ATTY. ERNESTOSANTOS,

Republic of the PhilippinesCOURT OF APPEALS

Manila

FORMER FOURTH qVlSlON

plvlsloN oF Elt/E

L. DELO$

Petitioner,

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128625

Mem bers:

.VETSUS" CARAN DANG, Chairperson,BATO, JR,,GONZALES.SISON,BARRIOS, andSORONGON, JJ.REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

BAGUIO CITY, BRANCH 60 ANDBRANGH 7, AND UNIVERSITY OFMANILA, REPRESENTED BYEMILY D. DE LEON,

Respondents

Prom ulgated:

B 2015

x------ ------------x

RE$OLUTION

CARANDANG, J,:

This resolves private respo-ndent University of Manila's (UM)

Motion for Reconsideration of Our Amended Decision dated 21

November 2014 which reconsidered the 30 July 2013 Decision of

the Special Tenth Division of this Court denying petitioner's

Petition for Ceftiorari.ln the said Amended Decision, We set asidethe trial court's finding of probable cause against petitioner for the

crime of qualifierJ theft and quashed the warrant of arrest ag?rythim ( //r-

2CA-G.R. SP NO. 128625RESOLUTION

UM's argunrents in its Motion for Reconsideration can be

summarized as follows: (1) the reversal by this court of the trial

court's finding of probable cause is beyond this Courl's certiorarijurisdiction ,i the trial court has the exclusive original jurisdictiott

to try, hear and resolve conflictirrg factual issues; (2) as a fugitive

from justice, petitioner has no personality to file the instant petition;

(3) Our vote'of 3-2 whiclr reconsidered the unanimous decision of

ih" Fot*er Special Tenth Division is tantamount to a "tyranny of

minority" because, in effect, the votes of tlrree Justices have

prevailed over those of tlre five Justices; (4) petitioner's defenses

of owner's consent and lack of intent to gain are evidentiary in

nature which can only be heard and ventilated in a full blown trial;

(5) ttris Court erred in ruling that the trial courl gravely abused its

discretion as the latter's fincling of probable cause is well-

grounded.

We deny the Motion for Reconsideration'

The first argument lras no basis. The last paragraph of

Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, grants to tlre

Court of Appeals the power to resolve factual issues' Thus:

"l-he Court of Appeals shall have the power

to try cases and conduct hearings, receive

evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to

resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within

itsoriginalandappellatejurisdiction,includingthepowei to grant and conduct new trials or furtherproceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of

Appeals must be continuous and must be

completedwithinthree(3)rnonths,unlessextendedbY the Chief Justice'"

Tlris courl is expressly granted by law through our cettiorari

powers to strike down any order that was issued with grave abuse

of discretion.l By granting the cefticrari petition, We have carefully

determined, afterLn e*huustive examination of the records, tlrat

the trial court gravely abused its cJiscretion which amounted to lack

or excess of jurisdiciion when it issued the assailed orders. As .W" f Ihave discussed in flre Amendecl Decision, the abuse of discretion L'fl

frt."rl rrtp"* *tttbartsa Blg. l29,as atttetlcled' !

CA_G R. SP NO. 128625RESOLUTION

was too patent in the act of the trial court in finding probable cause

against petitioner despite the absence of the two elements of ihe

.il** of qualified thefi. Although it is true that a finding of probable

cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely

than not a crime has been committed and was committed by

accused2 in this case, petitioner ably demonstrated the absence of

the aforementioned elements. l-hus, petitioner need not be

subjectecl to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial

because he clearly showed ttrat the trial coutl gravely abused its

discretion when it overloot<ecl the absence of these two elements

in the instant case.

UM's reliance on tlre case of Marcos'Araneta vs' Coutt of

Appeats3 is misplaced because the said case has a different

factual milieu. ln that case, tlre supreme court nullified the

decision of the court of Appeals which granted therein private

respondent's petition for ceftiorari because the Court of Ap;:eals

did not confine itself within its boundaries in resolving wlrether

there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional

Trial Court in issuing the assailed orders. lt must be stressed that

the Court of Appeals prematurely passed on the substantive issue

of the existence and enforceability of the asserted trust allegedly

issued by the Benedicto Group in favor of lrene Marcos-Araneta

even before evidence on the matter could be adduced. lt was not

even clear in the complaint whether the said trust is express or

implied, ln this case, We limited Ourselves to determining whether

there was a grave abuse of discretion on the parl of the trial court

in issuing the assailed Orders, determining whether the essential

elements of qualified theft are present'

UM's second contention is also without merit' lt must be

borne in mincl that petitioner filed the instant petition for ceftiorari

on the ground that the trial court, in issuing the assailed orders,

gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of

iurisOiction. There is excess of jurisdiction where a tribunal, being

clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its

authority as determined by law, A void judgment or order has no

legal ,nO binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. lncJntemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order

may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it 't(2 Estr.acla vs. Ofilce of the Ombudsr.nan, G.R. Nos. 2l 2140-41. January 21,2015;See PCL Feeders

Pte. Ltcl. vs. Perez, G'R. No. 162126' Decembet'9,2004't G.R. No. 154096. August 22,2008.

