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Trinity College Dublin

Department of Sociology

Dissertation Submission

Student: Nathan McGibney

Student Number: 09685995

Supervisor: Dr. Anne Holohan

Date of Requirement: March 15th 2013

Date Submitted: March 15th 2013

Dissertation Title: ‘What is the Role (if any) of Cultural Sensitivities in the

Delivery of Aid and Assistance to Afghanistan’

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ABSTRACT

Afghanistan’s social indicators1 depict a state that is and will be in continual

need of international aid and development assistance. One must note

however the substantial sums already spent in the region which is estimated

between US$17 and US$ 25 billion dollars (depending on what one discerns

as aid) since 2001. Afghanistan’s unique social make-up and complex history

of conflict and destabilization has created a challenging and continual

evolving working environment for those seeking to deliver aid and assistance.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the potential role of cultural sensitivities

in the delivery of this aid and assistance. By examining the nature and diverse

complexities of Afghan culture and the role of Islam I hope to ascertain

dominant deep-rooted practices that impact upon social and gendered

stratifications, access to communities, law and the rights of women and

investigate whether this impacts upon the work of aid agents. By employing a

qualitative methodology and semi-structured interviews I have sought the

differing working cultures of individuals working in aid delivery in the region

and their personal and working experiences with issues of cultural sensitivity

from the vast variety of aid agents, namely the national and international,

state driven and non-governmental, traditional humanitarian organization and

military backed projects. Each participants data coupled with a cross-

comparison of existent literature has allowed me to conclude a significant

need for culturally sensitive aid programming. This was particularly true for the

appreciation of Islam and its cultural connotations, access to communities,

women’s empowerment and individual Afghans access to justice and legal

representation2.

1 Afghanistan’s negative UNDP HDI ranking in 2011 positioned it 172 out of 187 countries and

territories. For every 100,000 live births, 1400 women die in child birth or from pregnancy related causes. 2 My findings also revealed the growing complexity of who is and will be the dominant aid

actor in the region.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements 4

Abbreviations 5

Map 6

Chapter 1

Introduction 7

Context 12

Chapter 2

Literature Review 12

Conceptual Framework 23

Chapter 3

Methodology 27

Chapter 4

Findings 31

Chapter 5

Conclusion 55

Bibliography 60

Appendices 64

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Anne Holohan for the continual

guidance and encouraging support. I would also like to acknowledge the great

influence of Dr. Roja Fazaeli who’s unique and whole hearted teachings of

Islam and Human Rights have greatly informed this paper. Finally, I would like

to acknowledge all who participated and commend their individual enthusiasm

to speak on such important issues. I can only hope to do them justice.

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ABBREVIATIONS AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

ANA Afghan National Army

ANAP Afghan National Auxiliary Police

ANGO Afghan non-government organization

ANP Afghan National Police

AOG Armed opposition group

BAAG British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group

CDC community development council

CF coalition forces

CIMIC civil-military relationships

CIVMIL civil-military

CPAU Cooperation for Peace and Unity

DFID Department for International Development

GoA government of Afghanistan

GM gender mainstreaming

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

INGO international non-governmental organization

ISAF International Security Assistance Force (NATO)

MSF Medicins Sans Frontieres

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

PRT provincial reconstruction team

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan

WHAM winning hearts and minds

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AFGHANISTAN

-Map taken from the United Nations Cartographic Section (2013)

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INTRODUCTION Afghanistan’s social indicators depict a country that is in continual need of

international support and aid tailored to meet a variety of societal concerns. A

2011 UNDP Human Development Report (HDR) entitled Sustainability and

Equity: a Better Future For All3 valued Afghanistan’s HDI (Human

Development Index) in 2011 as 0.398 which is deep within the low

development category. Such a rating positioned Afghanistan 172 out of 187

countries and territories. By comparison to other countries in the low human

development group Afghanistan is below average and further below average

of countries in South Asia who rank approximately 0.548. Two states which

are close to Afghanistan’s HDI rank and population size, namely Nepal and

Bangladesh have HDIs ranked 157 and 146 respectively (UNDP, 2011). One

cannot discount progress in key areas such as life expectancy and literacy

and access to education (See Table 1), one can however question the pace of

such progress.

Afghanistan’s HDI trends based on consistent time series data, new component indicators and new methodology

Life Expectancy at birth

Expected years of schooling

Mean years of schooling

GNI per capita (2005ppp$)

HDI value

1980 39.2 1.7 0.8 1,002 0.198

1985 40.8 2.2 1.2 1,271 0.234

1990 42.3 2.6 1.5 948 0.246

1995 43.8 2.4 1.9 589 0.238

2000 45.3 2.2 2.2 435 0.230

2005 46.6 7.6 2.6 913 0.340

2010 48.3 9.1 3.3 1,351 0.394

2011 48.7 9.1 3.3 1,416 0.398

(UNDP, 2011: 2) Table 1

3 The 2011 Human Development Report presents 2011 Human Development Index (HDI)

values and ranks for 187 countries and UN-recognized territories, along with the Inequality-adjusted HDI for 134 countries, the Gender Inequality Index for 146 countries, and the Multidimensional Poverty Index for 109 countries. Country rankings and values in the annual Human Development Index (HDI) are kept under strict embargo until the global launch and worldwide electronic release of the Human Development Report. The 2011 Report was be launched globally in November 2011 (UNDP, 2011: 1).

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Social indicators for women in Afghanistan are of particular concern and have

greatly informed and impacted upon international aid policies. According to

the UNDP, Afghanistan has a Gender Inequality Index4 value of 0.707 ranking

it 141 out of 146 countries in 2011. For every 100,000 live births 1,400 women

die in child birth or from pregnancy related causes. Only 5.8% of the female

population has reached secondary education compared to 34% of Afghan

males. Furthermore as of 2011 female participation on the labour market was

33.1% compared to 84.5% of their male counterparts (UNDP, 2011). Many

other important social indicators could not be calculated due to a lack of

adequate data and access for UNDP researchers but what is clear from

available data is the continual need for international assistance and

development programming. One should note however the vast sums that

have already been spent in assistance to the region since the military

presence began in 2001. According to Lydia Poole the author of Afghanistan:

Tracking Major Resource Flows 2002-2010 (2011), some US$26.7 billion5

had been spent on aid by 2009. In addition she notes that in 2009 Afghanistan

was the leading global recipient of Official Development Assistance (ODA). As

a consequence of large allocations of funding and remaining poor social

indicators we can recognize Afghanistan as a complex region to provide

assistance and deliver aid. It is the nature of some of these complexities that I

hope to shine a light upon.

The investigation of this thesis is to ascertain the role of cultural

sensitivities in the delivery of aid and assistance in Afghanistan. While the

notion of culturally sensitive programming is not particularly new or

challenging to dominant aid and development discourses I feel Afghanistan

represents a unique case study to test the true value of such an approach.

Afghanistan’s most recent history of conflict and destabilization has

4 ‘The Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects gender-based inequalities in three dimensions –

reproductive health, empowerment, and economic activity. Reproductive health is measured by maternal mortality and adolescent fertility rates; empowerment is measured by the share of parliamentary seats held by each gender and attainment at secondary and higher education by each gender; and economic activity is measured by the labour market participation rate for each gender’ (UNDP, 2011: 4). 5 Please note that great variance exists between different individuals and organizations who

estimate the total amount spent on aid. For example the World Bank ranked spending in the same period to be just over US$17 billion. Difference can be put down to numerous factors the most prominent perhaps being what is officially considered aid. The military’s engagement with civil society has made this issue particularly problematic.

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manufactured a unique continually evolving working environment for those

seeking to deliver aid, namely international aid agencies, local and

international NGO’s and international military forces. The ethnic makeup of

the region and tribal divisions represent a further consideration for agents of

aid delivery. One aspect of Afghan culture that greatly informed this study was

the dominant role Islam and its cultural connotations continues to play in

Afghan society. While one should be cautious not to over represent its impact

on everyday life one can recognise its presence in social stratifications,

gender stratifications, traditional practices, and the rule of law. As both

Chapter 1 on my literary review and Chapter 4 on my research findings point

out some 90-99% of Afghans are thought to be Muslim with varying degrees

of practice and dedication no doubt. By way of investigation I intend to

highlight cultural sensitivities that are dominant in Afghanistan and ascertain

what impact it has on aid delivery and what level of awareness international

bodies distributing aid have of such sensitivities. In addition I will devote much

of this thesis into discussing how (if at all) dominant aid actors facilitate, work

within or cater for such cultural sensitivities. Lastly, I will note the

consequences of failing to appreciate certain cultural sensitivities and its

impact on both potential benefactors and the aid community.

Chapter 1, which includes my Literary Review and Conceptual

Framework, looks at existent literature on aid delivery in Afghanistan and the

role of cultural sensitivities. I will be reviewing some of the prominent texts

that largely informed my thesis question. In the conceptual framework I will

discuss the individual themes that are re-occurring throughout my findings

and literary review, and note their origins. This chapter is designed to inform

the reader of the nature of aid delivery in the region and communicate the

surfaced and hidden Afghan cultural complexities that are of crucial

consideration.

Chapter 2, Methodologies, discusses the Methodological make-up of my

thesis enquiry. Within this chapter I will note the qualitative nature of this

paper, its research design, methods of collecting data, methods of data

analysis and discuss any ethical considerations and limitations. Chapter 3,

Findings, makes up the majority of the paper. It notes my research data and

findings from participants. Chapter 4, Conclusion, is designed to form a

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conclusive opinion on the role of cultural sensitivities in aid and development

in Afghanistan based on a comparison of existent literature and my research

findings.

CONTEXT

My own personal interest in international aid and development, as well as

issues of culture and tradition in the Islamic context has greatly influenced the

construction of this paper. I am of the opinion that the nature of international

assistance and mechanisms of development and state construction are

rapidly changing. In recent decades as a result of a globalized world and

interaction of differing cultures, religions and traditions, we have seen a

growing discourse on the incompatibility and growing tensions of particular

cultures. This was typified by Samuel P. Huntington’s 1993 publication The

Clash of Civilizations and has been succeeded by many more sophisticated

papers. I am a firm believer however, that if such tensions and incompatibility

exist it is a result of inadequate engagement and effort, largely by the

dominant actor(s). Consequently, I have sought to investigate whether

dominant aid actors in Afghanistan have adequately investigated,

communicated with, and programme designed within a local Afghan cultural

context. In doing so perhaps we can understand if international aid is truly

mandated for the benefit of Afghans themselves and not limited to the cultural

barriers and perceived limitations of international aid agencies.

My research has sought information from individuals from multiple

disciplines, organizational frameworks and personal backgrounds to explore

how the different working cultures of different agencies of many nationalities

and patronage inform aid delivery. I sought to capture each individuals

working and personal experience with cultural sensitivities in an aid working

environment in Afghanistan and neighbouring regions. Consequently I cannot

claim that this dissertation is a representation of aid delivery that I personally

witnessed in the field of Afghanistan as I did not conduct my research there. I

can however claim a broad perspective of differing opinion and extensive

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experience across a variety of humanitarian logistics and aid delivery. Listed

below are the names and backgrounds of each of my participants;

Laura Whitley: British State led body of International Development. Gerrard Humphries: Former Military Captain and NGO consultant. His main area of focus is now humanitarian logistics. David Reilly: Asia Regional Director for a prominent Irish NGO working in Afghanistan. Ara Sahar: Afghan/Irish student who travels frequently back to Afghanistan. Jahandar Qaderi: Managing Director of a prominent networking agency that provides information and assistance to over thirty international and national aid agencies and NGOs working in Afghanistan. Forozan Qazi: Current doctorate student on women’s empowerment in Afghanistan. She was a former staff member with U.S based Volunteer group (2010) and a USAID News Programme (2011). Katherine Greene: Programme Implementation Manager of a Kabul based Afghan NGO who work on the promotion of knowledge and awareness of peace, social justice, and human rights as the foundation upon which the future development of Afghanistan will be built.

For me it was important to collect data from a variety of sources that differed

on a number of variables such as the mandate of the organization or NGO,

the origin of funding, the nationality of the organization or NGO6, or whether it

was state influenced or driven. Furthermore personal variables of the

participants were equally as relevant such as gender, nationality, academic

and work history and personal experiences and opinions. Such difference

greatly informed my research findings and highlighted how truly complex and

diverse attitudes toward providing assistance and ensuring state construction

in Afghanistan are.

The balance of power in aid delivery and future development is spread

across a variety of influential actors in Afghanistan. As will become clear in

the chapter on existent literature and throughout my data findings it arguably

6 I felt nationality was an important variable in the Afghan context as certain states may carry

what one of my interviewees called ‘Colonial Baggage’ (Humphries, 2012). In addition Reilly noted the importance of being an Irish NGO in the region.

