Districting / redistricting. Issues Who draws the lines? – State leg, congress, local... What criteria? Partisan strategy Minority representation

Districting / redistricting

Issues

• Who draws the lines?– State leg, congress, local...

• What criteria?

• Partisan strategy

• Minority representation

Partisan strategy (partisan gerrymander)

• Maximize dominant party advantage– If party controls state leg + gov.

– Packing• cram other party voters into few districts, so they have

no influence in most

– Cracking• spread other party voters across many districts they

can’t win

Incumbent strategy (bipartisan gerrymander)

• Maximize seats safe for incumbents (all)

• Might be default if neither party controls gov + leg

Criteria• Equal population

+/- 10% (depends on state)

• Contiguous–RCW: “if common land border or connected by ferry, highway, bridge, tunnel”

–coincide with boundaries of local political subdivisions and communities of interest”

–Number of counties and municipalities divided should be as small as possible

Criteria

• Compact

• Communities of interest– identify (concentrated people with shared

interests)– represent– do not divide (as best possible)

Criteria

• Protect incumbents – in practice, and in law

• Minority representation– in practice, and in law

• Competitive elections (not an explicit goal in most states)

Who Draws?

• State (and local) legislature

• State Courts

• State (and local )commission– Independent– Bi-partisan– non-partisan

Who Draws?

• Legislature– 37 states do state leg districts; 43 do

congressional districts

– Gov. can veto in most states

– 2/3 req in CT, ME

Who Draws?

• Commissions (political)– AR, CO, HI, MO, HJ, OH, PA– elected officials can be on commission

• ‘Independent’ Commissions (6 states)– no legislators or other electeds, WA no lobbyists

Who draws?

• Independent Commission (AK, AZ, CA, ID, MT, WA)– WA (2 Ds, 2 Rs, one non-voting moderator)

– CA: lottery -> 20Rs, 20Ds, 20 ‘other’• then 3 Ds, 3 Rs, 2 others, they pick 6 more (14)

– 9 votes to pass map

Who draws?

• Independent Commission (AK, AZ, CA, ID, MT, WA)– expectation they will be less strategic re: partisan

goals

– All states with ind. commission adopted via voter initiative

• legislators / parties don’t want to give up authority over districting

Who Draws?

• Initiatives & referendums

• Courts– legislatures often gridlock over plans– litigate– miss deadlines

Districting

• Why care?– most important part of elections– elected officials pick their voters, vs voters pick

elected officials

– ‘gerrymandering’ and electoral competition• Do districting practices make elections non competitice

Districting

• Incumbents don’t lose– How much is ‘incumbent advantage’ due to safe

one party districts?– How much is due to other factors

• campaign finance• pork barrel politics• name recognition• representatives serving well

Districting

• gerrymandering vs. self-selection

• How difficult is it to– 1) partisan gerrymander

– 2) create competitive districts• 50% D voters & 50% R voters

Redistricting vs districting

• At least every 10 years, districts are redrawn– populations shift– growth

State Legislative Redistricting

• Before the 1960s, states rarely redrew district Before the 1960s, states rarely redrew district boundariesboundaries

• Populations shifted howeverPopulations shifted however• MalapportionmentMalapportionment—unequal representation—unequal representation• In 1962, the Supreme Court established In 1962, the Supreme Court established ““one one

person, one voteperson, one vote””• Reapportionment revolutionReapportionment revolution

Redistricting

• Reapportionment and re-districting: how Reapportionment and re-districting: how often?often?

– States may redraw districts as often as they like States may redraw districts as often as they like following following League of United Latin American Citizens League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry v. Perry (2006)(2006)

Minority Representation

• Why value, what effects

• Descriptive– legislature mirrors population

• Substantive– legislature approves policies in group’s

interest


• Why value?

• Fairness– history of explicit disenfranchisement

• Empowerment– Trust– Participation– Contacting representatives


• Descriptive Representation• How facilitate via elections?

• Voting Rights Act Amendments– registration without representation?– maximize opportunities for real representation?– since 1970s, Act used to challenge local election

systems that ‘dilute’ minority representation


• Majority Minority Districts– Local “at-large” elections original target– “sweep effect” group w/ 40% could lose all seats– Gingles v. Thornberg, 1986

• “at-large” illegal if:– minority group politically cohesive– minority could be a majority in potential district– majority votes as block against minoritymajority votes as block against minority


• Majority Minority Districts

– State legislative plans, congressional plans, can be challenged if not providing adequate minority representation

• under VRA


• Racially polarized voting– in parts of US, this has been a fact of life

– southern parts of the US, in particular

– do the math: if white majority majority won’t vote for minorityminority candidates.....

Racially Polarized Voting

• Voters of different racial or ethnic groups have different candidate preferences.

• Voting in opposition, rather than in coalition

• Since more white voters, minority candidates will usually lose

• Actual voting patterns determine if voting is racially polarized

• Look at precinct data

Racially polarized voting

• Exists in WA, – but no minority group (?) large enough to

challenge for m/m US House district

– m/m State leg district?

