DNVGL-SE-0470 Verification of onshore LNG and gas facilities

The electronic pdf version of this document, available free of chargefrom http://www.dnvgl.com, is the officially binding version.

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SERVICE SPECIFICATION

DNVGL-SE-0470 Edition August 2017

Verification of onshore LNG and gasfacilities

FOREWORD

DNV GL service specifications contain procedural requirements for obtaining and retainingcertificates and other conformity statements to the objects, personnel, organisations and/oroperations in question.

© DNV GL AS August 2017

Any comments may be sent by e-mail to [email protected]

This service document has been prepared based on available knowledge, technology and/or information at the time of issuance of thisdocument. The use of this document by others than DNV GL is at the user's sole risk. DNV GL does not accept any liability or responsibilityfor loss or damages resulting from any use of this document.

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Service specification — DNVGL-SE-0470. Edition August 2017 Page 3Verification of onshore LNG and gas facilities

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CHANGES – CURRENT

GeneralThis document supersedes the October 2010 edition of DNV-DSS-315.The purpose of the revision of this service document is to comply with the new DNV GL document reference code system and profile requirements following the merger between DNV and GL in 2013. Changes mainly consist of updated company name and references to other documents within the DNV GL portfolio.

Some references in this service document may refer to documents in the DNV GL portfolio not yet published (planned published within 2017). In such cases please see the relevant legacy DNV or GL document. References to external documents (non-DNV GL) have not been updated.

Editorial correctionsIn addition to the above stated changes, editorial corrections may have been made.

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CONTENTS

Changes – current.................................................................................................. 3

Section 1 General....................................................................................................51.1 General............................................................................................. 51.2 Risk based verification..................................................................... 61.3 Definitions and abbreviations........................................................... 91.4 References...................................................................................... 13

Section 2 Principles of risk based verification...................................................... 142.1 Purpose of section.......................................................................... 142.2 Verification principles..................................................................... 142.3 Selection of level of verification..................................................... 162.4 Communications..............................................................................19

Section 3 Service overview................................................................................... 203.1 General........................................................................................... 203.2 Service process...............................................................................203.3 Project initiation............................................................................. 223.4 Project execution............................................................................223.5 Verification documents................................................................... 28

Appendix A Selection of verification level.............................................................29A.1 General........................................................................................... 29A.2 Trigger questions............................................................................29

Appendix B Generic detailed verification scopes of work tables............................32B.1 Purpose...........................................................................................32B.2 Critical elements.............................................................................32

Appendix C Examples of verification documents...................................................93C.1 Verification documents................................................................... 93C.2 Use of quality management systems.............................................. 95C.3 Document forms............................................................................. 97

Changes – historic.............................................................................................. 100


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SECTION 1 GENERAL

1.1 General

1.1.1 Introduction

1.1.1.1 This service specification (SE) gives the criteria for and guidance on verification of the integrity(safety, environmental and reliability) of parts of onshore LNG (both import and export) and gas receivingfacilities during various phases of new developments and modifications.

1.1.1.2 This document is an object-specific service specification conforming to the philosophy defined in thetop level document DNVGL-SE-0474 Risk based verification.

1.1.2 Objectives

1.1.2.1 The objectives of this specification are to:

— describe DNV GL’s verification services for onshore LNG and gas receiving facilities during design,construction, and commissioning,

— provide guidance for the client and other parties for the selection of the level of involvement of thosecarrying out verification activities, whether quantitatively as a result of a quantitative risk assessment orqualitatively by simple trigger questions

— provide a common platform for defining and manage the scope and extent of verification activities.

1.1.3 Scope of application for verification

1.1.3.1 This specification may be adopted for the verification of parts of onshore liquefied natural gasand gas receiving facilities during the project development phase starting from detailed design up to andincluding commissioning and start-up.

1.1.3.2 The LNG and gas facilities covered in this specification comprise the following critical systems:

— support structures and foundations— non-cryogenic critical vessels, piping and equipment— cryogenic critical vessels, piping and equipment (including transfer piping)— LNG storage tanks— open hazardous drains— pressure relief systems— ignition prevention and control systems— emergency shutdown system— blowdown system— fire and gas detection system— fire and blast protection— emergency power supply— escape and evacuation means— emergency communication systems— environmental control.

which are applied in various configurations and tailored to each particular project’s specific requirements.The specification does not cover the following:


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— Jetty, mooring and marine related facilities (with the exception of the shore based transfer systems andassociated safety equipment. Jetty structures are covered by DNVGL-SE-0477).

— The import and export pipelines within plant battery limits (this is covered by DNVGL-SE-0475).

1.1.3.3 Compliance to CE marking directives such as Pressure Equipment Directive (2014/68/EU), MachineryEquipment Directive 2006/42/EC and Explosion Proof Devices ATEX 2014/34/EU which are applicable in theEuropean Community are not covered in this specification.

1.1.3.4 This SE describes the principle of a levelled verification involvement, where the extent of verificationinvolvement is linked to the risks associated with part or all of the facility.

1.1.3.5 The primary scope of DNV GL’s verification work is the verification of the integrity of gas facilities andthe safety of its personnel and those in close proximity to it. Other aspects, such as the verification of theenvironmental safety of the facility, or its ability to meet the client’s business objectives, may be included inDNV GL’s scope of work if desired by the client.

1.1.3.6 Statutory verification (or certification) of onshore gas facilities to the requirements of nationalauthorities is not included specifically in the scope of application of this SE. Such verification (or certification)shall be governed by the regulations of the relevant authority. However, if detailed procedures are not givenby these authorities, this SE will be applied by DNV GL for its work.

1.1.4 Structure of this documentThis document consists of three sections and 3 appendices:

— Section 1 explains the relationship between this document and DNV GL’s overall risk-based verificationprocess.

— Sec.2 explains the principles of DNV GL’s verification process with its risk-based levels of involvement, andhow the level of involvement for a particular project is defined.

— Sec.3 describes the verification process and the activities for each of the project phases.— App.A gives guidance on the selection of verification level, preferably as the result from a quantitative risk

assessment or alternatively, qualitatively as a result of the posing of trigger questions.— App.B gives a generic detailed scope of work tables for all phases and all levels of involvement. These

tables are the basis for the development of project-specific scopes of work tables.— App.C gives example verification documents and describes the documents issued during and as a result of

the verification process. The use of quality management systems is addressed here also.

1.2 Risk based verification

1.2.1 General

1.2.1.1 This SE describes the principles of verification of the safety and integrity of natural gas facilities forall phases.The risk based verification concept is described in DNVGL-SE-0474 and visualized in Figure 1-1.

1.2.1.2 The verification plan is the pivot element, with the asset specification, risk assessment and definitionof involvement level as input and the verification execution being the implementation.

1.2.2 Verification’s role in hazard management

1.2.2.1 Major accident hazards are identified in a safety assessment by an analysis of the risks to thefacility’s personnel using suitable definitions of such accidents.


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1.2.2.2 Critical elements are those parts of the facilities and such parts of the facilities (both hardware andsoftware), or any part thereof:

— the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to; or— a purpose of which is to prevent; or limit— the effect of a major accident and/or impact on project specific objectives.

1.2.2.3 Performance requirements are statements which can be expressed in qualitative or quantitativeterms, of the performance required of a system, item of equipment, person or procedure, and which is usedas the basis for managing the risk– e.g. planning, measuring, control or audit – through the lifecycle of thefacilities. It can be:

— a criterion or a standard of performance with which assessed performance may be compared— an availability/reliability standard; a probability that an HSE or business critical system will be available

for its required function under a defined load— an endurance period: a period of time over which an HSE or business critical function is stated to remain

functional under a defined load— an impairment criterion/threshold: a specified condition, which defines impairment of an HSE or business

critical function.

1.2.2.4 Verification plan is a document describing the process and activities required for verifying that allcritical elements meet project objectives. This will form the scope of work for the verifier.

1.2.2.5 Verification is the process whereby DNV GL as an independent and competent party assesses that acritical element will be, has been, and will continue to be suitable to meet project performance requirements.A graphical representation of this process is shown in Figure 1-1.

1.2.3 Risk-based verification planning

1.2.3.1 The selection of the level of verification shall depend on the level of risk a particular item adds tothe overall risk to the facility. The planning can be simplified or detailed. This is further described in DNVGL-SE-0474.

1.2.3.2 This service specification addresses both approaches as input into the preparation of a verificationplan.

Guidance note:Risk can be evaluated based on safety, environmental impact, business, schedule, public relations, reputation or other criteria setby the client.The generic scopes of work tables are generated based on safety and integrity risks. Where other risks, such as environment orbusiness, are required by the client to be considered during the verification process, the principles set out in this document may beused to modify the generic scopes of work tables given in App.C.

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1.2.3.3 In view of the complexity of many gas facilities, DNV GL recommends strongly that the verificationlevel be derived from the results of risk assessments of the facility.

Guidance note:Only for simple natural gas facilities, with consequently lower levels of risk would DNV GL consider that simplified verificationplanning using the trigger questions and generic Verification scope set out in App.A and App.B to be justifiable.For novel technology for which there are no applicable standards to verify against, technology qualification according to proceduresas defined in DNVGL-RP-A203 Technology qualification can be used as input for verification.



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Figure 1-1 DNV GL risk based verification flow-chart

1.2.4 Certificate of conformity

1.2.4.1 A certificate of conformity may be issued by DNV GL to confirm compliance according to the scope ofwork. An example is given in App.C.

1.2.4.2 The DNV GL certificate of conformity confirms that, after performing verification according to a DNVGL defined scope of work, DNV GL has found the natural gas facility to conform to a given DNV GL standardor acceptable international standards.


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1.2.4.3 Usually DNV GL performs the complete scope of work for all phases. However, in somecircumstances, DNV GL may accept external independent review certificates, for example for pressurevessels. This shall be reflected in the text of the certificate.

1.2.4.4 A statement of conformity is issued in all other instances where certificate of conformity is notapplicable. See App.C for further details.

1.3 Definitions and abbreviations

1.3.1 General

1.3.1.1 Relevant definitions in EN 1473:2007 also apply to this service specification.

1.3.2 Verbal formsVerbal forms used are given in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1 Definitions of verbal forms

Term Definition

shall indicates requirements strictly to be followed in order to conform to this documentand from which no deviation is permitted

should indicates that among several possibilities, one is recommended as particularlysuitable, without mentioning or excluding others, or that a certain course of actionis preferred but not necessarily required.

may verbal form used to indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of thedocument

1.3.3 TermsTerms used are given in Table 1-2.

Table 1-2 Definitions of terms

Term Definition

certification third-party issue of a statement, based on a decision following review, thatfulfilment of specified requirements has been demonstrated related to products,processes or systemsReview shall in this context mean verification of the suitability, adequacy andeffectiveness of selection and determination activities, and the results of theseactivities, with regard to fulfilment of specified requirements by an object ofconformity assessment (see ISO 17000:2004).

client DNV GL’s contractual partner, it may be the purchaser, the owner or the contractor

construction phase all phases during construction, including fabrication, installation, testing and pre-commissioning, up until the installation or system is mechanically complete andsafe to receive and/or export gas or LNG. In relation to onshore facilities, thisinclude both onsite and offsite fabrication, site assembly and integration, tie-in,pressure testing, pre-commissioning and repair.


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Term Definition

commissioningphase

activities after pre-commissioning when gas or LNG are introduced into theinstallation up until the complete installation is rendered safe and operable forintended operations

critical element parts of an installation which prevent, control or mitigate identified major hazardsand the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to impairment ofthe defined safety objectives. Safety critical elements represent the barriers whichprevent, control or mitigate the major accident scenarios.

critical equipment item of equipment or component or assembly the failure of which could cause orcontribute substantially to impairment of the defined safety objectives

design all related engineering to design of the onshore facilities, including structuralsupports, pressure containment, safety systems, as well as material and corrosionaspects

design phase an initial phase that takes a systematic approach to the production ofspecifications, drawings and other documents to ensure that the onshoreinstallation meets specified requirements (including design reviews to ensure thatdesign output is verified against design input requirements).

fabrication activities related to the assembly of objects with a defined purpose. In relationto the onshore facilities, fabrication typically refers to the process of assembly ortransformation of e.g. plates, profiles and pipes etc into production equipmentand facilities. These may be built fully on-site or built offsite in parts andtransferred to site for assembly or integration.

hazard a deviation (departure from the design and operating intention) which could causedamage, injury or other form of loss (Chemical Industries Association HAZOPguide)

hazardidentification(HAZID)

a technique for the identification of all significant hazards associated with theparticular activity under consideration (ISO-31010 Risk Management - RiskAssessment Techniques)

hazard operabilitystudy (HAZOP)

the application of a formal systematic critical examination to the process andengineering intentions of new or existing facilities to assess the hazard potentialof mal-operation or mal-function of individual items of equipment and theirconsequential effects on the facility as a whole (Chemical Industries AssociationHAZOP guide)

manufacture making of articles or materials, often in bulk. In relation to onshore facilities,this typically refers to activities for the production of various components undercontracts from one or more contractor or supplier.

major hazard a deviation (departure from the design and operating intention) which could causeunacceptable damage, injury or other form of loss

onshore gasfacilities

onshore process plants for regasification of LNG or receiving, treatment and/orliquefaction of natural gas

operations (phase) the phase when the gas facilities are being used for the purpose for which it wasdesigned

performancerequirement

a description (qualitative or quantitative statement) of the essential requirementsto be met, maintained or provide on demand by a system or item of equipment inorder for it to satisfactorily fulfil its purpose


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Term Definition

risk the qualitative or quantitative likelihood of an accident or unplanned eventoccurring, considered in conjunction with the potential consequences of such afailure. In quantitative terms, risk is the quantified probability of a defined failuremode times its quantified consequence.

Guidance note:Risk is not only related to physical failure modes, but also to operational errors,human errors and so on. For some risks the functional failures or physical failuremodes contributes less than 20% while more than 80% of the risk relates to otherdevices.


risk reductionmeasures

those measures taken to reduce the risks to the operation of onshore facilities andto the health and safety of personnel associated with it or in its vicinity by:

— reduction in the probability of failure— mitigation of the consequences of failure.

Guidance note:The usual order of preference of risk reduction measures is:

— inherent safety

— prevention

— detection

— control

— mitigation

— emergency response.


project objectives the safety, integrity and business goals for the design, construction, operation anddecommissioning of the gas facilities including acceptance criteria for the level ofrisk acceptable to the client

safety objectives the safety goals in terms of functionality, reliability/availability and survivabilityfor the design, construction and operation of the natural gas facility includingacceptance criteria for the level of risk acceptable to the client

statement ofconformity

a statement or report signed by a qualified party affirming that, at the time ofassessment, the defined onshore installation phase, or collection of activities, metthe requirements stated by the client

verification an examination to confirm that an activity, a product or a service is in accordancewith specified requirements.The examination shall be based on information, which can be proved true, basedon facts obtained through observation, measurement, test or other means.

Guidance note:It should be noted that there is a distinct difference between verification andcertification.The scope of work for verification is ultimately decided by the customer, while thescope of work for certification is ultimately decided by DNV GL (or the nationalauthorities when DNV GL issues certificates on their behalf).ISO 8402: 1994 definition: Verification: Confirmation by examination and provisionof objective evidence that specified requirements have been fulfilled.



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Term Definition

verification plan a plan which defines the scope of the work (sow) for verification. It includes;verification objectives, elements to be verified, performance requirements, levelof involvement by party and type of verification activity. (see DNVGL-SE-0474Sec.2)

1.3.4 AbbreviationsAbbreviations used are given in Table 1-3.

Table 1-3 Abbreviations

Abbreviation Description

ALARP as low as reasonably practicable

C&E cause and effect

CFD computational fluid dynamics

D&ID ducting and instrumentation diagram

EC European Community

ESD emergency shutdown system

ESDV emergency shutdown valve

ESSA emergency systems survivability analysis

FERA fire and explosion risk analysis

FGS fire and gas system

HAZID hazard identification (assessment)

HAZOP hazard operability (study)

HVAC heating, ventilation and air conditioning

HIPPS high integrity pressure protection system

ICS integrated control system

LNG liquefied natural gas

MPQT manufacturing procedure qualification testing

MPS manufacturing procedure specification

NDT non-destructive testing

PCS process control system

PFD process flow diagram

PFP passive fire protection

PSD process shutdown system

QRA quantitative risk analysis


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Abbreviation Description

RAM reliability availability maintainability

SE service specification

SIL safety integrity level

UPS uninterruptible power supply

VAR verification activity report

WPS welding procedure specification

WPQR welding procedure qualification record

1.4 ReferencesTable 1-4 Internal references

Document code Title

DNVGL-SE-0474 Risk based verification

DNVGL-SE-0475 Verification and certification of submarine pipelines

DNVGL-SE-0477 Risk based verification of offshore structures

DNVGL-SE-0479 Verification of process facilities

DNVGL-RP-A203 Technology qualification

Table 1-5 External references

Document code Title

HAZOP 1979, Chemical Industries Association Limited, London

ISO 8402 Quality – Vocabulary, 1994, International Organization for Standardization, Geneva

BS 4778 Quality Vocabulary, Part 2 Quality Concepts and Related Definitions, 1991, British StandardsInstitute, London

EN 45011 General Criteria for Certification Bodies Operating Product Certification, 1998, EuropeanCommittee for Standardization, Brussels

Relevant technical specifications which can be used as references are given in App.B. The main standards forLNG facilities addressed in this document are:

Table 1-6 Technical specifications

Document code Title

EN1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas - Design of Onshore Installations

NFPA 59A Standard for Production, Storage and handling of Liquefied Natural Gas.


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SECTION 2 PRINCIPLES OF RISK BASED VERIFICATION

2.1 Purpose of section

2.1.1 Objectives

2.1.1.1 The objectives of this section are to provide:

— an introduction to the principles of verification the safety and integrity of onshore LNG and gas receivingfacilities

— an introduction to the principles of risk-based levels of verification activity and— guidance on the selection of levels of verification.

2.2 Verification principles

2.2.1 Purpose of verification

2.2.1.1 Verification constitutes a systematic and independent examination of the various phases in the life ofa natural gas facility to determine whether it has sufficient integrity to meet its safety objectives.

2.2.1.2 Verification activities are expected to identify errors or failures or non-compliance to agreedperformance requirements in the safety and integrity-related work associated with the natural gas facility andto contribute to reducing the risks to its operation and to the health and safety of personnel associated with itor in its vicinity.

2.2.1.3 Verification is primarily focused on integrity and human safety, but business risk (cost and schedule)may be addressed also if required by the client.

