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Direct Democracy and Scapegoats: TheFive Star Movement and EuropePiergiorgio Corbettaa & Rinaldo Vignatiba Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, Bolognab University of BolognaPublished online: 28 Mar 2014.

To cite this article: Piergiorgio Corbetta & Rinaldo Vignati (2014) Direct Democracy andScapegoats: The Five Star Movement and Europe, The International Spectator: Italian Journal ofInternational Affairs, 49:1, 53-64, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2014.875822

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Direct Democracy and Scapegoats: The FiveStar Movement and Europe

Piergiorgio Corbetta and Rinaldo VignatiItaly is one the most europhile countries in the European Union.Nevertheless, as surveys show, over the last few years anti-Europeansentiments have increasingly surfaced among Italian citizens. Furthermore,there is now an important novelty regarding the relation between Italyand Europe: the Movimento 5 Stelle (The Five Star Movement), a newparty that expresses a peculiar and contradictory position towards Europe.Its leader, Beppe Grillo, sometimes advocates more, not less, unification,but he also proposes a referendum on Italian membership of the euro.Moreover, Grillo’s blog frequently lends its voice to the choir of openlyanti-European sentiment. Indeed, Grillo’s call for direct democracy isplebiscitarian and his positions contribute to the weakening of a Europeanproject that is already facing grave difficulties of its own.

Keywords: populism, euroscepticism, Movimento 5 Stelle, Five StarMovement, Beppe Grillo

It is well known that Italy is traditionally one of the most “euro-optimistic” coun-tries. This is reflected both in public opinion and in the stances adopted by politi-cal forces. Indeed, Eurobarometer data on the opinions of citizens, as well as theanalysis of party manifestos, provide clear evidence of this.1

Over the last few years, however, anti-European sentiments have increasingly sur-faced. These have been fomented and reaped by a few political parties (in particularthe Lega Nord – Northern League, but also, in different ways and to differentdegrees, by part of the radical left, some components of the Partito della Libertà –

Freedom Party (PDL) and, before this, the parties that merged to form the PDL:Forza Italia – Go Italy – and Alleanza Nazionale – National Alliance). Surveys con-ducted by the Demos agency indicate that, while more than half of Italians (56.8percent) expressed faith in the European Union in 2000, only one third (33.5percent) did so in 2013.2 In short, the phase of “euro-enthusiasm” seems to have

Piergiorgio Corbetta is Research Director at the Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, Bologna. Email: corbetta.piergior-gio@gmail.com; Rinaldo Vignati is Post-doctoral Fellow at the University of Bologna. Email:rinaldo.vignati@gmail.com1Conti, Party Attitudes to European Integration and “Tied Hands?”; Quaglia, “The ‘Ebb and Flow’ ofEuroscepticism”.2Demos agency, October 2013, http://www.demos.it/rapporto.php.

The International Spectator, Vol. 49, No. 1, March 2014, 53–64 ISSN 0393-2729 print/ISSN 1751-9721 online� 2014 Istituto Affari Internazionale http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2014.875822

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come to a close.3 While citizens once looked upon the European Union as moretrustworthy than their own national institutions,4 the winds of anti-institutionalmistrust blowing across the entire continent are shaking confidence in the EuropeanUnion (EU) in Italy, too.5 The economic crisis has made a decisive contribution tothis change in orientation. Indeed, the EU, and particularly its German ‘locomo-tive’, have been seen by many Italians as the source of austerity policies and hard-ship, and the euro has come to be viewed as an obstacle to monetary sovereignty –

an obligation which has deprived the country of that instrument (competitivedevaluation) which, at the time of the lira, was utilized in moments of crisis.On the whole, however, Italians still feel a certain attachment to the EU because,

as Diamanti has observed, “pulling out seems riskier than staying in. In the end, weItalians are used to living with institutions and politicians that we do not esteem.”6

Comparison with other countries shows that hostility towards Europe, though ris-ing, is less widespread in Italy than it is elsewhere. According to a recent surveyreported in the Financial Times,7 44 percent of Italians would like to curb the EU’spowers (as against 51 percent of Germans, 56 percent of Spaniards and 66 percentof Britons; only France’s 43 percent is in line with the Italian value).It is against this backdrop that the European elections will be held in a few

months; and these elections will feature an important novelty. Indeed, since thegeneral election of February 2013, the Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Star Move-ment – FSM) has taken its place among the main political forces in Italy. Foundedby Beppe Grillo, this movement is among those which many observers placewithin a broad front of eurosceptical, populist forces that might achieveconsiderable gains in the upcoming elections.8 Many have expressed the fear that a