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represents a unique meeting point of many different living and working

organizational cultures. At the centre of this meeting point is the crucial need

for assistance across an expanse of social requirements. It is not my intent to

discount the great progress achieved, the many lives already impacted upon

and the extent of government and state construction through the work of

international and national aid organizations and NGOs and military aid

projects. A paper constructed around such criticisms would be unimaginative

and negate the vast complexities of aid delivery in the region. Rather I am

seeking to investigate a potential process that could arguably increase aid

effectiveness and augment the participation and dialogue of Afghans

themselves.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Existent literature on the role of cultural sensitivities in aid delivery in

Afghanistan is not numerous in the public domain at least. Rather,

engagement with the issue occurs often as sub-content in broader studies.

Those which have been referenced as dominant texts in this literary review do

however engage sufficiently with issues of aid delivery, the dominant actors,

the benefactors and local Afghan actors. Through my extensive reading on

the subject (and related subjects) I feel they give a broad perspective and in-

depth description of the nature of aid delivery in Afghanistan and the potential

need for culturally sensitive programming.

A 2007 CPAU (Cooperation for Peace and Unity) report entitled The Role

and Functions of Religious Civil Society in Afghanistan highlighted the major

role that religion continues to play in Afghanistan. It further noted that

‘religious leaders hold considerable influence with a potential to affect the

peace process and country-wide development both negatively and positively’

(Wardak, 2007: 5). What is particularly relevant for the purposes of this thesis

is these religious leaders ability to strengthen the peace process and

development of Afghanistan. Ultimately what can be referred to as culturally

sensitive networks of power and gatekeepers of communities can be used for

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positive development purposes. While Wardak notes diverging levels of

authority and influence among religious community leaders across the region

he maintains that there are ‘three issues they still have control over’ (Wardak,

2007: 6),

1. Apostasy

2. Women (particularly issues relating to women)

3. The presence of foreign troops

Mullahs and influential community leaders7 interviewed by Wardak

declared their willingness and often eagerness to participate in the

humanitarian and development sphere ‘ordinary people are listening to us. If

we are given the opportunity and authority then we can preach to the people

so (that) they (will) participate effectively in the process’ (Wardak, 2007: 7).

The author notes how the current Karzai government and international forces

have largely ignored this resource due to the ‘active roles that Mullahs played

in the Taliban government, even if only in an advisory capacity’ (Wardak,

2007: 21). In relation to NGOs and aid agencies engaging with religious

leaders Wardak believes ‘it seems NGOs are either afraid to interact with the

Ulama or religious leaders or are restricted by their donors in doing so’

(Wardak, 2007: 44). Where Wardak believes that the current government and

international community can no longer afford to ignore their crucial role is the

field of law.

A 2010 report entitled Helmand Justice Mapping Study by Sarah Ladbury

and Deborah Smith greatly depicts the unique nature of the Afghan informal

legal system. Despite common perceptions of customary informal law deriving

guidance solely from Islamic Sharia law the reality is much more complex.

Ladbury and Smith define it as an agglomeration of customary traditions such

as Pastunwali and Sharia principles. Significantly Peavey (2012) estimates

7 It is important to make a distinction between Mullahs and Community Elders. Theoretically a

Mullah is an individual formally educated in Islamic law, theology and sacred texts. A Community Elder can hold authority over communities and villages by a variety of different means including financial authority, holding of arms and access to networks of power. As will become clearer in my literary review and in the chapter on my findings the distinction between religious leaders and community leaders has become blurred. In addition many religious leaders have little or no formal training and are often self-appointed.

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that 80% to 90% of Afghans, particularly those in rural areas, only have

access to the informal system (See Table 2). Access to law is everything and

affords the arbiters great power and authority. Given that the formal system

struggles to penetrate rural communities outside of the major towns and cities

and ‘that it suffers from widespread perceptions of corruption and inefficiency’

(Peavey, 2012: 9) (See Table 3) logic would dictate a necessary engagement

with the informal legal system by way of these gatekeeping religious

community leaders. Innovative projects to foster such an engagement were

not in abundance in the existing literature. There are however some credible

(arguably pioneering) efforts such as that of the CPAU who sought justice

linkages with the informal and formal system via the creation of community

peace councils8. Approximately 15 or 16 male elders are elected by the

community to these Peace Councils. Upon a 2012 review of one such council

in Kunuz, northern Afghanistan, the trained councils ‘demonstrated modest

yet clear improvements in record-keeping as well as improved understanding

and adherence to state law and better awareness of women’s rights in the

cases documented’ (Peavey, 2012: 2). Their recommendations for

international and Afghan state policy was to ensure a credible engagement

with Mullahs and to ensure they receive the adequate trainings particularly

surrounding women’s rights and vulnerable groups.

8 Please note that these Peace Councils are of similar nature to the CDCs (Community

Development Councils) pursued under the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and many international NGOs.

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The Community/ Informal System

Who may be involved

Basis of Judgements

Perceived end goal

Characteristics Application

Senior family members Local Elders Local Mullahs Other Respected high status persons Note: can be frequent interaction with Government

Pastunwali Sharia (Often a combination; depends on the issue and who adjudicates)

Pastunwali: to preserve group honour; to reconcile disputes Sharia; to give individuals their rights under Islam Local/tribal precedent; to preserve existing ways/values

Avoids courts (public/slow/costly) Adjudicators (Elders/Mullahs) are respected BUT judgements don’t always stick Judgements mostly considered fair BUT women want Sharia applied, not Pastunwali for rights cases

First dispute resolution step in Government and Taliban controlled areas In Government controlled areas next step is DG and statutory system In Taliban controlled areas next step is Taliban mechanisms

Table 2

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Government Statutory System

Who may be

involved

Basis of

judgements

Perceived

end goal

Characteristic

s

Application

a) District General and

district Admin.

Includes Land

Registry and JSC/CC

b) Justice personnel

(When present):

Prosecutors, judges,

def. Lawyers, courts

c) Security institutions

(ANP, ANA, NDS,

ISAF, Marines)

Afghan

National Law

Formal and

informal

practices of

government

and

international

institutions

and officials

To extract

money

from

disputants

and their

families

To punish

wrong

doers

Slow, corrupt,

Untrustworthy

‘a system for

those with

money’

Some

individuals can

be trusted

If it worked

well should be

final arbiter

Accessed by

those

government

controlled

areas but

little by those

outside

(Ladbury and Smith, 2010: 27)

Table 3

Aid programming for the empowerment of women in Afghanistan has

come under criticism over the last decade. While again existing literature is

not abundant, that which does exist highlights the complex and often

controversial nature of women’s empowerment in the Afghan context. Bruno

De Cordier the author of On the Thin Line Between Good Intentions and

Creating Tensions: A View of Gender Programmes in Muslim Contexts and

the (Potential) Position of Islamic Aid Organisations (2010) offers some

insightful and noteworthy commentaries on the issue;

‘Adequate gender approaches often require engagement with social actors

and with the culture “as they are”, including religious actors, even if the values

they espouse are often considered incompatible with international standards,

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or they do not correspond to the kinds of partners that many Western actors

and local secular elites desire’ (De Cordier, 2010: 1).

In seeking to define why gender has become such a contentious issue in

terms of international aid and development De Cordier notes the problem of

Orientalism and its long standing impact on the West. Such has been the

impact that according to Cordier there has been a fixation on issues like the

Islamic veil9 which inevitably distract from real pressing issues. Furthermore

he notes that the international militaries engagement in aid and civil society

issues and the subsequent erosion of many aid agencies and NGOs non-

political association has led to ‘aid becoming instrumental in a wider control

and security agenda that involves the propagation and implantation of neo-

liberal development models including nation-building in so-called failed states

(De Cordier, 2010: 236).

It is necessary for us to question whether International aid efforts in

Afghanistan mandated to empower women often negate the important role

Islam and traditional culture has to play in such a process. De Cordier notes

that ‘gender is intimately connected to culture as it is to politics and

economics (De Cordier, 2010: 238). In the Afghan context one cannot further

separate culture from religion; arguably therefore one cannot separate gender

from religion. De Cordier maintains that paying simply lip service to issues of

cultural sensitivity particularly in gender projects will inevitably result in

ineffective programming. Defining culture becomes a crucial part of gender

based programming and one must examine whether aid actors define and

understand Afghan culture as it is or rather how they would like it to be (De

Cordier, 2010). Crucially for our consideration Lina Abirafeh notes in her

publication Freedom is Only Won From the Inside: Domestic Violence in Post-

Conflict Afghanistan (2006) that in conflict and post-conflict situations women

often bear the increased burden of cultural maintenance.

Abirafeh is a notable critique of international efforts to empower women in

Afghanistan. She upholds that,

9 De Cordier notes further sensationalist and emotional coverage of the real and supposed

predicament of ‘women under Islam’ in Western media such as acid burnings in Bangladesh, female circumcision in Somalia or flogging in Pakistan.

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‘often international efforts run the risk of doing a disservice to women by

implementing programmes and policies that have not taken all possible

repercussions into account- development interventions aiming to empower

women may in fact place women at increased risk’ (Abirafeh, 2006: 10).

Despite this, Abirafeh upholds that the aid community is still in a unique

position to increase the rights of women in post-conflict Afghanistan if they

can avoid creating a Myth of Liberation (Abirafeh, 2009: 60) based on a

common tri-part oversimplification,

1. Afghan women need to be saved

2. Afghan women cannot save themselves

3. Afghan women need to be saved from Afghan men

(Abirafeh, 2009: 60)

Gender Mainstreaming10 has become common place in the policies of

dominant aid actors in Afghanistan. It is designed to incorporate gender

issues into all stages of policy making, programme design and

implementation. Through her own research published in 2009 Abirafeh noted

that despite the allocation of substantial funds and existence of extensive

rhetoric on Gender Mainstreaming there was a severe lack of credible in-

depth research into the processes of implementation. She noted no definitive

definition of gender in the Afghan context. Concern should therefore lie not

with the squandering of funds but rather the potential consequences for

women in Afghanistan. Abirafeh notes that in certain instances aid agencies

and NGOs have inadvertently manufactured, heightened and reinforced

already existent tensions between women in Afghanistan and their male

counterparts and communities. In her research many of her interviewees

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Rounaq Jahan who is credited with coining the phrase Gender Mainstreaming identifies two dominant types:

1. The Integrationist Approach which see gender issues added to an already existent spectrum of development sectors.

2. The Agenda Setting Approach where the agenda of women, as opposed to women as individuals gets recognition in the mainstream development.

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noted how often Afghans consider the term Gender employed by international

agencies as a weapon against Afghan men, one male interviewee declared

that ‘Most people think that gender is about increasing the power of women

while decreasing the power of men. Women over men. That’s what they think’

(Abirafeh, 2005: 13). It is no doubt that the striking social indicators of women

in Afghanistan has informed a prioritization and concentration of funding on

women’s empowerment projects. For Abirafeh failing to appreciate women in

Afghanistan on Afghan terms and ignoring existent agency and roles will deny

a genuine opportunity for empowerment and have negative consequences for

potential benefactors. Consequently it is necessary to investigate whether

cultural sensitivities play a role in aid delivery to Afghanistan.

In trying to ascertain the role of cultural sensitivities in aid programming in

Afghanistan it is crucial to analyse the major actors in the delivery of

assistance. If one can assume that further engagement with issues of Afghan

cultural sensitivities is a logical beneficial step we must understand who is

best placed and indeed capable of doing so. Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind in

their publication Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy: Aid,

Security and Civil Society after 9/11 in Afghanistan (2009) place NGOs in the

dominant makeup of Afghan civil society. They maintain that,

‘the social fabric of life is criss-crossed with ‘modern’ associated structures,

such as political parties, trade associations, NGOs, women and youth

organizations, cooperatives and human rights groups. Thus, elements of a

“modern”, proto-civil society have emerged at key moments in Afghanistan

over the past half century’ (Howell and Lind, 2009: 723).

Noting the vast influx of international NGOs from 2001 onwards11 and the

large sums of international aid budgets accompanying them Howell and Lind

believe both local and international NGOs now ‘embody the very essence of

civil society’ (Howell and Lind, 2009: 725). International funding has

legitimized their role as key player in construction and development and

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Howell and Lind note that NGO numbers rose dramatically from 46 registered in Kabul in 1999 to over 350 by 2002 and was estimated at 2000 or more at the time of publication in 2009.

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afforded them authority, power and resources but no guarantee of local

legitimacy (Howell and Lind, 2009). International bodies fulfilling the role

(large or small) of a national civil society can however create considerable

problems12. If we accept Howell and Lind’s appreciation for the role played by

international aid bodies in Afghanistan then we can afford them some

responsibility in implementing projects that are in keeping with dominant

cultures and designed based on well informed societal research in all its

complexities. Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al note how NGOs have in the past

employed or used elements of Afghan culture to further project outcomes and

increase the number of potential benefactors, ‘ NGOs have also used aspects

of Islam to argue for change...however in the past few years they have tended

to rely less on such tools. It may be time they started revisiting such practices’

(Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al, 2008: 27). The current absence of culturally

sensitive programming by NGOs and international aid bodies is likely to be

multifaceted in nature (De Cordier, 2010). Budgets and funding allocation

would no doubt be championed by aid representatives and perhaps

conservative international donors. One major actor in Afghanistan’s aid

delivery does not suffer from equal funding restrictions and has the potential

to alter the face of humanitarian assistance in the region for the worse13.