2.2.2 Verification as a complementary activity

2.2.2.1 Verification shall be complementary to routine design, construction and operations activities and nota substitute for them. Therefore, although verification will take into account the work, and the assurance ofthat work, carried out by the client and its contractors, it is possible that verification will duplicate some workthat has been carried out previously by other parties involved in the natural gas facility.

2.2.2.2 The verification plan shall be developed and implemented in such a way as to minimise additionalwork, and cost, to maximise its effectiveness. The development of the verification plan shall depend onthe findings from the examination of quality management systems, the examination of documents and theexamination of project activities.

2.2.3 Risk-based levels of verification

2.2.3.1 To achieve a DNV GL certificate of conformity for a natural gas facility a verification of the activitiesdescribed by the scope of work defined within this SE first shall take place.

2.2.3.2 The level of verification activity is differentiated according to the overall risk to the facility andto individual parts of it. If the risk to the facility (or a particular part) is higher, the level of verificationinvolvement is higher. Conversely, if the risk to the facility (or a particular part) is lower, the level ofverification activities can be reduced, without any reduction in their effectiveness.


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2.2.3.3 The extent of verification of gas facilities is categorised into low, medium and high. A summary ofthe levels of involvement is given in Table 2-1.

2.2.3.4 It is the prerogative of the client of the natural gas facility to decide the level of verification. Theselection should consider the factors given in this section. The selection of the most suitable verificationlevel may be guided by using the information gained from a quantitative risk assessment, or alternativelyqualitatively by trigger questions, as described in App.A. Further guidance is provided in DNVGL-SE-0474Risk based verification.

2.2.3.5 Where DNV GL is issuing the certificate of conformity for the facility, DNV GL will decide on theappropriate scope and use the same type of questions to evaluate the suitability of the selected level.

2.2.3.6 Different levels of verification can be chosen for different phases of the natural gas facility’s design,construction or commissioning, or even within the same phase if necessary. For example, the design ofa particular component or unit may be innovative and considered high risk whereas the construction andinstallation methods are well-known and considered low risk. The converse might be true also.

2.2.3.7 The level of verification can be reduced or increased during a phase if the originally chosen level isconsidered too rigorous or too lenient, as new information on the risks to the natural gas facility becomesavailable.

2.2.3.8 Verification should be planned in close co-operation with the client and each of its contractors,to provide a scope of work that is tailor-made to the schedule of each production process or activity, i.e.to make the verification activities, surveillance and hold points, an integrated activity and not a delayingactivity.

Guidance note:Many contractors have adequate quality control systems and quality control departments, with competent personnel to perform,for example, inspection at pressure vessel manufacturers.In that case, not all verification work need be done by DNV GL personnel. Where applicable, the various inspections may be carriedout by competent persons other than DNV GL personnel.In that situation DNV GL’s verification activities may comprise:

— reviewing the competence of the contractor’s personnel

— auditing their working methods and their performance of that work

— reviewing the documents produced by them.


2.2.3.9 Verification will direct greatest effort at those elements of the natural gas facility whose failure orreduced performance will have the most significant impact on safety and integrity.

2.2.3.10 The degree of confidence placed in a certificate by its users depends on their degree of confidencein the verification carried out. Therefore, the level of verification will be stated on the certificate of conformityfor the facility.

2.2.3.11 If more than one verification level has been used for a phase, then the lowest level will be reportedon the facility’s certificate, and the additional verification activities will be identified and described in theverification report.


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2.3 Selection of level of verification

2.3.1 Selection factors

2.3.1.1 The selection of the level of verification shall depend on the criticality of each of the elements thathave an impact on the management of hazards and associated risk levels of the facility. This is illustrated byFigure 2-1.

2.3.1.2 The contribution of each element shall be judged qualitatively and/or quantitatively and shall use,where possible, quantified risk assessment data to provide a justifiable basis for any decisions made.

2.3.1.3 Selection factors are the:

— overall safety objectives for the facility— assessment of the risks associated with the facility and the measures taken to reduce these risks— degree of technical innovation in the facility— experience of the contractors in carrying out similar work— quality management systems of the client and its contractors.

Table 2-1 Levels of verification - summary of involvement

Level Description of involvement Guidance for application on the level of involvement

Low — Review of general principles and productionsystems during design, construction andcommissioning

— Review of principal design documents,construction and commissioning procedures andqualification reports

— Site attendance only during system testing— Less comprehensive involvement than level

medium

— Proven facility designs with relativelyharmless contents and/or installed in benignenvironmental conditions

— Established design; manufacturing andinstallation by experienced contractors

— Low consequences of failure from a safety pointof view (or environmental or commercial, ifrequired)

— Relaxed to normal completion schedule

Medium — Review of general principles and productionsystems during design, construction andcommissioning

— Detailed review of principal and other selecteddesign documents with support of simplifiedindependent analyses

— Detailed review of construction andcommissioning procedures

— Full time attendance during (procedure)qualification and review of the resulting reports

— Audit-based or intermittent presence at site

— Facilities in moderate or well-controlledenvironmental conditions

— Facilities with a moderate degree of novelty— Medium consequences of failure from a safety

point of view, (or environmental or commercial,if required

— Ordinary completion schedule


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Level Description of involvement Guidance for application on the level of involvement

High — Review of general principles and productionsystems during design, construction andcommissioning

— Detailed review of most design documents withsupport of simplified and advanced independentanalyses

— Detailed review of construction andcommissioning procedures

— Full-time attendance during (procedure)qualification and review of the resulting reports

— Full time presence at site for most activities— More comprehensive involvement than level

medium

— Facilities with a high degree of novelty or largeleaps in technology

— Extreme environmental conditions— Inexperienced contractors or exceptionally tight

completion schedule— Very high consequences of failure from a safety

point of view (or environmental or commercial,if required

Note:

High, medium low verification involvement refers to the degree or intensity of verification involvement.

Completion schedules affect verification involvement in an indirect but important way. The effect of a tight completionschedule is pressure on the project team to take less time to carry out the various tasks. Tight completion schedulesare more prone to run late, thus adding more pressure on the project team. Problems which have been encounteredin this situation in the past have included:

— design reviews not carried out— incomplete welding— non-destructive testing incomplete— missing structural members— commissioning incomplete.

Figure 2-1 Selection of the required level of verification

2.3.2 Overall verification objective

2.3.2.1 An overall verification objective covering all phases of the natural gas facility from design tooperation shall be defined by the client. The objective should address the main integrity goals as well asestablishing acceptance criteria for the level of risk acceptable to the client. Depending on the facility and


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its location, the risk could be measured in terms of human injuries as well as environmental, political andeconomic consequences.

2.3.3 Assessment of risk

2.3.3.1 A systematic review should be carried out to identify and evaluate the probabilities andconsequences of failures in the natural gas facility. The extent of the review shall reflect the criticality ofthe facility, the planned operation and previous experience with similar facilities. This review shall identifythe risk to the operation of the facility and to the health and safety of personnel associated with it or in itsvicinity.Once the risks have been identified, their extent can be reduced to a level as low as reasonably practicableby means of one or both of:

— reduction in the probability of failure,— mitigation of the consequences of failure.

2.3.3.2 The result of the systematic review of these risks is measured against the safety objectives and usedin the selection of the appropriate verification activity level.The result of the systematic review of these risks is measured against the safety objectives and used in theselection of the appropriate verification activity level.

2.3.4 Technical innovation and contractor experience

2.3.4.1 The degree of technical innovation in the natural gas facility system shall be considered. Risks tothe facility are likely to be greater for a facility with a high degree of technical innovation than with a facilitydesigned, manufactured and installed to well-known criteria in well-known locations.Similarly, the degree of risk to the facility should be considered where contractors are inexperienced or thework schedule is tight.

2.3.4.2 Factors to be considered in the selection of the appropriate verification level include:

— degree of difficulty in achieving technical requirements— knowledge of similar facilities— knowledge of contractors’ general experience— knowledge of contractors’ experience in similar work.

2.3.5 Quality management systems

2.3.5.1 Adequate quality management systems shall be implemented to ensure that gross errors in the workfor facility design, construction and operations are limited.

2.3.5.2 Factors to be considered when evaluating the adequacy of the quality management system include:

— whether or not an ISO 9001 or equivalent certified system is in place— results from external audits— results from internal audits— experience with contractors’ previous work— project work-force familiarity with the quality management system, e.g. has there been a rapid expansion

of the work force or are all parties of a joint venture familiar with the same system.


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2.4 Communications

2.4.1 Notification of verification level

2.4.1.1 An assessment of the required level of verification for a project should be made by the client beforepreparing tender documents for design and construction activities. The client can then specify this level inInvitations to tender. This will give contractors clear guidance and reference when estimating the extent andcost of efforts associated with verification activities.

2.4.1.2 The required level of verification can be assessed by the client using this SE. However, if the clientrequires the contractor to carry out this assessment as part of his response to an invitation to tenderthe client should provide the necessary information to enable the contractor to carry out this work. Thisinformation should include overall safety objectives for the natural gas facility as well as particulars, such astemperatures, pressures, contents and environmental criteria, commonly contained in a design brief.

2.4.2 Obligations

2.4.2.1 To achieve the purpose and benefits of verification the involved parties shall be mutually obliged toshare and act upon all relevant information pertaining to the verification scope.

2.4.2.2 The client shall be obliged to:

— Inform DNV GL about the basis for selecting the level of verification and the investigations andassumptions made in this context.

— Give DNV GL full access to all information concerning the verification scope for the natural gas facilityand ensure that clauses to this effect are included in contracts for parties acting on behalf of the clientand parties providing products, processes and services covered by the verification scope. If information isproprietary and not available, exclusion from verification shall be mutually agreed with DNV GL.

— Ensure that DNV GL is involved in the handling of deviations from specified requirements within theverification scope.

— Act upon information provided by DNV GL with respect to events or circumstances that may jeopardisethe safety or integrity of the facility and/or the purpose and benefit of verification.

— Ensure that the safety objective established for the facility is known and pursued by parties acting onbehalf of the client and parties providing products, processes and services covered by the verificationscope.

2.4.2.3 Second parties shall be obliged to:

— Perform their assigned tasks in accordance with the safety objectives established for the project.— Provide the client and DNV GL with all relevant information pertaining to the verification scope.

2.4.2.4 DNV GL will be obliged to:

— Inform the client if, in the opinion of DNV GL, the basis for selecting the level of verification or theassumptions made in this respect are found to be in error or assessed incorrectly.

— Inform the client of events or circumstances that, in the opinion of DNV GL, may jeopardise the safety orintegrity of the facility and/or the purpose and benefit of verification.

— Effectively perform all verification work and adjust the level of involvement according to the actualperformance of parties providing products, processes and services covered by the verification scope.


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SECTION 3 SERVICE OVERVIEW

3.1 General

3.1.1 Objectives

3.1.1.1 The objectives of this section are to provide:

— an overview of the verification activities— details of DNV GL’s verification services for onshore LNG and Gas facilities during design, construction and

commissioning phases.

3.2 Service process

3.2.1 General principles

3.2.1.1 The description of the process of DNV GL’s verification of LNG and gas receiving onshore facilities isbased on distinct project phases and the recognition of key milestones.

3.2.1.2 Verification performed by DNV GL normally progresses through one or more of these project phasesand may include all or selected aspects of the project. Prior to commencement of work, the scope shall bedefined in terms of the facilities to be verified (battery limits to be specified), applicable codes and standardsand performance requirements, the agreed verification levels and phases to be covered in the VerificationPlan.

3.2.1.3 Credit may be given in the verification plan, in terms of reduction in the Verification scope, forcompliance to National regulations for example EC Pressure Equipment, Machinery Directive and ATEXDirectives certified by a notified body. This is relevant for projects in the European Union in which the ECDirectives are applicable.

3.2.1.4 The risk based verification process is described in relation to the normal project phases:Project initiation:

— conceptual design.

Project execution:

— project management— detail design— construction— manufacturing of process facilities— manufacturing and fabrication of process facilities components and assemblies— site assembly and integration— project completion (pre-commissioning)— commissioning— issue of as-built and as-installed documentation— issue of operation manuals.

3.2.2 Simplified verification planning

3.2.2.1 The steps in the simplified verification planning are as follows:


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— Use trigger questions to assess the overall risk level of the project (or manageable elements thereof).— Evaluate the risk against the relevant project acceptance criteria (often this can be directly tied to

the client’s core values, objectives or a sub-set of these) and decide whether the general verificationinvolvement shall be low, medium or high.

— Use the example detailed scope of work tables in App.B to make a first draft of a verification plan.— Generate the project specific verification plan by including a project specific engineering judgment or risk

analysis to adjust the table to suit the project.— Perform the verification execution according to the Verification Plan, making revision to the plan if and

when necessary.— Report the verification.

3.2.2.2 The trigger questions are included in App.A.

3.2.2.3 Generic scopes of work for verification are suggested at the three levels of verification:

— low (L)— medium (M)— high (H).

These are given in the tables in this section.

3.2.2.4 Project specific detailed scope of work descriptions should be made identifying all relevant activitiesto be verified. Examples of the level of detail are given in App.B.

3.2.2.5 It is the tables in this section that give the principle difference between the levels of verificationinvolvement. The detailed example tables in App.B should be treated as examples only. They shall not beused without a project specific confirmation of their completeness based on an assessment of the prioritisedrisks.

3.2.2.6 The project specific scope of work definition, derived from the tables in App.B (or similar), shall bepart of the final DNV GL verification report.

3.2.3 Selection of level of verification

3.2.3.1 The selection of the level of verification for the simplified verification planning is facilitated by thetrigger questions included in App.A.

3.2.4 Codes, standards and reference documents

3.2.4.1 The verification process described in this DNVGL-SE-0470 is not tailored to a specific technicalstandard, code or reference document.

3.2.4.2 It is recommended to use internationally recognised codes or standards. Where combinations ofstandards and external criteria are used the exact terms of reference and documents to be issued shall beagreed at the beginning of the project and formally defined in the contract.

3.2.4.3 It is strongly recommended not to mix standards due to the possible differences in safetyphilosophies. The use of European standards (EN) is required for compliance to EC directives.

Guidance note:Most standards are a coherent collection of requirements for all the relevant aspects of a process system. These aspects, e.g. loadand resistance, are normally among themselves adjusted to give an overall acceptable safety level. To pick requirements fromdifferent standards can then easily result in unpredictable (low) levels of safety and non-uniform level of safety.



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3.3 Project initiation

3.3.1 Verification during conceptual design

3.3.1.1 Verification during the conceptual and or feasibility studies of a project and in the early stages of aproject can reduce the need for verification during the design and construction phases, and can reduce costsduring the long term operation, inspection and maintenance phases.

Table 3-1 Scope of work for initial verification plan

LevelVerification activity

L M H

Review of the project conceptual design

Review of initial design x x x

Review of environmental aspects x x

Review of project schedule risks x x

Review of business risk x x

3.4 Project execution

3.4.1 General

3.4.1.1 All design, construction and commissioning aspects, relevant to an onshore LNG and gas facility,shall be covered by a verification process.

3.4.1.2 In this specification the split in the scope of work between design and construction is made betweensets of performance requirements developed during design and a description of the steps necessary to satisfythe specification (procedures) showing how construction verification activities will be implemented.

Guidance note:The split between design and construction phases may vary, but it is useful to spend some time on the definition to reduceinterface problems later.


3.4.2 Verification of overall project management

3.4.2.1 Verification of the overall project management is the examination of the means of controlling theentire onshore LNG and gas facilities development project, or the phase for which verification is undertaken.

3.4.2.2 This verification should confirm that the necessary controls are in place to ensure adequateinformation flow across the various interfaces. It is especially important where separate contractors havebeen employed for different phases of the project such as design and installation.

3.4.2.3 Typically, the documentation produced is expected to be in line with ISO 9000 requirements.


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Table 3-2 Scope of work for verification of overall project management


L M H

Review of the project management process by:

Review of project quality management documentation. x x x

Audit of project quality management system x x

Review of sub-contractor control x x

Review of interface controls x x

Review of methods of information flow including document control x x

3.4.2.4 The verification of the overall project management quality system and documentation is optional.The reviews and audits should typically be performed if an extensive verification of a project is performed,while may be omitted for smaller sub-phase verifications.

3.4.3 Verification during design

3.4.3.1 Design verification is the examination of the assumptions, methods and results of the design processand is performed at the specified level of verification to ensure that the specified requirements of the onshorefacilities will be achieved.

3.4.3.2 Design verification should consist of one, or more, of the following:

— review of specifications for design (asset specifications)— review of design reports and drawings— review of technology qualification program and associated results (for new technology)— performing independent calculations— audit of project quality management system— review of specifications for construction, installation and operations, resulting from design.

3.4.3.3 The documents that shall be produced in the project should as a minimum satisfy the requirementsof the selected code applicable for the project.

3.4.3.4 Definition of scope of work for verification of design should follow Table 3-3.

Table 3-3 Scope of work for verification of design


L M H

Review of specifications for design by:

— Review of the design basis with emphasis on the design criteria x x x

Review of design reports and drawings by:

Review of the main documentation to ensure that the main load conditions have beenaccounted for in design, that the governing conditions are identified, and that the chosendesign philosophies are in accordance with specified codes and standards

x x x


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L M H

Evaluation of the main methods used and spot checks of the input data and the calculationresults x x

Detailed review of main design reports x

Performing independent calculations by:

Check of pressure containment or overall integrity x x x

Simplified independent analysis and calculation(s) performed by spot checks x x

Advanced independent analysis and calculation(s) performed by spot checks x

Review of specifications for construction and operation by:

Spot check of critical aspects x x x

Review of main specifications x x

Thorough review of main specifications x

Review of specific operational challenges (e.g. flow assurance etc.)

general principles x x x

Review of main documents supported by simplified analyses x x

Guidance note:Design verification activities may be split up between basic design and detailed design, or other sub-phases, depending on type ofcontract.


3.4.4 Verification during construction

3.4.4.1 The construction phase comprises procurement, fabrication, manufacturing, sub-unit and unitintegration testing, assembly, erection and commissioning. An important element is to ensure that thecontractual design requirements are incorporated in the purchase documentation, and that correct materials,joining and corrosion control, have been applied, and that pressure rating, capacity and function are meetingthe requirements as per approved specifications and procedures. It is imperative that relevant preparationsfor this is started as early as possible, e.g. by the appointment of a vendor supply verification co-ordinator.

3.4.4.2 Verification during construction is carried out by means of full time attendance, audits, inspection orspot checks of the work, as appropriate, in sufficient detail to ensure that the specified requirements of thefacility will be achieved.

3.4.4.3 Verification of these activities relates not only to the contractor’s work but also to the monitoring ofthis work carried out by others.

