Disclosure in Qohelet

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[ JSOT 27.1 (2002) 115-126]ISSN 0309-0892

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(Dis)closure in Qohelet: Qohelet Deconstructed*

Mark Sneed

Bible Department, Lubbock Christian University,

5601 19th St., Lubbock, TX 79407, USA

Abstract

While previous scholars have noted an afnity between the persona ‘Qohelet’

and postmodern Deconstructionists, this essay will explore his blindspots,instances of closure and presence. Employing a Derridian method, this article

explores Qohelet’s conservatism hidden within a façade of dissidence.

Qohelet assumes the same retributive schema of his peers but in a different

form. He employs the same dichotomous conceptualization of human moral-

ity. He ultimately attempts to master the chaos inherent in the cosmos, though

his detection of disorder is keener than his peers. He also assumes the same

typical misogyny of his time, another form of mastery. Finally, this article

explores instances of différance in his text, places where the text resists mas-tery and reveals its own Otherness against Qohelet’s intentions.

Several biblical scholars have noted an afnity between ‘Qohelet’, the nar-

rator’s persona,1 and Deconstructionists.2 Both Michael Fox and William

* This essay is a revised version of a paper entitled ‘(Dis)closure in Qohelet:Qohelet Deconstructs Himself’ that was read at the SBL 2000 annual conference on 21

November in Nashville.

1. I follow Michael Fox’s distinction between the frame-narrator and his ctional

persona, Qohelet ( A Time to Tear Down and a Time to Build Up: A Rereading of

Ecclesiastes [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999)], pp. 363-67).

2. This essay involves deconstructive methodology and nomenclature, especially

that of Derrida. For secondary sources that are helpful with concepts and terminology,

see C. Johnson, Derrida (The Great Philosophers, 9; New York: Routledge, 1999); J.

Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (Ithaca, NY:



116 Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 27.1 (2002)

© The Continuum Publishing Group Ltd 2002.

Brown speak of Qohelet deconstructing traditional sapiential values but

not to the point of nihilism.3 Eric Christianson has shown how Qohelet

transcends himself as he narrates and reveals a sort of deconstructed self.4

Scott Stephens has shown how Qohelet undermines traditional wisdom’sontological presence.5 Suseela Yesudian has created an imaginary dia-

logue between Derrida and Qohelet, seeing many points of connection.6

Thomas Krüger maintains Qohelet ‘deconstructs’ prophetic eschatological

belief that God’s timetable can be discerned, but he also ‘reconstructs’ it

with an appeal to creation theology.7 And nally, in a previous study, I

have demonstrated how Qohelet ‘deconstructs’ the traditional dichotomies

hmkx / twlks (‘wisdom’/‘folly’) and hqdc / (#r (‘righteousness’/‘wick-

edness’).8

Cornell University Press, 1982); C. Norris, Derrida (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University, 1987); J. Derrida and J. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversa-

tion with Jacques Derrida (Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, 1; New York:

Fordham University Press, 1997); J. Powell, Derrida for Beginners (A Writers and

Readers Documentary Comic Book; New York: Writers & Readers, 1997); G. Spivak,‘Translater’s Preface’, in J. Derrida, Of Grammatology (trans. G. Spivak; Baltimore:

The Johns Hopkins University Press, rev. edn, 1997), pp. ix-lxxxvii; Leonard Orr, ‘De-

construction’, in idem, A Dictionary of Critical Theory (New York: Greenwood, 1991),

pp. 105-15. For the application of deconstructive theory to biblical texts, see D. Odell-

Scott, ‘Deconstruction’, in A. Adams (ed.), Handbook of Postmodern Biblical Inter-

pretation (St Louis: Chalice, 2000), pp. 55-61; Y. Sherwood, ‘Derrida’, in Adams

(ed.), Handbook , pp. 69-75.

3. Fox, A Time to Tear Down, pp. 10, 138-45; W. Brown, Character in Crisis: AFresh Approach to the Wisdom Literature of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerd-

mans, 1996), p. 134; idem, Ecclesiastes (Int; Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2000),

p. 14.

