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Disneys successful adaptation in Hong Kong: A glocalization perspective Jonathan Matusitz Published online: 28 October 2009 # Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009 Abstract This paper applies the principles of glocalization theory to Disneys successful adaptation in Hong Kong. Glocalization refers to the interface of the global and the local. After Hong Kong Disneylands lack of success within a year of its opening in 2005, Disney executives attempted to cater to the local Chinese context. From a glocalization perspective, four major changes were made: (1) reduction of prices; (2) adaptation to local visitorscustoms; (3) change of décors and settings; and (4) adaptation of labor practices. Ever since, Hong Kong Disneyland has proved successful: park attendance and revenues from growth have increased. Keywords Adaptation . Business . China . Culture . Disney . Globalization . Glocalization The purpose of this paper is to apply the principles of glocalization theory to Disneys successful adaptation in Hong Kong. The theme park is known as Hong Kong Disneyland. When it first opened in 2005, it was met with mitigated responses. One of the main reasons is that Disneys traditional method of imposing its US products from its Burbank, CA headquarters to the Chinese local context did not work. Amid many criticisms, employees complained that Disneys labor practices, restaurants, and various outlets were not Chineseenough, and Disneys rides, shows, and events were not appealing to Chinese visitors. To the locals, this demonstrated too much Western cultural imperialism. As a result, Disney executives attempted to cater to the local Chinese context and this is why the author adopts a glocalization perspective. Glocalization refers to the interface of the global and the Asia Pac J Manag (2011) 28:667681 DOI 10.1007/s10490-009-9179-7 J. Matusitz (*) Nicholson School of Communication, University of Central Florida, 600 Colonial Center Parkway, Lake Mary, FL 32746, USA e-mail: [email protected]

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Disney’s successful adaptation in Hong Kong:A glocalization perspective

Jonathan Matusitz

Published online: 28 October 2009# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009

Abstract This paper applies the principles of glocalization theory to Disney’ssuccessful adaptation in Hong Kong. Glocalization refers to the interface of the globaland the local. After Hong Kong Disneyland’s lack of success within a year of itsopening in 2005, Disney executives attempted to cater to the local Chinese context.From a glocalization perspective, four major changes were made: (1) reduction ofprices; (2) adaptation to local visitors’ customs; (3) change of décors and settings; and(4) adaptation of labor practices. Ever since, Hong Kong Disneyland has provedsuccessful: park attendance and revenues from growth have increased.

Keywords Adaptation . Business . China . Culture . Disney . Globalization .

Glocalization

The purpose of this paper is to apply the principles of glocalization theory toDisney’s successful adaptation in Hong Kong. The theme park is known as HongKong Disneyland. When it first opened in 2005, it was met with mitigated responses.One of the main reasons is that Disney’s traditional method of imposing its USproducts from its Burbank, CA headquarters to the Chinese local context did notwork. Amid many criticisms, employees complained that Disney’s labor practices,restaurants, and various outlets were not “Chinese” enough, and Disney’s rides,shows, and events were not appealing to Chinese visitors. To the locals, thisdemonstrated too much Western cultural imperialism. As a result, Disney executivesattempted to cater to the local Chinese context and this is why the author adopts aglocalization perspective. Glocalization refers to the interface of the global and the

Asia Pac J Manag (2011) 28:667–681DOI 10.1007/s10490-009-9179-7

J. Matusitz (*)Nicholson School of Communication, University of Central Florida, 600 Colonial Center Parkway,Lake Mary, FL 32746, USAe-mail: [email protected]

local, a cooptation of the global and the local, the dynamics of culturalhomogenization and heterogenization, and the conflation of both universalizingand particularizing tendencies. Ever since, Hong Kong Disneyland has proved fairlysuccessful: park attendance and revenues from growth have increased.

This paper begins with a detailed description of the theoretical concept ofglocalization, what the term means, in what areas it has been applied, and how it fitsinto current globalization trends. Then, this paper proceeds to outline the history ofHong Kong Disneyland from its opening to the present. What follows is the heart ofthis analysis: the glocalization of Hong Kong Disneyland. As such, it is a section thatexplains, in detail, the four major changes that have made Hong Kong Disneylandmore successful: (1) reduction of prices; (2) adaptation to local visitors’ customs; (3)change of décors and settings; and (4) adaptation of labor practices. This paper endswith a discussion section that also includes suggestions for future research.

Glocalization theory: A description

Developed by Robertson (1992, 1994), glocalization is a theoretical concept that is amélange of the words “globalization” and “localization.” Glocalization refers to theinterface of the global and the local (Andrews & Ritzer, 2007), a cooptation of theglobal and the local (de Nuve, 2007; Swyngedouw, 1997), the dynamics of culturalhomogenization and heterogenization (Eric, 2007), and the conflation of bothuniversalizing and particularizing tendencies (Robertson, 1994). Whereas globalization,in and of itself, stresses the omnipresence of corporate or cultural processes worldwide,glocalization stresses particularism of a global idea, product, or service (Ritzer, 2007).