3I. Diamanti, “Noi italiani, delusi ma non scettici”, La Repubblica, 12 October 2013.4Dissatisfaction and mistrust towards national institutions have traditionally been greater in Italy than inother countries. For an analysis of the trends in dissatisfaction, see Morlino and Tarchi, “La società insod-disfatta e suoi nemici”.5Rosanvallon, Counter-democracy.6Diamanti, “Noi italiani, delusi ma non scettici”.7Cited in L. Offeddu, “Ue, l’onda alta del populismo che fa leva sull’immigrazione”, Corriere della Sera, 20October 2013.8For an introduction, see Corbetta and Gualmini, Il partito di Grillo; Vignati, “The challenge of the Five StarMovement”. Caution is mandatory with regard to the FSM. Indeed, up until Grillo’s posting (http://www.beppegrillo.it) of 16 October 2013, one could not even have been sure that the movement would takepart in the European elections; some journalists had hinted that the FSM would not run (E. Buzzi, “Nienteliste alle Europee. La tentazione dei 5 stelle”, Corriere della Sera, 21 September 2013). In any case, the resultthat the movement might obtain remains, for the moment, a matter of speculation. Opinion polls currentlyforecast around 18-20 percent for the movement, but from now until the elections, several factors could affectthe outcome: what will the state of Italy’s economy be and what level will the ‘spread’ have reached? What sac-rifices will Italians have been asked to make in the meantime in the name of Europe? Will the DemocraticParty and the centre-right parties have overcome the crises they are going through and what relations will theyhave with each other? And how far will the wear and tear of the FSM have gone? In some respects, the Euro-pean elections could constitute a rough terrain for the FSM (in that the FSM has proven weak when voters areallowed to express preferences). On the other hand, these are elections in which the voters of the traditionalparties are given free rein, and this could work in favour of Grillo’s movement.

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sort of ‘international populist movement’ might coalesce9 – a movement made upof ideologically very distant forces, from the far right Golden Dawn party, throughparties of a distinctly nationalist orientation, to various liberal-radical forces – andthat its aim might be to put an end to the project of integration. The FSM hasbeen numbered among these ‘suspects’.

Grillo and Europe

At present, it is not easy to clearly define the FSM’s stance on Europe, nor to estab-lish what its political behaviour might be if confronted with important choices onthe matter. So far, statements have tended to be somewhat generic. Focussing strictlyon the FSM’s ‘programme’,10 we can see that the question of Europe is substantiallyabsent. It is mentioned in passing to urge compliance with some of the EU’s direc-tives (on energy) or adherence to standards in force in other member states (forinstance, on pain therapy). In order to find more substantial references, we have todig more deeply into the mountain of declarations made by Grillo. And here wecome across Grillo’s controversial call for a referendum on Italy’s continued member-ship of the eurozone. This proposal would represent a clean break with the substan-tial unanimity that has so far characterised the European policies of governments inItaly and would undoubtedly introduce an element of unpredictability into the pro-cess of integration (as recent history shows, whenever European citizens are calledupon to vote on European questions, the outcome is always very uncertain). Thisproposal, however, does not constitute a true anti-European sentiment.The various forms and degrees of euroscepticism can be grouped into different

categories. Wessels, for example, distinguishes between “adamant eurosceptics”,“eurosceptics” and “critical Europeans”.11 Like other classifications that can befound in the literature, this one tries to highlight the difference between those whooppose any and every process of European unification (whom Kopecky and Muddecall “europhobe europessimists” and Szczerbiak and Taggart “hard eurosceptics”12)and those who are critical of the specific forms assumed by the process of unifica-tion (the “europhile europessimists” of Kopecky and Mudde; and the “soft euro-sceptics” of Szczerbiak and Taggart). From this point of view, Grillo’seuroscepticism – unlike that of the Northern League – could perhaps be classifiedas “europhile europessimism”. Indeed, the positions he has taken do not fail to payhomage to the founding fathers (Adenauer, De Gasperi, Monnet and Schuman),even though he claims that the current state of the European Union is a betrayal

9These include Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, who said in an interview with the New York Times, 15October 2013: “We have the big risk to have the most ‘anti-European’ European Parliament ever”.10http://www.beppegrillo.it/iniziative/movimentocinquestelle/Programma-Movimento-5-Stelle.pdf.11Wessels, “Discontent and European Identity”.12Kopecky and Mudde, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism”; Szczerbiak and Taggart, Opposing Europe.

