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Economy and State-Formation in Early Viking-Age Denmark

Brian Johnson

2011

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction....... 3

II. Synthetic Overview....... 7

III. Data and Analysis....... 44

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I. Introduction

Abstract

For most of the Viking Age, Denmark's internal political structures are only exposed through their

interactions with those of other states in possession of a textual tradition, and its contemporary

systems of economic activity can largely be inferred only from the archaeological record. However,

by applying an interpretive framework which relates these two aspects of social activity, it may be

possible to make inferences regarding gaps in the historical record concerning each.

Outline

After briefly outlining the purpose of this research project, I will then provide a brief

overview of the historical context in which the following data and interpretations are to be

considered. Next, I will address some of the questions raised by previous studies of Denmark's

Viking Age, followed by an overview synthesizing extant research into its economic and political

systems, as well as applicable insights from the field of economic anthropology. Finally, I will

present a new compilation and analysis of published archaeological data relating to Danish

economic media from this period, and its possible implications.

Aims of This Project

I intend to address ambiguities concerning the development of economic organization and

political power in early medieval Denmark by synthesizing the archaeological and historical

evidence for its economic and sociopolitical structures, and interpreting this material in terms of a

framework which correlates the two systems. This is a pertinent topic, as the historical record

concerning Denmark until the mid-11th century is based entirely upon accounts from neighbouring

societies with whom the Danes interacted, creating a limited and often ambiguous picture of its

internal political and economic organization.

Historical Context

In order to elucidate the historical context in which questions of economic and sociopolitical

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organization will be addressed, I will briefly outline here the historical and archaeological record

concerning Viking-Age Denmark and some of its most significant settlements, drawing particular

attention to Ribe as a representative case study of a long-term, centrally-planned hub of trade.

Hodges (1989: 39) suggests that '[from] the mid-seventh until the later eighth century the

North Sea basin was largely isolated from the Mediterranean world', with one major northern-

European trade system emanating from the Neustrian kingdom, and a counterpart centred on the

Rhenish Austrasian court. Inferring macro-scale sociological facts from the archaeological record

for this period is made difficult by there being '...very few settlement and fortification data and, in

the late eighth century, only the earliest traces of townships (Hedeby and Ribe in southern

Jylland)'(Randsborg 1980: 5). Contemporary documentary sources for events within Denmark are

similarly sparse, and exclusively written by foreign observers. As Olsen (1989: 7) succinctly puts it,

'[t]he written words from this dark age on the border between prehistory and history in Scandinavia

are insufficient and untrustworthy, and the archaeological finds and features are generally of little

value for the student of political history.' The Royal Frankish Annals describe relations with the

Danes beginning around 800, continued by the annals at the German monastery of Fulda for the

years 829 to 901 (Skovgaard-Petersen 2003: 169). Further details, of more limited scope, come

from the late 9th-century Vita of the German missionary Ansgar (Skovgaard-Petersen 2003: 170).

Indigenous records of any kind are limited to commemorative inscriptions on scattered monumental

stones, and these are only datable with precision when they mention known people or events

(Skovgaard-Petersen 2003: 171). The original oral composition of the Icelandic sagas concerning

this period may have been roughly contemporary with the events they describe, but the transcribed

editions were only made centuries afterwards.

The town of Hedeby is known from the Frankish Annals to have existed by 804, and the Vita

Ansgari characterizes it as an international trading place by 850 (Randsborg 1980: 71). It remained

under Danish authority until 934, afterwards experiencing German influence, and outright control

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from 974 to 983 (Wiechmann 2007: 33). While Harald 'Bluetooth' Gormsson converted to

Christianity sometime around the 960s, Danish bishops subordinate to the episcopal see of

Hamburg-Bremen are referred to in 948, implying some degree of German influence at this point

(Skovgaard-Petersen 2003: 174). The town appears to decline around 1000 however, the Vita

Bernwardi citing unrest in the region (Randsborg 1980: 90).

The first Danish raids in the west occurred around the year 800 (Randsborg 1980: 12). 808

saw king Gudfred raid the Slavonian Abrodites, allies of the expanding Carolingian empire, razing

the town of Reric and relocating its merchants to Hedeby. A Carolingian commercial monopoly may

have been perceived as a threat as pressing as imperialist expansion to a monarch like Gudfred

(Hodges 1989: 42). Evidence from literary sources and settlement planning point to royal attempts

to control inter-regional commerce, and thus maintain control over access to scarce resources or

prestige goods (Hodges 1989: 54). The Danes re-established a treaty with the Franks soon after,

however, and Rhenish-Baltic trade increased significantly, especially via Hedeby and Ribe. In 815 a

Frankish army entered Jylland, seeking to overthrow Gudfred's sons, who at the time were fighting

a king Harald Klak who had allied with the Franks against them. Harald's faction was ultimately

unsuccessful in its attempts to permanently claim control of the throne for him, and '[t]he Danish

raids on the west escalated in the last two thirds of the ninth century, with fighting in Frisia, Saxony,

Francia and England. Several "kings" are mentioned as leaders of the Vikings, and some of them

have the same names as kings in Denmark...'(Randsborg 1980: 13).

The Danes were nominally Christian by about 960 (Randsborg 1980: 13). The runestones at

Jelling, one of which declares Harald, son of Gorm, ruler of a united Denmark which he had

converted to Christianity, date to around this time (Skovgaard-Petersen 2003: 168). Churches had

been built at Hedeby and Ribe by 865, following the Carolingian mission to the Danes, and the

German emperor was claiming at least nominal suzerainty over Danish territory by 965.

Danish raids on Anglo-Saxon England proceeded from 994 under Sweyn, son of Harald

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Gormsson, who would ultimately expand the Danish empire to encompass, for a time, England and

Norway (Randsborg 1980: 14). The dynasty begun with Harald would reign in Denmark for the

next eight decades or so, as well as in England from 1016 to 1042.

Ribe

The Ribe excavations of 1970 and 1972-1976 proceeded through occupation layers dated to

between 725 and 800 on the basis of numismatic, dendrochronological, and ceramics

thermoluminescence data (Bencard 1981: 11). The earliest documented reference to the settlement

comes from the late 9th-century Vita Ansgari, where king Horik II is mentioned granting land there

for the construction of a church (Bencard 1981: 22). This historical note implies at least some

degree of royal landholding at Ribe, and Bencard suggests the building of a church there may imply

a growing Christian merchant and artisan population, attracted by the security a king would be able

to guarantee. As Olsen (1989: 9) notes, a Danish king's primary obligation in this era was the

internal and external defence of his constituents, including foreign parties such as merchants and

missionaries in whom he was invested. The town's location between tributaries of the Ribe river

provided access for waterborne transport, and Stiesdal (1968: 155) suggests that Ansgar's selection

of Ribe for his church was motivated by its prominent position as a point of entry into Denmark for

trade from the west.

The intact archaeological material from the 1985-86 excavations extends from the Late Iron

through Early Viking Ages, material from the later layers being largely lost to post-depositional

activity (Frandsen and Jensen 1987: 175). The site exhibits a clear differentiation of phases

separated by levelling activity, and the material evidence appears to reflect continuous deposition

over a period of occupation long enough to display typological developments (Frandsen and Jensen

1987: 175-176). Continuity of occupation is strongly implied by both the similarity among finds

and the renewal of an intra-site ditch along a consistent axis over a series of activity layers (Bencard

1988: 225). This sequence of workshops with intervening levelling horizons parallels that seen in

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the 1975 excavations (Bencard 1988: 226). While the settlement's geographical focus and

boundaries have shifted significantly, it has remained continuously occupied to the present day.

Shortcomings of Previous Research

Previous interpretations of the numismatic evidence from this region have come to

contradictory conclusions regarding where and when the minting of indigenous currency, and with

it a true monetary economy, began. Opinions vary on whether Ribe or Hedeby had the first Danish

mint in the 8th century, and there is disagreement over whether some of the earliest sceattas were

imports from Frisia, or in fact native issues. The resolution of these questions has implications for

the development of sociopolitical organization in early Medieval Denmark, as the ability to mint,

and enforce the circulation of, a coinage not only has powerful political effects, ranging from

control over the flow of wealth, to the legitimation of rule in the public consciousness, but also

implies an antecedent ability to marshal significant material and human resources. A re-evaluation

of Denmark's early economic organization may thus assist in elucidating its pre-historic internal

political organization.

II. Synthetic Overview

Economic Organization

Thurborg (1988: 303) defines an economic system as '...a structure of different economic

spheres, in which different kinds of money, objects and services circulate.' Applying this framework

to Viking-Age Scandinavia, Thurborg outlines a typology of the various forms and functions of

economic media in circulation. 'Primitive money', uniform media with an obvious commercial

function in a society with only peripheral market exchange, included things like silver bullion and

early coinage. The uniformity among silver ingots, as well as their frequent pecking and

fragmentation, imply this essentially monetary role (Thurborg 1988: 313). 'Early cash' is a uniform

coinage, the production and circulation of which is controlled by a central authority, and is

generally associated with a developing state. Its primary, if not sole, function is to facilitate the

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payment of fees collected by that state. Foreign coins can be interpreted as reflecting interactions

with merchants from abroad, often serving an essentially different function within the society in

which they were minted than in the one where they were ultimately deposited (Thurborg 1988:

304). Alongside all of these are the 'primitive valuables', such as the familiar silver arm-rings of the

Vikings, which were objects of symbolic social exchange, whether political, personal, or juridical.

Thurborg goes on to note that items could shift between these functional categories, undergoing

varying degrees of physical alteration. Thurborg (1988: 310) argues that the function of a medium

of exchange in the economy of a given time and place can be inferred from the composition of the

hoards it occurs in. For example, fragmented items may imply a weight-based mercantile economy,

while whole silver artefacts can be seen as 'primitive valuables'.

As mentioned above, one of the persistent questions of Viking-Age Danish economics

concerns the provenance of some of the earliest coins in circulation there. Bendixen (1981: 64)

states that '...modern analyses of the material have determined that both of the sceatta types found in

Ribe were struck in Frisland. The porcupines are believed to have been struck from about 725 to

some time in the middle of the 8th century.' Aside from one variant not represented in any Frisian

finds and bearing a resemblance to securely identified English coins, Bendixen (1981: 69) attributes

the majority of sceattas of the Wodan/Monster type found in Denmark to Frisian mints, based on the

quantity of evidence from Frisian hoards. The Hallum hoard, for example, consists largely of

Wodan/Monsters, and variants among them appear in finds from Dankirke and Ribe as well

(Bendixen 1981: 69-70). Further, the Hallum find was buried inside of an earthenware pot similar to

the Nørdso pottery found at Ribe (Bendixen 1981: 69), suggesting material exchange between

Frisland and the mercantile centres of Denmark. It should be noted, however, that the Hallum hoard

shares no actual die-duplicates with the Ribe assemblage, nor do the porcupine sceattas from the

Franeker hoard have identical counterparts among the porcupines from Dankirke and Ribe

(Bendixen 1981: 70). Bendixen (1984: 152) notes, in fact, that there are no die duplicates among

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sceatta finds from Ribe, and an overall high variation in iconography. This seems to suggest an

influx of issues from numerous sources. In any case, Bendixen (1981: 75; 1984: 152) suggests,

'[b]ased on the comparisons between Danish and western European hoard finds and stray finds, it

should be apparent that the coins represented in Denmark are those which were especially common

in the Netherlands, France, and England in a period which we have restricted to about 720-750',

though some finds clearly imply earlier contacts.

Contra Bendixen, Frandsen and Jensen (1987: 188) argue that '[i]f the sceattas found in Ribe

came from Frisia one might expect that the currency reform of Pepin the Small in 755 would have a

more marked influence here, or at least some of the coins which replace the Frisian sceattas ought

to appear.' It has also been proposed that the 9th-century coins found at Ribe were based on native

8th-century prototypes (Malmer 2007: 18). Metcalf (1984: 161), for instance, has argued that the

Wodan/Monsters are in fact native Danish products, not Frisian imports, based on the much greater

proportion of Wodan/Monster finds in Denmark compared to locations near the Rhine mouths.

Furthermore, he argues that the copying of the Wodan/Monster type by the later mint at Hedeby

implies that it was a familiar Scandinavian coinage (Metcalf 1984: 162). He suggests that either

Hedeby or Ribe may have been the location of a mint producing Danish Wodan/Monsters, where

'...money arriving from the west was required to be reminted'(Metcalf 1984: 162). Williams (2007:

182) has also noted that Arab, Frankish, and Anglo-Saxon coins were melted down for their raw

material in early Viking-Age Scandinavia. Based on the balance of evidence, Metcalf concludes that

Ribe seems the most likely candidate for the Wodan/Monster mint, '...taking into account the limited

integration of the Saxons into the international community at this date, and also the evidence of the

coin provenances on Föhr, and by the Limfjord...'(1984: 162). Metcalf notes that the Föhr hoard is

totally devoid of Wodan/Monsters, and argues that its contents are not typical of contemporary

Jyllandish currency, being rather '...presumably a sum of money which had remained more or less

intact since it left the area of the Rhine mouths.'

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Hedeager (1994: 139) also places a mint producing Wodan/Monsters at Ribe in the early 8th

century, noting that Wodan/Monsters were the exclusive type seen at Ribe from 720 to the end of

the 8th century. He argues that the apparent monopoly of this type at Ribe reflects the operation of a

true monetary economy at the town, so the medium of exchange in such an economy would have

been produced locally (Hedeager 1994: 140). Furthermore, Wodan/Monsters were found spread

throughout the excavation layers at Ribe, indicating the extent of their use as a medium of regular

trade (Bendixen 1981: 77). Malmer (2007: 13), however, draws attention to the lack of any

archaeological evidence for a mint at Ribe in the 8th century, and suggests the Ribe finds may

indeed be Frisian/Frankish imports (2007: 14). Regarding the relative prominence of Ribe and

Hedeby, Bendixen (1981: 77) notes that '...Olaf Olsen points to the possibility that Ribe may have

played a special role in periods of unrest in Hedeby.'