A 2008 publication by researchers (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al) of the

British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) entitled Afghan Hearts,

Afghan Minds: Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations is of

great relevance to this thesis as it discusses the increasing engagement of

international military forces in aid delivery and subsequent impact on both

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Howell and Lind highlight one such problem, ‘The emphasis on the service-delivery role of civil society that effectively substitutes for the welfare functions of the state has the effect of depoliticising civil society in at least two ways. First this ideal overlooks the political role of civil society as a sphere of citizen engagement and deliberation in public affairs. Second, it glosses over the inherently politicised and contested nature of the terrain of civil society, which comprises a multiplicity of actors with divergent interests, values, ideologies and purposes’ (Howell and Lind, 2009: 727). 13

One must compare the level of aid funding versus that of the military to understand priorities in the region. Howell and Lind note that since 2001 international donors have provided US$ 7,000,000 per day in aid whereas the US military budget for example is approximately US$100,000,000 per day.

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national and international humanitarian organizations in Afghanistan14.

Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al note the new challenges posed to NGOs by this

engagement,

Managing and juggling differing perceptions of their NGO’s identity

amongst key stakeholders and power-holders, including insurgent

factions, local populations, local leaderships and the government of

Afghanistan.

Differences between military concepts of stabilising and securing an

area, versus NGO approaches to aid agency security management

based on acceptance and negotiated access to communities in

insecure areas.

Increasing challenges in negotiating access to beneficiaries with local

power-holders as new generations of insurgent forces assume control

of areas.

Negative consequences for NGO safety and security associated with

real or perceived associations with the international military, which can

result in the civilian identity of the wider NGO sector and not just

individual agencies working with the military, being tainted by

association.

(Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al, 2008: 6).

This so called Militarization of Aid (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al, 2008: 10)

erodes the natural humanitarian space and impacts (arguably indefinitely) on

the identity of aid agencies and NGOs who would consider themselves

politically impartial15. Based on existent literature I am of the opinion that the

14

Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al believe that ‘non-government organizations (NGOs) are under pressure from all sides: from communities to deliver without jeopardising their security; from government to implement their national programmes; from criminal groups who threaten their safety; from armed opposition groups (AOGs) who put them into the same basket as their opponents; from political donors and NATO representatives who pressure them to operate in strategically prioritised provinces in order to align with “heart and minds” (WHAM) strategies’ (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al, 2008: 12) 15

Howell and Lind note that ‘US NGOs have come under considerable pressure from military powers in Washington to work with PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams)...there is a need for NGOs to reflect more deeply on their own positions in the highly charged situations in which they intervene, and where neutrality may be nothing more than illusory’ (Howell and Lind, 2009: 733).

22

military’s engagement in aid delivery and Afghan civil society does not

legitimize their consideration for entry into the humanitarian field. I would

argue that due to the nature of their presence and what they are mandated to

do in Afghanistan they should never be considered within a humanitarian

framework. Opinions aside however if programmes and projects fielded by

international military forces are to remain then perhaps the same questions

should be asked of them as of NGOs regarding culturally sensitive

programming.

US Military funded projects carried out by Provincial Reconstruction

Teams (PRTs) have come under increasing criticism from both the aid

community and international commentators for their lack of dialogue with local

communities and benefactors, their quick impact and little consideration for

sustainability and prioritization of consent winning as part of WHAM (Winning

Heart and Minds) over the best possible outcome for Afghans themselves

(Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al, 2008). In interviews carried out by Azarbaijani-

Moghaddam et al potential benefactors showed a preference for multi-year

projects with long-term sustainable impact based on community engagement

and involvement ‘which often rules out PRTs as implementers or fund-

providers as national and international actors...cannot predict from one PRT

to the next what to expect in terms of expertise, level or sustainability of

engagement or focus’ (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al, 2008: 43). In terms of

the charity versus development dichotomy, PRTs continue to promote the

‘hand-out mentality which NGO’s have been working for many years to erase

among both beneficiaries and staff’ (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al, 2008: 45).

Unlike humanitarian assistance the charity paradigm is based on a power

differential, ‘it is patronising and sees beneficiaries as disempowered victims

who should be grateful and beholden for assistance’ (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

et al, 2008: 45). In regards to consultation and contact Azarbaijani-

Moghaddam et als respondents stated that local involvement was very

important in a projects success. PRT’s level of interaction with communities

and local actors was found to vary dramatically and most felt more

comfortable working with NGOs due to their extensive consultations and long-

term presence.

23

Issues surrounding the use of language and imported and local principles

were recorded by Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al not just for military aid

programming by the PRT’s but by impartial NGO’s also. BAAG researchers

could not find local translations in Dari or Pashto for what has been referred to

as development terms or development language (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et

al, 2008:44). Closest translations found often negated the original meaning

and led to many principles being lost in translation. The ability to communicate

intent and design inclusive culturally sensitive programming would no doubt

rely greatly on cross-comparative translation. It is not my intent to corrupt the

image and reputation of all PRTs and military backed aid projects in

Afghanistan. Such an attempt would be equal in arrogance and ignorance as

the broad and many sectors in which they work would denounce any

generalization. Rather, I am trying to ascertain the potential need for and

feasibility of dominant aid actors implementing culturally sensitive

programming in keeping with the issues noted above such as access to

communities, law and women’s empowerment. Unfortunately we cannot look

beyond 2014 and the withdrawal of military forces to fully comprehend who

will remain and what their individual mandates and capabilities may be. What

one can gather from the literature above is that NGOs and organizations that

are justifiably within the international humanitarian space are best placed to

programme more culturally sensitive given their consistent consultation and

interaction with the local populace. Their allocation of funding may however

restrict an adequate engagement.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THEMES

My thesis question and area of investigation, notably What is the Role of

Cultural Sensitivities in the Delivery of Aid and Assistance to Afghanistan was

not informed by broader sociological theories or concepts that are applicable

across a variety of contexts. My inquiry was instead developed around a large

variety of contemporary and continually evolving reports, articles and

organizational investigations into the nature of aid delivery in Afghanistan, aid

and development in the Islamic world, as well as in-depth investigations into

the complexities of Afghan culture and society. This continually evolving

24

context as a result of conflict, funding and geopolitical interests I felt would be

done a disservice with an overreliance on static sociological concepts. I firmly

believe that the nature of aid delivery in the Afghan context with all its

surfaced and hidden complexities of cultural sensitivity and history is

deserving of a unique conceptual framework tailored as best as one can to its

conditions. However one can evidently recognise informed sociological

theories and concepts on fundamental issues of culture, interaction, feminism

and religion. I have no doubt that those who have informed my thesis question

have derived great influence from said broader concepts. Listed below are the

reoccurring themes both within my literary review research data;

Cultural Juncture/ Meeting-Point: (Nawabi et al, 2007), (De Cordier,

2010)

Religion/Culture: (De Cordier, 2010), (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al,

2008).

Gatekeeping: (Peavey, 2012),

Interaction through Aid: (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al, 2008), (De

Cordier, 2010)

Humanitarian Space: (Howell and Lind, 2009).

Gender: (De Cordier, 2010), (Abirafeh, 2009).

Language: (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al, 2008), (Howell and Lind,

2009).

Conflict and Development: (Abirafeh, 2009), (Azarbaijani-

Moghaddam et al, 2008), (De Cordier, 2010)

Samuel P. Huntington (1993) famously noted people’s culture and religion will

be the source of conflict in the post-Cold War period. While I am an avid

disbeliever of this fact in its simplicity his regard for cultural junctures and

meeting points is somewhat applicable in the Afghan context. By this I mean

through the humanitarian community and military involvement in aid delivery

we are seeing the interaction of many differing cultures (De Cordier, 2010).

25

This interaction, as will become clear throughout, has greatly informed aid

programming both for the better and for the worse.

The apparent secularization and rise of individualism in the West has

manufactured a unique working surface for the international humanitarian

community and international forces in Afghanistan. Consistent failures to

recognise the remaining dominant role of Islam (Nawabi et al, 2007) in the

region has led me to question the subsequent need for an in-depth

investigation into the role of cultural sensitivities. Applying conditionality’s of

Western relations with religion in the 21st Century has resulted in under-

performing programmes (De Cordier, 2010). The theme of Religion/Culture

will seek to ascertain the nature of such cultural sensitivities. The theme of

Gatekeeping refers to those in Afghanistan who hold the power of authority

and access of communities where aid is largely required, namely religious

leaders, Mullah’s and Community Elder’s (Peavey, 2012). Interaction with

such figures or lack thereof is a reoccurring theme throughout. Interaction

through Aid looks further at the dichotomy of giver and benefactor and the

very nature of who is giving. The charity versus development dichotomy

(Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al, 2008) greatly informs the nature of aid

programming and the mandate of the organization.

Like the evolving nature of Afghan society as a result of conflict, invasion

and a history of destabilized governance the humanitarian space in which the

aid community operates has experienced similar transformations. This theme

of Humanitarian Space is unique to the region as the dividing line between

impartial aid organizations and NGOs and military funded aid projects

becomes ever thinner (Howell and Lind, 2009). Post-2014 and the withdrawal

of international forces, the nature of this humanitarian space may define the

methods of aid delivery and development in the region. The theme of Gender

is vital to this thesis investigation. So much international focus has been on

the empowerment of women in Afghanistan. In addition commentators have

noted how often women in periods of conflict and post-conflict assume greater

responsibility in cultural maintenance (Abirafeh, 2009). It is my aim to analysis

the nature of gender stratifications and roles in Afghanistan and how

international agents operating in the region recognise, appreciate and effort to

work in compliment with them.

26

The theme of Language is multidimensional as it seeks to investigate

issues of translation from international languages to local Afghan dialects, the

existence of a unique development language (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al,

2008) which is understood only by those working within the aid community,

and the possible existence of dominant terms that are only understood and

relevant in a so-called Western context, notably Humanitarian Space and

Gender Mainstreaming (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al, 2008). Language

being a strong representation of, and access point to, local culture and

knowledge requires a great appreciation.

The final theme of this dissertation Conflict and Development seeks to

investigate the process of development in Afghanistan by way of international

assistance. Issues of security for aid agencies, NGO’s and military funded

projects are reoccurring and inevitably impact upon development outcomes

(Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al, 2008). Furthermore, it is important to

ascertain the true mandate and agenda of individual agents in the field of aid

and development to understand how progress can perhaps be ensured. I am

of course referring to projects designed for quick impact, consent winning

(WHAM), with little local consultation or reference and recognition of cultural

sensitivities (Howell and Lind, 2009). Notably each theme is deserving of an

individual in-depth investigation. While this is not possible in the context of this

thesis I do feel the areas investigated are both in adherence to one another

and aid the development of a broader investigation into the role of cultural

sensitivities in the delivery of international assistance to Afghanistan.

The purpose of my own research and data collection is to capture the

experiences of individuals from different organizational and institutional

backgrounds working in Afghanistan or aid delivery in other complex regions.

Each individual’s awareness and opinion on cultural sensitivities will inform

this thesis as to whether issues of cultural sensitivity should be a priority for

the aid agenda. Given the broad nature of their individual backgrounds and

nature of their employers (as noted in Context), whether they are

international, national, state-funded, non-governmental, from the traditional

humanitarian field or military, I intend to address the following;

The level of official training (if any) on issues of cultural sensitivity prior

to arriving in Afghanistan.

27

Their working experiences on the ground and how this impacted on

their work.

Their personal experiences with cultural sensitivities and if this

informed the development of learning curve.

The lessons they have taken away from working in Afghanistan or a

notably unique complex region.

Recommendations (if they have any) for the future of aid delivery to

Afghanistan and whether cultural sensitivities have a necessary role or

not to play.

While I cannot claim primary first hand on the ground experience in

Afghanistan I am confident that the nature of my participants will allow me to

develop a credible discussion on the role of cultural sensitivities (if any) in the

aid agenda.

METHODOLOGY

In this chapter I will outlining the nature of my research methodologies and the research methods I employed. I will discussing the processes and approaches that best complimented and enabled my thesis investigation. As will become clear a qualitative investigation was crucial due to the nature of the question. In addition to outlining how I collected data I will be noting the processes of data analysis and how I recognised and encouraged emerging themes. I will also be discussing the limitations and ethical considerations I faced throughout the research process.