Communication scholarMarwanKraidy has analyzed glocalization in detail. Accordingto Kraidy (2001), glocalization refers to a new cultural hybrid and change of norms andpractices aimed as adjusting to local mindsets (Kraidy, 2002). Glocalization is not merelyanother take on niche-marketing, now global. Rather, glocalization also adds accuracyto the present globalization approach among scholars and practitioners (Svensson, 2001).Glocalization theory fuses relationships, balance, and harmony between culturalhomogenization and heterogenization, standardization and adaptation, homogenizationand tailoring, convergence and divergence, and universalism and particularism(Robertson, 1995). Glocalization is important because it questions the very model ofWestern cultural imperialism (Schiller, 1971). From this vantage point, globalizationstrengthens the consciousness of the world that pervades both the local and the global(Holton, 1998). This opposed the argument that globalization is a fully homogeneousprocess. On the contrary, while globalization gears toward some degree of culturalhomogenization, it simultaneously permits people to identify more strongly with theirlocal culture (Maynard & Tian, 2004). Glocalization is tantamount to relocalization,whereby the practice is to integrate local elements into global themes, products, orservices (Archer, 2008; Lee, 2003).

Glocalization emphasizes that relocating a theme, product, or service elsewherehas a higher chance of success when it is accommodated to the local culture in whichit is introduced (Appadurai, 1996; Robertson, 2001). The fundamental thesis behindglocalization is that imposing our home values in other cultures does not always bearfruits. For Friedman (2005), in order to uphold cultural survival, local cultures must

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forfeit some of their economic imperialism to global processes so that they canachieve economic success by Western standards. Yet, to remain “local,” localcultures must simultaneously maintain their local ways of life while undergoingglobalizing processes. Friedman (2005) refers to this as glocalization too.Consequently, glocalization is a specific type of globalization that is receptive todifferences within and between areas of the globe (Robertson, 2001). The goal ofglocalization is to look for local market input and break out from the ivory tower.This also means that no single approach is right in all instances.

Glocalization refers to both minor modifications to global products and moresignificant changes to those products for a specific local market (Robertson, 2007).From this perspective, direct associations exist between the local and internationallevels (Mooney & Evans, 2007). Local forces work to alleviate the impact oftransnational institutions (Aliet, 2007). As explained in this paper in detail, oneof these transnational institutions is the economy of global scale set by a giant ofglobalization: the Walt Disney Company. For the past two decades, one of the chiefconcerns Disney has had with respect to globalization is determining the fit of whatit wishes to transfer abroad with new host cultures (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989, 1997;Kogut, 1989; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1993; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). Since theheadquarters of the Disney corporation in the US are considerably foreign from itssubsidiaries on other continents, the corporation is well aware that the transplanta-tion of Disney assets may not fit the receiving environment in host countries(Hymer, 1976; Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002, 2003).

Only when adaptation to foreignness is successful can glocalization becomesuccessful. Generally, foreignness refers to dissimilarity—or lack of fit—in operatingcontexts of a transnational corporation between home and host environments (Hymer,1976; Kindleberger, 1969). Adaptation requires flexibility and tolerance, even thepromotion of differences. One of the biggest obstacles to effectiveness for executivesworking outside their native culture is a lack of tolerance from the “locals.” However,mere tolerance of differences is just the beginning. Real adaptation requiresexecutives to generate diversity vis-à-vis local conditions (Ulrich & Smallwood,2006). People think they might know a great deal about foreignness, strategic fit, anddifferences in host cultures, but there is something about the role of the countryenvironment in the global transfer of corporation assets that is missing (Brannen,2004). As this case study on the glocalization of Hong Kong Disneyland will reveal,glocalization theory helps fill this gap. Disney experienced unanticipated success inJapan but an equally unanticipated lack of success in Hong Kong, even though bothplaces are in East Asia. This demonstrates that, somehow, in the transfer process, thetransplanted Disney assets—as well as the notion of foreignness itself—assumeunanticipated meanings that directly affect globalization outcomes (Brannen, 2004).