3.4.4.4 Construction verification should consist of one, or some, of the following:

— reviewing the construction process— reviewing construction procedures— reviewing qualification process— surveillance during construction activities— reviewing final documentation.


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3.4.4.5 The documents that should be produced in the project and submitted for review prior to start up aretypically:

— manufacturing procedure specification (MPS)— manufacturing procedures and method statements, including test requirements, test procedures and

acceptance criteria, repairs, personnel qualification records etc.— material specifications and data sheets— quality plans including inspection and test plans (ITP)— welding procedure specifications (WPS) and welding procedure qualification record (WPQR)— NDT procedures— manufacturing procedure qualification test (MPQT) results— manufacturer’s and fabricator’s quality system manual.

3.4.4.6 The as-built documentation to be submitted after manufacturing should include but not be limited to:

— manufacturing procedures including test requirements and acceptance criteria, repairs, personnelqualification records etc.

— Material certificates— production test records (visual, NDT, test samples, dimensional, heat treatment etc.)— hydrostatic test report— final acceptance test (FAT) report— commissioning report.— as-built drawings— relevant statistics of chemical composition, mechanical properties and dimensions for the deliveries.— relevant logs.

3.4.4.7 Definition of scope of work for verification of construction should follow Table 3-4 for manufacturingand fabrication of critical (high risk) components, Table 3-5 for manufacturing and fabrication of componentsnot considered critical, Table 3-6 for verification of site construction and Table 3-7 and Table 3-8 for finaltesting, pre-commissioning and completion.

Guidance note:Materials may be ordered with certificates of varying degrees of independent 3rd party verification (e.g. 3.2 according to EN10204). This can this be integrated in the overall verification activities, so as not to duplicate work.


Table 3-4 Scope of work for verification of manufacturing and fabrication of critical equipment


L M H

Review of the manufacturing and fabrication process

Review of manufacturing and fabrication management systems x x x

Audit of the quality management system x x

Review of manufacturing and fabrication procedures

Review manufacturing, fabrication and inspection procedures for confirmation of compliancewith the manufacturing specification x x x

Review method statements x x

Review of qualification process


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L M H

Review the manufacturing procedure specification (MPS), manufacturing procedurequalification test (MPQT), as applicable x x x

Full time attendance during MPQT, as applicable, or first day production x x

Surveillance during manufacturing and fabrication activities

Visit-based attendance during testing, to ensure, based on spot checks, that the deliveredproducts have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing specification x x x

Visit-based or full-time attendance during manufacturing and fabrication to ensure, basedon spot checks, that the delivered products have been produced in accordance with themanufacturing specification

x x

Full-time attendance during manufacturing and fabrication to ensure, based on spot checks,that the delivered products have been produced in accordance with the manufacturingspecification

x

Review of final documentation x x x

Table 3-5 Scope of work for verification of manufacturing and fabrication of non-criticalcomponents


L M H

Review of the manufacturing and fabrication process

— Review of manufacturing and fabrication management systems x x

Review of manufacturing and fabrication procedures

— Review manufacturing, fabrication and inspection procedures for confirmation ofcompliance with the manufacturing specification

x x


— Review the manufacturing procedure specification (MPS), manufacturing procedurequalification test (MPQT), if applicable

x x x

— Full time attendance during MPQT, if applicable, or first day production x

Surveillance during manufacturing and fabrication activities

— Visit-based attendance during testing, to ensure, based on spot checks, that the deliveredproducts have been produced in accordance with the manufacturing specification

x x

— Visit-based attendance during manufacturing and fabrication to ensure, based onspot checks, that the delivered products have been produced in accordance with themanufacturing specification

x



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Table 3-6 Scope of work for verification of site construction


L M H

Review of the construction process

Review of construction management systems x x x


Review of construction procedures

Spot check of construction procedures, including erection procedures x x x

For critical operations (identified from the FMEA and HAZOP studies or QRA) review themethod statements x x


For critical operations, review the qualification process, e.g.

- welding

- non-destructive testing

- site heat treatment

x x x

Full time attendance during qualification tests x x

Surveillance during construction activities

Visit-based attendance during start of each critical operation x x x

Full time attendance during each critical operation x x

Full time attendance for all construction operations x


Table 3-7 Scope of work for verification of site commissioning and start-up


L M H

Review of the commissioning process

Review of commissioning management systems x x x


Review of commissioning procedures

Spot check of commissioning procedures x x x

For critical operations (identified from the FMEA and HAZOP studies or QRA) review themethod statements x x

Surveillance during commissioning activities

Visit-based attendance during start of each critical operation x x x

Full time attendance during each critical operation x x


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L M H

Full time attendance for all commissioning operations x


Table 3-8 Scope of work for verification of final testing for operation, including as-built surveyand project completion


L M H

Review of procedures

Review of the procedures for commissioning tests to ensure that the procedure adequatelycovers the system in accordance with the design requirements x x x

Surveillance during testing and completion activities

Full time attendance during commissioning x x

Full time attendance during specific tests testing and audit based attendance during ongoingtesting x

Review of test results x x x

Review of final documentation

Spot check of as-built documentation x x x

Review of as-built documentation x

3.5 Verification documents

3.5.1 GeneralThe hierarchy of verification document is given in DNVGL-SE-0474. The descriptions of the content of thesedocuments as well as examples of reporting templates are given in App.C to this specification.


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APPENDIX A SELECTION OF VERIFICATION LEVEL

A.1 General

A.1.1 General principles

A.1.1.1 The selection of the level of verification depends on the risk level of each of the elements that havean impact on the management of risks to the asset.

A.1.1.2 Verification shall direct greatest effort at those elements of the asset where the risk is highest andwhose failure or reduced performance will have the most significant impact on the project objective andgoals, e.g.:

— safety risks— environmental risks— business risks.

A.1.1.3 Suitable selection factors include, but are not limited to, the:

— overall safety and other objectives for the asset— risks associated with the asset and the measures taken to reduce these risks— degree of technical innovation in the asset— experience of the contractors— quality management systems for the project and its contractors.

A.1.1.4 Due to the diversity of various installation facilities, their contents, their degree of innovation,the geographic location, etc, it is not possible to give precise guidelines on how to decide what level ofverification is appropriate for each particular LNG and gas receiving onshore facility.

A.1.1.5 Therefore, guidance is given as a series of questions that should be answered when deciding theappropriate level of verification for an onshore gas facility. This list is not exhaustive and other questionsshould be added to the list if appropriate for a particular onshore gas facility.

A.1.1.6 It should be emphasised that the contribution of each element should be judged qualitatively and/or quantitatively. Wherever possible quantified risk assessment data should be used to provide a justifiablebasis for any decisions made.

A.1.1.7 Depending of the stage of the project, the activities may not have taken place yet in which case thequestions can also be posed in another form, i.e. “Is …. planned to be?”

A.2 Trigger questions

A.2.1 Overall project objective and goalsa) Does the overall verification objective address the main project objectives?b) Does the verification objective establish acceptance criteria for the level of risk acceptable to the client?c) Is this risk (depending on the onshore LNG and gas facility and its location) measured in terms of safety,

as well as environmental, economic and reputation consequences?


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A.2.2 Assessment of riska) Has a systematic review been carried out to identify and evaluate the probabilities and consequences of

failures in the onshore gas facilities?b) Has this review judged the contribution of each element qualitatively and or quantitatively and used,

where possible, quantified risk assessment data to provide a justifiable basis for any decisions made?c) Does the extent of the review reflect the risk level of the (onsite and offsite) onshore gas installation, the

planned operation and previous experience with similar facilities?d) Does this review identify the risk to the operation of the onshore gas facilities and to the health and

safety of personnel associated with it or in its vicinity?e) Has the extent of the identified risks been reduced to a level as low as reasonably practicable by means

of one or both of:

— reduction in the probability of failure?— mitigation of the consequences of failure?

f) Has the result of the systematic review of the risks been measured against the client’s safety (or other)objective?

g) Has the result of this review been used in the selection of the appropriate verification activity level?

A.2.3 Technical innovationa) Has the degree of technical innovation in the onshore gas facilities been considered?b) Has it been considered that risks to the onshore gas facilities are likely to be greater with a high degree

of technical innovation than with an onshore gas facility designed, manufactured and installed to well-known criteria in well-known locations?

c) Have factors been considered in the selection of the appropriate verification level such as:

— Degree of difficulty in achieving technical requirements.— Knowledge of similar onshore LNG and gas facilities.— Effect of the new onshore LNG and gas facility on the surrounding area.

A.2.4 Contractors’ experiencea) Has the degree of risk to the onshore LNG and gas facilities been considered where design, construction

or installation contractors are inexperienced?b) Has the degree of risk been considered where the contractors are experienced but not in similar work?c) Has the degree of risk been considered where the work schedule is tight?

A.2.5 Quality management systemsa) Have all parties involved in the onshore LNG and gas facilities implemented an adequate quality

management system to ensure that gross errors in the work are limited?b) Do these parties include the:

— client?— design contractor?— construction contractors?— installation contractor?— operator?

c) Do the factors being considered when evaluating the adequacy of the quality management systeminclude:


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— Whether or not an ISO 9000 or equivalent certified system is in place?— Results from external audits?— Results from internal audits?— Experience with contractors’ previous work?— Project work force familiarity with the quality management system?


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APPENDIX B GENERIC DETAILED VERIFICATION SCOPES OF WORKTABLES

B.1 Purpose

B.1.1 Introduction

B.1.1.1 This appendix gives the format of the generic detailed scope of work tables for onshore LNG and gasfacilities.

B.1.1.2 The verification plan shall be developed based on the tables provided in this appendix. The Tablesshall be supplemented and updated by input from project risk assessments when developing the plan.

B.1.1.3 The appropriate level of verification involvement based on the principles outlined in Sec.3, is furtherdefined in the verification plan.

B.1.1.4 For gas facilities with aspects or components not covered in this appendix, similar tables, with thesame degree of detail, shall be developed.

B.2 Critical elements

B.2.1 Critical elements and components

B.2.1.1 Based on the results of the HAZID, HAZOP or other risk assessments, gas facilities are likely to havemany or most of the critical elements listed in [B.2.1.4] below.

B.2.1.2 Verification of design is broken down into consideration of these critical elements and components inisolation but the many interactions between them should not be forgotten.

B.2.1.3 Typical critical elements for an onshore LNG and gas facilities are shown in Table B-1. These criticalelements shall be modified to suit a specific facility and the project objectives.

Table B-1 Onshore LNG and gas facilities - typical critical elements and associated components

Function Critical elements Component

Layout Area classificationInherent safetymeasures Hydrocarbon inventory/leak

source minimisation All

Ship-shore interface

Loading arms and transfer facilities

LNG transfer pipelines

Offloading and loading facilitiesintegrity

Jetty and moorings

Support structures and foundations

Relief valves and relief system

Hazardpreventionmeasures

Process facilities integrity

Process Systems


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Cryogenic pressure vessels, piping and equipment

Non-cryogenic pressure vessels, piping and equipment

LNG storage tanks

Dropped object and impactprotection Critical components

Bunding and drains

Fired heaters, hot Surfaces and Exhaust

Electrical items (explosion proof rating, electromagneticcompatibility, ingress protection)

Control of ignition

Lightning protection, static and earthing

Smoke and gas detection for site buildings

Fire and gas detection - external areas

Fire and gas detection - machinery enclosuresFire and gas detection

Fire and gas control system

Control room Control systems

Hazarddetectionand controlmeasures

HVAC Ventilation system, fire dampers pressurised enclosures

Fire water storage

Firewater pumps

Firewater distribution ring main

Firewater and foam supply

Gaseous fire fighting systems

Active fire fighting systems

Fire-fighting vehicles

Blast and passive fire protection Critical components

Bunding and drainage Closed drains, open drains, tank bunds

Blowdown and flare system Flare, blowdown valves, knock-out drum, relief valves

ESD control system

Hazardmitigationmeasures

Emergency shutdown system(ESD) Emergency shutdown valves (ESDVs)

Personnel protection, breathing apparatusEgress and evacuation system

Escape routes

Muster area

Emergency lighting

Emergency power, uninterruptible power supply

Emergency

response

measures Emergency services

Emergency communications and alarms


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Emission and waste controlsystems Emission and discharge controlsEnvironmental

protectionWaste heat recovery Waste heat recovery units

B.2.1.4 The following Table B-2 to Table B-8, Table B-9 to Table B-12, Table B-13, Table B-14 to TableB-16 and Table B-B17 provide a template of verification activities which can be used for verification activityplanning. These give generic performance requirements and verification activities for typical critical elements:

— Table B-2 Support structures and foundations— Table B-3 Installation layout— Table B-4 Non-cryogenic pressure vessels and equipment— Table B-5 Cryogenic pressure vessels and equipment— Table B-6 LNG tanks— Table B-7 Open hazardous drains— Table B-8 Pressure relief systems— Table B-9 Ignition prevention and control system— Table B-10 Emergency shutdown system— Table B-11 Blowdown system— Table B-12 Fire and gas system— Table B-13 Fire and blast protection systems— Table B-14 Emergency power system supply— Table B-15 Emergency escape and evacuation— Table B-16 Emergency communications— Table B-17 Environmental protection


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Table B-2 Support structures

HAZARD MANAGEMENT

Prevention Control Mitigation Emergency Environment

HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT:STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

Support structures

OBJECTIVES: The objectives of the structural integrity performance requirement are:

1) To ensure that foundations will adequate support of surface structures and equipment

2) To ensure that surface structures are able to support the weight of the installation facilities and equipment andtransfer all operating and environmental loads to the foundations;

- support escape routes to allow personnel to escape from the process Installation to the muster areas and thenevacuate to a place of safety;

- prevent escalation following a major accident by maintaining the integrity of equipment supports;

Limits and boundary:

Foundations of support structures include the following major items of equipment:

a) Slug catcher

b) Storage tanks (condensate, LPG, LNG)

c) Major rotating equipment

d) Buildings (local and central control room)

e) Critical utility systems (electricity, heating and cooling, fuel gas)

f) Flare stack

g) Pipe rack in process area

h) Firewater retention pond bund

i) Scrubbers

j) Columns (distillation, contactors, wash)

k) Vaporizers

l) Major heat exchangers (cold box)

m) Condensors

n) Stair towers and escape routes

RELEVANT SPECIFICATIONS

EN1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas - Design of Onshore Installations

EN1992 Design of Concrete Structures

EN1993 Design of Steel Structures

EN1994 Design of Composite Steel and Concrete Structures

NFPA 59A Standard for Production, Storage and handling of Liquefied Natural Gas

EN14620-1, Design and Manufacture of Site Built Vertical Cylindrical Flat bottomed Steel Tanks for the Storage ofRefrigerated Liquefied Gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Part 1 General

Performance requirementspecification

Document types Phase Verification activity

Foundations


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— Basis ofdesign

— Detail design

calculations(includingcomputerinput/outputif applicable)

— Soil orgeotechnicalreports

— AFCfoundationdrawings

Design

Confirm by review of civil foundation design thatthe foundation will adequately support the structureunder all realistic loading conditions. Including thefollowing as relevant to the specific foundationdesign:

Review foundation piling design for a given soilcondition for the maximum and minimum governingloading cases. Check:

— Resistance to differential settlement— Sliding resistance if relevant— Frost heave of tank foundations to be avoided if

relevant— Seismic/earthquake— Review design of concrete foundation base,

reinforcement requirements and check that thematerial specified is suitable

— Review foundation construction drawings forcompliance with the design

— Design of tank connections to foundation base.

Review construction procedures for piling, pile capsand rafts to confirm compatibility with industrypractice

Confirm by audit that the properties and originof materials for piles, pile caps and rafts (steel,reinforcement, aggregates, concrete mixes) areaccording to specifications and/or as specified ondrawings.

Foundations to be designedsuch that they adequatelysupport the structures underall realistic loading conditionsas per code requirements for:

— slug catcher— storage tanks

(condensate, LPG, LNG)— major rotating equipment— buildings— critical utility systems— flare stack— pipe-racks/supports— firewater retention pond

bund— scrubbers— columns— vaporizers— re-condensors— major heat exchangers

(cold box)— stair towers and escape

routes

Guidance: Heat tracingsystem to prevent frost heaveof LNG Tank foundations is acritical system which requiressufficient reliability.

Methodstatements

ITP

Materialcertificates

Concretestrength testrecords

Construction

Review records and monitor construction to:

Confirm that pile layout, position, dimensions anddepths are in accordance with design;

Confirm by sampling review of test results thatstrength of concrete piles, pile-caps, rafts meetminimum requirements.

Support Structures


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Design

Confirm by review of design basis that all relevantdesign conditions are being considered, the correctloads have been combined for each load case, andthe load combinations and allowable limits conformto the requirements of an applicable and recognisedcode.

Review mooring analysis to ensure that the loadsfor the range of vessels anticipated to berth at theJetty are considered for design.

Basis of design

Load analysis

Detail designcalculations(includingcomputer inputand output ifapplicable)

DrawingsDesign

Confirm by review of the structural analyses, weightreports and environmental data or by independentanalysis that:

— the loads and load cases identified in the designbasis for all the design conditions have beencorrectly incorporated

— the thermal loads induced by the flare radiationhave been correctly assessed and included inthe load combinations

— in conjunction with the structural drawings thatthe structural and material properties have beencorrectly assessed and incorporated

— the response to the applied loads has beencorrectly assessed and stresses do not exceedthe values specified in the code specified in thedesign basis

— suitable materials have been specified.

ConstructionReview fabrication specification for the supportstructures to confirm that it is compatible with therelevant industry practice

Construction

Confirm by surveillance that the properties andorigin of all materials within this CE are assured andthat material properties are at least equivalent tothose specified in the fabrication drawings.

Support against all loadinganticipated through thedesign life of the installation:

flare structure

process equipment

pipe-work supports

firewater retention pond bund

Guidance: Loads includeenvironmental, dead loads,live loads, accidental loadsas specified in the riskassessment, seismic andoperational loads.

Methodstatements

ITP

WPQR and NDTrecords

Fabricationdossiers

Construction

Review records and monitor fabrication to:

— Confirm compliance with the design andfabrication specification with any deviationdocumented and justified and that dimensionsare within tolerances defined in the specification.

— Confirm that welding procedures are inaccordance with the fabrication specification.

— Confirm by document review that NDT andinspections are being carried out in accordancewith the requirements of the fabricationspecification and design requirements.


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Design

Review the FERA (or other appropriate study) toconfirm that fire and blast scenarios and fire andblast loads are appropriate. Confirm that thesescenarios have been incorporated into the designbasis.

