Doctrine 9 US.pdf

5/20/2018 Doctrine 9 US.pdf

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DOCTRINE

Contact Intelligence in the Kingdom of Insolence>> Lessons learned

2006

# 09

general military reviewgeneral military review

DOCTRINE

Ground Intelligence

Future and Stakes

FOREIGN STUDIES

Intelligence Lessons Learned

Leveraging the Practical Experience

of Operation Iraqi Freedom

Operation Enduring Freedom

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Terrorism and

Ground Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE

for Land Forces

INTELLIGENCE

for Land Forces


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DoctrineThe New Conditions of Military Efficiency p. 4

Ground Intelligence Future and Stakes p. 9

New Techniques, New Threats p. 13

The Threat Continuity - From National Territory to Theaters of Operations p. 16

The Land Forces Synthetic OPFOR p. 20

GLAISE Army p. 24

The New Threats: the Challenge for Military-Oriented Intelligence p. 26

Collecting Intelligence - Adapting our Capabilities p. 30

Future Intelligence: Stakes and Digitization p. 35

Collective Training for Intelligence - A New Organisation Framework p. 38

Training for intelligence - Evolutions to be Expected for Army Officers p. 41

Main Abbreviations and Acronyms in the intelligence Area p. 44

Bibliography p. 49

Foreign studiesIntelligence Lessons-learned - Leveraging the Practical Experience

of Operation Iraqi Freedeom/Operation Enduring Freedom p. 45

Intelligence in Iraq within the Spanish Brigade Plus Ultra p. 59

The ISTAR Capability of the Canadian Forces p. 63

The Dutch Approach of ISTAR concept during NRF-4 p. 65

Freedom of speech

Additional opinions on the topic dealt with in this 09 issue

Terrorism and Ground Intelligence p. 70

Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Expectations and Problems p. 74

Asymmetrical Threat and Ground Intelligence p. 78

The All sources Analysis Cell: An improved Way to Process Information p. 82

Other contributions to doctrinal thought

Doctrine and Command in the British Army an Historical Overview p. 86

French Practice in Getting Prepared to Overseas Operations p. 95

Lessons learned

Intelligence in Indochina p.100Contact Intelligence in the Kingdom of Insolence p.103

A Battalion Intelligence Officer in Afghanistan p.107

LICORNE or the Challenge to Reality p. 111

The First Computerized Application for Intelligence: the Ideliance Project p. 115

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LCL(CR) Jacques de Vasselot

LCL(CR) Alain Prignon

LCL(CR) Donatien Lebastard

Relecture des traductions :

Colonel (ER) Philippe Jolly

Maquette : Christine Villey

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Summary #09Summary #09


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CDEF

editorial

Realities shatter; today they bring us backfrom virtual warfare and its perfect vision ofthe transparent space of battles on scopes toterrain requirements. A new awareness istaking place.

Because the end result of armed engagementchanges, their conditions transformthemselves: from the simple obviousness of theknown enemy, material targets, strategic

visions, military objectives and open spaces, weare switching to the uncertainties of thepermanently changing chameleon opponent, ofthe human environment, of combat occurring inimmaterial battlefields, of low level tacticalmicro-actions and partitioned spaces. Today, itis no longer the case of organizing the successof the common action of a limited number ofunits acting against an identified opponentcarrying out a finalized action, but of seeing to itthat the combination of the actions of a greatnumber of small teams concurs to the successof the whole, although they are acting in a very

decentralized manner, facing a badly knownenemy, in a discontinued area of operation. Thecontested areas1 where land engagementstake place today are marked by a great physicala nd human heterog enei ty; wh ere th einformation superiority is of less importance,where communication systems show theirlimits, whilst the physical and human roughnessof the environments renders observation andinterpretation difficult. For a great part and in away, intelligence has switched from an objectivenature to a subjective one. Yesterday, focus wasplaced on collecting concrete information and

the intelligence general picture could fairlyeasily present itself under the format of tables,organization charts and sketches; now, the realobjective of intelligence is intentions that cannoteasily anymore be derived from situations.

Un d e r t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s , i t i s a nunderstatement to say that the intelligencefunction has increased its importance as well asits complexity. It is an understatement to saythat the equipment and the systems of systems

conceived for the past conditions are now ofteninsufficient, sometimes out of date, despite alltheir modernity and their technology. It is arevolution and one must discuss about it. Today,not taking its dimension into considerationwould lead our forces to fight blindly tomorrow,only able to react against an opponent having

the initiative and, from this standpoint, all theuseful information for its punctual action.Obviousness imposes itself: the mutation of themilitary action entails a parallel evolution ofintelligence. General Fast, commanding the USArmy intelligence school clearly states it2:The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan haveimposed a re-balancing of an approachcentered upon sensors towards a systemfirstly aiming at providing an optimized directsupport to those who need the mostinformation: the soldier and the small unitcommander.

Globally, the issue is complex: what wasnecessary yesterday remains so for a greatdeal - as one must still be prepared forconventional warfare if one wants to push backits occurrence - but now come in addition newrequirements for a new type of conflicts inwhich our land forces are engaged for a longtime. The new adversary appears as being moreand more difficult to detect, therefore difficult tolocate, therefore much less possibly subject toaccurate strikes. Yesterday, the essential part ofthe military action was destruction and

intelligence consisted primarily in targetintelligence whilst, now, the essential part liesin the situation awareness and intelligence, theperception of micro-situations and micro-objects; the transparency of the battlefieldappears to be a more and more erroneous goodtheoretical idea. Yesterday, we thought wefought thanks to information; we realize todaythat we are more and more condemned to fightfor information.

The priority of levels swings over: strategygives precedence to tactic and we areswitching from a top down approach to adown towards top approach where troops atcontact give the multitude of uncertain terrainindications from which the operative synthesiswill be built. As a result, processes and layoutsreverse themselves, the low tactical echelonsmust imperatively be reinforced with acquisitionassets and analysis capabilities; as a result,digitization must thought over again as, in thisdomain, it had been conceived for theconventional warfare of the past and now bringsmuch less than when we were thinking ofcarrying warfare against material targets.

1 BG Robert E. Schmidle & LCL Franck G. Hoffman, Commanding the Contested Zones, Proceedings, September 2004.

2 See Foreign Studiescolumns, page 52.

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CDEF

ditorial

The fog of warfare has become thickeragain on the battlefield. The US Army,directly confronted in Iraq to the new conflictreality, today realizes that there is an obviousrisk of knowing more and more about friendlyforces and in proportion less and less about theenemy; it feels the risk, at the now tacticalprevailing level, of the impossibility of mergingcomputerized blue picture - always exact andaccurate - with the red picture - alwaysinaccurate and out of time. This leads it tonaturally doubt about the COP (Common

Operational Picture), which it now differentiatesfrom the ROP, or Real Operational Picture,although the whole system is not yet stabilized.

In the same way, the concept of precisionaction keeps its pertinence as the efficiency ofaction within human environments to which iscompelled the land forces soldier, requires toavoid uncertain actions and human collateraldamages that ruin very quickly the patient workof conquering hearts and minds. But this sort ofprecision action can only be built uponintelligence acquired by men and about men:

and we see there all the new and importantplace that not only HUMINT will have but alsothe action of scout units and of the commonsensors that all the soldiers are. Our Anglo-Saxon friends rightly assert: Every soldier aSensor. The present operational environmentundoubtedly underlines the soldiers role in theintelligence process3. Inexorably also, the ideathat one can no longer be content with thinkingabout the adversary: it is necessary to thinkas the adversary. The adversary is not inert, heis not a simple subject for planning; endowedwith a creative and free mind, he has no

intention of thinking like us and to give in to ourviews. One really has to place oneself in theadversarys shoes; facing the Iraqi difficulties,the Anglo-Saxon have understood that and theyhave created red cells within their operationalstaffs and developed courses in which one istaught to think as the adversary.

Conflicts of today, conflicts of tomorrow, willbe better conducted if they are reallyconceived as intelligence and informationoperations and not as maneuvers or processesof destruction... Therefore, an intellectual, butalso human and material effort has to be madein favor of intelligence, and this will imply re-balances between the contact/destructionfunctions and the intelligence function, withmost probably the availability of significantintelligence organic assets at brigade level4.Beyond unfruitful debates about the respectiveroles of specialists and of non-specialists,beyond the purely technical visions focused onequipments and networks, an in-depth thinking

has to be carried out about our capabilities aswell as about our methods and our courses ofaction in order to place our objectives andavailable assets in sync.