Research Design

The research design of my thesis is best represented by the case study design. One could argue that many of the issues discussed in Chapter 4 on Findings; such as women’s positioning in an Islamic society like Afghanistan and the interaction of customary and Islamic law with international legal standards, is applicable to other states and societies. I would argue, however, that while elements are indeed common to other Islamic states the fundamental nature of Afghan society today as a result of three decades of conflict, poor social indicators, the ethnic makeup of the population, it’s

28

geographical nature and prominent role of Islam make this a unique or so-called extreme case study . While notably qualitative in nature I have employed significant quantitative data in the form of Afghan social indicators, national data and statistics, aid agency and NGO budgets, and military budgets. The level of quantitative data used however does not qualify a mixed-method research design. The significance of qualitative data to my design is best understood by the very nature of the thesis question; notably the investigation of cultural significant elements in the delivery of aid rather than an exclusive appreciation for allocated aid budgets, quota filling and enrolments. Qualitative data enabled me to go beyond the standout figures of aid and military budgets and striking social indicators to gather data on the delivery of aid to the individual amidst the long-standing deeply engrained cultural contexts. The case study design enabled me to test the hypotheses of whether cultural sensitivities are relevant to the delivery and sustainability of aid in Afghanistan.

Research Methods As my research design would suggest my research methods were largely of qualitative form. Again however quantitative data had a role to play in guiding the formation of data. For example many of those interviewed referred regularly to official statistics and independent quantitative research carried out on issues like maternal mortality rates to exercise a point. While I did have a pre-existent hypothesis I was happy to employ a certain level of grounded theory whereby the data collected would become one of the main driving forces of the thesis. The initial stages of my research method were spent ascertaining the relevant participants with relevant experience in the area of aid delivery. As is noted in the passage on sampling I made particular use of strong networks within the international humanitarian community. I experienced a rapid exposure to many relevant participants following my connection with one or two individuals. In an effort to let the data drive the thesis development I employed semi-structured interviews. While I had a specific set of questions and themes to touch upon and keep the interview guided I was very much interested in personal experiences, opinions and grievances with particular issues surrounding international aid, particularly in Afghanistan. The nature of the questions covered a wide variety of topics from their own personal and organizational knowledge of Islam and Afghan cultural connotations to the impact of military forces on their work effort. Four of the seven semi-structured interviews were conducted face to face over a period of 2 months. Given the sensitive nature of some of the themes and the inevitable protection of and confidentiality of organizational information some were less forthcoming than others, particularly around learning curves or potential mistakes made. The remaining three interviews were conducted via Skype which in many ways proved more productive than face to face methods. Participants seemed more at ease in their own living environment (in Afghanistan or abroad) and willing to share personal

29

experiences and opinions on the many problems, complexities and learning curves involved.

Data Analysis From the very first interview conduction with David Reilly themes began to emerge that both contrasted and complimented some of the existent literature. I began transcribing all of the interviews when the last one was completed so that I could correlate emerging themes and contrast data. Following this I had three levels of data analysis that led me to further analysis evolving and emerging themes. I employed Thematic Coding to regulate and categorize this process over a period of time. By coding and further sub-coding I was able to isolate the dominant themes and arguments that eventually guided the construction of my thesis question. A process of comparative analysis with existent literature followed to ascertain how my data either contrasted or complimented existent opinions and accounts. Sampling

For the purposes of my research I employed a non-probability sample. This was necessary because I required the declarations and opinions of specific individuals who had experience of working in Afghanistan or the neighbouring region or had experience working in humanitarian and aid sectors. While many of my interviewees were acquired by contacting each one individually whether it be through their agency and employer or sourcing their contact on the internet, I did experience and make use of snowball sampling. My research has made me increasingly aware of the fact that many employment opportunities are advertised and the sharing of information is done through strong networks of communication within the international humanitarian community or in the field. Such networks enabled me to employ snowball sampling as one method of data collection. Most interviewees were happy to pass on at least one further contact. Within my sample size I sought to gather a representation of different variables that could affect the outcome of my research. This included recording data of geographical variance whereby I sourced interviewees who had/continue to work in different regions of Afghanistan. Furthermore, I sought the declarations of individuals who have worked on a variety of issues in Afghanistan, many of which are highlighted by poor social indicators; most notably women’s rights and empowerment, access to justice and healthcare. In addition, as my thesis title suggests I wanted to ascertain the role of cultural sensitivities as experienced by individuals from a variety of organizational backgrounds, namely Afghan national and international, state funded (Afghan or international) and non-governmental, and those from the so-called traditional humanitarian sector and the military. The importance of this stratification will become clear in the Chapter 4 on Findings. Given the specialized nature of my research and the limitations involved both time and

30

literary space I chose to conduct seven detailed semi-structured interviews. I am confident that the information obtained from these interviews is sufficient to support my thesis.

Ethics

Fortunately I was not presented with any unique unavoidable ethical issues that may be common in research on such sensitive issues. To conceal the identity of my participants and their subsequent employers I have used pseudo names. While each individual gave their consent to use their real identity and opinions expressed I felt obliged to respect their privacy.

Limitations

One of the most evident limitations I experienced in doing my research was access to Afghan nationals themselves whether living here in Ireland or in Afghanistan. Two of the interviewees however were Afghan nationals. Jahandar Qaderi the managing director of a large development consultation and programme implementation group has worked across numerous sectors in Afghanistan. Ara Sahar is an Irish Afghan national who has the unique insight of returning to Afghanistan to visit relatives having lived in the notably culturally different West. I made repeated efforts to contact Afghan communities living here in Ireland via the two Dublin mosques and Muslim family groups in the city but was unable to secure any participation. However, one cannot be guaranteed access to an Afghan national living in Ireland for a relatively short period of time who has recently been a benefactor of an international aid agency or NGO in Afghanistan. One of the aims of my research was to gather data from many of the Irish NGO’s or NGO’s with departments in Ireland who have a working operation in Afghanistan. For the most part this proved to be difficult. Irish NGO’s and Irish Aid were largely unresponsive or offered their regret at being unable to help. When an NGO did agree to participate I was treated with a mild suspicion and distance, which inevitably impacted upon my data collection. The foreign military presence plays a large role both in my literature review and subsequent findings given their engagement with civil society, implementation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s) and delivery of aid. Unfortunately I could not secure more than one interviewee on the unique role the military has to play in Afghanistan in terms of aid delivery. However the nature of the data collected coupled with the extensive pre-existent data reviewed provided an adequate insight to inform my thesis.

31

Reflections on Methodologies

Given the nature of this thesis and the limitations of time and capacity I feel my methodologies adequately facilitated the research process and enabled me to collect credible and informative data. Naturally an academic researcher would choose first-hand field experience to conduct ethnographic research; this, however, was not an option. One notable element of my data collection that has, if you will, surprised me is the impact ICT’s such as Skype can have on participant’s willingness and comfort to divulge information. Admittedly my research methods and processes of data collection are not unique or standout. Rather, they reflect the complex process of data collection on the role of cultural sensitivities in arguably one of the most complex regions in the world.

FINDINGS

Throughout my interviews I recognised evident patterns and reoccurring

themes common to many of my participants. Insights into both their work and

importantly personal experience on the ground are invaluable to a thesis of

this nature. Firstly, the nature of Afghan society and the complexity of its

identity makeup must be appreciated to understand how unique a region this

is, in terms of aid delivery. All but one participant noted the complex makeup

of the region. Many forces are at play, including a three-decade long history of

conflict and violence16,

‘You have a country that’s been at war for 30 years on and off so you have to

take into account what that does in terms of disruption and destruction of

family units, in terms of insecurity like destroying civilian infrastructure, in

terms of completely disrupting education and health services and everything

else’ (Whitley, 2012)

16

Sahar noted how three decades of conflict have impacted upon the national psyche; ‘There is a lot of violence in Afghanistan and I think a lot of Afghans are full of anger, not toward a particular group but simply because of what they have been through in their life and the recent history of Afghanistan so there is a lot of room for violence’ (Sahar, 2012)

32

Consequent diaspora experiences in neighbouring states and deep-rooted

ethnic divisions17 were further noted by some participants,

‘Identity in Afghanistan is so heterogeneous like Uzbeks, there’s Tajiks,

Hazaras, there is Pasthuns em there is a lot of Afghans that spend most of

their life either in Pakistan or Iran so they have dual types of identity’ (Qazi,

2012)

Noted by all of the interviewees was the dominant role Islam has to play in the

daily lives of most Afghans18. Qaderi captured this relationship quite

poetically,

‘It is difficult to separate Islam from the daily life. When Afghans are born, the

Mullah comes in their house and they, the first thing they hear is the Ozan,

prayers that the Mullah recites and whispers it in the new babies ear; and then

when this man gives all he has to go to mosque, and when he gets married a

Mullah has to establish a sacred bond between the husband and the wife and

when he dies, you know, the entire proceedings are religious proceedings. So

the bond between an ordinary Afghans life and that of Islam and religion is

inextricable’

(Qaderi, 2013)

17

Ethnic association is a significant consideration for aid programming as customary traditions and ethnic stratifications go beyond Islam and religious association. This was a particular working consideration for Whitley who was advocating for greater women’s access justice and legal representation in Helmand Province which has an estimated 94% Pashtun population; ‘Now what does that mean for women, well, the Pashtun ethnic group probably has one of the most conservative codes for women in all of Afghanistan You know, even by Afghan standards the Pashtun way that women are regarded is very conservative, you know, women basically stay at home, they don’t leave the house, they are typically married off for very large Dowries to older men, or to whoever can afford the Dowry; you know, women are very much secondary and this is something prominent in Pashtun culture I would say more than even Islam or Sharia law, this is cultural so where I was working in Helmand obviously being 94% Pashtun that culture was very strong’ (Whitley, 2012) 18

It should be noted however that many observed a variation in the prominence of Islam across Afghanistan based on numerous factors such a geographical location, social positioning and access to education; ‘It’s very class stratified is what I mean. It really depends and can be contextual’ (Qazi 2012)

33

Furthermore, it is a difficult task to separate religious and non-religious spaces

where Qaderi notes a ‘tremendous overlap between peoples religious as well

as community affairs’ (Qaderi, 2013). Even the political sphere is not exempt

from the presence of Islam19 with Qaderi declaring that election to parliament

is only possible with some form of Islamic knowledge and regular reference to

the Quran or Hadith in public speeches. In terms of international development

and aid delivery it would appear an unavoidable consideration20 and arguably

a unique avenue to impact potential benefactors:

‘In Afghanistan it is not that so there are tremendous overlap between

people’s religious as well as community affairs and to be honest we can’t do

anything about it, but to come to terms with it and also use it for development

purposes’ (Qaderi, 2013)

How this could be achieved is a matter of great debate with many including

Whitley showing great reservation for Western aid agencies participating in

Islamic based programming. What is clear, however, is a caution for aid

agencies to ignore this dominant aspect of Afghan culture and identity. Failing

to appreciate the role Islam and its cultural connotations, most notably

gendered stratifications, will run high risks for Afghan women in particular who

have been subject to societal push backs21 and reactions to Western

programming; this has been particularly observed by Qaderi:

19

Qazi noted the prominent presence of Islam in the political sphere in Afghanistan, ‘It’s definitely the case for government, like, when I was there they had this group that was making recommendations about how to review civil codes around women’s legal status in Afghanistan and they actually consulted. It very much had to be in consultation with Ulama Islamic scholars and I’d say at a certain level in political discourse Islam is always the centre that people talk about, adhering to Islam’ (Qazi, 2012) 20

Greene noted ‘you need to put everything in an Islamic perspective, because Islam has such a huge influence in the everyday life of people, everything kind of needs to be somehow connected to it’ (Greene, 2013). 21

Whitley cautions international aid agencies against failing to recognize Afghan women’s positioning in the conservative society and understand the distance between theoretical rights and practicing rights in everyday life; ‘there are radio stations and so on that have started talking about women’s rights and so on, but you know that can also be dangerous because, you know, to talk about all of these theoretical rights before the society is ready to realize them is also dangerous. I mean, I recall a radio station on air saying a woman has a right to do this, a woman has a right to do that,

34

‘as a whole the women’s rights agenda in Afghanistan has given women more

awareness but it also has made the society having negative views about

them- this is also witnessed in the high number of women setting themselves

to fire in Heart province where women’s education rates have increased in the

past 10 years but the society as a whole is still very restrictive (Qaderi, 2013)

Given the nature of my thesis investigation I was interested in ascertaining

the level of official training aid agencies, NGOs and the military give on issues

of cultural sensitivities in Afghanistan. As such training would arguably

improve the delivery and potential sustainability of aid one might be forgiven

in assuming it a priority of the humanitarian community22. The majority of

those whom I interviewed however revealed that they had received no official

training or lengthy preparation for such a unique complex working

environment, rather many recalled a more informal briefing on the do’s and

don’ts; ‘I wouldn’t describe it as a training more of a briefing, so people get

clearly briefed on what you can and what you can’t do, how to behave, show

respect all that kind of stuff’ (Reilly, 2012). The consequences of failing to

appreciate cultural sensitivities can have negative consequences both for the

international staff and the benefactors23, Reilly noted;

‘there was an incident maybe about 6 months ago were there was a guy

working for another organization in another part of the country and he was

basically, it was during the summer, he was sunbathing, he was only wearing

shorts basically, so he thought he was in his house or compound but people

could actually see, so they could see him sort of half-naked and that caused a

massive incident. He had to be basically evacuated from the country. So

well, yes on paper she does, but then you get a girl running away from home saying they want to marry me off and I know it’s my right not to well that’s all. Well and good, and what the hell will happen to that girl, because if she goes home now her family may kill her for dishonouring them, so you have to very careful in going out and broadcasting about all of these wonderful rights before the men in society and the society itself is ready to recognize and realize those rights’ (Whitley, 2012) 22

Please note that I am not considering the military’s engagement with Afghan civil society as part of the international humanitarian community. 23

This negative impact on Afghan nationals will be discussed in greater depth throughout Chapter 4 on Findings particularly on the issue of Gender Mainstreaming.