Design

Confirm by review of safety studies that the timerequired for essential safety equipment to completesafety critical actions has

a) been identified; and

b) been considered in the design

Design

Confirm by review of the fire and blast structuralanalyses that the structure is adequate or hasadequate PFP to withstand the scenarios identifiedin the FERA, for the required period, and conformsto the requirements of a recognised code.

DesignConfirm by review of PFP specification and reports(type approval certificates, test reports etc) thatPFP specified is adequate and sufficient.

QRA

FERA

Fire and blast

Structuralanalyses

PFPspecifications

Design

Confirm that support structures and escape waysthat maybe exposed to accidental spillage of LNG (ifconsidered a credible event) are protected againstbrittle failure if failure of such structures can resultin escalation. e.g.

water curtain, drip trays, thermal protection of steelstructures.

Support structures forenclosures with criticalfunctions or containingcritical equipment or normallyoccupied by people shallmaintain integrity for the timerequired to complete theirsafety critical actions under:

a) fire loading and followinga design explosion [asdefined in the FERA]. Plasticdeformation is acceptableproviding integrity ismaintained

b) other accidental eventsas specified in the designbasis or as required in coderequirements.

c) accidental spillage of LNGand cryogenic liquids causingbrittle fracture

Methodstatements

ITP

Specifications

Productcertificates

Construction

Confirm by monitoring and review of recordsthat measures to provide protection from blastoverpressure, fire (PFP) and LNG spillage havebeen implemented and conform to the structuraldrawings.


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Table B-3 Installation layout

HAZARD MANAGEMENT


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT:PROCESS CONTAINMENT

Installation layout

OBJECTIVES: The layout of facilities in the Installation shall:

— Ensure safe working conditions and access for personnel and equipment for operation and maintenance.— Prevent ignition by separation of ignition sources from fuel sources and non hazardous area from hazardous area

(Note: Hazardous area classification is addressed in HSE Critical Element P7 Ignition Prevention and Control).— Minimise the consequence of fire and explosion, in particular with respect to escalation and ease of access for fire

fighting personnel and equipment.

LIMITS and BOUNDARY:

All equipment and unit layouts within installation battery limits.


NFPA 59A

EN1473

IP part 15


Document types: Phase Verification activity

HAZID study

Safety concept

Impacted,restricted area andfire zone layout

Design

Confirm by review of the scenario’s taken in theHAZID Study that all worst case and fire zonelimit defining cases have been correctly selectedand modelled as required.

Fire zone limits shall beselected such that theconsequences of a fire, aflammable gas leak or anexplosion corresponding tothe credible event likely tooccur in the concerned firezone shall not impact otherfire zones to an extent wheretheir integrity could be put atrisk.

HAZID study

Safety concept


Design

Confirm by review of the HAZID Study resultsagainst the fire zone layout plots and fire zonesafety distance layouts that all appropriatefire zone safety distances have been compliedwith, unless deviations are noted and approved.Compliance shall be confirmed with respect tothe above relevant Project Specifications.


DNV GL AS


Document types: Phase Verification activity

HAZID/HAZOPstudy

Safety concept


Installation andequipment plotplans

Design

Confirm by review of the scenarios consideredin the HAZID Study that all worst case andrestricted area defining cases have been correctlyselected and modelled as required.

Confirm by review that simultaneous operations(e.g. maintenance activities, truck loading)cannot cause additional unacceptable situations.

Areas affected permanentlyby normal operation of thefacility or exceptionallyby the consequences ofan emergency situationcaused by a major failureshall be designated as“Restricted Areas” which shallbe confined to within theboundaries and control of theInstallation.

Guidance: Areas affectedpermanently implies areasdefined by flare and ventdispersion and radiation byhazardous area classificationor by legislation.

HAZID study

Safety concept



Design

Confirm by review that all buildings andequipment located within the Restricted Areasare correctly identified as being suitable forthe applicable Restricted Area requirements.Restricted areas extending beyond theInstallation boundary shall be adequatelyaddressed through risk assessment.

The criteria for equipment and buildings designwhen located inside the restricted areas areprovided in the relevant project specifications.

Safety concept


Design

Confirm by review of Installation equipmentlayouts that minimum spacing requirement withrespect to the project requirements are compliedwith.

Facility, equipment andbuilding layout shall meet thegeneral requirements of theclient. Safety concept

Building layouts

Plot plans

Design

Confirm by review of building area layouts thatgeneral spacing and equipment locations complywith the minimum project requirements.

Safety concept

Workingenvironment

Installation andequipment

Building layouts

Plot plans

Design

Confirm by review of Installation equipment andbuilding area layouts that minimum fixed meansof access requirement with respect to the projectand regulatory requirements are complied with.

Review Specification for Fabrication andConstruction of the Installation and buildingarea and confirm that it is in compliance withspecifications or compatible with industrypractice.

satisfactory level of inspection and possiblemeasurement will be performed by all parties;

fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordancewith Specification for Fabrication and Installation

Working platforms, walkways,stairs, step-ladders, guard-rails and fixed ladders shallmeet the safety requirementsof the client and localregulations.

Constructiondrawings Construction

Confirm by review of Installation equipment andbuildings that Hazardous layout on site complieswith all project requirements.


DNV GL AS

Table B-4 Non-cryogenic pressure vessels, piping and equipment

HAZARD MANAGEMENT



Non-cryogenic pressure vessels,Ppping and equipment

OBJECTIVES: To provide appropriate and effective pressure containment systems and process equipment that shalleliminate or minimise likelihood of release of hazardous material or loss of containment.


Pressure vessels, storage tanks, equipment and pipe-work where significant levels of hydrocarbon are present orcould be present during normal operations. ‘Significant’ is defined as those vessels, pipe-work or equipment requiringactive mitigation in the event of loss of containment.

The process installation equipment including pressure vessels heat exchangers and process equipment are thoseassociated with the following systems: slug-catcher, pig launcher/receivers, inlet separator, gas conditioning, gascompression, condensate stabilisation and storage, LPG storage, chemical storage, fuel gas, produced water, closeddrains and hot oil system

— Safety critical rotating equipment are as follows: condensate pumps, gas compressors, flare liquid pumps, diesel/hydraulic/lube oil pumps, methanol pumps, produced water and closed drains pumps.

— The safety critical pressure vessels are those associated with the following systems: scrubbers, gas coolers, gasconditioning (amine unit, molecular sieve unit, sulphur recovery unit)

— The safety critical tanks are those associated with the following systems: condensate storage tanks, closed drainscollection tank, methanol storage and diesel (large volumes).

— Piping systems refers to all pipe-work, fittings, flanges, manual valves, tubing, flexible hoses, etc. downstream ofthe inlet isolation valve associated with the following systems:

— process gas, fuel gas, relief, vent and flare, diesel, hydraulic and lube oil, chemicals, hot-oil systems, coolingmedium system, produced water and closed drains.

Notes: piping systems in high-pressure utility systems (e.g. utility air) are considered safety critical if their failure islikely to damage the hydrocarbon envelope in the immediate vicinity.

For the ESD valves the process containment is covered in C1 emergency shutdown systems


DNV GL AS

HAZARD MANAGEMENT



Non-cryogenic pressure vessels,Ppping and equipment


- project specific documents

- regulatory requirements

- international standards.

Pressure Vessels:

— ASME VIII— PD5500

Heat exchangers:

— API 660 Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Service— API 661 Air Cooled Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Service— API 662 Plate Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Service— ASME VIII— TEMA.

Rotating equipment:

— API 610 Centrifugal Pumps for Petroleum, Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries— API 611 General Purpose Steam Turbines for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Industry Services— API 616 Gas Turbines for the Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service Industries— API 617 Centrifugal Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service Industries— API 618 Reciprocating Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service Industries— API 672 Packaged Integrally Geared Centrifugal Air Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Service

Industries.

Tanks:

— API 620 Design and Construction of Large, welded, Low pressure storage tanks— API 650 Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage

API RP 686 Recommended Practices for Machinery Installation and Installation Design

API 2510 Design and Construction of LPG Installations

Piping systems: ASME B31.3

Relief systems: API 14C

ASME B31 Standards of Pressure Piping

EN13480 Metallic Industrial Piping


DNV GL AS

Performance

Requirement

Specification


The process facilitiesshall safely containall hydrocarbons atthe maximum andminimum foreseeablepressures, designtemperatures andoperating forces.

Design basis

PFDs

P&IDS

Line list

Design

Confirm by review of process basis of design, PFDs,line lists and P&IDs that specified design conditions arecorrect for all lines and equipment.

Materials

P&IDs

Piping class

Specification

Materialselection report

Material

Specifications

Design

Review material selection and corrosion controlphilosophies and coating specifications to confirm thatpiping class is suitable for the worst case conditions,that suitable allowance for internal corrosion isspecified and that significant external corrosion isprevented by suitable protective coatings.

Piping

Stress analysisreports

ISOs

Critical line list

Design

Review piping design to confirm that:

— the correct design conditions are considered— suitable criteria are set for identifying which

systems/lines require calculations of stresses— the criteria has been correctly applied in

accordance with the appropriate design codes— there is sufficient piping flexibility inherent in the

design.

Critical equipmentpackages

Supplier data

FAT reports

Manufacturer

Dossiers

Procurement

Review of recognised Independent Third PartyCertification and design data to confirm that allprocured safety critical equipment have been designed,constructed and tested in accordance with a recognisedinternational code or standard.

Bulk items Supplier data Procurement

Review manufacturing records and quality certificationto confirm all bulk items (fittings, flanges etc)have been designed and fabricated to a recognisedinternational code or standard.

Storage tanks

(non-cryogenic)

Methodstatements

Procedures

ITPs

Construction

Review specification for fabrication, Installation andTesting of the Installation and confirm that it is incompliance with specifications or compatible withindustry practice.

satisfactory level of inspection will be performed by allparties;

fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance withspecification for fabrication, installation and testing ofpiping


DNV GL AS

Performance

Requirement

Specification


Methodstatements

ITPs

WPQR

Material

Certificates

Test packs

Commissioningreports

Construction

Survey to confirm that:

— the equipment nozzles are installed inaccordance with design, and any deviationsdocumented and justified

— the piping system is installed in accordancewith the design and any deviations have beendocumented and justified including stress analysiswhere necessary

— all piping systems are fabricated and pressuretested in accordance with the design, and anydeviations documented and justified

— piping spools are installed and that field weldsare completed and tested in accordance withthe design, and any deviations documented andjustified

— hydrocarbon containment systems installed are leaktested and proof tested satisfactorily.

Design basis

Design reports

Material

Specifications

P&IDs

Design

Confirm by review of design documentation that anyhydrocarbon containing storage tanks have beendesigned in accordance with a recognised code orstandard.

Methodstatements

ITPs

WPQR

Material

Certificates

Construction

Confirm by survey that any hydrocarbon containingstorage tanks have been fabricated in accordance withthe design documentation and fabrication is to therequired project specification.

HAZOP

HAZID

Thermal reliefstudy

Surge analysisreport

PSV data sheets

P&IDs

Design

Confirm by review of P&IDs and HAZOP Study thatadequate and appropriate safety devices to preventoverpressure resulting from process upsets (includingblocked outlet, excessive temperature or fire exposure)which may result in unsafe operation are specified andcomply with specifications.

Systems shall beprovided with adequateand appropriate safetydevices to preventoverpressure or otherprocess deviationswhich may resultin unsafe operation(including exposure toexcessive temperaturesand fire).

P&IDs

ITPs

Test procedures

Commissioning

Confirm by inspection that all piping components andsafety devices are correctly installed in accordance withP&IDs, correctly calibrated and set points are correct.


DNV GL AS

Performance

Requirement

Specification


Design

Confirm by review of specifications that rotatingequipment has adequate seal systems provided andthat appropriate monitoring is provided with necessaryexecutive actions specified.

Rotating equipmentto be provided withadequate seal systemto prevent loss ofcontainment ofhydrocarbon.

Supplier data

Vendor P&IDs

Commissioning

Confirm by review of commissioning records thatrotating equipment have adequate seal systemsprovided and appropriate monitoring is provided andexecutive actions are undertaken as specified bydesign.

Design Review the safety studies to confirm that the proposedfire and explosion loadings are justified.

Design

Confirm by design review of equipment details, layoutdrawings and details of passive fire protection thatspecified equipment will survive specified explosionoverpressure and fire impingement with no lossof containment in the period while the Installationinventory is being reduced to a safe level (blowdown iscomplete) and personnel are escaping.

All hydrocarboncontainment non-cryogenic equipmentand piping with thepotential to giverise to significantescalation hazardsare to withstandthe effects of anexplosion followed byfire impingement withno loss of containmentbefore the Installationinventory has beenreduced to a safe level(blowdown is complete)and personnel haveescaped to a place ofsafety.

Guidance: plasticdeformation isacceptable providingthere is no loss ofintegrity and no lowcycle fatigue failure.

Safety studies

Testing andcommissioning

Confirm by inspection and review of records that anyrequired passive fire protection has been installed asper the design.


DNV GL AS

Table B-5 Cryogenic vessels, equipment and piping

HAZARD MANAGEMENT



Cryogenic vessels, equipment andpiping

OBJECTIVES: To provide appropriate and effective cryogenic fluid containment systems and equipment that shalleliminate or minimise likelihood of release of hazardous material or loss of containment.

(Cryogenic vessels, storage tanks, equipment and pipe-work where significant levels of LNG are present or could bepresent during normal operations.)

Significant is defined as those vessels, pipe-work or equipment requiring active mitigation in the event of loss ofcontainment.


LNG loading arms

Heat exchangers (vaporisers, re-condensors, shell and tube- plate fin, spiral wound)

Process vessels (scrubbers, separators, columns)

Piping and valves

Cold boxes

Rotating equipment (pumps, turbo compressors and expanders)

Refrigerant and liquid nitrogen storage

Note: LNG storage tanks are covered by separate Table B-6


EN1160 Installations and equipment for liquefied natural gas – General characteristics of liquefied natural gas

EN1474-1 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas - Design and testing of loading/unloading arms

EN1532 Installation and Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas – ship to shore interface

EN1473

NFPA 59A

EN12567 Industrial Valves – Isolating Valves for LNG Specification for suitability and approval verification test

(EN1626 Cryogenic Vessels, valves for cryogenic service, EN12300 Cryogenic vessels, cleanliness for cryogenicservice, BS6364 Valves for cryogenic service)

EN ISO 10497 Testing of valves – Fire type-testing requirements

ASME VIII div 2

ASME B31.3Pressure Equipment Directive (only applicable in the EU)

API520 and API521



LNG loading facilities


DNV GL AS



Design basis

Hazard studies

Design code

Design reports(calculations andanalysis for allcomponents ofmarine transfersystem)

Materialspecification

Drawings

Criticalequipment list

Design

Confirm by review of design basis and hazardstudies that the design philosophy is in compliancewith the requirements prescribed in a recognizeddesign standard (EN 1474-1, SIGGTO or relevantcode)

Confirm by technology qualification or for provendesign a review of design documentations (reports,design basis, material specifications) that marinetransfer arms are designed in accordance with arecognized design standard (EN 1474-1 or relevantcode)

The review should comprise:

— structural design— pressure containment, including thermal and

hydraulic loads

— swivel joints— valves, connectors— materials, fittings, piping.

— motion envelope

— ESD and Safety system, including the ship shoreinterface

— hydraulic and electric control system

— electrical systems, cables

— accessories.

Marine transfer arms

Marine transfer arms shallload or unload the LNGand the vapour return in asafe and controlled mannerbetween LNG carrier and theonshore LNG installation

Purchaserequisitions

Supplier data

FAT reports

Manufacturerdossiers

ITPs

Procurement

Review of purchase requisitions for compliance withthe design basis.

Review Specification for Fabrication, Installationand Testing of the Marine transfer arms and confirmthat it is in compliance with specifications orcompatible with industry practice.

Satisfactory level of inspection will be performedby all involved parties; review of recognisedindependent third party certification and designdata to confirm that the Marine transfer armshave been designed, constructed and tested inaccordance with a recognised international codeor standard. Monitoring, fabrication, assembly andtesting of loading arms for compliance with thedesign basis.


DNV GL AS



Methodstatements

Procedures

ITPs

Construction

Review specification for fabrication, installation andtesting of the marine transfer arms and confirmthat it is in compliance with specifications orcompatible with industry practice.

satisfactory level of inspection will be performed byall parties;

fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordancewith specification for fabrication, installation andtesting

ITPs

WPQR



Construction


— the equipment is installed in accordance withdesign, and any deviations documented andjustified.

— all piping is fabricated and pressure tested inaccordance with the design, and any deviationsdocumented and justified.

— all safety systems are installed inspected andtested.

Test protocolsand acceptancescriteria


Commissioning

Confirm by review of test protocols and acceptancecriteria that these are in accordance with theprotocols and acceptance criteria specified in arecognized design standard (EN 1474 -1 or relevantcode)

Witness SAT in accordance with the relevant designcode.

Vaporisers

Supplier data/data sheets

Design codeDesign

Confirm by review of design basis and specificationsthat the design philosophy is in compliance withthe requirements prescribed in a recognized designstandard (e.g. EN1473)

For all types of vaporizers(water stream open rack/closed, intermediate fluidatmospheric water bath/forced flow condenservaporizer, submergedcombustion and atmosphericvaporizer); systems shallbe provided to control thevaporiser’s operationalprocess parameters in a safeand controlled manner.

P&IDs

Specifications

-Methods

-HSE

-Operation

manuals

Design

Confirm by review of specifications that thevaporiser has appropriate monitoring and executiveactions are undertaken as specified

The review should comprise:

— Vaporiser gas outlet temperature and water flowrate (open rack type)

— Flow rate and temperature of the water (closedtype, forced flow type)

— Water bath temperature and heat supply(atmospheric water bath)

— Intermediate flow rate and LNG temp at outlet(condenser/vaporiser type)

— Bath water temperature and level, gas outlettemperature, extinction of flame, gas detectionin incoming air, air fan tripping (submergedcombustion type vaporiser),


DNV GL AS



- ITP

- Commissioningreports

Commissioning

Confirm by review of commissioning records thatthe specific vaporiser has appropriate monitoringand executive actions are undertaken as specifiedby design.

For example with respect to Submerged combustiontype vaporisers that the water pH is regularlymonitored, safety devices that initiate shutdown areimplemented and a program for testing of legionellaand a plan to avoid bacterial growth is in place.

-Supplier data

-Data sheets

-Procurementspecifications

Procurement

Review of purchase requisitions for compliance withthe design basis.

Review specification for fabrication, installation andtesting of the vaporiser and confirm that it is incompliance with specifications or compatible withindustry practice.

