DISASTER PLAN

BODEGA BAY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT

Sean Grinnell

Fire Chief

Board Members

Liz Martin, President

Charlie Bone

Dave Kruppa

David Love

Shay Pickton

November 11, 2018

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BBFPD DISASTER PLAN PREFACE

This plan is intended to be used by the first responder staff at BBFPD and any members of the

community, such as CERT, who will be working with the staff during a disaster. The BBFPD

Disaster Plan contains Policy, Procedures and Threat Assessment. Policy is a deliberate system of

principles to guide decision making, explain and reference what is to be done (procedures) when

those decisions are made and achieve positive outcomes. Each policy topic is a statement of

intent, and is implemented as a procedure or protocol in the form of Standard Operating

Guidelines referenced in this document.

The policy and procedures presented here are based partially on the Threat Assessment in

Appendix A. The reader is referred there for details on the potential disasters that underlie

disaster policy and procedures. The threat assessment is intended to cover relevant

understanding of the disaster threat(s) including earthquakes and related natural events such as

tsunamis and liquefaction as well as landslides, wildfires, civil unrest, terrorism, multi casualty

incidents, hazardous materials, and other incidents that potentially will overwhelm the district

resources.

The Bodega Bay Fire Protection District (BBFPD) community has recognized that the BBFPD

staff, even with other available first responders, may not be able to address all of the community

needs during a disaster. It will be the combination of BBFPD career and volunteer staff working

with CERT members that provide direct support during a disaster. Other community groups have

shown remarkable capabilities for resilience in the face of disaster as well. As learned during the

Tubbs fire, we have a vibrant consortium of community organizations that can quickly organize

and operate to support disaster victims. Our successful recovery will depend on all of these

efforts both during and after the disaster.

The Disaster Plan is subject to change as we understand the threats better and devise new or

better policies and procedures.

Dewey Kribs, Editor

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SUMMARY OF THE BBFPD DISASTER PLAN

This summary is meant for the reader who does not need or want all of the details provided in

the plan. It is also provided for BBFPD staff and CERT as a way to preview the details they will

need to study later.

We define a disaster as an overwhelming event to the community resources. A disaster is a

serious disruption of the community, occurring over a relatively short time, involving human loss

of life and well-being, property and normal functioning. It can exceed the ability of the

community to respond using only its own resources. To plan for reaction to a disaster we began

by identifying the threats, in sufficient detail, to know what could occur in Bodega Bay. Our

district geography, climate, geology, road system, harbor structure, tourism life, and other

factors were taken into account. We researched Federal, State, and County offices as well as

University libraries to compile directly meaningful information on our disaster threats.

Residents of Bodega Bay should be able to determine with some accuracy how a threat may

impact their home and business. If the reader wishes to delve further they can find out how the

professional and volunteer staff of the District, along with trained CERT members, will react by

reading the Policy and Procedures body of the report along with Standard Operating Guidelines

developed with the Plan. Threat scenarios, described below, provide a good way to understand

the gravity and response for two major threats; earthquakes and wildfires.

Threats.

We are subject to disaster threats. The BBFPD Disaster Plan is intended to guide response to

such natural and man-made disasters as earthquakes, tsunamis, wildfires, hazardous material

intrusions, multiple casualty incidents, terrorism and active shooters. These and other disasters

are included in the Plan as threats to the community for which we may have to react to and

mitigate (Appendix A).

For example, a major earthquake is considered to be a high probability event that can be

accompanied by violent shaking, tsunami wave action, liquefaction of land, landslides, fires and

extreme damage to infrastructure including road destruction and building collapse. Bodega Bay

has a very high earthquake risk, with a total of 412 earthquakes since 1931. The USGS database

shows that there is an 83.62% chance of a major earthquake within about 30 miles of Bodega

Bay, CA within the next 50 years. A major earthquake is defined as 7.0 or greater on the Richter

scale.

The Plan also presents the projections for wildfire severity in Sonoma County as seen by

CALFIRE. Wildfire for Bodega Bay is designated as a moderate zone. A moderate zone is seen as

much less of a risk and hazard than the High and Very High assigned hazards of the County

interior or further north. There are, however, two additional conditions that change these

CALFIRE projections of Wildfire Hazard classification. These are: 1) Earthquakes and 2) Climate

and topography changes at times of the year. First, we must anticipate the need to fight wildfires

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when an earthquake occurs. Historically, most modern earthquakes have had more destruction

from fire than other earthquake factors. Second, the Sonoma County Operational Area

Emergency Operations Plan points out that the western portion of the county is influenced by the

Pacific Ocean that it borders. Fire hazards are mitigated by summer fog and lower temperatures

and are only of moderate risk in this area. However, that same ocean influence results in several

weeks of off shore winds in the fall and although the coast is considered of only moderate risk

most of the time it is in this period that the fire risk becomes extreme.

Scenarios.

There are scenarios for the threats of earthquakes and wildfires. The words below are excerpted

to demonstrate the content. The full text is worth reading and thinking about. These scenarios

are meant to accompany the Disaster Threat Assessment. They are intended to show how many

of the elements of the Disaster Plan, including the threat assessment, policies and procedures will

operate in a real disaster. All disasters, including earthquakes and wildfires will be different but

these scenarios illustrate the basics of BBFPD plans.

An Earthquake Disaster Scenario: Day One. In this scenario it is the July fourth weekend. The

Bodega Bay Firefighters Association had their annual Pancake breakfast the day before. It has been

a busy weekend so far with calls for several auto accidents requiring BBFPD help including a head

on collision, a cliff/ocean rescue and kayakers in distress outside the harbor. A camper at Doran

Beach started a fire inside an RV.

It is estimated that 10,000 to 20,000 people will pass through Bodega Bay each day, many stopping

to eat and shop and view the beauty of the place. There will be 3,000- 5,000 visitors staying at the

campgrounds, vacation home rentals, and hotel lodging. Restaurants will be filled throughout the

day. The harbor and coastline are filled with both commercial and sportsman boaters.

A crew of four is on duty since it is a holiday weekend. They are just about ready to sit down for

dinner at about 7:00 PM.

Minus One Minute to First Shockwave. The USGS (United States Geological Survey) issues an early

warning of an earthquake from the San Andreas Fault to the Sonoma County REDCOM dispatcher.

REDCOM notifies BBFPD and other Sonoma County agencies. The shift at the station house braces

for the shockwave to come in just seconds.

A 7.4 earthquake begins with shaking lasting a full minute. (This scenario continues for 24 hours.)

Policy and Procedures.

District staff and many CERT members will need to read the Main Body of the Plan; Policy and

Procedures and study the SOGs for action needed. Policy is a deliberate system of principles to

guide decision making, explain and reference what is to be done (procedures) when those

decisions are made and achieve positive outcomes. Each policy topic is a statement of intent, and

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is implemented as a procedure or protocol in the form of Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs)

referenced in this document.

The Disaster Plan is subject to change as we understand the threats better and devise new or

better policies and procedures.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

BBFPD DISASTER PLAN PREFACE i

SUMMARY OF THE BBFPD DISASTER PLAN ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS v

DISASTER PLAN POLICY AND PROCEDURES 1

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS) IMPLEMENTATION AT BBFPD 2

Initiation of Disaster Operations. 2

Agency Coordination and Mobilization. 2

First CERT Coordination. 2

FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT AND SECURITY DURING A DISASTER 2

Equipment, Apparatus and Infrastructure. 2

Security. 2

EOC Setup. 3

EVACUATIONS 3

Tsunami Evacuations. 3

After Shock Evacuations. 3

Wildfire Evacuations. 4

TRIAGE AND MEDICAL TREATMENT 4

CERT Triage Staging 4

CERT Self Help. 4

BBFPD Level Triage. 4

Triage Supplies. 4

Triage Methodology. 4

Patient Transportation from Triage. 5

Morgues 5

COMMUNICATIONS 5

BBFPD Communications Operations. 5

Public Service Frequencies. 6

CERT Community Outreach Through Hams. 6

CERT Ham Communication Protocols and Support. 6

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APPENDIX A: DISASTER THREAT ASSESSMENT 1

EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 1

Slope Stability and Earthquake Impact. 4

Shaking from an earthquake. 7

Liquefaction Impact. 8

Tsunami Impact. 9

Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ). 10

WILDFIRE DISASTER 14

CIVIL UNREST 16

TERRORIST ATTACK 16

HAZARDOUS MATERIAL EMERGENCY 17

MULTIPLE CASUALTY INCIDENTS (MCI) 17

GRAPHICS AND DATA REFERENCES USED 18

OTHER RELATED REFERENCES REVIEWED IN MAKING THIS DOCUMENT 18

FIGURES IN THIS DISASTER PLAN 20

SCENARIO OF AN EARTHQUAKE DISASTER: DAY ONE 21

WILDFIRE SCENARIO #1: THE TUBBS FIRE IN 2017 27

WILDFIRE SCENARIO #2: SONOMA COUNTY COASTAL FIRE 20XX 31

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DISASTER PLAN POLICY AND PROCEDURES

The BBFPD Disaster Plan Policy is a deliberate system of principles to guide decision making,

explain and reference what is to be done (Procedures), when those decisions are made, and

achieve positive outcomes. Each Policy Topic is a statement of intent and is implemented as a

Procedure or Protocol through an Standard Operating Guideline. The Policies and Procedures

presented here are based partially on the Threat Assessment in Appendix A. The reader is

referred there for details on the potential disasters that underlie Disaster Plan Policy and

Procedures.

It is imperative that all parties follow policy. This is knowledge that both BBFPD staff and CERT

members must have and follow when a disaster occurs. The table below summarizes the Policy

Topics discussed in the Disaster Plan. They are presented, generally, along the expected

timelines of disasters.

TIMELINE MAJOR POLICY AREAS SUBPOLICY AREAS Initial Response to a Disaster ICS Implementation at

BBFPD • Initiation of Disaster

Operations • Agency Coordination

and Mobilization • First CERT

Coordination Initial Response to a Disaster Facilities, Equipment

and Security During a Disaster

• Equipment, Apparatus and Infrastructure

• Security • EOC Setup

Call for Evacuation Evacuations • Tsunami Evacuations • After Shock Evacuations • Wildfire Evacuations

Continued Disaster Response Triage and Medical Treatment

• CERT Triage Staging • CERT Self Help • BBFPD Level Triage • Triage Supplies • Triage Methodology • Patient Transportation • Morgues

Continued Disaster Response Communication • BBFPD Comm. Ops. • Public Service

Frequencies • CERT Ham Outreach • CERT Ham Protocols

Table 1. Policy Topics Presented in This Disaster Plan.