4

involved.4 Thus, petitioner rnay any time assail the order which he

deems to have been issued by ihe trial court in excess of its

friiuOi.tion.s ln ieopte vs. Hu -Ruey

Chrtt'r6, the Supreme Coutl

ruled:

"The Court agrees with the respondent's

contention that he was not proscribed from

assailing the August 1, 2AAZ Order of the RTC

before ine Cn on certiorari, even before his arrest.

Moreover, petitioner's filing of pleadings seeking affirmative

relief is equivalent to voluntary appearance and submission to the

jurisdiction of the coufi . ln Jimenez vs. Sorengons, the $upreme

Court held that:

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128625RESOLUTION

4

5

6

1

I

"As a rule, one who seeks an affirmativerelief is deemed to have submitted to thejurisdiction of the coutt. Filing pleadings seeking

affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance'arrd the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to

the jurisdiction of the courI.

Thus, by filing several motions before the

RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal Gase,

respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to thejurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not

iequired for the adjudication of reliefs other than an

application for bail."

Cuevara vs. Sandiganbayan, G,R" Nos' I 3 8792-804' March 3 1, 2005'

td.G.R, No. 158064. June 30,2005.cited irr the Decision renclered on.luly 30,2013 by the Special Tenth Division'

G.R..No, 178607. December 5,2A12.

tt'l* raiO purpoi-e.' (Underscoring Ours.)7

CA-G.R. SP NO, 128625RESOLUTION

ln this case, petitioner filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for

Judicial Determination of Prolcable Cause, To Lift/Quash Warrant

of Arrest, and To Defer/Suspend Arraignment And/Or Any

Proceedings as well as a Moiion for Partial Reconsiderationseeking various reliefs from the trial court. lndubitably, he

voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of that court'

The third contention is also bereft of merit. UM's clairn that

the promulgation of Antended Decision is "odd", "absurd", and

"unsensical [sic]" because the votes of three Justices ovedurnedthe votes of the five Justices is outrageous. UM erroneouslylumped together the unanimous votes of the three AssociateJustices in the Former Special Tentlr Division with the dissentingopinions of the two Associate Justices in this Division to ccrme up

with its own tally of five votes versLls three votes of the majorityopinion. Any lawyer worth his salt can easily spot the absurdity ofthis argument. Contrary to UM's erroneous claim, the rules on

lnhibition and the Composition of the Special Division of Fiveunder the 2009 lnternal Rules of the Court of Appeals were dulycomplied with in this case. lt must be recalled that in a Resolutiondated 5 March 2014e, the mentbers of the Former Special TentlrDivision inhibited themselves from this case after they issued theOriginat Decision on 30 July 2013. Accordingly, and wl-rile theMotion for Reconsideration was pending, the case was rafflled tothis Division for tlre resolutiorr of tlre Motion for Reconsideration.The Special Division of Five was constituted when the unanimousvote of the members of this Division could not be attained in viewof the dissent manifested by the Chairperson. Thus, AssociateJustices Ramon M, Bato, Jr. and Manuel M. Barrios weredesignated by raffle as additional mentbers of the Special Divisionof Five. The conclusions in tlre Amended Decision were onlyreached after consultatiorrs by and among all the members of the

Special Division of Five. The votes of the former Division cannotbe considered in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration.

As to the fourth and fiftlr arguments, the same are mererehashes of those presented and have already been passed uponin the Amended Decision. Nevedheless, We maintain Our position

that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in finding probablecause against the petitioner for the crime of qualified theft and in

e Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenz-uela inhibited herself frour fufther participation in the

case on l9 Novernbet' 20 13.

CA-G.R, SP NO. 128625RESOLUTION

issuing a warrant of arrest against him despite the clear showing of

the absence of the elements of intent to gairr and the lack of

owner's consent. lt is fundamental that the concept of grave abuseof discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it properlypertains to a jurisdictional aberration. While defying precise

definition, grave abuse of discretion generally refers to a

"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to

lack of jurisdictiott." Corollary, the abuse of discretion nrust be

patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive dutyor a virtual refusal to perform a duty errjoined by law, or to act at all

in contemplatiorr of law.1o

Owner's consent was obtained bypetitioner.