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of the original project.13 Moreover, he sometimes advocates more, not less, unifica-tion, for example with regard to political unification and greater democracy.14 Suchpronouncements reflect the same rhetorical technique Grillo adopts towards Italianinstitutions: he praises the work of the founding fathers so as to highlight betterthe inadequacy of the current political class.Grillo’s euroscepticism does not stem from deeply rooted ideological motivations;

rather, it feeds on the gravity of the current crisis and the fears that this arouses inthe public. Thus, his arguments on Europe, which are based on a catastrophicdepiction of reality (Italy has already failed,15 but is being kept afloat artificially bythe banks, which are looking after their own interests to the detriment of the peo-ple), tend to single out scapegoats and to invoke a simplistic solution (in this case,the referendum on the euro).The European Union therefore figures in Grillo’s speeches within a chiefly

national framework. In his blog, Grillo criticises the use that the Italian politicalclass makes of European institutions: a parking space for those politicians who havebeen rejected by voters in national elections and a means of persuading the Italianpeople (“this is what Europe wants…”) to accept political decisions that theywould otherwise disagree with (such as the TAV, the high-speed rail link betweenTurin and Lyon). Europe also has a rhetorical function: it serves to bring out theshortcomings of the Italian political class, which has brought disaster on the coun-try. Thus, Europe features in Grillo’s speeches in opposite ways, sometimes as toointrusive (and accused of being co-responsible for the disaster) and sometimes astoo remote (and invoked as a remedy for the disaster). This duality can also beseen with regard to the flow of financing from Italy to Europe and vice versa.Indeed, Grillo has oscillated between criticism of the fact that Italy pays in morethan it gets out and criticism of EU financing granted to Italy in that it favoursorganised crime syndicates and a corrupt political class (on 17 November 2007, ina speech to the European Parliament, to which he was invited by a parliamentarian

13See the posting, “C’è del marcio a Bruxelles”, published on the blog, http://www.beppegrillo.it, 9November 2012.14“More Europe, fewer banks. Italy's role in Europe is fundamental, but we have to renegotiate the condi-tions of our participation, starting with the issue of the eurobonds that safeguard the weaker economies,renegotiation of public debt, cancellation of the Fiscal Compact, a noose that will hang our country”,http://www.beppegrillo.it, 18 September 2013.15On 18 September 2013, he wrote on his blog that "by the end of the year the economic crisis will befull-blown and will force us to ask for support from the state-saving fund and from the anti-spread shield…We have to recognise that we are already downtrodden and derided, already governed by Europe, alreadysubjects. Monti and Letta rushed to bow down before her Highness, the just elected Merkel, but theydidn't have the courage or honesty to admit this subjugation to the Italian people. We have ceded our sov-ereignty to Europe without getting anything in return; on the contrary, we have shelled out €50 billion (inincreased public debt) to finance EU support for peripheral countries instead of paying off the debts owedby the public administration to small and medium-sized enterprises." This recrimination concerning aid toperipheral countries is noteworthy, in that it is in blatant contrast with his request – in his subsequentposting of 16 October – for greater solidarity from the EU to save Greece from sinking.

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of the Italia dei valori (Italy of Values) party, he asked Europe to stop financingItaly because it was “like financing Bokassa”).As mentioned previously, Grillo, unlike other populist leaders who crowd the

European scene, has no cultural rejection of Europe. If anything, he invokesEurope, using a technique of argumentation similar to the one once adopted bythe Northern League to criticise what the party saw as an ‘enemy of the people’.In a certain phase of its history, the Northern League invoked Europe as a safe-guard that would enable Northern Italy to break free from the grip of ‘Roma ladro-na’ (‘thieving Rome’) and the southern part of the country that guzzled itsresources.16 Similarly, Grillo – having identified the people’s enemy as a “dead”,incompetent and dishonest political class – has often evoked Europe as a means ofshaking off this burden.However, as is also the case with regard to domestic institutional issues,17