35

those kind of things can escalate, they might seem to us very minor but,

actually, they can escalate’ (Reilly, 2012).

In relation to the consequences for Afghans themselves Whitley noted,

‘The NGO treads that line I think most Afghans will accept, yes that Western

NGOs can come in, they can help us with health, they can help us with

education, and so on, but it has to be culturally appropriate for the region and

if the region is conservative you cannot go in there and say, no we want a

classroom full of girls and, you know we are going to start doing this, because

there will be a backlash, there really will be’ (Whitley, 2012).

Humphries highlighted the dilemma of converging cultures and the

absence of adequate dialogue. He recognised the individual cultures of the

aid community and those in the international forces suddenly being immersed

‘in a completely different culture is it that they are trying to change the world,

like, what is the ethos? Is it just to get the aid out even in spite of local culture

and then we will work on that at a later date? I don’t know how the world is

going to solve that problem’ (Humphries, 2012). Interestingly, the international

military do provide training on cultural sensitivities but more from the priority of

security and engagement24. This distinction from international aid agencies

was for Humphries defined by funding25.

One cannot assume however that NGOs and aid agencies working in the

region are vastly under-funded and unable to allocate resources for training.

Humphries noted from his experience that ‘there is an awful lot of waste, there

24

‘Yes, yes the military do that. Before you go overseas there is a whole admin thing getting you medically certified and fitness test and all of that and then there is another thing whereby the military bring you up to the defence forces headquarters and you get a brief on the overseas location, the state of the situation, militarily the operational situation but also then there is a cultural awareness programme and that is done in the UN school’ (Humphries, 2012). 25

‘The problem is for a lot of aid agencies, and it is a drum I keep banging for them, is that a lot of them do a very good job, don’t get me wrong, but they don’t have the money to put into training and they don’t have the funding to put into cultural awareness programmes because as a donor you or I or anybody, when we donate our money we expect to see it on the ground, expect to see that blanket, we expect to see that piece of bread being given to somebody and we don’t understand for that to happen there has to be this training part’ (Humphries, 2012).

36

is a huge amount of waste in aid agencies. Now I understand people have to

be paid, but there is a huge amount of admin costs that I think should be

converted into training’ (Humphries, 2012). Given the limitations of this thesis I

simply cannot engage with the allocation of funding within international aid

agencies. I can however recognise a need for streamlining and subsequent

prioritization of formal culturally sensitive training for international staff working

in complex regions not merely for their own safety but perhaps more

importantly for the well-being and best possible outcome for benefactors in

Afghanistan.

Language was a particular issue reoccurring in my data. It represents the

ability to work within and inclusive framework and access local culture. This

issue was multidimensional in that it concerned the use of translators, the

existence of a development language and the inability to translate certain

international humanitarian terms into Afghan dialects. The reliance on

translators who were predominantly male could often infringe upon cultural

sensitivities and often hinder my respondent’s work. Whitley noted that,

‘For me in particular dealing with women that was very complicated, in that we

had no female interpreters, so while a lot of my female counterparts were

used to using male interpreters, there would obviously still be situations where

they would want to discuss something maybe slightly sensitive or particularly

say when I would go to the prison to interview female detainees and they

might want to discuss something, you know, that might be intimate or talk

about violence that happened to them and they would not necessarily feel

comfortable doing so in26 front of a male interpreter’ (Whitley, 2012).

Qazi and Whitley further noted how much was lost in translation due to an

inability to translate certain terminologies. Qaderi referred to the mushrooming

26

Whitley further noted, ‘would say that all of us, all of my colleagues suffered from…shall I say poor interpretation or you know, just trying to make yourself understood by an interpreter, it obviously meant that your meetings went on for twice as long with half as much information getting passed across because obviously there was the delay of the interpretations, and you know certain obvious cultural things you know I mean it’s such a different culture, the way of working is very different’ (Whitley, 2012).

37

of NGO’s into Afghanistan following 2001 with what he called a distinct

language spoken within the international humanitarian community; ‘concepts

like Human Rights, Women’s Rights, Democratization process and similar

topics were kind of quite new and they were overwhelming to the population in

Afghanistan’ (Qaderi, 2013). The CPAU has advocated for greater cross

comparable efforts at translating humanitarian terms as a response to this

crucial cultural element. However Humphries notes again that such efforts will

be hindered if not halted completely by funding allocations27.

In ascertaining the dominant actors in aid delivery my data revealed the

growing complexity of the nature and role of NGOs operating in Afghanistan.

Like the nature of the conflict which began over three decades ago their

humanitarian space has evolved in equal measures. Those interviewed

expressed different outcomes in terms of autonomy and ability to move

around due to their geographical location but generally issues of security

impacted upon their work. Whitley noted the situation in Helmand Province,

‘one of the biggest issues we had was security mean obviously we were I

mean our movement was quite restricted in terms of how often we could go

out, I mean up until that time I had been very used to being able to go out and

see counterparts whenever I wanted because I mean capacity building is one

of the most important things that you are doing and capacity building means

that you have to be able to spend time with your counterparts because

effectively you are mentoring them. So one of the biggest issues in

Afghanistan was the lack of time we were able to spend on the ground with

counterparts......there were very view NGO’s operating where I was in

Helmand because it simply wasn’t safe. I mean there were a few Afghan local

NGO’s but there were very few, what you would call “Western NGOs”28’

(Whitley, 2012).

27

‘Yes, I totally agree but again, the problem is with budgets, they have to sell that idea to Joe citizen in order to achieve this’ (Humphries, 2013) 28

Whitley noted two exceptions to this Medicine San Frontier and the ICRC.

38

Whitley noted how the security situation in Helmand Province was

deteriorating further and largely unstable for even local NGO’s at times, never

mind international29. Restricted access will inevitably impact on the individuals

work and affect the outcome of projects ‘You couldn’t really follow up on stuff

you couldn’t really verify so a lot of it was just going on trust’ (Whitley, 2012).

NGO and agency strategies and policies are naturally reactive to such

restrictions but perhaps are not so malleable to issues of cultural sensitivities

such as the prominent role of Islam.

The National Solidarity Programme (NSP)30 arguably embodies

international ignorance towards issues of cultural sensitivity by prohibiting any

programming of a religious nature. I am by no means denouncing or ignoring

the great advancements achieved under the programme but rather

questioning how it remains true to logic to prohibit programming of any

religious nature in a country where an estimated 99%31 of the population are

Muslim. Qaderi noted initial opposition to the NSP among religious elders, ‘In

one of the conferences I participated in in 2005, the minister for rural

rehabilitation gave a presentation and as soon as it was over a Mullah stood

29

‘There was another NGO, and I would rather not mention their name, and they were given a little bit of money from the US embassy to go and work on a women’s group based on sewing and the two women were murdered just outside Girishk and that was in 2010. They were beheaded. We still don’t know why I mean some people say it was, the motivation was theft because the sewing machines were stolen, other people say well they were women from outside of Helmand and that they were upsetting the balance, or that they had said something that somebody didn’t like or that they were travelling in a private car and they were stopped and executed. But I mean, all they were doing was setting up a women’s sewing circle basically and they were beheaded for that. So even for local NGOs it is a very dangerous, very precarious operating environment, and if you do something that somebody doesn’t like and that somebody doesn’t have to be Taliban, that somebody can just be a rival NGO or somebody who gets jealous’ (Whitley, 2012) 30

The official NSP website declares its mandate as follows, ‘The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) was created in 2003 by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development to develop the ability of Afghan communities to identify, plan, manage and monitor their own development projects. Through the promotion of good local governance, the NSP works to empower rural communities to make decision affecting their own lives and livelihoods. Empowered rural communities collectively contribute to increased human security. The programme is inclusively supporting all of the communities including the poorest and most vulnerable people. NSP strongly promotes a unique development paradigm, whereby communities can make important decisions and participate in all stages of their development, contributing their own resources. With the support of FPs, communities elect their leaders and representatives to form voluntary Community Development Councils (CDCs) through a transparent and democratic process’. 31

The CPAU estimate that approximately 99% of Afghans are Muslim. 85% are understood to be Sunni, 14% Shi’ite, and less than 1% non-Muslim. Such statistics however do not ascertain the amount of practicing Muslims.

39

and said we don’t accept this, we can completely oppose this because you

say you will not build mosques for us’ (Qaderi, 2013). Greene noted how

difficult this policy is to implement on the ground:

‘Saying that it should not have any religious connection is extremely hard

down here, you can’t really work without connecting to Islam, if they don’t

have a mosque and you build a house it will be used as a mosque. It will be

used as an area for solving disputes, prayers and weddings’ (Greene, 2013).

Reilly noted that while they made every effort to keep within the guidelines of

the NSP, inevitable links to Islam and its cultural connotations arose:

‘what we find then, is when those kind of basic needs, when the village has

electricity, when the village has water systems or whatever, then you might

start saying ok we need what they call a community centre, but actually what

the community centre is is kind of an annex to the mosque so it is a religious

em thing. So the NSP don’t permit that’ (Reilly, 2012).

One unavoidable element of my data was the presence of international

military forces and how this impacted on the operation of aid agencies and

NGOs. The term Militarization of Aid was common among my findings as

many noted the military’s engagement with Afghan civil society. The blurring

of the distinction between the humanitarian community and the military forces

is becoming ever more problematic and arguably manufacturing a new

cultural sensitivity. ‘Nobody makes the distinction anymore. The NGO’s, try

they really try, but the distinction is so blurred now because you have military

doing civilian activities, classical civilian activities’ (Whitley, 2012). Reilly noted

the dangers of this erosion of humanitarian space and being seen to

associate with the armed forces, ‘There were German troops in our area and

there was a German organisation who were targeted because they were

associated with the German troops’ (Reilly, 2012). Whitley further highlighted

the negative impact their presence has had on a long established NGO in the

region,

40

‘In its own way the military presence makes it very difficult for NGO’s I mean

the ICRC, the Red Cross, now has less freedom of movement because of the

presence of NATO than it did before NATO arrived, because of IEDs on the

roads, they didn’t have to worry about that before and now they do, so their

freedom of movement has been negatively affected by NATO presence and in

a way because of the military’ (Whitley, 2012).

Many maintained that far from being politically impartial, many agencies and

NGO’s mandated to deliver aid have gone past the point of no return in terms

of association. The consequences of ill-perceived association were evident at

the time of interviewing32.

My findings further revealed a mixed prognosis of NGO and aid agency

operating activity post 2014 and the military withdrawal. While Reilly in the

Northern regions and Greene in Kabul noted there would be more restrictions

in terms of funding and autonomy, Whitley upheld a more pessimistic outlook,

‘I think Afghanistan is a country where NGO’s will not be able to work when

the military leave. I mean they are not even working there now and the military

is there’ (Whitley, 2012). Beyond issues of a resurgent Taliban and access to

certain regions many noted the inability of international aid agencies to adopt

and further to massive contracts and projects undertaken by the military civil

engagement teams. The military has effectively priced the humanitarian

community out of Afghanistan33,

‘ISAF and NATO has gone in and done a lot of assistance projects, you know,

they have put millions and millions of dollars in schools and hospitals and so

on, and these are the kinds of budgets that no NGO has, NGO’s, there is no

way they can mobilize the kind of money that is being around in Helmand at

32

‘I think really Western NGOs have to be very careful of the agenda they are seen to pursue I mean we have those 9 doctors who were killed in Nuristan because they were accused of being missionaries. Now whether they were or not the word got round and that is what they are accused of and almost every Westerner killed in Afghanistan working for an NGO has been killed because they were accused of imposing an agenda’ (Whitley, 2012). 33

Humphries highlighted a reaction from the international aid community, ‘There is a big push back from the aid community and a more cynical person might recognise that the military can do and are capable of these tasks, so Joe citizen might question the aid agencies and why am I giving you my money’ (Humphries, 2012).