Regardless of their provenance, Wodan/Monster sceattas are speculated to have circulated

approximately from 720 to 800 (Bendixen 1981: 66). Bendixen (1984: 155) suggests that the

distribution of sceattas across Scandinavia reflects contemporary trade routes: one along the west

coast of Jylland, and the other travelling eastward from Hedeby to Helgö and Birka. Indeed,

Randsborg (1980: 91) suggests that '...it is the transit traffic between the North Sea and the Baltic

which makes Hedeby the largest town in Scandinavia in the Viking period.' Wiechmann (2007: 29)

characterizes Hedeby as the first 'urban' centre in northern Europe, and attributes this status to its

role as an international trade hub. Jankuhn (1982: 23) suggests that the '...cultural and economic

efflorescence of the north-eastern part of the Frankish State...' between 600 and 800 was facilitated

by the seafaring Frisian traders (1982: 25), and the alignment of trade routes across Scandinavia in

the 7th and 8th centuries reflects contacts between the rising Frankish and Yngling powers (1982:

35). Sindbaek (2007: 119) also has argued that long-distance traders stimulated the growth of proto-

towns in Viking-Age Scandinavia. He mediates that position, however, with the assertion that places

of trade were not reducible to solely economic or political formative principles, but rather were

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junctures of traffic with various motivations (Sindbaek 2007: 120).

The primary argument for extending circulation of Wodan/Monsters up to 800 derives from

their apparent use as a model for what some have argued were the earliest indigenous Danish

mintings, generally placed around that date (Bendixen 1981: 75). An early 9th-century date for the

first Danish coins, which Bendixen attributes to a mint at Hedeby, is suggested by several apparent

connections they bear to closely antedated Carolingian issues. One of these Hedeby mintings, for

example, appears to be in accord with regulations implemented by the late 8th-century Carolingian

coinage reform (Bendixen 1981: 75). Further support comes from another putative Hedeby series

which appears to imitate a minting from Carolingian Dorestad, circa 768-794, possibly by way of

Frisian imitations appearing from around 790 (Bendixen 1981: 76). As Hodges (1989: 40) notes,

Frisian participation in Carolingian trade continued even after the usurpation of Dorestad by Pepin

of Herstal. The peak of Frisian trade appears to occur in the 8th to 9th centuries, and '...their activity

was to a great extent directed toward southern Jutland, where they had to trans-ship goods destined

northwards.... [and t]hat part of the shipments intended for sale in Denmark may have been carried

by ship to Ribe...'(Bendixen 1981b: 407). Bendixen (1981b: 407) interprets the evidence for regular

circulation of coinage at Hedeby, utilized in increasingly intensive commerce and likely collected in

taxes, as reflecting a monetized economy there, if only in the immediate area. This is interesting,

because if the use of coinage for transactions was, in fact, introduced to Hedeby by Frisian traders,

it implies that what began as an unregulated, albeit agreed-upon, medium of international exchange

could be assimilated and controlled by a local administration. Regarding the putative start of

indigenous Scandinavian minting during the early 9th century in the Schleswig-Holstein region,

Callmer (1980: 206) also argues that '[i]t is surely not too bold to interpret this minting as a

phenomenon directly connected with the prosperity of Hedeby and perhaps also of Ribe at that time.

The minting may be regarded as motivated by commercial transactions rather than by taxation of

land. Consequently we may assume that commercial transactions in Schleswig-Holstein and

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Southern Jutland could be so complicated that coins were constantly needed.'

Randsborg (1980: 89) also places a mint at Hedeby in this period, but suggests that the coins

produced there may have only served as a regulated currency at Hedeby itself, as they appear

elsewhere worn as amulets. Malmer (2007: 20) notes that one series appears to concentrate around

Hedeby in non-grave contexts, while grave finds concentrate to the north. Most of those northern

finds had been pierced for use as jewellery, while the grave finds that do occur around Hedeby were

not. Two other series mentioned by Malmer, excluding those examples from hoards and graves,

appear to concentrate around Ribe, while grave finds, all of which had been adapted for use as

ornaments, concentrate near Birka. This may reflect the emergence of a monetary economy at

Hedeby and Ribe earlier than in their hinterlands. Wiechmann (2007:35) also notes evidence of an

apparent regional variation in the use of Hedeby coins, with those appearing in East Holstein

exhibiting the cut marks indicative of the quality testing common in economies based on weights of

precious metals, while in Angeln all of the recovered coins have been whole.

Conversely, H. Steuer has argued that in the 8th to 9th century barter still predominated at

Hedeby with only some early attempts at a money economy, while the 9th to 10th century did see a

monetized system localized around Hedeby, but with a bullion-based economy operating in the

region generally (Malmer 2007: 24). While the majority of coin finds from Hedeby itself have been

identified as Hedeby issues (Wiechmann 2007: 40), Wiechmann (2007: 42) also argues that

significant production did not begin until the 10th century, with mass production superseding hack-

silver and foreign coins from the second half of that century.

The 'Hedeby' coins were anonymous, and Wiechmann (2007: 32) suggests that their mint

could have been either a royal or merchant-initiated enterprise. Malmer (2007: 13) notes that the

lack of text on the earliest Danish coinage also makes determining its precise provenance and date

of issue impossible. According to Bendixen (1981b: 410), the first Danish king to put his name on

the coins he had minted was Sweyn Forkbeard, with an issue from around 1000 patterned after the

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crux-type of Aethelred II, large quantities of which were extracted as Danegeld. Hedeager (1994:

141), however, claims that Cnut was the first to do this. During Cnut's reign in Denmark, 1018-

1035, he established mints at Lund, Viborg, Ribe, Ørbaek, and likely elsewhere, staffed by Anglo-

Saxon professionals (Bendixen 1981b: 410-411; Becker 1981: 449).

Bendixen (1981b: 408) argues that the first Hedeby minting experienced a long period of

circulation, with no new Danish issues until around 900. Production of this secondary Hedeby

coinage, again imitating Carolingian types and characterized by a progressive decrease in weight,

appears to cease around 980, with the town's decline (Randsborg 1980: 90; Wiechmann 2007: 32).

Another Danish series, featuring a cross motif, is suggested by Bendixen (1981b: 408-409) to have

been minted in the late 10th century at Jelling, the political focus of Harald Bluetooth's unified,

nominally Christian, Denmark. While the convergence of religious and political motivations may

have determined the choice of designs for this coinage of the early Danish state, this is called into

question by Malmer's (1981b: 419) suggestion that the crux-type issue of Harald's successor Sweyn

was simply copying coins of Aethelred II. Conversely, Hedeager (1994: 141) notes that Harald's

crux minting coincides with the German occupation of Hedeby, and argues that it was an explicitly

propagandistic act, intended to demonstrate both piety and political independence.

Malmer (2007: 13) argues that native coinage of any kind only existed in south-western

Scandinavia before the 990s. This may arguably be the case, though at least one putative Hedeby

coin appears in a mid-10th-century hoard on the island of Bornholm (Skovmand 1942: 25).

Bendixen (1981: 76) suggests that the rationale for the implementation of an indigenous coinage in

Denmark, and its formal similarity to the Wodan/Monster type, may have arisen from a practical

need to fill the commercial void left by declining quantities of Wodan/Monsters, which had become

the accepted standard. Callmer (1980: 206), however, argues that the commercially-oriented coin-

stock of Scandinavia during this period was dominated by Arab imports, and that it was this coinage

which the Scandinavian mints emerged to supplement in order to meet the demand of regular

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commerce. Randsborg (1980: 152), too, notes that the coinage in Denmark in the 9th century

comprises a greater proportion of Arab than European issues. These mintings largely concentrate in

the early 9th century, possibly correlating with an intensification, and later decline, in international

trade (Randsborg 1980: 153). Randsborg notes that the later part of this period corresponds to a

significant episode of raiding activity, and suggests this was likely a response to the diminishing

influx of wealth. A renewed increase in the presence of Arab coins in the late 9th and early 10th

centuries is followed by a sharp decline and ultimate cessation. Contrary to this hypothesis, Sawyer

(1985: 168) has suggested that the oriental coin hoards in Scandinavia were acquired by violence,

rather than trade, and that the two-decade cessation of imports after 965 was due to increasing

resistance to this forcible extraction.

Evidence for Scandinavia's international trade connections appears in both the

archaeological and documentary records. Kruse (2007: 165) notes that the 9th-century treaty

between Alfred the Great and Guthrum, then-overlord of the Danelaw, contains clauses outlining

the conditions of trade between the Danes and English. Scandinavian-Arab trade relations were

mediated via routes through the Middle Volga - Ural region beginning in the 7th century (Hårdh

2007: 138). By the 9th century, trade centres along this and other eastern European routes included

Skiringssalr, Ribe, Hedeby, Aarhus, and Helgö (Jankuhn 1982: 39). Spherical and polyhedral

weights based on Arab prototypes appear around the Baltic from the end of the 9th century, and the

9th- and 10th-century 'Permian' rings produced at fixed, discreet weights likely served as units of

exchange in an economy based on weights of precious metal ( Hårdh 2007: 140, 143), though

Thurborg (1988: 319) notes the role of such rings in transactions mediating social status

relationships. Hårdh (2007: 144) suggests that these were not in general circulation, but rather

functioned as a means of wealth-accumulation and -storage.

Despite this evidence, there are a number of difficulties in identifying, to say nothing of

defining, trade. Kruse (2007: 165) notes, for example, that the luxury goods which constitute the

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most recognizable class of long-distance imports may, unless found together in mass quantities, be

items of elite gift-exchange rather than mercantile commerce. As Hodges (1989: 55) notes, '...long-

distance trade under aboriginal conditions.... was not a reflection of cost differentials; rather, goods

were sought abroad that were not obtainable at home.... To import, not to export, was the prime

impetus.... [S]ystems appear to have flourished and declined according to the trade-partnership

extant between the leaders of the territories involved...'. Further, as noted elsewhere, not all coinage

or other monetized precious metal was acquired through trade, much of it changing hands via

raiding and tribute-extraction (Kruse 2007: 166).

Bencard (1981: 22) suggests that raiding and international trade formed a continuum within

the overall economic system of the early Viking Age, arguing that '[a] precondition for the Viking

expeditions was the existence of an international trade with [the kinds of goods those expeditions

pursued]; the Vikings were sometimes forced to purchase them when they could not plunder them.

The expeditions quite simply presupposed knowledge of where to search for booty.... This form of

trade... was consolidated into one system of circulation in the first half of the eighth century.'

Samson (1991b: 125) argues, contrary to those who view Viking trade as '...a form of capitalist

mercantilism, imported Oriental silver as the result of a "favourable balance of trade", and

Scandinavian hoards as the profits of merchant activity', that the Viking-Age Scandinavian

economy was essentially utilitarian and goal-oriented. The end to which expeditions were

undertaken was the acquisition of specific goods (Samson 1991b: 126). The Arab silver found in

Scandinavia was not, for example, the positive balance of a two-way trade in goods, but was itself

the object of trade sought by the Vikings, even though it was simply the medium of exchange for

the Arab merchants (Samson 1991b: 127). Likewise, Hedeager (1994: 137) argues that Viking

traders were fundamentally not merchants. Whereas merchants use money to buy goods to sell for

more money, the Vikings traded goods, often plundered rather than purchased, for silver as an end

in itself.

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Henri Pirenne argued that Roman economic institutions in northern Europe, and contact with

the Mediterranean, were maintained until a collapse in the 7th century brought about by the

westward expansion of the Islamic empire, in turn catalysing a new economic structure that was

more self-sufficient, and less market-based and internationally-oriented (Hodges 1989: 7). In

contrast to Pirenne's thesis that the transition from gold to silver coinage in northern Europe was a

result of economic stagnation, Bendixen (1981: 68) argues, rather, that this reflects a growing

demand for coins that could more easily be used at multiple transactional scales. Whereas high-

value gold coins would be suitable only for commensurately large purchases, silver pieces could

facilitate smaller, and likely more frequent, transactions. Metcalf (2007: 5), for example, argues that

the large scale of coin-minting in 8th-century England, as inferred from the number of unique dies,

implies that coins were being used by the largest proportion of society, and thus for everyday

transactions rather than wealth-storage. Gaimster (2007: 123) makes a similar observation regarding

material from contemporary Scandinavian hoards, arguing that '...a high degree of fragmentation in

hoards could be described in terms of a more intensive use of silver for small and everyday

transactions...' in an economy based on precious-metal weights. Hedeager (1994: 141), too, argues

that '...the quantity of silver in both coined and uncoined form shows that many more transactions

than previously must have involved payment in silver', and the growing proportion of coins and

fragmentation of hack-silver through the 10th century indicate that silver was increasingly used for

small transactions.

As Williams (2007: 177) demonstrates, there was '...no single pattern of economic

development across the Viking world.' Gaimster (2007: 124) traces a development in the hoarded

material of south-west Scandinavia from mostly unfragmented silver objects in the 8th through 9th

centuries, to increasingly fragmented pieces, and finally intact, increasingly indigenous, coins in the

11th century. This rising proportion of domestic coinage is argued to '...reflect a straightforward

development from a weight-based to a monetary economy, culminating in the cessation of large-

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scale precious metal depositions'(Gaimster 1991: 121). Likewise, Samson (1991b: 129) suggests

that '[t]he centuries of the hoarding phenomenon are those in which traditional forms of exchange

developed into a system in which neutral forms, ones with no ramifications for social relations

between the partners, played a major role. The end of hoarding, therefore, coincided with the

monetisation of the economy.' Gaimster (2007: 124), too, suggests that '...the cessation of Viking

silver hoards would seem to reflect the transition into a monetary society.' Randsborg (1980: 160)

likewise suggests that the decline of available Arabic silver generally in Denmark by the late 10th

century marked the end of a pre-market economy conceived in terms of barter.

Looking at Denmark in particular, Randsborg (1980: 137) finds a similar pattern to that

noted by Gaimster and Samson above. The 9th-century hoards are relatively few in number, and

lightweight, consisting mostly of complete silver articles. Through the 10th and 11th centuries they

become both more frequent and rich, and contain increasing proportions of coins and hack-silver.