Hong Kong Disneyland: From its opening to the present

The Walt Disney Company is one of the biggest media and entertainment businessesin the world. The company grew from a tiny business in 1923 to one of theheavyweights of globalization. In the 1920s and 1930s, Disney consisted of only onestudio and one theme park. By the end of the twentieth century, the company had

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numerous TV networks, additional theme parks openings, a cruise line, merchandising inUS malls and airports, publishing houses, real estate, hotel resorts, and so forth(Clandinin, 2006). By 2005, the Walt Disney Company expanded to 129,000employees (Page, 2006). This high number of employees stems from the fact that thecompany has established, respectively in time, Disneyland, Disney World, TokyoDisneyland, Disneyland Paris, and Hong Kong Disneyland (Schmidt, Conaway,Easton, & Wardrope, 2007). Building theme parks is the main foundation of Disney’sstrategy of global growth. According to Disney’s Chief Executive Bob Iger, overseasmarkets are crucial because they offer clear growth opportunities for a business that stillearns more than 75% of its revenues from domestic sources (Marr & Fowler, 2005).

Hong Kong Disneyland is the most recent major theme park built by Disney. Allbegan in 1985 when Disney executives met with government officials of the Hong KongSpecial Administrative Region (HKSAR) to negotiate the company’s expansion there.After years of talks, Disney opted for a park in Southern China (Marr & Fowler, 2005).The Walt Disney Company and HKSAR reached an agreement to build the theme parkin Hong Kong in 1999 (Zhang, 2007). Even though Hong Kong was handed over to thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC) in July 1997, there is still a one-country–two-government-system that prevails. The HKSAR government agreed to invest $2.9 billion(including infrastructure improvements and loans) and earn a 57% stake in the project(about $780 million); Disney would own the remaining 43% (approximately $419million) (Marr & Fowler, 2005). According to estimates from the HKSAR government,the construction of the resort created 30,000 jobs (Wiseman, 2005).

The PRC is still the world’s most popular destination for the Walt DisneyCompany because of the nation’s size. Investors predict China’s economy willremain robust. A global business’s decision to make a foreign investment iscontingent upon economic and political factors. What mostly attracted the WaltDisney Company to Southern China are low labor costs and less costly materials(Schmidt et al., 2007). In China, Mickey Mouse, Daffy Duck, and Winnie-the-Poohare hardly household names. Disney wanted to change that. According to the WorldTourism Organization, an international group that oversees policy issues, the PRC isexpected to be one of the largest tourist destinations on earth in the next 15 years;and Hong Kong is already in the top 15 (Holson, 2005). The hope is that HongKong Disneyland will boost the tourism industry in the next two decades (Lee &Haque, 2006).

Hong Kong Disneyland was built on a 250-ha plot located on Penny’s Bay andsided by mountains (Holson, 2005). The precise location is the undeveloped LantauIsland, 30 min away from downtown Hong Kong. The theme park can be easilyreached from Hong Kong by a Mass Transit Rail System (MTR). The resort isthemed around “four lands,” which are representative of other Disney resorts. Thelands are Main Street, USA, Tomorrowland, Adventureland, and Fantasyland. Eachland comes with star attractions (Ball, Horner, & Nield, 2007). Hong KongDisneyland also includes the first train line ever devoted to a theme park, with railcars sporting mouse head-shaped windows (McPhail, 2006).

Hong Kong Disneyland opened in September 2005 (McKercher, Wong, & Lau,2006). Amid disappointing attendance (A Chinese Makeover for Mickey andMinnie, 2008), the theme park only drew 5.6 million visitors during the first season.This debut was marred by public relations debacles and protests over Disney’s

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refusal to let Chinese food inspectors onto the premises (Wiseman, 2005). Accordingto labor leader and legislator Lee Cheuk-Yan, Hong Kong was not a good place forbeing a colony of Disney. To begin, Hong Kong Disneyland could not manage todraw customers because it was considered too small relative to other Disney themeparks worldwide (i.e., Disneyland, Disneyworld, Tokyo Disneyland, and DisneylandParis). In fact, Hong Kong Disneyland was so small that visitors had to wait in linesfor hours before enjoying park rides and other attractions (Huang & Hsu, 2005).

In line with these contentions, after Hong Kong Disneyland opened, it was facingcompetition from a neighboring attraction, Ocean Park, a marine-themed theme parklocated in the Southern District of Hong Kong (Huang & Hsu, 2005). A few yearsago, approximately five million people visited Ocean Park, earning it the position ofthe World’s Number 15 Theme Park by Annual Attendance. This figure was wellahead of Hong Kong Disneyland (Fyall, Leask, Garrod, & Wanhill, 2008).Additionally, the city of Hong Kong considered Disney’s presence as unacceptable.Planting an American cultural and business institution on Chinese soil was expectedto be challenging from day 1 (Wiseman, 2005). Within days of its opening, the HongKong Disneyland infuriated local pop stars, upset labor leaders, and receivedcriticism from the Hong Kong government, its own partner in the theme park.Among other things, a discontented, fired employee climbed atop Space Mountainand said he would kill himself until he was talked down (Wiseman, 2005).

