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Distribution of PLA and Connectivity-1 

http://tandemwarhead.blogspot.in/2013/05/distribution-of-pla-and-

connectivity-1.html 

Please find attached below a set of maps which show the spatial distribution of PLA formations which are part of Lanzhou andChengdu Military Regions.

In addition to the same, I've also added a railway and highway network map of China; the formations from these two MR are alsomarked the railway network map of China. The idea was to understand the means by which PLA would move troops into theatersin east and western Tibet. Most of the rail network especially in east-west direction broadly follows the highway alignment.

As can be seen from the railway map, all the formations are located on major railway nodes. This permits movement in east -west direction as well as towards Lhasa.

Map showing spatial distribution of PLA in Lanzhou and Chengdu MR 

Map showing spatial distribution of PLA in relation to rail network 

Highway network map of China 

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(A) Western Theater:

For Lanzhou MR, the nearest formation to our position in Aksai Chin is in Kashgar. Other formations are spread across other major

town of the restive Xinjiang region with Urumqi holding substantial amount of troops. The spread of PLA in Xinjiang representdistribution of British Army in pre-independence India where the army was placed in strategic nodes to keep an eye on nativepopulation and safeguard all the major political and economic centers.

Another reason for this placement could be to prevent Red Army from breaking in towards Chinese heartland in coastal areasfrom former USSR Republics. These formations sit astride the main communication axis from erstwhile border with USSR toheartland of China.

National Highway 312 connects Lanzhou to Urumqi which is further connected to Kashgar through Highway 314. From Kashgar,Highway 219 provides connectivity with Lhasa. Similarly, a railway line connects Lanzhou with Urumqi and Kashgar.

So, if required, formations can be moved up till Kashgar by rail line and further through G219 to Sino-Indian border in Aksai Chinarea and general direction of western Ladakh.

However, distance by road from Kashgar to area opposite Aksai Chin is close ~1000 kms and therefore, would require substantialtime for PLA to deploy any large sized formation.

Bulk of main elements of Lanzhou MR (21 GA and 47 GA) are situated in general area of Lanzhou-Baoji City-Xian corridor.Distance from this corridor to Kashgar by train is ~3000 kms implying considerable transit time for the PLA without counting theactual process of loading and unloading the military stock fro trains. And considering that both 21 and 47 GA are mechanized to agreat degree, the quantum of stock to be moved would be that much higher.

The above analysis begs a question - in case of quick shooting match on LAC in Aksai-Chin, where does the PLA plan to move itsforces from to reinforce this sector?

(B) Eastern Theater

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Tibetan Military District (MD) has limited number of troops which would amount to a division at maximum. The reinforcementsconsist of the following:

1.  61st Plateau RR Motorized Division (21st GA, Lanzhou MR; at Tianshui, Gansui) 2.  149th Rapid Reaction Motorized Division (13th GA, Chengdu MR-based in Chongqing)  

3.  15th Airborne Corps has conducted a divisional-level drop in Tibet 

Both the 1st and 2nd formations are going to use the Golmud-Lhasa rail network to reach the eastern theater in case of a

shooting match. Both these formations sit astride major rail nodes which have direct connectivity with origin of Tibet railways at

Golmud. However, what remains to be understood is whether formations and military stores loaded in Tianshui/Chongqing can be

moved as it is to Lhasa or would it be required to be shifted to flat-beads made especially for use on the Tibet Railways. For

example, passengers traveling on Tibet railway do so in specially made and pressurized wagons to help them deal with issues

related to high altitude. The PLA troops (considering they are not acclimatized) would either need to board such wagons from

their parent station or switch to such wagons at Golmud. From military perspective, it makes sense for Rapid Reaction Units to

have such wagons ready at their boarding points.

In terms of troop deployment during shooting match with India, one possibility, based on assessment of maps and spatial

distribution of PLA, is that bulk of formations under Lanzhou and Chengdu MR will move towards eastern sector. However, this

leaves western sector w/o much troops to go with and it is unlikely that PLA will completely denude the restive Xinjiang Region

of PLA for massing them against India in western Ladakh. As it is, it will require much more than troops stationed in western

China to take on IA in western Ladakh.

Another possibility is that since China knows that it is it which is going to fire the first shot in anger against India, it will move

formations in east under Lanzhou MR (21 and 47 GA) to Ladakh sector. The rail network will allow their movement till Kashgar

and thence through G219 to Indian border. As it is, on examination of satellite images of G219, one can see that the road is

undergoing up-gradation to proper hard-top level.

Formations from other Group Armies can be moved into Eastern Sector along with formations from Chengdu MR.

Will further expand on this topic.