He further argues that the increasing frequency with which hoards appear inland, compared to

littorally, through the 10th century implies a shift in raiding activity from strict piracy to inland

expeditions. He suggests that the hoards represent measures taken by those expecting to be robbed

to protect their wealth. Likewise, Thurborg (1988: 320) suggests that periods during which greater

proportions of media such as silver jewellery, typically used in status economies, were hoarded may

have been experiencing some kind of social crisis, wherein items capable of being traded for

personal loyalty would have been especially valuable. As Fichter (1979: 253) demonstrates, the role

of this type of 'status money' as a form of both financial and social insurance was recognized in the

Icelandic sagas. Callmer (1980: 207) also notes that in the late 10th century '...we meet phenomena

of instability, the most important of which is the occurrence of non-monetary hack-silver', the non-

monetary nature of which is implied by the contemporaneous increase in frequency of weights and

scales, and which could have functioned as a means of trade in the absence of regulated coinage.

Sawyer (1985: 169), in contrast, argues that the sharp increase in, and then scarcity of, hoards in

18

Sweden beginning in the mid-10th century reflects a practice of hoarding in response to increasing

difficulty in acquiring foreign silver.

Contrary to these hypotheses which posit the contents of hoards as a reflection of

contemporary economic transactions, Gaimster (1991: 114) argues that the contents of hoards were

not, in fact, normally in continuous circulation, but were conceived of rather as personal property.

This, in turn, would seem to stand in contrast to Samson's (1991b: 131) position that hoards, while

intentional accumulations of wealth, were intended to be used in social transactions; he also rejects

any explanations attributing the practice to religion or conspicuous consumption.

As has been demonstrated, multiple incommensurate spheres of economic circulation

frequently coexisted, often making use of the same material realizations of value, albeit conceived

of very differently. As Bendixen (1981: 77) argues, '...we must re-evaluate our usual impression that

payment according to the weight of broken silver pieces was the Viking's sole mode of payment up

to about 1000.' Gaimster (1991: 119; 2007: 127), for example, argues that the variable compositions

of silver hoards reflect different contemporaneous systems of exchange, practised in different

contexts and attributed different meanings. As Hedeager (1994: 138) notes, contemporary with

Viking trade expeditions bent on acquiring silver for use in their internal status economy, centres of

mercantile trade such as Ribe were developing, where both prestige and utilitarian items were

manufactured and sold. Gaimster (1991: 122) suggests that '[t]he development of a monetary

economy did not primarily imply quantitative changes in the circulation of goods, but rather that the

means of payment and exchange came to some extent to be controlled.' Regarding the

implementation of a 'regal' coinage, Williams (2007: 177) notes that 'Denmark started strongly, and

maintained the development; Norway started weakly and only really began to develop coinage on

any sort of scale in the mid-eleventh century; while the Swedish coinage began strongly but was

already collapsing when the Norwegian coinage began to take off.' While the presence of hoards

without coin scatters in the same general context may imply a prestige- or gift-based economy, such

19

transactions could still occur within monetized economies (Metcalf 2007: 7). As Williams (2007:

178) notes, '...precious metal could function perfectly well both for exchange and for storage of

wealth without the need for regulated coinage...', and the practice of 'pecking' precious metal to

gauge its purity evidently persisted well into the era of standardized coinage. While political

centralization may correlate with minting, it does not necessarily imply the cessation of all but

monetary transactions. Bendixen (1981b: 411) notes that despite the progressive increase in locally-

minted coinage in Denmark, hack-silver and foreign coins still appear in hoards from the reign of

Svend Estriden in latter half of the 11th century, and coins minted under previous rulers evidently

continued to circulate. Items produced for a 'status' economy could function also within a bullion

economy, especially if produced to standard weights (Williams 2007: 181). Bendixen (1981b: 410)

notes that much hack-silver was evidently weight-adjusted to correspond to contemporary coins,

and suggests it was produced as a substitute coinage. That the material content of coins could

remain significant even in a relatively monetized economy is suggested by Hedeager (1994: 141),

who interprets the weight standardization of Danish coins around 1032 as an indication that they

were accepted as denominatory.

Monetary media imported into a non-monetary society could take on new functions as

jewellery or bullion (Gaimster 1991: 117). As Bendixen (1981b: 409) notes, hoards consisting

purely of indigenous coins were exceptionally rare, and almost 100% of the coins present in Danish

hoards between 850 and 950 were Arab dirhams. Callmer (1980: 206) notes that coins of the early

9th-century Schleswig-Holstein minting do not appear in Scandinavian hoards before the 10th

century, and suggests that it and the coin-stock of the hoards circulated in independent spheres for

an extended period of time. As Malmer (1981: 397) suggests, '[o]ne can divide Europe during the

Viking age into two contrasting zones, on the one hand the zone where coins were minted,

comprising western, southern, and part of central Europe, and on the other hand the coin-importing

zone, comprising Scandinavia, the Baltic countries, and eastern Europe.' Coins found in the

20

importing zone exhibit the tell-tale bending and pecking reflecting their use as bullion, and '[t]he

zone of bending and pecking diminishes progressively at the same time as local minting

begins'(Malmer 1981: 398). Likewise, Bendixen (1981b: 409) notes that hoards with mixed

contents '...belong to areas where the silver was accepted by value and weight, and local minting

was on a small scale, while the feudal system in Western Europe created a monopolized tax money,

current for only a short period and in a limited area.' This type of control over coin production and

circulation on a supra-local level does not appear in Denmark until the reign of Harald Hen in the

late 11th century (Bendixen 1981b: 412-413). Whereas previous issues had a high degree of

heterogeneity between mints and over time, the minting system at this time appears to have been

consolidated, reducing the number of coin types and active mints. The ultimate cessation of

hoarding can possibly be linked to the constraint placed on the validity of a given coinage as a

means of exchange to a geographically and chronologically limited sphere, rendering the

accumulation of foreign and outdated money counterproductive. There is, however, some evidence

for the operation of controlled monetized economies at a more local level from much earlier. For

example, Malmer (1981b: 419-423) argues that a die-linked subset of the coins in a hoard from near

Lund, lacking the bending and pecking seen in other coins from the same hoard, as well as instances

of this minting found elsewhere, was likely minted in the area, probably at Lund itself. If this

interpretation is correct, it would seem to indicate that this locally produced coinage was treated as

valid money independent of its metal content, at least, and perhaps only, in the local zone of

commerce and taxation. Similarly, Bendixen (1981: 77) notes that '[barter] can be found far down

into historical times. However, the abundance of sceattas and the earliest currencies related to them

seem to show that at least in certain circles, particularly among the inhabitants of early Ribe and

Hedeby, an incipient coin economy had already gained foothold from sometime during the 8th

century to the beginning of the 9th century.' As Bendixen (1981: 77; 1984: 153) has argued, '[t]he

wide-spread use of coins can perhaps best be explained by the introduction of a monetary economy

21

by the Frisian part of the population' operating as traders at towns like these.

Thurborg (1988: 312) sees the degree of differentiation within the material of individual

hoards during a given period as directly related to the level of complexity of the contemporary

economic system. It is interesting to consider that, in this sense, an increasingly purely monetized

economy, as reflected in an increasing proportion of indigenous coins in hoards, becomes

progressively less complex. The political centralization seen to correspond to this economic shift

can thus be interpreted in two alternate ways: as featuring greater 'internal' complexity, in the form

of social stratification and the development of an apparatus of administrative institutions, or less

'external' complexity, with fewer competing hierarchical centres. Malmer (1985: 190) suggests that

the practice of hoarding is less prevalent in a highly-functioning economy, which demands the

continuous circulation of wealth, and thus the relative frequency of hoards over time may reflect the

transition to a monetary economy. Likewise, Hedeager (1994: 137) argues that '[t]here is probably

little scope for interpreting the treasure hoards without understanding the function of the valuables

deposited in the society of the day and thus without seeing their presence as representing areas with

an under-developed economic structure.' Callmer (1980: 206) argues that the hoarded coins of

Viking-Age Scandinavia are representative of an exchange situation '...different and less well

balanced than...' that of regular commerce, instead connected to a prestige economy, with hoarding

attributable to '...the failure of two different sides to conform in an exchange situation.' Gaimster

(1991: 119) argues that an economy in which personal belongings (jewellery, etc.) were converted

into a form of money (hack-silver) likely comprised relatively discontinuous series of transactions,

and where uniform media did occur, they indicate a limited sphere of continuous transaction, which

'...is likely to have operated at higher levels of regional organization, and would reflect inter-

regional exchange.' Likewise, Thurborg (1988: 316-317) argues that '...we must stress the casual

character of hacksilver - as compared to complete objects and to bars and ingots - indicating an

exchange that is neither continuous nor uniform.... The hacksilver... must be considered as the

22

reflection of a casual regional circulation where personal belongings, when needed, were

transformed into a more practical economic medium.... but secondarily, when absorbed into the

super-regional sphere, it will function along with primitive money as a more explicit economic

medium.' Whereas Hedeager (1994: 137) notes that '...the substantial geographical difference in the

weight of individual pieces of metal in hacksilver hoards has been interpreted as a reflection of the

more or less advanced use of a currency', Bendixen (1981: 77) argues that '... the choice of hack-

silver as a medium of payment was not the expression of a more primitive stage than coined silver

but instead an attempt to manage as well as possible in the face of a shortage of coins.... In fact,

detailed tests of weights have shown that the silver fragments often have the same weight as coins.'

Political Organization

The evolution of political formations in Viking-Age Scandinavia is unique among its

western European contemporaries. As Andrén (1989: 586) notes, '...due to the marginal position of

Scandinavia... the heritage of Antiquity was lacking, as a background to society and its

organization.... The medieval kingdom does not appear as a disintegration of the political power, but

rather as a step toward the territorial State.' As Thurston (1997: 240) notes, approaches to the

question of Danish state-formation have generally divided along disciplinary lines, with

archaeologists discerning the presence of a state as early as the 9th century, based on localized

evidence of centralization, while historians have argued, based on the documentary records of

outsiders, for fragmented political organization until significantly later. Drawing instead upon a

regional analysis of settlements, Thurston (1997: 242) argues that '...the homelands of the ruling

dynasties came under control quickly, while Scania, a more peripheral area, remained largely

autonomous for some time....' Thus the history of Denmark's political centralization, while

beginning in the 9th century, was geographically variable.

Randsborg (1980: 141) has made estimates of the quantity of silver available at various

times in Denmark based on the archaeological evidence, and drawn inferences regarding its

23

relationship to contemporary military and political strategies, though Samson (1991b: 128)

questions Randsborg's interpretive methodology, arguing that '[t]he number of hoards cannot reflect

both the silver stock and the level of violence.' Randsborg identifies a peak in the silver stock

around 900, which coincides with the hegemony of a Swedish dynasty at Hedeby. Another peak

around 1000 can probably be traced to payments by the English to Sweyn and Cnut. Late 9th-

century payments extracted by the Danes in western Europe appear to have made little impact on

the silver circulating in Denmark, presumably being invested in trade goods from abroad.

Randsborg (1980: 143) suggests that this '...crisis in the importation of silver in the second half of

the ninth century... caused an increase in the raids and attacks on western Europe.' Similarly,

Randsborg (1980: 154) notes that major Scandinavian emporia including Kaupang and Birka, which

served primarily as markets where luxuries were exchanged for silver, decline along with the silver

stock in the mid-10th century. Birka appears to have been fortified shortly before its abandonment,

a probable sign of increased raiding in the Baltic region. A similar crisis in the late 10th century,

however, preceded Denmark's coalescence into a unified state. Harald's nominal unification of

Denmark in the mid-10th century was preceded by a period of unrest coinciding with that decline in

available silver (Randsborg 1980: 163), a destabilized socioeconomic situation that Harald may

have been able to take advantage of. The collapse of the silver-reliant international trade in prestige

goods saw the growth of an internal, perhaps more capitalistic, merchant-driven, economy, and

hierarchical authorities seeking means other than the distribution of symbolic forms of wealth to

maintain a base of loyal supporters. As Andrén (1989: 588) argues, after the turn of the 11th century

external wealth-exploitation was superseded by internal. Following the rise of sites like Ribe to

prominence as hubs of international trade, a second tier of locally-oriented towns had appeared in

Denmark in the 10th century (Hedeager 1994: 139), and Randsborg (1980: 7) notes that by the

Medieval period proper, towns came to serve as markets primarily for their local provinces, with

international trade connections limited to the Baltic and Germany. Randsborg (1980: 6) notes that

24

many Viking villages appear to lack continuity into the Medieval period. Following their continual

relocation throughout the preceding centuries, agrarian settlements became relatively permanently

placed in the 11th and 12th centuries with their organization around parish churches (Skovgaard-

Petersen 2003: 181). This raises questions concerning the degree to which human settlement and

movement, treated as resources, could have been manipulated from above in post-unification

Denmark. Saunders (1995: 41-42), for example, argues that the development of towns in 9th- and

10th-century England was not the organic result of market forces, but rather a means of ensuring

centralized political power through economic control, the towns being granted a legally-enforced

monopoly on resource redistribution.

Samson (1991b: 132) suggests that the increasing proportion of coins in hoards during the

immediate pre-state period in Denmark reflects a rising need for forms of payment divorced from

social relationships, as might be used for hiring large numbers of soldiers. The acquisition of such

forms of 'objective' wealth with a consensus value could thus serve to reinforce the coercive power

of a leader of men, power which could be directed toward claiming further wealth, and so on. The

period leading up to the formation of the Danish state, then, was one of '...transformation producing

silver hoards, hoards that grew larger and more purely of coin.... The increasingly violent

competition among the ever fewer and more powerful big-men led to fighting with silver as well as

fighting with weapons' (Samson 1991b: 133). While the Viking kings' hold on power depended

largely on their military might, a necessity for both external defence and internal coercion, Olsen

(1989: 8) argues that some degree of royal blood was a necessary prerequisite for one to be

recognized as a legitimate ruler, a conception deriving from the pagan attribution of spiritual power

to the royal lineage, vital for a king to effectively execute his priestly role. Competition for kingly

power was thus often intra-familial.

