Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom of the Will: Review Article

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REVIEW ARTICLE

Divine Foreknowledge and Freedomof the Will: Contemporary WorkRevisits Calvinism

Owen Anderson

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledgeand Free Will in Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of FreeWill, Oxford University Press 2002 (0-19-513336-6), pp. xvii + 638,Hb 46.99/$75

What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?, Millard J.Erickson, Zondervan 2003 (0-310-24769-1), pp. 268, Hb $24.99

A well-known problem in the philosophy of religion is the question ofhow a person can be free if God foreknows what they will do. Simplystated: if God infallibly knows what I will do in the future then in whatsense am I free? In an article published in The Oxford Handbook ofFree Will Linda Zagzebski looks at common attempts to solve thisproblem and the current literature critiquing and respondingto these solutions. Millard Erickson, in his recent book What DoesGod Know and When Does He Know It?, offers a summary of thesesame views, but also looks at a view not considered by Zagzebskithat he calls Calvinism. In Calvinism God does not simply foreknowbut predetermines what will happen. The following paper willconsider the problem as stated by Zagzebski and the common typesof solutions she outlines in order to contrast these with Ericksonspresentation of the Calvinist solution, and argue that the Calvinistposition can solve the problem and avoid difficulties inherent to othersolutions.

Zagzebski presents the problem as follows:

A typical contemporary way of stating the argument that if Godknows B infallibly [B stands for the proposition that tomorrow you

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will get out of bed exactly 7 minutes after your alarm goes off] thenyou do not get out of bed freely is the following:

1. Yesterday God infallibly believed B. (Supposition of infallibleforeknowledge).

2. It is now necessary that yesterday God believed B. (Principle ofNecessity of the Past).

3. Necessarily, if yesterday God believed B, then B. (Definition ofinfallibility).

4. So it is now necessary that B. (23, Transfer of Necessity Principle).5. If it is now necessary that B, then you cannot do otherwise than

get out of bed tomorrow exactly seven minutes after you wake up.(Definition of necessary).

6. Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than get out of bed tomorrowexactly seven minutes after you wake up. (45, modus ponens).7. If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not do it

freely. (Principle of Alternative Possibilities).8. Therefore, when you get out of bed tomorrow, you will not do it

freely (67, modus ponens).By parity of reasoning you can argue that no act any human personperforms is done freely (p. 47).

Zagzebski believes that there is consensus that this argument, or some-thing very close to it, is thought to pose a threat to the compatibility ofdivine foreknowledge and human free will, and considers a numberof attempts to reconcile the two. The first deals with the differencebetween omniscience and infallibility. In theism God is essentiallyomniscient, but a solution to the problem might be sought in doubtingthis. For a being to be omniscient is for that being to know the truthvalue of every proposition. This does not entail infallibility in that anomniscient being is not mistaken in any of his beliefs, and he has a

belief corresponding to every proposition, but he still might have madea mistake (p. 47). Such a being is omniscient even though he might nothave been omniscient in the past or in other possible worlds. In con-trast, if a being is essentially omniscient then he is not only omniscientas things actually are, but is also omniscient in every possible world.Essential omniscience does entail infallibility. One who doubts thatGod is essentially omniscient can doubt 1 and 3 and perhaps look fora solution by these means. Zagzebski further points out that believingthat God is infallible does not require essential omniscience in that the

latter is more than is needed for 1 and 3 (p. 48). God could be infalli-ble with respect to the beliefs he has and yet not be omniscient. Havingclarified these concepts Zagzebski classifies the traditional and con-temporary responses to the argument.

In the Boethian Solution the timelessness of God is used to solve theproblem. If God does not exist in time then statements about what God

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believed yesterday do not apply. In the Ockhamist Solution there isbackward counterfactual dependency which means that my actiontoday makes true a specific counterfactual about Gods beliefs yester-day. Soft facts about the past are dependent on what a person does inthe present. These solutions are similar in that they raise questionsabout Gods relationship to time, and they both affirm the Principle ofAlternative Possibilities with respect to human free will. The desire isto retain that principle and alter the temporal parts of the problem thatlead to contradictions between Gods knowledge and human freedom.However, the problem remains in that God predetermines what willhappen in the temporal order of events because he is the creator andprimary cause. The question is does God as creator, and primary cause,

predetermine what will happen? If God predetermines what willhappen then he has more than a simple foreknowledge of the tempo-ral order of events.