Given these drawbacks, observers and analysts were questioning Disney’s latestforay in a foreign culture. Among the rebukes, visitors from mainland China werenot familiar with both the Disney culture and Disney characters (Lee, Garbarino, &Lerman, 2007). Likewise, they had no idea about how to behave or what to enjoy atan amusement park. In fact, some visitors were entering the park, snapped a fewpictures, and then turned around to leave (Fowler & Marr, 2006). After months ofdiscussion, Disney executives realized that Hong Kong Disneyland was insuffi-ciently catered to local customs and needed to undergo serious local adjustments inorder to become popular among the Chinese and Hong Kongers. The next sectiondiscusses the glocalization changes brought forth by Hong Kong Disneyland.

The glocalization of Hong Kong Disneyland

Hong Kong Disneyland’s main challenge was to tailor its corporate philosophy andniche attractions to the local Chinese culture, environment, and mindset while keepingthe Disney theme intact, something that has proved challenging to Disney executives(Marr, 2007). By integrating itself into the Chinese context, the goal of Disney wasto avoid problems of cultural backlash, customs, and traditions. This sectionexplains, in detail, the four major glocalization changes that have made Hong KongDisneyland more successful: (1) reduction of prices; (2) adaptation to local visitors’customs; (3) change of décors and settings; and (4) adaptation of labor practices.

Reduction of prices

When Hong Kong Disneyland opened in September 2005, the area had not fullyrecovered from the late 1990s Asian financial crisis (Wiseman, 2005). In the

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beginning, the admission ticket to the theme park was too high for local visitors.Because China overall was still a nation with low income levels, the lack ofaffordability of the Disney vacation experience did not help (Marr & Fowler, 2005).Also, the theme park sold tickets that visitors could use on any day, withoutconsidering China’s holiday schedule (Kwok, 2007). Executives at Hong KongDisneyland soon realized that finding strategies to drop prices and, ultimately, to fitthe nation’s low-income levels and holiday schedule was necessary (Marr & Fowler,2005). Today, prices at HK$295 (US$38) for an admission ticket (for adults) on aweekday are cheaper than at the other Disney parks (Year of the Mouse, 2005).Because Hong Kong Disneyland was (and still is) the smallest Disney parkworldwide, another reason for promoting these low off-peak prices was an attempt atcrowd control—prices became higher on weekends and holidays. Now Hong KongDisneyland even offers lower prices for seniors. This is presumably an effect of thefamily-oriented culture in Asia in regards to senior citizens (Zhibin Gu & Ratliff,2006).

A third reason for cutting the price stems from the fact that China already hasnumerous theme parks (although many of them are forced to close or are strugglingfinancially). The Walt Disney Company successfully conveys the message that itsparks are different from the more traditional thrill-ride parks that are the Chinesestandard today (Marr & Fowler, 2005). Not surprisingly, because China is a massivecountry, the Hong Kong theme park is welcoming, yearly, at least a third of itsvisitors from the mainland, not just from Hong Kong. However, it is important tonote that, nowadays, particularly this fiscal year 2009, the income levels ofinhabitants of Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong have surpassed the income levelsof people who live in many other large cities worldwide (Prices and Earnings, 2009).In fact, the economy in Hong Kong has so much improved that Hong KongDisneyland has recently increased its admission prices for Hong Kong residentsfrom HK$295 to HK$350 for adults, and from HK$210 to HK$250 for children.Disney visitors have been charged these prices since the spring of 2009 (Lau &Chen, 2009).

Adaptation to local visitors’ customs

People from mainland China have very different expectations than those from manyother places in the world. Generally, visitors from the mainland travel on packagetours that include group dinners. At first, Hong Kong Disneyland could notaccommodate such large groups. In addition, the ticket prices did not have adequatecommissions for the tour operators. Therefore, few of them included Disney on theiritineraries. Hong Kong Disneyland was so unpopular that a Hong Kong transvestitebar nearby was attracting more visitors from the mainland (Holson, 2005). Today,the theme park has significantly improved its collaboration with tour companies,which now benefit from a share in attractions and steer their groups towards them(Fowler, 2006). Disney marketing executives have also been training Asian travelagents for months, where the firm expects one third of the park’s revenues to comefrom (Martin, 2007).