Sanderson (1999: 74) argues that a certain level of socioeconomic stratification is necessary,

but not sufficient, for state formation; an independent cause of that increased stratification must

25

exist, as in less differentiated systems the accumulation of power is mitigated by redistributive

mechanisms governed by social norms. Working from the proposition that violent conflict arises

due to geographic, sociopolitical, or resource-based constraints on population expansion, Sanderson

(1999: 79-82) argues that the development of a differential in coercive power within a society at

war creates a situation in which the militarily empowered are well-placed to appropriate economic

resources and control over administrative institutions, giving rise to the socioeconomic stratification

seen to precede state formation. Likewise, Reynolds (2003: 551) defines the state as '...an

organization of human society within a more or less fixed area in which the ruler or governing body

more or less successfully controls the legitimate use of physical force.' Sanderson's hypothesis

appears to closely match the evidence we have for Viking-Age Denmark. As Thurston (1997: 239-

240) suggests, '[d]uring the sixth through twelfth centuries A.D., neighbouring societies encroached

economically and militarily on Danish territory, acting as catalysts for internal change', specifically

attempts at political consolidation, and thus conflict among regional elites. Conceiving of the 'state'

in this way, it can be argued that multiple, if transitory, contemporaneous state-like structures

existed within Denmark prior to Harald's ascendance in the late 10th century. This was evidently not

a unique arrangement, as Andrén (1989: 552) characterizes '...a good deal of post-Carolingian

France as an area of unstable mini-states...', and attributes the impression of statelessness in part to

the erroneous assumption that a state must be trans-regional.

Randsborg (1980: 2) argues that '[t]he raids on the west... can be seen... as part of the critical

changes leading to and stemming from the foundation of a state in the area', and that '[t]he Viking

raiders set out intentionally to acquire this wealth in western Europe at a time when trade

diminished or when they were keeping up large and efficient military forces, as occurred in about

1000, and this accompanied the process of state formation. Thus warfare became an alternative

economic strategy'(Randsborg 1980: 5). Hodges (1989: 182) comes to the same conclusion, arguing

that the '...impetus for the formation of the Viking state in Denmark appears to have come from the

26

demise of the second phase of Arabic trade to the Baltic', with Sweyn's raids on England intended to

generate capital to underwrite the transition to a regionalized market economy (Hodges 1989: 178-

183). Ironically, by the Medieval period, the sovereign's dependence upon the social and economic

sectors engendered by this socioeconomic transformation undermined the ability to organize and

conduct raids of wealth-extraction simply by royal fiat (Randsborg 1980: 7).

Similar strategies were evidently utilized in earlier periods. King Gudfred, for example,

secured power around 800 by force of arms (Randsborg 1980: 14), and this military superiority

subsequently ensured an inflow of wealth by both plunder and taxation, as well as providing a

bulwark against incursions by foreign powers. Some proportion of this wealth must have been

channelled directly into the hands of Gudfred's warriors themselves, a steady flow of pay being

necessary for the maintenance of an army's fighting ability, to say nothing of its loyalty. Randsborg

(1980: 15) suggests that revenues may have been insufficient to support the growth of the military

around this time in response to Carolingian expansion, leading to the implementation of feudal-style

land grants. Gaimster (1991: 121) notes that the increasing frequency of indigenous coins in 10th-

century hoards coincides with the reign of Harald Bluetooth and the incorporation of the Jelling

kingdom, and the concomitant period of militarization. The rise of a professional soldier class

would necessitate some degree of economic reorganization, and Samson (1991b: 133) contends that

'[h]oarding ended because the main source of political power changed. Land and estates were the

source of power, not territories and followers.' This development appears similar to the process of

'feudalism from below' described by Saunders (1995: 33-34), in which the subordination of the

general populace to an elite military class, itself owing service to a central ruling authority,

effectively reproduced that ruler's power at all levels of society, facilitating the formation of a state.

It must be kept in mind that all characterizations of the extent of authority of Danish rulers

that come to us from contemporary Viking Age sources come from outside Denmark itself, and may

not accurately represent the internal political situation. Bencard (1981: 24) notes, for example, that

27

the late 10th-century letters of immunity issued to Danish bishoprics by the German Emperor were

likely more representative of ecclesiastical administrative norms than actual German sovereignty

over some part of Denmark. However, it has been suggested on the basis of archaeological evidence

that the Danish territories were in fact united under a single ruler as far back as the early 8th

century. The Kanhave Canal bisecting Samsø has been dendrochronologically dated to 726, and

Olsen (1989: 15) argues that it must have served a military function, facilitating the rapid

deployment throughout the Kattegat maritime region of a fleet kept in the eastern harbour.

Likewise, he suggests that the foundation of the Danevirke around 737, as well as its further

fortification by Gudfred circa 808, would have been beyond the capacity of a ruler with only

localized powers (Olsen 1989: 13-14). He hypothesizes that the evident formation of a Danish 'state'

at this early date was '...above all an act with the aim of solving a growing security problem for the

inhabitants of the petty kingdoms around the Kattegat', caused by developments in shipbuilding

technology that enabled fast oversea travel, expanding the potential range of seafaring raids (Olsen

1989: 17-18). Thus, '...it was no longer sufficient for the petty kings to be on good terms with the

nearest neighbors of their kingdom. They had to conclude treaties of peace and mutual protection

with a larger number of kings in Denmark. In the course of time this led to amalgamation of

kingdoms...', either through diplomacy or conquest (Olsen 1989: 19).

The nature of the historical sources produces a vague, sometimes contradictory, picture of

Denmark's internal political organization during the period under discussion. Isolated references are

made to putative kings, but the actual extent of their remit, and relationships among them, is often

unclear. As Olsen (1989: 7) notes, '...many of the Viking leaders who raided in France, and were

called "kings" by the Frankish chroniclers.... were either pretenders to the throne in their homeland

or dethroned Scandinavian kings in exile....' For example, the entry for 811 in the Royal Frankish

Annals makes reference to twelve 'magnates' of the Danes, but the degree to which any of them

were autonomous or subordinate to a higher authority is unclear (Thurston 1997: 245). The likely

28

12th-century Roskilde Chronicle, addressing this period, claims that Denmark at different times had

one, two, or five kings. Olsen (1989: 10-11) suggests that provincial divisions recorded in the 13th

century likely reflect earlier independent kingdoms, and that the 9th-century account of Wulfstan

referring to an independent king of the island of Bornholm may reflect an even greater profusion of

kingdoms. Horik, son of Gudfred, acceded around 827, and the Vita Ansgari claims he was the first

king of all the Danes, but there is no independent evidence for this (Skovgaard-Petersen 2003: 173).

In any case, he rose to power not through direct succession, but by expelling a king Harald Klak,

who had himself previously been coregnant with his brothers Reginfrid and Hemming after the

defeat of Gudfred's nephew Sigifrid following the death of Gudfred's son, Hemming I (Royal

Frankish Annals 812; 827). By 873, the German king was negotiating with two kings in Denmark

(Skovgaard-Petersen 2003: 174). Adam of Bremen claims that a Swedish dynasty claimed

hegemony in the Hedeby region for three generations around 900, and this is corroborated by two

runic inscriptions. A series of strongholds were constructed around 981 at Fyrkat, Aggersborg,

Nonnebakken, and Trelleborg, and Skovgaard-Petersen (2003: 175) suggests that the

contemporaneous initiation of these projects, their geographical dispersal, and structural similarity

among the sites all suggest that they were commissioned by a single party with the power to

command resources throughout Denmark, lending credibility to Harald's claim to have won all of

Denmark. A charter of Knud (Canute IV) from 1085 outlines some of the powers of the Danish king

in relation to military organization and law enforcement, including the levying of a national naval

defence and the issuing of fines for refusing such a summons or otherwise violating the peace,

though the precise antiquity of those powers is uncertain (Skovgaard-Petersen 2003: 181-182).

Bendixen (1981: 76) suggests that a mint at Hedeby may well have been instituted by

Gudfred after he relocated the merchants of Reric there in 808. Like Ribe, described below,

Randsborg (1980: 90) suggests that Hedeby's evidently planned layout and defensive structures

likely reflect administrative control by a central authority. Hedeager (1994: 139) notes that royal

29

control of a trade centre could ensure that neutral transactions took place free of coercion, which the

presiding ruler could then profit from via tolls. The implementation of a mint at a town like Hedeby

would facilitate mercantile trade and the collection of taxes therefrom by whoever controlled it

(Bendixen 1981b: 407). Olsen (1989: 16) argues that the evident prosperity of towns such as

Hedeby signals the successful internal pacification of Denmark under a single authority, freeing it

from violent competition among regional overlords. In post-unification Denmark, and elsewhere in

10th-century Scandinavia, royal interests at trading centres were typically overseen by specially

appointed commissioners responsible for ensuring public order and collecting taxes (Jankuhn 1982:

37, 42). Commerce was also facilitated by royally administered road- and bridge-building projects.

However, Hyenstrand (1985: 65-66) has suggested that state-level authority is already implied by

the organization of labour and technical knowledge required for large-scale, long-distance trade and

the extraction of natural resources, as were evident from early periods. Similarly, Metcalf (1984:

162) argues that the domination of late 8th-century currency in Jylland by what he suggests is an

indigenous coinage '...implies firm political control of the currency, since it seems inescapable that,

for much of the period during which sceattas were in use, foreign money was reminted on arrival.'

Numismatic correlations would allow for the earliest phases of Ribe to be placed in the first

half of the 8th century, and this dating is reinforced by dendrochronological and pottery

thermoluminescence evidence (Bendixen 1981: 76; 1984: 152). Pieces of wood from barrel staves

recovered from a well contemporary with the initial marketplace level have been dated to 704 and

707, and were evidently deposited soon after felling, based on their state of preservation (Bencard

and Jørgensen 1990: 580). Williams (2007: 186) suggests that the dating of a significant phase of

construction on the Danevirke to the early 8th century could support the attribution of the so-called

'series X' sceattas to a mint at Ribe during that period. The undertaking of a major engineering

project suggests the presence of a centralized authority in the region which commanded sufficient

resources to have established a mint as well. Frandsen and Jensen (1987: 189) make a similar

30

inference regarding the probability that Ribe was, from its inception, a centrally planned settlement,

based on the contemporaneous construction of the Danevirke, as well as the Kanhavekanal on

Samsø. Thurston (1997: 245-246), however, argues that while the correlation of towns with such

construction projects indicates increased sociopolitical complexity, it does not necessarily imply

state-level centralization that transcended localities. It seems possible, however, that localized

political centralization could have developed at this early date, with socioeconomic

complexification motivated, sustained, and guided by a hierarchical authority. Bencard and

Jørgensen (1990: 582) note that Alcuin's Vita Willibrordi places Willibrord at the court of a Danish

king Ongendus (Angantyr) somewhere along the western coast of Jutland between 690 and 714, and

they suggest that this king may have been Ribe's founder.

Feveile (1994: 93) notes that the 1993 excavations revealed a base layer of sand covering at

least 10000 square meters, deposited prior to the beginning of the marketplace phases, implying the

deployment of manpower and resources on a scale suggestive of royal control. Craft activity at the

site appears to be largely of a luxury character, including glass, bronze, and amber media, as well as

production of gaming pieces, combs, and ironwork (Frandsen and Jensen 1987: 187). This would

seem to imply the presence of an elite consumer class for such products, either in the immediate

vicinity or accessible via commercial networks sufficiently busy to support such manufacturing.

Indeed, certain pottery types, Rhenish glass, and basalt quernstones at the site reflect international

contacts, while at the same time the style of bronze and glass items manufactured on-site are

characteristic of local types, suggesting that their intended market was within the region, rather than

abroad (Frandsen and Jensen 1987: 188). Still, Ribe's foundation in the first decade of the 8th

century coincides with the evidently planned reorganization of Dorestad and Hamwih, as well as the

founding or reorganization of Quentovic, Ipswich, and York, and Bencard and Jørgensen (1990:

581-582) interpret this series of sites as '...a trading network linking the northwest European realms.'

Andrén (1989: 590) suggests that early urban industries, including minting, '...should probably be

31

regarded as an expression of the royal and ecclesiastical need of "necessary articles", which were

mandatory in order to maintain and justify the new supremacy.' As Olsen (1989: 14-15) argues,

'...there is little doubt that the crafts and trade in Ribe could only thrive because of active support

from the king and due to the protection he - and only he - could offer the foreign merchants during

their stay in Denmark and passage through Danish waters. In return for this protection the king

could claim tolls and taxes from the travelling men....' The 1993 excavations delineated an

enclosing ditch at the site, with dimensions of approximately 105 by 125 meters, and finds from its

base giving a 9th-century terminus post quem (Feveile 1994: 96-97). Ribe is known to have been

fortified by some time in the 10th century, and Feveile (1994: 98) suggests this may be attributable

to a general program of fortification undertaken by a Danish-Abrodite alliance against the Franks in

817.

While Ribe's initial settlement layer appears devoid of any trade or industrial activity, the

subsequent layers evince relatively uninterrupted mercantile and workshop activity (Frandsen and

Jensen 1987: 177-178). Significantly for the question of centralized authority in the region, and its

possible relationship to the establishment of Ribe, except for a brief hiatus in the early 8th century

the workshop zone appears to respect the boundary expressed by a ditch which persists through the

phases uncovered during the 1985-86 excavation (Frandsen and Jensen 1987: 178). The

marketplace, organized into discrete plots, was evidently of significant size, extending more than

150 meters along one of its axes (Feveile 1994: 95). Bencard (1988: 225) agrees that the ditch is

evidently not a later excavation, but rather an intentional void maintained throughout the site's

period of activity, and notes that similar ditches appeared in the 1975 excavations. Frandsen and

Jensen (1987: 187) argue that '[t]he phenomenon of the division into areas being maintained

through approximately a hundred years is best explained through the presence of some permanent

authority, which must also have been able to ensure the peace of the marketplace and access to and

from the site. It is also reasonable to conceive that the trade and craft activities might have spawned

32

a permanent settlement which gradually evolved into a true Viking-period town.' Bencard and

Jørgensen (1990: 582) argue that the evident demarcation of Ribe's marketplace into discrete plots

indicates an intention to collect rents from their occupants, and hence the party responsible for the

site's organization was in a position to do so, a king or overlord commanding some coercive power.

