Disaster Victim Identification- Learning from the Victoria Bush Fires

Tragedy.

A Winston Churchill Travel Fellowship 2011

Inspector Kirsty Jennett

Merseyside Police

Index

1. Introduction

2. Personal Acknowledgements

3. Understanding Disaster Victim Identification.

4. Why Victoria. Australia?

5. Comparisons of policy, procedure and Structure, UK and Australia.

6. How does DVI change after a DVI event?

7. Developments and strategy.

8. Conclusion.

9. Further reading and Media

10. References.

11. Life Goes on.

1. Introduction

“The second worst peace time disaster in Australia since the second world War”. This is how the

Victoria bush fires in February 2009 have been described. The world could only watch in horror, as

the images on national television of the fires raging in residential areas of Victoria were viewed

across the world, far too close to the heavily populated areas of Melbourne for comfort. There had

been speculation about the heat during the Australian summer of 2008/2009 and the dry “bush”

with its associated fire risk. But no-one could foresee the intensity and speed at which the fires

eventually took hold and the number of separate serious incidents that would occur simultaneously,

totally overwhelming the emergency services.

Disaster Victim Recovery and Identification is an area of work often not considered by the public at

large. The people, who go in after the initial rescue phase is over, recover the deceased, manage the

coronial processes, and correct identification of the deceased and repatriation. It is often a

harrowing task, not least because the people who do that job, often live and work in the area

themselves, and will undoubtedly have been touched by the disaster in some way, whether that be

by knowing and living in the affected areas, or knowing people who were affected by the tragedy or

have told tales of lucky escapes. Victoria was no exception. But in Disaster Victim Identification (DVI)

work, which also encompasses the body recovery phase, in Australia and the UK, people are

volunteers, and during regular training are subjected to images and realistic training exercises

designed to reduce the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder in the event of deployment.

This fellowship was supported to allow a comparison to be made between Australian and UK DVI

processes and in particular to assess how the Australian teams learn and develop from real DVI

events. The UK is fortunate to not have too many recent incidents involving mass fatality of UK

citizens either in the UK or abroad which would require deployment of DVI teams and use of

techniques in DVI. However, it is important to remain prepared for such an event in the future by

learning from the experiences of others and sharing the knowledge gained.

2. Personal Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the following people for their support and assistance in planning preparing and

completing this project;

Annette McAuliffe, Australian Federal Police, Canberra, Australia.

Federal Agent Janine Ennis, Australian Federal Police, previously of The Australian High Commission,

London.

Federal Agent Karen Hill, Australia Federal police, Canberra.

Sergeant Rod Anderson, Officer in charge& acting DVI commander, Tuggeranong Police Station,

Canberra.

Steve Sergeant, Australian Federal Police, Victoria.

Dr Simon Walsh, Forensic technological services, Australian Federal police, Canberra.

Sergeant Trevor Blake DVI/CBRN Unit, Forensic Counter terrorism, Forensic services, Victoria Police.

Senior Sergeant Rod Munro, DVI/CBRN Unit, Forensic Counter terrorism, Forensic services, Victoria

Police.

Inspector Matthew Anderson, Field Services Branch, Victoria Police.

Detective Superintendent Doug O’Loughlin APM, Assistant Director Forensic services department,

Victoria Police.

Peter Lucas, Acting Operations Manager, Wildfire Planning and Policy Unit County Fire Authority,

Victoria.

Robert Lanigan, County Fire Authority, Victoria.

Superintendent Mark Sweeney, ADVIC Chair, and DVI Commander, New South Wales Police, Sydney,

Australia.

Senior Sergeant Paul Taylor, New South Wales Police Forensic Services Group, Australia.

Ian Cartmel, ACPO DVI, London.

Kate Roe (nee Robb) Norfolk Constabulary, UK., and Winston Churchill Fellow.

Chief Constable Jon Murphy, Merseyside Police, UK.

Assistant Chief Constable Colin Matthews, Merseyside Police, UK.

I would also like to thank all the staff who I met at the Metropolitan Fire Brigade in Melbourne and

all the other police officers who assisted with visits and tours. I would like to thank my managers at

Merseyside Police for their support, from the application stage right through to finishing my report.

Fire Officer Ian Nuttall, Leicestershire Fire service whom I met at my interview for being my ‘Winston

Churchill Fellow buddy’. And of course, many thanks to all the staff and board at the Winston

Churchill Memorial Trust for making this trip possible.