4. E. Christianson, ‘Qohelet and the/his Self Among the Deconstructed’, in A.

Schoors (ed.), Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom (Leuven: Leuven University Press,

1998), pp. 425-33.

5. S. Stephens, ‘Chaosmography; or, Qoheleth and the Pleasures of Différance’, in

AAR/SBL Abstracts (1999), p. 384.6. S. Yesudian, ‘Derrida and Qoheleth: There is Nothing New Under the Sun’, an

unpublished paper delivered to the Reading, Theory, and the Bible Section, AAR/SBL

Convention, Boston, November 1999.

7. T. Krüger, ‘Dekonstruction und Rekonstruktion prophetischer Eschatologie’, in

A. Diesel et al. (eds.), ‘Jedes Ding hat seine Zeit…’: Studien zur israelitischen und

altorientalischen Weisheit (Festschrift S.D. Michel; Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1996),

pp. 107-29.

8. M. Sneed, ‘Qohelet as “Deconstructionist” ’, Old Testament Essays 10.2 (1997),

pp. 303-11.



SNEED (Dis)closure in Qohelet 117


While scholars are passionate in noting Qohelet’s afnity to decon-

struction, none except Yesudian has explored how Qohelet himself is

blind to his own envelopment in textuality. In other words, none has

turned the scalpel on Qohelet himself. Yesudian has Derrida debate livelywith Qohelet, revealing some of the chinks in Qohelet’s armor. I want to

go further, dig deeper, and reveal certain primary stances of closure and

presence in Qohelet. But before I begin this task, a brief glossary of terms

signicant for this essay will be presented to help the reader who is not

uent in Derridian method.

Dening Terms

Presence: the supposed self-present truth that needs no justication.

Derrida attacks such notions and shows that they are instances of absence.

Closure: the illusion of totality, unity, and identity, with the concomi-

tant exclusion and marginalizing of the Other or different.

Différance: neologism coined by Derrida to deconstruct Saussure’s

belief that positive meaning adheres in a linguistic system. Derrida coins aFrench word that sounds like ‘difference’ (passive sense of differ) but looks

like a word for ‘deferral’ (active sense). Derrida argues that all meaning is

relational and not inherent to the system itself. A word has meaning in

that it differs from other words, in its ‘absence’ from them. Thus, meaning

is achieved through absence. But words also defer meaning by continually

having to refer to other words in the linguistic system in order to produce

their own particular meaning. Because of this continual deference, mean-ing is unstable and slippery.

Aporia: places in a text where meaning is not decidable, a place where

différance is detectable.

(Dis)closure in Qohelet

Before we examine instances of closure in Qohelet, we will need to un-derstand something about the nature of his critique of traditional Wisdom.

Qohelet’s most deconstructive feat is his questioning of the contemporary

formulation of retribution. The Germans call it the deed/consequence

connection (Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang), that is, a person’s behavior is

connected with his fortune. The doctrine forms the ethical matrix of the

aphoristic material in the book of Proverbs. In Prov. 9.11, Lady Wisdom

woos her potential disciples with ‘length of days in her right hand and inher left, riches and honor. Her way of life brings favor; her path brings





prosperity.’9 Qohelet counters by saying, ‘I turned and saw under the sun

that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the mighty, nor bread to

the wise, nor wealth to those with understanding. Neither is there favor

for those who are knowledgeable, for time and chance happen to them all’(9.11). And in 8.14, one nds, ‘There is an evil which is done upon the

earth: there exist the righteous who fare as if they were wicked. And there

are the wicked who fare as if they were righteous. I said that this is also a

vanity.’

In 7.15-18, Qohelet goes so far in rejecting the contemporary notion of

retribution that he advises against any extreme behavior, including right-

eousness:

I have seen everything in my vain days. There exists the righteous person

who perishes in his righteousness, and the wicked person who lives long in

his wickedness. Do not be overly righteous. Neither be overly wise. Why

ruin yourself? Do not be overly wicked. Neither be foolish. Why die before

your time? Better to hold to the one and not withdraw your hand from the

other. For the person who fears God will go forth with both of them.