In a similar vein, efforts by the Walt Disney Company to improve the attendanceat the Hong Kong Disneyland theme park have included adding local attractions and

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entertainment offerings in 2008 (Ng & Orwall, 2007). For example, seasonalentertainment, such as Disney’s Haunted Halloween (which was actually started byOcean Park), A Sparkling Christmas, and Disney’s Chinese New Year, are shown inthe park to celebrate main Chinese festivals. It is a truism that fireworks andgunpowder were invented in China (Sardar & Masood, 2006). For this reason,Disney managers made a wise move by holding fireworks extravaganzas in HongKong Disneyland. The park also includes the world’s only Fantasy Gardens, wherechildren can meet famous characters (Reiber, 2007). Likewise, for a long time, Chinawas under communist rule. Today, this is still felt in Hong Kong Disneyland in thesense that, for instance, Mickey and Minnie Mouse benefited from a communistmakeover in 2008. While Mickey was put in a bright red Mao suit, Minnie sported acherry-blossom red dress, in an attempt to appeal to Chinese tourists (A ChineseMakeover for Mickey and Minnie, 2008).

Cast members at the theme park speak both English and local dialects. In HongKong, one of the official dialects is Cantonese; in China, it is Putonghua (alsoknown as Standard Mandarin or Standard Chinese). Since Chinese visitors are stillnot too familiar with the Walt Disney Company, the theme park has produced guidesdescribing attractions like rides and shows. Brochures and maps are printed intraditional and simplified characters, Japanese, and English (Fowler, 2006). Todemonstrate its willingness to adjust to the Chinese tourist culture even more, HongKong Disneyland will soon perform its own version of the show “It’s a SmallWorld,” with a lady doll in a traditional Chinese opera costume and a specificallydesigned Hong Kong scene that features Victoria Harbor and the city’s landmarkskyscrapers. The goal of Disney is evident: to blend local, regional, and globalelements. New versions of the theme song—respectively in Mandarin, Cantonese,Tagalog (the official language in the Philippines), and Korean—will be added to theHong Kong rendering of “It’s a Small World” (Epstein & Shapiro, 2007).

Visitors from both mainland China and Hong Kong will be pleased to see theJungle Cruise (Barrier, 2008). Indeed, the Hong Kong Disneyland version has newfeatures, whereby skippers conduct live commentary in Cantonese, Putonghua, andEnglish; guests can board whatever boat and the skipper speaks their language. Theskippers’ witticisms and jokes have also been tailored to local cultural sensibilities.And, in contrast to the other Disney parks that also have the Jungle Cruise attraction,Hong Kong Disneyland has added Cambodian ruins for guests to float past and anunruly pack of hippos. In this case, there are no guns scaring off the hippos; thehippos have bad breath and belch (Holson, 2005). All these new Disney facets seemto exemplify the Disneyfication of the spectacle (Demossier, 2007). Nevertheless,Hong Kong Disneyland recently came under fire for being so overcrowded on theLunar New Year holiday, so much so that ticketed guests had to be turned away(Fowler, 2006).

In line with these contentions, to benefit the most from its guests, Hong KongDisneyland tried to make adjustments to local eating habits and food preferences.One of the most challenging decisions by Disney was to include, in its menu, atraditional but very expensive Chinese dish: shark’s fin soup. In some cases, it canbe as pricy as US$400 (HK$3,120), just for a bowl. Along with the soup, roastsuckling pig and sliced abalone were planned to be included in wedding banquetsthat the firm was promoting at the two hotels at Hong Kong Disneyland (Year of the

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Mouse, 2005). Shark’s fin soup is a long-established Chinese elegant dish popular atweddings and other major social events. Shark’s fin soup holds cultural significanceand is considered luxurious and a sign of affluence and generosity.

However, even though the dish has been a conventional delicacy for centuries, themethod to catch and kill sharks (to provide the tasty ingredients) has been underheavy criticism, especially with respect to the process by which fins are harvested.Many sharks are endangered (Hills & Welford, 2006). As a result, environmentalistspressured Disney to get rid of shark’s fin soup from its restaurant menus due to fearsover the diminishing shark population (Studer, Tsang, Welford, & Hills, 2008). Forexample, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Sea ShepherdConversation Society, the Animals Asia Foundation, and Greenpeace lobbied togreat lengths to prevent Disney from serving the soup at Hong Kong Disneyland.

After its attempt to serve shark’s fin soup on the Wild West-themed Main Street,USAwas thwarted by those NGOs (Year of the Mouse, 2005), Disney finally agreed(Bloomgarden, 2007). Today, the glocalization of other local food preferences hasreally taken place; restaurants at Hong Kong Disneyland primarily serve Chinesefood (Hills & Welford, 2006). Disney’s intention to serve roast suckling pig andsliced abalone in wedding banquets was followed through. At a recent event wherespecial dishes were served in the park’s eight restaurants—everything from curry tonoodles to sushi—Disney managers agreed that a specific type of Chinesehamburger be prepared by a local chef (Holson, 2005). When the Walt DisneyCompany realized that Chinese visitors usually take ten more minutes to eat thanAmericans, the company added 700 seats to park dining areas. Hong KongDisneyland’s managing director, Bill Ernest, admitted that Disney is “still learning”about Chinese culture (Martin, 2007).