3. Understanding Disaster Victim Identification.

Disaster Victim Identification is the term used to describe the practice of identifying human remains

after an event of mass fatality. Some still refer to the practice as Disaster Victim Recovery (DVRI), but

this is the initial phase of disaster victim identification. The four phases are;

1. Recovery at scene

2. Coronial processes/ mortuary.

3. Gathering anti-mortem data.

4. Reconciliation – comparing stages 2 and 3.

5. De-briefing – effectiveness and health and safety.

The UK has a national team of disaster victim identification staff, known as UKDVI. Interpol is the

organisation which co-ordinates practices within signatory countries, with around 50 countries

signing up to the Interpol DVI processes and another 180 countries agreeing to the principles of DVI.

None the less, when a mass fatality occurs in any country where there are believed to be multi-

national victims, the process of DVI management becomes an increasing sensitive procedure, with

respect for the deceased and their relatives, and accuracy of identification both being of equal and

paramount importance.

In response to tragedies in the 1980’s namely the Marchioness disaster and the Bowbelle dredger on

the Thames, the UK DVI practices were reviewed by a public enquiry by Lord Justice Clarke. This has

led to a multi- disciplinary approach to UKDVI.

Interpol operates a DVI standing committee to develop policy and manage overseas requests for

assistance when mass fatalities occur. The UK and Australia both have members on this committee.

4. Why Victoria, Australia?

In February 2009, Victoria, Australia had experienced a particularly hot dry summer and

temperatures were unusually high. A number of bush fires were started and the area suffered the

worst bush fire fatalities spread across 1.1 million acres of land. The speed with which the fires

spread and the temperatures reached were greater than ever experienced before in Victoria’s

history. The combination of low humidity, high temperatures, prolonged dry weather and winds

meant that once the fires started, they quickly developed to overwhelm both the residents and the

emergency services.

As a member of the Merseyside DVI team, I could not imagine how at the conclusion of the rescue

phase, the Australian DVI teams managed the multiple recovery sites, the number of casualties, the

DVI processes as well as the clear problems of identifying multiple fire victims, the remains of many

which were merely piles of ash. The fact that the teams did recover all the missing people and

reconcile them with anti-mortem data and witness testimony, despite the sheer scale of the

problem, made this case study an interesting one in terms of DVI policy and practice.

The Winston Churchill Fellowship was promoted within Merseyside Police, and the idea for my

studies was then made possible.

1

1 Images of bushfires taken on ‘Black Saturday’, courtesy of D/Supt. O’Loughlin.

5. Comparisons of Policy, Procedure and Structure, UK and Australia.

Both the UK and Australia have signed up to the Interpol protocols and policy for DVI. Both have

policies and procedures based on that document [http://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-

expertise/Forensics/DVI]. Each police force in the UK, or in the case of Australia, each state, has a

policy written and developed by the DVI lead, which largely mirrors the Interpol guide. However,

there are slight variations in terms of guidance for recovery and identification procedures, and very

different ways of implementing and managing DVI teams across each police force and state.

UK police forces have volunteer teams, with some staff being trained to a diploma level, in

conjunction with Dundee University. These staff members are part of UK DVI, and are available for

oversees deployments as well as within their own forces and as part of mutual aid in the UK. Each

force has a DVI lead, usually a detective superintendent. The remaining force DVI teams are trained

either via NPIA or in force, and are an additional resource for UK deployments.

Victoria Police have a full time DVI team. They are deployable to any incident of multiple fatality or

where there are two or more victims where facial identification is an issue.

2

2 DVI team equipment, one of 2 trucks fully equipped and portable. Morning briefing with multi-agency staff

dealing with the aftermath of the bushfires in Victoria.

Victoria police combine the duties of DVI staff with CBRN. In the UK, CBRN is considered to be a

counter terrorism team, but in Victoria, the teams are frequently called to deal with ‘Clan labs’,

clandestine laboratories for the production of illicit drugs. Victoria police discover an average of 2

clan labs per week, and the gathering of evidence, the dismantling of the chemical laboratories,

requires CBRN skills and some similar skills to DVI. This enables the team to have a continuous and

sustained workload which justifies the cost of the unit. They are a small team who are deployable to

all of the Victoria state. They are supported by CSI and other forensic staff who are multi-skilled and

can assist with DVI events when required.