Satisfactory level of inspection will be performedby all involved parties; review of recognisedIndependent third party certification and designdata to confirm that the Vaporiser will be designed,constructed and tested in accordance with arecognised international code or standard.

Monitoring fabrication, assembly and testing ofloading arms for compliance with the design basis.

-FAT

-ITP

-Drawings

-Material

certificates

-WPQR

Design

Review specification for fabrication, installation andtesting of the vaporiser and confirm that it is incompliance with specifications or compatible withindustry practice.

Satisfactory level of inspection will be performed byall parties;

fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordancewith specification for fabrication, installation andtesting

The vaporizer shall safelycontain all hydrocarbons atthe maximum and minimumforeseeable pressures,design temperatures andoperating forces.

-Fabrication

dossiersConstruction


— the equipment is installed in accordance withdesign, and any deviations documented andjustified.

— all piping and components are fabricated andpressure tested in accordance with the design,and any deviations documented and justified.

— all safety systems are installed inspected andtested.

To avoid over-pressure,any vaporiser that could beisolated shall be served withsufficient, adequately sized,relief devices such that thesystem may not be over-pressured.

See verification activity Table B-8 – Pressure reliefsystems


DNV GL AS



Cold Boxes

-Drawings

-Insulation

specifications

Design

Review specifications and drawings from suppliercovering insulation material and insulationcontainment

Cold box are to be designedand fabricated to containthe equipment and providecontainment of insulation

-Material

certificates

-Drawings

-ITP

-FAT

-Fabrication

dossier

Construction

Review cold box fabrication to confirm:

— Verify the identity of the components beinginstalled within the cold box

— Suitable materials have been used— Compliance with the design and fabrication

specification with any deviation documentedand justified and that dimensions are withintolerances defined in the specification

-Drawings DesignReview cold box design to ensure:

That appropriate safety relief (e.g. burst disc orvent panels) is installed

Cold box to be provided withadequate and appropriatesafety devises to preventoverpressure within Cold Boxenclosure -Drawings Construction Verify that appropriate safety relief (e.g. burst disc

or vent panels) is installed

Rotating equipment (pumps and turbo compressors/expanders)

Rotating equipment are to beaccording to manufacturerscode and requirements andprovided with adequate sealsystem (where relevant) toprevent loss of containmentof hydrocarbon.

-Design code

-Drawings

-Data sheets

-Criticalequipment list

Design

Review purchase requisitions for Rotatingequipment

Review mechanical interface with connectedequipment and support

Review control and safety system

Confirm by review of specifications that rotatingequipment has adequate seal systems providedand that appropriate monitoring is provided withnecessary executive actions specified


DNV GL AS



-Materialcertificates

-Drawings

-FAT

-Fabricationdossier

Construction

Review rotating equipment manufacturing dossiersto confirm:

— Specified materials have been used— Compliance with the design and fabrication


— FAT are performed and fulfil projectspecifications

— Where relevant, CE mark certificates areavailable

Guidance: DNV GL CMC procedures to be followedwhere relevant.

Supplier data

vendor P&IDsCommissioning

Confirm by review of commissioning records thatrotating equipment have adequate seal systemsprovided and appropriate monitoring is providedand executive actions are undertaken as specifiedby design.

Valves

Design code

supplier dataProcurement

Review manufacturing records and qualitycertification to confirm that the valves havebeen designed and fabricated to a recognisedinternational code or standard.

The cryogenic valvesshall safely contain allhydrocarbons at themaximum and minimumforeseeable pressures,design temperatures andoperating forces.

Methodstatements

Procedures

ITPs

Design

Review valve design to confirm that:

— the correct design conditions are considered— the criteria has been correctly applied in

accordance with the appropriate design codes.

Relief valves

Thermal relief valves for theprotection of equipment,piping and hoses fromover-pressure resultingfrom ambient heat input toblocked in LNG or other lighthydrocarbon liquids shall beinstalled.

Materialspecifications

Ensure material compatibility for low temperatureapplication.

In addition, see verification activity Table B-8 –Pressure relief systems

Re-condensors


DNV GL AS



Design code

supplier dataProcurement

Review of recognised independent third partycertification and design data to confirm that the re-condensors have been designed, constructed andtested in accordance with a recognised internationalcode or standard.

Drawings Design

Review re-condenser design to confirm that:

— the correct design conditions are considered— the criteria has been correctly applied in

accordance with the appropriate design codes.

The re-condensorsshall safely contain allhydrocarbons at themaximum and minimumforeseeable pressures,design temperatures andoperating forces. -Material

certificates

-Drawings

-FAT

-Fabricationdossier(s)

Construction

Review re-condensors fabrication to confirm:

— Suitable materials have been used.— Compliance with the design and fabrication

specification with any deviation documentedand justified and that dimensions are withintolerances defined in the specification.

Heat Exchangers

For Shell and Tube heat exchangers - Seeverification activity Table B-4 – Non cryogenicpressure vessels and equipment

Designspecifications

DrawingsDesign

For other heat exchangers that are not regulatedby codes and standards, a process to be developedto ensure the equipment is delivered according toproject specifications. Review design basis that thefollowing is considered:

— Suitable materials are specified includingcryogenic temperatures

— Design calculations including thermal stresses— Review mechanical interface with connected

equipment and support— Review pressure relief system.


Drawings

FAT

Fabricationdossier

Construction

Review heat exchanger manufacturing dossiers toconfirm:

— Specified materials have been used— That compliance with design and fabrication


— FAT are performed and fulfil projectspecifications

— Where relevant, CE mark certificates areavailable.

Pressure vessels (for refrigerants)

Designspecifications Design

See verification activity Table B-4 – Non cryogenicpressure vessels and equipment


DNV GL AS



Confirm by review of design basis that all relevantdesign conditions are being considered:

— Thermal stresses— Mechanical properties at low temperatures.

Piping


Designspecifications

Isometricdrawings

Design

Check that materials for piping, flanges, fittingsand bolting etc are suitable for low temperatureapplications.

Piping flexibility analysis shall take into accountlarge temperature variations and mechanicalproperties at low temperatures.

Check water-hammer effects arising fromemergency shutdown of LNG transfer pipeline.Note: See verification activity Table B-4 – Noncryogenic pressure vessels and equipment

Isometricdrawings

ITPConstruction

Check that required expansion joints are installedaccording to project specifications.

Survey to confirm cryogenic containing pipinginstalled are leak tested and proof tested assatisfactory.

Guidance:

Preference is for pneumatic test if approved by localauthorities.

The cryogenic process pipingfacilities shall safely containall hydrocarbons at themaximum and minimumforeseeable pressures,design temperatures andoperating forces.

ITP CommissioningConfirm by inspection and review of records thatrequired insulation has been installed as per thedesign


DNV GL AS

Table B-6 LNG storage tanks

HAZARD MANAGEMENT



LNG storage tanks

OBJECTIVES: To provide appropriate and effective cryogenic fluid containment systems and equipment that shalleliminate or minimise likelihood of release of hazardous material or loss of containment.


LNG storage tanks (does not include tanks covered by the Pressure Equipment Directive – EU)


EN1160 Installations and equipment for liquefied natural gas – General characteristics of liquefied natural gas

EN1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas – Design of onshore installations

EN 14620-1 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage ofrefrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – General

EN 14620-2 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage ofrefrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Metallic components

EN 14620-3 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage ofrefrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Concrete components

EN 14620-4 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage ofrefrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Insulation components

EN 14620-5 Design and manufacture of site built, vertical, cylindrical, flat-bottomed steel tanks for the storage ofrefrigerated, liquefied gases with operating temperatures between 0°C and -165°C – Testing, drying, purging, andcool-down

API Standard 620 Design and construction of Large, Welded, Low-pressure Storage Tanks

NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)

EN12567 Industrial Valves – Isolating Valves for LNG Specification for suitability and approval verification test

EN1626 Cryogenic Vessels, valves for cryogenic service

EN12300 Cryogenic vessels, cleanliness for cryogenic service

BS6364 Valves for cryogenic service

EN ISO 10497 Testing of valves – Fire type-testing requirements

ASME Section VIII-DIV 2 Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

Pressure Equipment Directive (only applicable in the EU)

API 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure - Relieving Devices in Refineries

API 521 Guide for Pressure-Relieving and De-pressuring Systems

ASME B31.3 Standards of pressure piping – Process piping

Service specification —

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Performancerequirementspecification


The LNG storagetanks shallsafely contain allhydrocarbons atthe maximumand minimumforeseeablepressures (asdefined for this typeof tanks), designtemperatures,normal andabnormal loadingconditions

Sitecharacterizationdocumentation(weatherconditions,topography ofthe ground, sitesoil conditionsand geology,natural (lightning,flooding,earthquakes,tsunamis, etc)and man-made(projectile impact,collisions, etc)hazard potential,etc.

Preliminary designdocuments

Hazard

assessment

Hazard assessment shall be carried out during the design of the facility and it is alsorecommended if a major modification takes place. Methodologies (deterministic and/orprobabilistic), hazard identification (external and internal origin), estimation of probabilities, andestimation of consequences shall be done in accordance to the applicable and recognised code orstandard for the project.


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Design basis/specifications


Design reports(includingcomputer inputand output ifapplicable)

Test reports

Drawings

Constructionprocedures

Design

Confirm by review of design basis, reports, and drawings that all relevant design conditionsand phases are being considered and the load combinations and allowable limits conform to therequirements of the applicable and recognised code or standard for the project.

Adequacy of following items shall be checked:

— Materials:

General for all materials: Strength, fire resistance, behaviour at cryogenic temperature ifrelevant, durability

— Loads and load combinations for normal and abnormal loading condition: It shall be checkedthat following loads are considered:

— Dead and Live Loads— Fire loads— Other hazards

— Structural analysis: Containment structure shall be analysed as an integrated structure(foundation, wall, roof, contained liquid, liner (if acting as structural element) with dueconsideration of different construction stages and corresponding loading and discontinuities.Following aspects shall be checked:

— Material models and parameters shall reflect behaviour at cryogenic and ambienttemperatures. Most critical parameter shall be used in design.

— Boundary conditions shall reflect the different stages of the structure, friction coefficientsfor sliding connections shall be at cryogenic temperatures if this is more critical

— Loads, to be combined in accordance with applicable standards— Reliability of analysis tools shall be documented— Analysis simplifications shall be conservative related to actual behaviour— Seismic analysis: Methodology, effects of soil-structure interaction (if relevant), damping,

response spectra reflecting site conditions, load combination. Check of sloshing andadequacy of freeboard.


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— Design:

— Foundation: Covered in a separate checklist.— Wall: Access openings, closure pours between precast elements (if relevant), connection

to foundation, pre-stressing (losses, anchorages, etc), liquid/vapour tightness,embedment loads, design for heat flux loadings due to fires, construction joints, and wallpenetrations shall be checked. Walls shall be designed for missile impact. Requirementsfor liquid/vapour tightness are different for primary and secondary containments, ifapplicable. Buckling resistance considering pressure from the insulation when tank isemptied/heated shall be checked.

— Roof: Composite members, liner, sufficient thickness to provide adequate bucklingresistance, design for missile impact, and thermal resistance to heat flux due to fire

— Floor: Heating system shall be designed to avoid permafrost.— Insulation: Shall be designed to avoid permafrost and to meet boil-off requirements— Special considerations for earthquake design: Secondary containment structure shall be

designed for 1) SSE 2) SSE aft and spill, and 3) OBE— Special considerations for steel design: The “elephant’s foot” should be checked for

earthquake loadings. When non-linear analyses methods are used to determine theultimate strength of a structure the following shall be considered:

— The software used shall be documented and tested for the purpose;— The finite elements and the modelling techniques (element type, mesh, material

parameters, imperfections etc.) should be calibrated against a known case (e.g.from the design code) in order to show that the failure mechanisms are adequatelyrepresented. The calibration should be documented. All factors that influence theresistance shall be addressed. Such factors are material non-linearity, imperfections,residual stresses, external pressure etc.;

— The loading sequence in the analyses should be selected such that the resultrepresents the conditions to be analysed in a safe way;

— Detailing:

— Metal components— Liners and coatings— Anchorage details to concrete base, if required

— Instrumentation: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards:liquid level indicators and/or switches, pressure indicators and/or switches, temperatureindicators and/or switches, density indicator.

— Pressure and vacuum protection: Check that at least following items are according to relevantstandards: pressure relief valves, rupture disc, gas injection system, vacuum relief valves,etc.

— Safety equipment: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards:anti-roll-over devices, protection against lightning, sensors to monitor temperature, heatingsystem control, foundation settlement, leaks.

— Piping: Check that at least following items are according to relevant standards: Cool downpiping, filling piping.


DN

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and gas facilities

DN

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Constructionprocedures

Specification forfabrication

Inspection andtesting plans andreports



Design reports

Drawings

Qualificationof weldingprocedures

Construction

Confirm by review of relevant documentation that constructions procedures are in compliancewith the requirements of the applicable and recognised code or standard for the project. LNGstorage tanks shall be installed in accordance with design and any deviations shall be dulydocumented and approved.

Confirm that a satisfactory level of inspection for all systems is performed by relevant/competentparties.

Confirm that fabrication acceptance criteria are in accordance with the specification forfabrication, installation and testing.

Adequacy of following items shall be checked:

— dimensions and tolerances (should be within design assumptions)— material specification compliance— pre-stressing and post-tensioning systems (anchorages, forces, sequence of stressing), if

relevant— forming and forming removal, if relevant— construction joints, if relevant— embedment’s, if relevant— coatings (liquid/vapour barrier for concrete)— corrosion protection (steel outer tank and roof)— welding qualification— non-destructive testing (NDT) of welds.


Drawings

Testing,commissioningrecords

Commissioning

Confirm that following operations are performed according to the requirements of the applicableand recognised code or standard for the project and the design basis:

Testing including: hydrostatic testing, liquid tightness testing, pneumatic testing, pressure andvacuum testing.

Purging into service, cool-down operation, and LNG tank filling.

Purging out of service and warm up.

Records of all the previously mentioned operations shall be kept.

Note:

If needed during the course of the project and evaluation, DNV GL has an extensive database containing data, formulae, etc pertaining to the risk andevaluation of different types of LNG tanks and configurations.


DNV GL AS

Table B-7 Open hazardous drains

HAZARD MANAGEMENT


HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM: PROCESSCONTAINMENT

Open hazardous drains

OBJECTIVES: To remove hydrocarbon and hazardous spillage from process and utility areas and to prevent thespread of hydrocarbon spilled inventory to adjacent areas.


Open hazardous drains system.


NFPA 59

EN1473

Drainage systems


Documenttypes

Phase Verification activity

DesignConfirm by review of the project studies that thehazardous drains system is consistent with theproject requirements and fire zone layout philosophy

Design

Review utility P&IDs to confirm that open drains arespecified for all open areas where hydrocarbons maybe present, and that the drains terminate either at anopen drains tank or the contaminated fire water pond.

Hazardousdrains designspecifications

Hazardousdrains Dwgs.P&IDs

Plot plansDesign

Review open drain system design to confirm that itis sized to remove spills, deluge water and rainwaterfrom all open areas and drain lines are sloping asspecified with no pockets.

Open drainage system toremove deluge, rainwaterand spills from all open areaswhere hydrocarbons may bepresent, terminating eitherat an open drains tank orthe contaminated fire waterpond.

P&IDs ConstructionConfirm by survey that the bunds are installed whererequired and have connections to the open drainagesystem in accordance with the P&IDs.

Design

Confirm by survey that impoundment basin(s)are consistent with project requirements. Areas ofconcern are:

— process areas— vaporization areas— transfer areas for LNG, flammable refrigerants and

flammable liquids— areas immediately surrounding flammable

refrigerant and flammable liquid storage tanks.

Plot plans

GA drawings

Hazardousdrains dwgs.

DesignReview project documentation that the spill collectionarea and the impounding basin is connected by openchannel(s)

Impounding basins shallprevent cryogenic liquidfrom damaging importantequipment, structures orflammable fluids enteringthe surface water drainagesystem.

An LNG spill within theprocess and transfer areasshall be confined in thevicinity of or remote fromthe spill collection area.The spill collection areaand the impounding basinshall be connected by openchannel(s)

P&IDs

Plot plansConstruction

Confirm by survey that the impoundment basins areinstalled where required and have connections tochannels in accordance with the P&IDs/Plot Plans.


DNV GL AS


Documenttypes


Segregate hazardous andnon hazardous open andclosed drains to preventmigration of vapour betweensystems.

P&IDs Design

Confirm by review of P&IDs that the design ofhazardous and non hazardous open and closed drainsprevents the migration of vapour between systems.


DNV GL AS

Table B-8 Pressure relief systems

HAZARD MANAGEMENT



Pressure relief systems

OBJECTIVES: The role of relief systems is to protect process systems from over-pressurisation.

To reduce to ALARP the probability that a pressure vessel or associated pipe-work will fail under excess pressureowing to pressure control device failure, isolated and “locked in” equipment, overheating or fire impingement. Tosafely dispose of hydrocarbons released from the process as a result of operation of certain pressure control valves,lifting of relief valves, draining and maintenance depressurisation.


Relief/safety valves

Relief system network (included in relief system activities)

Flare header and flare system are not part of this HSE Critical System


API RP 520 Sizing, selection and installation of pressure-relieving devices in refineries

API 521 Pressuring relieving and de-pressuring systems (equivalent to ISO 23251 Petroleum and natural gas industry– Pressure-relieving and de-pressuring systems

Guidance note: The following specifications can be useful:

ISO10418 Petroleum and natural gas industries -- Offshore production installations -- Analysis, design, installationand testing of basic surface process safety systems

API 14C Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems forOffshore Production Platforms


Documenttypes


The maximum allowableback pressure and minimumdesign temperature of therelief system shall be suitablefor the highest identified flowrate.

P&IDs

Relief systemdesign basis

Relief sizingcalcs.

Design

Confirm by review of the relief study and processsimulations that the maximum allowable backpressure and minimum design temperature ofthe relief system shall be suitable for the highestidentified flow rate.

P&IDs DesignConfirm by review of P&IDs that sufficient reliefdevices have been provided such that the systemmay not be over-pressurised.

The hydrocarbon containingsystem shall be served withsufficient, adequately sized,relief devices such that thesystem may not be over-pressured.

Relief valvesizing calcs.

Relief valvedata sheets

Design

Confirm by review of process calculations anddata sheets that PSVs capacity sizing basis andinlet pressure drops are such that they will relievepressures in excess of system design pressure, withreference to applicable specifications.