41

the moment, so I think unfortunately, I think it will be very difficult for any NGO

to take over these sort of humanitarian projects because simply they would

not be able to meet the expectations that are being created, they would not

have the budget’ (Whitley, 2012).

Such findings are crucial to understanding who will be the dominant operating

forces in terms of aid delivery post 2014 and the military withdrawal. While I

have notably critiqued NGO’s and aid agencies for failing to adequately

engage with issues of cultural sensitivity the military’s humanitarian efforts

largely through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) leaves much to

be desired and paints a pessimistic outlook for cultural appropriate planning if

they are to remain the dominant aid actors34.

Beyond the contentious debate and efforts to legitimize the presence of

international forces in Afghanistan are issues of equal controversy wanting of

in-depth investigation, notably the military’s engagement with the delivery of

aid35. The so-called militarization of aid and erosion of the natural

humanitarian space were sentiments shared by those whom I interviewed.

‘What is known in the NGO community both the international and the national

heavily criticize the delivery of aid through military personnel, it is they say

simple and that is that the aid should be neutral and that people should not

see it mixed up between ye know an NGO worker and a military

worker....soldiers are there to fight not to deliver aid’ (Qaderi, 2013)

34

Dominant aid actors refers to the large budgets military backed programmes and private contraction firms have. Whitley noted her opinion on who may remain after 2014, ‘Now what you may have, you may have contractors; a lot of work being done in Afghanistan is being done by big consulting firms, the likes of PAE, Chemonics, DAI, Creative Associates big big consulting firms very often for profit. These are no NGOs and they have very big USAID and DFID contracts and they may very well stay on. I mean Chemonics has been a presence in Helmand province since the early 2000s and they may well stay on’ (Whitley, 2012). 35

Humphries offered a unique insight into why the military are now seeking to provide aid in addition to their traditional roles, ‘There is a big problem that is not spoken about very often and it is something that I have been championing for a while, is that since the end of the cold war the military have been unemployed so they want a new job, particularly the big powers, so they think we are gona go and give aid to the world’ (Humphries, 2012).

42

The blurring of the distinction between aid agencies and military forces in

Afghanistan warrants an in-depth investigation to itself. The military’s

engagement in Afghan civil society has led many to question the ultimate

aims36 of their efforts and to ascertain the potential damage being done to

Afghanistan’s relationship with the international humanitarian community as a

consequence of their Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM) project,

‘To me it’s about Winning Hearts and Minds. Now would people state that

openly? I’m not sure because, I mean if you look at the grander strategic aims

of say DFID in Afghanistan, or USAID in Afghanistan, if you look at their

strategic aims it does say “oh we were all about development and sustainable

future” and so on but if you look down on the ground at how some of the

money is being spent in some of the PRT’s and so on a lot of it is being spent

very short term with consent in mind. But again, that’s just my opinion and I’m

certainly not the first person to say that’ (Whitley, 2012)

Far from considering an in-depth engagement with Afghan cultural

sensitivities in their delivery of aid the Military’s Provincial Reconstruction

Teams (PRT’s)37 have largely failed to engage with Afghan benefactors at an

36

Qaderi recalled one example where the military agenda outperformed the needs of the benefactors, ‘In some areas the military, I’m giving an example of a place called Zabul, in Zabul the military were distributing wheat seed improved wheat seed and fertilizers to the community. But we found out later that they were also using the biometric data received from the farmers from when they were actually handing them the fertilizers and the wheat seed to ye know coordinate that data with their intelligence data and to see whether Taliban operated among these farmers. They call this Militarization of Aid. So that is difficult, that is dangerous for the NGO’s because as soon as they start working in an area, especially hostile areas eh they will also be seen as somewhat serving the purpose of the military’ (Qaderi, 2013). 37

Qazi noted on the issue of PRT’s, ‘One of my good friends in Afghanistan actually oversees PRT’s in Afghanistan and what I think is that the Afghan people themselves have generally not been listened to even in a sense of, what a PRT might say ok this area needs a road and a school and X Y and Z things and where that road goes through and how its paid for em where that school is who gets to go to that school is not determined by people in that community I don’t think they are even asked really so like I don’t have a scientific knowledge of it but this is what I have heard from colleague and my friend who oversees them also said the same thing’ (Qazi, 2012)

43

adequate level to ensure the best possible outcome for Afghans themselves38.

However unlike most NGO’s, international forces do formally educate

personnel on issues of cultural sensitivity39 and even make certain

accommodations in terms of CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation Roles) team

staffing40. This training however is designed for security purposes41 and not to

facilitate the delivery of effective aid. It is not without its irony that the military

are in the best possible position over many aid agencies and NGO’s to deliver

effective sustainable assistance in keeping with crucial Afghan cultural

sensitivities due to their far superior budgets42 and communication networks.

Yet the military will never be43 and should never be considered within the

humanitarian space at least within the Afghan context. What is clear from my

data is that their PRT teams alone are under-performing due to a narrowed

agenda of consent winning, therefore one can be forgiven for remaining

pessimistic about a sophisticated culturally sensitive programme.

Like many aspects of my research opinion was divided on the potential

role Mullahs can play in the delivery of aid. What is agreed upon, however, is

38

‘Even when you get off the plane coming from Dubai to Kabul it’s just enormously obvious to you that the interests of the civilian population of the country are not a prominent aspect of any policies and that was even when I went to Kabul just a couple of years ago, and they invaded in 2002, and they didn’t even have a proper sewage system in the country, in the capital city of Kabul until 2011. If you can see this happen in Kabul and that’s where all the money, the NGO’s and all the international community are, what is the rural like? and let’s remember 70% of the population live in rural areas’ (Qazi, 2012). 39

Yes, yes the military do that. Before you go overseas there is a whole admin thing getting you medically certified and fitness test and all of that and then there is another thing whereby the military bring you up to the defence forces headquarters and you get a brief on the overseas location, the state of the situation, militarily the operational situation but also then there is a cultural awareness programme and that is done in the UN school (Humphries, 2012). 40

Humphries noted that following the UNSC resolution 1325 which calls for the greater inclusion of female staff overseas CIMIC teams are regularly made up of female staff because ‘it was found to be more beneficial because they better understood the wants and needs of the female populations that were in these areas’ (Humphries, 2012) 41

Greene informed me that the military has recently decided to engage with Mullahs as part of their WHAM program. She remained doubtful however as to whether their concerns were beyond security and consent winning. 42

‘I was seeing budgets, six-month budgets being spent in villages by NATO that I would have run a program on for 3 years. The budgets were massive, I cannot overstate that and no normal NGO can compete with that’ (Whitley, 2012). 43

‘Military assistance in a complex emergency such as Afghanistan is not seen as acceptable’ (Humphries, 2012).

44

the necessary engagement with these influential figures in any effort to gain

access to a community and their individual role of gatekeepers44,

‘Well you have to I mean you can’t just go in and start working in villages, you

have to engage with the leaders ye know, and with the religious leaders so I

mean yes, we have to go in and explain what we are doing and why we are

doing it’ (Reilly, 2012).

The authority and power afforded to many of these elders and religious

leaders was evident to all who I interviewed with Greene of the CPAU noting

their unique power over information:

‘One should know that whatever the Mullah says on, on Friday is what goes

for the upcoming week. That’s the only way for people to get new information

so again if that is the basic line of receiving information then you can’t

disregard the power they have’ (Greene, 2013).

If harnessed in the appropriate way, such influence can perhaps further the

aims of aid agencies and improve access and the conditions of potential

beneficiaries. It is worth noting that such figures whom ‘are key to getting this

country on the right track, and to ignore them completely will just create

fractions in society’ (Greene, 2013) have been largely un-utilized45 by INGO’s

and those attempting to deliver aid. Only in the last 18 months have the

military in its civil society engagements of the Winning Hearts and Minds

Agenda begun to recognize their relevance46.

Caution must be afforded however, as the nature of this gatekeeping

system is as complex as it is unique. Proposals have been made to use such

44

‘If a Mullah goes in and says that we do not have access to a community there is not much we can do’ (Greene, 2013) 45

‘I think it is the only platform really to utilize community leaders if you want to gain respect of a particular community, but at the same time, and it’s the case in my opinion, that the international community hasn’t utilized what is already there, the communication networks that are already there in Afghanistan’ (Qazi, 2012). 46

‘The Military has in their Winning Hearts and Minds kind of operations they have just recently realized that the Mullahs are the way to go, this is quite a late idea. Before they kind of tried to avoid it but have now realized that you can’t’ (Green, 2013).

45

figures to improve the conditions of Afghan women by reinterpretation of the

Quran and other key Islamic texts. Whitley notes however that:

‘It would not be correct to assume that just because someone is a Mullah that

they are necessarily knowledgeable about Islam or they are necessarily

knowledgeable about what Islam does to protect women, and it’s very

convenient for people to ignore certain things that Islam does for women

particularly things like inheritance and property rights’ (Whitley, 2012)

While many religious leaders remain what is referred to as conservative47 on

the issue of women’s rights and empowerment, the lack of uniformity48 (if any)

in Islamic education and existence of other variables of power49 further

complicate this approach. Fundamentally however the humanitarian

community cannot afford to continue ignoring this essential resource of

access, power and information. Greene notes that failing to recognize them in

a sense awards them further power and further compounds the aid

community as the outsider. ‘You cannot fly in the face of established power

47

‘When I interviewed Imams or Mullahs it was for my own work on women’s rights and when it comes to that subject there is not really, em maybe in the whole country if I got to interview all the Mullahs there would be a pretty wide range of opinion on it but I was really interested in interviewing people who would be sort of well-known to certain communities, so like, I interviewed Mullah Omar’s former spokesperson who is an Imam, em and specifically asked him questions about women and so I found his answers to be quite conservative ’ (Qazi, 2012). 48

‘One of the things that I was quite shocked about in Afghanistan, there is over 11,000 Mullahs in Helmand province right for a population of about a million so that’s what, one Mullah for every 100 people? I don’t know my math’s isn’t great. There is a lot of Mullahs and about 11,000 mosques in Helmand and even Afghans, even Helmandies themselves will say the quality of the Mullahs is not what it should be, like a Mullah is you know supposed to have gone to Madrassa, he is supposed to have studied the Quran he is supposed to have sat exams there is certain standards and many of them feel that many of these 11,000 Mullahs in Helmand simply don’t have that depth of knowledge. I mean sometimes they are self-declared Mullahs, or you know they went to Pakistan for a bit and came back. Of course the Taliban has also run Madrassas so some of them are from conservative schools so it would also in Helmand anyway not be correct to assume that just because someone is a Mullah that they are necessarily knowledgeable about Islam or they are necessarily knowledgeable about what Islam does to protect women and its very convenient for people to ignore certain things that Islam does for women particularly things like inheritance and property rights’ (Whitley, 2012). 49

Whitley notes that many of these influential religious leaders or village elders derive their authority and power from other sources often beyond religious influence; most notably wealth often accumulated through poppy farming, access to networks of power and becoming local war lords.

46

relationship you cannot do that in Afghanistan’ (Whitley, 2012). Aid agencies

wishing to work on improving crucial social indicators particularly in rural

communities50 should improve efforts to engage with such community leaders.

One need only look to issues of legality and access to justice to appreciate

their significance.

One of the most complex issues that has troubled both international and

national aid agencies is legality and Afghans access to justice. Like many

aspects of Afghan society its complex and unique nature has called for

innovative and adaptable approaches, many of which have not been

forthcoming. An estimated 90%51 of disputes whether it be family, land or

inheritance in nature are settled by the informal or customary tradition.

‘I would say that that is the system that most Afghans have access to so one

of the things that we tried to do was say ok fine the elder system exists it’s

going to outlive everything it’s not gona be done away with this is the system

that Afghans use themselves so fine you know what can be done to work with

that system to help that system conform more to the Afghan statutory system

and with Sharia law in the decisions that it makes instead of customary that

may or may not be in line with statutory or Sharia’ (Whitley, 2012).

Agencies charged with addressing issues of restricted access to justice,

instilling a national legal system and seeking a platform of harmonization with

international legal standards have slowly begun to realise that this customary

informal system despite its lack of uniformity and dominant patriarchal nature

50

Many of those interviewed alerted me to the point that Mullah and elder authority and influence, like many aspects of Afghan Civil Society, is Geographically dependent. In more urban locations like Kabul one will witness a decreased authority, while in rural and often isolated communities they remain influential. With an estimated 70% (Qazi, 2012) of the population living in Afghanistan’s rural locations such an engagement is crucial. 51

Whitley noted, ‘Probably over 90% of disputes are resolved through this informal system and that includes family disputes. It includes things about women, it includes disputes over property, basically everything. It is a combination of Sharia and customary law and its based around what the elders know so there is no uniform system and you know, sometimes on an elders Jurga you might have a Mullah and sometimes you wouldn’t and like I said sometimes the Mullahs are not guaranteed to know Sharia em it’s not a guarantee that the elders know Sharia so its pot luck’ (Whitley, 2012).

