managing its own revenues is critical to its survival. Factors subject to implementing agency control: Like the broader government, the implementing agencies also tended to centralize decision making, bypassing the provincial and district education authorities. This was less evident for disbursements of Block and Capitation Grants at the HE level since the institutions themselves developed proposals which were approved for financing. Discussions regarding sector policy making, planning and financing tend to remain within the ministries with little consultation at the national level across ministries such as Finance or Economics, or with provincial authorities. Such consultation is essential for both long-term planning and project implementation.

Weak capacity to manage systems and coordinate donor inputs also influenced implementation. As stated earlier, this led to activities becoming donor-driven, resulting in uneven development across provinces, districts and schools. In the last 18 months after the GMU was abolished, the separate donor project offices under one ministry fragmented the MOE’s ability to manage education rather than building its capacity to do so. At the EERDP level, this caused delays in contracting, FM and procurement issues, although this improved over time. Frequent changes in leadership also contributed to too little coordination among donors.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization Given the emergency nature of the project, country and education system context at the time, the project had very little data to be able to put M&E systems in place. It was envisaged in the original project documents that during implementation sector M&E systems would be established and maintained. It was, perhaps, too ambitious to assume that good M&E systems would be in place in two years, as four years later the systems are just beginning to function. An Education Management Information System (EMIS) was established by UNICEF with some help from EERDP, and began collecting school level data in 2003. Issues remain with the system and data collection which the follow-on project, EQUIP, is addressing. EMIS is able to collect school level data such as numbers of students, teachers, schools and other facilities. It does not, however, provide a vehicle for understanding broader system issues such as out-of-school children to calculate Gross or Net Enrollment Rates or teacher deployment. Higher quality household surveys would be required to generate this information.

At the project level, some evaluations of project activities took place such as an independent evaluation of the performance of the NGO partners implementing the CGSDP. Such M&E was not universally embedded in the respective components’ design. Third-party reports or spot supervision of use of Block and Capitation Grants are available, but not systematic. The CGSDP evaluation could have helped the process renewing contracts with the international NGOs and expanded under EQUIP. A similar exercise to monitor the

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PED’s implementation in Badakshan has not been conducted. The lack of M&E must be looked at in the context of the overall complex implementation environment, but remained a weakness of EERDP.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance There was little or no capacity for financial management and procurement in 2002. Government established the AACA which contracted out a specialized firm (Procurement Agent) to work with line ministries. All procurement, financial management and audit functions for the project were undertaken through the umbrella contract financed by the Emergency Public Administration Project (Grant H-006-AF). EERDP made a deliberate decision to work with staff in the line ministries rather than creating a project office. A Grant Management Unit (GMU) was established in the MOE, and the MOHE’s Planning Department managed project activities in the tertiary subsector. Financial Management: Records of the project's funds receipts and disbursements from inception until closure were maintained at the MOF, Special Disbursement Unit (SDU), as well as at the MOE & MOHE. Due to lack of capacity and systems, in the early years of the project these records were not adequately maintained, for example disbursements were not recorded on component-wise basis. Records under EERDP, like other emergency projects in Afghanistan, were maintained manually at the SDU from inception until March 2005 when the SDU started using the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS). It was assumed that record keeping would have improved greatly with the transition to AFMIS, but this has not been the case. Under AFMIS, there are still no component-wise disbursements records. Improvement was evident in the area of internal controls. Supporting documents were maintained, however, an SOE review conducted in August 2006 revealed that 17 percent of expenditures under EERDP had inadequate supporting documentation. Funds flow to all implementing agencies was controlled centrally by the SDU. An assessment of the process reveals that this has been managed appropriately since the project began. Financial reporting was poor throughout the project: monthly and quarterly financial reports – including the mandatory financial monitoring reports to be submitted quarterly to the Bank – were not prepared regularly. Annual audited financial statements were submitted regularly. The audit opinions of the Control and Audit Office of Afghanistan were generally unqualified. Key points raised in the last audited financial statements and management letter for the fiscal year ending March 20, 2005 (SY1383) were about the inability to disclose component-wise disbursements as required in the Grant Agreement and the blanket payment of US$494,470 on May 30, 2004 to an individual for a national school survey. After significant effort on the part of the Bank and government, all funds have been accounted for. Given that there were no financial management systems in place when the project became effective, one could conclude that FM capacity has been built steadily over the life of the project. However, capacity remains weak and much strengthening remains to be done. Procurement: At the beginning of the project, the implementing ministries relied on the AACA’s Procurement Agent. Once this function moved to the ministries, the Bank and Grantee worked towards improving the quality of documentation and evaluation reports, and on reducing documents processing time. In four of the five project provinces, the project was implemented by two implementing partners. These NGOs were responsible for procurement and implementation of civil works with contracts ranging from US$32,000 - 60,000, as well as procurement of furniture. The MOE took the lead in implementing the project in Badakshan province, where 38 schools were improved with the participation of newly established SMCs. Each school was allocated US$10,000 as a subproject grant which was disbursed in two tranches. In three provinces SMC receivables and expenditure were displayed on a notice board on the school premises for the information of the communities. The MOE was assisted by the Afghan Reconstruction Development Services for larger procurement contracts.

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An ex-post review conducted near the end of the project highlighted areas in need of improvement in the documentation, selection of contractors, and compliance with agreed procedures carried out by the NGOs. The identified shortcomings were: (i) non disclosure of pre-qualification and evaluation criteria by one NGO; (ii) failure to formulate the estimate and evaluation criteria before bid opening; and (iii) advising SMCs to request interested contractors to provide services by disclosing the estimated price in an open forum. Issues arose due to the lack of availability of qualified contractors in remote areas. Estimated at an average of US$30,000, contracts did not attract bidders, even from nearby provinces. In Badakshan, delays in disbursing the second tranche of US$5,000 to the SMCs resulted in postponing completion of the activities. These shortcomings were addressed in the ongoing EQUIP. Considering the emergency situation, the volatile environment and the security conditions and capacity of the Grantee, the overall procurement actions under the project can be rated as satisfactory.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase Two operations, Education Quality Improvement Project (EQUIP, Grant H163-AF) and Strengthening Higher Education Project (SHEP, Grant H1620-AF) were approved by the Board in July 2004 and May 2005 respectively. Both were processed under OP/BP 8.50 as emergency projects. Aspects of EERDP have been included in the design of both projects as follows: Appropriate technical and institutional provisions to ensure effective project operation EQUIP: The project continues the use of: (i) the two community-based modalities to increase access through NGOs and PEDs and has been expanded from five to ten provinces; (ii) social mobilization and dissemination on the use of grants to schools, especially for attracting and retaining girls; and (iii) introduction of a basic M&E system including teacher ID and registration, further development of EMIS, and promoting the use of data to inform the budget process. SHEP: In order to simplify disbursements to universities, SHEP continues the use of block grants with well-defined criteria to support the six main universities based on their own strategic plans. Adequate budget provision, staffing and management EQUIP: A GMU was established to provide continued implementation support for management, FM and procurement. The project also finances appropriate TA as required. SHEP: A Steering Committee was established at the MOHE, as well as a program coordination unit, FM and procurement officers in each of the six universities to support implementation. Implementation of policies for effective operation and maintenance EQUIP: The policy work that began under EERDP is being further developed, expanded and costed out to become a National Education Strategy. SHEP: The project is conducting a review to recommend changes for the draft National Higher Education Law. It is also reviewing ways to improve the delivery and administration of the University Entrance Examinations.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation The project objectives of increasing access to all levels of education and creation of an information base for policy development are highly relevant in a post-conflict situation. The importance of education in facilitating nation building and development is well documented. The education system had been virtually dismantled and participation, particularly of females, was extremely low. According to an Operational Policy & Country Services (OPCS) report on Fragile States (2005), flexibility in the design

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of an emergency project in a post-conflict situation is essential. The restructured component which created the CGSDP shortly after approval to pilot mechanisms for bringing funds to schools through SMCs was responsive to the priorities of the country and the Afghan people, and remains so today. The Afghan population has responded positively and more quickly than expected to reconstruction of the education sector, especially at the school level. Given the challenging implementation environment, the expected outputs/outcomes proved to be too ambitious: the assumptions about the capacity of the implementing ministries to design and deliver grants to institutions, conduct a baseline survey and develop a sector-wide policy within two years were overly optimistic. There is a natural tension in an emergency situation between responding to the country’s immediate needs for service inputs (textbooks, schools and teachers) and setting up an institutional framework and system. It would have been more relevant to build capacity of government to harmonize inputs and plan for/finance education delivery at all levels. During implementation, the relevance of the TA provided through the project was low. International experts and firms were contracted for two flagship reports: (i) a six-week assignment to develop the mid-term policy framework, and (ii) an American-based firm to prepare a report on “The Potential for Private Sector Investment in the Higher Education Sector.” The reports themselves are of appropriate quality, but the process by which they were developed has not resulted in ownership by the MOE, MOHE, or other stakeholders.