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INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM (ICS) IMPLEMENTATION AT BBFPD

Initiation of Disaster Operations. The Senior Safety District Member on duty (usually a shift

Captain or Fire Chief) will declare himself/herself IC (Incident Commander). He/she shall initiate

disaster mode of operation upon any earthquake of 5.0 or more (can be felt), wild fire close

enough to be a hazard, and instances of multi-casualties, hazmat, and civil unrest where there

may be requirements for an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and possibly Unified Command

Operations. Since a foreshock of less than 5.0 may pre-curse a major earthquake, the Disaster

Mode may be declared until a safe time indicates that further shaking is not a danger. Any

Tsunami Watch, Advisory, or Warning received requires initiation of Disaster Mode (SOG 2-26:

Disaster Checklist for Mobilization, SOG 2-27: After Shock Station Checklist).

Agency Coordination and Mobilization. The IC will notify the Fire Chief and Operations Captain

of actions and conditions. The IC will coordinate immediately with other agencies (SOG 6-7:

Coordination/Communication with Other Agencies During a Disaster) to ensure Unified Command

Operations and status of each agency. Given the small amount of resources and expected lack of outside

help during an earthquake Unified Command Operations at BBFPD are necessary. For other disasters,

where outside resources are expected, and even part of protocol, the IC will act according to Sonoma

County and State regulations. In the event of an earthquake, REDCOM may be notified of a Self-Dispatch

mode of operation. Off duty personnel will be contacted for mobilization as may be deemed necessary.

(SOG 2-26: Disaster Checklist for Mobilization).

First CERT Coordination. The IC, or designated EOC member, will monitor the CERT Net on the

BBFPD repeater and, if the Net is established outside of Station One, call in. The net will continue to be

monitored for status reports needing professional staff responding and to assess conditions.

FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT AND SECURITY DURING A DISASTER

Equipment, Apparatus and Infrastructure. After an earthquake shock of 5.0 or more, the on duty

crew will ensure the safety and well being of all staff and visitors and then attend to apparatus and

facilities (SOG 2-27: Aftershock Checklist). All apparatus will be staged outside with bay doors open.

Equipment will be put back in place if needed or placed ready for use. Checks of power, including the

standby generator, all communications, fuel tank, propane tank, and utility water will be conducted. The

building must be inspected for structural integrity.

Security. It is expected that in any disaster, perhaps especially a major earthquake, unknown visitors

will be around and in the station. Areas such as crew quarters, paramedic supplies, office areas, Radio

Room, and EOC areas should be made secure and vigilance applied (SOG 2-28: Disaster Operations and

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Security). Unknown visitors should be challenged in off-limit areas and instructed to move outside or to

other community designated areas for evacuees and those seeking commodity aid (such as water and

food).

EOC Setup. Following FEMA, NIMS, ICS definitions, and Policies and Procedures, the IC will set up an

EOC in the Burke Room with working spaces for IC, Operations, Planning, Logistics and

Finance/Administration. Space for other agencies to come in under Unified Command will be set up as

needed (SOG 6-7: Coordination/Communication with other Agencies During a Disaster). The IC will

consider a Base at Station 2. In an earthquake disaster, a Station 2 Base may be established as soon as

personnel and apparatus are available.

EVACUATIONS

Tsunami Evacuations. Tsunami event messages are designated by three types: Watch, Advisory, and

Warning. Upon receiving a tsunami watch message, the on-duty Captain will notify the Fire Chief and

Operations Captain, and monitor for the message changing to either the Advisory or Warning Level. If an

Advisory Message is received, the on-duty crew and responding Volunteers will take immediate action to

ensure that those near beaches and other waterlines, including the harbor, are notified to stay out of the

water and move back from it. If a Warning is issued, on-duty the crew will take immediate action to

evacuate low lying areas such as the Porto Bodega Marina and RV Park, Salmon Creek, and

residences/business along the shoreline of Highway 1. The on-duty Captain shall contact REDCOM to

notify Sonoma County Regional Parks Rangers (Doran Park and Westside Park) and California State Parks

Rangers (Bodega Dunes Campground, Wright’s Beach Campground, and the Sonoma Coast State Beach

System to initiate evacuations of these areas. Radio communications will be maintained to ensure orderly

evacuation is taking place and to ascertain if further resources are needed. If County or State Parks

Rangers are not able to conduct evacuations, the BBFPD IC or Duty Captain will send a vehicle (if

available) to warn visitors and workers to evacuate the affected areas immediately. This will be a backup

action only. Marine channels will be used to warn the Spud Point Marina and boaters unless the Coast

Guard has already taken this action. Coordination with CHP and the Sonoma County Sheriff will also be

initiated. (SOG 6-7 Coordination/Communication with Other Agencies During a Disaster, SOG 2-27

After Shock Station Checklist)

After Shock Evacuations. Regardless of whether there is a Tsunami Watch, the IC will order

evacuation procedures after the initial shock from a major earthquake where there is a large

amount of destruction and possibility of death and injury. This will require communication with

County Roads Department and CalTrans, as well as Sheriff and CHP to conduct orderly

evacuations. Visitors should be advised to drive to their home or other non-affected areas. (SOG

6-7: Coordination/Communication with Other Agencies During a Disaster, SOG 2-27 After Shock

Station Checklist).

.

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Wildfire Evacuations. The IC will issue evacuation orders as soon as it is judged safe and

required to save lives. County and State agencies will be notified and consulted. Law

enforcement will be notified of the evacuation orders and assist in carrying them out. (SOG 6-7

Coordination/Communication with Other Agencies During a Disaster, SOF 2-27 After Shock Station

Checklist).

A “Precautionary Evacuation” may be issued to residents advising that they are in the influence zone of

the fires and should be prepared for evacuation. BBFPD may issue orders to all non residents to leave

immediately and with only residents, with ID, allowed to stay.

TRIAGE AND MEDICAL TREATMENT

CERT Triage Staging. It is expected that CERT groups may need to Triage at two levels. First, triage

will be necessary at a search and rescue site where treatment for any immediately threatening

condition(s) is given. Second, triage will be needed at a common CERT site area (disaster sheds) where

patients can be monitored and provided additional treatment. CERT training covers these procedures

CERT Self Help. BBFPD staff, especially firefighters and EMS personnel, must be ready to consult by

radio over amateur bands with CERT members who are acting as First Responders in Bodega Bay

neighborhoods. Radio consultation might occur in the Radio Room or while a Firefighter/EMT is already

in the field but at another location.

BBFPD Level Triage. The third level of Disaster Triage is when a victim is under BBFPD personnel

treatment at a station or designated care lodging. This most likely will happen in the Apparatus Bays of

Stations 1 and 2, or commercial lodging that has been deemed safe and secure by the IC/Operations

Officers, or other community areas like the Bodega Bay Grange, BHHA Yacht Club, or Bodega Bay

Community Center.

Triage Supplies. The Logistics Desk and EMS/Paramedic personnel will track and inventory all

medical supplies such that if shortages occur or supplies are becoming low, efforts can be made to shift

storage sites or obtain more supplies. The Logistics Desk will ensure that supplies are shifted from station

to station such that each station will be able to conduct triage and treatment. Those responsible for CERT

Disaster Sheds will need to inventory their respective supplies and report to CERT Net Control who

should maintain a file of current CERT shed supplies. The CERT Net Control Operators should periodically

request an update from each Shed Manager to facilitate shifting needed supplies if needed and possible.

Triage Methodology. CERT members are taught the START methodology of triage and identify

patients by four types; Immediate (I), Delayed (D), Minor (M) and Dead (D). These categories and triage

steps are consistent with BBFPD practice. Categories of patients, color coding and labels practices are

standardized. Color coding is red (I), yellow (D) Green (M) and Black (D). Patients may be re-categorized

and relabeled when transferred from CERT to BBFPD. BBFPD staff will document all treatments, as time

allows, including those done by CERT when known.

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Patient Transportation from Triage. During most disasters patient transportation will be

conducted by standard ambulance procedures. In the event of a major earthquake, it will be necessary to

transport patients by any means necessary including private boats and vehicles of any sort. This includes

transporting serious injuries to the stations and/or hospitals. BBFPD staff will advise for transportation

and, when possible, prepare patients for transportation. Ambulances will be used only when absolutely

necessary.

Morgues. Both at CERT and BBFPD station triage levels, morgues will be set up separated from patients

receiving treatment. Dead victims will be placed with identification and any treatment or

rescue/recovery information available. Morgues should be separated from other groups and marked by

blue /tarps (if available), markers, sheets. or other means as available.

COMMUNICATIONS

BBFPD Communications Operations. There are two cases of Communications Operations for

BBFPD staff. Each case has an impact discussed here. The first case consists of disasters in which

standard REDCOM operating procedures have been defined and the coordination with other agencies

has been specified. The includes HAZMAT, Multiple Casualty Incidents (MCI), wildfires, and other

disasters which will involve several agencies and responders from those agencies. The

communication policies, protocols, frequencies and agencies related to BBFPD as a fire and medical

service in such disasters are defined in Redwood Empire Dispatch and Communications JPA: Standard

Operation Guidelines and Policy. CERT will not be normally involved except to man the CERT Net to

provide and receive information relevant to the community.

The other case is the incident of a major earthquake, in which there will be no outside agencies

available for a long period, communication with REDCOM may be curtailed for some time, Self

Dispatch may be in effect, and much communication will be through the CERT Amateur Radio

Network. In this case the following apply:

● Redwood Empire Dispatch and Communications JPA: Standard Operation Guidelines and

Policy SOPs 10 and 40

● SOG 6-7: Communication/Coordination with Other Agencies During a Disaster

● Operating Manual: CERT BBFPD Station Licensed as KJ6QBM

Automated support for logging calls and revising or maintaining disaster files is being considered

by BBFPD and will allow sending the call results directly from the Radio Room to

computers/monitors in the EOC. Until this resource is ready, scribes will write legibly on forms

in the station for transfer to the Operations Desk by the Auxiliary Communications Unit.