47

is one that simply cannot be ignored52. Ultimately access is everything.

Interestingly Greene noted,

‘Both the formal system and informal system have pros and cons obviously

and the formal system is better equipped to deal with complicated civil cases

like criminal cases, while the informal system is better at creating like long-

term peace because they are basing their decisions on restorative justice’

(Greene, 2013).

The formal statutory system based on the 2004 constitution remains largely

ineffective particularly in rural communities. The CPAU have recorded

community responses to the formal system which highlighted concerns of

corruption, Western agendas53 and an inability to enforce rulings. Furthermore

the high regard for Islamic law and principles thoroughly outperforms formal

efforts, ‘Afghan law is..the Afghan constitution says that although they have a

legal code and if that would in any way go against Sharia, Sharia overrules it’

(Greene, 2013).

As the informal label would suggest the construct of the system is by

nature complex and diverse. Typically it is associated with an agglomeration

of traditional tribal law and Islamic Sharia law but often the lines are blurred

and many including Greene believe that many Afghans themselves have

difficulty distinguishing between what is customary and what is indeed

52

Greene noted her organizations efforts to work with the informal system: ‘Traditionally in Afghanistan you have groups of elders who sit down and resolve disputes, they are called Shuras or Yurgas, so what we do, we pretty much go into villages and tell them what we want to do which is train in peace-building and peaceful conflict resolution and legal awareness’ (Greene, 2013). 53

Whitley noted how much of the recent legislation has failed to instil a sense of Afghan ownership and shake the image of Western agenda, ‘You have the 2009 elimination of violence against women law, now that you could argue was very much Western influenced and I’m not sure a lot of Afghans themselves….em, I think if you speak to judges and prosecutors in Afghanistan a lot of them are not very convinced by this law in terms of its applicability and they feel it was imposed by, you know, Westerners and it doesn’t feel very Afghan’ (Whitley, 2012).

48

traditional54. This becomes a particular issue when one considers women’s

access to justice. Pashtunwali customary law is perceived by many including

many of those whom I interviewed, as the most conservative code55 for

women. In matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance and negative practices

like Badal marriages56 such a blurring can be most devastating.

‘In the Quran and under Afghan law Mahr, which is Dowry, is fixed at around

300 Afghani which is not very much But Walwar which is particularly used by

Pashtun, is like an extra bride price, literally I mean I was shocked. You know

you would have Afghans who are earning almost nothing and they would be

paying Walwar of tens of thousands of dollars to marry their girls off so you

know so then they would end up getting married off to the highest bidder often

the guy who had made his money off poppy, who is in his eighties because

you know, he is the only guy who has that kind of money’ (Whitley, 2012).

Greene noted how in this respect many Afghan women desired access to a

system based upon Sharia law and not customary. Under Islamic law women

can initiate a divorce known as Palaq and it is generally perceived to be more

recognising of women’s rights57. In terms of international efforts to increase

access to justice and negotiate between dominant Afghan legal practices and

international, the humanitarian community cannot ignore this informal system

despite its complexities and lack of uniformity. A cultural sensitive approach

may prove more effective than employing a conditional international

54

This is largely to do with a long history of particular practices that have become deep-rooted into particular communities. Furthermore Afghans inability to refer to the Quran and overreliance on religious elders means there is little investigation. 55

‘ Pashtun ethnic group probably has one of the most conservative codes for women in all of Afghanistan you know even by Afghan standards the Pashtun way that women are regarded is very conservative you know women basically stay at home they don’t leave the house they are they are typically married of for very large Dowries to older men or to whoever can afford the Dowry you know women are very much secondary and this is something prominent in Pashtun culture I would say more than even Islam or Sharia law this is cultural’ (Whitley, 2012). 56

Badal Marriages is the practice whereby young children (mostly girls) are married of to settle feuds. 57

‘I would say not only Pashtunwali but between customary law and Islamic law Islamic law recognizes the statue and the role of women in society to a greater extent than customary law does’ (Greene, 2013).

49

approach. Engagement with community councils and dialogue on human

rights on both international and Afghan terms is essential. The promotion of a

unified system such as Sharia can prove beneficial in the eradication or

harmful practices such as Badal marriages58 and enables a clearer dialogue

with the international community. The well-informed approach of the CPAU

(noted in Chapter 1) can perhaps act as model:

‘I would say that you would have a hard time approaching people and getting

them to listen if you don’t link it to Islam, so in a sense to do any kind of

program implementation down here you kind of need to, you need to relate it

to something they know, or so you don’t just come in with something

completely like unfamiliar to them. And again Islam is such a huge part of

society you kind of need to relate it to them so you don’t come in and say Oh

in Europe we have an awesome way of doing this but rather saying that

human rights are just as well incorporated in Sharia or Islamic law as they are

in international laws’ (Greene, 2013).

International aid in Afghanistan has been dominated by contentious

debates on how to improve the rights and positioning of women. Given the

stark social indicators surrounding Afghan women particularly or maternal

mortality rates59 women’s empowerment has become a preoccupation for the

international humanitarian communities. If there were ever a greater need for

culturally sensitive programming this is it: ‘Because in a lot of the cases there

are no women doctors so they are not gonna otherwise go and see a male

doctor. So then they die in childbirth or complications’ (Reilly, 2012). Many of

58

Greene noted how her organization, in dialogue with rural community councils were able to curve the number of Badal marriages by noting that the practice was contrary to Sharia law. 59

Reilly noted how members of the communities they work with have two main concerns for assistance, ‘Another thing that we find in a lot of villages when you go in and talk to villages about their needs, there is usually two things they will always mention. The first one is water that’s a huge need they always need water and then the second thing is always about maternal mortality, so a lot of men are saying our wives are dying in childbirth, so that’s a really good entry point to bring up those issues ye know why are they dying’ (Reilly, 2012).

50

those interviewed spoke of the plight of many Afghan women60 and the

prevalent issues that occur on a daily basis61. Violence against women was

described by Whitley as endemic in her working region of Helmand. Qazi

noted the difficulties for women working as journalists in Kabul,

‘The difficulties in doing their work was just so wide-ranged some things were

very basic like they didn’t have electricity, there wasn’t roads or access to

certain areas they wanted to report on. Also because of the war it was very

dangerous to travel on some of the roads, em but they also talked about some

of the harassment they would get either from the people they were trying to

interview or from their families and friends. Some experienced all kinds of

threats trying to get stories like sexual violence or stations being bombed or

people throwing Molotov Cocktails at them’ (Qazi, 2012).

Whitley further noted an atmosphere of resignation among the women she

interviewed or came into contact with, ‘I think a lot of the women, they don’t

expect much more because that’s the situation they are in, that’s what’s

around them’ (Whitley, 2012). Respondents highlighted restricted access to

Afghan women in certain communities which has greatly impacted on the

delivery of aid and individual agencies ability to ascertain the success rate of

programming on women’s empowerment. Reilly noted, ‘When I go to

Afghanistan I can’t meet the women so it’s hard to know, but just from talking

60

Whitley noted, ‘One of the biggest reasons why women were in prison in Helmand was for morality crimes, for adultery or for running away from home and we would point out to these justice officials that running away is not crime’ (Whitley, 2012). 61

It must be pointed out however that there are great geographical differences in the agency and positioning of women in Afghanistan. Greene noted, ‘Kabul is not like the rest of Afghanistan and every area is obviously unique in its way but it’s very easy to bring forth the bad stories the horrible stories but there has been an improvement, you see women walking around these days’ (Greene, 2013) And Sahar noted,

‘There are great differences across Afghanistan particularly for the agency of women because I have a lot of female relatives in Kabul who can move around but in areas like Heart you see a lot of self-immolation because of forced marriages and what not’ (Sahar, 2013).

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to our staff anecdotally ye know some of committees women are quite

involved, others not so much’ (Reilly, 2012)62.

As I have discussed in my literary review international failings to

appreciate the complex and what is often referred to as conservative

positioning of Afghan women in Afghan society in programming or staff

interactions can not only result in ineffective aid but substantially it can create,

heighten and maintain existent tensions between Afghan women and their

communities. Gender Mainstreaming63 projects which are theoretically

designed to improve the rights of men, women and children have become

inseparable64 from notions of women’s empowerment and have largely failed

to appreciate the cultural sensitivities of Afghan women’s positioning in

society. Whitley sounded a caution to the international humanitarian

community, ‘I think we as Westerners have to be very careful as seen to

champion women’s rights too much. It has to be indigenous, it has to be

something that is pushed for by Afghan women and Afghan men and Afghan

societies’ (Whitley, 2012). A substantial appreciation of the male stakeholder

role is crucial to increasing the rights of women65:

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Reilly further noted how Strategic efforts are implemented to subtly gain access to Afghan women, ‘what we find usually is you start off doing certain projects to give it tangible benefits to the communities and then once you have that trust and you have made an impact you can introduce the ideas of working with the women and things like that, and they are going to be more receptive to it’ (Reilly, 2012). 63

Nader noted the alien terminology of Gender Mainstreaming for most Afghans, ‘I remember one person who was attending a Gender Mainstreaming workshop and in the conference after the workshop which was for the general public he came and said we want Gender Mainstreaming in the Afghan policies and this Gender Mainstreaming is one particular example that you can’t really make it, em, you can’t find an equivalent of it in Dari or Pashtun so it was a very odd translation and em, yes sometimes translations are very troublesome in Afghanistan, especially in Military’ (Qaderi, 2013). 64

Whitley was quick to condemn this exclusive association with Afghan women, ‘I think gender mainstreaming is a good thing when done right because gender mainstreaming isn’t just about prioritizing women it’s about doing your analysis of the needs of men, women, boys, and girls separately and addressing those needs. It’s not just about women’s empowerment and I think if gender mainstreaming is being used as a synonym for women’s empowerment that’s wrong’ (Whitley, 2012). 65

Reilly noted how his organization have become very cautious over programming exclusively for Afghan women, ‘We don’t have projects where it is only women benefitting that’s causing resentment, I mean you have to be very careful about things like that and very strategic’ (Reilly, 2012).

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‘There is some sensitivity about how women are/were empowered throughout

the past decade. This is not necessarily right , but Afghan men feel threatened

by the fact that their wives or sisters are more empowered; they think that

they do not have that authority in their home to make decisions for the family

anymore’ (Qaderi, 2013).

Whitley significantly added,

‘If you don’t engage male stakeholders you are dead in the water, there is no

point, you have to have to engage male stakeholders so if programs are

ignoring men or pushing women ahead of men then I’m sorry, it’s a badly

designed project’ (Whitley, 2012).

Every effort must be made in humanitarian planning to avoid the further

marginalization of Afghan women even with the best intentions.

Empowerment of women without the inclusion of all civil society will incur what

Whitley notes as a ‘substantial backlash for women’ (Whitley, 2012). This

does not suggest an end to Gender Mainstreaming Programming but rather

the proper implementation of its ideals66. The advancement of Afghan

women’s positioning in society is a complex and lengthy process that will only

truly be achieved by Afghans themselves. The international humanitarian

community continues to have a vital role to play, however, if in my opinion it

can come to terms with cultural sensitivities and appreciate women on Afghan

terms and not so-called Western.

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Whitley noted that she felt the humanitarian community should do more gender mainstreaming because it involved asking the right questions, she added; ‘Say for example we are going to do a food zone project so we are going to pay farmers not to grow poppy we are going to pay them to grow wheat. Ok, hypothetically, this was one of the projects that was done so what gender mainstreaming would mean is you ask the question in advance are there women who own property or are they farmers that we need to get involved in this program and how would we do that, because obviously most of the people we deal with are male because of the ministry of agriculture and all the land owners and so on. Now what that means is you go to the ministry of agriculture and you say well do you know any female land owners that have to be integrated into the project or you go to the department of women’s affairs and ask them and if the answer is no then fine you write it that there are no female beneficiaries on this project because we did our analysis which reveals that no women own land and to me that’s gender mainstreaming because it meant that you asked the question and even if the answer was no it meant we asked’ (Whitley, 2012).

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Where I found the most divided opinions amongst my participants was on

the potential role Islam has to play in the delivery of aid. By this I mean an

adequate engagement with dominant Islamic principles by international aid

agencies to work within culturally sensitive boundaries, particularly

surrounding the rights of women. Qaderi noted that ‘What is an issue from a

strategic point of view is that the NGO’s the international NGOs in Afghanistan

have not been able to couple their understanding of women’s liberties with

what Islam can offer’ (Qaderi, 2013). Greene held a similar regard for the role

of Islam and the Quran in particular ‘I think you have to go through explaining

that the Quran does not say that women should be locked up that they should

not be kept from society; the Quran states that men and women are equal,

they have different responsibilities but they are equal’ (Greene, 2013).