Through the third component, communication was facilitated within government, with donor partners and internationally. The DLC and government intranet/internet connection helped government connect quickly to the outside world after years of isolation. Given the nature of global communication, this was highly relevant, although less obviously so to the direct benefit of the education sector.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Improved access to education, particularly for women and girls. Satisfactory. For the objective of increasing access, Afghanistan witnessed larger than expected increases in enrollments and the number of schools over the four years of the project. Between 2003 and 2005, across the country enrollment of primary (grades 1-6), secondary (grades 7-9) and high school (grades 10-12) grew from 3.1 million to over 5.5 million. For females, the increase was from just under 839,000 to 1.74 million, and for males, from 2.27 million to 3.27 million. In an emergency project the causal links between project interventions and system outcomes at the primary and secondary levels cannot be readily assessed. Donors worked across different provinces and resources were not mapped. If donor involvement had been distributed geographically and each donor was responsible for all aspects of education development within a province (including quality inputs and processes), stronger linkages between outputs and outcomes could have been analyzed. EERDP was able to focus primarily on access interventions to improve the schooling environment, but had little or no influence on improving the quality of teaching and learning. Based on information available, Table 1 shows that the average gains in the five EERDP provinces compared to all Afghanistan without Kabul (an extreme outlier) were close to the national average, and slightly higher with regards to percent gains in female students and teachers.

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Table 1: Key Outcome/Output Indicators (Percent Change between 2003-2005) Indicator All

Afghanistan

Afghanistan w/o Kabul

EERDP Provinces

Difference Afghanistan vs. EERDP

Difference Afghanistan w/o Kabul vs. EERDP

Overall Enrollments 60.7 39.4 35.5 25.2 3.9 Male 65.3 26.1 16.9 48.4 9.2 Female 105.5 76.3 79.9 25.6 -3.6 Increase in Teachers 85.8 60.2 49.9 35.9 10.3 Male 69.1 59.7 45.2 23.9 14.5 Female 151.8 62.1 72.5 79.3 -10.4 Increase in Number of Schools

24.7 21.5 20.7 4.0 0.8

A qualitative outcome was the active participation and enthusiasm for education on the part of stakeholders. In communities, parents became actively engaged in their children’s education, which stimulated enrollments and generated additional resources. At the tertiary level, administrators and faculty jointly developed improvement plans, fostering greater ownership of their institutional development. At the tertiary level, enrollment increased 29 percent from 30,112 to 38,861 between 2003 and 2005. In 2003, females were 21 percent of the tertiary students, with 23,913 males and 6,199 females. By 2005, enrollments there were 30,437 males and 8,424 females, and females occupied 22 percent of places. Although there was an upward trend, more will need to be done to attract female students. Faculty members, on the other hand, increased by 100 percent in the same timeframe: from 1,959 in 2003 to 3,924 in 2005. However, the distribution of faculty across the different higher education institutions remains uneven. Female teaching staff increased 157 percent, but they still only occupy 15 percent of overall faculty positions. Other donors were not as actively involved in the tertiary subsector, therefore one can say that the project, specifically the use of Block and Capitation Grants, was able to “jump start” the system by providing necessary resources. One could argue that the grants only supported procurement of inputs such as buildings and furniture, but these essential inputs served as a catalyst to bring faculty and students back into the system. The outcome of the development objective to increase access can be rated Satisfactory (although it cannot be directly linked to EERDP at the school level). Improved education sector management through policy development. Moderately Unsatisfactory. There were no effective policies in place at preparation. The objective was to develop a medium-term policy framework which would serve as the base for long-term system development. The key areas were: (i) developing the medium-term policy framework at all levels for delivery of quality education, and (ii) developing baseline information to track progress on basic human development indicators and measure the impact of policy on sector outcomes. Technical Assistance was provided through a consultancy to develop a sector-wide policy framework, but it was not vetted by the MOE/MOHE, across ministries such as MOF, or with the provinces and other stakeholders. An Education Management Information System (EMIS) was developed to measure school factors such as enrollment, teachers and facilities. The expectation was that the Bank would measure out-of-school children in order to allow assessment of enrollment data, budgeting and policy making. The Bank deferred this to UNICEF, which developed a Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Instrument conducted in parts of the country. In the end, it captured some interesting trends in education, but was not fully representative and could not be considered a baseline assessment.

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Exogenous factors common in emergency post-conflict situations created obstacles to building ownership of a policy framework and generating the information including the high turnover of ministers, and lack of capacity within the ministries.

Improved communication network and distance learning capacity in key government agencies. Satisfactory. The government installed a network linking eight ministries and providing internet access, and established a DLC connected through the Global Development Learning Network (GDLN). With the assistance of the World Bank’s ISG, both systems were set up and running within the first year. The DLC was inactive for a period of two years due to being housed in a building which was inaccessible for security reasons. This was remedied by moving it to the MOC in February 2006. The internal government network was set up and became operational within a year of project effectiveness. Officials use the internal network and internet regularly for conducting government business.

3.3 Efficiency A full-fledged efficiency analysis of the grants could not be carried out since (i) baseline costs are not available in ERLs processed under OP/BP 8.50; and (ii) implementation progress had not been systematically monitored or compared to other similar interventions in the country. Given the limitations, analysis has been carried out to cull lessons on efficiency, focusing primarily on components that served as pilots and have implications for future program and policy development. CGSDP: EERDP made a decision to focus on five provinces that: (i) were accessible and afforded operational feasibility for supervision; (ii) represented different ethnic groups; and (iii) were reasonably secure. Through CGSDP, schools were provided cash grants through two mechanisms (three entities) to test their effectiveness: two NGOs in four provinces and the PED in Badakshan. Grants were disbursed on the basis of girls’ enrollments, and civil works carried out on a needs-basis through SMCs. (i) NGO Modality: One NGO disbursed quality enhancement grants and provided inputs to all schools in its provinces. Support reached 160,549 students at a unit cost of about US$29. The total investment financed by EERDP was $3.88 million and the overheads of the NGO were $0.84 million. The second NGO disbursed grants to 30 percent of schools in two provinces. One hundred schools and 48,015 students received grant support against total enrollment of 303,003. The unit cost was approximately US$47. The total investment cost was about $2 million and the NGO’s overheads were $0.26 million. The first NGO’s implementation was considerably more cost-effective and efficient in that it reached more beneficiaries and built a bit more capacity of provincial authorities. The second NGO’s methodology did not have adequate coverage or depth of impact for the amount spent. (ii) Grant funding from the MOE/MOF to a PED: A unique protocol for providing PEDs with development funds directly from MOF was developed and approved under EERDP. This allowed Badakshan province’s PED, for the first time in Afghanistan’s history, use of development funds to establish SMCs. The MOE built 38 schools at a significantly lower cost since communities contributed between 20-60 percent in cash and in kind. A total of 39,534 students (approximately 18.3 percent of 2005 enrollments) and 1,611 teachers benefited at an approximate unit cost of US$10. The model was the most cost efficient, but smallest in scale. More analysis of this model is required to understand the resources required for scaling up.

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Table 2. Community Grants for School Development Program (CGSDP) Investment

Costs (US$)

Overheads (US$)

EERDP Beneficiaries

(students)

Unit Cost (US$)

Total 2005 Primary and Secondary

enrollments Department of Education (Badakshan Province)

380,000 10,000 39,534 10 215,485

NGO 1

3,884,566 842,893 160,549 29 160,549

NGO 2 1,996,017 264,200 48,015 47 303,003

Source: NGO project reports, Kabul, July 2006

Skills Development for Quality Schools and Institutions. Block grants totaled $1.4 million and reached 38,978 beneficiaries for an estimated unit cost of $36. Institutions planned and prioritized expenditures, and grant recipients were transparent about line item expenditures. The objectives of most proposals were to improve quality, but at these early stages of being in an emergency, the funds went primarily to essential inputs such as furniture and desks, blackboards, and in some rare cases, libraries.

Table 3. Grants to Tertiary Education Institutions Activity Costs

(US$) Benefits/Beneficiaries Avg.

Grant/ University (US$)

Average/Unit Cost (US$)

Comments

Block grants

1,383,742 38,978 students

345,946 36 To improve girls’ enrollment support for 7 higher education institutions in Kabul

Capitation grants

512,424 15,864 students

128,106 32

Grants to 18 HE institutions on the basis of size, number of female students and proposals

Note: Costs from disbursement data

Capitation grants went to all Higher Education Institutions based on the size of the university and number of female enrollments. These grants were used for constructing and rehabilitating university buildings and providing transportation, especially for women. Some grants were used to help equip university laboratories, thereby contributing to improving the quality of training for students. The project attempted to increase post-secondary education opportunities by introducing the concept of a two-year community college program. A building was constructed under the project, but consensus on the intent or curriculum of a two-year degree was not reached, and the building remains uncommissioned. Thus, the US$500,000 expenditure was neither efficient nor cost-effective. This is being addressed under SHEP. Improved education sector management through policy development: Technical assistance provided under this component was, by and large, costly and had little impact. The lesson, which the 2005 Country Portfolio Review highlighted, is that short-term, international technical assistance is not effective in the Afghanistan context.