In Canberra, ACT, and in New South Wales, the DVI teams are volunteers who are posted into

policing teams in the same way as they are in the UK. They are spread out amongst all areas of

policing so that the impact of any deployment does not impact disproportionately on any particular

department. This approach also ensures that volunteers are genuine volunteers, and a variety of

skills are possessed by the team members. Each state has a DVI commander and deputy and they

also manage training needs and exercises.

In the UK, ACPO have a nominated DVO lead, responsible for policy development and training in

conjunction with the National Policing Improvement Agency, NPIA. There are regular regional

meetings. Each police force has a DVI lead, usually Detective Superintendent, and the

implementation of Senior Identification Managers (S.I.M.) in each force was an important step

forward in managing DVI in a corporate and professional manner.

6. How Does DVI change after a DVI Event?

In terms of policy, each police force in the UK, and each state in Australia, write their own policy

document, but it is based on the Interpol protocol. This does mean that there are some variations in

organisational structure and procedure. When a force or state has experienced a DVI event, de-

briefs are part of the recognised process. Inevitably, the previous case dealt with will have a bearing

on the review of policy within that police force. For example, after the bush fires, Victoria reviewed

its policy. The DVI lead (D/Supt O’Loughlin) , would have had the bush fires foremost in his mind. It is

natural to write any changes in response to that incident, that being the purpose of review.

However, he had to take into account that the next DVI incident may not be bushfire related. In

Merseyside in December 2010, a DVI incident was managed on an industrial estate in Kirkby which

presented a particular set of problems. The resolution required staff to work at height and in

confirmed spaces. Post de-brief, the DVI commander made a decision to train DVI staff in working at

height and confined spaces awareness. This decision was a direct response to that incident.

However, the ADVIC chair, Superintendent Mark Sweeney, from his experiences in DVI, believes that

training staff in such skills is unnecessary and that his teams will call upon other services or staff with

those skills should he need them. These differences in how teams are managed are direct results of

individual experiences. Interpol does not seek to dictate how teams and policy are managed, their

objective is to maintain a minimum standards which will enable countries to work together

coherently in the event of DVI events.

In Australia, regular meetings are held between DVI commanders and lessons learned from DVI

training or events are shared. However, there is no formal process for cascading this knowledge to

DVI teams and relies on managers to individual keep team members informed of changes. This is a

similar process in the UK.

NPIA also manage a forum for sharing of policing research and good practice. Members of police

forces can register and upload documents which will assist in sharing the learning in every aspect of

policing. However, it isn’t routinely used to share good practice, and the entries relating to DVI are

minimal.

7. Developments and Strategy.

In order to engage more Interpol member countries to sign up to the same DVI protocol, minimum

standards must remain simple and effective without resulting in excessive costs for poorer countries.

This effectively allows for other member countries to develop their own policies, and produce what

they individually consider to be their ‘gold standard’ in DVI. However, there cannot be an

expectation of these gold standards being adhered to where for example British nationals are

involved in mass fatality events in Thailand. The current thinking is to develop policy in respect of

religion and diversity by ensuring policy takes into account good practice in ensuring that deceased

are treated wherever possible in accordance with their religious and cultural beliefs. Both Australia

and the UK have policy sections relating to religious beliefs, but this is considered to be an area for

training and development.

In addition, there is an acknowledgment that the USA does not use the Interpol protocol and have

the ‘D-MORT’ process. This relies on the use of undertakers trained in DVI processes to assist the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Agents in DVI events. The USA is the largest developed country

not to sign up to the process.

The UK and Australia similarly have strategies spanning the next five years or more in developing

DVI. However, as the UK has not been involved in mass fatality events on the scale or frequency of

Australia, funding is far smaller, which in turn delays development. This is particularly apparent in

term of equipment and funding provided for DVI in the UK compared to Australia. 3

3 DVI store Victoria being re-stocked during operation. Temporary mortuary facilities at Victoria Hospital.

8. Conclusion

Both UK and Australia use the Interpol protocol as do around 50 other Interpol member countries.

The remainder do largely agree to the principles of DVI but not the process and paperwork etc. The

USA has a different process called DMORT. In the event of multinational deployments, which are

always a sensitive subject, this difference in practices can cause tension.

The sharing of information regarding the management and in particular problems solving aspects of

DVI incidents could be improved for the benefit of all countries. However, it is a sensitive subject,

and any reports which can be accessed by members of the public should be censored and full

reports reserved for the benefit of DVI professionals only. The NPIA POLKA site, if developed would

be an ideal platform for such information sharing.

