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Do nuclear weapons have anyrational utility?Frank BarnabyPublished online: 22 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Frank Barnaby (1995) Do nuclear weapons have any rationalutility?, Medicine and War, 11:3, 67-70, DOI: 10.1080/07488009508409224

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07488009508409224

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Part III

THE FUTUREWAYS OUT OF THE

NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

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Do Nuclear Weapons Have any RationalUtility?

FRANK BARNABY

If the leaders of the nuclear weapon states have their way nuclear weaponswill remain of central importance in international affairs for the fore-seeable future. The number of tactical and strategic nuclear weaponsoperationally deployed by the United States and Russia will, according tocurrent plans, be cut from today's total of 50,000 to a total of about10,000 within the next ten years. Nevertheless, American and Russianpolitical leaders, supported by some of their military leaders, continueto claim that their nuclear weapons have significant utility. And thebehaviour of British, French, and Chinese leaders suggests that they alsobelieve that nuclear weapons are useful.

Nuclear Policies of Military and Political Leaders

It is not surprising that some military leaders argue in favour of the con-tinued deployment and modernization of nuclear weapons. After all, somemilitary careers - in, for example, the strategic nuclear submarine fleets -continue to depend on nuclear arsenals. Yet most military officers insistthat the decision to use nuclear weapons would generally be a politicalone, taken for political rather than military reasons.

Because the military now have an arsenal of conventional weapons ofvarious destructive powers, including very powerful ones, which can bedelivered with great accuracy, the number of occasions when it could beargued that nuclear weapons are the only (or the best) weapons whichcan achieve a certain military objective is vanishingly small. The military-technological fact of life is that very powerful conventional weapons cannow be delivered with such precision that the use of nuclear weapons canno longer be justified. For this reason some senior military officers arearguing for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Put simply, in today's worldnuclear weapons are obsolete. And the moral, legal, military, and politicalreasons against the use of nuclear weapons are so strong that the use ofconventional weapons would be the preferred option under all circum-stances.

Even though nuclear weapons have no military utility, the politicalleaders of the nuclear weapon states continue to rationalize their posses-sion of nuclear weapons by claiming that they improve national - and evenglobal - security. This argument is old hat. Throughout the Cold War,

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68 HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

Western politicians justified their nuclear forces on the grounds that theyprevented (i.e., deterred) a major international war - conventional as wellas nuclear - in Europe.

And they still argue that nuclear weapons continue to deter conventionaland nuclear war in the post-Cold War world. The Warsaw Pact has dis-appeared but, they say, the world may be even less stable now than it wasduring the Cold War. The Western nuclear weapon powers argue that theystill need nuclear weapons in case Russia again becomes a threat or in casethey become involved in a future war in some unstable region in which oneof the combatants has nuclear weapons.

Many doubt that nuclear weapons have played any role in preventingwar in Europe. But, even if they did, few can really believe that Russia willagain become a serious enough threat to require deterring with nuclearweapons. Even those who predict a war between Russia and the Ukrainedo not expect it to spread to Europe. Nor is it really credible that thedeclared nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russia, the UnitedKingdom, France, and China) will drop nuclear weapons on Third Worldtargets.

There is, of course, a fundamental flaw in the argument used by thenuclear weapon powers. If they claim that nuclear weapons are good forthem, they cannot at the same time argue that other countries, like Israel,India, Pakistan, and so on, should not have them too, to increase theirsecurity and to deter wars in their regions. It is simply not credible toargue that India, for example, should not have them to deter a nuclear-armed China, the country India sees as its greatest threat. And, of course,if India has nuclear weapons, is not Pakistan justified in wanting a nucleardeterrent too when it is in conflict with a nuclear-capable India overKashmir?

Now that the American and Russian nuclear arsenals are being reduced,it is being implied that nuclear policies of the great powers are moving to apolicy of minimum nuclear deterrence, based on a relatively small nucleararsenals. But a world containing nations deploying nuclear weapons, albeita relatively small number of them, cannot be maintained indefinitely. Itis most probable that for so long as nuclear weapons remain in nationalarsenals more countries will acquire them. If large-scale nuclear weaponproliferation is to be avoided, nuclear weapons must be removed fromnational control, preferably abolished.