DNV GL AS


Documenttypes


Vendor data Design

Confirm by review of manufacturer’s data sheetand calculations that PSVs have adequate capacityfor the required flow rate to ensure that theywill relieve pressures in excess of system designpressure and that selection of device is appropriatefor the specified conditions (suitable for flow, fluidphase, back pressure, etc.)

ITPs ConstructionConfirm by inspection and review of mechanicalcompletion records that the PSVs are of the correcttype and sizing as per the P&IDs/data sheets.

ITPs Construction

Confirm by inspection that inlet pipe-work torelieving devices is located satisfactorily in relationto potential restrictions (e.g. above liquid levels,vessel internals, etc.).

P&IDs Design

Confirm by review of P&IDs that isolation valves forrelieving devices are specified as per the projectspecifications and that no protected equipment maybe isolated from the disposal system.

It shall not be possible tosimultaneously obstructall relief routes from anyprotected equipment to thedisposal system (e.g. bylocking off both isolationvalves at once)

ITPs CommissioningConfirm by sample inspection that all isolationvalves for relieving devices are installed as verifiedin the above activity.

P&IDs

Equipmentplant layouts

Pipingisometrics

Design

Confirm by review of all vent locations (atmosphericvent from drums or equipment seals) that they ventto safe location and in the event of liquid carry overwill not discharge to areas that may cause a hazardto personnel.

Relief sizingcalculations

Data sheets

P&IDs

Design

Relief drum sizing shall be sufficient to ensure noliquid carry over to the flare system under highestidentified flow rate conditions

Hydrocarbon liquids shallnot be discharged fromrelieving devices or ventssuch that they are a hazardto personnel.

P&IDs

equipmentplant layouts

Pipingisometrics

Construction

Confirm by visual inspection that vent locations arein safe locations.


DNV GL AS

Table B-9 Ignition prevention and control system

HAZARD MANAGEMENT


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT:IGNITION CONTROL

Ignition prevention and controlsystems

OBJECTIVES: To reduce to ALARP, the probability that a release of flammable gas will encounter a source of ignitionby:

— applying hazardous area classification and specifying the degree of protection required for electrical apparatus tobe used in hazardous areas.

— providing adequate ventilation— isolating electric power supplies to apparatus which might provide a source of ignition.— preventing hot surfaces causing ignition.— providing earthing continuity.


All electrical equipment and instrumentation which must function within a potentially flammable atmosphere;

All exposed surfaces;

Earthing continuity for all equipment, structures and piping;

Fire dampers in all “rated” fire divisions and boundaries.

RELEVANT CODES AND SPECIFICATIONS

IP Code Part 15 (Area Classification of Petroleum Installations)

IEC 60079 -10-1, Classification of Areas – Explosive Gas Atmospheres

IEC 60529 Degrees of protection provided by enclosures (IP Code)

API RP 500 Recommended Practice for Classification for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities

ISO13732-1 Ergonomics of the thermal environment – Methods for the assessment of human responses to contactwith surfaces Part 1:Hot surfaces

Building Safety Regulations

Non-Hazardous Area Ventilation

Certified Electrical Equipment

Cargo Tank Inert Gas System

Earthing and Bonding Systems

Ignition Control Components

ATEX 99/92 (for EU projects only)

ATEX 94/9 (for EU projects only)


DNV GL AS


Documenttypes


Table ofhazardoussources

Hazardousareaclassificationlayouts

Hazardousareaclassificationcriteria

Design

Review the area classification layouts andassociated studies to confirm that:

all possible Hazards have been appropriatelyconsidered, (including possible migration)

the hazardous area drawings correctly account forthe actual location of the sources of release

the hazardous areas have been appropriatelydefined and all areas have sufficient ACPH inaccordance with the chosen design code.

Vent inlets and outlets are correctly located inaccordance with code requirements.

Guidance:

Design documentation relevant to the reviewwill include but not limited to: Gas release anddispersion study; Schedule of hazardous releases;FERA study; and CFD study as applicable.

Areas where potentiallyhazardous concentrationsof flammable gas mayoccur shall be an electricallyclassified Hazardousarea, in accordance withspecifications.

Hazardousareaclassificationlayouts

Equipmentlayouts

Construction

Confirm by survey:

the hazardous area drawings correctly account forthe actual location of the sources of release

vent inlets and outlets are correctly located inaccordance with design documents

Mechanical and electricalequipment installed in areaswhere an accumulationof accidentally releasedhazardous flammable gasor vapours can occur shallbe appropriate for the areaclassification.

Hazardousareaequipmentregister

Hazardousarea layoutdrawings

Equipmenthazardous areacertification

Schedule ofhazardousreleases

Design

Confirm by review of appropriate data thatelectrical and mechanical equipment is correctlycertified for the hazardous area in which it is tobe located and that a complete Hazardous AreaEquipment Register has been developed.

Guidance: Appropriate documentation willinclude independent third party hazardousarea certification, compliance review reportsengineering & procurement contractors.


DNV GL AS


Documenttypes


Guidance: For complianceto IP Code Part 15 (AreaClassification of PetroleumInstallations), all fire andgas detection equipment,ESD Process Field Devicesand ESD Driven actuatingdevices shall be certified foruse in a Zone 1, Gas GroupIIA temperature class T3Hazardous Area.


Hazardousarea layoutdrawings

ITPs

Construction

Confirm by review of independent third partyATEX or equivalent compliance review reports(Construction Contractors) that instrument andelectrical equipment is correctly certified forthe hazardous area in which it is installed andit has been installed in accordance with anyspecial conditions of use. Confirm that a completeand accurate as built ATEX Register has beendeveloped (for EU projects).

All externally locatedInstrument and Electricalequipment is compliant withthe project requirements inmeeting specifications.

Vendor data Design

Confirm by review of independent third partyIngress protection compliance review reports(Engineering and Procurement Contractors) thatinstrument and electrical equipment is correctlycertified for the minimum project requirement e.g.IP Rating 56. or NEMA 4/4X.


Shutdownphilosophy

Design

Confirm by review of the philosophy that allexternal electrical equipment that is to remainlive following a confirmed gas release is suitablefor Zone 1 hazardous area use and that all otherequipment is isolated on confirmed gas detection

All equipment shall beisolated on confirmed gasdetection. All externalelectrical equipment that is toremain live shall be suitablefor Zone 1 hazardous areause.

ITPs CommissioningConfirm by survey and function test that theinstalled equipment is either appropriate for zone 1use or isolated on confirmed gas detection.

Earthingphilosophy forall productionequipmentincludingpiping.

Frame/structuredrawings

Design

Confirm by sample design review that equipmentand structures are suitably earthed and complywith requirements of specifications. Review toinclude but not be limited to:

— electrical earthing specification— electrical earthing drawings— electrical earthing typical detail drawings.

All structures, equipmentand piping shall be suitablyearthed to prevent a potentialignition source, by build upof a differential potentialbetween adjacent equipmentand/or structures

ITPs Construction Confirm by sample survey that the installedequipment and structures are correctly earthed


DNV GL AS


Documenttypes


P&IDs

Pipingisometrics

Design

Confirm by design review of the equipmentdata sheets, piping schedule/list; piping laggingschedule and P&IDs that equipment and pipe-work located where flammable vapours or gasmay accumulate shall have exposed surfacetemperatures lower than the hazardous areatemperature classification.

Insulationspecification

P&IDsDesign

Confirm by review of the insulation specificationand P&IDs that appropriate equipment and pipingprotection is specified and meets specifications.

Surface temperaturesof exposed equipmentand pipe-work whereflammable vapours or gasmay accumulate shall beless than the minimumtemperature as definedby the hazardous areatemperature classificationin accordance withspecifications.

Guidance: All exposed partsof equipment or surfaceshaving surface temperaturesof more than 70°C or lessthan -10°C shall be protectedto avoid direct contact withpersonnel.

ITPs Construction

Confirm by survey that all equipment or pipe-work which is expected to have a high surfacetemperature is correctly lagged such that theexposed surface temperature meets design andspecifications.

D&IDs DesignConfirm by review of D&IDs that HVAC is providedto enclosed areas and that it is specified to providepositive air pressure.

F&G cause andeffects

D&IDsDesign

Review Cause and Effects to confirm that there isan alarm in a normally manned area on reductionof the differential pressure below the thresholdpressure.

Guidance: Threshold pressure should be 50 Pa.

HVAC systems shall providepositive air pressure withineach enclosed area to inhibitgas ingress; a reduction indifferential pressure below 50Pa shall alarm in a normallymanned area or agreed forthe project.

ITPs Commissioning

Confirm by survey and witness Function tests, thatthe HVAC systems provides positive air pressurewithin each enclosed area and that a reduction indifferential pressure below the threshold pressure,alarms in a normally manned area.

Guidance: Threshold pressure should be 50 Pa.

Safety concept

Vendor data

F&G detectioncriteria

Design

Confirm by review of safety studies and detectorspecifications that temperature set point specifiedfor each damper is appropriate

Note: all dampers in rated fire divisions andboundaries.

Fire dampers to close on firedetection and be fail safe onloss of control signal

ITPs Commissioning

Confirm by sample witness function test, that firedampers automatically close on fire activation ofthe frangible bulb / fusible loop or similar and failsafe on loss of control signal


DNV GL AS


Documenttypes


F&G cause andeffects

Vendor data

D&IDs

Design

Review Cause and Effects to confirm that HVACdampers are specified to close within the specifiedmaximum duration on confirmed detection ofsmoke or gas at the ventilation inlet

HVAC dampers to close andall HVAC fans to trip withinthe specified maximumduration of confirmed smokeor gas detection at theventilation inlet to enclosedareas. ITPs Commissioning

Confirm by witness function test that the HVACdampers close and all HVAC fans trip within thespecified duration or less on confirmed detection ofsmoke or gas at the ventilation inlet.


DNV GL AS

Table B-10 Emergency shutdown system

HAZARD MANAGEMENT


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT:SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS

Emergency shutdown system

OBJECTIVES: To provide facilities which detect abnormal conditions and initiate appropriate shutdown and isolationactions to minimise the likelihood of escalation into a major hazardous event and to minimise the duration of anysuch event.


ESD system (including field initiation devices and output driven executive action safety function devices)

ESD valves – incoming and recirculation piping and other ESD valves considered critical


EN1532 Installation and Equipment for Liquefied Natural Gas – ship to shore interface (move to control and ESD)

IEC-61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems

IEC 61511 Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector

ANSI/ISA-91.00.01-2001 Identification of Emergency Shutdown Systems and Controls that are Critical to MaintainingSafety in Process Industries

SIGTTO ESD Systems & Linked Ship/Shore Systems on Liquefied Gas Carriers (for Marine Transfer Facilities)


Documenttypes


ESD shutdownphilosophy

ESSA

ESD and F&Gcause andeffect

Safety concept

HAZOPs

P&IDs

Design

Confirm by review of the ESD system hierarchyand project safety concept that all types ofscenarios, associated hazardous conditions andrequired executive actions have been identifiedcorrectly.

Initiators and shutdown levels shall be incompliance with project requirements.

Guidance: In the case of LNG facilities,consideration shall be given to combined shutdownoperations of LNG vessel during loading/unloadingand the shore based facilities.

P&IDs

Safety conceptDesign

Confirm by review of P&IDs and systemarchitecture that appropriate process and utilityinputs are specified for the appropriate hazardsidentified in the ESD system hierarchy and safetyconcept. Confirm the compliance of process andutility causes for ESD shutdown according toproject requirements.

The ESD System shallcontinuously monitor allinstrumentation and devicesassociated with the systemto provide a systematicmeans of processing thesignals and carrying outnecessary automatic alarmand executive actions.

The system shall be resistantto single fault failure, andthe system as a directconsequence of any singleaccident or fault shall not bedisabled and shall remaincapable of identifying thehazard for which it has beenprovided.

ESD and F&Gcause andeffects

ESD hierarchylogic

Design

Confirm by review of ESD and F&G cause andeffect diagrams that the appropriate executiveactions are undertaken by the ESD system inresponse to the detected hazard. Considerationshould be taken of the conclusion identified inpreceding activities.


DNV GL AS


Documenttypes


ITPs Commissioning

Confirm by witness of function testing that theESD control system undertakes appropriateexecutive actions in response to the detectedhazard in accordance with the ESD and F&G causeand effect diagrams

Ship to controlschematic

ESD cause andeffect

ESDpushbuttonlayout

Design

Confirm by design review of the ESD controlsystem, jetty control panel arrangement drawingand Ship to Control schematic that the meansof manually initiating an ESD from a normallymanned area has been specified.There shall be means of

manually initiating an ESDfrom a normally mannedarea.

ITPs CommissioningConfirm by Survey and function test, that themeans of manually initiating an ESD from anormally manned area has been provided

P&IDs

Function testingDesign

Confirm by design review of ESDV hydraulic andInstrument P&IDs that all ESD devices move totheir safe condition (fail safe) on loss of systemoutput or electrical/hydraulic power or instrumentair.

All ESD devices shall move totheir safe condition on lossof system output, hydraulicpower or instrument air.

ITPs Commissioning

Confirm by witness sample of function tests andreview of records that all ESD devices move totheir safe condition (fail safe) on loss of systemoutput or electrical/hydraulic power or instrumentair.

Vendor data

HAZID

Equipmentlayouts

P&IDs

Design

For ESDVs specified on the PIDs, review the safetystudies and layouts to confirm that the fire andexplosion scenarios which may affect the ESDVsor their actuators have been identified and confirmwhich ESDVs and actuators will require protection.

Vendor dataand calculations Design

Review the design and fabrication data for ESDVswhich require protection to ensure that they aresuitably protected against relevant hazards

Guidance: Where protection or PFP or otherprotection is required for either valves or actuatorsthen review vendor drawings, calculations, testdata and relevant certificates [including explosionsurvivability calculations for the actuators]provided by vendor to confirm that the specifiedprotection is suitable and sufficient for theapplicable fire and explosion scenarios.

All ESDVs and actuators shallremain functional followingan explosion or under fireconditions for a sufficienttime period to perform theirintended function.

ITPs ConstructionSurvey all ESDVs and actuators to confirm thatthey are installed in the correct location andprotected as required


DNV GL AS


Documenttypes


Safety concept

Cablespecification

Cable schedule

Cablerequisition andvendor data

Design

Confirm by review of the cable specification, cablerequisition, vendor data sheets and cable schedulethat all cables associated with the ESD system arefire resistant.

Cable supports/racks shall offer equal rating as aminimum to maintain availability of the system.

ESD system cables shall befire resistant to Specifications.As far as is reasonablypractical, ESD system cablesshall be protected frommechanical damage.

Cablespecification

Cablecertification

Construction

Confirm by sample survey that the cables installedare fire resistant. Cable markings and certificationshall be verified as being compliant.

Routing of cables shall also confirm they are, as faras is possible, protected from mechanical damage.

HAZID

FERA

Equipmentlayouts

Design

Review the safety studies to determine thatcredible event scenarios which may affect the ESDPanel and associated equipment along with thetime required to complete ESD have been clearlyidentified.

ESD panels and associatedequipment shall be protectedagainst fire, blast anddropped objects, such thatits ability to function isnot impaired until ESD iscomplete.

HAZID

FERA

Buildingstructuralcalculations

JCR, SS andITR equipmentroom(s) heatrise study

Equipmentlayouts

Design

Confirm by documentation review that the ESDpanel and associated equipment is protected fromthe identified credible event scenarios.

All aspects of the building design relevant tomaintaining the integrity of the ESD system (tofulfil its function in an emergency situation for therequired duration) shall be confirmed as beingacceptable for the identified hazard conditions.

The ESD system shall have aminimum SIL rating and meetthe requirements of the SILClassification Study.

Guidance: Hazard Studiesare used to decide SIL rating.

Safety concept

SIL assessmentstudy

SILclassificationstudy

SIL verificationreport

Vendorverificationreport

Design

Confirm by review of vendor data and SILassessment study that the ESD system andassociated loops are based on a probability offailure on demand as defined in the relevantspecifications.

Hydraulic/pneumatic ventlines from ESDV valveactuators to be locatedso they are not (as far aspracticable) vulnerable tomechanical damage

ITPs Construction

Confirm by inspection that the hydraulic/pneumatic vent lines from ESDV actuators havebeen located so they are not (as far as practicable)vulnerable to mechanical damage.


DNV GL AS

Table B-11 Blowdown system

HAZARD MANAGEMENT


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT:SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS

Blowdown system

OBJECTIVES: To enable rapid depressurisation of the gas inventory so as to minimise the potential for escalationof the initiating event. To reduce the probability that a pressure vessel or associated pipe-work will fail underexcess pressure owing to pressure control device failure, isolated and “locked in” equipment, overheating or fireimpingement. To safely dispose of hydrocarbons released from the process as a result of operation of certainpressure control valves, lifting of relief valves, opening of emergency blow-down valves and manual purging, drainingand maintenance depressurisation.


Functionality of relief valves/blow-down valves; Knock out drum; HP and LP system

Note, hydrocarbon containment of relief, flare and vent lines is covered by the hydrocarbon containment performancerequirement


ISO 4126 Safety devices for protection against excessive pressure

EN 764-7 Pressure equipment Safety systems for unfired pressure equipment

API 521/ISO2351 Pressure relieving and de-pressuring systems

API520 PT 1&2 Sizing, Selection and Installation of Pressure Relieving Devices in Refineries Sizing and Section andInstallation


Documenttypes


Design

Confirm by review of the safety studies and HAZOPreport that a suitable blow down time has beenderived accounting for, but not limited to, thebalance between potential for escalation, PFPrequirements and material selection.

Design

Confirm by review of the blow-down study andprocess simulations that the inventory shall beblown down within a time period suitable to ensurethat escalation of the incident does not occur.

DesignConfirm by review of the PIDs that isolatablesections are specified in accordance with the blowdown requirements

Inventory shall be blown-down to a sufficiently lowpressure within a time periodsuitable to ensure that nosignificant escalation of theincident occurs.

Blow downstudy toincorporateresults of FERA

HAZOP report

DesignReview blow-down orifice data sheets and sizingcalculations and confirm these comply withappropriate codes and process design data.


DNV GL AS


Documenttypes


Commissioning

Confirm by witness of blow-down tests that theprocess inventory is to blow-down to a sufficientlylow pressure within the correct time period, in thecorrect valve sequence and without exceeding theminimum design temperature

Guidance: This is achieved by a full blow-down from operating pressures then making acomparison of the field data obtained with theprocess models and calculations developed for thedesign case to confirm the suitability of the latter.Special consideration is given to blow-down of liquidcontainers in LNG facilities.

Design of reliefsystem

Blow downstudy

Design

Confirm by review of the blow-down study andprocess simulations that the maximum allowableback pressure and minimum design temperature ofthe relief system shall be suitable for the highestidentified flow rate.