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Overall, activities that proved cost-effective and efficient were the CGSDP as implemented by NGO 1, grants to universities, which helped jumpstart the system, and the internal government communications network. The Badakshan PED model requires more analysis before making conclusions. The performance of NGO 2 was less efficient/cost-effective, and the management component, TA and community college proved inefficient and not cost-effective.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. The weaknesses of project and sector M&E systems do not allow confirmation of the gains made or, since EERDP could have been seen as a pilot project, full analysis and application of lessons learned. In the case of the CGSDP, an evaluation took place too late in the project to inform follow-on projects how to scale up or improve implementation (e.g., performance-based contracting of NGOs to improve the performance/outcomes). An evaluation of the Badakshan model has not yet taken place, so there is little understanding of the resources and support it would take to build on this potentially positive experience. At the tertiary level, there was little systematic validation of the use of grants. Across the system, a comprehensive survey to measure the total population of school-aged children would have allowed measurement of gross enrollment rates and net enrollment rates, which would have provided a better understanding of the education system requirements. Second, the institutional strengthening expected in project documents took place on a much smaller scale than anticipated. The expectation itself may have been too overreaching, but some steps towards building this capacity could have improved prospects for sustainability. Some involved in project implementation suggest that the environment was too complex. This is counter balanced by the Country Portfolio Reviews of 2004-2006, which point to the successes in these areas of a few other projects such as inter alia, the National Solidarity Program and the Health Sector Emergency Reconstruction and Development Project. All of these were seen to have produced more visible output/outcomes and built capacity of government.

These drawbacks are mitigated by the fact that during the life of the project, the education sector witnessed strong growth in participation during this early phase of the reconstruction period. Overall enrollments in project provinces and HE Institutions increased by 35.5 percent and 29 percent, respectively. There is evidence in the HE Institutions of ownership of improvement efforts. The NGO model used appears, when done well such as by NGO 1, effective. However, it is not entirely possible to asses the impact of the project’s interventions on attaining these gains since resources and activities from other donors and NGO efforts in education are not mapped. What can be said is that EERDP was able to help “jump start” the system and develop a few models for bringing funds to beneficiaries for school reconstruction.

Table 4: Summary Justification of Overall Rating

Objective Relevance Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Efficiency

Outcome

Increased access High Satisfactory/Substantial Moderate* Satisfactory Support for policy reform and education management

High** Moderately Unsatisfactory/ Negligible

Low Moderately Unsatisfactory

Introduce ICT & distance learning

High Satisfactory/Substantial High Satisfactory

* To the extent that the different models have been and can be evaluated ** High relevance, overly ambitious targets

Overall Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

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3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Poverty impact of an education project cannot be measured after four years in a post-conflict emergency situation. Gender and other social aspects of project interventions have been discussed. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening (particularly with reference to impacts on longer-term capacity and institutional development) Institutional capacity of government and the project’s input has been addressed above. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) Government has indicated two outcomes of the project which were unanticipated: (i) over time, other donors became more willing to finance projects through the government budget in the manner of the Bank; and (ii) investments in the Higher Education subsector appear to have slowed the ‘brain drain’ of academics to NGOs. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops Two separate workshops were held in Kabul with stakeholders of the education and higher education components of the project. Details are contained in Annex 9. In summary, the main messages were: • It is necessary to involve stakeholders at all levels in the policy and strategy formulation, and project

preparation and design • Provincial and district governments need to be more involved and have a clearer role • Without a policy framework in place and strategic planning, it is difficult to prioritize the reform

agenda, i.e., new teaching methods, curricula standards, how to produce graduates of quality • More is needed to improve quality: make sure teachers get trained and students get books on time • The project was too short to sustain the gains. Afghanistan is still in an ‘emergency’ phase, and all

HE Institutions need continued support • Community participation was essential in increasing girls’ enrollments and attracting more students,

which has created a sense of responsibility and ownership • Involvement of communities directly and through NGOs in educational activities is a sustainable

approach • The flexibility of the project has enabled the HE line institutions to build their basic operational

capacities.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: High At the country level, the risk to development outcome is primarily driven by the complexity of the security situation in Afghanistan, which has been further deteriorating since early 2006. This presents an overall threat to the education system at all levels: primary schools are being closed or burned down, and teachers and parents are rumored to be threatened for sending their children, especially girls, to schools. It is highly likely that this could spill over to the higher education institutions in certain geographic areas, as well. The second country-level and institutional factor affecting ‘risk to development’ outcome concerns national and provincial institutional capacity. The OPCS assessment of Fragile States acknowledges that building systems and capacity for planning, management and service delivery takes at least ten years. Therefore, one could not have expected the institutions to be fully functional in only four years. Progress continues to move in the right direction, but remains fragile.

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At the sector level, two factors could help mitigate and lower the high risk to development outcomes: (i) evidence of government commitment by placing a strong, dynamic minister with a good track record into the MOE (post project); and (ii) strong support from parents and communities for education of all children and young adults, which could help sustain some of the gains in the current volatile environment. EERDP was able to contribute to the latter at the school level, especially in Bamiyan and Logar provinces, by establishing SMCs and providing them with training, funds and decision-making powers. Learning from the success through indepth analysis in these two provinces, in particular, as well as Badakshan, could facilitate government in scaling up the achievements in the CGSDP component of EERDP. At the tertiary level, 12 of the 18 institutions which received grants are not receiving further financing from SHEP or other programs. The capitation grant scheme provided them with once-off seed funds for development and quality inputs, but most have indicated that resources are scarce and faculty are not distributed well across institutions outside Kabul. There was a decision by the MOHE during the preparation of SHEP to focus on the six larger universities, and perhaps make the smaller institutions satellite campuses. Not providing them further funding could leave these institutions weak, especially since their distance from Kabul makes it difficult to attract and retain good faculty. A decision regarding their role (as satellite campuses or other) will need to be made soon.

Technically, much remains to be done to improve education at all levels in Afghanistan. EERDP could only serve as a beginning. The country and its education system remain in an “emergency” phase, which stakeholders in government, education institutions, and communities continually emphasize. A significant influx of financial and technical support is still required for quality improvements in teaching, learning, development of quality inputs, management capacity, deployment, attracting and retaining qualified personnel, etc.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The Bank responded quickly, as recommended in an emergency post-conflict situation, to the need for a needs assessment, coordination among donors and the attempt to articulate and measure the country’s educational needs. The team was committed and balanced with an implementation specialist, economist, an education specialist with experience in basic education, another education specialist focused on higher education, and staff from the ISG and Global Development Learning Network. These proved to be the strengths of the Bank during project preparation.

External pressures on the team to deliver a project were significant from outside governments, donors and internally at the Bank – although not from the country management team itself. Despite the efforts of the team, the overall project design was not of appropriate flexibility or quality. The design of the project appeared relatively simple, but given the challenging implementation environment and fragility of the system, the expected outputs/outcomes proved to be too ambitious for two years in an emergency post-conflict situation. This resulted in less ownership from stakeholders and less understanding of the implementation obstacles which were likely to emerge, evidenced by two restructurings in the first year and implementation delays. In particular, the Bank might have done more to think through means of strengthening government’s role in better coordination of multi-donor financed inputs to ensure equitable distribution of resources for physical infrastructure and quality inputs to schools.

(b) Quality of Supervision

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Rating: Satisfactory The complexity of the implementation environment in Afghanistan cannot be underestimated. The lack of effective counterparts, weak skills, and an evolving system complicated every implementation decision and action required. The continuous field presence of an education specialist with the addition of qualified national staff allowed the Bank to provide intensive project implementation support to the line ministries. Over time this built some capacity for day-to-day management of project activities in procurement, disbursements, financial management, civil works, and the process of preparing grant proposals. The intensity of this support was appreciated by all stakeholders. The team encountered difficulties in finding people willing to travel to Afghanistan given the security situation. The internal and official documentation reflect this through a lack of continuity and skills mix in team composition during supervision. The task team leaders remained fairly consistent, but missions were often comprised of too few people or people with similar skills. For the CGSDP, one would expect a social development specialist or architect to be included to look at the social and construction aspects of the community-based approach at some point during the supervision process. The project files, aides-memoire and back-to-office reports reveal that due to weak capacity within the ministries supervision focused largely on procurement and disbursements issues, and ongoing incremental work required for implementation such as drafting contracts, pro forma for grant proposals, and developing operational manuals for various activities. The team has suggested that policy dialogue took place by helping government rethink its role in education delivery as financier of education rather than direct suppliers of services. There are several aides-memoire which identify lack of adequate government reporting and other shortcomings in implementation, but no subsequent discussions or actions were taken by the implementing agencies or according to the PSR/ISRs, the Bank. No mid-term review was conducted, which is reasonable for a two year emergency project. With the lack of M&E, however, an indepth review of activities would have been desirable at some stage of project implementation for guidance on redirecting resources, examining progress towards outcomes (not outputs), and to provide some lessons for the two subsequent projects, EQUIP and SHEP. The project was originally extended by a year from 2004 to the end of 2005, which could have provided an appropriate opportunity for closer examination of the program.