Based on the 1990-91 excavations, Feveile and Jensen (2000: 22) identify signs of more

permanent buildings in the marketplace by no later than 790-800, though the 1985-86 work

produced no signs of substantial construction, possibly indicating a zone of periodic or seasonal

occupation (Frandsen and Jensen 1987: 187). Bencard (1988: 226), however, argues that signs of

such transitory occupation layers would have eroded within a year if not covered relatively soon

after abandonment, and thus that each of the workshop phases identified by Frandsen and Jensen

represents only a single period of market activity, with the entire sequence covering no more than

five years. He argues further that the intra-site ditch could not have remained intact for the century

or so suggested by Frandsen and Jensen, due to the sandy soil of the Ribe plain. Finally, he

questions the chronology Frandsen and Jensen infer from artefact typologies (Bencard 1988: 227),

but while they accept a degree of ambivalence regarding the dating of brooches from the site, they

maintain that typological changes evident in the overall assemblage reflect a time span of at least a

century (Frandsen and Jensen 1988: 288-289). While the alternating layers of the workshop phases

are suggestive of periodic activity, one particular plot was found to contain a series of identical

brooch moulds over four successive layers, possibly indicating that some craftsman had staked a

semi-permanent claim to that spot, to which he returned year after year (Bencard and Jørgensen

1990: 581). Also, wattle-and-daub fragments, as well as evidence of weaving such as loom weights

and mature sheep bones, suggest some degree of permanent settlement nearby.

The question of a motivation for the founding of Ribe is closely tied to the question of a

definition of 'town' or 'urbanization'. Andrén (1989: 588) notes that the Icelandic sagas record

Norwegian kings founding towns for the express purpose of establishing their control over various

33

regions. If we require a town to feature administrative institutions serving a ruling power, then

documentary evidence implying that Ribe had something of the sort does not appear until the 9th

century when Horik alienates some of his land there for Ansgar's church. However, even if Ribe

was established purely as a locus of economic exploitation, it has been argued, as noted above and

following, that control over the economy is often inextricably linked to political power. It seems

probable that any royal authority at Ribe would have extended to its hinterland, as Andrén (1989:

591) has argued that even as late as the early Medieval period, towns were not yet conceived of as

units distinct from the surrounding countryside, with royal control exercised irrespective of

population density or precise demographic distribution.

Economic Anthropology

The interpretation of 'primitive' economic systems can be approached from one of two

basically opposed positions. Whereas the formalist school sees primitive economies as

comprehensible within modern microeconomic theory, the substantivist school proposes that such a

hermeneutic framework is incompatible with what they see as a fundamentally gift-based system of

exchange (Hodges 1989: 14). The formalist approach seeks to analyse exchanges in terms of

concepts of supply and demand, and rational, profit-oriented decision making (Samson 1991: 88).

To apply such a framework to pre-capitalist societies, economic goals must be understood to

include the creation and maintenance of social relationships. The substantivist approach, in contrast,

maintains that processes of exchange cannot be analysed as an independent social sphere (Samson

1991: 90). Transactions are predicated by social relationships, as well as serving to establish and

mediate them, and often take place in order to renegotiate positions when the relative statuses of

parties have changed.

Samson (1991: 91) argues that whereas socially-embedded modes of exchange such as gift-

giving or theft call for reciprocity or retaliation respectively, the neutral exchange of a commodity

neither requires nor engenders a particular type of persisting relationship. With this premise, it could

34

be suggested that the transition from a gift- to a market-based economy implies a depersonalization

of the public sphere, which Goody (1977: 16) suggests is a precondition for the development of

complex state structures. Society becomes dependent upon the enforceable authority of a

hierarchical power rather than traditional moral obligations to maintain its coherence. While

increasing social complexity may dissolve bonds of personal obligation between authority figures

and the public, some superficially economic transactions remain embedded within a tacit social

contract, such as the expectation that certain services will be provided to the public in exchange for

their payment of taxes. As Gaimster (1991: 122) notes, '[i]f conflicts and social obligations were

earlier solved through the circulation of special media such as the arm-rings, these were now solved

by payment in cash and involved a central administration.'

'Neutral' transactions still took account of the social relationships between parties. The

refusal of an exchange by a social inferior could result in a loss of status for the superior party,

which might be circumvented through the violent seizure of the desired commodity, and '[t]he

greater the social distance between parties, the more neutral or negative the form of exchange. Thus

foreigners or outsiders might be robbed or killed with general approval...'(Samson 1991: 93). This

suggests an interesting parallel, where just as socially predicated exchange eventually transitions to

a system of market transactions, forcible extraction of wealth is replaced by asymmetrical trading

partnerships. As Hedeager (1994: 132) argues, transactions between socially unequal parties were

essentially conflicted. The more powerful party would attempt to maintain its position by avoiding

entering into an obligation to the less powerful, and could do so either by seeking a neutral

exchange or through coercive extraction. This logic may elucidate the way in which Vikings

conceived of the raids they undertook. Foreigners were only to be coerced, their valuables traded

for their lives, both of which were otherwise forfeit. They existed outside the system of reciprocal

social relations, effectively without status and not even potentially to be entered into obligation to.

Vestergaard (1991: 101) notes how the failure of reciprocal exchange can bring about social

35

breakdown, with the 'negative exchange' expressed in the narrative of the Volsunga cycle resulting

in theft, murder, and hoarding. Hoarding, then, likely had negative connotations in a gift economy,

just as it is antithetical to a purely market-based economy. In each the practice stifles exchange,

though the moral implication of this may have been more pronounced in the former. Fichter (1979:

249) argues that the narrative of the Auðunar Þáttr Vestfirka expresses the social functionality of

gift-giving in Viking-Age Scandinavia. In the story, Harald's evaluation of Svein's reciprocal gift in

response to Audun's suggests a normative system governing appropriate action in the exchange of

gifts (Fichter 1979: 251). The transactions that occur within the storyline conform to the three

phases of exchange; gift, acceptance, and repayment; comprising Marcel Mauss's principle of

reciprocity, and the expressions of gratitude accompanying each party's receipt of a gift indicates

the social, rather than purely material, nature of the exchanges occurring (Fichter 1979: 252).

Audun's interaction with Svein demonstrates the expectation that a gift, in this case hospitality,

should be gratefully accepted, and that failure to do so constitutes a breach of the social contract;

only a sufficiently 'valuable' excuse can effectively discharge the guest's obligation (Fichter 1979:

254). Conversely, the interaction between Audun and Aki, Svein's steward, demonstrates the

presence of a parallel transactional system characterized by bargaining for advantage, and the

consequences of failure to distinguish it from gift exchange (Fichter 1979: 256). Aki's attempt at

quantitative gain is in opposition to the normal functioning of the gift exchange relationship, and in

fact interferes with it, resulting in his dishonour and dismissal.

Both the Hávamál and the 13th-century Gulþing Law stipulate that gifts are to be

reciprocated (Hedeager 1994: 132). A gift, by definition, had to be given voluntarily, but society's

cohesion depended upon such transactions actually taking place, effectively making them

obligatory. Wealth in a gift economy was essentially a matter of social status; material objects were

merely the means by which this effective wealth was negotiated. As individuals and households

within a gift-economy society negotiated their positions relative to their peers, the means of

36

negotiation, treasure, ultimately had to be acquired from outside that system (Hedeager 1994: 133).

Negotiation within a prestige system is a zero-sum game, so any increase in one party's status that

does not result in a loss of status for another must be based upon resources drawn from outside the

system. It was those near the top of the social hierarchy who were responsible for this external

wealth-extraction, as they had the means to do so, and maintaining or improving their positions

depended upon it (Lund 1989: 52-53).

Karl Polanyi characterized three different systems by which commodities can be exchanged:

reciprocity between symmetrical groups or subunits within them; appropriation and redistribution

by a centralized administration; and a supply-and-demand based market system (Hodges1989: 14).

George Dalton and Paul Bohannan discuss the variable relationship between the operation of the

'market principle' of rational choice, competition, and supply and demand, and the presence of

markets as sites of exchange in a society: a society may lack both; markets may be present, but non-

integrated and non-essential; or a society may operate having fully internalized the market principle

(Hodges 1989: 15). Timothy Earle in turn typologizes systems of redistribution in terms of their

socioeconomic context: a system in which a levelling mechanism, such as the potlach, serves to

counteract the accumulation of wealth; pooling of domestic products; allocation of goods from

cooperative labour; and the appropriation of goods and labour by an elite (Hodges 1989: 14).

Hodges (1989: 23) classifies urban communities in terms of their relationship to commerce: ports of

trade, which offer foreign traders organized security, storage of goods, and a judicial authority;

gateways, which develop at points of transit between distinct cultural geographic regions, linking

those regions to an external trade route; and market-places, either integrated or not as defined by

Dalton and Bohannan, which may coincide with the port and/or gateway.

In a gift economy, trade centres serve as places for utilitarian commodities to be exchanged

for prestige goods, and vice versa (Hedeager 1994: 142). For example, Saunders (1995: 37) argues

that the system of tributary kingship in early Anglo-Saxon England, reliant upon personal alliances

37

secured through gifts, motivated rulers to establish emporia where they could control access to

those prestige goods. Thurborg (1988: 319-320), referring to Viking-Age Scandinavia, concurs that

'...the control of circulation and the existence of systems of exchange forming a continuous function

within society must be stressed. It is within these systems, and largely within the upper social strata,

that we find Viking Age silver.' Hedeager argues that the need for an objective valuation of

commodities in this type of system set the stage for the transition to a capitalist economy, with

towns facilitating both types of transactions (1994: 143-144). While the exchange of prestige goods

secures political relationships among elites, commodities extracted through tribute and redistributed

through forms of conspicuous consumption such as feasting maintain bonds between the elite and

their social subordinates. Hedeager suggests that the party responsible for founding Ribe, located so

as to be connected to the network of similar sites along the North Sea coasts, may have done so in

order to ensure access to the goods vital to maintaining their political position.

Marxist theory explains social stratification in terms of differential control of, and access to,

the means of commodity production , with variant class structures determined by different modes of

production (Smith 1976: 309). Smith (1976: 310) proposes a corollary whereby '[s]tratification is

seen to result from differential access to or control over the means of exchange; and variation in

stratification systems is related to types of exchange between producers and nonproducers as they

affect and are affected by the spatial distribution of the elite and the level of commercialization in

the region and beyond.' In other words, whereas stratification depends upon differential control over

a key resource, this control may be maintained via the power to regulate the system under which

that resource is exchanged (Smith 1976: 311). As posited by Sanderson above, Smith (1976: 311)

also notes that such control may be guaranteed by means of coercive force.

Smith's argument is predicated upon an agrarian socioeconomic system, but it seems equally

applicable to systems in which material wealth takes less utilitarian, more socially-mediated forms.

In either case, surplus commodities, whether labour, rent in kind, or money, are extracted from a

38

subordinate producing class by an elite class with control over the means of production, whether

land or the minting of coinage (Saunders 1995: 32-33). For example, Williams (2007: 180) notes

that rulers could insist upon the use of coinage for certain functions. The coercive potential of a

centralized authority may allow it to extract surplus value from its subordinates via taxation, and

furthermore to determine what form those taxes take. Therefore, if that authority demands taxes be

rendered in a standardized coinage of its own minting, it can effectively control the form and

movement of real wealth within society. For instance, Pepin of Herstal's implementation of a silver

standard was likely intended to assert control over minting, inter alia, and coincided with his

recapture of Dorestad and its mint around 680 (Hodges 1989: 40).

The socio-psychological power of the mint should not be overlooked, however, as '...simply

issuing coins at all could be seen as an expression of the legitimacy of an individual ruler's

kingship'(Williams 2007: 180). Gaimster (1991: 121) notes that during the early 11th-century reigns

of Cnut and Harthacnut, while there were a greater number of mints in the western core of the

Danish kingdom, a greater volume of minting took place in the east, likely reflecting the role of a

regulated coinage in establishing royal authority in remote provinces. Conversely, the limited 10th-

century distribution of Danish coinage may indicate the limited scope of royal authority at that time

(Williams 2007: 190). Hedeager (1994: 140) notes that Harald Klak's alliance with the Franks

around 815, and Harald's ultimate exile from Denmark by the sons of Gudfred in 827, can be seen

reflected in contemporary coins issued at Hedeby. Coins from Harald's reign feature Frankish

symbolism, only to be replaced by typically Scandinavian imagery under Gudfred's sons. Similarly,

he suggests that the cessation of minting for around fifty years in the middle of the 9th century was

not due to a stagnation in trade, but rather a reduced need for symbolic political expression in the

face of a weakened Frankish state.

In any case, while some early mintings were likely motivated primarily by concerns of

demonstrating and reinforcing political power, especially in eastern Denmark, others, such as the

39

8th-century sceattas and anonymous Scandinavian coinages from sites including Ribe, Birka, and

Hedeby, correlate with centres of trade (Gaimster 2007: 124). Hodges (1989: 41) suggests that

Pepin III's 8th-century monetary reform may have been partially motivated by a desire to stimulate

long-distance trade, and that increased Rhenish-Baltic trade from the late 8th century may have

been a result of Charlemagne's silver revaluation (1989: 43). Sindbaek (2007: 128) has argued that

while the operation of early Viking trade centres was of concern to political powers, their

maintenance and security appear to have been ensured by the interdependence of the traders

working at such places, rather than any central authority. As a corollary, the apparent hierarchy

among these sites resulted from considerations of efficiency in the movement of people and goods,

and not necessarily a political power differential. Jankuhn (1982: 40) notes that merchant

cooperatives did organize armed protection against Viking raids, but also draws attention to

protective measures taken by local rulers. The role of hierarchic authorities in protecting

commercial interests may be evinced by the rampart and ditch defences constructed at trade sites

beginning in the 10th century (Jankuhn 1982: 42).