The maximum allowableback pressure and minimumdesign temperature ofthe relief system shall besuitable for the highestidentified flow rate. Construction

Confirm by review of records that the blow-down valves, blow-down restriction orifice andblow-down/cold vent piping (including sizingand approximate routing) has been installed inaccordance with the design.

Design

Confirm by review of Cause and Effect Diagramsthat blow-down shall be primarily manuallyoperated and if no operator intervention withina project specified time period then will beautomatically initiated on:

- confirmed fire detection in a hazardous area

- confirmed gas detection

- signal from the installation control room

- manual push-buttons in control room.

Blow down will be primarilymanually operated and if nooperator intervention withinthe 3 minutes time periodthen will be automaticallyinitiated on:

— confirmed fire detectionin a hazardous area

— confirmed gas detection— signal from the

installation control room— manual push-buttons in

control room.

Cause andeffectsdiagrams

ConstructionConfirm by witness of test that blow-down isinitiated in accordance with the Cause and EffectDiagrams.


DNV GL AS


Documenttypes


Designcalculations

P&IDsDesign

Review to confirm that blow-down system has beendesigned such that the risk of significant escalationdue to failure to achieve blow down is ALARP.

The blow down systemshall be designed andfabricated such that the riskof significant escalation dueto failure to achieve blowdown is according to thedefined safety objectives.

Guidance: Scenarios to beconsidered should includethe potential for loss ofactuating media and/orloss of signal from the ESDSystem.

P&IDs

ITPConstruction

Confirm by witness test and review of records thatblow-down valves function as required by design.

P&IDs Design

Confirm by review P&IDs and piping drawings thatall flare, relief and blowdown lines are self draining,and where low points are unavoidable these havean appropriate drain connection with locked openisolation valve.

Liquid accumulation shall beprevented in the relief anddisposal system such thatthe route from protectedequipment to the flare tip orvent shall not be impaired. P&IDs Construction

Confirm by sample inspection and review of recordsthat all flare, relief and blowdown lines are selfdraining, and where low points are unavoidablethese have an appropriate drain connection withlocked open isolation valve.

Design

Confirm by review of the flare design report andventilation studies that the flare tip positions havebeen selected such that the risk of an un-ignitedgas release resulting in a flammable cloud over theInstallation is minimised.

Operatingphilosophy;

Flare tipselection

Flare vendorcalculations Design

Confirm by review of the flare design report andflare radiation study that the radiation levels asspecified in the performance requirement are notexceeded or that protection is provided.

Flare tip or the vent shall belocated such that:

It limits the risk of an un-ignited release from forminga flammable cloud in areasof the Installation whereignition may occur

An ignited release in thevicinity of the flare or ventdoes not exceed maximumallowable radiation limits innormally manned areas andon escape routes.

Guidance: Typical allowablelimits are:

(i) short term heat radiation6.31 kW/m2

(ii) continuous radiation notmore than 1.58 kW/m2.

Specifications

DrawingsConstruction

Confirm by inspection that the flare tips are locatedin accordance with the design


DNV GL AS


Documenttypes


Design

Confirm by review of P&IDs that a gas purge isspecified for the flare system, and by review ofcalculations; confirm it is capable of preventing airingress into the system.

DesignConfirm by review of P&IDs that any valves in thepurge gas supply are specified as either ‘lockedopen’ or ‘normally open’.

Flare systemdesign

P&IDs

DesignConfirm by review of P&IDs that instrumentation isspecified to alert the operator in the event of a lossof purge gas (low pressure or low flow)

P&IDs Construction Confirm by review of records that the gas purgesystem is installed in accordance with the design.

Air ingress to the disposalsystem shall be preventedin order to prevent anexplosion hazard in thesystem.

Commissioningreports Commissioning

Confirm by review of commissioning records thatthe purge system functions in accordance with thedesign requirements, including means of alertingthe operator of loss of purge gas.

Design

By reviewing the blow-down study in conjunctionwith the P&IDs and the purchase order data,confirm that all BDVs and actuators have sufficientprotection measures specified for their intendedpurpose

Blow-downstudy

Purchaserequisitions

Vendor dataDesign

Confirm by review of calculations, certificationor type test data that all blow-down valve andactuator assemblies will open following themaximum specified blast overpressure and underthe appropriate fire loading.

Blow-down valves, includingthose with a time delayspecified prior to openingshall remain functionalfollowing an explosion andunder fire loading for asufficient time to performtheir intended function

Drawings Construction Confirm by survey that all specified protectionmeasures are correctly provided


DNV GL AS

Table B-12 Fire and gas detection system

HAZARD MANAGEMENT


HSE CRITICAL ELEMENT:DETECTION SYSTEMS

Fire and gas detection system

OBJECTIVES: To detect flammable gas releases, fires and smoke in designated areas of the gas installation andinitiate the appropriate emergency response.


All fire and gas detection, logic and outputs to ESD system

Includes executive actions driven directly from the F&G system

Excludes: control devices initiated by the ESD system as a result of outputs from the fire and gas detection systemincluding high sensitivity smoke detection system in control and switch gear rooms.


IEC 60331 Tests for electric cables under fire conditions

NFPA 72: National Fire Alarm and Signalling Code


Documenttypes


The F&G system shallcontinually monitor for fire,smoke and flammable gasin all areas of the berthwhere a risk of flammablegas accumulation mayoccur (including HVAC inletsand airlocks) and initiateappropriate status and alarmsignals.

Detectors shall be located,spaced and voted such thata hazardous condition isdetected before significantdamage or escalation occurs

Alarm signals shall be relayedto a normally manned areaand appropriate actions taken.

F&G detectionlayout

F&Gphilosophy


HAZID

FERA study


Hazardousarea drawings/layouts

Design

Confirm by review of the safety studies that allhazardous conditions which are required to bedetected by the fire and gas system have beenidentified and dimensioned.


DNV GL AS


Documenttypes


F&G detectionlayouts

DetectorVendorperformancedata


Hazardousarea drawings/layouts

FERA study

Gas releaseand dispersionstudy

Design

Confirm by design review that the type andlocation, spacing and voting of detection devicesis appropriate to the identified and dimensionedhazardous conditions.

Type and location of all detection devices(including MACs, all fire and smoke detection(both indoor and outdoor) and hydrocarbon gasdetection, including battery room) shall complywith the project requirements

F&G detectionlayout

Fire and gasphilosophy


Design

Confirm by review of the cause and effectdiagrams, in conjunction with the detector layoutsthat the appropriate executive actions and status/alarm signals are undertaken by the F&G controlsystem in response to the detected hazard.

Guidance: Check interactions with ESD areappropriate and confirm logic for the F&G actionsis in compliance with the project requirements.

Designdrawings

ITPsConstruction

Confirm by survey, that the detector coverageas installed meets the intent of the conclusionsidentified in design.

All deviations from the accepted detector layoutsto be justified.

Guidance:

— distribute appropriateoutput signals to the ESDsystem for implementationof shutdown actions

— Installation and Jettygeneral alarm (GA) onconfirmed fire or gasdetection

— fire-pump start onconfirmed fire detection inopen areas

— Fire and Gas detectionplacement to be inaccordance with projectspecifications

Designdrawings

ITPsCommissioning

Confirm by witness function test, that the F&Gcontrol system undertakes appropriate executiveactions and status/alarm signals in response tothe detected hazard in accordance with the Causeand Effect diagrams and within the time periodsstipulated by the design [time to closure of ESDVsshall be confirmed through this activity].


DNV GL AS


Documenttypes


Safety concept

Cablespecification

Cable schedule

Cablerequisition andvendor data

Design

Confirm by review of the cable specification, cablerequisition, vendor data sheets and cable schedulethat all cables associated with the F&G detectorsare fire resistant.

Cable supports/racks shall offer equal rating as aminimum to maintain availability of the system.

Fire and gas detector cablesshall be fire resistant toproject specifications

As far as is reasonablypractical, fire and gas detectorcables shall be protected frommechanical damage.

Cablespecification

Cablecertification

Construction

Confirm by sample survey that the cables installedare fire resistant. Cable markings and certificationshall be verified as being compliant.

Routing of cables shall also confirm they are,as far as is possible, protected from mechanicaldamage.

The fire and gas controlsystem shall have a minimumSIL rating as specified for theProject.

Guidance: Hazard studies areused to decide SIL rating.

Safety concept

SILassessmentstudy

SILclassificationstudy

SIL verificationreport

Vendorverificationreport

Design

Confirm by review of vendor data and SILassessment study that the F&G system andassociated loops are based on a probability offailure on demand as defined in IEC-61508 andIEC 61511, and meets Performance requirements.

The F&G system shall beprotected against fire, blastand dropped objects, suchthat its ability to function isnot impaired either during amajor accident event and/or for a specified minimumduration thereafter.

Control system shall include allstatus monitoring and actionsto and from the control rooms.

Safety concept

HAZID

Fire and blaststudy

Buildingstructuraldesign

Equipmentroom(s) heatrise study

Equipmentlayouts

Design

Confirm by design review that the fire and gascontrol system is appropriately protected [bylocation or otherwise].

Review to include but not be limited to:

— HAZID— fire and blast study— building structural design— equipment room(s) heat rise study— equipment layouts.

This activity shall, if possible, be combined withsimilar activities where the protection of the ESDsystem is assessed.


DNV GL AS

Table B-13 Fire and blast protection systems

HAZARD MANAGEMENT


HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM:PROTECTION SYSTEMS

Fire and blast protection systems

OBJECTIVES: To protect key items of the Installation or structure against fire and explosion, where failure of theseitems could result in major escalation of an initial event.

To provide and aid in fire recovery by provision of equipment and devices allowing application of fire fighting agentsfor control or extinguishing by automatically or manually controlled methods.


To cover fighting of fire hazards at the Installation facilities including the following fire protection systems:

Passive fire protection, firewater pumps, deluge system, foam and water system, water curtains, total gaseousextinguishing system

(if provided for building protection)


Fire-Zone Layout

Hazardous Area classification

Fire-Water systems

Fire Extinguishing systems

Passive Fire Protection

NFPA 2001

NFPA 20 Fire Water Pumps



Basis of design

Safety philosophy

HAZID

QRA/FERA

ESSA

Design

Confirm that accident scenarios with the potentialto cause escalation have been identified anddimensioned correctly.

Review the safety studies to confirm that theproposed fire and explosion loadings are justified

Fire protectionphilosophy

Fire system basisof design

Design

Review the fire protection philosophy (or similar)to ensure that all the identified accident scenariosare correctly mitigated by an appropriatecombination of active and passive fire protection

All hydrocarboncontainment equipmentand piping with thepotential to give rise tosignificant escalationhazards are to withstandthe effects of anexplosion followed by fireimpingement with no lossof containment beforethe Installation inventoryhas been reduced to asafe level (blowdown iscomplete) and personnelhave escaped to a placeof safety.

PFP specifications


Calculationsapplicationschedule

Design drawings

Design

Ensure that correctly dimensioned PFP is specifiedfor equipment and structures as requiredcommensurate with the hazards.


DNV GL AS



Approved design

Coating records

ITP

Construction

Survey to ensure that PFP is installed in line withthe design.

Fire protectionphilosophy

Fire system basisof design

Design

Ensure that deluge coverage and rates areappropriately specified for the relevant hazardsusing appropriate extinguishing medium (water/foam).

Calculations –amount requiredand storage

Sizing calcs.

Hydraulic analysis

P&IDs

Layouts andcalculations


Fabrication specs

Design

Design review to ensure the fire water supplychain supply and distribution is adequate:

Sufficient firewater and foam available

Firewater pumps sized correctly

Firewater system sized adequately

Firewater system routed correctly and adequately(proven by hydraulic analysis)

Confirm the correct number, location and typeof deluge nozzles (or other firewater applicationsystems as specified)

Suitable materials and fabrication processspecified

Fabricationspecifications

Corrosionprotection

DO study

ISO drawings

Piping gas

Surge analysis

P&IDs

Fire zone locationplot plans

Equipment layouts

Pipe stressanalysis

Design

Design review to ensure firewater system isdesigned to survive foreseeable loadings andaccidental events

Corrosion

Supply routed to avoid or be protected fromdropped objects.

Supplied by duplicated feeds from separatedisolatable section of firewater ring main.

Deluge valve sets located as far as practicablefrom the fire areas they serve

Firewater system suitably design to be capablefor withstanding all foreseeable extremes ofoperating, pressure and temperate (includingwater hammer and transient effects from surge orwater hammer).


DNV GL AS



Approved designdocumentation

ITPsConstruction

Survey to ensure the firewater system isfabricated and installed as specified in the design:

Pumps

Routing

Sections/isolation

Nozzle layout

Fabrication and workmanship

Materials

Deluge Valve set locations

Pipe supports

Mechanical completion records

F&G/ESD C&Es

F&G/ESDspecifications

Active fire fightingphilosophy

Design

Design review to confirm the correct initiators, foractive fire protection systems, are specified andincluded in the ESD executive actions:

F&G/ESD initiation

Manual initiation

Fusible loop initiation

Fail safe initiation (loss of IA or hydraulicpressure)

Time from initiation to supply specified in design

ITPs CommissioningSurvey and witness test to ensure firewater/foamis supplied when initiated (check each initiator inevery fire zone including fusible loop).

Firewater andfoam protectionlayouts

P&IDs

Commissioning

Survey to confirm the required coverage isachieved in each fire zone.

Visual inspectioncommissioningtest reports

CommissioningConfirm the firewater is supplied within the timespecified in the design.

Design

Confirm by review of the Fire Protectionphilosophy [or other relevant documents] that thehazards have been identified and the appropriateReliability and Availability has been specifiedcommensurate with the identified hazards.

The reliability/availabilityof fire water system shallbe commensurate withthe identified hazards andin accordance with projectrequirements and fireprotection philosophy

Active fireprotectionphilosophy

Fire water systemdesign basis

DesignConfirm the reliability and availability of firewater system in accordance with the projectrequirements.

DALS (designaccidental loadspecification)

DesignConfirm by review of the DALS that criticalbuildings and control rooms are in accordancewith the project requirements.

Specified critical buildingsand control roomsnormally occupied bypersonnel shall surviveblast loads defined by theproject

ITP ConstructionConfirm by visual inspection that constructioncomplies with the requirements of the design


DNV GL AS



Buildingstructural designdocumentation

DesignConfirm by review of building design that internalboundary rated divisions comply with the projectrequirements.

Specified critical buildingand enclosure boundariesshall prevent passageof fire and smoke andmaintain an acceptabletemperature on the innersurface when subject tofire load exposure for thetime specified

ITPs Construction

Confirm by visual inspection that rated divisionscomply with the requirements of the design. Allpenetrations through rated divisions shall maintainthe rating of the division certification shall bereviewed for compliance.

Building andenclosureextinguishingspecifications

Design

Confirm by review that all building areasand enclosures requiring protection havebeen correctly identified and that the correctextinguishing system has been selected.

Vendor drawingsand dischargecalculations

Equipment andbuilding layouts

Systemschematics

System logic andcontrol drawings

Design

Review area protection plans and vendor data,and confirm that enclosures have been specifiedto be equipped with an appropriate floodingsystem as appropriately defined in the projectspecifications and that total flooding extinguishingsystems provided meet the specific dischargerequirements (volumes, rates, type, etc.) of eachprotected area and the system requirements(interlock, discharge alarms, systems control,feedback, 100% back-up, etc…) of the applicableFlooding System Specification

Buildings and enclosuresshall be protected by totalflooding systems whererequired at concentrationlevels and flow-ratesin accordance withproject requirements. Thefollow up flow shall besufficient to compensatefor leakage.

ITP Construction Confirm by survey that the flooding systems havebeen provided as specified in design.


DNV GL AS

Table B-14 Emergency power system supply

HAZARD MANAGEMENT


HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM:EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Emergency power system supply

OBJECTIVES: To maintain power to the ESD and F&G systems as well as the telecoms systems that requires powerto function in an emergency and to allow the plant to be safely shut down and evacuated. The system shall be from areliable source of electrical power and shall be available after the identified major hazard events.


Includes emergency battery power supply for ESD system, FGS system, PA/GA audible and visual alarms and powerto all other identified end users which must function under an emergency condition.


Cable Specifications (e.g. IEC60331)

NFPA 110 Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems

EN 50091 Uninterruptable Power Systems


DNV GL AS



UPS loadschedule

Loadcalculations

Vendor batterycalculations

Design

Confirm by design review that the UPS emergencypower system type is capable of supplying UPSemergency power to all identified emergencysystems for the required durations.

FAT reports DesignReview FAT load and discharge tests to confirmthat UPS is of sufficient capacity to supply thespecified equipment.

There shall be sufficientemergency battery powersupplied to support all safetycritical systems for the timerequired for each system toperform its intended functionas noted below.

F&G control system – durationof the event (see guidance)

ESD control system – durationto be determined as longenough to complete all ESDactions (see guidance)

PA/GA system – duration ofthe event

Guidance: 1hr to beconsidered as minimum

For emergency and escapelighting systems.

Guidance: 1hr to beconsidered as minimum forother safety critical systems –duration required to functioncorrectly.

ITPs Commissioning

Confirm by survey and witness test that sufficientUPS capacity for the required duration periods hasbeen provided and that it supports the equipmentas required by their normal operations mode.

Design

Review the design documents (safety studies etc)and layouts to confirm that all scenarios whichmay affect the emergency power system havebeen identified.Safety concept

HAZID

Fire and blaststudy

Buildingstructural design

TR/criticalequipmentroom(s) heatrise study

Equipmentlayouts

Design

Confirm by design review that the emergencypower systems (UPS) is appropriately protected[by location or otherwise].

Review to include but not be limited to:

FERA

Fire and blast study

TR/SCE equipment room(s) heat rise study

Equipment layouts

Guidance: This activity shall, if possible, becombined with similar activities where theprotection of the ESD and FGS Systems areassessed. Main and emergency distributionequipment should be located in separate rooms.

All emergency power systemsare to be protected from fire,blast and accidental eventssuch that the function is notimpaired while there is arequirement for emergencypower.

ConstructionConfirm by Survey that the emergency powersystem is appropriately protected [by location orotherwise]


DNV GL AS



Safety concept

Cablespecification

Cable schedule

Cable requisitionand vendor data

Design

Confirm by review of the cable specification,cable requisition, vendor data sheets and cableschedule that all cables associated with UPS feedto HSE Critical Systems are fire resistant.UPS field cabling to all safety

critical systems (as listedabove) should be segregatedfrom main power cablesand shall be fire resistantaccording to specifications. Cable

specification

Cablecertification

Construction

Confirm by sample Survey that the cables actuallyinstalled are fire resistant. Cable markings andcertification to be verified for compliance.