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Public Service Frequencies. Public service and other interagency communications will be

conducted by career staff and the Auxiliary Communications Unit. BBFPD Auxiliary

Communications Unit staff who are trained in public service communications will supplement

operations in these communications only as specifically instructed. No CERT Ham in the station

may use a public service frequency without specific authorization by the IC or his/her designee.

Public service and other important communication data are included in SOP 6-7: Coordination/

Communication with other Agencies During a Disaster. All staff should be prepared for

phone communication through the EMPpunity radio as specified in that SOP.

CERT Community Outreach Through Hams. It is possible, with all other forms of

communication unavailable and some roads not passable, that the CERT Hams reporting into and

manning the CERT Command Station will be the nerve network of BBFPD and the knowledge conduit

for rescue and recovery in Bodega Bay. The Operating Manual: CERT BBFPD Station Licensed as

KJ6QBM, available at all times in the Radio Room, provides necessary procedures, protocols and

frequencies for Ham operation of the BBFPD CERT Command Station. Only Hams designated by the

CERT Communications Director should operate at the station. Any Ham reporting to the Station

should directly report to the BBFPD Auxiliary Communication Leader on site or to the IC, or his/her

designee, for instructions before entering the Radio Room to log in.

CERT Ham Communication Protocols and Support. Ham message reports to the EOC staff

will be of three types and marked as such: 1) Emergency, 2) Priority, and 3) Routine. First

priority for immediate attention will be given to “911” class calls which indicate an Emergency

involving life and/or property danger. The second is a Priority message in which may include

requests for aid, including materials, and consultation on rescues or medical needs. The third is a

Routine report, not requiring immediate response and often only for information purposes, such

as results of inspections, self rescues and first aid, and conditions of neighborhoods such as

landslides, liquefaction, and roads.

The minimum information will include Time and Date, Caller ID, Ham Receiving Call, Location of

Caller (including Shed Tactical Call Sign if appropriate), Category of Call, and Description of Call.

The Description of a Call should be brief and use language that is concise and known to

emergency responders.

Areas of Bodega Bay have been defined to allow organization and action by the community in

those local areas. CERT Provision Sheds have been placed in these areas containing disaster

supplies; including Ham radios, generators, and basic information regarding their use. Each area

has a specific tactical call sign and working frequencies for communication among themselves in

that area. Hams also will communicate with CERT Net Command in the Radio Room at the

BBFPD station house through the BBFPD Repeater frequency. CERT Area Teams will conduct

surveys of such relevant items as roads, structures, fires, explosions, triage status, other notable

events, and pass the results onto CERT Command. This routine message traffic will be passed to

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the EOC by the Auxiliary Communications Operator. If an Auxiliary Communications Operator is

not available the CERT Hams may pass the reports directly to the Operations Captain or other

EOC personnel designated by the IC.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | APPENDIX A: DISASTER THREAT ASSESSMENT 1

APPENDIX A: DISASTER THREAT ASSESSMENT

The Bodega Bay Fire Protection District (BBFPD) has responsibility for 34 square miles of fire protection

and 185 square miles of medical and rescue area. All of this area is on the Sonoma and Marin County

coasts. BBFPD also has automatic/mutual aid agreements with other agencies such as Marin County for

services outside the district jurisdiction. The greatest risk for disaster is an earthquake from the San

Andreas fault. Other possible disasters include wild fires, civil unrest, terrorism, hazardous materials, and

multiple casualty incidents. All are subjects of this threat assessment.

EARTHQUAKE DISASTER We begin with an earthquake disaster. It is a high probability event that can be accompanied by violent shaking,

tsunami wave action, liquefaction of land, landslides, fires and extreme damage to infrastructure including road

destruction and building collapse. Bodega Bay has a very high earthquake risk, with a total of 412 earthquakes

since 1931. The USGS database shows that there is a 83.62% chance of a major earthquake within 50km of

Bodega Bay, CA within the next 50 years. A major earthquake is defined as 7.0 or greater on the Richter scale.

For our purposes in disaster planning we will consider any earthquake of 5.0 or more to trigger consideration of

implementing the policies and procedures covered in this document.

Figure 1. The San Andreas Fault Line in California

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 2

In Figure 1 the bright red lines reflect the San Andreas fault. It starts on the eastern side of the Salton Sea.

and runs the length of California. When it reaches the San Francisco area from the South it begins a path

under the ocean water straight up Tomales Bay, Bodega Bay Harbor, across a short piece of land at Salmon

Creek and then back out to the ocean in front of Carmet and Sereno Del Mar.

This path through the Bodega Bay Fire Protection District (BBFPD) is seen in Figure 2. It runs through

residential areas, a vital harbor of commercial fishing, restaurants, campgrounds, view points and

commercial lodging that are on and near the fault.

Figure 2. Depiction of San Andreas Fault in the Bodega Bay Community (Copyrights by Google).

The District is centered directly on the San Andreas Fault between the two tectonic plates; North

American and Pacific. The eastern edge of the fault is on the North American Plate. This Google Map

aerial shot in Figure 2 shows the fault on the east side of the harbor and running through Salmon Creek

toward the shores near Carmet and Sereno Del Mar.

However, as seen in Figure 3, the San Andreas Rift Zone is an expected heavy impact area of 1 ½ miles

across because there are fractures that are connected to the San Andreas Fault but not directly part of it,

The zone covers a broad area from the open Pacific Ocean coast of Bodega Head (pointed to as The Hole),

across the sand dunes to the north and west of the harbor, under the harbor bottom, and across to the

Eastern coastline of the harbor. Marinas and campgrounds of the harbor are in the middle of the zone

along with the Coast Guard station and several favorite viewing and food places for tourists. Residential

areas, the Bodega Bay School and the Bodega Marine Laboratory, with student housing, are also inside the

rift area.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 3

Figure 3. The San Andreas Rift Zone at Bodega Bay. (Copyright © 2002-2017 Kenneth & Gabrielle Adelman, California Coastal Records Project, www.californiacoastline.org)

Much of the area was, in fact, formed many years ago by seismic activity. The natural harbor bottom has

both mud and sand composition as does the surrounding land. Sand dunes surround the west and north

area of the harbor and this has resulted in sand eroding onto the harbor bottom at points.

An earthquake disaster will have shaking, liquefaction, landslides, possible Tsunami implications, road

and building collapse and fires. In the event of an earthquake we can expect severe ground shaking and

liquefaction of both the harbor bottom and its surrounding coastline. Tsunami activity is possible both

from the San Andreas fault and other, more distant, off shore faults. Landslides can be expected along

roads such as California Highway 1 which goes through Bodega Bay and is a main road for

firefighter/rescue incidents. We expect fires from both gasoline and propane gas ruptures. We also live in

an area subject to wildfires so any fire resulting from an earthquake can become a wildfire if not

contained quickly. It is anticipated that any or all of these events will result in a disaster including:

1) Loss of electricity, phone services, Internet services and water utilities;

2) Severe damage to the roads that are needed to respond to calls;

3) Upheaval and damage of the fleet in the harbor as well as the harbor bottom itself;

4) Heavy volume of calls for help not only from residents but the many visitors who frequent the area.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 4

Over 5 million tourists are estimated to visit the Bodega Bay area each year and are dependent upon the

BBFPD for their safety. In addition when fishing seasons are open, we host many transient commercial

vessels as well as our large permanent fleet. This also means more fishing boat crews are residents.

We do not anticipate that help from outside responders will be available immediately, and perhaps for a

long time, as other larger populations will also need help and will have priority for responders. Our intent

is to attend to life and property whether on land or water and to get the community back to functioning as

quickly as possible. We are looking forward to establishing resiliency.

Slope Stability and Earthquake Impact. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate several aspects of the

earthquake disaster threat to the harbor. These maps come from the California Department of

Conservation in its efforts to determine the geology and slope stability along the Highway 1 corridor of the

state. Their geological survey was done for California Department of Transportation in preparation of

Highway 1 road and bridge conditions caused by seismic and erosion conditions. . The red lines on the

Eastern shore represent the San Andreas fault as either well located or inferred by that Agency based on

the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. Some major harbor landmarks of our BBFPD concern are shown

including the Marinas, Two County Camping Parks, Porto Bodega RV Park, recreational boat ramps, beach

areas, Coast Guard Station and the opening to the harbor.

Figure 4. Slope Stability in Bodega Bay Harbor-Part 1.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 5

As shown on the maps, the shoreline of the harbor is a combination of fill (shown as afbm on the maps)

and bay mud produced in the current geological Holocene era (shown as Qhbm on the maps). This is

especially true of the western shore where two major marinas, boat ramps, and campground are located.

This type of geology is regulated for what can be built on it. It is low strength consisting of clay, silt and

sand and cannot support heavy structures. An earthquake can readily move the mud.

In Figure 5 Doran Beach, home to the U.S. Coast Guard Station, beach activities for Sonoma County,

several campground sites, horseback riding, and fishing off the jetty, is shown to be artificial fill over bay

mud (afbm plus Qhbs), or beach sand, formed from the current Holocene geological period. These

combinations of geological forms will also be easily moved during a major earthquake.

Figure 5. Slope Stability in Bodega Bay Harbor-Part 2.

Further up the coast, especially along the residential areas of Carmet and Sereno Del Mar there is a great

deal of QMT (Pleistocene Marine Terrace) soil. QMT deposits are defined to be between 10,000 to 2

million years old. The QMT deposits, which have substantial silt/clay or are cemented, have low

liquefaction potential. In addition, for sediments above the water table, the liquefaction hazard is

generally low. The QMT areas shown are all on high gentle slopes making liquefaction impact less likely.

Figures 6 and 7 show the geological makeup of these northern BBFPD district areas.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 6

However, in the same report from the California Department of Conservation that these maps are taken

from, the authors note that all five bridges in the Fire Protection District on Highway 1 are projected,

(“possible consequences”) to be closed from liquefaction in the event of seismic activity. The closures will

occur rapidly under seismic conditions. These include Cheney Gulch Bridge, Salmon Creek Bridge, Scotty

Creek Bridge and Russian River Bridge. Thus, the communities north of the Salmon Creek Bridge will be

cut off from the southern part of the district and both of the Fire Protection Districts stations.