If our ambition in future engagements is toemploy limited force able to set the basis forthe accomplishment of the strategic goal,undoubtedly we probably have to accept to havea limited action capability of rethought force forthe benefit of a more complete and re-orientedreconnaissance and intelligence capabilitywarranting an efficient, targeted and mastered

employment of the armed force, necessary forthe new military efficiency.

Brigadier General Vincent DESPORTESCommander, Forces Employment Doctrine Center

3 On this subject see Lessons Learned article (RETEX) bygenerals Fastand Le Botas well as the article bygeneral Fleury.

4 Simple example, but meaningful example. The future new structure of the FCS brigades (US Army) is now known; there will be one scouts

cavalry troop, in addition to one intelligence company and one recon and acquisition battalion organic to each of the three combined arms

battalions task forces.

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EADSAstrium

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The New Conditionsof Military Efficiency

Yesterday, facing the state controlled uniformity of the threat corresponded a model of forcesstill recently consolidated by the characteristics of blocks confrontation. Today, although it isimperative to keep the capability to conduct conventional warfare in order to reduce its occurrence

thanks to the preservation of superiority and the production, as much as needed, of constraining

and deterring violence, it is all the more so necessary to adapt the defense capabilities to the new

commitment conditions of forces.

To a world marked by the coexistence of several conflicting logics must correspond renewedmodels of forces, without any homothetic link with those that prevailed before.

BYBRIGADIERGENERALVINCENTDESPORTES, COMMANDER OF THEFORCESEMPLOYMENTDOCTRINECENTER


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The new relativity

of the destruction capability

A reshaped role

For the systems of force, the destruction capabilityremains high in itself, even if it is significantly less inproportion. In most cases destruction remains essentialto win the battle of intervention, which isthe indispensable phase although now intermediarytowards the accomplishment of the strategic objective.The stabilization phases are now decisive as they arethe ones that will enable or not to reach the requiredpolitical effect; during these phases, the coercioncapability must still support other forms of actionand power and be able to face the unavoidableresurgences of violence.Besides, although the sole destruction will,

in the future much less than in the past, be able to leadto the political solutions for the crises justifyingthe employment of armed force, it keeps a fundamentalreinsurance role. In fact there is no doubt that, facinga new enemy, protean and having few moderncapabilities, the technological power - displayed, forexample, by the air force or the navy - plays an ultimateinsurance role for troops in contact. Thanks to theinsurance it provides, it increases their own capabilitiesand, to a certain extent, deters the opponent, by denyinghim to carry out aggressions of a certain level or againstcertain objectives. The rustic army of a great power

having real joint capabilities is in no way comparable,even with equivalent specific capabilities, to a rusticarmy that would be lacking them. Indeed, the projectionof an army at contact necessarily supposes a multiformjoint capability that itself requires tremendous financialand technological investments.

Operational limits

However, the fading out of the state control uponwarfare depreciates nowadays the destructioncapability that, effective or potential, has traditionallyup till now represented the central course of actionof the armed force facing its peer.The technological superiority no longer deters the non-conventional adversary and the capability logic,opposing capabilities to capabilities, does not impresshim; he no longer looks for superiority as he knows thatmilitary victory - in the classic meaning and with classicassets -is no longer the condition of political victory.Facing him, striking at security range, along the fire andforget principle is often vain. In fact, it is no longerthe case of reaching conventional objectives, but ofattaining results of another nature, falling under

cognitive and psychological aspects. Giving way tosimplicity by acting in using classic assets within thetraditional physical space in order to materially destroythe non-conventional adversary rarely leads tothe achievement of the political goal.

As long as it is no longer the case of reducing the abilityof a State to stand in the way of the will of a third party,the destruction assets of the States confrontationcapabilities lose their sense. They even lose much moresense, as asymmetrical violence assets are much lessvulnerable to conventional strikes; they no longer offer

numerous targets for high technological fires. Therefore,classic strategies and weapons are partially struck withuselessness, whilst the ability to produce non-solelymilitary effects becomes one of the usefulness criteriaof the systems of forces.

A certain de-legitimization

Similarly to the gradual depreciation of destructionas military and political tool, it can be noticed that itbecomes gradually de-legitimized. This evolutionis based upon two phenomena. The first one is

the information revolution. Today, any act of destruction -and its unavoidable collateral damages - is rapidlytaken to the court of international public opinion, quickto judge based upon criteria that are very far frompolitical logics; indeed, advanced societies are fragilein front of losses and violence shown endlessly on homeTV screens. The second phenomenon lies in the fact that,today, the forces are often committed for interests thatare no longer vital for the nations or, at least, that donot appeal as such for their citizens; although, whilstthe vital nature authorized by itself, in the spirit ofnational defense legitimacy, the destruction action,

the relative nature of the defended interest nowwithdraws from this latter one, in the internationalconscience, its morality. In a certain way, destructiondiminishes the legitimacy of the action that today hasitself become the condition of freedom of action.

The rules

of the new military efficiency

The concomitant criteriaThe evolution of society and of the context ofemployment of forces, together with immediateavailability of information all over the world, hasreinforced three acceptance essential criteria formilitary violence, and therefore for the freedomof action of politic executives.

The first one is the respect of the essential valuesof the intervening societies. These values, often atthe root of the decision of using force, make up the baseof the right to war as well as the laws of warfare.

The second criterion is legality; the multiplicationof legal instruments and special international courtscompels the military action to develop itself withina clear legal context. The third criterion, an enrichedsynthesis of the first two, is the legitimacy of action,


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intrinsic or to be constructed; closely related to theselection of ways and assets, to modalities and intensityof the force, to rules of engagement, it is fragile.Permanently having to be protected and consolidated,it closely depends on communication strategies, evenin the cases when it seems to be obvious, as in the

contemporary minds, fair war doesnt necessarilycoincide with legitimate war.

Upstream of this last criterion, the idea of strictnecessity or strict proportionality reinforces itself:it imposes a permanent capability of modulation andadjustment, a capability of reversibility of the courses ofaction and assets, in accordance with a subtle perceptionof the environment and of its changes necessarilyacquired in contact.

In this way, the credibility of the security system is nolonger based on forces ratios as they were conceived at

the time of interstate war, but on the capability to meetthe adversary on his own terrain by sticking as closely aspossible to his changing reality. The traditional topdown approach of interstate conflicts (attackingthe State, favoring from now on action from the thirddimension), is now replaced by the down towards topapproach, as it is most often the case of starting fromthe ground and from the population to rebuild the State.Through the remoteness from the terrain it is looking for,the revolution in military affairs seems from thenonwards to be out of touch with the recent evolutionof conflicts and unable, in most situations, to bring an

appropriate answer.

A protracted action

As weve seen it, modern conflicts may be characterizedby a psychological action - through the winning over ofminds and wills - as well as a material action, and from

this point of view they require a protracted action. Facingthe new threats and environments, looking for animmediate or even rapid result is a mistake in mostcases due to reasons coming from duration and can onlybe dealt with on this scale. The idea of first in, firstout, falsely attracting but regularly rejected idea by

experience, i.e. the idea of an intervention in firstconceived to be punctual and followed by a withdrawalplanned from the start as fast as possible even beforethe political resolution of conflicts, is not compatible -unless the responsibilities are subject to a transferto others - with the reality of crises, or withthe indispensable tune that only the armies are able toplay in the process of crises resolution. Indeed, successof a crisis management is assessed after long monthsor years after the beginning of the intervention and noton the efficiency of the coercion initial action that isnever the decisive action directly leading to the expectedstrategic result.

It is more the case of persuading in time, thanks todialog and contact, than of imposing in the short termusing constraint and destruction capability. What countsis the accompaniment as well as the intervention.In this sense, the trend, born with the technologicalimprovements of the Cold War, consisting in placingthe soldier farther from the battlefield cannot favordurable solutions.

One may notice that the very nature of new conflictslessens for them the capability to be fenced in time.

In fact, limited warfare supposes a dialog betweenplayers that is no longer permitted by the loss of controlby states and the voluntarily disorganized scatteringof an opponent often lacking political unity. Althoughthe deliquescence of States is often nowadays atthe root of crises, it is all the more responsible forthe difficulty to solve them.

Acting in the same spaceas the adversary

Facing the classicoverpower of its opponent,the adversary is only leftwith the choice of refusingcombat on equal termsand of looking forconfrontations withinoperational spaces wherehe hopes to reach politicalresults without needinglarge scale militarysuccesses. Rational and

classic warfare, reinforcedby the bad habits of theCold War, uses the fourspaces land, sea, airand electromagnetic;

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the new opponent neglects them and concentrates on hisown advantages in the sphere of information - or spaceof information communication - and the human spacethat is very marked by its affective and irrationaldimensions.

