DM Consuji - Zafra Cases

8/19/2019 DM Consuji - Zafra Cases

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D.M. Consuji, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Maria J. JuegoG.R. No. 137837 – April 20, 2001 (357 SCRA 249)

FACTS: At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M.Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. PO3 RogelioVillanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated

November 25, 1990, stating that victim was rushed to the Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, MetroManila where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol deYzo, at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date. Investigation disclosed that at the given time, dateand place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were]performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D,Renaissance Tower Building on board a platform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its fourcorners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merelyinserted to connect the chain block with the platform, got loose xxx causing the whole platformassembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of thebuilding under construction thereby crushing the victim to death, save his two (2) companionswho luckily jumped out for safety. It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to deathwhen the platform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of theplatform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to theconnecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. On May 9, 1991,Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint fordamages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, amongother defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.Aftertrial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, which is also affirmed bythe Court of Appeals. D.M. Consuji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE(S): (1)Whether or not the petitioner is negligent based on the doctrine of resipsa loquitur

(2) Whether or not the private respondent can still claim for damages against the petitioner afterrecovering under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

HELD: (1)Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to hold the petitioner negligent. Asa rule of evidence, the doctrine is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that primafacie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specificproof of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence isabsent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accidentwas of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) theinstrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the personcharged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntaryaction or contribution on the part of the person injured. Applying in the case at bar, all the

requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present. First, no worker is goingto fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a constructionsite unless someone is negligent. Second, the construction site with all its paraphernalia andhuman resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management ofpetitioner. Third, no contributory negligence was attributed to the private respondent’s deceasedhusband. Thus a reasonable presumption or inference of petitioner’s negligence arises.Further, petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine for though thepetitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur,


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from the vessel. He reported to respondents as required. He also sought medical assistance butwas not extended such.

DDC was diagnosed to be suffering from malignant peripheral nerve sheath tumor. He was notemployed by respondent's thereafter because he was already incapacitated to engage in hiscustomary work. He filed for his claim for sickness allowance from the same manning agency

but the same was not granted which led to a complaint before the NLRC.

Respondents denied the petition arguing that the claim has been filed beyond the one yearperiod from the date of the termination of the contract. DDC countered that the applicableprescription is 3 years pursuant to the POEA Standard Employment Contract.

DDC asseverated that he is entitled to sickness allowance because of the incident when he washit by a metal board on his back, which required medical attention. Furthermore, he assertedthat he is entitled to said allowance because his inability to work and perform his usualoccupation lasted for more than 120 days. To which the respondents averred that the medicalcondition is not work-related and therefore not compensable. And that the company-designatedphysician neither issue any certification as regards the medical condition of DDC nor conductedany post-employment medical examination.

The LA ruled in favor of DDC;opined that Delfin contracted his illness during the period of hisemployment with respondents and that such illness is a compensable occupational disease.

On appeal, the NLRC, found Delfin’s claims to be barred by prescription for having been filedbeyond the reglementary period of one year from the termination of the employment contract.The NLRC also found no evidence that would establish a causal connection between Delfin’sailment and his working conditions.

However, the CA ruled that Delfin’s Complaint was filed well within the reglementary period of

three years from the date the cause of action arose, as provided for in Section 30 of thePhilippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Terms and Conditions Governing theEmployment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA SEC). Nonetheless,the CA sustained the NLRC’s pronouncement that petitioners are not entitled to disabilitycompensation as they failed to establish that Delfin’s illness was work-related.

Issue: Whether Delfin is entitled to permanent disability benefits and sickness allowance?

Held: The petition lacks merit. Petitioners are not entitled to permanent disability benefits andsickness allowance.

Section 20 (B) of the 1996 POEA SEC reads as follows:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

x x x x B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITSFOR INJURY OR ILLNESS:

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of hiscontract are as follows:


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1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board thevessel;

2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employershall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment aswell as board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.

However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injuryor illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or thedegree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sicknessallowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree ofpermanent disability has been assessed by the company designated physician, but in no caseshall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examinationby a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when heis physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within thesame period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatoryreporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

4. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer shall bearthe full cost of repatriation in the event that the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2)fit to work but the employer is unable to find employment for the seafarer on board his formervessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.