Furthermore, the same communities could be cut off from northern travel on Highway 1 by loss of both

the Scotty Creek Bridge and Russian River Bridge.

Figure 6. Northern District Slope Stability Part 1.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 7

Figure 7. Northern District Slope Stability Part 2.

Shaking from an earthquake. How much damage will be done in and out of the harbor depends

upon the strength of the earthquake and therefore the shaking. The geology of the ground, discussed

above under slope stability, is also a major factor in determining impact.

Figure 8 shows the shaking intensity expected for Sonoma County and specifically the Bodega Bay

District. The Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale estimates the intensity of shaking from an

earthquake at a specific location or over a specific area by considering its effects on people, objects, and

buildings. At high intensities (MMI ≥ 6), earthquake shaking damages buildings. In Figure 8, the dark

Maroon color indicates a MMI scale number of 9 and surrounds the Bodega Bay area as well as the entire

coastline that is in the Jurisdiction of BBFPD. An MMI of 9 indicates expectation that damage will be

considerable even in specially and well designed structures. They will be thrown out of plumb with partial

collapse and be shifted off foundations. The BBFPD coastline district is assigned the 9 based on San Andreas

fault projections.

The rest of the County is shown in red (8) and yellow (7) with major population centers along the

Highway 101 corridor in the brown (9). The latter is the result of other faults in those County areas.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 8

Figure 8. Bodega Bay projected harbor shaking based on past earthquakes

Liquefaction Impact. The loose Holocene (a new geological age) mud and sand in and around the

harbor, including the entrance and outer harbor area, that is saturated with water can behave like a liquid

when shaken by an earthquake. Earthquake waves cause water pressures to increase in the sediment and

the sand grains to lose contact with each other, leading the sediment to lose strength and behave like a

liquid. The soil can loose its ability to support structures, flow down slopes, and erupt to the ground

surface to form sand boils. Many of these phenomena are accompanied by settlement of the ground

surface — usually in uneven patterns that damage buildings, roads and pipelines. Three factors are

required for liquefaction to occur:

1 Loose, granular sediment — typically "made" land and beach and stream deposits that are young

enough (late Holocene) to be loose.

2. Saturation of the sediment by ground water (water fills the spaces between sand and silt grains).

3. Strong shaking — The harbor and its coastline have the potential to be shaken hard enough for

susceptible sediment to liquefy.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 9

Liquefaction will therefore be a major factor in BBFPD’s responding to an earthquake disaster.

Figure 9. Expected Liquefaction of the Harbor and its surroundings.

Figure 9 is taken from a United States Geological Survey office study. A red area indicates very high

liquefaction and this includes Doran Beach and the Pacific Ocean coastline directly facing west including

Salmon Creek. The brown color shows the areas of high liquefaction while yellow indicates moderate

liquefaction and green is low impact. The Western and Northern harbor shores will have high to

moderate liquefaction. The Eastern shore will fare better with mostly low or no liquefaction with the

exception of a County Park just to the North of the Doran Beach Park entrance.

As discussed previously, in the section on Slope Stability, California Department of Conservation research

authors noted that all District bridges on Highway 1 are projected as “possible consequences” to be closed

from liquefaction in the event of seismic activity. The closure will occur rapidly. These include Cheney

Gulch Bridge, Salmon Creek Bridge, Scotty Creek Bridge and Russian River Bridge.

Tsunami Impact. Figure 10 shows the expected impact of a Tsunami as published by Sonoma County

and based on as study done by the California Emergency Management Agency. It is somewhat difficult to

see. Looking closely there are large pinkish areas at the entrance to Salmon Creek, another large area on

the west coastline of the harbor, all of Doran Beach, and several parts of the eastern shore. All of the

harbor will be affected. The red lines are also show impacted areas to be all along the coastline.

According to a study by the California Division of Mines and Geology a runup (a rush of water up a

structure with the breaking of a wave from a tsunami) of 20 feet is expected in those pink areas on the

map.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 10

Figure 10. Expected Tsunami Impacts.

In an article by the Santa Rosa Press Democrat (March 18, 2011) a reporter quoted the Assistant County

Office of Emergency Services Coordinator. "In the worst case, 700 homes." as being affected in the District

by Tsunami conditions. Evacuations of Westside Park, Doran Beach, Salmon Creek and the Marinas would

be necessary.

Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ). All of the previous discussion has been based on what is known

about the San Andreas fault. There is another fault that impacts our district; the Cascadia Subduction

Zone (CSZ). It is important to us for several reasons including; it will generate much more powerful

earthquakes along the west coast of the United States than the San Andreas, it directly influences seismic

activity on the San Andreas fault, and it will generate a tsunami along our coastline of perhaps greater

destruction than one from the San Andreas fault.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 11

First, let’s discuss the CSZ power for disaster. Figure 11 shows the length of the zone from the Vancouver

area in the North , along Washington and Oregon states, and then down to Northern California near

Eureka.

Figure 11. Cascadia Subduction Zone.

At the bottom of this graphic the surface is shown with the Juan de Fuca Plate under the continental crust

of the North American Plate. This “subduction” is what differs from the San Andreas fault. The San

Andreas fault consist of two plates traveling past each other in a horizontal manner. They strike and slip

(a strike/slip fault) past each other. In the subduction fault, here in the CSZ, one oceanic plate pushes

down past the continental plate causing the oceanic plate to sink; flexing and then snapping. Since it is

under water here, the water also sinks and then rises with a destructive turmoil of both land and water. A

subduction fault, specifically the CSZ, is considered by earthquake specialists to be capable of earth’s most

destructive disasters. Geologists have reconstructed an event in 1700 in which the CSZ did have an

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 12

earthquake of magnitude 8.7-9.2. Japan recorded a tsunami at that time for which they had no known

cause and named it an orphan. USGS sponsored research concluded that the CSZ can be expected to have

a “mega thrust” earthquake of 9.0 or greater every 500-600 years. Of course smaller ones occur more

frequently. More recent research from Oregon State University (see citations following the Threat

Analysis) has shown that the southern CSZ is more in line with the Northern San Andreas Fault

expectations for major ruptures. That is, 200 years on average over a period of about 2800 years..

Figure 12 show magnitude 6 or greater earthquakes recorded by the USGS since 1980. At the bottom of

the graphic the San Andreas Fault can be seen, in red, crossing the CSZ in blue and heading out toward the

west along the Mendocino Fracture Zone. It is not a coincidence that, according to the Oregon State

research team, the last 13 of 15 San Andreas earthquakes in the North were preceded by a CSZ

earthquake. 8 of the last 10 occurred within 200 miles of the Mendocino Fracture Zone.

Figure 12. CSZ M6.0+ Earthquakes Since 1980.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 13

The Mendocino Fracture Zone seen at the bottom of Figures 11 and 12 is the boundary of three tectonic

plates; The Pacific Plate and the North American Plate (Forming the San Andreas Fault) and the Gorda

Plate at the bottom of the CSZ. Along the eastern part of the Mendocino Fracture Zone is the Mendocino

Triple Junction where the three plates actually meet in the Pacific Ocean water around Cape Mendocino in

Northern California. This is considered to be the most seismically active area of the United States. Figure

13 is another depiction of the CSZ and San Andreas Fault meeting at the Mendocino Triple Junction.

Figure 13. The Mendocino Fracture Zone and Mendocino Triple Junction.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | WILDFIRE DISASTER 14

WILDFIRE DISASTER Figure 14 represents the projections for wildfire severity in Sonoma County as seen by CALFIRE. Wildfire

for Bodega Bay is designated as a moderate zone. The yellow areas are moderate risk and much less of a

hazard than the High and Very High assigned hazards of the County interior or further north. The three

classes of wildfire used by CALFIRE are based on a combination of how a fire will behave and the

probability of flames and embers threatening buildings. Each area of the map gets a score for flame length,

embers, and the likelihood of the area burning. Scores are then averaged over the zone areas. Final zone

class (moderate, high and very high) is based on the averaged scores for the zone.

Figure 14. Wildfire Hazard for Bodega Bay Fire Protection District.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | WILDFIRE DISASTER 15

Figure 15 shows another CALFIRE representation of wildfire hazards to Sonoma County. The difference

between the two maps is that Figure 15 highlights the high and very high hazards and also shows areas by

responsibility of a local jurisdiction versus federal or state. Of importance to the Bodega Bay District is

that, because we are an unincorporated area we are a state area of responsibility (SRA), as designated by

light and dark gray colors, and receive the full benefit of CALFIRE resources if needed. We also need to

follow CALFIRE requirements and guidelines for fire protection such as roofing, vegetation, and other

factors that determine fire spread. Pink and red map areas in Figure 14 are Very High Fire Hazard Zones.

Figure 15. Wildfire Hazard area of Responsibility for Bodega Bay Fire Protection District.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | CIVIL UNREST 16

There are, however, two additional conditions that change these CALFIRE projections of Wildfire Hazard

classification. These are: 1) Earthquakes and 2) Climate and topography changes at times of the year.

First, these CALFIRE projections do not include fires resulting from an earthquake. Wildfire hazards could

be substantially more as earthquake history tells us. An earthquake will likely down power lines and

transformers as well as rupture propane gas lines commonly located in residents and businesses here.

Gasoline contained in vehicles, boats and storage may also rupture and provide fire fuel. Explosions and

fires will be started and may spread quickly in the heavy brush and wooded areas. We must therefore

anticipate the need to fight wildfires during an earthquake instance. Historically, most modern

earthquakes have had more destruction from fire that other earthquake factors.

Second, the Sonoma County Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan points out that the western

portion of the county is influenced by the Pacific Ocean that it borders. Fire hazards are mitigated by

summer fog and lower temperatures and are only of moderate risk in this area. However, that same ocean

influence results in several weeks of off shore winds in the fall and although the coast is considered of only

moderate risk most of the time it is in this period that the fire risk becomes extreme. At that time of the

year vegetation is also dry. Rivers and creeks such as the Russian River and Salmon creek have carved out

channels for winds to move from the coast to inland areas. As the land is heated inland air rises and is

replaced by air from the coast. This results in wind speeds in the late afternoon and early evening at

around 15-20 miles per hour and sometimes more. All of these factors together change the BBFPD area to

characteristics of a Very High Fire Hazard classification, if only for a relatively brief period of time. Thus,

the recommendations and requirements of CALFIRE for this higher class of hazard become relevant.