Despite these shortcomings, the task team should be commended for their persistence in the difficult environment fraught with security issues, uncertainty, and lack of capacity as Afghanistan sought to establish its government and public administration. Particularly commendable were the support to the MOE and MOF for developing the Badakshan protocol to provide PEDs with development funds which could be transferred to schools, and in the last year, the role Bank staff played in helping recover misappropriated funds by an individual in the MOE. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory In an emergency context, the uncertainty and pressures for results leave task teams little time for reflection. The strengths of the teams’ efforts lie in: (i) being responsive in a timely way to the urgent requests for support; (ii) providing ongoing support in the field which became a form of TA to the government; (iii) developing what appears to be a good model for NGO provision of school support; and (iv) addressing two highly complex tasks of designing a means to get development funds to the provinces and schools, and recovering over $400,000 in misplaced funds. The Bank’s role in the education sector grew over time to the point that, post project and with the minister installed after EERDP closed, EQUIP

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is now seen as the government’s own program. This was clearly a “learning-by-doing” environment in many ways, and any weaknesses identified should be viewed in this context.

Preparation and supervision efforts assisted with designing and implementing specific project activities. Overall, however, the Bank was less robust in setting the stage by which the government and the Bank could focus on the ‘big picture’ to ensure building better and sustainable capacity for service delivery, as recommended by OPCS and other entities in the Bank looking at post-conflict and fragile states. At the project level, more attention was required for basic M&E and third party validation of project inputs and ongoing assessment of implementing partners’ performance.

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory The government has gone through substantial transitions since first interacting with the Bank in late 2001. The AIA made the successful transition to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and it has been working to create systems of public administration and finance to support service delivery. The changes are to be commended, especially given the complete lack of systems beforehand. Overall capacity has been built over time, but still remains weak. The following have been identified in Country Portfolio Reviews as requiring attention by the Government of Afghanistan for better implementation: Commitment and political will. There is recognition that lack of capacity is probably the greatest constraint to achieving results in Afghanistan. In the education sector government changed ministers six times in four years, sometimes for very short tenures. Sectors with strong leadership have seen strong results on the ground. Government put its strongest education minister in place after the project closed. Capacity to manage Technical Assistance and donor coordination. Issues with TA and donor coordination have been discussed throughout this ICR. Experience indicates that ad hoc, project-based and donor supply-driven approach; fragmented and uncoordinated provision of TA; absence of regular M&E and reporting mechanisms and lack of skilled government counterparts impeded progress. Counterparts are not always part of the TA or service delivery process, which demoralizes staff, especially at the provincial and district levels. Coordination and capacity building TA must be anchored within responsible line ministries and go hand in hand with ministry-wide reform.

Complexity of Internal Processes and Procedures. Streamlining internal processes and procedures between the MOF and line ministries has taken time to establish and need continued strengthening, especially in the areas of procurement and financial management. One of the program’s strengths was creation of the Badakshan protocol to finance activities through the PED. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

Implementing Agency Performance Ministry of Education MS Ministry of Higher Education MS Ministry of Communication N/A – DLC transferred to MOC near project completion

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

The Grantee faced enormous challenges at all levels and implementation improved over time, as described above. For EERDP specifically, overall performance was hindered by continued weak capacity,

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frequent changes in ministers of the MOE, changes in direction of education development with the arrival of new ministers, and a few decisions, which resulted in implementation delays or wasted expenditures. For example, it took nearly a year to contract the NGOs for the CGSDP component, which left only one and a half years of actual implementation on the ground, and the GMU never built enough capacity to manage the different donor projects. The disappearance (and subsequent recovery) of nearly half a million dollars resulted in six months of further delays in disbursements, followed by significant scrutiny of minor expenditures by the MOF for fear of recurring. At the tertiary level, much was achieved by allowing the HE institutions to determine the use of the Block and Capitation Grants, but nearly $500,000 was spent on the construction of a Community College which remains unused. Essential policy decisions regarding the consolidation of the HE system (hence the decision to strengthen only six universities under SHEP), as well as the intent and curriculum of a Community College system, were not taken. This raises questions regarding sustainability of the HE subsector interventions.

Overall, EERDP provided a base from which the Grantee and Implementing Agencies could begin basic development of the education system. Institutionalization of the systems improved, but significant challenges remain which will require commitment and political will to overcome.

6. Lessons Learned In an emergency situation, the long-term vision must be to build capacity of government’s own structures and ability to perform core functions. All activities should serve to support this vision. This is one of the “Paris Principles for International Engagement in Fragile States,” and is applicable to how donors and the Bank approach economic and sector development in the context of Afghanistan. It is essential to work within government systems and structures, including its budget. In education, the work must focus on improving capacity and accountability in basic areas of service delivery. The Bank should encourage donors to consider how they can streamline their respective projects’ management from within the ministries, and serve to strengthen the MOE and MOHE’s own capacity to manage their budgetary, planning, and delivery systems to ensure quality education. In an emergency project, there is a need to prioritize and focus on a small set of realistic, yet meaningful short-term measures which will achieve significant changes. The underlying principle should be that the activities take incremental steps, building a platform from which the next set of actions would take off. To this end, the scope of development objectives must be rooted in what can be achieved from the project inputs and processes. The provision of block and cash grants to end users while building capacity of government is a good example of this practice. The goal to develop a medium-term policy framework without the appropriate inputs to do so could be seen as overly ambitious and a weakness in this project. However, at the same time, it is essential to focus on generating the information required to inform policy and build capacity for service delivery: budgeting, expenditure management, and management of technical inputs/processes required to move from ‘emergency’ to ‘development.’ Technically sound research informs better policies and facilitates measuring sector investment needs and outcomes. With appropriate support to the government to improve M&E capacity, conduct comprehensive household surveys, and engage in bottom-up consultations, it would have been possible to generate more valid and reliable information to develop a medium-term policy framework. Such an approach to institution-building and policy development would provide government the means to manage the political process of decision-making and implementation. The project achieved much in terms of access and participation, but the absence of information on teachers, school-age children in and out of school, and community decision making processes is impeding progress in quality areas of teacher recruitment and development, curriculum, setting standards, textbook availability, and providing appropriate incentives. The Emergency Health Project could be seen as a model for embedding M&E and providing incentives for quality improvement, especially performance-based monitoring of implementing agencies.

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In preparing an emergency project, three issues arise: (i) donor commitment to finance separate, specific investments does not provide an efficient mechanism for building capacity to deliver services; (ii) a two-year timeline is insufficient for generating the information base and consensus for developing a medium-term policy framework; and (iii) it takes time to develop the specifics of a project’s activities takes time to so that government, implementing agencies and donors can consider the potential implications of the design and implementation. It could be beneficial to utilize preparation/Trust funds to build consensus and capacity for project management. Implementation experience suggests that coordinating – from different donors – required educational inputs to ensure smooth running of quality institutions is complex and too demanding of government's time and capacity. It also indicates that the expectation of being able to create an information base to inform a medium-term policy framework is overly ambitious. With regard to the amount of time taken to develop a project, the initial delays and need for two amendments to the Grant Agreement in the first eight months suggests that more attention to design/preparation and building ownership has value. In an emergency situation, the use of financing mechanisms which provide cash as close to the service recipients as possible is an effective way to “jump start” the system. The cash grants to schools and block grants to universities – and autonomy to define their use – generated ownership and improvements of the recipient institutions in a timely and effective way. Piloting different delivery mechanisms (through NGOs and government) also served to provide the MOE with lessons on the importance of performance-based monitoring, and the requirements to make community support organizations sustainable.