Qohelet’s method in deconstructing this notion of retribution consists

of challenging two related dichotomies: wisdom/folly and righteousness/

wickedness.10 He does this by demonstrating that the contemporary de-

nitions do not t reality. The way ‘wise’ and ‘righteous’ were traditionally

dened involved more than certain types of behavior. It also involved the

supposed consequences of that behavior. Wicked behavior was believed

to result in punishment from God, wretchedness, and short life. Righteous

behavior was to result in long life, prosperity, and blessing. This is adver-

tised particularly in Proverbs 1–9. Thus, deed and consequence are already

built into the denition of the Hebrew words ‘wise’, ‘righteous’, ‘fool’,

and ‘wicked’. Qohelet then demonstrates that the opposite than expected

fate often resulted. So, if the righteous receive what the wicked should

expect, are they really ‘righteous’? Could it be that God rewards the

‘wicked’ because he considers them to be the truly ‘righteous’? As Helmut

Gese maintains, the concept of qydc (‘righteousness’) disintegrates in

Qohelet.11 More accurately, Qohelet shows how its formulation decon-

structs.

9. All Hebrew and French translations are mine.

10. See Sneed, ‘Deconstructionist’, pp. 304-307.

11. H. Gese, ‘Die Krisis der Weisheit bei Koheleth’, in Les Sagesses du Proche-

Orient Ancien (Bibliotheque des Centres d’Etudes superieures specialises; Paris:

Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), pp. 139-51 (144).





Closure in Qohelet

Some scholars maintain that because Qohelet denies the doctrine of retri-

bution as traditionally formulated, he then denies any form of retribu-tion.12 But if he had, we could rightly label him a true Deconstructionist.

However, he stops short of that. Qohelet will not let go of the standard

sapiential form of presence, which is the notion of a cosmic retribution or

moral order. In other words, Qohelet has no problem with the notion of a

retributive connection; he only nds fault with its particular formulation

among his contemporaries.

The notion of cosmic moral order is frequently implied in Qohelet,except there is no specic word for it in Hebrew as there is in Egyptian.

Maat is both a concept and a goddess. Words that reect this concept in

some way in Qohelet are the nouns +p#m (‘judgment’, 3.16; 5.7; 8.5-6;

11.9; 12.14), hmkx (‘wisdom’, passim), hrqm (‘fate’, 2.14-15; 3.19;

9.2-3), qlx (‘lot’, 2.10, 21; 3.22; 5.17-18; 9.6, 9; 11.2), t( (‘time’, 3.1-8,

11, 17; 7.17; 8.5-6, 9; 9.8, 11-12; 10.17), Nmz (‘season’, 3.1), and espe-

cially the adjective hpy (‘beautiful’ or ‘appropriate’) in reference to God’spreordained times (3.11; cf. 5.17). With these concepts, Qohelet, as other

sages, attempts to connect behavior and consequence with the notion of

cosmic retribution.

The methodology of the wisdom enterprise is centered on determining

the particulars of this cosmic order. Martin Rose aptly denes ancient

sapiential methodology, ‘Wisdom is in line with the concrete and daily

experiences on which it reects, and it pursues this reection up to thepoint where it dares to formulate postulates for the success of human life

and for the realization of a global order of the world’.13 He points out that

this order can be expressed positively as in the book of Proverbs or

negatively as in Qohelet when that order is often difcult to detect.14

12. F. Crüsemann, ‘The Unchangeable World: The “Crisis of Wisdom” in Koheleth’,

in W. Schrottroff et al. (eds.), God of the Lowly: Socio-Historical Interpretations of the

Bible (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1984), pp. 59-61; J. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes: A Commentary

(OTL; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1987), p. 28; L. Perdue, Wisdom and Crea-

tion: The Theology of Wisdom Literature (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), pp.

239-42.