CIVIL UNREST Civil unrest is usually triggered by dramatic political or social events. Every major metropolitan

area in California has experienced and is at risk for, civil unrest. A recent and significant civil unrest

incident in the state was the 1992 Los Angeles Civil Disturbance that resulted in 53 deaths, over 2,300

injuries and over $800 million in damages. This event also precipitated simultaneous, but smaller,

incidents throughout California and the country.

We must be prepared even in our small community. We are notable for our attraction to visitors who

enjoy the food, tranquility, beauty and recreation. We often have thousands of visitors at the same time.

Those protesting can and do select communities that do not have to have direct relationship to the cause

for a protest and demonstration that can be disruptive at best and can involve both the need to rescue and

medically treat people.

TERRORIST ATTACK California’s population, industrial infrastructure, economic importance, international reputation,

media industry and numerous iconic features combine to make the state a potential target for

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | HAZARDOUS MATERIAL EMERGENCY 17

both domestic and international terrorist attacks. Terrorists typically exploit vulnerabilities

caused by technological hazards and may include hazardous materials, biological agents that

result in epidemics, or attempts to damage the state’s critical infrastructure including cyber

attacks which pose potentially devastating disruptions to essential communications such as voice,

email and Internet connectivity.

This also includes the current car ram threat; a recent tool of terrorists that is effective in taking lives.

HAZARDOUS MATERIAL EMERGENCY General categories of hazardous materials include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive

(CBRNE), oil spills and any incident that results in the release of agents into the environment.

Depending on the severity of release and type of material, a hazardous materials emergency may cause

injury, death, property damage, environmental damage, or may result in orders to evacuate or shelter in

place. Examples of possible threats include release of chemicals at the Bodega Bay Public Utilities yard or

the Bodega Marine Lab.

Among the CBRNE threats to Bodega Bay are the possibility of a North Korea nuclear attack with San

Francisco as a target. Chemical, biological, radiation, and explosive terrorists’ attacks on our Northern

metropolitan areas will also effect our community and, even when they don’t directly impact us, we will be

called upon to aid others. We must be prepared to thwart the effects even though we are some distance

from primary impact area. Many CBRNE incidents will impact Bodega Bay even when the event occurs

miles away

MULTIPLE CASUALTY INCIDENTS (MCI) A major source of multiple casualties is Highway One. North of Bodega Bay it becomes a twisting and

narrow road often close to cliffs. It is common in recent experience for the district to have multiple

casualties caused by head-on collisions, vehicles going off the road, and even over the cliffs. We must

anticipate an accident such as that involving a school bus or tourist bus where quick treatment of many is

needed. In addition, most commercial and chartered fishing boats have many passengers and crew and do

potentially run into natural disasters. We have been called upon to rescue, treat and retrieve victims of

these boat related incidents. All of these threats are the source of potential MCIs that may overwhelm the

resources of BBFPD.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | GRAPHICS AND DATA REFERENCES USED 18

GRAPHICS AND DATA REFERENCES USED

Figure 1. The Third California Rupture Forecast (UCERF3). Edward Field and Working Group on

California Earthquake Probabilities. U. S. Geological Survey. 2015.

Figure 2. Copyright Google Earth.

Figure 3. San Andreas Rift Zone. Copyright © 2002-2015 Kenneth & Gabrielle Adelman, California Coastal

Records Project, www.californiacoastline.org

Figures 4-7. Special Report 196-Landslides in the Highway 1 Corridor between Bodega Bay and Fort Ross,

Sonoma County, California. M.W. Manson, C.M. Huyette, C.J. Wills, M.E. Huffman, M.G. Smelser, M.E. Fuller,

C. Dormuse and C.G. Gutierrez. California Geological Survey. 2006.

Figure 8. Shaking Hazard Map. Association of Bay Area Governments Resilience Program. USGS 2013.

http://resilience.abag.ca.gov/earthquakes/

Figure 9. Preliminary Maps of Quaternary Deposits and Liquefaction Susceptibility, Wine country San

Francisco Bay Region: A Digital Database. K.L.Knudsen, J.M. Sower, R.C. Witter, C.M. Wentworth, and E.J.

Helley. U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 00-444. www.pubs.usgs.gov/2000/of00-444/

Figure 10. Tsunami Inundation Map for Emergency Planning. Bodega Head Quadrangle/Valley Ford

Quadrangle. California Emergency Management Agency. www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/geologic-

hazards/tsunami/inundation_maps/sonoma/documents/tsunami_inundation-bodegahead_quad.pdf

Figure 11. Cascadia Subduction Zone. Pacific Northwest Seismic Network. Sponsored by USGS.

Figure 12. CSZ M6.0+ Earthquakes Since 1980. Pacific Northwest Seismic Network. Sponsored by USGS.

Figure 13. The Mendocino Fracture Zone and Mendocino Triple Junction. Humboldt State University in

Science Thoughts BlogSpot.

Figures 14 and 15. Sonoma County FHSZ Maps.

http://www.fire.ca.gov/fireprevention/fhsz_maps_sonoma

OTHER RELATED REFERENCES REVIEWED IN MAKING THIS DOCUMENT

The Geologic Setting of Bodega Head. James B. Koenig. Division of Mines and Geology, State of California.

July, 1963.

Tsunami: What is the Risk to Sonoma County? Bob Norberg. Santa Rosa Press Democrat. March 18,

2011.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | OTHER RELATED REFERENCES REVIEWED IN MAKING

THIS DOCUMENT

19

The San Andreas Fault. U.S. Department of the Interior/ U.S. Geological Survey. S. Schultz and R.E.

Wallace. U.S. Government Printing Office: 1992-306-523.

The following are related to the Sonoma County/Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan.(SC/OAP)

Sonoma County Fire and Emergency Services. December 2014.

Annex to SC/OAP: Coastal Incident Response Plan. January 2015.

Annex to SC/OAP. Lower Russian River Flood Response Plan. June 2013.

Annex to SC/OAP. Local Oil Spill Contingency Plan. February 2011.

Annex to SC/OAP. Emergency Public Information Plan. January, 2009.

Annex to SC/OAP. Response Plan for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Event. Draft, January,

2004.

The next two are from the Shakeout Scenario work done for Southern California.

The Shakeout Earthquake Scenario. A Story That Southern Californians are Writing. Circular

1324. California Geological Survey Special Report. 2008.

The Shakeout Scenario. USGS Open File Report 2008-1150. CGS Preliminary Report 25. 2008

The following are reports published by Oregon State University Oceanic and Atmospheric scientists (with

others from NOAA, Texas A&M, and USGS).

Deep-water turbidites as Holocene earthquake proxies: the Cascadia subduction zone and Northern San Andreas Fault system. Chris Goldfinger, C. Hans Nelson, Joel E. Johnson and the

Shipboard Scientific Party. GEOPHYSICS, VOL. 46, N. 5, October 2003.

Late Holocene Rupture of the Northern San Andreas Fault and Possible Stress Linkage to the Cascadia Subduction Zone. Chris Goldfinger, Kelly Grijalva, Roland Bürgmann, Ann E. Morey, Joel E. Johnson, C. Hans Nelson, Julia Gutiérrez-Pastor, Andrew Ericsson,* Eugene Karabanov,† Jason D. Chaytor,‡ Jason Patton, and Eulàlia Gràcia. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, Vol. 98, No. 2, pp. 861–889, April 2008

Investigation of the Offshore Section of the Northern San Andreas Fault: Slip Partitioning, Shallow Deformation, and Fault Trend Influence. Jeffrey W Beeson, Chris Goldfinger, Samuel Y. Johnson. AGU Conference presentation, San Francisco (January, 2012).

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | Figures in this Disaster Plan 20

FIGURES IN THIS DISASTER PLAN

Figure 1. The San Andreas Fault Line in California 1 Figure 2. Depiction of San Andreas Fault in the Bodega Bay Community (Copyrights by Google). 2 Figure 3. The San Andreas Rift Zone at Bodega Bay. (Copyright © 2002-2017 Kenneth & Gabrielle Adelman,

California Coastal Records Project, www.californiacoastline.org) 3 Figure 4. Slope Stability in Bodega Bay Harbor-Part 1. 4 Figure 5. Slope Stability in Bodega Bay Harbor-Part 2. 5 Figure 6. Northern District Slope Stability Part 1. 6 Figure 7. Northern District Slope Stability Part 2. 7 Figure 8. Bodega Bay projected harbor shaking based on past earthquakes 8 Figure 9. Expected Liquefaction of the Harbor and its surroundings. 9 Figure 10. Expected Tsunami Impacts. 10 Figure 11. Cascadia Subduction Zone. 11 Figure 12. CSZ M6.0+ earthquakes since 1980. . 12 Figure 13. The Mendicino Fracture Zone and Mendicino Triple Junction. 13 Figure 14. Wildfire Hazard for Bodega Bay Fire Protection District. 14 Figure 15. Wildfire Hazard area of Responsibility for Bodega Bay Fire Protection District. 15

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | SCENARIO OF AN EARTHQUAKE DISASTER: DAY ONE 21

SCENARIO OF AN EARTHQUAKE DISASTER: DAY ONE

NOTE: This scenario is meant to accompany the Disaster Threat Assessment of the BBFPD Disaster Plan. It is

intended to show how many of the elements of the Disaster Plan, including the threat assessment, policies and

procedures will operate in a real disaster. All disasters, including earthquakes will be different but this scenario

illustrates the basics of BBFPD plans when a major earthquake occurs.

The BBFPD is unique. The community has recognized that the BBFPD staff, and outside responders as well,

cannot solve all of the community needs during a disaster. The community must be prepared if it is to be

resilient in face of these difficult circumstances. It will be a combination of BBFPD career and volunteer staff

along with CERT members that provide support to recover in the event of a disaster.

In this scenario it is the July fourth weekend. The BBFA had their annual Pancake breakfast the day before. It

has been a busy weekend so far with calls for several auto accidents requiring BBFPD help including a head on

collision, a cliff/ocean rescue and kayakers in distress outside the harbor. A camper at Doran Beach started a

fire inside an RV.