It is within the sphere of information - where the battlebetween the weak and the strong nowadays takes place -that the adversary tries to play upon public opinions. Asthe sphere of information organizes the disconnectionbetween the strategic and tactical spaces, progressesin the field of communications enablethe adversary to project himself outside the physicalbattlefield, to transpose tactical successes at strategiclevels and from them directly build political victories.In this way, by playing upon the sensitiveness andversatility of public opinions, communication - brokerof the pity market - has become the terrain of victoryor defeat; using it, the grandstand turning into a court,

the action bets its results and its acceptance thanksto the image it shows.

Today, reaching political result is to become consciousthat power is under control of the opinion and thatvictory supposes to carry out combat within the spacesin which the adversary is fighting.

Acting in contact

Due to the very changing context of new conflicting

situations, a good awareness of these latter ones isa key factor of efficiency, thanks to the capabilityof continuous adaptation to events that it brings.As the identification of the adversary proves to beuncertain, and as the discrimination between friendsand foes can generally come only from human intelligenceat contact, understanding the threat requires a visioncoming from the field rather than from technique; it isno longer the case of detecting masses of tanks and oflocalizing potential targets, but of understanding socialenvironments, behaviors, psychologies.

The military leader will have to carefully graspthe sensitiveness of a complex and changingenvironment, and that can only be carried out onthe field, at contact, being in wait of micro-fluctuationsof circumstances. This will enable him to graduatethe employment of force and ensure the smoothreversibility of layouts in accordance with situations,whilst thus warranting the continuity of the link betweentactical action and political action.

Acting within the physical continuity

The fluidity and ubiquity of the threats, nowemancipated from the territorial framework, theglobalization of behaviors and contestations depreciatethe strongholds in which advanced societies thoughtthey were efficiently protected.

In fact, this threat continuity imposes that of retaliationand valorizes the force systems able to act continuouslyif necessary, with tools and according to methods almostidentical, on either side of the border: a continuum ofcapabilities of action in space and at the same levelmust answer the continuum of threats.


At the center of new conflicts, fighting againstinternational terrorism is a particular case, whichhas to however be taken into account over time, as itis likely that this plague will continue to feed itselfover a long period from disparities and imbalancescoming from differentiated access to wealth andknowledge. In this field, the destruction of terroristsand, possibly of their sanctuaries - as essential it maybe - is only one part of success.

As terrorism is more a communication mode than away of fighting, one must place oneself in the same

space whilst avoiding sending messages - ofdestruction for example - that consolidatethe terrorist action and enrich its environment.The key of the fight against terrorism may be foundin the combination of direct action and in-depthaction, over time, with the requirement of actingpreferably on the causes and the minds than onthe symptoms. In this way and outside the nationalterritory, fighting against terrorists directly falls fromnow on under the direct responsibility of trained buttrivial land forces.

Within this framework, the armed forces must playan active role in accompanying the fight againstterrorists or, directly, in counter-terrorism - which isaiming at preventing an action and acting on the verycauses of the threat - preferably to anti-terrorism,which directly gives an answer to an attack:prevention is better than cure, and the formerbenefits from the action of troops in contact.However, the duality of the forces on the groundallows them to combine these two types of actionsover time and to directly and very efficientlyparticipate, for the benefit of the security ofthe French people, in the anti-terrorism fight, now

occurring outside the national territory, tomorrowin it if, alas, that would become necessary.


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A collection processfitted to human behavior

understanding

In the French concept and ata time when there are onlyfew major commitmenthazards possibly leading toa direct hit of wills - likely tocarry things to extremes -,any land commitment shouldbe considered within

the framework of a limiteduse of force in order to keepit at a level of violence justnecessary to reach political-military objectives.

Ground IntelligenceFuture and Stakes

The Intelligence function is one among the four transverse operational functions in the French

Army. Its purpose consists in identifying the enemy, the threats and environment hazards as best

as possible in order to enable decision-makers to better draw up, plan and carry out their operations

at any commitment level. It is one of the factors enabling to master information.

In front of an increasingly sophisticated political-military commitment framework and of threats that

diversify and sometimes seam to be elusive, this function is subject to an obvious critical sight and

to a strong development pressure - at least at announcement level. However, a significant change

has already started that takes place by stages; and the following articles will show the way these

changes occur according to areas and circumstances.

Without featuring current threats - presented under various aspects in other articles - the different

evolving ways to gather information will be presented as well as the processing methods and tools.

It will end with some explanations about the organizational aspects for this function; at a time when

the French Army is more in a situation of strengthening what has been achieved, these explanations

will remain all-encompassing.

In this article, ground capabilities will be highlighted; but it is obvious that land forces commitments

can be thought of within a joint and most often multinational frameworkonly; and this is

permanently shown in the intelligence area. Incidentally, several articles in this issue will make a

reference to it.

BY COLONEL JEAN-FRANOIS COPPOLANI,

CHIEF INTELLIGENCE BRANCH, FORCES EMPLOYMENT & COMMAND STRUCTURES DIVISION, FORCES EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE CENTER

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During stabilization phases,which, in the short-term,are likely to be the mostfrequent and the most

plausible kind of

commitment for the French

Army, it will be highlynecessary to understand thehuman environment. First ofall, it is necessary to detecthostility factors towardsthe land force that will bedeployed and to identifythe various potentiallyhostile actors; then,according to requirements,track them and provideintelligence enabling toneutralize or to destroy

them. It is also useful toestimate the receptivityof populations to our action(support and co-operationcapabilities) and to be ableto feel these populationsrequirements - amongothers, for assistanceoperations that are to befound in all the phases ofthe operation continuum.

All this results into twooperational fields for

intelligence; they differ fromeach other in the way theyare carried out but theycomplement each other asregards their consequences.

On the one hand, accurateintelligence aboutthe enemy to beoverpowered (the enemyand not his neighborslikely to become collateralvictims) and aboutthe areas of activity forthe force: enemyvulnerabilities, armament/equipment/logistics/infrastructure to bedestroyed. All this willenable to carry out anaccurate commitment,which, for example, isnecessary when carrying

out counter-terrorismoperations; and fortunately,the development ofaccurate ammunitionenables to do it.

On the other hand,environment intelligence

in order to get andassimilate cultural, political,religious, social andeconomic factors enabling

to understand thecommitment environment.Thus, this understandingwill enable the commanderto anticipate actions carriedout by human groups and,among others, to applyimmaterial effects todirect them towardsthe intended direction.

This prerequisite resultsinto several improvement

requirements.

First of all, all the actors of aland force should carry out a

more significant action asregards vigilance towardscommitment environment,the research and gatheringof warning information, itsearly dissemination within atactical unit and its earlyreporting to G2s in order

to grant combined-armscommanders with the currentsituation information theyneed. This action starts fromthe beginning; and actionscarried out to highlight andrecognize the battalion S2srole illustrate it. As far asthe Land Forces Commanderis concerned, he stressedthe importance of collectiveintelligence training andthe crux value of battalionS2s in his training guidancefor operational readiness.

This intelligence cultureis also to be spread to anylevel of responsibility.

Indeed, each commander isresponsible for informationresearch and processing athis own level; and he shouldgive himself the means totake on this responsibility.

Then, we have to think aboutincreased HUMINT

capabilities to be able tounderstand this human

environment; to date, theHUMINT sensor is the besttool to this end. Everybodycan take part in this effort:from the most specialized tothe least specialized one,

from scout andreconnaissance units topeople dealing with sourceprocessing. However, it isnecessary not to makeconfusion between anyonesknow-how and field ofactivity; they are the bestproofs for the requiredprofessionalism inincreasingly more sensitivejobs. When facing aparticularly difficult

commitment framework, ourAmerican allies were able toset up a quick and efficientLessons Learned (LL)process; it resulted intoconcrete and importantmeasures, thus enabling totake important correctivemeasures in this field,despite obstacles. Indeed, forthem as for us, interpretersavailability remains a

problem; but solutions stillmust be looked for.

Modern people - also inremote parts of the world -have a need to communicate;and they are enticed to do soas modern civiliancommunication systems areeasily used. To some extent,this is also true forasymmetrical threat actors -whoever they are: guerrillawarfare, partisans, terroristor other movements; andthey are granted with hugepossibilities compared totheir former members;but it also grants them withvulnerabilities that can beexploited by our electronicwarfare and SIGINT (SignalIntelligence) assets.

Thus, technical intelligence

is still relevant and the role itplays in the awareness ofenemy networks is essential:the press regularly tells ushow some elements were

located and neutralizedthrough communicationinterception - for instancein Tchechnia or Palestine.As for cloak and daggerwarfare, we can be sure that

it results into successes thatare not mentioned. Thus, ourinterception and analysis

capabilities change to meetthe threat despiteencountered difficulties; andthey increasingly require atechnical support - within ajoint framework - monitoredby the Military IntelligenceDirectorate (in French DRM),which is formalized in thetactical SIGINT concept -

currently in development.