Sanderson (1999: 53) outlines an evolutionary sociopolitical typology which relates

differentiation of social power and organization of economic resources. He characterizes the 'band'

as operating under a hunter-gatherer subsistence economy, with informal leaders lacking any

effective coercive power, and egalitarian resource allocation making use of the above-mentioned

redistributive levelling mechanisms (Sanderson 1999: 54). This stage is succeeded by the 'tribe',

featuring a degree of egalitarianism similar to the band, but in an agricultural/pastoral economy,

with communities linked by non-hierarchical ceremonial or kinship relations. Next comes the

'chiefdom', in which a central authority holds power over several communities, and social status

differentials correspond to real differences in effective power and material privilege (Sanderson

1999: 54-55). The prevailing sociopolitical organization of late Iron-Age Scandinavia may have

fallen somewhere between the tribe and chiefdom. Tacitus's 1st-century Germania, encompassing

40

the region, indicates small, competing chiefdoms that participated in the exchange of prestige

goods, formed temporary alliances against external threats, and featured levelling mechanisms in

the form of both conspicuous consumption and occasional regicide (Thurston 1997: 243-244).

Sanderson (1999: 56-57) sees the chiefdom as a necessary precursor of the 'state', which is '...a form

of sociopolitical organization that has achieved a monopoly over the means of violence within a

specified territory...', meaning the governing apparatus is effectively unassailable. In terms of the

allocation of economic resources, the state is much like the chiefdom, with a ruling class capable of

extracting and redistributing privately generated wealth, though unlike the chiefdom, the

administrative institutions of the state are largely depersonalized and independent of kinship

relations. Significantly for the classification of sociopolitical structures in pre-unification Denmark,

this definition of the state is independent of geographical scope. Thus, administrative structures may

be morphologically similar to those of trans-regional systems of political power, while being

geographically limited in scope.

Smith (1976: 313) argues that '[d]ifferent types of exchange and distribution are not all

equally compatible with different spatial distributions of the elite.... [so] one should be able to

predict the spatial distribution of the elite from the organization and spatial extension of the

distribution system.' In uncommercialized systems of direct exchange between producers and

consumers, '[t]he size of the systems is determined by the distance over which the elite can control

the distribution of the scarce resource'(Smith 1976: 323). Indeed, the development of commerce

may begin to '...alleviate the scarcity that empowers the elite'(Smith 1976: 323). In light of this, it is

interesting to note that Randsborg (1980: 75) argues that Viking-Age Denmark lacked geographical

centralization of power, and that '...the king and his followers, as well as the central administration,

were traveling at regular intervals to carry out their tasks....' This could potentially have mitigated

some of the spatial constraints on their ability to exercise economic control.

Smith (1976:323) argues that the slow penetration of the capitalist mode of exchange in pre-

41

commercial systems is attributable to elite concerns for maintaining a power differential, because

'[w]hile low productivity, thus assured [by elite controls], prevents the development of a large

retainer class or bureaucracy that might allow the elite to extend their span of control over a more

diverse, more productive system, the dangers of commerce are more certain', and '[c]ommerce will

develop only when further scarcities make the closed polyadic arrangement unviable.' In other

words, market freedom increases in direct relation to the inefficiency of direct administration,

which itself increases proportionally to the scale of the elite class (Smith 1976: 334). Recalling the

emphasis placed on a monopolization of organized violence for the development of complex

socioeconomic systems, Smith suggests that '...political administrators are likely to allow a

marketing system to evolve in politically secure regions when commerce cannot erode elite powers,

most likely when the technology of weaponry and the organization of military force is developed

enough that smaller groups with their own localized economic resources have no means by which to

compete with or remain independent from a centralized state apparatus.'

As demonstrated above, the heads of hierarchical power structures may establish or

appropriate mercantile centres in order to reinforce the control over certain resources upon which

their differential status depends. As Smith (1976: 334-335) suggests, '[t]he marketing system is an

organ of the state when markets and the bureaucracy are concentrated in a few administrative

centres, and the much smaller class than the peasantry, the merchant-artisans, is policed.' Andrén

(1989: 590) argues that '[t]he economic life of towns should probably be viewed as a kind of

consuming economy, closely connected with those institutions and persons that exercised the new

sovereignty.' The administrative authorities '...can call forth the necessary surplus from the

peasantry by controlling monopolies over some goods and services that peasants need...'(Smith

1976: 335), not least of which may be public safety. Once control over the media of exchange is

established, possibly by minting and regulating - and insisting on payments with - a standardized

coinage, '...it is "the market" rather than direct tribute collection that gathers surplus from the

42

peasantry'(Smith 1976: 336). As suggested above, surplus extraction at Ribe may have taken the

form of taxes on a population of merchants attracted by the promise of a secure location to practice

their trades.

Fully commercialized systems come into being when '...administrative control over trade in

partially commercialized systems has slipped...'(Smith 1976: 353). Such a system is characterized

by '[c]ompetitive, redistributive trade in rural environs, articulated by high-level market towns

without administrative function, [which] assists the rural producers in specialization and

intensification of production by providing them with necessities dependably and at cheap enough

prices that they can forego producing their own'(Smith 1976: 354), in an interesting parallel to the

urban production of 'necessary articles' for the elite noted above by Andrén. 'If the competitive rural

marketing arrangement develops at roughly the same time that major administrative and

commercial centers also arise... a rural gentry class... will be maintained... involved in local-level

governance and commerce'(Smith 1976: 355). This pattern of development is very similar to the

model suggested by Hodges (1989: 50) for the evolution of emporia, which he defines as

'...primarily attributes of dendritic central-place systems. As long as those systems operated, their

archaeologically most articulate manifestation is the emporia. When they failed to operate, some of

the sites necessarily declined to a level consistent with the regional pattern of settlement, while

some... appear to have been maintained as regional administrative centres.' As their role in the long-

distance trade of prestige goods waned, emporia could continue to function in the local economy

(Hodges 1989: 52), and tended to transition into the capitalistic mode of exchange in the 10th and

11th centuries (Hodges 1989: 171). 'As resources from which commercial advantage might stem are

put into motion by the penetration of the market mechanism throughout, no one of the old estates

controls them; any entrepreneur with capital enough can exploit the opportunities that come his

way'(Smith 1976: 355).

Smith (1976: 317) proposes a typology of exchange types and their correlated levels of

43

commerce and sociopolitical organization. Briefly, they are uncommercial dyadic direct exchange

within 'tribal' societies, uncommercial polyadic direct exchange within 'chiefdoms' or 'feudal'

societies, partially commercialized administered markets in early states, partially commercialized

monopolistic markets operating peripheral to 'modern' economies, and commercialized competitive

markets in 'modern' economic systems. A political-economic system featuring commercialized

exchange, directly or indirectly administered by a hierarchical authority, is often included in

characterizations of the sociopolitical formation called the 'state'. As Randsborg (1980: 8) suggests,

'[i]n states wealth and surpluses of production are of special importance because a market economy

usually exists'(Randsborg 1980: 8).

Randsborg (1980: 7) argues that '...within an economically related, and usually

homogeneous, zone, the presence of a type of society with a high consumption of resources, like the

state, inevitably involves neighbors in a process of trade, warfare, etc.', thus transforming the

socioeconomic structures involved. As noted above, Randsborg suggests that the changing

socioeconomic considerations of the early unified Danish state brought about the eventual cessation

of the era of Viking expeditions. He argues that Denmark had less capacity for long-distance

influence as a state than it did in its earlier, less integrated form (Randsborg 1980: 10). The

localized, self-sufficient economies of the Viking Age could support military ventures abroad,

whereas an extensive intra-state commercial system demanding high surplus production could not.

Hodges (1989: 105) argues that market economies are predicated by state-formation. The

circulation of coinage, in that case, should be interpreted as an indication of long-distance trade,

rather than necessarily the presence of a market system, as it antedates other evidence of state-level

structures. Metcalf (2007: 2) makes a similar argument regarding the use of coins in 8th-century

England, observing that it does not appear to correlate with overall prosperity or political

centralization, instead being '...significantly linked with long-distance or inter-regional trade.' The

transition to a commercial market comes about, Hodges (1989: 188) argues, because the

44

hierarchization of society implied by state formation obsolesces the levelling mechanism of

redistributive exchange required by chiefdoms. Saunders (1995: 31), too, argues that '...the

transformation of kinship-based tributary social structures into structures grounded on feudal social

relations', and thus into increasingly complex, state-level formations, was a cause, rather than effect,

of changing patterns of trade.

III. Data and Analysis

Methodology

As outlined above, it has been widely argued that increasing sociopolitical complexity and

hierarchization correlate with the development of a centrally-controlled system of neutral economic

exchange. That type of system appears to be represented in Viking-Age Denmark by the circulation

of standardized, indigenously minted coinage. In order to re-evaluate the organization of political

and economic structures in this period based on these assumptions, I have drawn upon as exhaustive

and up-to-date a collection as possible of published data concerning archaeological evidence for

economic activity in this period. By applying this expanded pool of data to an interpretive model

based on the assumed correlations between economic and sociopolitical organization, new light can

be cast on some of the historical and interpretive ambiguities exposed in the preceding overview.

Where there are gaps in the historical record, it may be possible make inferences about

sociopolitical organization based on what the archaeological evidence appears to tell us about

contemporary economic organization. The data relating specifically to the Ribe region has been

analysed independently, in order to provide a case study of the structural developments within an

early, long-lasting centre of trade. Data from three other securely-identified find zones have also

been included for comparison.

To answer questions about the internal economic organization of Viking-Age Denmark, and

its implications for contemporary political structures, I have examined the evidence represented by

numismatics and precious-metal hoards from the early 8th through late 11th centuries. The early 8th

45

century makes for a convenient starting point, as it coincides approximately with the establishment

of Ribe, and precedes the establishment of similar large-scale works likely indicative of centralized

planning, such as Hedeby's resettlement with the merchant population of Reric in 808, and the

construction of a region-wide series of strongholds around 980. Geographically, I have included the

full extent of the kingdom of Denmark as it existed by the end of this period, namely Jylland, the

eastern islands, and the southern tip of present-day Sweden. Due to the relative scarcity and

irregular distribution of the types of archaeological material I am studying, as well as my reliance

on available published sources and the practical constraints on my research, I have sampled the data

in a nonprobablistic way, including all finds records that I could reasonably access. Due to these

limitations, it is impossible to claim that the data presented here are an accurate representation of

the actual quantities of materials in circulation during any given period, or changes therein. All

interpretations are thus necessarily speculative and limited.

46

regional location find context, date deposition date find associations date minted mint type(s) present # # die-duplicates notecited in

Aalborg Klostermark, Jylland 1837 find >= 970-975 hoard ~900 x brooch pin ? 1 x Skovmand 1942Aalborg Klostermark, Jylland 1837 find >= 970-975 hoard ~900 x head of small Thor's hammer 1 x Skovmand 1942Aalborg Klostermark, Jylland 1837 find >= 970-975 hoard <= 970 ? Kufic 41 x Skovmand 1942Aalborg Klostermark, Jylland 1837 find >= 970-975 hoard ~958-975 ? Kufic 2 x Skovmand 1942Aalborg Klostermark, Jylland 1837 find >= 970-975 hoard ~900 x non-numismatic silver (2 whole, 8 broken bars) 10 x Skovmand 1942Aalborg Klostermark, Jylland 1837 find >= 970-975 hoard ~900 x non-numismatic silver (arm-band fragment) 1 x Skovmand 1942Aalborg Klostermark, Jylland 1837 find >= 970-975 hoard ~900 x non-numismatic silver (band) 1 x Skovmand 1942Aalborg Klostermark, Jylland 1837 find >= 970-975 hoard ~900 x non-numismatic silver (broken rods) 16 x Skovmand 1942Aalborg Klostermark, Jylland 1837 find >= 970-975 hoard ~900 x non-numismatic silver (oval bead) 1 x Skovmand 1942Aalborg Klostermark, Jylland 1837 find >= 970-975 hoard ~900 x non-numismatic silver (ring fragments) 5 x Skovmand 1942Aalborg Klostermark, Jylland 1837 find >= 970-975 hoard ~800-900 x non-numismatic silver (ring fragments) 43 x Skovmand 1942Bjerregrav, Jylland ? >= 1080-1086 hoard 1080-1086 ? Danish 33 x Skovmand 1942Bonderup, Skibby, Zealand ? >= 1056 hoard ? ? Anglo-Saxon 93 x Stiesdal 1968Bonderup, Skibby, Zealand ? >= 1056 hoard ? ? Danish 892 x Stiesdal 1968Bonderup, Skibby, Zealand ? >= 1056 hoard ? ? German 350 x Stiesdal 1968Bonderup, Skibby, Zealand ? >= 1056 hoard ? ? Norwegian 2 x Stiesdal 1968Bovlund, Jylland ? >= 942-54 hoard ~895-954 ? Kufic 39 x Skovmand 1942Dankirke, s.w. Jylland ? multiple Dorestad Merovingian denarius 2 2 Bencard 1981; Bendixen 1984Dankirke, s.w. Jylland ? multiple ~725 Kent ?/Mercia ? English 1 x Bencard 1981; Bendixen 1984Dankirke, s.w. Jylland ? multiple ~725 ? English 1 x Bencard 1981; Bendixen 1984Dankirke, s.w. Jylland ? multiple ~725-750 ? Frisian porcupine 1 x Bencard 1981; Bendixen 1984Dankirke, s.w. Jylland ? multiple early 8th c. ? Frisian runic 2 x Bencard 1981; Bendixen 1984Dankirke, s.w. Jylland ? multiple late 7th c. Dorestad Merovingian triens 1 x Bencard 1981; Bendixen 1984Dankirke, s.w. Jylland ? multiple ? ? Wodan/monster 5 x Bencard 1981; Bendixen 1984Englund, Jylland ? >= 932 hoard <= 932 ? Kufic 33 x Skovmand 1942Enner, Jylland 1849 find >= 1016-1035 hoard ? ? ? 43 x Skovmand 1942Enner, Jylland 1849 find >= 1016-1035 hoard ~958-1035 ? Anglo-Saxon 680 x Skovmand 1942Enner, Jylland 1849 find >= 1016-1035 hoard 1018-1035 ? Danish 24 x Skovmand 1942Enner, Jylland 1849 find >= 1016-1035 hoard <= 1024-1035 ? German 568 x Skovmand 1942Enner, Jylland 1849 find >= 1016-1035 hoard <= 934-940 ? Kufic 3 x Skovmand 1942Enner, Jylland 1849 find >= 1016-1035 hoard x non-numismatic silver (bead) 1 x Skovmand 1942Enner, Jylland 1849 find >= 1016-1035 hoard x non-numismatic silver (beads) 7 x Skovmand 1942Enner, Jylland 1849 find >= 1016-1035 hoard x non-numismatic silver (earring) 1 x Skovmand 1942Enner, Jylland 1849 find >= 1016-1035 hoard ? x non-numismatic silver (object fragments) 8 x Skovmand 1942Föhr ? >= 638 single ~622-638 Maastricht Merovingian triens 1 x Bencard 1981; Bendixen 1984Föhr ? ~750 hoard ? ? English; Merovingian; porcupine 77 x Bencard 1981; Bendixen 1984