5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of employmentcaused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the

schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 30 of his Contract. Computation of his benefitsarising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensationapplicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted. (Emphasis supplied)

The 1996 POEA SEC clearly provides that a seafarer must submit himself to a post-employmentmedical examination within three days from his arrival in the Philippines (mandatory reportingrequirement) so that his claim for disability and sickness allowance can prosper.29 The onlyexception to this rule is when the seafarer is physically in capacitated to do so, but there mustbe a written notice to the agency within the same period of three days for the seaman to beconsidered to have complied with the requirement.

Unfortunately in this case, petitioners failed to show the steps supposedly undertaken by Delfinto comply with the mandatory reporting requirement. To the Court’s mind, this lapse onpetitioners’ part only demonstrates that Delfin did not comply with what was incumbent uponhim. The reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that at the time of his repatriation, Delfin was notsuffering from any physical disability requiring immediate medical attendance. Otherwise, andeven if his request for medical assistance went unheeded, he would have submitted himself forcheck-up with his personal physician. After all, the injury complained of by Delfin was a seriousone and it would seem illogical for him to just suffer in silence and bear the pain for a


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considerable length of time. Moreover, while the rule on mandatory reporting requirement is notabsolute as a seafarer may show that he was physically incapable to comply with the same bysubmitting a written notice to the agency within the same three-day period, nowhere in therecords does it show that Delfin submitted any such notice. Clearly, petitioners failed to showthat Delfin complied with the mandatory reporting requirement. Thus, he is deemed to haveforfeited his right to claim disability benefits and sickness allowance.

Even assuming that there was compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement, otherfactors that strongly militate against the granting of petitioners’ claims exist in this case.

The medical certificate pertains to a blow on Delfin’s back caused by a metal board and forwhich he complained of persistent pain in the chest and upper abdominal region. However, theinjury that showed up in his chest x-ray and MRI for which he claimed compensation pertains toa different portion of his body, i.e., a fracture in one of his ribs. Besides, if indeed there is truth topetitioners’ assertion that Delfin continued to experience pain after he was hit by a metal boardon his back, then why did he not request for reassessment as advised or submit himself to themandatory reporting requirement after he was repatriated? What is glaring instead is thatagainst all these, petitioners only offered their bare allegation that Delfin’s medical condition didnot improve thereafter. Second, while Delfin averred that he experienced on-and-off pain evenprior to the June 26, 2001 incident, there exists no record thereof. On the contrary, Delfinhimself claimed that despite the pain, he "remained calm and unbothered by the same."

As a final note, it must be mentioned that the Court respects and upholds the principle ofliberality in construing the POEA-SEC in favor of the seafarer. Nonetheless, it cannot grantclaims for compensation based on mere conjectures.

BEL CHEM v. ZAFRAGR 204845, June 15, 2015

Facts:Zafra was hired as a “wiper” by Belchem, through its local manning agent UPL, for a period offour (4) months under a duly approved contract of employment.

Records reveal that on July 17, 2009, Zafra boarded MT Chemtrans Havel and while onboard,he sustained injuries on his left knee after hitting the floor on his way to the ship's engine roomto check for leaks; he was advised to undergo x-ray examination and was repattriated for furthermedical treatment in the Philippiines. Upon his arrival, he immediately reported to the UPL officeand was sent to the petitioner’s designated physician, Dr. Lim at the Metropolitan MedicalCenter, Marine Medical Services; the attending physician found him to have “probable MedialMeniscal Tear, Left knee” and “Anterior Cruciate Ligament (ACL) Tear, Left Knee” which required

surgery;6 that on January 5, 2010, he underwent a procedure known as “Arthroscopic ACLReconstruction” costing him more than one (1) week of confinement and subsequentrehabilitation measures for him to walk again.

On April 19, 2010, or within the 240-day treatment period, the attending doctor, WilliamChuasuan, Jr. (Dr. Chuasuan, Jr.), wrote a letter to Dr. Lim stating that the suggested disabilitygrading of Zafra’s injuries was 20% of Grade 10, which under the Philippine Overseas


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Employment Administration – Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), was equivalent toUS$3,590.73.

Thereafter, Zafra filed a complaint for payment of permanent total disability benefits. He alsodemanded a copy of his medical records from petitioners but he was not given one.

The LA declared Zafra entiled to disability benefits in the amount of $3,590.73. The LA reasonedout, among others, that Zafra’s claim for the maximum benefit of US$60,000.00 wasunsubstantiated considering that (1) the assessment of the company- designated physician ofhis injury as Grade 10 should be respected; and (2) he failed to present the medical findingsshowing total and permanent disability.