In the Molinist Solution questions about Gods timelessness are setaside in favour of a counterfactual approach to the future. Often calledmiddle knowledge, this solution tries to explain how God knows thecontingent future. Middle knowledge is the knowledge that standsbetween necessary truths and Gods knowledge of his own will.The content of middle knowledge has to do with counterfactuals of

freedom. Assuming that there are true counterfactuals correspondingto every possible free action, God combines his knowledge of thesecounterfactuals with what he wills to do and this produces his knowl-edge of the actual future. The Molinist believes this preserves the Prin-ciple of Alternative Possibilities and the infallibility of God. However,the problem remains because it seems that God predetermines whatwill happen by creating persons who he knows will do certain actionsin specific circumstances. Once again, the question appears to be morethan simple foreknowledge, and involves whether God predestines in

creating.The Frankfurtian Solution questions the Principle of Alternative Pos-sibilities. Frankfurt sought to bring libertarian freedom into questionby driving a wedge between responsibility and alternative possibili-ties. He did this by showing that the important issue in a free act isdoing what one wants, rather than having alternative possibilities.Since doing what one wants is consistent with the foreknowledge ofGod there is no problem for human freedom. Most objections to theFrankfurtian Solution seek to defend libertarian freedom and reject

determinism. There is more to explore on this issue of whether thePrinciple of Alternative Possibilities is true.The final solution considered by Zagzebski that is relevant for this

study is the Open God Solution. This solution seeks to solve theproblem by challenging the Classical Theistic view of God. It does thisby asserting that God does not know the contingent future, especially

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the future related to free human actions. In the Open God SolutionGods knowledge is infallible but growing. God simply does not knowwhat a free person will do until they actually do it. This position oftenassumes that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is true, and thenargues from there to a nature of God that is consistent with that prin-ciple. Yet Open Theism still believes that God is the creator, and so theproblem returns to Gods predestination: if God is the creator andprimary cause has he predestined what will happen?

Each of these solutions has, in one way or another, attempted todefine foreknowledge in a way that makes it compatible with freedom(libertarian freedom except for the Frankfurt Solution). A recent bookthat looks specifically at the question of divine foreknowledge is

Millard Ericksons What Does God Know and When Does He Know It? Thelarger goal of this book is to explore the difference between ClassicalTheism and Open Theism, but central to this debate is the problem ofevil. Open theism claims that it can solve the problem of evil by limit-ing the foreknowledge of God. Erickson believes that there are threeways that Classical Theism has addressed the problem.

The first is simple foreknowledge, where God sees the future. Thisusually involves God being outside of time and seeing all points in timesimultaneously. The second is middle knowledge. This view asserts

that not only does God know what will be, but all the other possibili-ties in other possible worlds. The third view is Calvinism. This assertsthat God knows what will happen because he determined what wouldhappen. Erickson defines freedom in the following way: a person is freeif he/she was able to do otherwise than what he/she actually did (p.165). This is the libertarian definition of freedom. The first two viewsof divine foreknowledge are often coupled with libertarian freedomwhere a person is able to do otherwise. Calvinism denies that peoplecan do otherwise, but asserts that they are free because they can do

what they want. The view that asserts both determinism and freedomis called compatibilism. It is called compatibilism because it asserts thatdeterminism and freedom are compatible.

Divine foreknowledge and free will are only in conflict if the liber-tarian definition is assumed. Each of the solutions considered byZagzebski, except the Frankfurt Solution, assumes the libertarian def-inition of freedom. If freedom is understood as doing what one wants,and God knows ahead of time what a person will want, then freedomand divine foreknowledge can co-exist without any logical problem.

God can predetermine and people are free because they can do whatthey want. However, there are four obvious criticisms that the Calvin-ist position must address: first, the claim that I am not free if I couldnot have wanted otherwise; second, if God predetermined evil then heis responsible for the moral evil that is done; third, to be free I must be

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able to choose the kind of being am I; and finally the claim that I cannotchoose what I want but rather I am forced to want what I want by God.The following will show how the Calvinist can address these criticisms,and then end by asserting that Calvinism offers a solution to theproblem raised by Zagzebski by doubting #7 in her argument, and byasserting that while each person is predetermined by God it is also truethat each person does what he/she wants.

Very often those thinking about the problem of divine foreknowl-edge and free will consider rather trivial instances such as getting outof bed. But what is of crucial importance in the theistic context is savingfaith. In theism, a persons failure to have saving faith results in sepa-ration from God for eternity. Calvinism asserts that God foreknows

who will have saving faith by determining who will have saving faith.What Calvinism must explain is how humans can be responsible forhaving or failing to have saving faith if God predetermines this. Thequestion of responsibly is behind each of the four objections consid-ered below.