IMINT collection keepsdeveloping andthe forthcoming fielding ofthe Contact-ReconnaissanceUnmanned Aerial Vehicle(in French DRAC1) will providecombined arms and supportunits with a capability forstand-off observationbeyond crest-lines, thus

providing them with a slightincrease in their scouting andreconnaissance capability.

As a matter of fact, all thesecapabilities are necessaryand they increase eachother in value thanks tothe multisensor synergythat has already been usedby the intelligence brigadesince several years. It willbe fully operational whenimplementing the ISTAR2

principle, which will bepossible when achievingBattlespace Digitizationwithin intelligence andfielding analysis-support -and if possible merging -software.

The development of ourprocessing capabilities

However, if looking forinformation is good, beingaware of what to do with itis better. Even more todaythan yesterday, the actual



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difficulty regarding

intelligence consists in

processing the information

collected. In former highintensity operations,rebuilding the enemy

disposition by wonderingwhere the famousIndependent Tank Battalion3 -assumed to representthe axis of advance ofthe CARMINE MotorizedRifle Division - was locatedresulted into manyIntelligence officers sweating.Today, it seems easyin comparison with the meredescription of anasymmetrical threat

in theatres where it actuallyexists; and a fortiori if wehave to issue possibleEnemy Courses of Action(ECOAs), whatever they arecalled. Yet, encounteredintelligence difficulties inthe Ivory Coast, in Iraq and inAfghanistan for example, arealready within intelligencecollection. They are alsopertaining to processing

to a large extent, i.e.understanding populations,rebuilding hostile networks,identifying their maneuversand spotting riots they arelikely to prepare.

For our intelligence-headquarters qualifiedofficers, a significant trainingeffort is in progress, thanksto what has been done bythe CEERAT(Army IntelligenceStudy and Training Center);currently, it is responsible forall Army intelligence trainingcourses and, in the future, itwill result into increasedknow-how for this branchsstaff. It is completed withlessons learnt duringexercises and operations,what enables to enrichthought. However, a gooddefinition of expertise to

possess and of processingmethods to be used is still anambition. Anyway, one ofthe human capabilities to bedeveloped consists in being

able to sort what is usefuland what is useless in anover informed world.The lack of it could leadcommanders to indecisionor to blindness when facingactual issues.

If ever improvement is one

of the sources for thisinformation flood, it couldalso provide us withsolutions. Indeed, moderninformation flows areincreasingly electronic flows.

The progressiveimplementation ofBattlespace digitization intothe forces in general, and itsspecific applications tointelligence in particular, willlead to a significant increasein flows arriving at a G2 cell,as well as in documentationintelligence quantities thatwill have to be dealt with forprocessing purposes.A significant part of thisinformation will be composedof open source information;though they include muchnoise, they arenevertheless an increasingsource of information.

In comparison, availabletools to meet these flows

and these stocks aresignificantly insufficient, both

with specializedComputerized DocumentManagement appliances andwith software applicationsaiming at supporting G2s intheir analysis work.Command, Control andInformation Systems (CCIS =French SICF) expected

capabilities - including SICFV3 - are very limited; and it isdifficult to know today - andwith current budget estimates- what we can expect fromthe Forward intelligenceoptimization system(French : SORA4 initiative).

Some experience has beengained by the Land ForcesG2s, in particular bythe Technical intelligenceexploitation center withinthe framework of its standingsupport mission to B2sOperational ReadinessTraining 5 among othersthanks to tests conductedwith the IDELIANCEapplication; but much workis still ahead for operational

capabilities to meet the new

requirements.

When facing this floodof electronic informationon the one hand andthe requirement to takewarfare against asymmetrical

threats into account(including participating inlimited counter-terrorismwarfare) on the other hand -which means being able tolook for low signals - do wehave manpower fitted to this

need? We certainly dont.There again, [information]

harvest is abundant andworkers are few. Indeed,our G2s are very busy withcurrent operations; duringthese operations, they setup G2s with strengths muchhigher than those plannedin homeland Tables ofOrganization andEquipment but they do nothave all the requiredcapabilities and expertise.

Adapting capabilitiesand organizations

Then, these deep changes intargets and trades shouldhave an impact onorganizations, which arenot everlastingcathedrals, but structuresenabling the Army to carryout its mission in

the best conditions.Indeed, the intelligencefunction has takenadvantage of a first setof measures following

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the 2001 function review;among these, the mostimportant ones are:

extending thisspecialization field;

setting up a comprehensive

training for intelligenceofficers to begin right aftergraduating from branchschools;

any training in theintelligence area taken intoaccount by the ArmyIntelligence Study andTraining Center (CEERAT),which completed itsbuilding-up in late 2005;

The creation of the GroundIntelligence ProcessingCenter(CERT) withinthe Land Forces Command.

Once this experience issettled - which should bea significant improvementin the near futureregarding manpowerprofessionalization inthis area, other measuresshould certainly be

considered and all the moreas 2001 changes stoppedhalfway on numerousissues. So, there is stillmuch room for thinkinginorder either to carry on in the

same direction or to influencethe course of events in thelight of lessons learnt.

More basically, we have tothink about the balance ofcapabilities of our forces

regarding the most probablecommitment framework; andwe have to wonder whetherlooking for accuratecommitments is not likelyto downsize forceful-action-devoted capabilities tothe benefit of an increase ininformation collectingcapabilities. And this,whatever this information is:part - or not - of what we callspecialized research today

and especially to the benefitof a significant increase inour information processingcapabilities considering theimplementation of the ISTARprinciple - agreed by Franceat Army and joint levels. Ofcourse, all this is to be setwithin the framework of Armyrebalancing, regularlyallowed/compelled bymilitary programming laws.The new responsibilities

of the French Chief of Staff ofthe Armed Forces willnecessarily have an influencein this field: if someintelligence required bythe Army is well the Armys

province, on the one handthe Army takes part into jointintelligence and on the otherhand if takes advantageof what the latter does.The example of our alliesshows that different solutions

are possible.

However, without waitingfor this term, we can alreadymention an area within whichimprovements can beachieved rapidly: namely,co-operation with the otheractors tasked to defend ourcountry. Indeed, the sundryvariety of threats headingtowards security-increasingthreats - i.e. security that

police forces and servicesare regularly coping with -may, in the near future, resultinto changes in Army trades;but it already requiresreinforcing co-operationin the theatres of operation:

co-operation amongServices;

land/military intelligencedirectorate co-operationand land / military counter-intelligence agencyco-operation;

co-operation between theServices and Ministry ofdefenses other services;

Co-operation betweenthe Ministry of defenseand other Departments.

A Defense Ministersinstruction issued in January2006 already leads the way

in this field.

As for the Army, it wouldtake advantage of aclarification of itsrequirements and of thelimits of its trade whenconsidering what mustremain other actors job;then, it should draw up itspolicy with related doctrineand procedures without

mentioning equipment andcoordination structures thatare sometimes entailed.

1 Fielding planned in 2007.2 SA2R in the French Army.

3 Independent Tank Battalion (ITB).4 SORA: (Systme doptimisation du

renseignement aroterrestre) =Air-land Intelligence OptimizationSystem.

5 CERT - (Centre dexploitation durenseignement terrestre).


Being careful to the slight evolution of threats that are likely to jeopardize our committed forces, the ground intelligencefunction has taken into account the stakes that this change meant as regards its role when land forces are being committed.According to the impulses regularly sent by the Army Staff it has begun a progressive evolution that should slightly increaseits efficiency in the future.Yet, this important challenge is still increasing and it seems to be necessary to make new steps forthoughts that come up here and there to materialize:

in order to be more able to assess human environment for operations; among others, to understand and, if possible,anticipate when dull or hazardous threats may become true;

in order to provide information at the lowest required level in due time, and ideally in reflex time in the future;

in order to develop the integration of the intelligence chain, including with joint components, highly required to controlinformation;

In order to increase its capabilities in comparison with requirements.

This way, it will keep providing the joint commander with assets enabling him to keep the freedom of action he needs to carryout an ever more sophisticated mission, within a commitment framework that requires an increasing control of the use of forceand of the effect of force.


