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Diversifying Participation in Network Development. India’s Universal Service Instruments Payal Malik and Harsha de Silva WDR Expert Forum 1 October 2005, Jakarta. Outline. Achievements of Telecom Sector Reform in India Perceived Access Gaps Research Questions - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Diversifying Participation in Network Development
India’s Universal Service Instruments
Payal Malik and Harsha de Silva
WDR Expert Forum 1 October 2005, Jakarta
Outline Achievements of Telecom Sector Reform in
India
Perceived Access Gaps
Research Questions
Universal Service Obligation: Findings Concerns
and Way Forward
Access Deficit Charges: Issues
Conclusions
Perceived Access Gaps 70% of population is rural: GDP per capita US
$352
PCGDP holds higher teledensity potential
5000 urban agglomerates: Mobile coverage 50%
Current ARPU’s/EBITDA’s inadequate to fund
capex required
Operator can make profits at ARPU as low as $5
Perceived Access Gaps Urban teledensity 26.2 vs. rural teledensity
1.74
Rural demand stronger than revealed in the state-owned monopoly era; heterogeneity in rural areas
Roll out obligations failed
Rural DELs installed by incumbent through license fees relief: reliance on a dominant carrier not the most efficient way
Additional investments: mobilized through intervention: Universal Service Fund
Research Questions Context Any member of the WTO has the right to define the kind of universal service
obligation it wishes to maintain. Such obligations will not be regarded as anti-
competitive per se, provided they are administered in a transparent, non-
discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and are not more burdensome than
necessary for the kind of universal service defined by the member
Questions we address:
How well do the Indian universal service instruments stand the test of:
(a) not being anti-competitive
(b) being transparent in their administration; and
(c) non-discriminatory and competitively neutral
Findings Transparent multi-layered reverse bidding process
1.48bn USD collected 376mn USD disbursed
Significant lowering of benchmark subsidy RDELs: rates
down to 65 to 70%
Incumbent won almost 75 percent of auctions
BSNL (1267 SDCAs), Reliance Infocom Ltd (203 SDCAs),
Tata Teleservices (172 SDCAs), Tata Teleservices
(Maharsashtra 43 SDCAs)
Absence of network competition incumbent can leverage
its vertically integrated status even in a transparent
disbursement mechanism
Concerns Benefits from using auctions: difficult to have
sufficient participants bidding against the
incumbent
Incumbent in an advantageous position bidding
against operators relying on transfer or lease of
assets from their competitor
Tend to be used by market players to extract
too many concessions
Important strategic implications: effect the way
firms compete against each other
Concerns Restricted participation to already existing
phone companies: left huge rents for the
incumbent
Did not maintain incentives for competing
networks and/or technologies
Asymmetry of information between the
incumbents and new entrants
Concerns Auction design disregarded commercial, legal
and regulatory implications of the fact that the incumbent had a fair amount of network
Presence of high endogenous costs of doing business: onerous burden of various regulatory levies
Can affect the viability of the existing operators as well as the entry process in those areas; reduces entry
Way Forward
Sustainability of universal service: remove
regulatory barriers to competition
A liberal minimalist licensing regime: Entry of
more firms sine qua non of universal service
Effective, non-discriminatory access regime for
sharing of backbone
Impose special obligations regulations on
dominant operator and enforce its compliance:
counterbalance its market power
Way Forward Spectrum Assignment and Pricing
Maximise development of all technologies and
services
Avoid a subsidy laden universal service
programme
Gains from an elaborate USF will be marginal
Sound regulatory design and competition
cornerstone of universal service
Back
Access Deficit Charge ADC is to compensate for the difference
between the actual cost of providing service and the mandated lower tariffs for providing subsidized access services to a class of subscribers
TRAI logic for Indian ADC
to make basic telecom services affordable to the “common man” to promote universal access as per NTP’99
Implemented 1 May 2003, to enable affordability in terms of Rental and concessionary local call charges in the
rural areas (also free calls etc.)
What ADC is not Indian ADC at no time was specified as a “rural
subsidy” Some interpret it that way since urban tariffs were
forborne
Calculation and applicability of ADC
ADC = Cost based average monthly rental less average monthly recovery per DEL for entire network Data only BSNL; accuracy Methodology and detail: distance, technology
To BSO if either end of the call connected to a fixed line Collect ADC on applicable calls and pass on to BSNL
(and other FL operators)
ADC comparison; at implementation
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Why others less Tariff rebalancing Higher affordability
Brought down to 12% and now 6%?
Implementation BSNL not receiving sufficient ADC
ADC base increased Increase ADC base to all calls except cellular intra-
circle Reduce per minute ADC
Finally; INR 0.30
Concerns
Should ADC be rural only? ADC objective is not a “rural subsidy” What matters is historical costs of providing rural
access Should non-BSNL FL operators get ADC?
ADC not a legal obligation to anyone For smooth transition of BSNL to new regime New operators have hardly any ADC
Why not a simple revenue share Greater reliance on ILD ADC. With RS, unable to
maintain bias; would increase ADC on non-ILD calls But, possible with increasing minutes
Findings
ADC not a means to participate in network development Not an incentive to roll out rurally Only a safeguard for BSNL FL network (including rural)
built at a high historical cost To protect the BSNL copper wire BSNL (prior to that, DoT) monopoly provider for
number of years. What happened to monopoly profits?
Findings Reduces incentives for local (innovative)
technology in rural areas; distorts market Low cost innovative solutions can charge low market
clearing tariff in rural areas But, ADC increases the final cost Thus, unable to provide
Private operators compensating BSNL’s “wrong” choice of technology? Years ago, no choice Not in the recent past; not at the present time
Findings How ADC is helping universal service not clear
Technology bias: FL BSO FL BSO not growing
Not urban Not rural
How then, universal service (access)? Should it not be better to merge with USO if to
be used for network development Why not give to everyone to cover below mandated
cost operations without tech bias?
Findings
Too complex, could have been much simpler from the beginning Difficult to calculate, to implement and to monitor
Encourages greater by-pass High ADC on ILD
Created a FL bubble Cannot maintain without ADC or some other form of
subsidy (until legacy equipment fully depreciated)
Findings
Seems like a quasi-politically motivated tax on private operators to protect the incumbent during what seems like a very long transition period to competition
What happens when the ADC is phased out in total? If BSNL has then grown up to face a competitive
market well and good If not, does it mean that all the taxes extracted from
private operators to keep BSNL afloat would have been a complete waste?
Findings
Regulation should not hinder development through technological advancement and market forces “Whenever there is a conflict between regulation and
consumer benefit, it is regulation that should yield space, not the consumer” (Economic Times editorial 24 March 2005)
Way forward
Merge ADC with the USO Simple, technology neutral, revenue share model
Disburse from the combined fund to compensate mandated below cost services Anywhere? Any operator?
Phase out ADC USO will continue to grow New technology would reduce access deficit
Moving to a “network expansion” model… Mr Rajendra Singh, TRAI (30 September 2005)