Change of décors and settings

Another important glocalization move adopted by Hong Kong Disneyland was tochange décors and settings to fit in with Chinese culture more (Hills & Welford,2006). Feng shui, an ancient Chinese disciple of arrangement, is now playing a keyrole in the theme park’s design. For instance, the park moved its main entrance sothat it is facing the right direction. When building this new gate, Disney executivesshifted the angle of the front gate by 12° (Holson, 2005). The park also added acurve in its walkway from the train station to the gate so that “chi” (or energy)cannot flow into the South China Sea (Adekola & Sergi, 2007). In other words, chicannot slip past the entrance and out to the China Sea (Holson, 2005). Other fengshui experts were hired to lay out the rides (Martin, 2007). Dazzling visual changesand nods to cultural differences at Hong Kong Disneyland may appear to be so muchmarketing (Holson, 2005), but feng shui consultants keep saying that these changesensure prosperity for the park (Year of the Mouse, 2005).

When the creation of each building was finished—one of the main ballrooms waspurportedly 888 m2 in size—incense was burned; the number eight is a luckynumber in Chinese culture (Hills & Welford, 2006). On the other hand, the numberfour is believed to be bad luck. As a result, there are no fourth-floor buttons in any ofthe elevators at Hong Kong Disneyland (Holson, 2005). Other feng shuimodifications have included bringing cash registers closer to corners or along walls,

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where such placement is said to increase prosperity. In Crystal Lotus, the park’supscale restaurant, Disney put in a virtual koi pond where computer-animated fishzoom away from guests who approach a glass screen. The pond is one of five fengshui features in the restaurant; the others are wood, earth, metal, and fire. Bogus fireglows on a screen behind bottles in the bar. Because of the fire code, real fire wasnot allowed (Holson, 2005).

In a similar fashion, Hong Kong Disneyland has a topiary garden where peopledressed as Mickey Mouse, Minnie, and other cartoon characters pose forphotographs with guests, a favorite pastime with Asian parkgoers. Instead of buyingofficial photographs, visitors like to snap their own, even posing with shop toys,although they tend not to buy them (Year of the Mouse, 2005). Products emblazonedin cartoon characters come in solid gold. So, for the camera-rabid Chinese, there arefewer frightening rides and more costumed staff roaming about for “photo-ops”(Year of the Mouse, 2005). And once inside the theme park, Chinese visitorsconsider it little more than a backdrop (theatrical scenery) for family snapshots.Therefore, Hong Kong Disneyland began to distribute brochures that explained howto enjoy rides. Disney even went as far as hiring “guestologists” to follow parkgoersaround with a stopwatch (Martin, 2007).

Adaptation of labor practices

A final major glocalization effort by Disney has been to adapt its US labor practicesto Chinese ones. Labor practices refer to employee traditions and overall corporatephilosophy. For example, Disney, as the “happiest place on earth,” is notorious forimplementing its “smile factory” strategy (Van Maanen, 1991). Yet, the “smilefactory” so dear to Disney proved unsuccessful among the Chinese crew personnel.To begin, in Hong Kong, people who are overly friendly are looked upon withsuspicion. So, a smile is not automatically seen as a positive feature. By the sametoken, park guests do not display interest in the displays and interest from parkemployees (Bryman, 2006). For these reasons, Hong Kong Disneyland crewpersonnel just could not smile to the level of Disney University standards (Doz,Santos, & Williamson, 2001). In fact, they were required to smile at customers inless than 60 seconds of their entering the theme park (Cheney, Christensen, Zorn, &Ganesh, 2004), and that caused a mini revolution.

The “smile factory” was also a problem because Hong Kongers are not famousfor their hospitality (Adekola & Sergi, 2007). Providing a fake smile or smiling morethan one normally would is part of an overarching concept called “emotional labor.”Emotional labor is an important site for resistance (Bryman, 2006). Emotional laboris a type of emotional regulation whereby employees display the emotions that theyare expected to display as part of their duty. Emotional labor is commonly surfaceacting: employees inhibit their real feelings and, rather, display emotions on the“surface” (emotions that they do not actually feel) (Geist-Martin, Ray, & Sharf,2003). Surface acting also implies that an emotional dissonance exists between innerfeelings and outer expression (Guy, Newman, & Mastracci, 2008).

In the same perspective, when Hong Kong Disneyland opened in 2005, castmembers were told that they would not go to work, but “put on a show.” They werealso instructed to act as if they were “on stage,” especially when being out in the

Disney’s successful adaptation in Hong Kong: A glocalization perspective 675

park. The dilemma is that Chinese culture is more conservative. They do not like tobe that expressive about feelings. This Disneyfication, this attempt to turn Chinesecrew members into smiling robots, did not work (Clandinin, 2006). So, the Disneycompany had to make glocalization adjustments. Mr. Rasulo, one of the Disneyexecutives, conceded that Disney had to show flexibility, given the diverse culturesin Asia. Park employees today speak three languages: English, Cantonese, andMandarin (Holson, 2005).