It is estimated that 10,000 to 20,000 people will pass through Bodega Bay each day, many stopping to eat and

shop and view the beauty of the place. There will be 3,000- 5,000 visitors staying at the campgrounds, vacation

home rentals, and hotel lodging. Restaurants will be filled throughout the day. The harbor and coastline are

filled with both commercial and sportsman boaters.

A crew of four is on duty since it is a holiday weekend. They are just about ready to sit down for dinner at about

7:00 PM.

Minus One Minute to First Shockwave.

The USGS (United States Geological Survey) issues an early warning of an earthquake from the San Andreas

Fault to the Sonoma County REDCOM dispatcher. REDCOM notifies BBFPD and other Sonoma County

agencies. The shift at the station house braces for the shockwave to come in just seconds.

A 7.4 earthquake begins with shaking lasting a full minute.

0-15 minutes After First Shockwave.

The crew quickly runs through the aftershock checklist at Station One. Electricity is out and the generator has

kicked in at the station. It appears to be operating normally. Water utilities are out. Cell phone coverage is not

available. Landline phones are also out of service. Vehicles have moved in place but appear to be undamaged.

The crew opens the bay doors and positions vehicles in the driveway and parking lot. They pick up equipment

thrown around. They begin to contact other agencies and personnel via radio. They notify REDCOM that

BBFPD is now in Self-Dispatch mode. The shift captain takes over as Incident Commander (IC) of the

Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Expecting many civilians to approach the station, measures are taken to

secure areas that should be off limit. Station 2 apparatus, including M812 ambulance and 8841 ATV are

mobilized.

A tsunami watch has been issued by the Pacific Tsunami Weather Center (PTWC is part of the NOAA National

Weather Service). “A tsunami watch is issued to alert emergency management officials and the public of an

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | SCENARIO OF AN EARTHQUAKE DISASTER: DAY ONE 22

event which may later impact the watch area. The watch area may be upgraded to a warning or canceled based

on updated information and analysis. Therefore, emergency management officials and the public should prepare

to take action. Watches are normally issued based on seismic information without confirmation that a

destructive tsunami is underway. (taken from PTWC website)”

15-30 minutes After First Shockwave.

A tsunami warning has been issued by PTWC. When a potential tsunami with significant widespread inundation

is imminent or expected such a warning is issued. “Warnings alert the public that widespread, dangerous

coastal flooding accompanied by powerful currents is possible and may continue for several hours after arrival

of the initial wave. Warnings also alert emergency management officials to take action for the entire tsunami

hazard zone. Appropriate actions to be taken by local officials may include the evacuation of low-lying coastal

areas, and the repositioning of ships to deep waters when there is time to safely do so. Warnings may be

updated, adjusted geographically, downgraded, or canceled. To provide the earliest possible alert, initial

warnings are normally based only on seismic information. (taken from PTWC website)”

The IC sends out a crew member in the utility vehicle to notify, via siren and loudspeaker, Doran Beach tourists

to evacuate. The crew notifies marina boaters via marine radio channels. Park rangers have also received the

notification and have already begun the evacuations to higher ground. The Coast Guard begins positioning some

of its personnel at BBFPD Station One.

CHP and road agencies start the first reports of road damage. Highway One is reported damaged and perhaps

impassable in the middle of Bodega Bay around roads into the old town area. Both the Salmon Creek and

Russian River bridges, neither of which was earthquake retrofitted, are reported to be extensively damaged and

unsafe for crossing. There are reports of some liquefaction on all district bridges.

A CHP and Sheriff Deputy located in Bodega Bay arrive at the station to begin coordination with BBFPD.

Radio calls for incidents begin and are coming in via REDCOM, the State and County Park Rangers, and CERT

Hams. The many calls, even without any phone coverage available for citizens, are sufficient in number that the

crew can only log them as they come in. The first Radio Room Operator arrives and sets up operation. He/She

is an Aux Com Support Volunteer and amateur radio qualified operator with training to talk to public service

agencies such as REDCOM as well as the 60 CERT Hams. The Radio Room Operator starts to take calls, freeing

up the crew to start call prioritization and set up the EOC area along with CHP, Sheriff, and Coast Guard. All

calls are logged into the EOC log via laptop and displayed on the Monitors located in the main EOC duty room

and the upstairs break room.

30 Minutes-First Hour After First Shock.

A second shock wave measuring 6.1 occurs.

Bodega Highway and Highway One into Bodega Bay are still open but have obstacles such as landslides and

trees partially covering the roads. The Chief and several other crew members arrive. The EOC is being staffed

for operations, logistics, and planning. The monitors are filling up with logged calls. A BBFPD crew goes out

on a call at a nearby restaurant on Highway One where the location has a gas fire, now spreading, and several

people are injured.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | SCENARIO OF AN EARTHQUAKE DISASTER: DAY ONE 23

Both primary and backup vehicles are put into service. CHP and Sheriff personnel ride with the BBFPD in some

instances. Some 911 cell phone calls for help are being routed to the CHP in San Jose and then received in the

Radio Room. Radio calls are also being directly received from State and County Park Rangers on their normal

operating frequencies. In some cases tactical channels are being selected for further communication.

A second radio room operator arrives. He/She will attend to the public service agency calls as well as log all

calls while the first operator attends to the CERT Ham calls which are now increasing in number. All CERT

provision stations, as well as many from other locations, have called in with initial status reports. As more

CERT inspections occur follow up calls are received from the Hams. These calls include status of life and

property including the need for BBFPD services.

A paramedic sits with the radio room operators to begin advising CERT community members on medical and

triage questions arising. Rescue questions also are discussed to advise on procedures and cautions. Small fires

are being reported and the BBFPD staff advise on containing these as well. This self-help instruction via

amateur radio channels is conducted based on the Coastal Valleys EMS system for self-help from dispatchers.

In the Shakeout Scenario1, developed by a team of earthquake and emergency disaster experts writing a scenario

for the southern San Andreas Fault, 95% of fires and rescues will be controlled/conducted by local victims. This

is based on past, world-wide experience.

Evacuation of Doran Beach is continuing. The Western shore of the harbor has been notified via marine radio

channels of the tsunami warning. The BBFPD has manned the Fire/Rescue Boat to meet with Marina personnel

and ensure that Tsunami evacuations are underway for both boats and people. They also go by West Shore Park

to notify campers they need to evacuate immediately. This is also the first opportunity to gauge the damage to

harbor channels and the harbor bottom generally. The BBFPD boat then follows the Coast Guard out to sea until

the tsunami threat is cleared.

Hours two through five.

Aftershocks continue. New road reports indicate that Highway One has significant damage to the North but is

passable to the South. Many Evacuees from the County and State parks have gone into higher ground across

from the station and in the Harbor neighborhoods. Those evacuated from the Parks are advised by the CHP to

return home. The Coast Guard takes its ships out to deeper water and sends the rest of its personnel to the

BBFPD station. It reports back that the harbor entrance is safe for limited passage with caution for shifting

bottom areas.

There are multiple fires, calls for medical assistance and now calls for building structure rescues where people

are trapped. Many of the rest of the BBFPD professional and volunteer support staff have arrived so that there

are three crews operating.

1 Shakeout Scenario. San Andreas fault projections for Southern California made by experts gathered by the U.S.

Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, California Department of Conservation, and California Geological

Survey, (2008)

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | SCENARIO OF AN EARTHQUAKE DISASTER: DAY ONE 24

The triage center has begun to be set up in the Apparatus Bay and is manned by BBFPD Support Volunteer EMS

trained personnel and CERT volunteers with Paramedic supervision. Triage areas in several neighborhoods have

been set up by CERT members. Paramedics continue to advise on self-help until professionals can arrive in

these areas. Hospitals are reporting on which can receive patients. One of the BBFPD ambulances has been

dispatched to convoy with several private vehicles carrying more seriously hurt individuals.

The EOC is fully functioning. It now consists of the IC, Operations, Logistics, and CHP/Sheriff desks. Support

Volunteer personnel, trained with FEMA courses and BBFPD disaster drills, start to man some of the desks in

support roles. All EOC desks have sight of the monitors. The monitor in the break area informs the overflow

and breaking personnel. The IC and EOC operations staff send the crews the prioritized incident information as

needed. Bodega, Monte Rio, Russian River, Gold Ridge, Occidental and Valley Ford Fire Agencies have called

in via radio and are coordinating.

A third radio operator has arrived and is assisting in the radio room. The number of calls is now a heavy

volume. Some cell phone service has been restored in the area. CERT Hams have canvassed their respective

areas and reported in some depth. There are reports of visitors in campgrounds at the state park and county

parks as well as Chanslor Ranch approaching CERT members for help and these are being logged for

prioritization by the EOC.

Hours Six through Twelve

Over 100 fires of a 911 type have been reported via CERT Hams in the 12 hour period. The BBFPD crews were

able to respond to a dozen of these major fires. Most fires have been attended to by local residents but lack of

water and water pressure has hindered both residents and BBFPD crews. The water tender has been relied upon

often. Without this apparatus even the limited fire fighting success would not have been possible. Many roads

are broken or obstructed by liquefaction and landslides.

Triage areas have now been established by CERT in all neighborhoods. CERT continues to attend to medical

requirements, supported by BBFPD Paramedics available by Ham radio, and in severe cases by Paramedic

personal visits. The Paramedics have had to use four wheel utility vehicles and the BBFPD ATV (8841) in

many cases to reach patients and transport them back to the station if necessary. CERT members search for and

assemble blankets, food, water and other needed materials.

The triage at the station has overflowed the apparatus bay and now includes some outside area. Convoys of a

BBFPD ambulance with a paramedic and private vehicles continue to move patients to those hospitals accepting

them. The hospitals are also working beyond capacity but continue to accept patients in an overflow mode of

triage operation themselves.

There have been some reports of looting and threatening behaviors. These calls are made by the Hams in the

field to CERT Control. The sheriff deputy and CHP responded to these to maintain order. No arrests have been

needed but some individuals needed to be “talked” to by officers who explained that it is not necessary and

would not serve a purpose to continue that behavior. Most of these calls are the result of difficult circumstances

and frayed emotions. The officers have become counselors and therapists as well as enforcers of peace.