Petitioner's use of the electricity and water supply of BPTIwas with the consent of his father who was at that time themajority stockholder and Presiclent and Chairman of the Board ofTrustees of UM. Virgilio Delos Santos gave his consent to his son(herein petitioner) to use BPTI's electricity and water supply in2007. Tlrereafter, and until Virgilio's death in 2008, the Board ofTrustees of UM did not object to or repudiate said consent.

The Board of Trustees of UM could have easily overruledand nullified Virgilio's decision to allow the petitioner to use itselectricity and water supply in Baguio City. The fact that the Boardof Trustees of UM did not prevent the petitioner to continue toopenly use its electricity and water supply during the lifetime ofVirgilio, and even immediately thereafter lasting for four years,clearly manifests that it acquiesced to Virgilio's giving of consent totlre petitioner. lt was only after a serious family/corporate squabblethat happened between and among the corporate directors thatthe criminal case was filed against petitioner,

It is well-entrenclred that if a corporation knowingly permitsits officer, or any otlrer agent, to perform acts within the scope ofan apparent authority, lrolding him out to the public as possessing

_ tpower to do those acts, the corporation will, as against any person/

W

who has dealt in good faitlr witlr the corporation througlr sucfilf'IN

@toF.Itrstice,etal.,G.R'No.l97522'Septernberll,20l3'fiI

o

CA-G R SP NO. 128625RESOLUTION

agent, be estopped from denying such authority.ll

Apparent authority is derived trot merely from practice. lts

existence may be asceftained tlrrough 1) the general manner inwhich the corporation holds out an officer or agent as having the

power to act, or in other Words, the apparent authority to act ingeneral, with wlrich it clothes hirn; or 2) the acquiescence in his

icts of a parlicular nature, with actual or constructive knowledgethereof, within or beyond the scope of his ordinary powers'12

Virgilio's apparent authority to juggle the funds of UM with his own

fun-ds is clearly demonstrated by UM's own attached evidencet', towit:

"They failed to appreciate the fact that it was evenmy father who shouldered his grandchildren'sexpenses. This was evidenced by a certificationissued by the President and Chief of AcadenricOfficerla, copy of whiclr is attached hereto as Annex"8" attesting tlrat my brother's second mistress hasbeen receiving monthly allowance from theUniversity in the anrount of Nine Thousand EightHundred Twenty Five Pesos. Xxx."

By giving Virgilio an apparent authority, UM's Board ofTrustees cannot now deny and repudiate the legal effect ofVirgilio's consent given to tlre petitioner to use the electricity andwater supply of BPTI.

lntent to gain is wanting.

For a charge of crime to prosper, the accused must havebeen shown to have acted with a genuine criminal intent.lu lf lrewas acting under a bona fide belief that he has a claim or titlethe thing allegedly stolen, the criminal intent is missing.'u

rr AssociateclBank v. Pronstroller, G.ll. No. 148444,.luly 14,2008,558 SCRA 113.

l2 People's Aircargo and Warelrousing Co.^ Itrc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al'' G'R' No. 117847.

October 7, 1998,rr Affldavit of Maria Corazon Ramona Llarnas [)elos Santos, Auuex "C" of Atrnex "6" of private

respoudent's Comtnent dated22 May 2013. Recolds, p. 760.ru L)r. Enrily D. De Leon, wtro is the representative of UM in this case.

't US vs, Dor.ningo Viera, C.R. No. 861. December 20, 1902.r6 Pit-og vs. People, et al., G.R. No. 76539. October ll, 1990'

CA-G.R. SP NO^ 128625RESOLUTION

Petitioner's claim of riglrt on the basis of the permission

given by his father negates Criminal intent on his pad. He openly

;sed Bpl's electricityLrrd water supply under the bona fide belief

that he was allowed ind authorized by his father to use the same.

His father owned majority of the shares of stocks of UM and was

at that time its president and Clrairman of the Board. He practically

controlled and rarl tlre business affairs of the university' As

explained above, the Board of Trustees had given virgilio an

apparent authority to do so as shown by the fact that it allowed

Virgilio to treat the finances of UM as if they were his own personal

pro-perty. lt did not revoke this authority while Virgilio was still alive

or even immecliately thereafter. Tlre allegation therefore that

petitioner had the intention to deprive UM of its personal property

is negated by the fact that he relied in good faith on his father's

authority to use BPTI's electricity and water supply'

WHEREFORE,University of Manila'slack of merit.

prenrises considered, private respondentMotion for Reconsideration is DENIED for

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

ARI D.Associaie

MARLENE GONZALES-SISONAssociate Justice

),w)n//l-/

CARA

RAMON M. BATO, JR,Associate Justice

CA-G.R. SP NO, 128625RESOLUTION

I N, fi (&oaner/* t& {;'r* *fu'lL"

Fot<fi$ itt ry l'rt**ng aPim'a"'

MANUEL-fidl:Aesociate Justice

EDWINfl_SORONGONAssociate Justice