Grillo’s positions display a sort of schizophrenia, alternating between the invoca-tion of a distant utopia (of democracy, political unification, etc), the achieve-ment of which would appear to be written in the laws of history, and thedemonisation of the present situation on which he vents anger, frustration andrancour. In order to cover the distance between these two poles, however, whatis missing is a genuine effort to work out a viable project for institutionalreform (how to make EU institutions more ‘democratic’; what solutions toadopt with regard to economic governance). Concerning the institutional archi-tecture of the EU, Grillo’s postings, such as the one entitled “C’è del marcio aBruxelles” (“Something is rotten in Brussels”), contain several inaccuracies andcontradictions;18 symptomatic of a type of rhetoric that is aimed more at sur-prising readers of limited competence than at making a diagnosis and providingpolitical proposals. The simultaneous presence of “solidary” and “egotistical”arguments in Grillo’s critiques reveals the essentially propagandistic nature of hispronouncements on Europe.At the heart of Grillo’s political platform lies his emphasis on democracy (partic-

ularly on direct democracy). As concerns European integration, too, the panaceaaccording to Grillo is constituted by the magic wand of direct democracy (specifi-cally, through his call for a referendum on the euro). Every problem facing the EUcan apparently be solved through the citizens’ votes. But this begs the question:

16On the Northern League's stance on Europe and its shift from pro-Europe to anti-Europe positions, seeHuysseune, “Eurosceptic Vision in a Europhile Country”.17Floridia and Vignati, “Deliberativa, diretta o partecipativa?”.18In this posting, which centres on the European Union, Grillo mentions the European Commission fordemocracy through law (which is, instead an initiative of the Council of Europe, which has nothing to dowith the EU). Then, in addition to lumping together chalk and cheese (discussions on the EU budget andelectoral law), he contradicts himself by simultaneously attacking the EU for its excessive powers of sanction(which end up harming citizens) and an institution of the Council of Europe for its lack of power to sanc-tion member states (in this specific case, on electoral law).

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once the people have expressed their will and the decision to remain in the euro orto opt out has been ratified by a popular vote, will all the difficulties in which theEU is embroiled be overcome?19

In calling for a referendum on Italy’s continued membership of the euro,Grillo has always tried to appear equidistant from both the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’factions. In reality, however, his speeches manifest a clear inclination to with-draw from the euro.20 What therefore emerges is a fundamentally euroscepticalposition. Eurosceptical and/or overtly anti-European views may be motivated byvarious factors: (identity) the Italian people’s opposition to an indistinct supra-national state; (libertarianism) opposition to an intrusive bureaucracy; or (socialconscience) opposition to the supremacy of economics over politics in the pro-cess of integration.Indeed, Grillo’s euroscepticism is chiefly motivated by his opposition to austerity

policies and to the dominance of economics and finance over politics:

Europe is not a bank; it is a sum of peoples and of civilisations that stretch backfor millennia… Before creating the euro, we should have laid the foundations forcommon rules, for example on defence policies and fiscal policies. We’ve gonefrom the Europe of Julius Caesar and Charlemagne to the Europe of thespread.21

In Grillo’s words, the creation of the euro should have been preceded by a processof political unification; Europe should display greater solidarity and ensure that “acountry in difficulty, like Greece, is not left to die in order to save the balancesheets of German and French banks”.22

His blog, however, in its feature Passaparola, has also given voice to forms ofradical euroscepticism of a different ideological cast. For example, that of anthro-pologist Ida Magli, author of La dittatura europea (The European Dictatorship),whose vision can be traced back to the radical criticism of European unification indefence of national identity and values, and of people threatened by a supranationalstate bereft of culture and identity.23 Or the anti-bureaucratic, libertarian sentimentthat is averse to a supportive Europe, as expressed by Neil Farage, leader of theUnited Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and co-president of the Europe of

19Moreover, according to the Italian constitution a referendum on the euro is not admissible. See, forinstance, L. Cuocolo, “Referendum sull’euro? Un inganno giuridico”, il ricostituente, 10 March 2013,http://www.ilricostituente.it/2013/03/10/10-03-2013-referendum-sulleuro-un-inganno-giuridico/.20As emerged in his interview with Businessweek (S. Faris, “Comedian Beppe Grillo on Italy’s Political andEconomic Future”, Businessweek, 8 August 2013). While he wriggled out of answering a question on hispreference, his position on this issue could nevertheless be inferred from his answers to other, less direct,questions.21“C’è del marcio a Bruxelles”, http://www.beppegrillo.it, 9 November 2012.22“Il M5s alle elezioni europee”, http://www.beppegrillo.it, 16 October 2003.23http://www.beppegrillo.it/2012/03/passaparola_occ.html.