On appeal, the NLRC, reversed and set aside the findings of the LA awarded US$60,000.00.Pointing out that, in disability compensation, what was being compensated was not the injuryper se but the incapacity to work. Considering that more than 240 days from date of repatriationhad lapsed without any declaration of fitness to work from the company-designated physician,the NLRC found him entitled to receive permanent total disability benefit.

The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Zafra should have been declared as partially disabled with a Grade 10disability and entitled to $3,590.73 only?

Held: No. The rulings of the NLRC and CA is hereby adopted.

Zafra contended that his entitlement to fulldisability benefits was in accord with the following facts:1. The petitioners did not declare his fitness to work or the existence of his permanent disabilitywithin the 240-day period.

2. The petitioners’ medical records of his condition have shown to have remained the same fromthe time he sustained his injury until August 20, 2010.

3. He remains unemployed from the time of his repatriation and is unable to perform the samephysical activities he was able to do prior to his injury.

There is no dispute that Zafra has been suffering permanent disability because he has remainedunable to resume sea duties after the lapse of the 240-day period. The dispute is simplywhether such permanent disability is partial or total in character. If the permanent disability ispartial, then Zafra shall be entitled to US$3,590.73 only, the amount corresponding to the

assessed Grade 10 disability pursuant to the schedule provided in the POEA- SEC. If it is total,Zafra shall receive the maximum US$60,000.00 as compensation.

The Court has reiterated in many cases that total permanent disability means the disablement ofan employee to earn wages in the same kind of work that he was trained for, or accustomed toperform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It doesnot mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is


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compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earningcapacity.

Partial disability, on the one hand, is when the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of theuse of any part of his body as a result of the injury or sickness.

In Vicente v. Employees Compensation Commission , the Court laid down the litmus testand distinction between Permanent Total Disability and Permanent Partial Disability, towit:

While permanent total disability invariably results in an employee’s loss of work orinability to perform his usual work, permanent partial disability, on the other hand,occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular anatomical part of his bodywhich disables him to continue with his former work. Stated otherwise, the test ofwhether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of thecapacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disabilityhe incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee isunable to perform his customary job for more than 120 or [240] days and he does notcome within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability(which, in a more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability),then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from permanent total disability regardless ofwhether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.

To the petitioners, this assessment forecloses any claim that Zafra’s injury is total or one thatincapacitates the employee to continue performing his work. They treat it as the certificationrequired under Section 20 (B)(3) of the POEA-SEC30 as it contained his degree of disability andfitness to resume sea duties.

The statement, however, is clearly devoid of any definitive declaration as to the capacity of Zafra

to return to work or at least a categorical and final degree of disability. As pointed out by the CA,all the medical certificates found in the record merely recited his medical history and, worse, itmade no mention as to whether the seafarer was even capable of resuming work. In fact, it wasmerely a suggestion coming from the attending doctor and not from the company-designatedphysician, as if the letter was written while the process of evaluation was still being completed.To stress, Section 20 (B)(3) of the POEA-SEC requires the declaration of fit to work or thedegree of permanent disability by the company-designated physician and not by anyone else.31Here, it was only Dr. Chuasuan, Jr. who signed the suggested assessment, addressing the lettersolely to Dr. Lim, the company-designated physician. Taken in this context, no assessment,definitive in character, from the company-designated physician’s end was issued to reflectwhether Zafra was fit or unfit to resume duties within the 120/240 day period, as the case maybe. Thus, the Court deems him unfit to resume work on board a sea vessel.

It makes sense then to conclude that because Zafra has been deemed unfit to work after theexpiration of the 240-day period, it would be illogical to declare him as merely permanently,partially disabled. To reiterate, partial disability exists only if a seafarer is found capable ofresuming sea duties within the 120/240 period. Here, there was no such finding. Thus, thepetitioners’ claim that Zafra only suffered a partial disability has undoubtedly no basis on record.If at all, the basis was not strong enough to merit its affirmation by the NLRC and the CA.


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Verily, there is no question that Zafra has remained in a state of disability that has becomepermanent and total considering that no certification, compliant with the POEA-SEC and theLabor Code, was issued within the 120/240-day period.

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DM Consuji - Zafra Cases