Let us not forget to mention that, during the first few years after the constructionof Hong Kong Disneyland began, the park was plagued with controversy. Therewere complaints about not only environmental damage but also about pay andconditions. For instance, cast members and construction workers complained ofshort lunch breaks, long hours, and an insufficient number of staff (McPhail, 2006).Their complaints also concerned low pay (as compared to other Disney parks) anddifferentials between cast members. In the beginning, there were 5,000 originalemployees, but 1,000 left (which is considered high in Hong Kong because it is verycustomary to stay with one’s employer). As a result, Disney had to change directionagain. Today, employees have a trade union called the Hong Kong Disney CastMembers’ Union. The union aims at improving pay and work conditions (Ball et al.,2007).

The success of glocalization

The four glocalizing changes—that is, reduction of the price, adaptation to localvisitors’ customs, change of décors and settings, and adaptation of labor practices—have turned Hong Kong Disneyland into such a successful venue that the theme parkannounced in May 2007 it accumulated a double-digit percentage growth amongmainland Chinese visitors (Hong Kong Disneyland May Miss Lenders’ Target,2007). It has been predicted that the park’s revenues will add $19 billion to the HongKong area’s economic growth over the next four decades (Wiseman, 2005). Thetheoretical concept of glocalization has validity in this case. In the beginning, thetheme park was not too popular. For the past 2 years, however, parents from all overChina have flocked with their children to Hong Kong Disneyland. The park hasgrown seriously overcrowded, so much so that, at some point, it stopped sellingtickets (Fenster, 2007).

Even though the Chinese and Hong Kongers feel that Hong Kong Disneylandlacks creativity and innovation to move beyond the Disney brand itself, crewpersonnel at Hong Kong Disneyland are so busy that they cannot seem to catch abreak. While there were too few visitors after the park opened, today there are toomany. When the Chinese, on a week-long holiday, celebrate Chinese New Year,thousands and thousands of guests from mainland China descend on Hong Kong fora “Golden Week” of eating, shopping, and getting photos taken with Mickey,Minnie, and the rest of the Disney gang (Einhorn, 2006). Echoes of Hong KongDisneyland’s growing popularity even triggered the idea, among executives of anamusement park in Beijing (the capital city of China), to plagiarize Disneycharacters by making them look like those at Disney. This caused anger and furorahead of critical US–China trade negotiations (Tschang, 2007).

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The success brought forth by glocalization has led executives to considerdoubling the park’s capacity. For this reason, the Walt Disney Company has beentalking with the Chinese government about building a second Chinese Disney park.Disney has chosen the metropolis of Shanghai, an appealing place for many Chinese(Einhorn, 2006). This will not happen before 2012, though (Marr, 2007). In thiseffect, Hong Kong Disneyland can be considered a warm-up act for Shanghai. Thecompany hopes that the Shanghai Disney theme park will have a bigger presence inChina for its themes, shows, movies, services, products, and other assets. Bysatisfying China’s desire for a Shanghai theme park, Disney might be able to ensurebroader entrée into the world’s biggest consumer market (Marr & Fowler, 2005).With proper glocalization in Hong Kong Disneyland, the theme park has served as asplashy introduction to a new market in Asia, opening the door to other ventures. Bythe same token, a second Disney park in China will boost economic growth andemployment, and further give Shanghai the shape of an international city (Marr &Fowler, 2005).

Discussion and future directions

This analysis has demonstrated that, even Disney, the embodiment of a global firmpar excellence, has to show flexibility and adjustment to local preferences in order toproduce high profits and remain competitive in the global arena. As we have seen,when Hong Kong Disneyland first opened in 2005, the Walt Disney Company failedto understand not only Chinese local customs, but also their food preferences, eatinghabits, and meal times, their conception of how much should be spent (or not spent)on Disney admission tickets, their view of what Mickey characters and what settingsand backgrounds should look like, what shows and events are attractive to them,employee customs and labor policies, and even their version of emotional labor.

Truly, this analysis of Hong Kong Disneyland illustrates that glocalization works:Disney had to be flexible by factoring in Chinese culture and minimizing USculture, because it was considered cultural invasion in Hong Kong. As firms goglobal, executives have to weigh up the efficiency opportunities of global scale withthe effectiveness requirements of location adaptation (Ulrich & Smallwood, 2006).With glocalization, scholars may reassess the concept of globalization and admit thatit cannot always be a successful practice if it operates entirely at a global scale.Rather, globalization has to be localized through an assortment of strategies, basedon which region the corporation is located (Rugman & Hodgetts, 2001). Just asDisney executives determine what is core and, therefore, universal across the firm’sglobal operations, they must also establish what is noncore and, therefore, be open tolocal adaptation. The world is too big and too different to even consider the idea thatevery corporate philosophy, culture, policy, and practice (let alone product, service,or process) can be applied universally everywhere. Disney demonstrates that itsimply does not work (Ulrich & Smallwood, 2006).