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Freedom and Democracy group.24 Unlike Grillo, who criticises Europe for its lackof policy, Farage flatly rejects the attempt to introduce real elements of Europeanpolicy:

I think that here in Brussels … they honestly think that they can use a flag, anational anthem, a single currency, a single army and police force to create a newEuropean identity. It simply won’t work. Just as they failed when they tried to givedifferent countries a new identity and a new flag as Yugoslavia … This plan is notgoing to work because we are all different!25

And while, as has been said, Grillo believes that Jean Monnet was an exponent ofa positive European vision that should be restored, Farage’s opinion is that Monnetwas “a great bureaucrat and a man who truly weakened parliamentary democracy”by giving “the non-elected bureaucracy the right to propose laws”; as such, he wasresponsible for the current state of European institutions.26 These evident differ-ences (which emerge from the fact that, while Farage has worked out a positionthat has a certain consistency and an intellectual background, Grillo still seems tobe groping around, in search of a position of his own) have not prevented Grilloand Farage from uniting in their criticism of European institutions. Then again,Gianroberto Casaleggio, the eminence grise of the FSM and its technological guru,who is far less loquacious than Grillo, has expressed scepticism of the euro (a“cunning imposition, the work of remote and insensitive bureaucrats”27) that seemsclose to that of Farage.

Members of Parliament and voters

It would be wrong, however, to equate the FSM with its leaders alone. After all, inparliament, whether in Rome or in Strasbourg, it will be the unknown and mostlyyoung MPs who vote. What do we know about them with regard to their stanceon European issues? So far, we have no real evidence of what their position is.Indeed, from the investiture of the Italian parliament following the February 2013general election up to the end of November 2013 – the date of completion of thisarticle – the MPs of the FSM have not yet had occasion to express a particularlystrong and meaningful position on Europe; it is therefore still too soon to be able

24In which Italy is currently represented by the Northern League and by Io amo l’Italia. Should theEuropean elections result in the election of FSM representatives, and should the Northern League beexcluded, as is possible, this group could become the destination of the FSM. Farage has been compared toGrillo as a representative of “primarily anti-establishment populist movements, neither obviously left norright-wing” (J. Bartlett, “More Grillo than Griffin”, New Statesman, 9 May 2013, http://www.newstates-man.com/politics/2013/05/farage-more-grillo-griffin).25http://www.beppegrillo.it/en/2013/08/06/passaparola_the_sovereignty_of_1.html.26Ibid.27Sterling, “La versione di Casaleggio”, 47.

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to draw any firm conclusions as to where they stand on this issue.28 The MPs ofthe FSM are likely to end up adhering to – or being caught up in – the euroscep-ticism of the radical left parties and social movements. Indeed, although extremelyvariegated, the political views that the FSM expresses are chiefly identifiable withthis area. Nevertheless, with regard to this issue, the possibility of a rift developingbetween the FSM’s institutional representatives and its leader cannot be ruled out.What happened in the Italian parliament concerning the abolition of the crime

of illegal immigration,29 might provide some indication of the dynamic that couldbe created with regard to European issues. MPs might find themselves closer tothe position of the leftist movements, while the two leaders of the FSM might bemore attentive to the electoral consequences of their choices, preferring to takeadvantage of the popular wind that is blowing increasingly in a direction oppositeto Europe.30 By censuring the initiative of the FSM senators on illegal immigra-tion, Grillo allowed his electioneering bent to peep through; until then, it hadnever emerged so clearly in his speeches: “If we had proposed decriminalizing ille-gal immigration during the general election campaign, […] the FSM would havegot pretty measly percentages.”31

Grillo and Casaleggio might therefore aspire to exploiting a sentiment of discon-tent towards Europe which, as already mentioned, though not yet a majority view,is clearly on the rise. For the time being, the electoral catchment area of the FSMdisplays a profile that is clearly more eurosceptical than that of the other parties.This emerges unanimously from all surveys. According to the data reported byRoberto Biorcio, FSM voters are more eurosceptical than the average voter.32

