Direct Democracy and Land Use Policy: Exchanging Public ...jhp2121/publications/Direct Democracy and Lan… · Urban Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, 463–479, February 2004 Direct Democracy

Urban Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, 463–479, February 2004

Direct Democracy and Land Use Policy:Exchanging Public Goods for Development Rights

Elisabeth R.GerberGerald R. Ford School of Public PolicyUniversity of Michigan712 Oakland, Suite 250Ann ArborMI 48104MIUSA734 647 [email protected]

Elisabeth R. Gerber and Justin H. Phillips

[Paper first received, January 2002; in final form, January 2003]

Summary. To counter the power of pro-development interests, growth opponents in Americancommunities have increasingly turned to the institutions of direct democracy. This study analysesthe effects of one type of direct democracy—voter requirements for new development—onmunicipal growth. Analysing data from a sample of California communities, we consider theimpact of voter requirements on the land use process and outcomes. We find that—in general—voter requirements fail to stop new development; property owners and developers can and doadapt to the constraints created by these direct democracy institutions. We also find, however,that voter requirements change the land use process in important ways. Specifically, they changethe way developers interact with interest groups in the community and force developers tocompensate current residents for enduring some of the negative aspects of growth.

Introduction

On 7 November 2000, voters in 21 Californiacommunities considered 26 local ballot mea-sures that would require voter approval for awide range of future residential and commer-cial development. Most of these voter re-quirement initiatives sought to impose an‘urban boundary’ around the community, be-yond which development would be prohib-ited except by the approval of a majority ofvoters. Others sought to require voter ap-proval for any development involving morethan 10 housing units, for development thatwould adversely impact traffic, for airportexpansion, for reconstruction of a powerplant or for any major amendments to thecommunity’s general plan.1 Of the 26 mea-sures, 15 passed, adding their communities to

the growing list of localities in Californiathat have adopted voter requirements sincethe late 1980s. Table 1 describes each of theNovember 2000 California voter requirementmeasures.2

These voter requirement measures are at-tempts by slow-growth interests to shift thebalance of power over land use decisions intheir communities.3 Since the regulation ofland use in the US is largely a local issue,local government entities such as city coun-cils, town councils, county boards and theirstaffs make most land use policy decisions.4

Much of the research on this process con-cludes that the traditional process of land useregulation results in a ‘growth machine’where property owners, developers, local

Elisabeth R. Gerber is in the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, 712 Oakland, Suite 250, Ann Arbor,MI 48104 3021, USA. Fax: 734 998 6688. E-mail: [email protected]. Justin H. Phillips is in the Department of PoliticalScience, University of California, San Diego, 301 Social Science Building, La Jolla, CA 92093 0521, USA. Fax: 858 534 3548.E-mail: [email protected]. This paper was presented at the Critical Issues Symposium, Florida State University, November2001. The authors would like to thank David McMenamy who provided valuable research assistance in the early stages of thisproject. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-0001866). Elisabeth Gerberacknowledges the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioural Sciences.

0042-0980 Print/1360-063X On-line/04/020463–17 2004 The Editors of Urban StudiesDOI: 10.1080/0042098032000165343

ELISABETH R. GERBER AND JUSTIN H. PHILLIPS464

Table 1. Voter requirement initiatives, November 2000

Jurisdiction Measure Vote (percentage) Description

Fillmore K 38 Flood plain developmentPaso Robles O 39 Open space and agricultural developmentSan Luis Obisbo Co. M 41 Open space and agriculturalHealdsburg L 42 Annual limitSonoma Co. I 43 All zoning changesAlameda Co. C 43 Urban boundaryFillmore J 43 Open space and agriculturalClayton O 45 Over 10 units/2 acres/1000 ft commercialMorro Bay Q 46 Power plant approvalBrea N 49 Hillside developmentMalibu P 49 All zoning changes and large commercial

developmentMarina E 52 Urban boundaryMalibu N 53 Large commercial and mixed-use

developmentDanville R 53 Over 10 unitsSanta Paula I 55 Open space and agriculturalHealdsburg M 55 Annual limitAlameda Co. D 57 Urban boundaryDublin M 59 Urban boundarySolana Beach T 62 General plan amendmentsNewport Beach S 63 General plan amendmentsSonoma S 64 Urban boundaryRohnert Park N 71 Urban boundaryDanville S 74 Open space and agriculturalBurbank B 80 Airport expansionSan Jose K 81 Urban boundaryMonterey G 84 Sale of city-owned open space