Each coroner involved in DVI incidents will want particular measures to be implemented in the joint

operation. In the case of the Victoria bush fires, one example of this was a response to the high

temperatures and the effect on human bone. The coroner asked for all skulls to be wrapped in

bubble wrap, and teeth present in the skulls ‘glued in’ to preserve the positioning for dental records

comparisons. This practice forms part of normal procedure in Australia due their learning from that

experience. There will be many other examples of such practices, which could be shared more

effectively between DVI teams in every country.

Training is a particular learning point. In Australia, they train all DVI team members in every DVI role.

This enabled them to rotate teams depending on where the need was, and also to safeguard the

wellbeing of the staff and reduce stress. For example, the Victoria teams would recover in some

cases multiple deceased persons on one site. Due to the complete breakdown in the

communications system, they would then return to the mortuary with numerous exhibits and

corpses. This would then result in a ‘blockage’ at the booking in mortuary process and post mortem

examinations. There would be little point re-deploying that same team back into the field until the

mortuary staff have caught up. So the staff would be rotated and between roles, which would serve

as an opportunity to review working hours, de-briefs etc. and keep the system flowing.

In the UK the NPIA guidance is that DVI staffs are trained in a particular skilled role and remain

within it. There is an opportunity here to explore the effectiveness of both systems, but clearly the

Australian system has recent experience of their system working well in practice.

The UK has a very limited budget for any DVI operation. Should an event occur, then DVI teams

would have to seek authority to use equipment funded under counter terrorism budgets and

management. Clearly many DVI events are the result of natural disaster and not terrorism. Yet DVI

teams must rely on decisions regarding equipment etc. that is not necessarily suited to the specific

needs of DVI. There are some clear overlaps, particularly with areas such as temporary mortuary

facilities, but DVI in natural disasters would be better managed if equipment was designed for the

needs taking into account DVI user groups. In addition, the ability to exercise and practice with the

equipment for every team in the UK would be an advantage.

Co-ordination of DVI exercising, training and skills, in the UK is more difficult between the 44 forces

of England and wales as well as none home office forces. In view of changes in the structure and

budgets of police forces, it is perhaps an opportunity to review the structure of DVI and the need to

work more closely and effectively together. It is an area of work that is largely not considered as a

priority until something occurs. In addition, when reviewed, the link to Fire and rescue services and

other emergency services should be more closely aligned. There are many emergency services

personnel, both in the police and externally who are simply not aware that teams exist in this field of

work.

9. Further reading and Media

The experience of learning first hand from people who attended this tragic natural disaster has been

an immense opportunity to really get a feel for what it is like to deal with such an incident.

If you are interested in this area of work, further reading can be found in the references, but also in a

number of media and magazine articles aimed at promoting not only the work of DVI, but also of the

trust.

Part of the responsibilities of being a Winston Churchill Fellow, is the commitment to promoting the

trust. I have done this through giving presentations, magazine articles, and via support groups in

Merseyside police and the Police Federation. I am delighted to report that two members of the

Merseyside Network Of Women (NOW) have applied for and been short listed for fellowships of

their own for 2012. I do hope that Merseyside Police are successful in supporting both of the

applicants through the process to their conclusion. In times of austerity and budget cuts, it is

important to remain focussed on personal development and developing research in policing to make

us more effective in the future. The future of policing depends upon it.

For more information see the Spring 2011 and Autumn/Winter 2011 Grapevine magazine articles at

http://bawp.org/newsletters.php.

The Victoria Bushfires commission has also issued its full report into the cause and management of

the disaster. There 998 exhibits attached to the reports including witness statements.

10. References.

Disaster Victim Identification: The Practitioners Guide. Dundee University Press, 2010 (Black, Walker,

Hackman, Brooks).

ACPOS Guidance on Disaster Victim Identification. NPIA 2011.

[http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/uniformed/2011/20110324%20UOBA%20Guidance%20on%

20Disaster%20Victim%20Identification_2011.pdf]

2009 Victoria Bushfires Royal Commission [http://www.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/]

11. Life Goes On.

My favourite picture provided by D/Supt O’Loughlin, Victoria Police.

The boundaries which divide life from death

are at best shadowy and vague. Who shall say where one ends,

and the other begins?

Edgar Alan Poe