Indeed, 44 percent of FSM voters express faith in the European Union: a higherpercentage than that of the Northern League (38 percent), but lower than that ofall the other political parties – not only the traditionally more euro-optimistic ones,such as the centrist parties (71 percent) and the Democratic Party – PD (71percent), but also the PDL (52 percent), within which anti-Europe sentiments haveoften been evinced by both the leadership and the grassroots. This attitude towards

28During the discussion on the European Council of 24-25 October, the FSM MPs presented a resolutionin which they proposed that the government should ask for “a loosening of the pact of stability, i.e. thatpact (with the devil?) which forbids spending to finance enterprises and families. And, given that we havenot got any money, we propose the immediate suspension of any further payment into the "state-saving"fund (European Stability Mechanism) and request the insertion into the European Stability Mechanismtreaty of a clause allowing withdrawal from the fund (at the moment, there is no withdrawal clause)”,http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/parlamento/europa/2013/10/consiglio-europeo-24-25-ottobre.html.29Two FSM senators on the Justice Committee proposed an amendment (subsequently approved throughthe votes of the PD and Sinistra, Ecologia e Libertà – SEL, Left, Ecology and Freedom) which would de-criminalise illegal immigration. Grillo immediately intervened through his blog to censure this initiativeperemptorily (http://www.beppegrillo.it, 10 October 2013).30On the issue of Europe, the differences in orientation between the FSM MPs and their two leaders mayremain hidden; indeed, it is easier to unite around a ‘no’ than around a positive proposal.31“Reato di clandestinità”, http://www.beppegrillo.it, 10 October 2013.32Biorcio, “Le tre ragioni del successo”, 52.

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the European Union is part of a more general feeling of mistrust towards politicalinstitutions on the part of FSM voters, who vie with the supporters of theNorthern League for the record of the electorate with the least faith in political,economic and social institutions.Recent surveys show that the anti-Europe position of the FSM is hardening: the

April 2013 data from Itanes (Italian National Election Studies) indicate that only34.6 percent of FSM voters believe in Europe, as compared to 45 percent of PDLand Northern League voters.33 Even more recent data provided by the October2013 Demos survey depict FSM voters as even more sceptical towards Europe:only 26.1 percent of them express trust, as against 48.7 percent of centre-left votersand 33.6 percent of centre-right voters. With regard to the possibility of withdraw-ing from the euro, this last survey seems to indicate that the Italian population issplit: on the one side, the centre-left and centre (withdrawal being favoured by16.9 percent and 17.5 percent, respectively), and on the other side, the centre-rightand FSM supporters (41.3 percent and 43.2 percent, respectively, favouringwithdrawal).34

These percentages would seem to indicate that the FSM may find a huntingground in the electorate of Berlusconi’s coalition. Similarly, 13.7 percent of centre-left voters and 12.1 percent of centrist voters state that, in the present economiccrisis, Italy would be better off without the EU, while this view is held by aboutone third of the centre-right electorate (30.6 percent) and the FSM electorate(34.2 percent).35 To complete the picture, the data from a survey conducted on aparticular sample – Beppe Grillo’s Facebook fans – can be quoted: only 19 percentof them expressed faith in the European Union.36

Conclusions

According to some observers, the FSM cannot be regarded as an ‘anti-Europe’party. In the opinion of Barbara Spinelli, a political commentator for La Repubbli-ca, “those who listen carefully to Grillo will surely be struck by his incongruities,especially when he indulges in electioneering xenophobia. But they will not comeacross nationalist or truly anti-European sentiment.” 37 To be sure, there is no cul-tural rejection of Europe in Grillo’s declarations (on the contrary, he sometimescalls for more Europe and for a Europe that is more solidary). Nevertheless, themovement’s profile is complex and difficult to define. Its current situation can besummed up as follows: a leader who expresses himself more through slogans than

33Biorcio, “La sfida del Movimento 5 Stelle”.34L. Ceccarini, “Studente, di sinistra, del Nordest: l’identikit dell’euro-entusiasta”, La Repubblica, 12October 2013.35Ibid.36Bartlett et al., New Political Actors in Europe, 40.37B. Spinelli, “Europa, l’ufficio delle lettere smarrite”, La Repubblica, 6 November 2013.