? single Dorestad Merovingian gold triens 1 x Bencard 1981Graagaard, Jylland ? >= 983-1002 hoard <= 980-990 ? “Hedeby” imitating Dorestad; “Hedeby” w/ cross 83 x Skovmand 1942Graagaard, Jylland ? >= 983-1002 hoard 975-978 ? Anglo-Saxon 2 x Skovmand 1942Graagaard, Jylland ? >= 983-1002 hoard <= 983-1002 ? German 23 x Skovmand 1942Graagaard, Jylland ? >= 983-1002 hoard <= 944 ? Kufic 5 x Skovmand 1942Gravlev, Jylland ? >= 936-973 hoard <= 936-973 ? German 1 x Skovmand 1942Gravlev, Jylland ? >= 936-973 hoard <= 952 ? Kufic 262 x Skovmand 1942Grønnerup, Jylland 1842 find >= 940-960 hoard <= 960 ? “Hedeby” imitating Dorestad; “Hedeby” w/ cross 13 x Skovmand 1942Grønnerup, Jylland 1842 find >= 940-960 hoard <= 936-960 ? ? German 1 x Skovmand 1942Grønnerup, Jylland 1842 find >= 940-960 hoard ? x glass, crystal, and clay beads 18 x Skovmand 1942Grønnerup, Jylland 1842 find >= 940-960 hoard <= 907 ? Kufic 7 x Skovmand 1942Grønnerup, Jylland 1842 find >= 940-960 hoard ? x non-numismatic silver (small fragmented bar) 1 x Skovmand 1942Gudme, Funen ? uncertain ? Arabic dirhem 1 x Bendixen 1984Gudme, Funen ? uncertain ? Otto-Adelheid 1 x Bendixen 1984Hedeby, s. Jylland ? ? single ? ? Wodan/monster 1 x Bendixen 1984Hedeby, s. Jylland grave assoc. w/ Viking-age market ? single 1044-1066 ? Norwegian triquetra 1 x Stiesdal 1968Hedeby, s. Jylland inside s.e. rampart ~800 single ? Wodan/monster 1 x Bencard 1981; Bendixen 1984Holmsland klit, w. Jylland ? ? uncertain ? ? Wodan/monster 1 x Bendixen 1984Jegstrup, Jylland ? >= 1080-1086 hoard 1080-1086 ? Danish 32 x Skovmand 1942Jyndevad, Jylland ? >= 954-955 hoard ? ? ? 3 x Skovmand 1942Jyndevad, Jylland ? >= 954-955 hoard ~925-955 ? Anglo-Saxon 4 x Skovmand 1942Jyndevad, Jylland ? >= 954-955 hoard ~936-955 ? German 5 x Skovmand 1942Jyndevad, Jylland ? >= 954-955 hoard <= 954-955 ? Kufic 134 x Skovmand 1942

? >= 1059 hoard ? ? Anglo-Saxon 36 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1059 hoard ? ? Danish 240 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1059 hoard ? ? German 61 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1059 hoard ? ? Norwegian 1 x Stiesdal 1968

Kongsø, Jylland 1904 find >= 1035-1055 hoard ? ? ? 5 x Skovmand 1942Kongsø, Jylland 1904 find >= 1035-1055 hoard ~1018-1042 ? Danish 80 x Skovmand 1942Kongsø, Jylland 1904 find >= 1035-1055 hoard ? x finger ring 1 x Skovmand 1942Kongsø, Jylland 1904 find >= 1035-1055 hoard ? x non-numismatic silver (ring) 1 x Skovmand 1942Kongsø, Jylland 1904 find >= 1035-1055 hoard ? x non-numismatic silver (silver plate fragments) 4 x Skovmand 1942Kongsø, Jylland 1904 find >= 1035-1055 hoard ? x non-numismatic silver (small bar) 1 x Skovmand 1942Kongsø, Jylland 1904 find >= 1035-1055 hoard ? x rosette-form brooch 1 x Skovmand 1942Kongsø, Jylland 1904 find >= 1035-1055 hoard ? x small filigree fragments 3 x Skovmand 1942Kongsø, Jylland 1904 find >= 1037-1055 hoard ~978-1042 ? Anglo-Saxon 195 x Skovmand 1942Kongsø, Jylland 1904 find >= 1037-1055 hoard <= 1037-1055 ? German 386 x Skovmand 1942Laastrup, Jylland 1878 find >= 1047-1074 hoard 1047-1074 ? Danish 6 x Skovmand 1942Laastrup, Jylland 1878 find >= 1047-1074 hoard <= 1051-1059 ? German 3 x Skovmand 1942Lerchenborg, Zealand ? ? hoard ? ? ? 1 x Skovmand 1942Lerchenborg, Zealand ? ? hoard ? ? Danish 1 x Skovmand 1942Lerchenborg, Zealand ? ? hoard ? ? Kufic 2 x Skovmand 1942Limfjord mouth, n. Jylland ? ? single ? Dorestad Merovingian triens 1 x Bendixen 1984Louns, Jylland 1870 find >= 1035-1040 hoard ? ? ? 1 x Skovmand 1942Louns, Jylland 1870 find >= 1035-1040 hoard ~1016-1040 ? Anglo-Saxon 18 x Skovmand 1942Louns, Jylland 1870 find >= 1035-1040 hoard ~1018-1040 ? Danish 79 x Skovmand 1942Louns, Jylland 1870 find >= 1035-1040 hoard <= 1024-1039 ? German 13 x Skovmand 1942Lyngby, Jylland ? >= 1047-1074 hoard ? ? ? 97 x Skovmand 1942Lyngby, Jylland ? >= 1047-1074 hoard ~978-1066 ? Anglo-Saxon 146 x Skovmand 1942Lyngby, Jylland ? >= 1047-1074 hoard ~1018-1074 ? Danish 87 x Skovmand 1942Lyngby, Jylland ? >= 1047-1074 hoard <= 1051-1059 ? German 124 x Skovmand 1942Munksjørup, Jylland 1839 find >= 1047-1074 hoard ? ? ? 1 x Skovmand 1942Munksjørup, Jylland 1839 find >= 1047-1074 hoard ~978-1066 ? Anglo-Saxon 60 x Skovmand 1942Munksjørup, Jylland 1839 find >= 1047-1074 hoard ~1018-1074 ? Danish 56 x Skovmand 1942Munksjørup, Jylland 1839 find >= 1047-1074 hoard ? ? German 17 x Skovmand 1942Nørreballe, Lolland ? >= 936 hoard 805-936 ? Kufic 18 x Skovmand 1942

? >= 1047 hoard ? ? Anglo-Saxon 1 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1047 hoard ? ? Danish 13 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1047 hoard ? ? German 16 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1047 hoard ? ? Norwegian 1 x Stiesdal 1968

Over Randlev, w. Jylland ? >= 910 hoard <= 910 ? ? 3 x Skovmand 1942Over Randlev, w. Jylland ? >= 910 hoard <= 910 ? Anglo-Saxon 1 x Skovmand 1942Over Randlev, w. Jylland ? >= 910 hoard <= 910 ? Kufic 233 x Skovmand 1942Pilhuse, Jylland ? >= 983-1002 hoard <= 980-990 ? “Hedeby” imitating Dorestad; “Hedeby” w/ cross 60 x Skovmand 1942Pilhuse, Jylland ? >= 983-1002 hoard <= 983-1002 ? German 5 x Skovmand 1942Pilhuse, Jylland ? >= 983-1002 hoard <= 913-942 ? Kufic 7 x Skovmand 1942Ribe, s.w. Jylland 70-'76 excavations, workshop layers (phase 3) >= 730->= 759 multiple ~720-755 ? Porcupine 4 xRibe, s.w. Jylland 70-'76 excavations, workshop layers (phase 3) >= 730->= 759 multiple ~720-755 ? Wodan/monster 8 xRibe, s.w. Jylland 1874 find, eastern region >= 900 hoard ? ~900 x non-numismatic gold (arm-ring) 1 x Skovmand 1942Ribe, s.w. Jylland 1883 find, eastern region >= 900 hoard ? ~900 x non-numismatic gold (arm-ring) 1 x Skovmand 1942Ribe, s.w. Jylland 1919 find, eastern region >= 900 hoard ? ~900 x non-numismatic gold (arm-ring) 1 x Skovmand 1942Ribe, s.w. Jylland 1908 find, northern field >= 900 hoard ? ~900 x non-numismatic silver (5 silver dishes, fragment of another) 6 x Skovmand 1942Ribe, s.w. Jylland 1908 find, northern field >= 900 hoard ? ~800 x non-numismatic silver (Carolingian silver beaker) 1 x Skovmand 1942Ribe, s.w. Jylland 70-'76 excavations, pre-workshops (phase 4) ~704-720 multiple ~720-755 ? Wodan/monster 4 xRibe, s.w. Jylland 90-'91 excavations, first workshop phase ~705-725 multiple ? ? Wodan/monster 2 x Feveile & Jensen 2000Ribe, s.w. Jylland 90-'91 excavations, first workshop phase ~705-725 multiple ? ? Wodan/monster ? 7 x Feveile & Jensen 2000Ribe, s.w. Jylland 85-'86 excavations, workshop layers 1-2 ~720-755 ? multiple ~720-755 ? sceatta 19 x Frandsen & Jensen 1987, 1988; Bencard 1Ribe, s.w. Jylland 85-'86 excavations, workshop layers 3-4 ~720-755 ? multiple ~720-755 ? sceatta 9 x Frandsen & Jensen 1987, 1988; Bencard 1Ribe, s.w. Jylland 90-'91 excavations, deposit between first and later workshop ph~725-760 multiple ? ? Wodan/monster 16 x Feveile & Jensen 2000Ribe, s.w. Jylland 90-'91 excavations, later workshop phases ~760-780 multiple ? ? Wodan/monster 5 x Feveile & Jensen 2000Ribe, s.w. Jylland 90-'91 excavations, later workshop phases ~760-780 multiple ? ? Wodan/monster ? 2 x Feveile & Jensen 2000Ribe, s.w. Jylland 90-'91 excavations, later workshop phases ~780-790 multiple ? ? Arabic dirhem imitation 4 – 7 4 – 7 Feveile & Jensen 2000Ribe, s.w. Jylland 90-'91 excavations, later workshop phases ~780-790 multiple ? ? Wodan/monster 7 x Feveile & Jensen 2000Ribe, s.w. Jylland 90-'91 excavations, later workshop phases ~790-800 multiple ? ? Wodan/monster 4 x Feveile & Jensen 2000Ribe, s.w. Jylland 90-'91 excavations, later workshop phases ~800-820 multiple ? ? Wodan/monster 2 x Feveile & Jensen 2000Ribe, s.w. Jylland 90-'91 excavations, later workshop phases ~820-850 multiple ? ? “Hedeby” 1 x Feveile & Jensen 2000Ribe, s.w. Jylland 90-'91 excavations, later workshop phases ~820-850 multiple ? ? “Hedeby” ? 5 – 6 x Feveile & Jensen 2000Ribe, s.w. Jylland 85-'86 excavations, workshop layers 5-6 multiple ~720-755 ? sceatta 4 x Frandsen & Jensen 1987, 1988; Bencard 1Ribe, s.w. Jylland 70-'76 excavations, disturbed subsurface (phase 2) multiple ~720-755 ? Wodan/monster 8 x

? >= 954 hoard ? ? ? 1 x Skovmand 1942? >= 954 hoard <= 940-960 ? “Hedeby” imitating Dorestad 1 x Skovmand 1942? >= 954 hoard <= 936-973 ? German 3 x Skovmand 1942? >= 954 hoard <= 954 ? Kufic 31 x Skovmand 1942

Rørdal, Jylland 1836 find >= 961-970 hoard ~900 x fragment of pin from ring-brooch ? 1 x Skovmand 1942Rørdal, Jylland 1836 find >= 961-970 hoard ~907-970 ? Kufic 33 x Skovmand 1942Rørdal, Jylland 1836 find >= 961-970 hoard ~900 x non-numismatic silver (fragmentary rods) 13 x Skovmand 1942Rørdal, Jylland 1836 find >= 961-970 hoard ~900 x non-numismatic silver (plate fragments) 3 x Skovmand 1942Rørdal, Jylland 1836 find >= 961-970 hoard ~900 x non-numismatic silver (small band) 1 x Skovmand 1942Siem, Jylland ? >= 973-983 hoard <= 983 ? “Hedeby” imitating Dorestad; “Hedeby” w/ cross 20 x Skovmand 1942Siem, Jylland ? >= 973-983 hoard <= 973-983 ? German 2 x Skovmand 1942Siem, Jylland ? >= 973-983 hoard ? ? Kufic 1 x Skovmand 1942

? ? single ? ? Merovingian 1 x Bencard 1981; Bendixen 1984? >= 846 hoard <= 846 ? ? 4 x Skovmand 1942

Sønder Kirkeby, Falster ? >= 846 hoard <= 846 ? Kufic 93 x Skovmand 1942? >= 1053 hoard ? ? Anglo-Saxon 152 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1053 hoard ? ? Arab (Kufic) dirhem 2 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1053 hoard ? ? Bohemian 4 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1053 hoard ? ? Danish 77 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1053 hoard ? ? German 919 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1053 hoard ? ? Hiberno-Norse 3 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1053 hoard ? ? Hungarian 3 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1053 hoard ? x non-numismatic silver ? x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1053 hoard ? ? Norwegian 1 x Stiesdal 1968