13. M. Rose, ‘De la “Crise de la Sagesse” à la Sagesse de la Crise’, RTP 131 (1999),

pp. 115-34 (123).

14. Rose, ‘De la “Crise” ’, p. 126.





To give Qohelet credit, he attempts to transcend contemporary notions

of retribution, which would cast him in a somewhat dissident role. How-

ever, his solution to this problem is quite traditional. Instead of question-

ing the whole notion of cosmic moral retribution, which would be trulydeconstructive, he does something rather conservative—he employs an

old dichotomy and gives it a new twist. Instead of relying solely on the

traditional dichotomies, he prefers Myhl) )ry (‘those who fear God’) and

‘those who do not’ (3.14; 5.6; 7.18; 8.12-13; 12.13). He deconstructs

typical dichotomous conceptualizations of his day: the righteous and the

wicked, the good and the bad, the clean and unclean, those who offer sac-

rices and those who do not, the saint and sinner, and those who vow and

those who do not (9.2), but not once does he touch the notion of God-

fearing—it is too sacred; it is presence for him.

Scholars have noted Qohelet’s predilection for dening terms in his

own way.15 Some theorize that ‘fearing God’ in Qohelet takes on its origi-

nal sense of terror before the capricious deity.16 But one could go further.

God-fearing becomes for Qohelet a type of piety that is open to God’s

elusive ways. The God-fearer believes the cosmos is run by a moral order

that includes retribution. However, this retribution cannot be analyzed and

detected in any determinate manner. This is where Qohelet parts company

with his contemporary sapiential peers. Qohelet can speak of discerning

an order of retribution in only the broadest and most general terms. For

example, the God-fearer avoids any extreme behavior. Even extreme

righteousness is dangerous (7.16). Essentially, one responds to God as one

would an arbitrary despot (5.1-7 = 8.2-6). Caution, moderation, and

avoiding irritating the deity are the chief virtues. Taking cultic precaution

is recommended (5.1). If one makes a vow to God, one should pay it

quickly (5.4). One should limit correspondence with the deity via vows

and prayers (5.2-3). The non-God-fearer would overlap the traditional

categories of the righteous and wicked, the wise and the foolish: those

who do not display the caution and openness of the God-fearer. Only harm

will come to these (8.12-13).

Although one might argue that Qohelet’s ethic is an improvement on

the traditional formulation of the doctrine of retribution, it still looks

rather conservative. It is not far removed from the ethic found in Proverbs,

which also counsels moderation in everything.

15. See R. Gordis, Koheleth—the Man and his World: A Study of Ecclesiastes

(New York: Schocken Books, paperback edn, 1968), pp. 87-94.

16. E.g. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, pp. 99-100.





Qohelet’s new use of an old dichotomy unfortunately suffers from all

the weaknesses associated with dichotomous thinking. God-fearing/non-

God-fearing is nothing more than a revamped wise/righteous vs. foolish/

wicked dichotomy. Both are based on the notion of cosmic retribution, andcosmic retribution represents a form of the cause/effect dichotomy, where

the effect is dependent on and secondary to the cause. Nietzche is famous

for deconstructing this dichotomy.17 We must use it in the real world to

function. However, that does not mean it is unproblematic. Qohelet and

the traditional wise men assume that one’s fortune is dependent on human

behavior. But it is easy to imagine times when the opposite is true: when

human behavior is dependent on fortune. Qohelet admits that since ‘pun-

ishment’ on the sinner in the form of disaster is often delayed, the sinner

decides to continue along the foolish track (8.11).

Qohelet’s new dichotomy cannot also escape the dilemma that the con-

cept of God-fearing must, by necessity, feed parasitically on its opposite

to produce meaning. Though non-God-fearing is only once mentioned in

the book (8.13), its presence is conjured at each space where God-fearing

enters. In itself, there is nothing positively present in the notion of God-

fearing. It is only in its absence (non-God-fearing) that God-fearing carries

any kind of meaning. In other words, there is no God-fearing without non-

God-fearing. Though Qohelet would want to distance the two concepts as

far as possible, their link is eternally sealed. God-fearing and its opposite

embrace each other tightly in a mutual but necessary relationship.