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New Techniques,

New ThreatsThe threats that the Military Intelligence Directorate (DRM) has to assess naturally take placewithin the framework of symmetrical - even dysymmetrical - conflicts. However, to meetforces needs, the boundary for the DRMs missions has extended to some threats pertainingto asymmetrical warfare.Symmetrical conflicts are characterized by enemies endeavoring to achieve superiority by usingstructures and doctrines complying with the same rules. Dissymmetry relies on a qualitative or

quantitative superiority from one of the opponents but it meets the same logic. It is trickier todetermine the asymmetry concept that cannot be limited to armaments and to their use byguerillas and terrorists. Any conflict is asymmetrical when two enemies close with each other indifferent areas to make the other ones action illegitimate. Then, psychology and information arenew fields to be explored and to be taken over not to become overwhelmed by the enemy 1.

If the threat is currently linked to the implemented weapon systems - or in development amongforeign armed forces - it is also linked to the most various and unexpected assets used by non-governmental armies and it increases because of the infospheres permeability. From now on,the armed forces are compelled to do a balancing act between the Network Centric Warfare (NCW)

concept- in which technological superiority is overwhelming - and the stand-off use of force - acritical trump card - on the one hand, and the entanglement between armed forces and civilianpopulations - that have to be sometimes protected, sometimes controlled - on the other hand.Therefore, the threat is less within the last 300 meters than in the first 10 ones.

In a democracy, asthe psychological field for conflictsand information control cannot beentrusted to militaries only - who,besides, have only very limitedmeans to get into both these fields -we are going to deal only with newpieces of equipment that come upinto asymmetrical conflicts andthat are at the core of DRMsconcerns.

BYCOLONELCHOLLEY, HEAD OF THE ARMAMENTS AND PROLIFERATION DIVISION AT THEMILITARYINTELLIGENCEDIRECTORATE(DRM) 2

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Improvised ExplosiveDevices (IEDs)Booby traps have alwaysbeen used by soldiers orinsurgents. They are not

new. Until now, they used tobe one among many hazardsfacing soldiers in operations.An unpinned grenade undera corpse or a trip-wire acrossa path triggering anexplosive are usually partof harassing or delayingactions. Experience andcommon sense were oftenenough to protect ourselvesagainst them and theirinfluence was negligible

towards other hazards.Yet, the employmentof Improvised ExplosiveDevices (IEDs) has becomea favored COA (Courseof Action) in asymmetricalcrises. Their diversity, thelarge dissemination of theirmanufacturing process andof their implementationthrough modern media andthe Internet, their relatively

easy setting-up andtriggering, their destructivepower and their impactwithin human andinformation environmentsare such that they are trulya threat from now on.

Therefore, we have to set upthe most comprehensive listas regards implementationtechniques, used materials,packaging to conceal themand frequency bands used totrigger them. Their evolutionis steady and is in theaftermath of availablecutting-edge technologies.Their diversity is limited onlyby the imagination of theirdevelopers and theavailability of explosives.They easily fulfillconventional weapons suchas small-caliber weapons,

anti-tank rockets or mortars.

Fighting against IEDsrequires a decisive actionfrom intelligence services

in order to set up the abovelist, the fielding of newequipment (jammers,armor...), the adaptationof doctrines of use (MOUT -Military Operations on

Urbanized Terrain,protection of logistic flows,preventive posture...) andrelevant training for thehighest number of people(from SOF - SpecialOperation Forces -committed in theatersto units deployed onthe homeland territorywithin the framework ofVigipirate3). Only thecombination of all these

measures is likely to leadto a significant threatdecrease. A single - tacticalor technical - solutionwould be nonsense as itwould rapidly be foiled andcircumvented by those whodevelop them or use them.

Thermobaric explosives

Thermobaric explosives area technological breakdownin the field of militarywarheads and theirdissemination is worrying.The word thermobaricwas introduced by Russianengineers, who have a longexperience and a robustknow-how in this field.Coming from the Greeklanguage, it associatesthe concepts of warmthand pressure. Comparedto conventional explosives(burst), the efficiency ora thermobaric weapon islinked to secondary aerobicreactions that increase thethermal effect and the blasteffect.

There are several possibletechniques to develop

thermobaric explosives, theoldest and the best known ofwhich is fuel air explosivewith the famous BLU-82BDaisy Cutter bomb.

What is really new isthe reduction in size oflaunchers and their diversitythat perfectly fit guerrillawarfare: in addition tobombs dropped from aircraft,

we now have rockets of thePG-7 or RPO-A type, mortarshells and even grenades.According to the sizeand the architecture ofthe military head andof the kind of thermobaricexplosive, the ammunitionwill be more dedicated toopen space targets or setwithin confined space(vehicles, buildings, bunkersor tunnels). In this last case,

the ammunition will either befired through an aperture, orintegrated into an armored-piercing device to furtherexplode inside. Then,conventional protectionsare useless towards the blasteffect.

New calibers

The lethality of small caliberammunition can be definedby the equality:Pkill = Phitx Pkill/hit wherePhit is the Probability of Hit(PH) and Pkill/hit is the enemycombat ineffectivenessprobability if he is hit, whatis usually termed stoppingpower. The first factor iscritical and it mainly relieson the weapon-shooter pair.The second factor mainlyrelies on the ammunitionand on the Point of Impact(PI) (impact locationand presence of protectionor not).The latest lessons learntfrom US soldiers committedin Iraq show a lack of endefficiency for the 5.56 x 45ammunition. However,the Probability of Hit (PH) Phithas increased as most

shootings are MOUTshootings at distancesranging from 20 to 30meters; and the useof sighting aid devices of

the red point type has spreadto a large extent.On the reverse, the 5.56 x 45standard has a lack ofstopping power. Indeed, thisprojectile is too light and its

residual energy is notsufficient enough toneutralize at the first hit.Now the choice of this caliberin the 60s mainly relied ontwo criteria: a rapid projectilewith important after-impactsecondary effects andincreasing twofold theinfantrymans firepower incomparison with the NATO7.62 or the venerable 30-06.

New standards areappearing, such as the SPC(Special Purpose Cartridge)6.8 mm shot by the BarrettM468 assault rifle.These new cartridges bothhave the advantage of the5.56 x 45 (high MuzzleVelocity, flat trajectory,small maximum ordinate)but also the same trajectorystability as for the 7.62 x 51

(heavy projectile with highenergy on impact) whilepiercing most ofinfantrymans protections,either with additional armorplates or without them.

MANPADS

Shoulder Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems(MANPADS) should also belinked to new threats owingto the technological changesthey take advantage of, butalso owing to their smallsize, which eases theirscattering and theirtransportation. No helicopteris sheltered from them, aswell during overseasoperations as on thehomeland territory. Spottingthem is illusory as their

deployment meets noconventional organization.The diversity of thesesystems (in Afghanistan only,the presence of SA-7B, SA-



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OTAN

14, HN-5, Blowpipe andStingeris established),whose homing heads havedifferent characteristics andwhose IRCCM (InfraredCounter Counter-Measures)

capabilities keep improving,makes protection measurestrickier and trickier. For thetime being, the threat is stillto be kept in perspective asMANPADShave so far beenserved by poorly trainedpersonnel.

The proliferationof Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMDs)

At last, armed forces arelikely to close with enemiespossessing chemical orbiological, even nuclearweapons tomorrow. It hasnow been established thatAl Qaeda endeavored todevelop a quite organizedprogram of biologicalweapons in Afghanistan

and tested chemical agents.We are now attending aprivatization of proliferation,whose nature andthe scope of transferare not completely grasped,like Dr. A.Q. Khan networks;most of his customers arenot known.

In overseas theaters, armedforces rear bases, such asthe Green Zone in Baghdad,with heavy concentrations oftroops, would be as manypossible targets for the

insurgents that would havegot this kind of weapons.Deployed armies at the heartof hostile populations wouldthen be deprived of a safehaven for reconstitution andof a unique home base tolaunch and conductoperations.

1 To improve our understanding of

these concepts, see the excellentbook by Jacques Baud:asymmetrical war or the defeatof the winner, ditions du Rocher.

2 DRM - Direction durenseignement militaire.

3 Translators note: governmentwatch and security programtowards terrorist threats.

The above mentioned threats are not exhaustive.They have been chosen because of their relativelyold features in technical terms (IEDs, light infantryweapons, MANPADS...) and their innovative aspect

as for their impact on the human and informationenvironments. This way, they highlight the difficultyfor Western armed forces to do a balancing actbetween a compulsory modernization to keep upwith their technological and doctrinal advance infront of emerging powers that are likely to hit theirvital interests one day and to clash with them insymmetrical warfare, and the requirement to tacklenew environments featuring asymmetrical conflicts.Eventually, these threats take place within whatis usually called military intelligence, whichis at the heart of military-oriented intelligence.Other threats, more difficult to grasp - because

they are less direct but as heavy - are the provinceof environment intelligence, which has no limits,and for which the human and technical capabilitiesof intelligence services appear to be currentlyinsufficient.