So far those trying to reach family members in Bodega Bay from outside or those in Bodega Bay wanting let

those outside know how they are doing have been thwarted by lack of phone service. Many of the tourists, who

may have to await road repairs to go home, could not contact loved ones. The Hams at the Radio Room in

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | SCENARIO OF AN EARTHQUAKE DISASTER: DAY ONE 25

Station one have now set up a digital connection to allow emails to be sent and, with the calls for help

diminishing, can now turn attention to sending emails for residents and tourists. The CERT Hams in the

neighborhoods collect and send, by voice, short email messages to the station hams who then in turn, use the

digital capability to send these on Internet facilities. Emails received are also transferred back to the Hams in the

field as time allows.

The world's attention has focused on “The Big One” occurring in California and even Bodega Bay is now a

focus of interest by a few media representatives trying to report on what has happened to the rest of the world.

The reporters were able to reach the station over damaged roads from the south by cutting across fields in a four

wheel drive vehicle. The IC has designated a Media Liaison Officer, along with a support volunteer staff

member, to talk to the media. They are careful to provide information asked for while protecting private

information and ensuring that what is being reported is factual. There will be life and property losses as well as

health status data that are to be kept confidential (HIPPAA protected) . All other staff members simply point

back to the designated liaison officials.

Hours Thirteen through Twenty Four: YOYOMF

It is first light of the day. Everyone has been up all night doing what had to be done. The grim reality of this

disaster is accentuated and reinforced moment by moment. One major news item is that the tall cypress and

eucalyptus trees around the quarry south on Highway One have fallen during the night. Many have fallen across

the road and obstructed passage for almost a half mile. Power and telephone lines and poles are down leaving a

spaghetti of lines and poles lining the streets. Highway One is also out at old town and several places along

Highway One above the cliffs north of Bodega Bay. The Salmon Creek Bridge and Russian River Bridge have

both fallen. Most tourists have already left going south but a few remained to help others and now cannot get

out except by going off road. The ambulance caravans of those needing hospital level treatment have to cease

until the road is cleared. This means that Bodega Bay is now cut off by road from the rest of the world.

YOYOMF-You are On Your Own My Friend.

The news gets worse. Not only is Bodega Bay isolated from outside, but parts are also separated internally and

not only by Highway One being out at Old Town. With the bridges out the communities of Carmet and Sereno

Del Mar are now both isolated except by helicopter and boat. Much of Bay Flat and West Shore Roads are

covered in sand from liquefaction making it very difficult for most vehicles to pass. It is now reported by Hams

that there is a 20 feet wide and 40 feet deep fissure starting somewhere in Sonoma Coast State Park and

continuing through the high points of the hills above the north part of the harbor and going on to West Shore

Road. This combination of travel hindrances makes the Bodega Marine Institute as well as Marinas and

residents in the area isolated except for four wheel drive vehicles and boat. Further, a gulch bridge in South

Harbour is out so that direct movement in or out is not possible for residents in that area. Cheney Gulch Bridge

on Highway One is also covered by sand.

There have been 30 aftershocks overnight including four over 5.0 and one at 6.8 in this period (the Northridge

earthquake of 1994 was a 6.7). As a result of the original shake and these later ones almost all older homes are

uninhabitable. CERT has set up “camps” in neighborhoods and the campgrounds. CERT is collecting life

sustaining water and food as well as other needed material for portioning and distribution. There is still no tap

water or electricity (except for those having working backup generators).

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | SCENARIO OF AN EARTHQUAKE DISASTER: DAY ONE 26

There are reports of deaths. Five of the CERT areas have set up Morgues. The dead are separated from the

triage patients. The bodies must be protected for the duration of the period Bodega Bay is isolated. This is part

of training in the CERT program.

Perhaps the most stunning event is that Doran Beach, after centuries of natural development is now partially

covered by water. It has been breached in several places and therefore gone from sight at those points. The

Tsunami, shaking, and liquefaction combined to wipe it from this earth in those places. Several old California

Cypress trees that lined the beach road are now in the bay.

A rescue effort by CERT members is underway along the north harbor area of Bay Flat Road where liquefaction

had covered a house enough so that occupants cannot get out. Rescuers are using anything at hand to dig away

enough sand to rescue them. Shovels are the primary tool but others use their hands, pails or anything available.

There are about 20 people digging and calling to those inside.

There is fire on the water not far from the marinas. The fireboat crew is fighting it and, at least, trying to contain

it the best they can so it doesn’t spread to other flammable parts of the marinas.

BBFPD has arranged more triage spaces at several of the close by lodges and inns whose tourists have

evacuated. It helps that both BBFPD EMS personnel and the CERT members use one system, START, for

classifying those in medical need. Two of the tourists who stayed to help are nurses and are tending to the

patients in lodges.

It is apparent now that Bodega Bay residents, despite the catastrophic disaster, have entered the survival zone.

That is, they are totally focused on that survival and the safety of themselves and others. They are doing what

needs to be done to help themselves and others using whatever is available. Several members of the community

have organized a shelter for pets, and even some wildlife, that were lost and are wandering around. The stories

of neighbor helping neighbor are abundant and illustrate an unselfish attitude. Ham radio communication is

crisp and to the point. Nothing is wasted and everything and everybody is of value.

Ranchers and farmers near the fallen trees south on Highway One have come together with chain saws, small

graders, tractors and other equipment to remove the large trees . However, their efforts are minimized until they

can gather livestock that have scattered in fright. A local tree trimmer has arrived with his crew as well. Those

available will work until a path is cleared but do not expect to be done for several days.

Maintenance crews and Fire Agencies from as far away as other Western states have mobilized to respond to

needs of those affected but other locations are also in need now including some closer to the responder’s home

bases. No other resources are expected from the County or State for at least the next 48 hours and very possibly

longer.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | WILDFIRE SCENARIO #1: THE TUBBS FIRE IN 2017 27

WILDFIRE SCENARIO #1: THE TUBBS FIRE IN 2017

At around 9:45 PM on October 8, 2017 there were multiple reports of downed power lines and exploding

transformers near Tubbs Lane in Calistoga. REDCOM sent fire crews to check on what had happened. A north

Santa Rosa weather station recorded peak wind gusts of about 30 mph at 9:30 with an increase to 41 mph within

an hour. The wind proceeded to pay a major role in the Tubbs fire. The strong northeast winds drove the fire

more than twelve miles in the first three hours. It was declared to be the most destructive wildfire in California

history. 23 people died and over 5300 structures were destroyed.

1:00-2:00 A.M. The Evacuations Orders Begin

Around 1:00 A.M. (October 9) the fire had reached the Santa Rosa outer city. Hundreds of residences in

Fountaingrove, the Hilton Hotel and almost all of the 160 mobile homes in Journey’s End were destroyed.

Around 1:30 the first evacuation orders were given. Many were already on the road fleeing from the nearby

flames. The evacuations were conducted selectively to keep the roads as clear as possible for emergency

responders. The winds remained at Tropical Storm levels. Highway 101 was jumped by the burning embers and

the fire leveled a K-Mart and other nearby structures on the other side of the highway.

The Bodega Bay Fire Protection District had been toned and by around 1:00 A.M. rolled out crews manning the

primary Type 1 engine (8880), Water Tender (8895) and Paramedic/Rescue Ambulance (M811). Firefighters,

paramedics and EMTs were all on board with the complete manpower and apparatus compliment needed. M811

stayed for a day. M811 returned the next day. 8880 and 8895would stay in Santa Rosa for over 36 hours

working nonstop and returning on the evening of the 10th. The crews were supposed to stand down for 24 hours

but after 14 hours, all agreed to return to fight the devastation. 8895 stayed for about a week total.

A full crew was assembled at the BBFPD station to cover home needs. Vehicles and other apparatus were

moved from Station Two to Station One to ensure availability as needed for local needs.

2:00-7:00 A.M. Bumper to Bumper Car Lights Along Highway One in Bodega Bay.

By 4:30 A.M the winds had reached a speed of 60 miles per hour. The Tubbs fire reached the Coffey Park area

where it destroyed about 1300 more structures, including a substantial amount of homes. More evacuation

orders had been given. Later, there would be video of people driving through the fire storm to elude it. There

was no time to pack and many left with only the clothes they wore. Helicopter crews managed to lift up whole

families faced with certain death. There were several other fires affecting Sonoma, Napa, Mendocino and Lake

Counties. Thousands were being displaced. We received evacuees from the Tubbs fire and also Nuns fire in

Sonoma Valley

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | WILDFIRE SCENARIO #1: THE TUBBS FIRE IN 2017 28

By 4:00 A.M. in Bodega Bay, residents could see the glow of car headlights on Highway One throughout the

community. By early morning cars were parked all along both sides of the highway bumper to bumper and in

every parking lot along the road; including the Fire Station. Doran Beach was also a focus for evacuees.

Eventually it was estimated that there were over 1000 evacuees in Bodega Bay, including over 200 at Doran

Beach Park and 800 at the Bodega Dunes State Park. Rangers suspended fee requirements at both Parks.

It was during this time frame that several organizations banded together to begin opening Evacuation Centers

providing:

● Shelter

● Food

● Clothing

● Camping Supplies

● Comforting

● News

● Communication

● Medical attention

7:00 A.M. to Around the Clock for Days

The leaders of what was to be an evacuation support consortium realized many evacuees were lined up on the

road and called each other as well as the Grange Manager for a facility to gather and distribute food and other

items. Several organizations mobilized to find the facilities, funding, people resources, supplies and services that

were needed.

Doran Beach Regional Park Rangers experienced large numbers of evacuees at the beach (estimated by rangers

at several hundred) who would not go to official shelters for fear of ICE and other reasons (wanted to be near

water for example). Regional Rangers began collecting supplies such as cots and blankets. It was cold and

evacuees were in danger from the elements.

A volunteer who was at the Grange got word of evacuees at the beach and went to see. She set up a center at the

Miwok Lot working with the rangers so evacuees could receive food, clothing and some shelter. Several people

from Bodega Harbour heard what was happening and began feeding people with the help of the Blue Water

Bistro restaurant. On the second day evacuees were moved to a better location with all in one place and sheltered

by tents.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | WILDFIRE SCENARIO #1: THE TUBBS FIRE IN 2017 29

The Sonoma Coast State Park also began to experience evacuees and Park hosts made the decision to let them in

free. All 100 campsites were filled with evacuees and it was estimated that around 800 people were

accommodated. Rangers and hosts from both sites worked with the Grange volunteers to gather supplies needed

for the evacuees.