As ancients, Qohelet and the traditional wise men also, of course, fail to

perceive that their dichotomous thinking involves a social and ideological

dimension. ‘Wise’ and ‘fool’, ‘righteous’ and ‘wicked’, ‘God-fearer’ and

‘non-God-fearer’—all these pairs are socially constructed categories where

the rst member is deemed superior to the second. The wise, righteous,

and God-fearers are those who promote the values of Jewish society. The

fool, wicked, and non-God-fearer are those who ‘buck the system’, who

live by a different set of rules. The rst member becomes suspiciously

identical with the authors of the Wisdom literature. The second member

represents alterity, the Other, that is, those who differ from them in think-

ing and social position.

Qohelet is conservative in another way. Though he seriously damages

the utility of using the traditional dichotomies of the Wisdom tradition, he

17. For examples, see F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power (ed. W. Kaufmann; trans.

W. Kaufmann, et al.; London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968), pp. 132, 182-83, 264-65.

See Culler, On Deconstruction, pp. 86-88.





refuses to abandon them completely. God-fearing/non-God-fearing is his

favorite dichotomy, but he will still utilize and assume traditional dichoto-

mization like wisdom/folly. Though death levels out any superiority that

wisdom has over folly (2.15), it still has its value: ‘And I saw that wisdomis superior to folly, as light is to darkness. The sage has eyes in his head,

while the fool walks in the darkness.’ So, though Qohelet ostensibly

challenges the ultimate superiority of wisdom over folly, in reality he still

makes it central. He will not de-center it.

Mastery and its Resistance in Qohelet: The Other EmergesQohelet will not let go of the presence the deed/consequence connection

supplies him. It forms the cognitive basis for mastering the cosmos,

making sense of it. And this sense of mastery is what the wise men prided

themselves in. Nietzsche states: ‘The so-called drive for knowledge can

be traced back to a drive to appropriate and conquer…’18 Many of

Qohelet’s verbs (‘nding’, )cm; ‘inquiring’, #rd; ‘investigating’, rwt;

‘testing’, hsn; ‘knowing’, (dy; and ‘seeing’, h)r) imply mastery.Of these verbs, Qohelet uses h)r 47 times! Stephen Moore has referred

to the Gospel of Luke as ‘the Gospel of the Look’;19 perhaps we could call

Qohelet ‘the book of the Look’. Freud connected the human instinct for

knowledge with both mastery and the pleasure of looking.20 And the

attempt to master, of course, has been associated mostly with the male.

Recent social science research suggests that males are more visually

oriented than females. Qohelet attempts to look and discover an order inthe universe that will put everything in its place, to mitigate his own

dissonance and provide him and the other male sages with the control they

desire. He nds such an order, but it is not unproblematic.

The masculinity of Qohelet’s look attempts to exclude women. Women

represent the irrational for Qohelet. He avoids them as he would Dame

Folly. Scholars have attempted to rescue the famous passage of 7.25-29

from its misogyny, but to no avail:21

18. Nietzsche, Will to Power , p. 227.

19. S. Moore, ‘The Gospel of the Look’, Sem 54 (1991), pp. 159-96.

20. S. Freud, ‘Three Essays on Sexuality’, in J. Starchey et al. (eds.), The Standard

Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (trans. J. Starchey;

London: Hogarth, 1953), VII, p. 194.

21. C. Seow, Ecclesiastes: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary

(AB, 18C; New York: Doubleday, 1997), pp. 262-63; E. Tamez, When the Horizons





I turned my attention to know and investigate and seek wisdom and the

systematic result and to know the wickedness of folly and the foolishness of

confused things. And I found more bitter than death: the woman, because

she is a trap. A dragnet is her heart. Chains are her hands. The one pleasingto God will escape from her, but the sinner will be caught. ‘Look at what I

have found’, says Qohelet, ‘One plus one to nd the systematic result’. For I

continue to seek but have not found. One man among a thousand I have

found, but not one woman among all these! Only this have I found: that

God made man upright, but they have sought out many schemes.