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What threat?

The main interferences that

a land force has to face are

terrorism, espionage,sabotage, subversion andorganized crime (TESSOC2).

Terrorism consists inillegally using orthreatening to use force orviolence in order toconstrain or intimidategovernments andsocieties in order to reachpolitical, ethnical,religious or ideologicalobjectives. It is aimed atstriking the minds, atsubjecting them and atimposing a minority willthanks to the horror itintentionally provokes.

Espionage is the secretmethod used by a foreign

power or other groups ofinterests in order tosecure information towhich they do not haveaccess.

Sabotage consists in

the destruction orthe neutralization of criticalmaterials for the friendlyforces operations aimingat jeopardizing theirmaneuver.

Subversion is defined asan action conceived atweakening the military,economical or politicalstrength of a nation byundermining its citizensmorale, fidelity orreliability. On operations,the aim is to demoralizethe force thanks tooperations conceived atneutralizing or weakeningthe force combateffectiveness. A subversiveattack is difficult to detectand to counter.

Organized crime may be

described as an action oforganizations of a criminalnature aiming at illegallyattaining some kind ofpower thanks to influence

or money, and by

disregarding thedemocratic laws ofthe countries in whichthey operate. Onoperations, the varioustraffickings (drugs,prostitution, counterfeit orsmuggled materials orproducts, weapons)directly appeal to themembers of the force andcan weaken its potentialand even jeopardize itscredibility.

The threat mainly consistsin the action of the enemyintelligence services orthe special forces ofthe opponents or fightingparties, of organizations,terrorist groups orindividuals, subversivegroups or individualsor criminal organizations

or groups.

Up till the collapse ofthe former USSR, this threatwas mainly represented

by the action of the USSR

services, as well as thatof its official allies (Easterncountries for example) orobjective ones; either theywere being financed by it,or they were simple fellowtravelers even objectiveallied groups or individuals(various Middle-Eastterrorist organizations,some pacifist or anti-nuclear organizations); butnow this threat has becomewidely diversified.

The decaying of the formerUSSR and the developmentof the serious criminality ithas generated in this areaon the one hand, thedevelopment of Islamicfundamentalism and offanatic terrorist groups thatclaim to draw their

inspiration from it on theother hand, have totallydiversified this threat andmade it difficult tounderstand and master.

The Threat Continuity -From National Territory to

Theaters of Operations

On overseas operations, land forces are subject to threats from organizations or individuals trying to

undermine them by other means than military confrontation. These threats are qualified as interferences.

These interferences or attempts of the like, already existing in normal periods, are reinforced on operations,

be it on the given theater, or even outside the theater. They can even carry on through hostile actions on

the national territory, especially from the part of organizations or groups that have a multinational settlement

or a multinational capability of action.

This article will propose a statement about these threats then several reflections about the present situation

evolution to conclude on a few recommendations.

BYMAJORGENERALDENISSERPOLLET, DEFENSEPROTECTION ANDSECURITYDIRECTOR(DPSD1)



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A permanent threat

over the theaters

This threat is no longer

anecdotic or even secondaryfor our forces on operations.It can be further detailedby taking the conventionalpresentation of operationsdrawn from the notion ofcontinuum of operations,developed by NATO3 andcomplemented by the Frenchvision expressed throughthe stabilization concept.Unlike classic warfare whichencompasses an intense

combat phase followedby the signature of peaceand a complete halt inviolence, the presentoperations can be brokendown into three phases:intervention, stabilizationand normalization. Withinthis context, the TESSOC

threat is always there butat various levels, dependingon the phases of theoperation.

The diagram below showsin a theoretical manner,

the threat characterization:Whatever the phase ofthe operation may be,the terrorist threat isthe most flagrant and willtake an important part onfurther operations. However,one can think that the forcesare in a better position tofight against it duringthe intervention phase inthe coercion actions, as

the rules of engagementsat the moment and the forceposture allow a betterdefensive capability.

On the other hand, the threatis greater duringthe stabilization phase, asdramatically shown today inIraq: the force has been

compelled to deploy andintermingle at least partiallywith local populations,the rules of engagement arelighter, the acceptance ofthe force by the local playersis far from being complete

and armed groups remain.

However, other threatsshould not be neglectedespecially espionage that issystematically used by localintelligence services thanksto the recourse to nativecitizens of the countryemployed by the force.This threat is the base of allinterferences, as none ofthem can be carried outagainst a force withoutthe collection of information.An action of terrorism orsabotage is, in fact, alwayspreceded by the collection ofthe information necessary fortargeting and for selectingthe course of action,

as the terrorist action is,in fact, a precisely targetedaction aimed at actingagainst our vulnerabilities,which are more of apsychological nature than

of a real military one.

Similarly, a subversive actioncan only prove efficient ifthe opponent knowsthe morale status ofthe members of the forceand their weaknesses.It will therefore translateinto collection actionsof the opponent on ourorganization, ourmotivations, the

understanding of the truemotivations of the force. Itwill also try to identify howthe force commanders ortheir opinion leaders couldbe discredited, as well as todetect the force members itcould convert/subvert anduse as a relay.

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INTERVENTION STABILIZATION NORMALIZATION

Time ->

Threat

Terrorism

Sabotage

Espionage

Subversion

The threat continuum

Terrorism

Espionage

SubversionSabotage

Organised Crime

Terrorisme

EspionageSubversion

Organised

Crime


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Criminal organizations canonly develop their traffickingactivities within a force ifthey know how it works.They will also look forthe weak links to corrupt

them and use them for theirbenefit.

We must also notice thatthe various players do notexclusively act within theirpreferred TESSOC domain:without probably using thisvocabulary, they haveunderstood and used beforethe armies the principlesof versatility, info-valueand even synergy of

effects!

In this way some terroristorganizations find theirfunds thanks to criminalpractices (drug dealing,bank robberies,...); somecriminal organizations donot hesitate to carry outterrorist acts to weakenstates (for example:cartels in Columbia).

In the past, intelligenceservices used terroristmovements to countertheir opponents(i.e. the attack againstthe pope attributed toSoviet intelligence services).In Iraq, it is difficult to makethe difference betweenthe criminal and the terroristpart in hostage-takings.

An important difficultythat a force is confrontedwith is that services,organizations andindividuals using TESSOCbenefit from an activesupport or, at least, from

the neutrality of all or part

of the local population, be itin a national operation as inthe Ivory Coast or amultinational one as in

Afghanistan. They moveabout within theirenvironment and are allthe more so difficult todetect and to neutralize.

A threat withoutgeographical borders

Another characteristic ofmodern interferences lies inthe fact that the time-space

framework of the operationdoes not limit them.The development ofcommunication, physical ortelecommunication assets,the significant influence roleplayed by the media, haveblown up the geographicaland state frameworks.Although this is probably notthe case for the action of ourforces limited by rules of lawand treaties, this is certainly

the case for the studiedthreat that frees itself fromthese limits without anydifficulty.

The activities linked to

interferences can thus be

launched outside the area

of operation, and evenbefore it starts. Thesepreceding interferences canparticipate to opponents

deterrence, and contributeto its own intelligence beforelarge-scale actions withinthe political-military playthat precedes and goesalong with the militarycommitment. Nowadays, itis not conceivable to imaginemilitary operations thatwould not haveconsequences overthe national territory oranywhere in the world whereFrance has some interests.The October 6 2002 attackagainst the French tankerLimburg in the Yemenitewaters and that of May 82004 against the personnelof the Navy ShipbuildingDirection at Karachi perfectlyillustrate this. France hasbeen targeted because itparticipates actively tooperations in Afghanistan.

Although the terrorist threatis the most flagrant ontheaters of operations, otherthreats should indeed not beneglected.

In this way, during the aircampaign against Serbia in1999, a French officer, postedwith NATO, gave targetinginformation to the Serbians.Some defense personnel

are approached by foreignintelligence services and asalways in this kind of affair,for one discovered, howmany remain secret?

The most insidious threat

remains subversion. It is alsothe most difficult one to fightagainst, insofar as it rarelytranslates into actions likelyto be legally qualified ascrimes or offences. Over

the national territory, it istargeted against the publicopinion. In our hyper-mediasocieties, the smallest pieceof news benefits from aphenomenal resonancechamber amplified byInternet. The broadcastof the Abu Ghraib jail imagesillustrates this point verywell. Subversiveorganizations or individuals

benefit, in their fight, fromthe help of influence agentsactive or not, the first rankof them being televisionchannels. In Vietnam,the American public opinionmainly switched against wardue to reports that showedin quasi real time therealities of the conflict.This type of information,appropriately manipulatedby disinformationtechnicians, will have effectsentailing some consequenceson the theaters.