Clearly delineated roles and responsibilities among the national institutions, provinces and NGOs will ensure better accountability. Private-public partnerships and decentralization of decision making, financial and monitoring responsibility to provincial authorities and service delivery nodes (schools) appear to serve best as quick responses to emergency situations. Resistance to public-private partnerships by sub-national authorities could be overcome by engaging provincial and district education departments earlier in the process participate. Their roles and accountabilities must be defined early to avoid implementation delays.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies The MOF Education Pillar, MOHE and MOC responded to a request for comments by stating they had no comments except that the ICR was “well organized.” (b) Cofinanciers N/A (c) Other partners and stakeholders

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Promoting Skills Development and Learning

5.80 6.59 114

Education Sector Management Reform

5.70 7.86 138

Distance Learning and Communications

3.50 2.94 84

Total Baseline Cost 15.00 17.39 116

Physical Contingencies 0.00

0.00

0.00

Price Contingencies 0.00

0.00

0.00

Total Project Costs 15.00 17.39 116 Project Preparation Fund 0.00 0.00 0.00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 0.00

Total Financing Required 15.00 17.39 116

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Borrower 0.00 0.00 .00 IDA GRANT FOR POST-CONFLICT 15.00 17.39 116

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component Component 1: Improved access to education, especially for girls and women (US$5.8 million) This component originally comprised three sub-components: (i) literacy learning and ECD; (ii) increasing the number of girls and young women in schools through demand-side financing schemes; and (iii) skills development for underserved groups (nonformal education). Within a year of Board approval of the project, the government decided that literacy, ECD and skills development programs were not priorities, and the project was restructured to adjust the first component to a Community Grants for School Development Program. The grants were designed to stimulate community participation in order to enhance access, particularly to girls' schools, and improve teaching and learning processes. The restructured project was consistent with the original project objectives. CGSDP: The CGSDP was administered in five provinces with three entities: two NGOs in two provinces each, and through the PED in the province of Badakshan. It aimed to establish SMC and Parent Teacher Associations (PTA) for the purpose of improving school management, facilitating construction, and increasing investment in teaching and learning materials. In Bamiyan and Logar provinces where NGO1 facilitated the program, each of the 440 schools in the provinces formed SMCs and PTAs and received a cash grant from $1,000 to $10,000. The grants were used for inputs such as furniture, additional classrooms, toilet blocks, and boundary walls. In rarer cases, SMCs used the cash grants to ensure teachers received subject training or purchased books and/or libraries. The NGO also built 18 schools, and conducted teacher trainings for 1850 teachers and management trainings for 542 head teachers and provincial/district staff. NGO2 worked in Pawan and Kapisa provinces. They established SMCs in 402 schools, but provided training and grants to only 15 percent of them. A total of 62 cash grants were given out and 28 schools were built. Methodological training was conducted for 27 head teachers, and management training for 105 head teachers. The NGO completed 28 school buildings across the two provinces in which it worked. The role of the provincial education authorities was not clearly defined in the project documents, and varied depending on the PED Director and provincial NGO representatives. The NGOs as facilitating agencies were contracted directly by the MOE without consultation of the provinces. This contributed to a slower start-up of activities on the ground. According to a third party evaluation of the NGOs, Provincial and District officials in Bamiyan and Logar became interested in the work when they saw that funds were flowing to all schools and SMCs were functioning. In Parwan and Kapisa provinces, although district and provincial committees were established by NGO2 with representation of officials, their interest in project activities were closely linked to those schools where construction took place. In Badakshan, officials fully owned the need for SMCs, the process for establishing them and working with communities, and built capacity for managing school development. In Badakshan the PED was able to provide $10,000 cash grants to 38 schools. Preliminary reviews found that the SMCs were able to leverage the grants to generate enough money to build an 8-10 room school building for considerably smaller unit cost than the other models. This model was able to build the capacity and confidence of the PED officials in forming SMCs, managing development funds, and monitoring progress. It was also the first time that a protocol was developed to release development funds directly to a PED. For building capacity and ensuring sustainability, this model should be carefully evaluated.

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It is difficult to isolate the impact of this project on outcomes in the sector, particularly in the primary and secondary sub-sectors. Every province had different interventions by various donors and NGOs. The security, geographic, refugee returnee and cultural situations which would affect access to education for all children, and especially girls, are different across provinces and regions of the country. For example, Badakshan is as poor, mountainous and rural as Bamiyan, but has higher than average participation of girls and female teachers. Based on the information available from the 2003 and 2005 School Surveys, comparisons between all of Afghanistan and the five project provinces reveal that the EERDP provinces did not fair as well as all of Afghanistan. However, removing Kabul – an extreme outlier – from the calculation, the average gains in the five provinces were more similar to the rest of the provinces. In fact, percent gains in the number of female students and teachers are slightly higher than the rest of the country.

Key Outcome/Output Indicators (Percent Change) Indicator All

Afghanistan

Afghanistan w/o Kabul

EERDP Provinces

Difference Afghanistan vs. EERDP

Afghanistan w/o Kabul vs.

EERDP Overall Enrollments

60.7 39.4 35.5 25.2 3.9

Male 65.3 26.1 16.9 48.4 9.2Female 105.5 76.3 79.9 25.6 -3.6Increase in Teachers

85.8 60.2 49.9 35.9 10.3

Male 69.1 59.7 45.2 23.9 14.5Female 151.8 62.1 72.5 79.3 -10.4Increase in Schools

24.7 21.5 20.7 4.0 0.8

Component 2: Policy Development for the Sector (US$5.7 million) As stated earlier, the group of education donors decided at the time of conducting the CNA that the WB would take the lead on helping government develop the overall medium-term policy framework and establish baseline data to form the platform for making medium-term policy decisions. The policy framework was to include: (i) the definition of standards and qualifications of teachers; (ii) curriculum requirements; (iii) assessment of learning outcomes; (iv) accreditation; and (v) regulatory guidelines for functioning of NGOs and private providers. This subcomponent was also intended to support institutional analysis and sector work to gain indepth knowledge of the sector requirements, including a baseline survey to provide information, which would allow measurement of the impact of sector investments. The MOHE and MOE utilized project funds for a study on the potential for private sector involvement in the higher education sector and an education management technical assistance to develop the sector policy framework. The reports were completed and shared with government, but there was little follow-up dissemination or consultation with stakeholders. EMIS was established under the project with technical assistance from UNICEF. The surveys to date collect information about the schools, students and teachers themselves. The baseline survey to capture the broader condition for school-aged children outside the education system (out-of-school, dropouts, repeaters, etc.) was not conducted. A few surveys have been conducted which generate some information, but may be too small in scope to be reliable to inform policy decisions. The conditions for conducting household surveys were extremely difficult in some provinces, but two other Bank projects under implementation were able to generate such data of reasonable quality.

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Skills Development for Quality Schools and Institutions: This subcomponent originally envisaged capacity building at all levels of the education sector from primary through university. When the project was restructured in March 2003, the quality aspects of primary and secondary schooling were embedded in the Community Grants to Schools contracts with the facilitating NGOs, and subsequently with the Badakshan PED. Therefore, this component focused on rehabilitation of the tertiary sub-sector in an attempt to meet institutions' most urgent needs to upgrade the quality of teaching and learning, as well as building infrastructure, establishing a community college system and a girls' internet café. (a) Block Grants: A total of US$1.4 million was disbursed as block grants to universities and other higher education institutions to cover their urgent needs from basic furniture to office supplies. The grant recipients included Kabul University ($450,000); universities of Balkh, Heart, Nangarhar and Kabul Medical University and Kabul Polytechnic University ($100,000 each); Kabul University of Education, Kandahar University, Takhar University, Albaroni University, Khost University , Parwan Pedagogy Institute, Badakshan Higher Education Institute, Faryab Higher Education Institute and Kunduz Pedagogy Institute ($50,000 each). (b) Teacher Training Allowance (TTA): At the tertiary level, the MOHE was concerned that low government salaries resulted in the inability to attract and retain qualified lecturers. They requested that the project provide a six month 'allowance' (later expanded to eight months) to all faculty members for the purposes of training. As a result, all 2,200 faculty received an additional US$50.00 per month for eight months for teachers to purchase supplies and research materials to assist them with their work. There has been little monitoring to understand the end use of these funds. There are clear indications, however, that officials in the MOHE, the Chancellors of the higher education institutions, and the faculty themselves all saw the $50.00 as part of their regular salary package, rendering the TTA little more than a temporary subsidy. During the time the TTA was provided, the MOHE was able to secure higher salaries for faculty members, but the TTA itself raised expectations. The absence of a medium-term policy framework makes it difficult for MOHE to negotiate with MOF for reasonable salaries for their staff. (c) Girls' Internet Café: A girls' internet café was established on the Kabul University campus to allow females access to the internet and computer time. It is managed by a group of students who received training from the Kabul University IT Department, also established under EERDP. An empty space was provided by the university, and a group contracted out by MOHE to procure the equipment, fix the building, and furnish the center, all managed and supervised by female members. Approximately 254 Kabul University female students use it regularly on a fee basis, and visitors are allowed. It is entirely managed by the members, and most women who use it would have no other place to go for computer learning or internet usage. The café has generated approximately $6,880 in revenues. Maintenance costs have amounted to $1,013, resulting in a profit of $5,867. However, the future of the café remains unsure: under the constitution, all proceeds of an entity in government are required to be given to the MOF. Therefore, the profits from the café cannot be retained by the management team. In order to ensure its continuation, there would need to be either a line item in the Kabul University budget to support it, or the MOHE would have to get an exemption from the MOF to allow the café to retain its earnings. (d) Establishing a Community College: It was envisaged that the MOHE would promote expansion of the post-secondary system through establishing the concept of "community colleges." These colleges were to offer two year associates degrees in a few key areas which would give graduates enough skills to enter the job market. A college campus was constructed on