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proposals (and who has so far used the issue of Europe mainly as a jemmy in thedomestic political struggle); political representatives who have not yet had the occa-sion to take up clear positions (but who, according to their social and ideologicalbackground, seems chiefly to be a part of the world of leftist movements); an elec-torate that is more eurosceptical than that of the other parties (against a backdropof public opinion in which euroscepticism is gaining ground).The interplay among these components38 and the populist nature of Grillo’s

leadership39 suggest that the FSM will ride the growing wave of anti-Europe senti-ment. A heavy economic crisis leads people who are increasingly in difficulty andanxious about their future to seek scapegoats; the euro and the EU readily lendthemselves to this role. By pointing to them as responsible for the crisis (or for fail-ing to solve it), Grillo can also take the stance that is most congenial to him: thatof the scourge of all political parties, be they on the left or the right – in that theyare all, to some degree, responsible for Italy’s submission to European policies.In riding this wave, the rhetorical use of the issue of direct democracy (specifi-

cally, the referendum on the euro) plays a central role. One could claim thatGrillo’s call for democracy (or rather for a referendum) is like making the bulletsfor others to fire; he reaps the discontent generated by the crisis and heaped uponthe euro (as it makes a competitive devaluation impossible) or upon the austeritypolicies imposed by Europe and Germany, while leaving it up to the ‘people’ todecide rather than taking a clear position on the matter himself. So far, Grillo’sappeal for direct democracy has been a ruse employed to mask his lack of apolitical programme.It almost seems that the movement has grown too quickly, and that it has not

yet found the time to adequately work out its utopian hopes of renewal nor toforge those hopes into programmes that have a reasonable chance of being imple-mented. This appeal to give back to the people the voice that remote bureaucratsand politicians have allegedly taken away from them is not without contradictions.Indeed, much as Grillo loves to depict himself as a mere mouthpiece for themoods and wishes of citizens,40 in reality he does not restrict himself to reporting

38To which another factor should be added: the party's refusal to form coalitions. On this variable as animportant factor in determining a party’s stance on Europe, see Topaloff, Political Parties and Eurosceptic-ism.39Corbetta, “Un web-populismo dal destino incerto”. Initially, Grillo indignantly rejected the label ‘popu-list’; he then transformed it into a catchphrase to be used ironically (during his rallies for the 2013 generalelection, he asked his audiences to chant “populist, populist!”), and finally he openly embraced the term –

in his meeting with the FSM MPs on 29 October 2013, according to the recordings reported by Il Fattoquotidiano (30 October 2013), he allegedly said: “We speak to the belly of the people; we are true popu-lists. We shouldn't be ashamed of that.” Moreover, in his posting of 16 October 2013, Grillo accepted thelabel of ‘populist’ for the FSM, meaning by this an "attitude of political, social or cultural movement thattends generically to raise the poorest classes”.40“Usurping public opinion and the will of the people is common practice among the parties that wish to‘educate’ citizens, but it is not ours.” (“Reato di clandestinità”, http://www.beppegrillo.it, 10 October2013).

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what the people want, but rather contributes decisively to forming those moods.When he vehemently calls for a referendum on the euro,41 while subtly indicatingthat he himself is in favour of withdrawal, he actually helps to heighten anti-Europe and eurosceptical sentiments. Even when his speeches propose ‘reformist’solutions (like the creation of eurobonds42), Grillo refuses to seek common groundwith other political forces that might ideally converge on the same positions. Bycontrast, as the quotes from his blog have already shown, he does not hesitate tolend his voice to the choir of openly anti-European sentiment.As long as he remains unable to draw up a coherent programme on Europe and

to ask voters for their approval of this programme (instead of trotting out slogansand denouncing scapegoats), his call for direct democracy will remain plebiscitarianand his positions, fraught with contradictory declarations, will continue to contrib-ute to the weakening of a European project that is already facing grave difficultiesof its own.43

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41As, for instance, during the third ‘V-day’, the big rally held in Genoa, 1 December 2013.42Proposed during the press conference held in the Senate on 28 October 2013.43This article has focused on the FSM and the populist nature of its positions on Europe. It has not dealtwith the difficulties, not to say inability, of the mainstream political parties to work out a programme onEurope that is capable of creating a consensus. This issue also deserves in-depth analysis.

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