Around 8:30 A.M. the CERT Amateur Radio Net was opened at the Fire Station. All topics related to the

evacuees. Where were the evacuation centers? What was needed...types of clothing, foods, who needed helping

hands, and more. Reports began coming in that the Grange, Doran Beach, the State Park and Bodega Bay

Church were all taking in evacuees and providing immediate services.

The Centers remained open as long as needed. Evacuees could not return for some time and some could not

return at all.

This necessitated organizational elements to support around the clock efforts, security, storage, accounting and

record keeping, funding, medical needs, and other aspects of a major, long term evacuation center.

Multiple organizations and individuals offered support immediately including:

Sonoma County Supervisor Linda Hopkins

CERT

Waves of Compassion

Chamber of Commerce

Bodega Bay Community Association

Blue Water Bistro/Kemper Sports

Bodega Harbour Homeowners Association

Community Chest

Active 20-30 Clubs

Volunteers began coming into the Grange almost immediately and continued to do so during the week.

Facebook was used to solicit volunteer help. A major source of funds and administration was the Waves of

Compassion (WOC). Record keeping of donations was kept by WOC. Community Closet kept records for their

participation at Doran Beach.

There was a county wide communications breakdown in the first few days. Bodega Bay Centers and Parks tried

to send evacuees to official centers and found out they had closed. State Park rangers tried to relocate evacuees

but couldn’t reach official centers. Cell phone coverage was spotty to very bad most of the time. Evacuees

could not contact family and friends to let them know where they were and their status. Centers could not

coordinate.

People evacuated with medical problems including asthma, COPD and diabetes. The smoke took a toll. A local

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | WILDFIRE SCENARIO #1: THE TUBBS FIRE IN 2017 30

retired MD volunteered. Several MDs came to help from as far away as San Rafael and Novato. They

administered treatment at the Grange, went to Doran Beach and as far north as Wright Beach. Waves of

Compassion used cash reserves to buy medicines.

Media, with photographers, visited the centers. There were children in protective custody, among others, that

needed to have images and identities protected. This became a matter of confrontation with media.

There were false starts, adjustments, errors, conflicts, unexpected events and needs. No one volunteering at the

centers knew what to expect in this disaster. Demographics changed from day to day with number of people and

their needs. Each morning briefing was a new day of what needed to be done and then changed as the day went

on. It was difficult to organize at first but as everyone realized that this was a long-haul period the organization

came together better.

After the Centers were Needed

After the needs for evacuation support were over, the organizations and individuals who made this

happen wanted to use what they had built and learned to carry forward to the next disaster. They wanted

to document, make preparations in advance, and make appropriate changes to resource acquisition,

guidelines, rules, procedures and policies that would provide an even better response next time. This

resulted in forming a consortium, associated with the BBFPD. This scenario will be completed as that

consortium work goes on.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | WILDFIRE SCENARIO #2: SONOMA COUNTY COASTAL

FIRE 20XX

31

WILDFIRE SCENARIO #2: SONOMA COUNTY COASTAL FIRE 20XX

The Sonoma County Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan points out that the western portion of

the county is influenced by the Pacific Ocean that it borders. Fire hazards are mitigated by summer fog

and lower temperatures and are only of moderate risk in this area. However, that same ocean influence

results in several weeks of off shore winds in the fall and although the coast is considered of only

moderate risk most of the time it is in this period that the fire risk becomes extreme. At that time of the

year vegetation is also dry. Rivers and creeks such as the Russian River and Salmon creek have carved out

channels for winds to move from the coast to inland areas. As the land is heated inland air rises and is

replaced by air from the coast. This results in wind speeds in the late afternoon and early evening at

around 15-20 miles per hour and sometimes more. This scenario is based on that climatic fact and

topography of the coast.

Labor Day Weekend around 4:00 P.M. Saturday

The Bodega Bay District is crowded with campers, beach goers and visitors in both lodging and

restaurants on this long holiday weekend. 10,000-20,000 will come through the area each day. Perhaps it

was an overloaded transformer, no one knows yet, but a fire started in the surrounding hills and quickly

got out of hand spreading toward the populated areas in the Harbours and Old Town. Around the same

time, a careless camper started a fire that escaped its confines and another fire was raging in the Dunes

State Park reaching to Salmon Creek. A third fire was started behind Bay Flat Road in the State Park dunes

behind the Marinas. Residents later said that they heard fireworks exploding and thought that was the

cause. Smoke is in the air and flames, rising high, can be seen in all parts of the district.

The four person crew at the fire station (the standard holiday crew complement) calls for assistance. The

multiple fires, spreading rapidly, are overwhelming for BBFPD alone. The mutual aid agreements with

others from Bodega, Valley Ford, and other fire companies are sorely needed now. To be safe more

mutual aid resources from the County are called for. CalFire, responsible for all unincorporated State

Responsibility Areas {SRAs) of the State begins mobilization; sending resources and ordering more to

standby. An Emergency Operations Center with an Area Commander from CalFire is set up at Fire Station

One. The CERT Amateur Radio Command Net has been initiated and is in touch with several shed station

captains.

Evacuation and Rescue

Evacuation orders are given quickly; both tourists and residents. Initially, BBFPD orders a “Precautionary

Evacuation” for the entire inhabited region from Salmon Creek south to the end of the South Harbour. All

non residents are ordered to leave immediately and only residents with ID are allowed to stay. Residents

are advised that they are in the influence zone of the fires and should be prepared for evacuation.

CHP, Sheriff, County and State Park Rangers all participate in warning people to evacuate immediately.

CHP and Sheriff Deputies conduct the road evacuations As you might imagine the evacuation meets some

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | WILDFIRE SCENARIO #2: SONOMA COUNTY COASTAL

FIRE 20XX

32

difficulty as campers and lodgers try to pack up before leaving. The warning agents all stress immediacy

as a life and death requirement.

The roads are also crowded with cars coming from North, East and South into the area. It will be

necessary to control traffic coming in and out of Bodega Bay and also control and divert traffic such that

the fire fighting resources can get to their destination. Both CHP and Sheriff officers mobilize in critical

points to begin the traffic control moving nonresidents out and incoming to outgoing.

CERT Net Command passes the word to Hams who are monitoring the Net now. CERT Hams are reporting

some elderly and handicapped residents that need assistance. Neighbors are being enlisted by CERT to

conduct door to door checks quickly to ensure all are notified of the evacuation and can do so. Caravans,

including those not able to evacuate themselves, are formed to move people out to safety. CERT Hams are

requested to check in with CERT Command when all in the area have evacuated.

An “Immediate Evacuation” order is issued. The fires are moving towards immediate threat to life and

property in several places within the district. Roads are closed by the CHP and Sheriff except for

evacuating residents and firefighters.

Two helicopters have arrived and are circling the fire areas. Each will eventually conduct rescues of

trapped families and hikers. The BBFPD utility vehicle is used to pickup and save three teenagers who are

hiking in the dunes of the State Park and became lost.

The Battle Against Fire

The two fires in the State Park have joined together and jumped Highway One going over to the hills near

the State Park entrance. The firefighters are experienced in wildfire suppression and CalFire brings in the

specially designed firefighting aircraft. Wildfire-trained crews suppress flames, construct fire lines, and

extinguish flames where wilderness and resources can be protected. The first priority of firefighters is the

protection of life. They establish safety zones, escape routes and ensure communications are in proper

working order. Avoiding entrapment is paramount. Fortunately in this scenario, there are no firefighter

or law enforcement casualties.

However, the fire is now on the wildland-urban interface; meaning that the housing in almost all parts of

the District including Salmon Creek, the west shore of the Harbor (Bay Flat, West Shore and Whaleship

Roads) and the Harbours are at risk. Eventually the fires will be contained but not before 100 homes are

totally destroyed and many more damaged. The State Park is also badly damaged. Bodega Bay is left in

mourning for three of its residents and two more nonresidents. Three more people are reported missing.

Evacuation Orders are Lifted

It takes twelve days to contain the fire and ensure flareups are quelled. Now the evacuation orders can be

lifted. Only residents with ID are allowed back in initially. In some cases, residents are searching through

the ruins for personal belongings that may have survived. Others are looking for pets that were left

behind in the rush to evacuate. Wildlife are seen walking about in confusion. Estimates are that about

half of the permanent residents cannot return home yet. And the air, even in the pristine environment of

Bodega Bay, causes difficulties for many residents.

Bodega Bay Fire Prevention District | WILDFIRE SCENARIO #2: SONOMA COUNTY COASTAL

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Recovery Begins

The Disaster Support Consortium made up of charitable non-profit (such as Waves of Compassion and

Community Closet) and civic organizations (such as the Chamber of Commerce and Bodega Bay

Community Association) were ready. They had planned disaster recovery to support those in need of

shelter, clothing and food. A Community Disaster Call List had been compiled after the Tubbs Fire and this

enabled quick response to the current fire even while residents were in evacuation status. The

consortium had responded while evacuated by arranging for what would be needed.

The consortium had also organized within the framework of FEMAs National Incident Management

System (NIMS). This national disaster response system includes an Incident Command System (ICS) to

provide:

● Common processes for managing and planning including logistics, finance and administration, and

daily operations

● Coordinated response with other agencies including the BBFPD Unified Disaster Command

● Integration of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within

a common organizational structure

●

The Logistical Desk folder had the names of previous donors, sources for food, shelter, medicine, clothing,

and all other resources that might be needed. Mechanisms for funding had been preplanned to get a start

on recovery. Consortium dollar reserves were tapped and then efforts made to replenish. The Planning

Desk was prepared to brief and adjust on a daily and even intraday basis. There were needs for medicine,

food, clothing and other basics of life support.

The Financial and Administrative Desk had established procedures for record keeping that would benefit

disaster cost recovery. Most importantly, all governmental and nonprofit agencies (including both the

BBFPD and Disaster Support Consortium) could apply for cost recovery through FEMAs Public Assistance

Program. The Consortium was provided space in conference rooms to carry out all operations and this

included desks to track costs and prepare the needed cost recovery forms. As the recovery operations

continued help from other agencies, including insurance companies, FEMA individual assistance

representatives, and Red Cross joined in the recovery support efforts.