In order to perpetrate theiracts far from their bases,the organizations andservices must be able tobenefit from some supportin the countries in which

they operate. On ofthe characteristics of our

Western democraticsocieties, including France,is the extreme andespecially ethnical diversityof their population, due to

the presence of more orless important communitiescoming from countries ofthe area of operation;the corollary of this is a widereligious or ideological

diversity. It is within thesecommunities that activistsare recruited and thatsleeping or supportnetworks are developingthemselves.

Countering the threat

As the African wise mansays the foreigner only

sees what he knows.Knowing the threat isthe first step of counter-interference. The other twosteps are its detectionand its neutralization.

Detecting the threat consistsin collecting the securityintelligence and in gatheringthe facts and evidences, inexploiting them in order to

give the force commanderan assessment of the threat.

Neutralizing the threat

consists for the commander,in a first step, in takingmeasures enabling theachievement of a state ofsecurity.This means reaching asatisfactory level ofprotection of information,materials and installationsthat are sensitive toterrorism, espionageand sabotage, and alsothe protection of personnelagainst subversionand organized crime.

Countering interferences onoperations is one of themissions of the DefenseProtection and SecurityAgency. However, the action

that has to be carried out isnot only limited to that ofspecialists, to those whocould be considered as theprofessionals of suspicion.



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Organizationally speaking,the coordination of counter-interference actions withina projected multinationalunit is deemed to be carriedout by the G2X structure,

taking advantage of theconcept developed in theAJP 2.14; it is a doctrine thathas been approved byFrance but that should haveto be translated into facts,by identifying the structuresand by drafting theappropriate procedures.

Our organizations wouldthen be in sync with thoseof our Allies with whom weare bound to be mostfrequently committed.The DPSD has trained

personnel that are preparedto staff the correspondingcells of this G2X.

When specific cases areidentified pertaining tonational citizens, themultinational chain handsthem over to the national

chain, which then takes theappropriate measures. Onthe theater, this chain isrepresented by the DefenseProtection and Securitydetachment deployed

together with the force. Itbrings its assistance tothe various levels ofnational elements commandfor exercising theirresponsibilities as far assecurity is concerned andfirstly to the ForceCommander in case of a

national operation or tothe French Senior Officerin case of a multinationaloperation.

1 DPSD - Directeur de la protectionet de la scurit de la dfense.

2 In French: TESSCO - Terrorisme,lespionnage, le sabotage, lasubversion et le crime organis.

3 AJP 3.2, Chap. 1.64 AJP: Allied Joint Publication.


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However, the behavior of each of us must be the first line of defense facing the opponents threat : compliance tosecurity rules, no angelism even vis--vis native citizens of an angelic faade. One should not hesitate to raise thequestion of the opponents intention and of its likely courses of action, etc. If intelligence partly concerns each ofus with reference to the culture everybody should have and to the contribution of all the personnel involvedin the collection of information, counter-interference cannot solely rely upon the competence of a limited numberof specialists.

It must be part of a culture of discretion, of security and vigilance.


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It thus appearedindispensable to remedy

these problems if we

wanted our army to be

ready to be confronted

to the new conditions

of engagement. Alliesoperations in Iraq or ourown involvement in theIvory Coast were toreinforce that requirement.It has thus been proposedto the Army Chief of Staff toinitiate comprehensivestudies about differentpossible options, and thefirst objective was to definethe stabilization operations

concept and then a doctrine

related to those operations.

An action has then beeninitiated in common withCFAT2 to redefine the LandForces synthetic scenario

that would supportexercises from level 1 to 3.

This action, which is aboutto be finished, shouldprovide the force with a

significant training supportmeans for getting ready tothe stabilization phases ofoperations.

And last, in June 2004,CDEF initiated a study onthe upgrading of the Land

Forces exercise and training

synthetic enemy. An enemythat should serve as areference for building upthe OPFOR to be used duringthe exercises implementingthe new generic scenariowhich would guaranteethe coherence of the entireset of training tools selectedby the Army.

That endeavor had beeninitiated in a very favorable

period:

- NATO had no generic

enemy (AJP 2.4 - GenericOPFOR was still a projectat the time);

- CDEF was believing that

this was a European

common requirement,

beyond our own borders;

- DRM3 s willingness to getinvolved in drafting AJPsand in particular to startworking on a newsynthetic OPFOR.

Moreover an additionalspecific requirement existedand that was a concern forFAT4 and CDEF, the finetuning of SCIPIO, the newsimulation system to beused for CAX within the FAT.This program has beendeveloped by France underCDEF/DSROs5 authority.By the end of 2006, itshould replace BBS, the USprovided tool. SCIPIO is

much more sophisticatedthan BBS, it usesautomated elements toportray basic units at lowerlevel than company. This

constitutes a definite plusfor friendly representationsince it allows a significanteconomy of personnel(LOCON). It was thusnecessary to define a

precise OPFOR doctrine

that could be implemented

within SCIPIO for

portraying OPFOR

automated basic units.

This led to initiating thestudy whose result is nowwell known within most ofFAT units and trainingcenters. This is what thisarticle will develop beforedrawing some lessons forthe future.

The product

It has been developedkeeping in mind a key

word, realism, that couldactually be split into threemain ideas:

The Land Forces

Synthetic OPFORTaking New Threats into Account

The requirements

T

he threat that western forces had to be prepared to confront has evolved a lot since

the vanishing of the Warsaw Pact. However, in spite of the fact that real world engagements,potential threats and even the strategic thinking had all changed, the synthetic training and

exercise OPFOR had only drifted very slightly from the good old Red-Army type one . This issue

appeared particularly vividly during the OPERA 3T exercise, in November 2003 which portrayed

a Fulda Gap type of threat without any asymmetrical dimension whatsoever.

BYCOLONELERICROUSSEL, CDEF/DEO1



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- The taking into accountof the diversity of ourforces frameworks ofengagement,

- The integration ofconventional forces which

could still constitute apotential threat,- Integration of asymmetric

threat (guerilla andterrorist organizations).

The solution selected is atoolbox concept. Thereis no single enemysdescription but a varietyof potential OPFOR which

would allow FAT/FLT6

exercises directors andchiefs of G3/S3 exercisesin schools or battalions tomake their selection, thatthey would organize and

integrate in exercises tobetter fit their objectives.No country books weredeveloped, it would havebeen an error: when wewant a product evolutionaryand adaptable to variousspecific requirements, thedocumentation should notbe fully drafted and fixed.The CDEF commanding

general has alreadyvalidated and publishedBook I which includes 12

scenarios - as a matter offact, it is rather 12 scenariosnuclei - that cover all

potential types offrameworks into whichthe Army could be engagedin the short term to respondto the current operationalcontract. They have beendeveloped jointly with DRMbut they are not a carboncopy of the real worldalthough any knowledgeablereader will be able to

recognize actual or potentialcrisis. The number ofscenarios selected

represents a sufficient

diversity of frameworks of

engagement for the limited

number of exercises ortraining sessions that canbe organized. Book I hasbeen published in Englishand offered to our Europeanpartner through the FINABELforum.

Of course, there stillremains a possibility thatan engagement against

conventional forces occur.Three types of forces have

been selected (which webelieve to be enough)according to the followingcriteria:- GLAISE armed forces

constitute the level 1force. This is the forceof a major regional power.It has a modernequipment that hasbeen bought onthe international market

and it is able to conductcoordinated actions,at least, at division level.

- TOURBE constitutethe second level force.It serves a local powerbut which has however asignificant role at regionallevel. Its equipment isoutdated and not highlyperforming. In spite ofthe personnels highmorale, it is unable toconduct coordinatedactions at a level higherthan combined armsbattalion task force; butthey master quite wellthat level.

- HUMUS is the third level.This is the force of a poorcountry. Very weaklyequipped, it is however

very efficient for whatregards Infantrywarfighting. It is able toconduct locally dreadfulcommando type of

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actions. It is unable toconduct coordinatedactions at a level higherthan combined armscompany task force.

These forces reflect realones because the objectivewas to drift from the Soviet

template and to get closer

to existing or potential

conflict areas, howeverthose have been slightlytransformed in order tomake them less easy torecognize.

Up to this day, the main

effort was the developmentof GLAISE, which isintended to be used asthe main support to buildthe SCIPIOs first OPFORmodelization. This workwas achieved by the endof 2005, it is now validated,translated into English,and readable online byeverybody via the CDEFwebsite on INTRATERRE

(Book II/1). It will bepresented in this magazinein a separate article.