– Local challenges successful (Yakima)


• When US House districts plans suspect– Remedy: Minority / Majority DistrictsMinority / Majority Districts

• 1990 US Congress Redistricting– Maximize number of majority / minority districts

in US House, state legislatures– Bush Dept. of Justice, Latino and African American

litigants in synch


• Majority Minority Districts– once estimated that district must be at least

65% minority to guarantee election of minority candidate

• Congress elected in 1992– first since new system– record number of African Americans, Latinos


• Majority Minority Districts• Partisan consequences

– Overwhelmingly safe Democratic seats– Mostly in South, Southwest– Demise of Democratic voters in “influence districts”– Surrounding districts more competitive for GOP– 1992 Bad election overall for Dems (9 seat loss)


• Majority Minority Seats

• Partisan Consequences?– 1994 ‘Republican Revolution’– GOP gain 54 seats

• many gains in southern states• some in formerly majority Dem districts.

– GOP assumed control of US House / Senate


• Challenges to Majority Minority Districts:

– ‘Unfair’ to white voters– trade-off, loss of substantive representation– “Bizarre” contours to districts

• difficult to draw, at times

North Carolina as Example

• 1991 State leg plan, 1 minority CD– state 22% African American, 12 districts– ‘proportionality’ = at least 2 seats (2.64)

• Population more concentrated in North

• Dem state legislature changed plan to add 2nd minority district

North Carolina 12th CD, 1992, 64% Black

WSJ: “political pornography”


• Shaw v. Reno (1993)– legal challenge to NC 12th CD map

• when a State concentrates a dispersed minority population in a single district by disregarding "traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions" the State is drawing a racial gerrymander that is subject to strict scrutiny


• Shaw v Reno 1993

• ‘By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract’


• Shaw v. Reno 1993– race-based redistricting notnot always

unconstitutional– states did need to comply with Section 2 and

Section 5 of Voting Rights Act– butbut...race can’t be main factor, district must be

compact

North Carolina 12 CD, 1997; 52% white

New map,another lawsuit


• Cromartie v. Hunt, 1998– complaint alleged that the new 1st and 12th

congressional districts are unjustified racial gerrymanders. The new 12th, was "fruit of the poisonous tree"--the poisonous tree being the old 12th and the poison being its racially gerrymandered origins


• Cromartie v. Hunt, 1998

• 12th of 1997 was noncompact and showed evidence that race was the predominant factor in its design. The Court noted that as the district wound through certain counties and towns, the deciding factor in which precincts it picked up along the way seemed to be race rather than party.

Third Time’s a Charm? NC 12th CD, 1998

More compact,but not quite...

NC 12th CD post 2000 census, 47% white, 45% Black

Represented by Mel Watt (D) since 1993

Partisan View of Law?

• Shaw case– two judges appointed by Democrats and one by a

Republican. – ruled against complaint three times to uphold a plan. – Each time the Republican dissented.

• Cromartie case– two Republican appointees and one Democratic

appointee. – ruled 2-1 in favor of complaint, with the Democratic

appointee dissenting


• Future of Majority Minority Districts• Minority litigants sensitive to partisan

consequences (substantive rep.)– in 2001, tables turned re: GOP vs. Dems– 2011 /12, same

• Compactness– depends on segregation

• What about groups that are geographically dispersed– Latinos?


• Alternatives to Majority Minority Districts

• Cumulative Voting– A remedy in several VRA cases at state and

county levels in• TX, SD, AL, NC


• Cumulative Voting• How it works

– ‘modified at-large’ system– multi-member districts– Voter casts votes equal to number of seats being

selected– voter can ‘plump’ all votes to one candidate, spread

votes around...


• Semi-proportionate– threshold of exclusion = 1/(m + 1)– 2 seats up = 33%– 3 seats up = 25%– 4 seats up = 20%– 5 seats up = 17%– 6 seats up = 15 %


assume 3 seats up, 10,000 voters (30,000 votes)

If ‘at large,’65% white voters, 35% Latino voters6500 white voters, 3500 Latino

• if racially polarized votingif racially polarized voting....

Minority Representation • Standard Voting 3 seat example• (3 seats, 10,000 voters. 65% Anglo, 35% Latino)

Ethn.name votes for seat 1:

W A 6,000 electedL F 3,500

W H 500seat 2

W B 4,000 electedL D 3,500W E 2,500

seat 3:W C 6,500 electedL G 3,500

Minority Representation • CV, 3 seat example 10,000 X 3 votes

Ethn.name votes for

W A 7,500 electedW B 6,500 electedW C 5,000 W X 250

W H 0L F 8,000 electedW E 250L G 2,500

Cumulative Voting

• Evidence– more candidates– more campaigning– more turnout– more minority representation


• Cumulative Voting

• Minority representation w/o the acrimony?

• Not automatic

• Not ‘tokenism’

• Cross-racial coalitions?


• Obama 2008: Is racially polarized voting a thing of the past?

• If so, how defend majority-minority districts?

• Any evidence that we are ‘beyond race?’

Documents

Districting / redistricting. Issues Who draws the lines? – State leg, congress, local... What criteria? Partisan strategy Minority representation