We may not understand every phrase of this section, but its negative

assessment of women is unmistakable. Scholars often contrast this sectionwith a seemingly more positive portrayal of women in 9.9, ‘Enjoy life with

the woman that you love’, attempting to mitigate the misogyny somewhat.

However, there is still little positive here. His only use for the woman is

as an object of sexual fulllment. The Other remains an object of his

gaze.22

Aporia in Qohelet

I would like to close with two examples of aporia in Qohelet. These

represent instances where his attempt at closure and mastery fail to

succeed, places where Qohelet’s own argument deconstructs itself.

Dreams cannot be mastered in Qohelet (5.2, 6). In only two instances

where Qohelet refers to dreams, Mwlx carries a somewhat negative conno-

tation. In 5.2 dreams are compared with the many words of a fool, and,thus, they connote things ephemeral or without substance.23 In fact, Mwlx

is connected with lbh in v. 6. Seow believes, and I agree, that a hendiadys

Close: Rereading Ecclesiastes (trans. M. Wilde; Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2000),

p. 102. On its misogyny, see D. Rudman, ‘Woman as Divine Agent in Ecclesiastes’,

JBL 116 (1997), pp. 411-27; A. Brenner, ‘Some Observations on the Figurations of

Woman in Wisdom Literature’, in idem (ed.), A Feminist Companion to Wisdom

Literature (The Feminist Companion to the Bible, 9; Shefeld: Shefeld AcademicPress, 1995), pp. 50-66 (59-60).

22. L. Irigaray, ‘The Sex which is Not One’, in L. Cahoone (ed.), From Modernism

to Postmodernism: An Anthology (Blackwell Philsophy Anthologies, 2; Cambridge:

Basil Blackwell, 1996), pp. 461-68 (463). In her book, Speculum of the Other Woman

(trans. G. Gill; Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), Irigaray uses various meta-

phors for seeing that represent the male attempt to dominate women.

23. Seow, Ecclesiastes, pp. 199-200; J. Husser, Dreams and Dream Narratives in

the Biblical World (trans. J. Munro; The Biblical Seminar, 63; Shefeld: Shefeld Aca-

demic Press, 1999), p. 102.





is being used, and so the word ‘dreams’ becomes synonymous with

‘vanities’.24 Verse 6 is using Mwlx essentially in the same way as v. 2.

Thus, in 5.2 and 6 Qohelet connects folly and the fool with dreams.

Dreams have an ambivalent position in the Hebrew Bible. On the onehand, Joseph’s dreams and his ability to interpret others’ dreams are

viewed in an entirely positive light. And were not dreams and their inter-

pretation the exemplication of Daniel’s great wisdom, which also came

from God? On the other hand, a suspicious perspective is represented by

the D Code in Deut. 13.1-3, which cautions against listening to dreamers

or prophets who incite the Israelites to apostasy. More polemical is Jer.

23.25-29, which demotes dreaming beneath a genuine word from the Lord

(cf. Zech. 10.2).

But has Qohelet forgotten that Solomon, the patron and hero of Israelite

Wisdom, received his great wisdom in a dream (1 Kgs 3.5)? In Qoh. 1.16,

when Qohelet assumes the role of none other than Solomon and states, ‘I

said to myself, “Indeed I will become greater and increase in wisdom

more than all those before me in Jerusalem. My heart will experience

much wisdom and knowledge”’, was he not referring to this very event or,

at least, its beginning? So which did Solomon receive during his dream:

wisdom or folly? Does God grant wisdom or folly? Thus, though Qohelet

is wary of dark and mysterious dreams that occur in the night and

connects them with the vain and empty words of fools, he fails to realize

that it is through a dream at Gibeon that the Wisdom movement had its

origin. Though Qohelet works hard to repress folly, here it raises its ugly

head. The distinction between wisdom and folly once again blurs, this

time unexpectedly, in the book of Qohelet. It is both the source of

Qohelet’s wisdom and yet, at the same time, the representation of all he

fears: the dark and mysterious, the irrational. It is both; it is différance. It

is something to be carefully controlled and mastered. But it will not be.25

It will not play the dichotomy game!