HUMUS has been

the following force to be

developed: its an Africantype synthetic OPFOR.Its the one thats the mostdifferent from GLAISE andthat corresponds the mostto our current requirements.This synthetic OPFORdocument has recently beendistributed to the forcesand to the Army TrainingCommand (CoFAT7) forbeing commented beforevalidation.It is to be noted that it willbe presented differentlyfrom GLAISE. As a matterof fact, on the opposite toGLAISE which could be

more or less defined withconstants, i.e. a doctrineand an organization that arevalid at all time and in anyplace, HUMUS doctrine,

organization and behaviorare supposed to beadaptable to circumstanceThere is thus moreemphasis put on HUMUSstyle, even though the

presented doctrine isunderstandably a morebasic one.Two more specificities areworth to be noted. FirstHUMUS can incorporate ahighly performing privatemilitary firm, capable byitself to give hard time tofriendly forces and tobecome a force multiplierfor HUMUS. And second,courses of action specific

to local environment havebeen developed: offensiveactions in desertenvironment, actions in rainforest, actions in urbanizedareas as well as courses ofactions that include supportprovided by civilian riotersand also crowdmanipulation. Theseinnovations remain howeverdescribed in a very simple

way and will have to beformalized and refined aslessons learned arereported after this OPFORhas been used in exercises;AAR from actual operationswill also be used.

The initiation of TOURBE

study has been delayed,

due, in particular tocommitments taken withinthe FINABEL framework,a topic that will bedeveloped later.

The main innovation of that

study lies in the

description of asymmetric

threats, which, as this isclearly demonstratedespecially in the MiddleEast, represent a seriousthreat against which it isvital to get ready.

A preparatory in-depthstudy analyzing, sincethe 30s, all revolutionaryand guerilla movements,has been conducted by

the Foundation for StrategicResearch at the CDEFrequest, to find out whatwere the main trends and todraw some standardizationdata. It appeared that,

although they seem to beapparently diverse, several

constants can be identified.

It is thus possible to drawout of that study and tothe greatest benefit of allofficers in charge ofpreparing exercises(without having to study atChe Guevaras or BenLadens schools) anirregular forces doctrine,with notions of maneuver,

desired effects, coursesof action, all ingredientsallowing the exercisespreparing teams to developscenarios and MEL/MIL.The correspondingtheoretical elements aredescribed at the beginningof Book III; they can beregarded as being tooschematic and not completeenough but they however

allow serious studies to beconducted about the OPFORbehavior.

A guerilla organization

(the theological liberationmovement) and a terroristmovement (the true faithcombatants) have beencreated out of that study;

those organizations thatare well adapted to thescenario 2 framework ofengagement, can also be

exported towards otherscenarios provided a fewadaptations are brought by

the preparation team. As amatter of fact, and morethan with a conventional

force, the description aswell as the shaping of anasymmetric OPFOR arevery much dependant

on the scenario andthe adaptations have to becarefully made in order to

keep the OPFOR realistic.This OPFOR is also in the

process of being validated

and available on the

INTRATERRE network.

An archipelagic type ofguerilla, similar tothe pirates of Sunda Straits,

is currently being defined. Itcould become an interestingjoint OPFOR but stillrequires a lot of work beforebeing usable. The documenthas not been distributed.For the moment, the studieson other asymmetric typesof OPFOR have stoppedwhile waiting for the resultsof multinationalcooperation (see below).

What should now followthese studies?

Prospects

and developments

First, the Army should takethe time to get acculturatedto these studies. After arather gradual start, thesestudies are now well

publicized since they havebeen the object of severalpedagogical presentationsat different levels.A major step has beenthe presentation of thestudies to the seniorcommanders during theirperiodic conference in

January 2006. COMFATand CoFAT have both issuedguidances to have this newsynthetic OPFOR well takeninto account by theirsubordinate commands.

However this work is notsomething that the Armydiscovers out of the bluesince the study has notbeen conducted by CDEFalone: it is the result of alasting and well developed

collaboration: DRMproviding the foundations

(several models of crisisserved as a basis forbuilding up the scenarios,models of real armedforces, and participation



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of experts in all draftingseminars); CFAT wrote aGLAISE first draft; the Armybrought an importantparticipation to GLAISE andHUMUS follow on drafts(April - December 2005).It has to be noted that manyDirectorates for CombatDevelopments got involvedsignificantly - which wasvital - in the developmentof that study, this is a verynoticeable sign that threatevolution is well advancedin our trainingorganization.

To write is one thing, but

now one has to implement

what has been written.

CDEF DSRO is currentlytranslating organizationand doctrine into digitizedcode. This will be aprotracted project due to

the vastness of the task:digitization of GLAISEorganization is alreadyfinished, the doctrine isnow being processed. Thefirst AURIGE exercise usingGLAISE full capabilitiescould be conducted earlyin 2007; HUMUS shouldfollow. CEPC8 will of courseinclude GLAISE in itsexercises as DSRO deliversthe product components.

In addition there will befurther developments tothe study itself. During

the FINABEL Chiefs ofArmy Staffs meeting,the French Chief of staffoffered to exploit thatstudy which he offeredto our partners, aiming

thus at developing aEuropean combinedsynthetic exerciseOPFOR. This was a verynatural proposal sinceour engagement arealways moremultinational,the same for ourexercises starting fromlevel 2 on,and in additionthe requirements for

multinationalinteroperability increaseregularly. That offer hasbeen positively receivedby the other chiefs whodecided to make thatstudy a priority for theyear 2006, with, as agoal, to make it anoperational product fortraining (which is aninnovation for FINABEL).

Corresponding studieshave started, underthe conduct of theFrench representative.It remainsto be asked if ourpartners vision of whatis an exercise and themodelizationof the threat will permitthe development of acommon product.

And last, since our forcesengagement has to beregarded as being partof a joint effort, the sameshould be done for theexercises synthetic OPFOR.Indeed these studies haveup to now been mostly

conducted by an Armyworkforce and this for apractical reason, becauseit was for the Army thatthe requirement wasurgent. Supplementary

studies have to beenvisaged not only to

depict how OPFOR air and

maritime forces could

threaten a land force but

also to describe a more

global threat against

friendly air and maritime

components. These studiesare to begin shortly andthey should lead to thedevelopment of a jointOPFOR corresponding

to the NATO expectedproduct. Collaborationon that topic with othernations under DRMsguidance should be lookedfor.

1 Forces Employment DoctrineCenter /Forces Employmentand Command StructuresDivision.

2 Land Forces Command.3 Military Intelligence

Directorate which, inter alia,represents France within allNATOs organizations thatelaborate intelligence related

doctrine.4 Land Forces.5 Forces Employment and

Command Structures Division/Simulation and OperationalResearch Division.

6 Land Logistic Forces.7 Commandement de la

formation de larme de terre.8 Brigade CP Battle Command

Training Center.

Our forces should soon be provided with an advanced tool enabling them not onlyto conduct training, including within a joint environment, but also to think about

their maneuver and doctrine. It could also be used as a support to studyingthe capabilities that we ought to require in the short term. Just like any other tool, itwill only produce what we ask it to produce and its capabilities are still to be furtherdeveloped.

SIRPATERRE

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GLAISEGLAISE Army comprises two major elements: the regular armed forces (400,000 pers.) and a Law Defenderscorps (80,000 pers.). Apparently similar to Vermillion, GLAISE is anArmy corresponding to the one of a regionalpower and that includes powerful and modern forces well organized and equipped like the Former Warsaw Pactwas. However, GLAISE forces are very different as far as structures are concerned; its Armys basic tactical elementis the battalion. In addition, the brigades are much less numerous than the Warsaw Pact ones and they have aternary type of structure.GLAISE Army has three major characteristics. First, it favors defensive doctrines. Contrary to our former genericenemy, GLAISE fights on its territory, perfectly knowing how to command and conduct mobile or static defense,

fighting on in depth prepared positions adapted to the terrain. They do not hesitate to leave vacuum areas withintheir field configuration. GLAISEs logistics organization relies on pre-positioned stockpiles and civilianinfrastructure facilities; its weak transportation capability does not enable it to conduct significant operationsoutside its borders. GLAISE frequently makes use of deception and decoy positions. GLAISE has at its disposal anamazingly important amount of firepower (field and air defense artillery)

The major originality of GLAISE Army is then the presence at its sides of perfectly trained and fanaticizedideological forces. Constituting the Praetorian guard of the regime, they are in charge of ensuring the countrysinternal security, and in particular the defense of the capital city governmental sites as well as the one of the majorstrategic

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