The first objection is that the person without saving faith did nothave the option of wanting to be in the other group. The Calvinist canrespond that the person need only get what they want for there to beresponsibility. If at any point a person wants to believe in God then

he/she can believe in God. In other words, want precedes ability: aperson has the ability if he/she wants to. The libertarian may claim thata person does not have the ability to do otherwise and therefore doingwhat he/she wants is of little value in terms of freedom. But thisassumes that ability is more basic than want which is not true. Forevery time the libertarian can say, you cannot do otherwise the Calvin-ist can respond with you can do otherwise if you want to do other-wise; nothing is stopping you except that you do not want to dootherwise.

The second objection is that in reality it is Gods fault that a persondid not have saving faith and therefore God is responsible for this evil.This can be solved by distinguishing between primary and secondarycauses. God creates the secondary cause of a human being with beliefs,desires, and a will. It is the person that does not want to believe in God,it is not God who does not want to believe in God. Nor can the personsay, I would want to believe in God if only God wasnt forcing me tonot believe in Him. If at some point an unbeliever wants to believethen he can believe. There is no outward coercion that keeps a person

from believing when he/she wants to. Wanting to be in the other groupis sufficient for being in the other group. God determines what theperson will do without Himself being the one who does it. This provesthat God is not responsible for evil but does not offer an explanationfor why God permitted evil.

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The third objection is that to be free a person must be able to choosewhat kind of being they are, whether they are rational or non-rational,yet in the Calvinist view he/she never had this option. The person whodoes not believe in God and suffers undesirable consequences becauseof his/her lack of saving faith might say that he/she wishes he/shehad the option of being non-rational. Why did God make me a rationalbeing? This question is self-defeating in that it asks, give me a reasonfor why I am a rational being, or give me a reason for why I needreasons. Perhaps the person will say, I wish I could reject belief inGod and not suffer any consequences. But if the consequences areontologically necessary, for instance, the result of rejecting God isnot having a relationship with God, then they cannot be avoided. This

cannot be said to be Gods fault.A final objection is that while each person gets what he or she wantshe/she is forced to want this. To answer this objection the Calvinist dis-tinguishes between ontology and personhood. God creates persons asrational beings with beliefs and wants, and it is part of being a personto have wants. There is a certain sense in which I find myself wantingparticular things, perhaps because of my past choices, perhaps becauseof other reasons. And I may find myself either wanting or not wantingto believe in God. However, what is important is that I can question

this want and decide to want otherwise. Here Calvinism offers a cor-rective to the libertarian definition of free will. It is too simple to definefreedom as having other options because other options are irrelevantif one does not want them. What is important is doing what one wantsto do without hindrance. And in the crucial area of belief in God thewill is free in that nothing hinders a person from believing. Not onlyis there no hindrance, but if a person finds himself or herself in a con-dition they do not want to be in with respect to belief, they can changetheir positions simply by changing their belief. It is nonsensical to say,

I want to believe in God but I cant because He wont let me. TheCalvinist position preserves this deep kind of freedom, and a strongview of foreknowledge where God not only foreknows but also pre-determines what will happen.

In conclusion, the specific solutions considered by Zagzebski can besummarized by the three kinds of solutions offered by Erickson. Specif-ically, those that assume the libertarian view of freedom can be said toeither solve the problem by locating God outside of time, throughmiddle knowledge, or the Open View of God. The common attempts

to solve the apparent problem between divine foreknowledge and freewill share the libertarian definition of freedom which undermines theirability to solve the problem. However, in his recent book Ericksonreminds his audience of the Calvinist position which has the ability toexplain how God both predetermines and humans have free will. TheCalvinist has answers to the objections that arise from the intuition that

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alternative possibilities are necessary for freedom. The Calvinist solu-tion asserts not only that God foreknows whether a person will believein him or not, but predetermines this. However, this predeterminationdoes not take away responsibility or freedom. As the creator andprimary cause God determines what will come about. This is a muchstronger claim than the solutions Zagzebski considered were willing tomake. However, while God is the creator, no person is kept from doingwhat he wants. At the end of the day no one will be able to look backand say, I wanted to believe in God but I wasnt allowed, or I didntwant to believe in God but I was forced to do so. There is freedom ofthe will with respect to belief in God.

Owen Anderson teaches philosophy, religious studies, and history atArizona State University.

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Divine Foreknowledge and Freedom of the Will: Review Article