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the grounds of the MOHE, but at the time of drafting this report has yet to be commissioned. The concept underpinning the two year degree has not been widely agreed or accepted, therefore curricula and program design have not been developed and teachers not appointed. Component 3: Distance Learning and Communications (US$ 3.5 million) Distance Learning Center. The DLC was established in the Prime Minister's Compound shortly after the project was approved. Initially, it was managed by the AACA. From late 2002 until 2004, it was able to provide public officials management training and computer courses, linked countries to discuss development issues in post-conflict situations and more. In the early days, it generated more than $43,000 in revenues, mostly from government (financed by donors and embassies at standard GDLN and DLC rates). In 2004, access became more difficult because of security issues when the Finance Minister moved his office to the compound and the DLC came to a virtual halt. It was moved to the MOC Directorate of ICT in December 2005. It has been offering courses since March 2006 during what the Director calls a "soft opening" at an average of one Video Conference (VC) per day which easily covers its overheads. It will continue to provide services to all government and international agencies on a fee basis, and the revenue generated earlier was enough to update its computer learning center technology. The DLC will likely be sustainable once the MOC and MOF come to an understanding of the financial flows. Furthermore, unlike other DLCs established earlier in Bank-financed projects, it has IP technology which allows it to link to other entities without going through the GDLN in Washington. This has the potential to become a productive and efficient means of providing educational and learning opportunities to a wide range of government employees if further developed after the official opening. Government Network and Intranet: An internal government network was established in the first year of the project, initially linking seven ministries, which was increased to eight. With the assistance of the Bank's Information Solutions Group, it was quickly equipped with microwave technology. This technology was subsequently replaced under another Bank-financed emergency communications project with fiber optic technology. However, the original equipment has been used to set up the national-provincial VC and internet links. All 34 provincial governments are linked through the MOC, managed by Afghan Telecom.

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis N/A under OP/BP 8.5. Economic and Financial Analysis is not feasible in an emergency project. The ICR team has attempted, based on information available and expenditure projections from government, to assess the fiscal impact and prospects for sustainability. Assessment of education sector needs: In 2005/06 the Government of Afghanistan's education expenditure was 2.2 percent of GDP and is projected to increase to 4.1 percent in 2006/07. The core development budget is projected to increase from US$23.3 million in 2005/06 to about US$216.7 million in 2010/11, and the operating budget from US$146.4 million to approximately US$505.6 million in the same time period.

The current economic, political and institutional situation indicates that Afghanistan is still in a state of emergency and unable to generate sufficient revenue. A projection of resource availability indicates that the financing gap for education in the medium-term would be significant (Figure 1). If the economy grows at an annual rate of 7.5 percent in real terms, and government allocates approximately 25 percent of the total government expenditure (4 percent of GDP) to education, by 2010-11, donors would need to meet a shortfall of 50 percent of total education expenditure. Steps are being taken to mobilize internal resources, but donors would need to continue financing education system requirements. Fiscal Impact and Sustainability of EERDP: Figure 2 shows overall education expenditure, including donor financing, during the project implementation period. Taking the EERDP activities to scale on a country-wide basis would require a significant outlay. The core development budget for education is estimated to require an annual increase of 20 percent. Over the six-year period (2006-2011) donor assistance is estimated to reach 50 percent of total education expenditures, and 28 percent of government spending to meet the financing gap. This level of expenditure is required to sustain improvements in quality and access across the country. Government and donors will have to take decisions to optimize strategies to improve outcomes, factoring poverty and vulnerability into the development of optimization strategies.

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In the medium-term, coordinating donor support and absorptive capacity of the system will challenge MOE's capacity to shore up gains made in education to date. Sustainability of the EERDP and follow-on projects (EQUIP and SHEP) is subject to country-wide (macro fiscal) and capacity risks, requiring an emphasis on reforms in priority areas such as human development to facilitate a more efficient allocation of fiscal resources. The Programmatic Support for Institution Building (PSIB) already includes a number of measures to increase budget allocation for MOE, reorient the role of MOE to focus on policymaking, providing guidelines, contracting out to the private sector, and partnerships with NGOs. The reform program also includes the strengthening capacity and developing MOE's financial management system.

Conclusion. EERDP has assisted in jump-starting, to some extent, the education system in Afghanistan in its post-conflict state. Sustainability of EERDP depends on the development and implementation of a policy framework to set priorities, maintaining investments through regular operations and maintenance, and institutionalizing good practices through the sharing of knowledge and information across provinces. It will be critical for the MOF to provide institutions such as the DLC, higher education institutions, and the Girls' Internet Café the ability to open bank accounts, subject to regular audits, and manage their own revenues.

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty

Lending William B. Herbert SASHD Team Leader Christine Allison Lead Human Development Specialist SASHD Economist Rosita Van Meel Senior Education Specialist SASHD Higher Education Mark LaPrairie Education Specialist SASHD Education Virginia Jackson Operations Specialist ECSHD Operations/Costing Julie-Anne Graitge Program Assistant SASHD Operations/Admin

Supervision/ICR

Manoj Agrawal Consultant SARFM Financial Management

Irajen Appasamy Sr Operations Officer SASHD Operations Deepal Fernando Sr Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement

Julie-Anne M. Graitge Program Assistant SASHD Administration/ Operations

Shawkat Muhammad Quamrul Hasan Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement

Susan E. Hirshberg Sr Education Specialist SASHD ICR Team Leader

Hasib Karimzada Team Assistant SACAF Administration/ Operations

Laura M. Kiang Operations Officer SASHD Operations Dhirendra Kumar Consultant SARPS Procurement

Scherezad Joya Monami Latif Education Specialist SASHD Task Team Leader (II)

Keiko Miwa Sr Education Economist ECSHD Task Team Leader (I)

Hena G. Mukherjee Consultant SASHD Higher Education

Kenneth O. Okpara Sr Financial Management Specialist SARFM Financial Management

Shobhana Sosale Operations Officer HDNED Operations S. R. Tiwari Consultant SASHD School Construction

Habibullah Wajdi Education Specialist SASHD Task Team Leader (III)

(b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including

travel and consultant costs) Lending

FY02 33 177.72 FY03 -0.44

Total: 33 177.28

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Supervision/ICR FY02 0.29 FY03 29 255.92 FY04 47 102.01 FY05 63 104.06 FY06 21 45.06 FY07 21 81.58

Total: 181 588.92

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results Not applicable

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Two day-long consultations took place in Kabul at the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Higher Education respectively. The following summarize the findings of the meetings:

Consultations with Stakeholders: Ministry of Education July 10, 2006 Attending the meeting were Ministry of Education (MOE) officials, provincial and district authorities, partner NGOs and SMC members. The Deputy Minister opened and closed the meeting. After the presentation by the Deputy Minister the participants broke into smaller groups for guided discussions. First breakout session: (i) Quality of Design, Appropriateness of Objectives, Implementation Strengths and Weakness; and (ii) Key Factors Affecting Implementation, (including the Bank Government, external and internal partners). Strengths, Weakness and Issues:

• Project objectives were clearly defined and most objectives were appropriate. • Community participation was essential to its success, including increases in girls'

enrollments. • Performance is different across provinces because (i) different implementation

environments, and (ii) the differences among the facilitating agencies (two different NGOs and PED Badakshan).

• The funds were spent efficiently because of the SMC/PTA's involvement. • Time was too short to implement all activities. It was too small and under-funded to

meet the educational needs, but it was a good start. • PEDs/DEDs have more capacity and should have been more involved. • Clearer guidelines should be provided for implementation and monitoring. • Much more monitoring is needed at all levels. • Budgets and cash grants should be needs-based (not norm-based) and have clearer criteria. • More attention should be paid to quality: teachers are too weak and books are not in

schools. Second breakout session: (i) Outputs, outcomes and indicators; and (ii) how to measure (quantitatively and qualitatively)? Outcomes, Outputs, and Issues:

• Increasing girls' enrollment. • Improved quality of facilities that attracts more students. • Encouraged a sense of responsibility and ownership. • Constructing buildings, provision of equipment and, in some cases, teaching materials. • SMCs assisted with improved access, and also improving hygiene and sanitation at

schools. • Established better coordination among MOE, PED, DED and schools. • Cost-effective schools built: many organizations spend up to $120,000 on an 8-10 class

building. NGO1 and Badakshan PED did it for less than half that amount through community contributions.