Stolpehuse, Tårnby, Zealand ? >= 1053 hoard ? ? unidentified coins ~1092 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1106 hoard ? ? Bohemian ? 9 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1106 hoard ? ? Danish 60 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1106 hoard ? ? English 121 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1106 hoard ? ? German 947 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1106 hoard ? ? Hiberno-Norse 3 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1106 hoard ? ? Italian 1 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1106 hoard ? ? Kufic 24 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1106 hoard ? x non-numismatic silver ? x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1106 hoard ? ? Norwegian 2 x Stiesdal 1968? >= 1106 hoard ? ? Roman 1 x Stiesdal 1968

Terslev, Zealand ? >= 949-52 hoard <= 952 ? “Hedeby” imitating Dorestad 18 x Skovmand 1942Terslev, Zealand ? >= 949-52 hoard ~871-952 ? Anglo-Saxon 10 x Skovmand 1942Terslev, Zealand ? >= 949-52 hoard <= 936-962 ? German 11 x Skovmand 1942Terslev, Zealand ? >= 949-52 hoard <= 940-944 ? Kufic 1702 x Skovmand 1942Tolstrup, Jylland ? >= 983-1002 hoard <= 940-960 ? “Hedeby” imitating Dorestad 2 x Skovmand 1942Tolstrup, Jylland ? >= 983-1002 hoard <= 991-994 ? German 171 x Skovmand 1942Tolstrup, Jylland ? >= 983-1002 hoard 927 ? Kufic 1 x Skovmand 1942Tørring, Jylland ? >= 1047-1074 hoard ~978-1066 ? Anglo-Saxon 504 x Skovmand 1942Tørring, Jylland ? >= 1047-1074 hoard ~1018-1074 ? Danish 440 x Skovmand 1942Tørring, Jylland ? >= 1047-1074 hoard ? ? German 1285 x Skovmand 1942Vester Vedsted, w. Jylland 1933 find ? single ? x non-numismatic gold (small pendant) 1 x Skovmand 1942Vester Vedsted, w. Jylland 1859 find >= 913-42 hoard ~892-942 ? Kufic 10 x Skovmand 1942Vester Vedsted, w. Jylland 1859 find >= 913-42 hoard ~900 x non-numismatic gold (arm rings) 5 x Skovmand 1942Vester Vedsted, w. Jylland 1859 find >= 913-42 hoard ? x non-numismatic gold (broken bars) 2 x Skovmand 1942Vester Vedsted, w. Jylland 1859 find >= 913-42 hoard ? x non-numismatic gold (chain fragment) 1 x Skovmand 1942Vester Vedsted, w. Jylland 1859 find >= 913-42 hoard ~900 x non-numismatic gold (neck rings) 2 x Skovmand 1942Vester Vedsted, w. Jylland 1859 find >= 913-42 hoard ? x non-numismatic gold (small round pendant) 1 x Skovmand 1942Vester Vedsted, w. Jylland 1859 find >= 913-42 hoard ? x non-numismatic gold (small round piece w/ filigree, stylized an 1 x Skovmand 1942Vester Vedsted, w. Jylland 1859 find >= 913-42 hoard ? x non-numismatic silver (beads) 2 x Skovmand 1942Yngsjö, s. Sweden ? ? multiple ? ? Wodan/monster 3 2 Bendixen 1984

>= early 8th c. early 8th c.>= early 8th c.>= early 8th c.>= early 8th c.>= early 8th c.>= early 8th c.>= early 8th c.

10th c. ?10th c. ?10th c. ?

Gadegård, s. Sweden >= late 7th c. late 7th c.

>= 10th c. 10th c.>= 10th c. 10th c.

8th c.

Kirke Vaerlöse, Vaerlöse, ZealandKirke Vaerlöse, Vaerlöse, ZealandKirke Vaerlöse, Vaerlöse, ZealandKirke Vaerlöse, Vaerlöse, Zealand

Ölsted Churchyard, Ölsted, ZealandÖlsted Churchyard, Ölsted, ZealandÖlsted Churchyard, Ölsted, ZealandÖlsted Churchyard, Ölsted, Zealand

Bencard 1981; Bencard & Jørgensen 1990Bencard 1981; Bencard & Jørgensen 1990

Bencard 1981; Bencard & Jørgensen 1990

late 8th – early 9th c. ?late 8th c. Bencard 1981; Bencard & Jørgensen 1990

Rø, BornholmRø, BornholmRø, BornholmRø, Bornholm

Sild, n. of FöhrSønder Kirkeby, Falster

Stolpehuse, Tårnby, ZealandStolpehuse, Tårnby, ZealandStolpehuse, Tårnby, ZealandStolpehuse, Tårnby, ZealandStolpehuse, Tårnby, ZealandStolpehuse, Tårnby, ZealandStolpehuse, Tårnby, ZealandStolpehuse, Tårnby, ZealandStolpehuse, Tårnby, Zealand

Store Frigård, Öster Marie, BornholmStore Frigård, Öster Marie, BornholmStore Frigård, Öster Marie, BornholmStore Frigård, Öster Marie, BornholmStore Frigård, Öster Marie, BornholmStore Frigård, Öster Marie, BornholmStore Frigård, Öster Marie, BornholmStore Frigård, Öster Marie, BornholmStore Frigård, Öster Marie, BornholmStore Frigård, Öster Marie, Bornholm

47

Dated Deposits of 'Hedeby' Coins (total numbers)

Dated Deposits of Wodan/Monster Coins (total numbers)

Material from the Ribe Region, Including Dankirke and Vester Vedsted (number of find

contexts: total numbers)

Material from the Aalborg, Enner, Gronnerup, and Ribe regions (number of find contexts)

Hoards:

Recorded finds of Danish hoards appear from the 10th-century and later, with a fairly

find place

Graagaard, Jutland 8313

Pilhuse, Jutland 60Ribe, Jutland 6

1Siem, Jutland 20Terslev, Zealand 18Tolstrup, Jutland 2

mid 9th c. late 9th c. early 10th c.mid 10th c. late 10th c.

Grønnerup, Jutland

Rø, Bornholm

find place

Dankirke, s.w. Jutland 5Hedeby, s. Jutland 1Ribe, s.w. Jutland 13 24 26 2

1

early 8th c. mid 8th c. late 8th c. early 9th c.

Yngsjö, s. Sweden

find type

hoard, foreign coin and non-numismatics 1: 10/14(Vester Vedsted)hoard, non-numismatic 1: 7(Ribe)scatter, 'sceatta' 2: 28(Ribe) 1: 4(Ribe)scatter, Arabic imitation and W/M 1: 11-14(Ribe)scatter, Danish (excluding W/M) 1: 6-7(Ribe)scatter, foreign and W/M 1: 13(Dankirke)scatter, Porcupine and W/M 1: 12(Ribe)scatter, W/M 2: 13(Ribe) 1: 16(Ribe) 2: 19(Ribe) 1: 2(Ribe)single non-numismatic 3(Ribe)

early 8th c. mid 8th c. late 8th c. early 9th c. mid 9th c. late 9th c. early 10th c.

find type

hoard, Danish and foreign coin 3hoard, Danish and foreign coin, and non-numismatics 1 1 1hoard, foreign coin, and non-numismatics 1 2hoard, non-numismatic 1scatter, 'sceatta' 2 1scatter, Arabic imitation and W/M 1scatter, Danish (excluding W/M) 1scatter, foreign and W/M 1scatter, Porcupine and W/M 1scatter, W/M 2 1 2 1single non-numismatic 3

early 8th c. mid 8th c. late 8th c. early 9th c. mid 9th c. late 9th c. early 10th c.mid 10th c. late 10th c. early 11th c.mid 11th c.

48

regular frequency until a significant increase in the mid-11th century. Non-numismatic material

consistently appears in hoards of all represented periods, and if the three single finds from Ribe are

interpreted as pieces of a singular hoard, then the early 10th century contains both the earliest

example of non-numismatic hoarding, as well as its quantitative peak. Purely numismatic hoards,

which only occur with mixed foreign and Danish contents, only appear in the mid-11th century, but

then in a significant number. Foreign coins consistently appear in hoards of all represented periods,

while Danish coins only appear in hoards from the mid-10th and early and mid-11th centuries, and

always in combination with foreign coins. The chronological distribution of these hoards appears to

indicate that the practice was by no means abandoned by the early Medieval period. The general

presence of both foreign coins and non-numismatic silver would seem to imply that unregulated

forms of wealth continued to circulate in parallel with indigenously minted money.

Scatters, and the Wodan/Monster Coinage:

Scatters of single coins only appear up to the mid-9th century, and with fairly regular

frequency. Only one such find context contains coins securely identifiable as indigenous, and that

one entirely so, from the mid-9th century. Conversely, only one contains definitely foreign coins,

and those mixed with Wodan/Monsters, from the early 8th century. The Wodan/Monster coins, the

provenance of which remains in question, appear in mono-type scatters regularly from the early 8th

through early 9th centuries, and in combination with other types from the early through late 8th

century. Significantly, this type appears only in scatters, never hoards, possibly indicating that it was

recognized as functioning within a distinctly monetary sphere of transactions, leading to its

exclusion from accumulations of weight-based or status-symbolic wealth. Its contemporaneous

appearance in association with scattered coins of other varieties does not necessarily invalidate this

hypothesis, because, as noted above, multiple independent, incommensurate, spheres of economic

activity have been shown to operate simultaneously. The overwhelming majority (97%) of dated

Wodan/Monster finds within the geographic bounds of Viking-Age Denmark appear in the vicinity

49

of Ribe, and of those, 93% were recovered from the town of Ribe itself. Also, in contradistinction to

their very brief circulations at other locations, they appear at Ribe throughout the full century or so

of their circulation in Denmark. The moderate increase in their circulation there after the early 8th

century may reflect Ribe's ascendance over the town of Dankirke as the mercantile hub of the local

region. Overall, this evidence appears to lend credibility to the suggestion that the Wodan/Monster

sceattas in Denmark were in fact minted at Ribe.

The 'Hedeby' coins:

The catalogued coins putatively minted at Hedeby present a highly discontinuous

distribution. Their earliest appearance is at Ribe in the mid-9th century, but they then vanish from

the record until reappearing elsewhere in Jutland and the eastern islands approximately a century

later. Their circulation at these locales appears similarly short, however, being taken up a few

decades later at entirely different locations. Their early appearance at Ribe, so far removed from

Hedeby and in an apparently mercantile context, calls into question the identification of these coins

as 'Hedeby' issues, and even the hypothesis that the Hedeby 'type' in fact originated there, and not at

Ribe. If it is insisted that these coins were minted at Hedeby, then the suggestion that their mass

production did not begin until the 10th century begins to appear untenable. Unlike their

Wodan/Monster predecessors, these coins were hoarded in large numbers; indeed, hoards account

for all of their find contexts following their circulation at Ribe. However, the overall numbers from

each period, and the quantities accumulated in individual hoards, would seem to imply that they

were circulating in large, and perhaps increasing, numbers. We can see a 433% increase from the

mid-9th to mid-10th centuries, followed by an even more rapid increase of 416% from the mid- to

late 10th century, with the average number of Hedeby coins per hoard increasing from 10.67 to

41.25.

The Ribe region:

Looking at the data from Ribe and other local sites as a representative example of a high-

50

traffic economic zone with a long lifespan, several patterns can be discerned. Coin scatters appear

only up to the mid-9th century, with overall numbers fluctuating sinusoidally. The quantity

increases by 115% from the early to mid-8th century, before decreasing by 39% from the mid- to

late 8th century, followed by a dramatic 94% decrease from the late 8th to early 9th century, a small

increase of 2% from the early to mid-9th century, and vanishing entirely thereafter. The so-called

'Hedeby' issues - coins generally accepted as Danish, whatever their precise place of origin - only

appear at the end of this date range, and are then in fact the only coins evident in circulation in the

region.

Wodan/Monsters from this area appear in find contexts both in association with other types

and independently. A quantitative increase of 33% can be seen from the early to mid-8th century,

increasing again by 8% from the mid- to late 8th century, and finally diminishing sharply by 92%

from the late 8th to early 9th centuries, before vanishing entirely just before the appearance of the

Hedeby coins at Ribe.

Other identified types have much more circumscribed periods of circulation around Ribe:

Frisian-style 'porcupine' coins appear from the early through mid-8th centuries; several other

foreign types, including English, Frisian runic, and Merovingian, appear only at early 8th-century

Dankirke; a number of sceattas of indefinite type occur at mid- through late 8th-century Ribe; and a

collection of Arabic dirham imitations come from late 8th-century Ribe.

Hoards from this region only appear during the early 10th century, following a hiatus of any

recognizable media of exchange in the late 9th century: a collection of non-numismatic material

from Ribe, and a combination of non-numismatic material and Kufic dirhams from Vester Vedsted.

A series of three separate finds of single gold arm-rings datable to the same approximate period

from the eastern section of Ribe may also represent a hoard, though their precise find-spots are

unrecorded. In any case, it seems evident that both hoarding and the use of non-numismatic media

of exchange continued around Ribe well after the rise to general use of indigenous coinage.

51

Conclusions and Possibilities for Future Research:

The limited quantity of relevant archaeological material, as well as the limitations placed on

interpretations thereof by a purely quantitative analysis, have made clear conclusions regarding the

sociopolitical implications of the data elusive. The strongest statements it seems permissible to

make are probabilistic ones concerning the likely origins of certain coin types, and the nature of

economic systems in operation at various points. A more extensive and thorough tabulation and

typological analysis of the extant data relating to numismatic and hoarded materials may make more

accurate interpretations and emendations of the historical record possible. Despite the

aforementioned methodological limitations, with sufficient data I believe this same basic

interpretive model could be successfully applied to Denmark's contemporaries in early Medieval

Scandinavia, as well as other societies of a similar level of socioeconomic development elsewhere.

52

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