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1. Concept Builders vs. NLRC Facts: Employees of Concept Builders obtained a judgment favorable to tem against petitioner. !o satisfy suc judgment" NLRC issues #brea$%open order& to 'ydro (ils.)nc."*sister company of te respondent+ for te seri, to be enforced against te personal property found in te premises of petitioner-s sister company. )ssue: eter or not te #brea$%open order # can be enforced against te personal property of te sister company. Ruling: /es. )t is a fundamental principle of corporation la0 corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stoc$olders and from oter corporations to 0ic it may be connected. But tis separate and distinct personality of a corporation is merely a ction created by la0 for convenience and to promote justice. 2nless corporation is merely an adjunct" a business conduit or an alter ego of anoter corporation. (etitioner even alleging tat it already ceased its operations on 1345" but in 1346 led an information in te same day" 0ic is e7actly te same as tat of its sister company *'(()+ and suc is led by te same person 0o is te corporate secretary of bot te corporations" tey ave te same president" board of directors" subscribers" and tey also ave te same address. 2nder tis circumstances" it cannot be said tat te property levied upon by te seri, 0ere not of respondents. 8. 9u$an )nternational Corporation vs. Reyes Facts: udgment 0as rendered against 9u$an )nc." and in favor ;orales for 9u$an )nc.<s failure to pay te remaining balance bidding contract. ;orales see$ to levy te properties of petitioner 9)C to satisfy te remaining balance sortly after 9u$an )nc. stopp participating in te case against it. )ssue: eter or not petitioner 9)C sould be eld liable for obligation of 9u$an )nc. Ruling: No. !e principle of piercing te veil of corporate ction and resulting treatment of t0o *8+ related corporations as one and same juridical person 0it respect to a given transaction" is basically applied only to determine establised liability. )t is not avai confer on te court a jurisdiction it as not ac=uired" in te rst pla over a party not impleaded in te case. Else0ere put" a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to te court<s process of piercing te veil of its corporate ction. )n tat situation" te court not ac=uired jurisdiction over te corporation and ence" any proceedings ta$en against tat corporation and it property 0ould infringe on its rigt to due process. >. N?@ECA uards ?ssociation vs. N?@ECA Facts: (etitioner see$s to collect CB? bene ts from respondent 0ic is a 0olly%o0ned subsidiary of (NB. (etitioner argues tat respondent and (NB are te same 0en it comes to nancial condition.

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1. Concept Builders vs. NLRCFacts: Employees of Concept Builders obtained a judgment favorable to them against petitioner. To satisfy such judgment, NLRC issues a break-open order to Hydro Phils. Inc., (sister company of the respondent) for the sheriff to be enforced against the personal property found in the premises of petitioner's sister company.Issue: Whether or not the break-open order can be enforced against the personal property of the sister company.Ruling: Yes. It is a fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it may be connected. But this separate and distinct personality of a corporation is merely a fiction created by law for convenience and to promote justice. Unless the corporation is merely an adjunct, a business conduit or an alter ego of another corporation. Petitioner even alleging that it already ceased its operations on 1986, but in 1987 filed an information in the same day, which is exactly the same as that of its sister company (HPPI) and such is filed by the same person who is the corporate secretary of both the corporations, they have the same president, board of directors, subscribers, and they also have the same address. Under this circumstances, it cannot be said that the property levied upon by the sheriff were not of the respondents.

2. Kukan International Corporation vs. ReyesFacts: Judgment was rendered against Kukan Inc., and in favor of Morales for Kukan Inc.s failure to pay the remaining balance in a bidding contract. Morales seek to levy the properties of petitioner KIC to satisfy the remaining balance shortly after Kukan Inc. stopped participating in the case against it.Issue: Whether or not petitioner KIC should be held liable for the obligation of Kukan Inc.Ruling: No. The principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and the resulting treatment of two (2) related corporations as one and the same juridical person with respect to a given transaction, is basically applied only to determine established liability. It is not available to confer on the court a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not impleaded in the case. Elsewhere put, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the courts process of piercing the veil of its corporate fiction. In that situation, the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the corporation and hence, any proceedings taken against that corporation and it property would infringe on its right to due process.

3. NASECO Guards Association vs. NASECOFacts: Petitioner seeks to collect CBA benefits from respondent which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of PNB. Petitioner argues that respondent and PNB are the same when it comes to financial condition. Respondent on the other hand claims that although it is a subsidiary, it's personality is separate and distinct from that of PNB.Issue: Whether or not petitioner can collect from PNB.Ruling: No. Although respondent is a subsidiary of PNB, control by itself is not does not mean that the controlled corporation is an instrumentality or a business conduit of the mother company. Even control in the financial or operational concerns of a subsidiary company does not by itself call for disregarding the corporate fiction. There must be a perpetuation of fraud beyond the control or at least a fraudulent or illegal purpose behind the control to justify piercing the veil of corporate fiction. Such fraudulent intent is lacking in this case.

4. G Holdings vs. NAMAWUFacts: Maricalum Mining Corporation was incorporated by DBP and PNB. Later, DBP and PNB transferred it to the government for disposition or privatization because it has become a non-performing asset. Later on, GHI and Asset Privatization Trust executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement, GHI bought 90% of MMCs shares and financial claims. These financial claims were converted into promissory notes issued by MMC in favor of GHI and secured by mortgages over MMCs properties. A labor dispute arose between MMC and NAMAWU and MMC was found liable for refusing to bargain collectively and unfair labor practice. NAMAWU wants to held GHI liable for the judgment against MMC.Issue: Whether or not GHI should be held liable.Ruling: No. The factual antecedents of this case does now warrant a finding that the loan agreements between MMC and GHI were simulated, then their separate personalities must be recognized. To pierce the veil of corporate fiction would require that their personalities as creditor and debtor be conjoined, resulting in the personalities of GHI and MMC in one person, such the the debt of one to the other is thereby extinguished.