To keep nuclear weapons to deter countries which may possibly acquirethem in the future is, then, an ineffective policy, likely to encourage thespread of nuclear weapons. The spread of nuclear weapons will reduce thesecurity of all countries, including the declared nuclear weapon powers.Therefore, the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free world is likely to be seenincreasingly to be in the national interest of these nuclear weapon powers.

So far as political leaders are concerned, the utility of nuclear weaponsmay be confined to their mere possession. The use of the weapons may not

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RATIONAL UTILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 69

enter the calculations of political leaders. The political utility of nuclearweapons will not be the same for all the nuclear weapon powers. TakeBritish nuclear weapons as an example. British political leaders may wellbelieve that the political utility of their nuclear weapons are mainly relatedto Britain's ability to retain its permanent seat on the UN Security Council.This may depend on Britain remaining a nuclear weapon power.

Politicians, among others, are impressed by the fact that all the currentpermanent members of the Security Council are nuclear weapon states. Butthey are also aware that Britain's seat is increasingly threatened byGermany and Japan. In the post-Cold War world, economic power reflectsinternational prestige and status more than military nuclear power. Astime goes on, nuclear weapons may well count for less and less in thecorridors of the United Nations.

Reasons for Acquiring Nuclear Weapons

The most important reasons why countries may acquire nuclear weaponsare: prestige; the need to solve real or perceived security threats; anddomestic political motives. There is also likely to be a 'domino' effect insome regions.

As described above, prestige may be a central reason why the UnitedKingdom is keeping and modernizing its nuclear weapons. The same argu-ment probably applies to France. Smaller countries may well see a nuclearweapon force as a way of achieving leadership in their regions. This mayexplain Iraq's nuclear ambitions.

Political leaders may want to develop nuclear weapons for internalpolitical reasons - to satisfy the demands of the military, to boost domesticpolitical prestige, or to distract the attention of the population fromdeteriorating social or economic conditions. Some countries have, or per-ceive that they have, security problems which they believe may beremoved, or reduced, by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. India, forexample, may have initiated a nuclear weapon programme because of a(perceived?) security threat from a nuclear armed China. And, in turn,Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme may be a reaction to feelings ofinsecurity produced by India's nuclear capabilities.

Changing Nuclear Policies

History shows that once a country acquires nuclear weapons it will con-tinue to improve them by developing new types and to create increasinglysophisticated delivery systems to carry them. In particular, the accuracy ofthe delivery of warheads and the reliability of warheads will be steadilyimproved. These developments will inevitably result in changes in thenuclear policy of the country concerned.

Nuclear policies will change because the targets at which nuclear

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70 HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

weapons are aimed depend mainly on the accuracy with which they can bedelivered. Inaccurate weapons are seen to be useful to support a policy ofnuclear deterrence, by threatening an enemy with unacceptable death anddestruction. The targets for such a nuclear deterrence policy are theenemy's cities, civilian population, and industry. These are the hostages tonuclear deterrence.

As the accuracy of delivery of nuclear warheads increases, they becomemore capable of destroying even very hardened military targets.Adversaries believe that accurate nuclear weapons are targeted on militaryinstallations rather than cities; the hostages to deterrence disappear.Nuclear war fighting, based on the destruction of hostile military forces,then becomes the preferred policy. Generally speaking, nuclear policies donot necessarily change because political leaders want to adopt a nuclear-war fighting policy, but because technological developments make changenecessary.

Moves away from nuclear deterrence by mutual assured destruction andtowards nuclear war fighting explain why many of the nuclear weaponstates will not adopt a no-first-use policy, promising not to be the first touse nuclear weapons. In fact, the failure to adopt a no-first-use implies thatthe country has a nuclear-war fighting policy which may require a pre-emptive first nuclear strike.

(15 May 1995)

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