DNV GL AS

Table B-15 Escape and evacuation

HAZARD MANAGEMENT



Escape and evacuation

OBJECTIVES: To provide reliable, secure and effective systems for alerting personnel to the existence of anemergency and for communicating additional information to personnel during, or after, a major hazard incident.

To provide routes and facilities which personnel can use to move away safely from the effects of a hazardous eventin their vicinity and to continue their movement in safety along readily identifiable access routes to the Muster Areasand evacuation points.

To provide reliable facilities which allow communication both internally and to external locations in the event of anemergency condition at the facility.

To provide rescue of injured personnel


Emergency lighting

Escape routes

Personal protective equipment


Temporary refuge/muster area

Emergency lighting and signage

Personal survival equipment

EN1838 Lighting applications – Emergency lighting, EN50171 Central Power Supply Systems, EN50172 EmergencyEscape Lighting Systems, EN60598-2-22 Luminaries, Particular requirements Luminaries for emergency lighting


DNV GL AS



Safety concept

Building escaperoute layouts

Plant layouts

Design

Confirm by design review that escape routedrawings show two correctly dimensionedescape routes from all normally manned areasand that the escape routes do not run throughprocess areas containing hydrocarbons. Escaperoute widths and provision shall be confirmedas being compliant with project or nationalspecifications.

At least two unobstructeddiverse escape routes shall beprovided from all potentiallymanned working areas tothe muster areas. All escaperoutes shall be provided toensure that any area can berapidly and safely evacuatedin the event of an emergency.Escape route width andprovision shall be as definedin project specifications.

Guidance: Escape routesshould be greater than 1mwide.


Plant layoutsConstruction

Survey the primary and secondary escaperoutes to confirm the actual dimensions meetthe specified requirements.

All escape and accessroutes shall remain clear ofobstructions.

All escape routes includingemergency exit doors tobe readily accessible, non-slip, marked and signposted.Markings and signs to beclearly visible if there is lossof artificial lighting outsidedaylight hours.


Plant LayoutsCommissioning

Survey the primary and secondary escaperoutes to confirm that they are non slip andfree from obstruction and that marking, andsignposts are acceptable.

Guidance: This only applies to routes tomuster areas.

All escape doors shall be of atype that can easily be openedin an emergency situation.


Door schedule

Security doorsystem spec

Design

Confirm by design review that all escape routedoors have been identified correctly and can beeasily opened in the event of an emergency

Guidance: e.g. panic bar, fail safe for electricallocking systems, integral key on egress sideetc. Escape route doors which normally openoutwards should be fitted with panic bars.

Rescue breathing apparatussets and other equipmentnecessary shall be locatedat strategic locations aroundthe facilities to allow promptrescue of personnel.

Safety concept


Installation safetyequipment layouts

Design

Review safety equipment layouts to confirmthat breathing apparatus is providedin sufficient quantities and at locationsappropriate to hazards envisaged.


DNV GL AS




Installation safetyequipment layouts

Lighting layoutdrawings

Lighting vendordata

Design

Confirm by design review that provision ofemergency lighting and illumination levels aresufficient to allow safe egress from buildingand installation locations. Minimum provisionand lighting levels shall comply with project ornational requirements.

Guidance: Emergency lighting should have aminimum capacity of 30 – 60 minutes.

Emergency lighting shallbe provided to permit safeegress during escape andevacuation in the event of lossof normal power, by means ofemergency power generationand integral battery backedfluorescent fittings, locatedon/at:

— main escape andevacuation routes,

— main access points— muster area— first aid station(s)— fire fighting area— stairways and landings.

ITPs Commissioning

Survey the escape route lighting by night toconfirm the battery endurance period andmeasure the lux at ground level to ensure theescape routes are sufficiently lit or alternativelythe testing of part of the Installation lightingmay be extrapolated to other areas based onlighting layouts and analysis.


DNV GL AS

Table B-16 Emergency communications

HAZARD MANAGEMENT



Emergency communications

OBJECTIVES: To maintain an uninterrupted and reliable means of indicating alarm and implementing effectivecommunication with personnel working on or around process equipment during a major incident

SCE LIMITS and BOUNDARY:

Emergency communication to/from control room

PA/GA System


Project standards

ISO 7240-19 Fire Detection and alarm systems

Performance requirement specification Document types Phase Verification activity

Safety concept/EERS

Telecommunicationssystem philosophy

Telecommunicationsequipment Layouts

Design

Confirm by design review thatemergency communication systemsequipment shall provide both normaland emergency communicationsbetween the emergency responseteam and the team managing thesituation

Effective communication, both internaland external shall be provided foremergency situations.

The systems shall be protected by,location of equipment, spatial diversityand equipment redundancy.

Internal and externaltelecommunications in order toperform the emergency functiondefined by project requirements shallbe confirmed between the ControlRoom, vessel/s and storage/pumpinglocations and Muster area

Telecommunicationsschematics/diagrams

Telecommunications

Specification

Design

Confirm by design reviewof telecoms block diagramand specification that thetelecommunications systems meetsthe project requirements in termsof protection, location, diversity andredundancy.


DNV GL AS


Telecommunications

Schematics/diagrams

Telecommunications

Specification

Design

Review amplifier loading to ensurethat the number of speakers on aspeaker ring does not exceed theamount which the amplifier candrive,

PA/GA system shall provide a meansof alerting all personnel to theexistence of an emergency situation,provide the means to communicateadditional information to personnelduring an emergency and shallbe capable of operating withoutimpairment for the minimum timerequired to escape to muster locationsand then to evacuate to a place ofsafety after the start of a majoraccident.

The provision and minimum alarmnoise level above local ambientshall be in accordance with projectrequirements. In areas with greaterambient noise levels, visual alarmsshall also be provided.

Guidance: Audible alarms should beprovided in all areas with minimum of+6dBA above local ambient and visualalarms in high noise areas (>85 dBA).

PA/GA layouts/arrangementdrawings

System architecturaldrawings

System blockdiagrams

System specification

Noise study andlayouts

ITPs

Commissioning

Confirm by witness test thatthe GA System provides clearcommunication between the controlroom and all Installation areasto alert personnel of potentialhazardous or emergency conditions.

The PA/GA system shall be inaccordance with the projectrequirements. The minimum alarmnoise level above local ambient shallmeet the project requirements.

Emergency communicationsequipment shall not be adverselyaffected by the operation of otherdevices/equipment in close proximity(electromagnetic compatibility).

Design

Confirm by review of the vendordata pertaining to the GA systemthat it will not be adversely affectedby, nor adversely affect, theoperation of nearby equipment.

Guidance: Review of vendortechnical file, EC Declarations ofConformity and associated technicalfile for individual equipmentas well as data pertaining tothe compatibility of all nearbyequipment.

Emergency communicationsequipment shall not create additionalhazards during an emergency situation

Design

Confirm by review of the vendordata pertaining to the emergencycommunication system that it canbe operated in situations where aflammable gas mixture is present.

GA control systems to be protectedagainst fire, blast and credibleaccident events, by location orotherwise, such that its ability tofunction is not impaired for the timetaken to muster after a major accidentevent.

Design

Confirm by design review that GAControl System shall be protected bylocation or otherwise, such that itsability to function is not impaired.

Note: Secondary method is handheld radios or fixed intercomsystem.


DNV GL AS


Safety concept

Cable specification

Cable schedule

Cable requisition andvendor data

Design

Confirm by review of the cablespecification, cable requisition,vendor data sheets and cableschedule that all cables associatedwith the PA/GA system are fireresistant.

Cable supports/racks shall offerequal rating as a minimum tomaintain availability of the system.

PA/GA cables should be located so thatthey are protected against accidentalloads as far as possible and shall befire resistant to specifications

Cable specification

Cable certificationConstruction

Confirm by sample survey that thecables installed are fire resistantand are protected against accidentalloads as far as possible. Cablemarkings and certification shall beverified as being compliant.


DNV GL AS

Table B-17 Environment

HAZARD MANAGEMENT


HSE CRITICAL SYSTEM:ENVIRONMENT

Environmental control systems

OBJECTIVES: To limit the emissions to the air, limit the discharge to water, limit the generation of waste and spillprevention.

SCE LIMITS and BOUNDARY:

Complete Gas Installation or Process Plant


Project and National Regulations

ISO 14001 (environmental management system)

Council Directive 96/61/EC (Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control)

NORSOK S-003

Performance RequirementSpecification

DocumentTypes:

Phase Verification Activity

During the developmentof the project, technicallyand financially feasible andcost effective options shouldbe evaluated to reduce oroffset project related GHG(green house gas)

emissions during the designof the project.

Environmental

Managementsystem

Design

Review project documentation that takes into accountoptions such as energy efficiency/conservation (e.g.combined heat and power and waste heat recovery)use of alternative energy resources, alterations ofproject and system design, reduction of VOCs (volatileorganic compound) and reduction of gas flaring.

Facilities with the potentialto generate e.g. processwaste water, sanitarysewage or storm watershould incorporatenecessary precautions toavoid, minimize and controladverse impacts to health,safety or the environment

Environmentalmanagementsystem

Project andnationalregulations

Design

Review project documentation pertaining to thefollowing:

— discharge to surface water— discharge to sanitary sewer systems— discharge to storm water— cooling water discharge.

to ensure that impacts to health, safety and theenvironment are as low as possible.

Water conservationprograms should beimplemented in conjunctionwit the magnitude and costof water use.


Project andnationalregulations

Design

Confirm by review that measures have beenaddressed and taken to reduce water consumptione.g.:

Water monitoring and management

Process water recycling

Sanitary water conservation


DNV GL AS

Performance RequirementSpecification

DocumentTypes:

Phase Verification Activity

Plans shall be developedthat considers prevention,reduction, reuse, recovery,recycling, removaland disposal of wastes(including hazardous waste)generated during all projectphases and modes ofoperation.

Wastemanagementplan

Nationalregulations

Design

Confirm by review that operations have developed awaste management plan to define categories of alltypes of waste and plans for treatment, disposal andshipment.

The project to addresspotential environmentalimpacts on existingconditions such as surface,groundwater and soils.


Design

Review project documentation of existing landconditions, the proximity to ecologically sensitive orprotected areas, check if strategies are in place thatcontribute to improvement of local conditions andevaluate project location alternatives.

Plans shall be developedto minimize or reduceemissions as far asreasonably practicable,resulting fromcommissioning and testingactivities

HSE (healthsafety andenvironmental)systemenvironmentalmanagementsystem

Construction

Confirm by review of the vendor data pertaining toemissions that they will be according to project orregulatory levels.

Review to include but not limited to:

Air emissions (SO2, NOx, Particulate Matter (PM),Ozone, Ozone Depleting Substances)

Noise and vibration emissions (traffic, turbines,compressors and other major equipment


DNV GL AS

APPENDIX C EXAMPLES OF VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS

C.1 Verification documents

C.1.1 Validity of verification documents

C.1.1.1 Verification documents are, in principle, documents confirming that an examination has been carriedout, and are valid only at the time of issue.

C.1.2 Statement of conformity

C.1.2.1 A statement of conformity can be issued on completion of each particular project phase, or naturalpart thereof, and shall be based on a dedicated verification report.

C.1.2.2 A statement of conformity shall be issued as a formal statement confirming that verification ofdocuments and or activities, has found that the onshore gas installation, a part thereof, or a verificationactivity, complies with the requirements applicable for that particular project phase.

C.1.2.3 The technical information on a statement of conformity shall contain:

— onshore gas installation description and item number, if relevant— application (operational limitations and conditions of use) for which the onshore gas installation is

intended— codes and standards with which the onshore installation has been found to comply— level of verification— an appendix containing the accompanying dedicated verification report.

C.1.2.4 A statement of conformity shall be signed by the DNV GL project manager.An example of a typical statement of conformity is shown at the end of this appendix.

C.1.3 Verification reports

C.1.3.1 Verification reports are issued to confirm that the relevant product or service has been completed inaccordance with specified requirements.

C.1.3.2 The report shall include information such as:

— product or service description and item number, if relevant— application (operational limitations and conditions of use) for which the product or service is intended— codes and standards with which the product or service has been verified against— safety objectives and performance requirements— clear statement of the conclusion from the verification (does it or does it not meet the specified

requirements)— codes and standards used as reference— documentation on which the verification report is based (documents, drawings, correspondence, including

revision numbers)— project-specific scope of work tables— any comments— identification of any non-conformances.


DNV GL AS

C.1.3.3 The verification report shall always be dated and have two signatures, the originator and the DNV GLinternal verifier.

C.1.4 Verification comments

C.1.4.1 Reviews of documents shall be reported using verification comment sheets (often called VerComs).These documents give details to the client of aspects of onshore installation design and construction thatDNV GL:

— considers do not meet the specified requirements— does not have enough information to make a decision— offers advice based on its own experience.

C.1.4.2 Only in the first two instances does DNV GL expect a response from the client or its contractors.

C.1.4.3 An example of a typical verification comment sheet is shown at the end of this appendix.

C.1.5 Audit report

C.1.5.1 Audit reports are issued to confirm that a company’s quality management system has been reviewedto confirm compliance (or not) with the nominated standard and project requirements. In addition, the auditreports confirm compliance with the documented procedures and that these procedures are effective.

C.1.5.2 Audit reports shall contain information such as whether:

— The company has a documented quality system.— This quality system been certified by an accredited certification body for the product (or service) in

question.— The quality system covers the following quality assurance elements adequately for the product:

— organisation— authority and responsibility— job descriptions for key persons— internal quality audits— documentation change control— job instructions and procedures— non-conformance and corrective action.

— There are adequate procedures for activities such as:

— calibration of equipment— material identification and marking— control of special processes such as welding, NDT PWHT— non-conformance identification and handling— inspection status— final inspection.

— The company’s facilities are, in general, considered adequate for the scope of supply.

— A quality plan been prepared for the order concerned.

— The purchaser or their appointed inspection agency are planned to attend the works.

— There are any problem areas identified.


DNV GL AS

C.1.6 Survey reports

C.1.6.1 Survey reports are documentation and recording of attendance activity by DNV GL.Guidance note:Survey reports may be called by different names. Examples are inspection release note, visit report, inspection certificate, sitereport, etc.


C.1.6.2 A survey report shall contain enough information to identify clearly the product or service that hasbeen examined, the operating conditions or specifications to which it has been examined and the conclusionreached by DNV GL.

C.1.6.3 The survey report shall be printed on the relevant form and shall contain as much informationas possible in accordance with the standard headings in the form. In addition, the report number shall beshown.

C.2 Use of quality management systems

C.2.1 General

C.2.1.1 The assurance of onshore gas installation integrity and function requires that gross errors duringdesign, construction and operation be minimised. The likelihood of gross errors shall be reduced in asystematic manner by the operation of a quality management system adequate for the work being carriedout.

C.2.1.2 Quality management systems frequently are documented at three levels:

— The quality manual and related procedures document how the organisation, as a whole, manages thequality of all its products and services.

— The quality plan documents the specific procedures related to a particular project.— The inspection and test plan documents how the quality control activities for a particular project shall be

carried out and recorded.

C.2.2 Quality plans

C.2.2.1 The basic function of a quality plan is to be a memory aid in the management of a project. Inan organisation with many quality procedures for a variety of functions the quality plan states those thatare applicable to that particular project. The quality plan acts as a route map through the complexities ofmanagement of the project and highlights those activities relevant to quality management.

C.2.2.2 The project quality plan normally consists of two parts; firstly, a narrative description of the meansof controlling the project, and secondly, a tabular description of the inspections and tests to be carried outduring the work.

C.2.2.3 The quality plan should address:

— organisational details of the project— authorities and responsibilities of key personnel— interfaces between, the client, contractors, sub-contractors and third parties— quality assurance activities placed on sub-contractors— cross references to existing company procedures.


DNV GL AS

C.2.2.4 The narrative part of the quality plan should include a description of:

— the applicable standards— project organisation and responsibilities— review of the contractual requirements— project planning and progress reporting— procedures for such activities as design control, purchasing, construction, installation, commissioning,

interface control and auditing— procedures for inspection and maintenance as well as normal operation— emergency response issues.

C.2.2.5 Additionally, the narrative part of the plan should describe the documentation requirements. Itshould be specified:

— what documents are required— at what stage these documents are required— who is responsible for preparing the documents— relevant parties to whom documents are submitted— how any necessary approvals are acquired— who has originals and who has copies— if copies have to be certified copies— the length of time documents are to be retained and by whom.

C.2.3 Inspection and test plans

C.2.3.1 The tabular description of the inspections and tests to be carried out during the work is frequentlyknown as the inspection and test plan.

C.2.3.2 The following items should be checked for inclusion within the inspection and test plan:

— each inspection and test point and its relative location in the production cycle should be shown— the characteristics to be inspected and tested at each point should be identified— the use of sub-contractors should be indicated and details of how the verification of sub-contractor’s

quality shall be carried out should be shown— hold points established by the constructor, the operator or a third party, where witness or review of the

selected inspection or test is required, should be shown.

C.2.4 Review of quality management programme

C.2.4.1 The contractor’s quality manual shall be reviewed for compliance with ISO 9001 or 9002 asappropriate. The contractor’s operations should be audited to establish compliance with the documentedsystem.

C.2.4.2 If the contractor has a quality system certified by an accredited third party certification body,this may be taken as evidence of a satisfactory quality system provided the certificate is relevant to thecontractor’s scope of work for the project. However, the last two years’ periodical audit reports shall bereviewed to identify if any recurring non-conformities have been revealed.

C.2.4.3 Any weaknesses revealed during this audit, or review of periodical audit reports, shall be consideredwhen planning the contractor monitoring activities.

C.2.4.4 Surveillance of the continuing acceptability of the contractor’s quality management system is carriedout by observing a selection of audits carried out by the contractor as part of its internal audit system. The


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audits to be observed should be selected over the length of the project at suitable intervals and should coveras wide a selection of activities as possible.

C.2.4.5 Contractor’s inspection and test plans for the various activities undertaken during their scope of workfor the pipeline shall be reviewed and accepted, if adequate.

C.3 Document forms

C.3.1 Introduction

C.3.1.1 The end of this appendix includes example forms for use by DNV GL in verification.

C.3.1.2 The following forms are included:

a) Statement of conformity.b) Verification comments sheet.


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C.3.2 Statement of conformity

EXAMPLE


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C.3.3 Verification comments sheet

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CHANGES – HISTORICThere are currently no historical changes for this document.

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DNVGL-SE-0470 Verification of onshore LNG and gas facilities