Dispatches from the Dispatches from the Benthos: Benthos:

Catch Shares and the Catch Shares and the Promise of Industry Promise of Industry

StewardshipStewardship

Alison RieserAlison RieserLes WatlingLes WatlingUniversity of Hawai’i at MānoaUniversity of Hawai’i at Mānoa

Ecosystem Overfishing

• both US Ocean Commissions acknowledged that fisheries can profoundly alter marine ecosystemstructure & function

Policy prescriptions for fisheries

• Pew Oceans Commission (2003) make marine ecosystems the organizing principle allocate fishing privileges to align fishers’ incentives with ecosystemif exclusive quotas are used, review regularly to allow transition to adaptive, ecosystem-based management

• U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy (2004, pp. 252-261)manage the oceans on an ecosystems basismake greater use of “dedicated access privileges” (DAP);use DAP fees to support ESBMdevelop regional ecosystem assessments and adopt ecosystem goals & objectives (w/ regional fishery councils “participating”)

U.S. Ocean Policy (2010): adopt ecosystem-based management as a foundational principle for the comprehensive mgt of the oceans…

NOAA’s Catch Share Policy

• “To achieve long-term ecological and economic sustainability of the Nation’s fishery resources and fishing communities, NOAA encourages the consideration and adoption of catch shares wherever appropriate in fishery management and ecosystem plans … and will support the design, implementation, and monitoring of catch share programs.”

questions

• Is there any evidence that catch shares/ITQs create incentives for fishermen’s stewardship?

• How is stewardship being defined?• Can we design catch share programs to

promote ecosystem-based management outcomes without relying on ‘fishful thinking’?

Evidence

• Catch shares can create incentives to internalize adverse impacts to target fish stock and specific by-catch species

• Catch shares do not create incentives to address ecological externalities of fishing– damage to habitat not tied to fish productivity– damage to benthic communities & biodiversity

A growing push to implement catch share fishery programs is based partly on the recognition that they may provide stronger incentives for ecological stewardship than conventional fisheries management. Using data on population status, quota compliance, discard rates, use of habitat-damaging gear, and landings for 15 catch share programs in North America, I tested the hypothesis that catch share systems lead to improved ecological stewardship and status of exploited populations.

The average levels of most indicators were unaffected by catch share implementation: only discard rate (*), which declined significantly in catch share fisheries, showed a significant response.

From: Essington, 2010, Ecological indicators display reduced variation in North American catch share fisheries. PNAS

These findings suggest that for the indicators examined, the primary effect of catch shares was greater consistency over time. This enhanced consistency could be beneficial to fishery systems and might also be an indication of more effective management.

Definition of industry stewardship

• Reducing amount of gear• Slowing fishing so more care can be taken in

choosing where & how to fish• Seeking reductions in TACs

• Identifying areas outside existing footprint to be designated as closed areas

• Adopting less-damaging gear

From T. Branch, 2009. How do ITQs affect marine ecosystems?,Fish & Fisheries 10:39-57.

Recent studies of CS/ITQ regimes

• ITQs can reduce overfishing of target species if based on meaningful TAC (Costello et al. 2008; Chu 2009)

• ITQs are not consistently effective in achieving EBFM outcomes (Branch, 2009)

‘Timing is everything’

• “once property rights [in fishing] have been allocated, it [has proven] difficult for regulators to protect benthic habitats and associated and dependent non-commercial species”

Gibbs, M.T., “Lesser known consequences of managing

marine fisheries using ITQs,” Marine Policy 31:112 (2007)

Deepsea Group Quota Owners Association asked Fisheries Minister to set aside 31% of NZ EEZ into Benthic Protection Areas

this equates to 4.4 times NZ’s land area

Closed to bottom trawling & dredging by regulation under Fisheries Act

See Helson et al. 2010, “Private rights, public benefits: Industry-driven seabed protection,”Marine Policy 34:557-66.

The ProposalThe Proposal

Clement & Associates LimitedFISHERIES ADVISORS TO THE DEEPWATER STAKEHOLDER GROUP LTD

Ministry adopted seamount closures(in filled red boxes)

Benthic Protection Areas inopen red boxes

Marine Env’t Classification 2005

NZ’s Biodiversity StrategyCommitment to protect 10% in MPAsBy 2010

But NZ’s National Institute ofWater & Atmosphereanalysis indicates most BPAs inareas of low biodiversity value

Also, BPAs are in water far too deep to trawl. Is this ecological stewardship?

Australia’s ocean policy and marine regional planning

• 1998 National Ocean Policy

• Planning process divides oceans into marine bio-regions (LMEs) and sets policies for development of regional plans

• Southeast Region Marine Plan completed May 2004 was used to identify candidate MPA areas, including the first lg-scale, deep offshore region and to integrate fisheries management with spatial planning tools

• Industry input through AFMA

Australia’s approach

• Marine Bioregional Plan for SE region preceded creation of new trawl FMP based on statutory fishing rights (ITQs)

• SE trawl FMPs had to be certified as ecologically sustainable under Environment Protection & Biodiversity Act 1999 based on ecological risk assessments

In 2006, Australia adopts first temperate deepsea MPA network in the world.

Protects representative examples of diverse seafloor features & associated benthic habitats. Through Australia Fishery Mgt Authority, industry input modified the proposal to be 20% larger (226,500 sq km).

Likely outcome under US Catch Share Policy

• Industry associations/sectors will ask councils to reduce TACs but will not ask for additional EFH or closed protected areas under sec. 303(b)(12)

• MSA’s habitat protection provisions are discretionary (vs. EPBA ’99)

• MSA & NMFS’s approach to habitat do not created sufficient incentive for industry to adopt voluntary ecosystem measures

Prospect for reform in the US?• Until there is much greater public

demand, it will be difficult to convince Congress to strengthen the ecosystem rebuilding provisions of the MSFCMA

• NOAA should be strongly encouraged to use existing law to combat “ecosystem overfishing” and NEPA, the Marine Sanctuaries Act, CZMA, and other laws along with the MSFCMA to do integrated marine ecosystem planning

• require overhaul all FMPs that do not address ecosystem overfishing, using access privileges to leverage a sincere commitment from industry to ecosystem rebuilding