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Third breakout session: (i) Sustainability and Lessons Leaned; (ii) What did the project achieve in the short run? (iii) For the longer run in the context of the overall education sector: Short-term achievement and Sustainability

• Provided more educational opportunities for both boys and girls. • Generated the knowledge of the importance of education. • Ownership by communities will sustain momentum. • Well built facilities attract students – but more are needed.

Lessons Learned

• It is necessary to evolve all the stakeholders in the policy and strategy formulation and the project preparation/design.

• Should be scaled up across all Afghanistan – not just 10 provinces like EQUIP. • Schools should be able to have bank accounts and manage their own finances. • All teachers with 6-9 grade passes should receive training and schooling as a matter of

priority. • Every area has different challenges, and the project should be flexible to address these

differences. • Provincial and District governments need to be more involved and have a clearer role. • Without a policy framework in place and strategic planning, it is difficult to prioritize the

reform agenda, i.e., new teaching methods with standard curriculums and produce graduates of quality.

• SMCs have the capacity to implement projects because they have a vested interest and sense of responsibility.

• More is needed to improve quality: make sure teachers get trained and students get books on time.

• Quality control should be the role of the PED and DEDs. Some SMCs purchased inferior furniture which has broken down quickly. Standards should be set and monitored.

• A strategic plan should be made through consultations with stakeholders such as the one held for the ICR.

_______________________________________________________________________

Consultation with Stakeholders: Ministry of Higher Education July 11, 2006

Attending the consultation were MOHE officials, higher education institution chancellors and faculty members. The Acting Minister opened the meeting and it was chaired by the Deputy Minister. First breakout session: (i) Quality of Design, Appropriateness of Objectives, Implementation Strengths and Weakness; and (ii) Key Factors Affecting Implementation, (including the Bank Government, external and internal partners).

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Strengths, Weakness and Issues:

• Project objectives are clearly defined and most of the objectives were achieved. • Female participation and enrollment has increased in many universities. • Establishment of the internet café for girls, buying equipment, and civil work was useful.

The girls' internet café is financially viable but spending their revenue is a problem. • The Emergency Project design was flexible, and block grants have been very useful in

building capacities and providing equipment for universities. • The World Bank was very responsive during the project implementation. • The training allowances for faculty helped teachers focus on research and academic work. • Financing the university entrance exam's and proper screening of qualify student raised

the quality of the university student. • There were no clear guidelines or training for project processing. • The Emergency Project was under funded and should continue.

Lessons Learned

• When the World Bank provided teachers with training allowance, it made the government realize that the university faculty needed a higher salary.

• The amount of allowance should be based on academic qualifications of each faculty. • There is a need to have clear guidelines and training which will ensure the proper

processes and procedures. Second breakout session: (i) Outputs, outcomes and indicators; and (ii) how would you measure quantitatively, qualitatively? Outcomes, Outputs, and Issues:

• Increasing girls' enrollment and improved quality of education that attracts more students. • Introducing the higher education institutions to new IT, equipping labs and creating more

opportunities for female participation • Partnership/fellowship with universities abroad, increasing opportunities for research

(students/faculty), and improved higher education institution management capacity. • Encouraged a sense of responsibility and ownership • Constructing buildings, and provision of equipment and teaching materials • Built a Community College. • Brought more credibility to Higher Education Institutions and opportunities for scientific

research which resulted in faculty development. • Financing the university entrance examination which improved the screening process.

Lessons Learned

• A policy framework and strategic plan are required to enable the institutions to progress, especially in areas of: (i) faculty development and recruitment; (ii) curriculum and standards; and (iii) accreditation.

• Scholarships are required to retain students and give incentives to females and poorer students

• There is a need for more autonomy of higher education institutions.

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Third breakout session: (i) Sustainability and Lessons Leaned; (ii) What did the project achieve in the short run? (iii) For the longer run in the context of the overall education sector: Short-term achievement and Sustainability

• Provided more educational opportunities for both sexes. • Generated the importance of higher education and working capacity to start meeting the

demand for the higher education. Lessons learned

• It is necessary to evolve all the stakeholders in the policy and strategy formulation and the project preparation/design.

• It was suggested that a policy framework, which includes revenue generation capacity of the institutions, could help them resolve this issue over the longer term.

• There have to be stronger links of the education provided to employment opportunities. • Without a policy framework in place and strategic planning, it is difficult to prioritize the

reform agenda, i.e., new teaching methods with standard curriculums and produce graduates of quality.

• In order to ensure funding for improvements, it should be needs-based and not a universal grant, and the capacity building should be given higher priority.

• The project was too short to sustain the gains. Afghanistan is still in an 'emergency' phase, and all HE Institutions need continued support.

• SHEP only supports six universities in Kabul and the rest do not have adequate budgets or faculty.

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

MINISTRY OF FINANCE Emergency Education Rehabilitation and Development Project was an appropriate project considering the emergency situation in which it was initiated and implemented. After the fall of Taliban education had unanticipated demand by Afghans who sent in big number their girls and boys to schools which inserted enormous challenges on government of Afghanistan and International community to respond to these demands. MoF especially was under focus to attract financial support to this sector. In 2002 in a very right time MoF received first financial support in shape of EERDP for education sector from its key donor and development partner, the World Bank. Below I will give a brief description of MoF role and its involvement in this project. EERDP (H-008) became part of MoF development budget for education sector after its approval in 2002. The payment requests or any transaction took place with the process initiated by MoE based on the approved project disbursement categories as outlined in the grant agreement. An approved payment request had to be allotted a budget allotment and coding before the funds had to be released by SDU to the client through special account operating under the Da Afghanistan Bank. As one of the first projects approved by the WB, the EERDP also helped the newly recruited staff of budget and SDU departments to understand the financial management aspects and process of both MoF and the WB. No doubt EERDP has its role in building financial management capacity in MoF and at MoE and MoHE. The regular presence of FM and Disbursement colleagues of the WB has always helped MoF staff to enhance their capacity in FM procedures. EERDP has disbursed all of the approved 15 million US $ in a time period of four years. Considering the huge financial support education sector has been requiring, the overall disbursement of this project has been slow. This project was able to disburse all funds with two project extensions. The slow disbursement and extension of project is understandable because of lack of financial capacity existed in MoF and in other line ministries. The FM system and FM capacity has developed extensively over the past few years and MoF is able to attract and manage many contribution from the donor community for the education sector. From the World Bank MoF is managing two main projects for MoE and MoHE by names of EQUIP and SHEP for the long term development of education in Afghanistan. No doubt that this project has an excellent impact on rehabilitation and development of the education system all over the country. Specifically I would like to mention the noteworthy achievements from the MoF’s point of view: • EERDP helped to strengthen and develop linkages between provincial education departments and

provincial Mastufiats, a crucial achievement for the financial decentralization and accountability • Close coordination among MoE, MoF, and MoHE developed on budgetery and disbursement issues

of education sector. Provided opportunities to have shared plans and programs with each other. • Before the launch of this project, very few donors were willing to channel their funds through

Ministry of Finance. This project became a starting and encouraging point for other donors to put fund in a single treasury account.

• In one sense this project acted as a pilot project from which many lessons were learned of equal importance for Afghan government, WB and other development partners especially in education sector.

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Lessons Learned • The implementation of this project proved that Afghan government and WB can work together on

agreed principles of financial management. • Many important rules and regulations of WB such as disbursement and procurement procedures,

which were not clear to the MoF, MoE, and MoHE are now very well understandable. • Sense of close coordination developed among all stakeholders through this project • Many lessons learned from this project helped both WB and Afghan government approved two more

projects in education sector such as EQUIP and SHEP. • For the first time through a disbursement protocol between MoF and MoE developed under this

project development funds were released to provincial education offices and Mustofidats. This has become a very successful model and is followed in other projects as well.

Issues/Problems • Not clear fund allocation between MoE and MoHE often confused both ministries and their financial

staff • Shift and changes in FM staff in MoE and MoHE often created problems such as : delays in payments

to contractors, late and irregular submission of SoEs, lack of appropriated documentation, which caused at a times problems to MoF staff in submitting recovery and replenishment applications to WB disbursement Unit.

• The collapse of GMU in MoE especially created lots of problems in regard to FM issues. It took a while before MoE could submit financial documents which were required for the recovery of outstanding balance against MoE. With the support of WB, MoE and MoF relevant staff this problem was solved. This also made all three ministries very cautious of proper systems in place before bid payments were approved.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION The emergency Education Project was a successful project in Afghanistan. The MoE had full project ownership and that contributed to the success of the project. We replicate the same model in the EQUIP project and implement it through the SMCs, DEDs, and the community. Emergency project played a fundamental role in an emergency situation of Afghanistan, in terms of technical, economical and social support for the education sector. In education system strong relation and cooperation between the administration and community is an important factor. This project for the first time attempted to establish and strength that relation and this was a successful attempt with a good result. Lessons Learned • It was a good experience on involving community participation. • Female participation and educational opportunities for female education have been increased. • Increased accountability and transparency in each provincial education department. • SMCs attained the capacity to implement projects because they have a sense of responsibility and

ownership. • Teachers are acquainted with new teaching methods, which add to the quality of education for

students. • Communities are more open to girls’ education and not only accept but also encourage female

participation and education. • But in order to continue improving their capacity, there is need for more consultation and training for

the SMCs followed by proper monitoring evaluation.