The glocalization of Disney also epitomizes the notion that the world is not beingturned into a single homogenized realm because, across the globe, there are sites ofresistance, in spite of the momentum of this well-regarded representative of popularculture (Bryman, 2006). This means that we must give due consideration that we

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cannot subscribe to a monolithic or one-dimensional view of globalization orAmericanization, a worldview that depicts icons of American culture spreading bydesign worldwide and riding roughshod over local conditions and practices. Scholarsconducting studies on Disneyfication or similar research have suggested that it isincorrect to think of globalization as a simple process of subsuming foreign cultures(Bryman, 2006; Zaheer, 2002). Not only has Disney accommodated to China’s localpreferences, dietary requirements, and even tastes for décors and settings, but it hasalso applied the glocalization model to different cultures, such as the one in Europeafter the Disneyland Paris (formerly Euro Disney) was opened in 1992 (Zhang,2007).

Understanding the theoretical concept of glocalization is a specifically criticalmatter, because Disney’s experience is one of the many instances that indicate thecurrent upward trend in the glocalization of corporations that increasingly transfercomplex assets abroad. Now, more than ever, corporations are not just adaptingideas, themes, products, and services, but also entire organizations, includingcorporate philosophies and strategies, operational procedures, models for supervi-sor–employee relations, and so forth. These have to be ever more closely linked tothe contexts and the sociocultural environments in which they are performed(Kostova & Roth, 2003).

Nevertheless, it would be useful to further analyze the concept of glocalizationnot as a replacement of globalization, but as a process that gives globalization freshand unique insights. Even though this case study of Hong Kong Disneyland haslooked at one key aspect of glocalization—that is, local adaptation or Robertson’s(1992) notion that glocalization refers to creating products or services aimed for theglobal market but adapted to the local cultures—the very concept of glocalizationdoes not limit itself to such a narrow approach. For example, as Wong (2000) pointsout, the idea of glocalization eliminates the fear from many that globalization is likea cultural tsunami that erases all differences. In other words, Wong continues, a giantcorporation does not have to go global “all the way” to reach international success.In a similar fashion, as Waters (1995) suggests, glocalization entails theincorporation of certain global processes into the local setting. From this perspective,glocalization is not “local adaptation,” rather, it is global inclusion.

For future research, it might also prove interesting to answer the followingquestions: Does glocalization lead to the end of global strategy, when it was thoughtthat corporations could totally impose the global on the local and, hence, be ultrapenetrative to local cultures, to such a point that they would erode those cultures? Inother words, is the global getting out while the glocal getting in? In a similar vein,does glocalization mean that a company like Disney, or even Wal-Mart, is nowexpected to give more power to locals in order to successfully tailor its strategies forthe local markets? Hong Kong Disneyland demonstrated this when the companyreplaced its own US supervisors with local supervisors who could speak English,Mandarin, and Cantonese.

Finally, in the case of the Disney expansion worldwide, what would be better forideal glocalization success: to build large theme parks (like Disneyland, CA) onother continents, or to create a stream of niche resorts and attractions in othercountries? Put it another way, does glocalization work best in small portionsworldwide, by adjusting painstakingly to local towns and regions, or in large

678 J. Matusitz

sections, by adjusting to larger populations? No matter what, for a long time it wasbelieved that the Walt Disney Company could be very successful by accelerating theglobal spread of its underlying principles (Bryman, 2006). Yet, the reality is thatDisney’s traditional method of force-feeding its products from its Burbank, CAheadquarters to local contexts has fairly been altered (Marr & Fowler, 2007).

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Jonathan Matusitz (PhD, University of Oklahoma) is an assistant professor in the Nicholson School ofCommunication at the University of Central Florida. Born and raised in Belgium, he earned a BA intranslation of foreign languages at the International Interpreters’ School in Mons (Belgium). In 2000, hemoved to the United States and pursued an MA in professional communication at the University of AlaskaFairbanks. In 2006, he earned a PhD in communication at the University of Oklahoma. His currentacademic interests include globalization studies, intercultural communication, organizational communica-tion, and communication and technology. He has published numerous articles in academic journals such asthe Journal of Transnational Management, Planning Theory, and Journal of Popular Culture. He is nowworking on globalization research, particularly with respect to Wal-Mart’s ventures in Asia and LatinAmerica.

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