Another example of aporia is found in 1.17: ‘I resolved to know wis-

dom and the knowledge of madness and insight ’. The problem is that the

phrase ‘madness and insight’ (twlk#w tllwh), paired antonyms,

resembles the regularly paired synonyms in Qohelet: (twlksw tllwh)

24. Seow, Ecclesiastes, p. 200.

25. Nietzsche, on the other hand, recognizes his status as a dreamer who welcomes

the irrational, ‘(A)mong all these dreamers, I, too, who “know”, am dancing my dance’

(The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs [trans. W.

Kaufmann; New York: Vintage Books, 1974], p. 116).





‘madness’ and ‘folly’ (2.12; 7.25; 10.13). The difference is only a letter:

samekh vs. in, which also makes the words homonyms (twlks / twlk#).

But how is the unexpected switch from ‘folly’ to ‘insight’ explained?

Almost all commentators resolve this problem by assuming that twlk# issimply a variant of twlks and should be translated ‘folly’ instead of

‘insight’, preserving the synonymous pair. Numerous Hebrew MSS do the

same. However, the LXX takes twlk# as from the root lk#, meaning ‘to

be prudent’ (e0pisth/mhn). So, which is it? Seow, keeps the meaning of

‘prudence’ and believes Qohelet is being ironic here.26 I agree with

preserving the meaning ‘insight’. However, there is no irony here. I main-

tain that this is a true example of différance, where Qohelet’s text unex-

pectedly breaks open, closure is shattered, and the Other is exposed.

Though the reader might be simply surprised by Qohelet’s alternation of

the expected paired synonyms, the hearer would be confused: does he

mean insight or folly? Here, the spoken word would be less precise than

the written.27

Thus, we are left with a word that looks like ‘insight’ but sounds like

‘folly’. twlk#, then, is Qohelet’s equivalent to Derrida’s différance! It is

a word that desperately seeks to prevent any slippage in meaning but is

unable due to the fact that its homonym happens also to be its antonym.

This aporia in 1.17, therefore, conrms the close connection between

wisdom and folly found throughout the book of Qohelet. The tight bounda-

ries between ‘wisdom’ and ‘folly’ have unraveled once again.

Conclusion

Qohelet indeed does a service to wisdom by deconstructing traditional

dichotomies like wisdom/folly and righteousness/wickedness. However,

both his radicalism and conservatism are demonstrated in his alternative

to these: the fearing God/not fearing God dichotomy. This dichotomy is

superior in that it involves the notion of openness toward God’s ways in

the world. But it is conservative in its dichotomous conceptualization and

in its assumption of a deed/consequence connection. Qohelet also reveals

his conservatism in assuming the same cognitive attempt at mastery over

irrationality associated with the wise men. This mastery is reected in his

exclusion of the feminine as a possible source of wellbeing. This Other is

26. Seow, Ecclesiastes , p. 125.

27. This ies in the face of Western philosophy’s preference for the spoken word as

more authentic and present than the written, what Derrida calls logocentrism.




© Th C ti P bli hi G Ltd 2002

too dangerous for Qohelet to embrace. Finally, associated with Qohelet’s

attempt at mastery are instances of aporia in the book, places where the

text erupts and différance emerges. Qohelet is suspicious of dreams, and

yet the wisdom movement fondly looks back on the dream of its patron,Solomon, as its divine source. And, while Qohelet would like to distin-

guish clearly between madness and insight, in 1.17 he befuddles the

attempt by using a term that looks like ‘insight’ but sounds like ‘folly’:

twlk#—Qohelet’s equivalent to Derrida’s différance!

Documents

Disclosure in Qohelet