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• Coordination between all stakeholders is very important; this project has helped increase community coordination and mobilization.

• Working strategies in each province resulted in a delay in project implementation. • SMCs are involved in decision making, implementation, school administration, and planning

activities of schools. • Constructing schools have resulted in higher girls’ enrollment up to 20% female participation in

SMCs has enabled women to have a role in the education of their children. • Establishment and development of the SMCs itself is improving civil society. • community participation in controlling quality of education has increased the project effectiveness Issues/Problems • The problem was lack of enough time in some provinces (i.e. Bamyan) to implement the project

according the project design and timeline. • Another problem was budget allocation: if budget for all schools are the same in amount that creates a

problem because of each province’s geographic location and distance from center. • This project could not meet all the needs of education in Afghanistan, but it was a good start. • PEDs/DEDs were not involved in the beginning of the project. • Construction problem occurred in Bamyan due to its geographic location. MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION Background The two decade conflict had almost collapsed the education system and very little institutional operational capacity at ministries level was in place to support the rehabilitation of education. There was an acute shortage of qualified faculty members as many had left the country during the conflict years. Those who stayed in the country have been isolated from the outside world and are out of touch with major developments in teaching and research. To improve the level of higher education system in the country, in year (2002) the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE), Ministry of Education (MoE) and the World Bank (WB) have agreed to launch a joint Emergency Education Rehabilitation and Development Project. This project was started in 2002 to be implemented by the MoHE and MoE. Initially the project was designed for tow years, but due to some obstacles in order to fulfill its objectives the project was extended for two more years. The project objective was to selectively support the Government Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in its efforts to reconstruct and develop the education sector. The project aim were to: (a) increase access to education opportunities in the formal and nonformal systems for under-served groups, especially women and girls; (b) support the development of a policy framework and the reform of education management at all levels; and (c) introduce modern information technologies for communications in the Ministries and distance learning for capacity building of the civil servants. Project Components 1. Policy Framework Improved education sector management through policy development: After years of turmoil and the last five years of the entire system being virtually dismantled, there were no effective policies in place. The objective was to concentrate in a few key areas to develop a medium term policy framework which would serve as a platform for long term education system development. For this purpose the Planning

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Department of MoHE partially completed the draft medium-term policy framework and it has been also translated into Dari to be utilized by the project university. Regarding the policy framework member of group (3) in the workshop held on 11th July 2006, made the following assessment: ''…. it was an excellent project, because there was no red tape; therefore, it was spent where it was needed. It did prevent brain drain to NGOs and private sector. It also attracted brilliant educated people to join the universities; so now we have better faculty to compete with other universities. There was no clear guideline or preparatory session in this project. In some cases the allocated money was not enough for the specified project. The budget was shared with two ministries with one account, so one ministry’s problem affected the other. The other achievement was the establishment of net café for girls, buying equipment, and civil work. The emergency fund was also used for the university entrance exam’s proper screening that gave us brilliant students in each school. The problem was that some universities were not covered under this project, i.e. Bamyan & Badakhshan. I think the project was a very useful one as a whole, but we are still in emergency and we want this project to be continued. '' Due to lack of experience staff and weak management the project was not completed within two years as it was originally designed.

Block Grants to universities All public universities and higher education institution have been awarded Block Grants to address all emergency needs essential for the basic day to day functioning universities. The project universities prepared a preliminary list of items which was reviewed by the Ministry of Higher Education and the International Development Association to insure the relevance of the proposal to the grant objectives. Experience and lesson on use of Block Grant learned from Emergency Project could be applied for Strengthening Higher Education Program. Block Grants disbursed to all 18 higher education institutions and has helped start-up of basic operations for all these universities. Urgently needed basic equipment was bought to facilitate day to day learning and administrative affaires of these institutions. Teacher training allowance Ministry of Higher Education used grant funds to provide training allowances for six months from January to June 2005 to the professors and lecturers to all project universities. The purpose of the training allowance was to motivate all professors and lecturers to get professional training and development to maintain quality teaching in their subjects. The training allowances also supported university professors and lecturers extra time for the development of quality teaching materials for their teaching sessions. Professors with PH, D were awarded US$ 300 while lecturers with Master and Bachelor degree were provided US$ 200 and US$ 100 per month respectively. In February 2006 IDA considered the very unique circumstances in Afghanistan and approved MoHE's request for the extension of an additional two months of training allowances. Training allowances paid to university professors and lecturers has improved learning output and has motivated teaching staff to regularly attend their classes. Improved access to education At the tertiary level, in year 2002 there were 23,418 male students but no females because of Taliban's ban on female education in previous years. Enrollment increased 25% from 30,121 to 37,797 between 2003 and 2005. In 2003, females were 14% of the tertiary students, with 25,659 males and 4,462 females. By 2005, enrollments were 29,235 males and 8,562 females, and females occupied 22 % of places. Faculty members, on the other hand, increased by 25 % in the same timeframe: from 1,585 in 2002; to

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1,978 in 2005. Female teaching staff has increased by 45% from 208 in 2002 tp 302 in 2005; meanwhile male teaching staff has increased by 21% from 1,377 in 2002 to 1,676 in 2005. Regarding the quality improvement of higher education, especially for girls, the first group of the workshop made the following assessment: • "Project objectives are clearly defined and the project achieved its objectives. One of the main points

about this project has been its flexibility that gave us the opportunity of solving our problems without any time delay

• In the project implementation phase, the MoHE has worked very closely with the World Bank and we are satisfied with the World Bank representatives in implementing the project.

• This project helped avoid brain drain within the higher education institutions by paying training allowances for our faculty. This allowance has helped teachers focus on research and academic work such as writing journals and articles. Female participation and enrollment has been encouraged in many universities. In Balkh University, 39-40% of our students are female.

• This project had also helped improve English language among our faculty and staff by internet clubs and….??

• The World Bank’s role was critical and the bank’s staff has been very helpful in ensuring a smooth project implementation.

• In terms of reporting, there has not been a central compiler to put all the reports from different institutions together, because we are still in an emergency situation, closing this project will create many challenges for the MoHE again. We suggest supporting the training allowances for faculty to help us keep the faculty working."

Overall Assessment and Lessons Learned As the first education project in Afghanistan, important lessons have been learned from the experience. Progress has been made in terms of SOE preparation and submission to Special disbursement Unit (SDU) in Ministry of Finance. The general level of disbursements has improved considerably. The Emergency Project helped avoid brain drain within the higher education institutions by paying training allowances for our faculty. This allowance has helped teachers focus on research and academic work such as writing journals and articles. The training allowances supported university professors and lecturers extra time for the development of quality teaching materials for their teaching sessions. The project enabled the dialogue between MoHE and MoF on compensation of university professors and lecturers on a permanent basis. MoF for last one year has been paying extra benefits to university professors and lecturers based on their presence and performance at their lectures from government ordinary budget. Block Grants disbursed to all 18 higher education institutions and has helped start-up of basic operations for all these universities. Urgently needed basic equipment was bought to facilitate day to day learning and administrative affaires of these institutions.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Not applicable

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents 1. Technical Annex, World Bank. May 10, 2002. 2. Memorandum and Recommendation of the President, World Bank. May 10, 2002 3. Development Grant Agreement, World Bank, June 8, 2002 4. Aide Memoire, 2002-2006 5. Afghanistan Transitional Support Strategies (2002 and 2006) 6. The State of Education in 2005, Key Indicators Report, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,

MOE June 2006 7. Country Portfolio Reviews, 2004-2006 8. Evaluation Report of Two Facilitation Agencies for the Community Grants for School

Development Component (2006) 9. Technical Memo #1: Analysis of 2005 School Survey Data on Student Enrollment in 1383

and 1384, USAID/Creative Associates International 10. EMIS data 2003, 2004, 2005 11. UNICEF, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey-2003 Questionnaire and Report 12. Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Protection: An Initial Study. Study, World Bank, March 7,

2005. 13. Investing in Afghanistan’s Future: A Strategy Note on the Education System in Afghanistan

(2005) 14. Afghanistan – State Building, Sustaining Growth and Reducing Poverty 15. Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development (2006) 16. PREM Working Paper Series: Structure and Performance of the Afghan Economy 17. Completion Report, EERDP, BRAC Afghanistan