Offering a contrasting view Whitley believed while there may be a role for

Islam to play, however, international NGOs and aid agencies of the West are

not the ones to play it,

‘We can be very hand-fisted in how we do stuff and I would be very cautious

about saying Western donors or Western organizations should embrace Islam

as the way forward. Number one because I think Islam has some very

conservative elements in it, number two I think Western agencies have a very

limited understanding of it’ (Whitley, 2012).

Where one might conclude a common ground is on the necessary

engagement with Islamic tradition and culture in order to deliver aid that is in

compliment with the many cultural sensitivities. The question is rather the

nature of this engagement. Perhaps it is too much to request an in-depth

Quranic education for international aid staff but it is not beyond reason to

recommend dialogue or even outsourcing67 to NGO’s who are exclusively

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Doyle noted the potential for such outsourcing to local organizations, ‘Yes, I mean we have tried that approach as well with local organisations. There are some Afghan organisations who do that, they do show how the Quran can be misinterpreted in terms of Gender and stuff like that so yes, that is an approach that can work’ (Reilly, 2012). But later he admitted his NGO’s reservations, ‘No I mean were not a religious organization, we are a secular humanitarian organization impartial to all of those principles we don’t get involved with organizations that are specifically religious’ (Reilly, 2012).

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Islamic or not but have an in-depth knowledge to clarify programme

implementation and align international standards with Afghan68. Qaderi noted

the benefits such an engagement can have for Afghan communities,

particularly for women when one Islamic Iranian NGO sought to address the

rights of women under Islam69.

Since the military occupation of 2001 many local NGO’s and aid agencies,

Islamic and non-Islamic,70 have become blacklisted due to apparent links with

insurgents and conservative religious leaders. In addition, conservative

international donors and recent development policies such as the National

Solidarity Programme (NSP) prohibit programming of any religious nature.

The complexities of this reality will be discussed in great detail throughout. My

data has revealed to me that there is indeed a role for Islam to play in

delivering effective aid to Afghanistan. Furthermore it offers an avenue for

international aid actors to familiarise themselves with dominant cultural

practices and sensitivities; what has not become clear however is the nature

of this role.

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Whitley noted how one such international NGO has tried to improve the rights of Afghans through comparative law, ‘I mean there are things that we can support, you know, for example you can support cross-cultural dialogue, you can bring in maybe an Egyptian scholar to work on certain things. Take the Max Planck institute, one of the things the Max Planck institute do is comparable international law so they publish these manuals which look at how different Islamic countries address the same issues that are addressed in Afghan law. They will look at say Syria and Tunisia and they will say ok this is how Tunisia deals with divorce this is how Syria deals with divorce and so on’ (Whitley, 2012). 69

‘I remember one Iranian NGO had a training for the Afghan NGO’s on issue of civil society and human rights I found it extremely useful. Some of the concepts they talked about in Persian, Persian and Dari are of the same nature and it’s probably kind of a difference of accents, they could talk to people in their own language and could clarify some of the issues at the end of that training. Some women did say that they think Islam gives them a lot of rights and most of those rights are in correspondence with what we talk about on the international level. It is only our misunderstanding that has created this’ (Qaderi, 2013). 70

Crucially however Qaderi notes how the distinguishing line between Islamic and non-Islamic NGO’s has become blurred, ‘It is very difficult to distinguish between them from an ordinary Afghans point of view. They are all looked at as NGO’s they, to be honest can’t really differentiate between an Islamic and a non-Islamic’ (Qaderi, 2013).

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CONCLUSION

An evident conclusive point from the both existent literature and those whom I

interviewed is the truly complex, challenging, and arguably unique working

environment Afghanistan creates for international aid agencies, NGO’s and

the military forces. Aid policy must remain reactive and adaptable to the

continually evolving conditions and contextual challenges. My aim was to

investigate the experiences and opinions of a diverse group of participants

from multidisciplinary academic and work profiles. I designed my research to

capture each individual’s personal and professional interactions with issues of

cultural sensitivity and to highlight how this may have impacted (if at all) on

their work. As a result of their participation reflecting a wide variety of

institutional and organizational structures and mandates, namely international

and national, state funded and non-governmental, and humanitarian and

military, I feel I can credibly claim a significant role for cultural sensitivities in

current and future aid delivery in the region. I believe such an opinion is

supported by occurring themes in my data and much of the existent literature.

These themes are deserving of further clarification.

While most of my participants noted a great geographical variance in

many issues of project implementation, autonomy, security and access to

potential beneficiaries across urban and rural locations, almost all of them

alluded to the dominant role Islam has to play in everyday Afghan society.

The nature of this role was not uniformly agreed upon, however, with Greene

noting its over-arching reach, Qazi upheld a regard for its often superficial

nature. Nevertheless the difficulty in separating religious from non-religious

spaces, the presence of Islam in both the social and political spheres and as

Greene noted the statutory legal system (in many regions) under-performing

to Islamic law, demands a high regard for Islamic tradition and it’s cultural

connotations. Failing to appreciate its deep-rooted engrained impact on

society can, as Reilly noted, have a negative consequence for aid staff and

put both their own and their organizations safety at risk. Arguably even more

importantly however it can have a negative long-lasting impact on

beneficiaries themselves, as Whitley highlighted on the issues of affording

Afghan women rights before so-called conservative sections of society are

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ready to realise them. Qaderis poetic appreciation of the presence of Islam

from the time of birth to death is greatly telling of its significance.

Evident from my findings is that access to communities (particularly of the

rural variety) is largely dependent on gaining admission from the

village/community religious leader or Mullah. All of my interviewees noted the

authority and power wielded by these figures and their unique role as

gatekeepers. Greene mentioned that only in the last 18 months, programme

designers of the military’s WHAM project have come to recognise this

necessary engagement. Furthermore, beyond necessity they may act as a

positive resource in terms of development and are ‘key to getting the country

on the right track’ (Greene, 2013). The need for cultural sensitive

programming is even more evident in terms of Afghan legal systems. While

Whitley and Qazi sounded caution in assuming the nature and origin of their

authority and power and actual Islamic education, engagement is still

necessary. When 90% of Afghans only have access to one system of law, it is

a system that cannot be ignored; for as Whitley conceded it as a system that

has existed before us and will arguably out last international presence in

Afghanistan.

One theme of my findings that I feel is most standout and evidence of the

need for cultural sensitivities in aid programming is Gender and the

empowerment of women in Afghanistan. Again problems of access and

interaction were highlighted by my interviewees which are largely bound in

issues of cultural sensitivity. Notably Reilly noted he cannot have any access

to women when returning to Afghanistan due to it being culturally

inappropriate. Epidemic issues for women like maternity mortality rates and

violence (of many kinds) both in the public and private sphere have to be

addressed with culturally appropriate responses such as gendered staffing

requirements or engagement with the local male stakeholder. Whitley was

very vocal on this point ‘in fact I would argue that the best way to empower

women in Afghanistan is to engage the males because ultimately they are the

ones with the power’ (Whitley, 2013). Her warning to the aid community to

alter their promotion and championing of women in keeping with conservative

cultural restraints is greatly telling of the need for cultural awareness. The

potential consequences of awarding theoretical rights before they are realised

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in society particularly in the overtly conservative regions, can be devastating

for women, as Qaderi noted with the common occurrence of self-immolations

in Herat Province.

Importantly Qaderi noted how even now many Afghan men continue to

have negative perceptions of Gender Mainstreaming projects. Many see it as

their own authority diminishing for the benefit of their female counterparts.

Notably (and unfortunately) this is still somewhat in keeping with Abirafehs

2005 and 2009 findings as discussed in the Chapter 1. Crucially however

Whitley maintained that the international humanitarian community should be

doing more Gender Mainstreaming as when implemented right ‘asks the right

questions’ (Whitley, 2012). She further noted that Gender Mainstreaming

projects not engaging with the male stakeholder are ‘badly designed projects’

(Whitley, 2012). Herein lies a strong argument for the need for culturally

sensitive programming, the empowerment of women must adhere to the

gender stratified social structure that is a product of cultural and traditional

mechanisms. Failing do so may result in under-performing projects and

significantly put women at risk of a backlash.

In terms of aid agencies and NGOs implementing official training

programmes on issues of cultural sensitivity Humphries highlighted on more

than one occasion the problem of funding. He noted the pressure on

international agencies to appease the donating public who wanted to see

physical development for their money and not allocated for staff training. He

further noted however ‘a lot of waste’ (Humphries, 2012) in aid funding that

could potentially go toward funding. Perhaps streamlining and a

reprioritization are necessary. Other interviewees noted no official training

beyond a briefing on the do’s and don’ts and current situation on the ground.

In terms of policy many referred to the NSP and its prohibiting of any planning

that is of religious nature. This is an agenda that all of those whom I

interviewed bar one, are or were a participant under. I am of the opinion that

such a restriction is ludicrous and not in keeping with the dominant role Islam

continues to play in Afghanistan. Such an opinion is somewhat supported by

Reilly who noted community centres they constructed became ‘an annex to

the mosque’ while Greene noted its difficulty in implementation on the ground.

Operating language also occurred as an issue for those who I interviewed

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from the humanitarian community. The inability to translate certain

humanitarian terminologies into local dialects and even the construction of a

development language itself overwhelmed many of the local population

according to Qaderi. Humphries noted the need for a cross-comparative

agenda such as that of the CPAU (see Chapter 1) to make every effort to

work within local languages. Such an effort would be naturally in keeping with

culturally sensitive programming.

When asked the question of who will be the dominant aid force in

Afghanistan following the withdrawal of international troops in 2014 I received

many distinct and contrasting answers. As I feel cultural sensitivities could/do

play a significant role in aid delivery it is important to conclude who is best

placed to do it. Geographical variance again plays a significant role with the

individual locations of organizations and projects greatly revealing of their

opinion. Many shared their concern for NGOs and international agencies due

to the military’s engagement in Afghan civil society. Qadari noted the ill-

sentiments among the aid community for this engagement and Humphries

further noted it as a potential future challenge to the function of the aid

community in the region. Whitley noted that ‘nobody really makes the

distinction anymore’ between so-called traditional aid groups and the military

backed projects done largely through the PRT’s. One could conclude that if

local benefactors are not making this distinction then why should we, aid is

aid? I believe however, it is of the upmost importance for the international

community to distinguish between these two distinct engagements whether it

is apparent to those on the ground or not.

The nature of the assistance through the PRTs with its much higher

budgets (Whitley, 2012), the existence of cultural sensitivity training in the

military (Humphries, 2012) and often greater access to remote areas should

promise more effective aid. However as my data suggests the PRTs (that my

respondents have witnessed) often fail to communicate adequately with local

communities and benefactors, have short-term impact, are often correlated

with military intelligence gathering (Qaderi), and are largely concerned with

consent winning (WHAM) and not long-term development. The fact that their

huge budgets and projects will not be sustainable by international NGO’s and

aid agencies following 2014 is disheartening. It is a horrible irony that those

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best placed to implement programming that adheres to and compliments the

many deeply engrained issues of cultural sensitivity in Afghanistan are the

international forces. Their sheer man power, ICT’s, budgets, regional

intelligence and already existent training on cultural sensitivity are a testament

to this. However the nature of their civil society engagement (according to my

participants) is also a testament to their intent. While I have no desire to

corrupt the reputation of all military funded projects I can recognize their

shortcomings in the development agenda. This is typified by Qazi and her

recollection of Kabul and its unmet requirements a decade on from the arrival

of international forces. Arguably from any and every perspective, the

international forces should never be considered within the so-called natural

humanitarian space. NGO’s and aid agencies (both national and international)

have assured their presence in the country post 2014 (Qaderi, 2013), and

while they may not have the resources and funding of the military forces they

are (in my opinion), the only agents capable of implementing aid programming

that works in keeping with and perhaps in harmony with issues of cultural

sensitivity. One might go so far as to argue that such cultural conditions may

be used as a powerful resource for the development of Afghanistan in keeping

with its own mechanism and indigenous traditions.

Evident from the data is that many elements of Afghan society are

engrained with deep-rooted cultural elements and mechanisms that cannot be

bypassed by international agencies seeking to alter living conditions for the

better. Negating the complex and long-standing elements of culture that have

defined the region for centuries, further negates a local participation in their

own development. As a consequence, a diminishing of local process and

ownership will arguably impact on long-term sustainability and the

construction of a fully representative and inclusive development model. A

prominent instruction from all my research participants was that development

and construction of Afghan society has to be done by Afghans themselves.

Consequently, one must question what outcome there will be if international

aid (by whatever agent) fails to recognise the existence and role of Afghan

cultural sensitivities.

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