Source: Official election returns, California county registrars, 2000.

businesses and elected representatives allshare strong incentives to promote commer-cial and residential growth (Molotch, 1976).In other words, this process is believed tohave a strong pro-development bias.5

Growth provides numerous benefits to acommunity—it stimulates the economy, cre-ates jobs, generates tax revenues, providesneeded housing and increases a city’s pres-tige. But growth also imposes costs on peo-ple who live near it and, in recent years,some of the more unsightly consequences ofgrowth have come to light. Recent surveysreport increasing public frustration with thenegative aspects of growth (see, for example,Ladd and Bowman, 1995; Polling Report,2001; Baldassare, 2001).

In a number of cities, slow-growth inter-ests have responded to the city hall growth

machine with creative new political strate-gies. One increasingly common strategy isthe use of these voter requirements, whichallow current residents a greater say in landuse decisions. Thus, while local governmentofficials still make most land use decisions,the projects that are subject to a voter re-quirement must also gain the support of amajority of the voting public. In effect, voterrequirements allow current residents to vetoprojects they oppose.

Advocates of voter requirements reasonthat current residents have different incen-tives regarding growth from those of electedrepresentatives. They argue that voters willbe less tolerant of new development, sincethey receive few direct benefits and pay sub-stantial costs in the forms of traffic, conges-tion, environmental degradation, loss of open

DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND LAND USE POLICY 465

space, strain on infrastructure, invasion ofprivacy and depression of existing housingvalues. Thus, the advocates argue, voters willprotect their interests by voting ‘no’ on newdevelopment and hence will more effectivelylimit sprawl than will city hall (Fischel,2001).

This paper is a first step towards under-standing whether this prediction is likely tobe accurate. More generally, the researchprovides insight into the impact of directdemocracy institutions on the politics of landuse. To understand the effects of these insti-tutions, we draw upon the experiences of anumber of communities where voter require-ments have been used. The main conclusionof our research is that voter requirementsforce pro-development interests to interactdifferently with interest groups in the com-munity. Perhaps most importantly, we findthat voter requirements do not stop growthbut, rather, they appear to change the waycurrent residents are compensated for bearingthe costs of growth.

Our findings have important practical im-plications for the communities that have re-cently adopted or are consideringimplementing voter requirements for futuredevelopment. We find that the types of de-velopment that occur, and the interests thatbenefit, are often quite different from thoseoriginally conceived by supporters of thevoter requirements. We consider this and anumber of other implications in more detailbelow.

Our research also provides new insightinto how political institutions affect the dis-tribution of costs and benefits in this increas-ingly salient area of local governance. Landuse decisions dominate local politics in manycommunities. These decisions range from themundane—such as whether to install a newstop sign or allow a second-storey addition toan existing residence—to the extraordi-nary—such as long-range planning for spe-cies preservation. By focusing on the choicein some communities to subject these landuse decisions to voters, rather than electedrepresentatives, this study helps to informour understanding of how institutions impact

policy outcomes in this highly salient area oflocal politics.

In the following section, we describe theexperiences of San Diego, California, wherevoter approval for certain types of develop-ment has been required for many years. SanDiego’s experience implies hypotheses aboutthe effects of voter requirements on severalaspects of the land use policy process. Theseinclude the effect of voter requirements oninterest group strategies, on the content ofdevelopment proposals and on public policyoutcomes. We test these hypotheses withdata from a sample of California communi-ties. We conclude by explaining the implica-tions of this research for the study of land useand the future of growth management strate-gies.

Land Use Initiatives in San Diego, Califor-nia

In 1985, San Diego voters passed PropositionA, which required voter approval for all de-velopment in the city’s ‘future urbanisingareas’ or FUA.6 The FUA is one of threeplanning areas designated by the city’s gen-eral plan and progress guide.7 The FUA con-sists of regions of the city currently reservedfor agricultural uses and open space, andaccounts for most of the city’s useable, unde-veloped land (see Calavita, 1992). Theseplanning areas are represented in Figure 1.

Prop A was placed on the ballot by slow-growth interests using the acronym PLAN(Prevent Los Angelization Now). Its statedpurpose was drastically to slow residentialdevelopment (McMenamy, 1999). The prop-osition was initiated as a direct response tothe city council’s 1984 decision to approve aproposed development of 5100 acres inpristine La Jolla Valley. The approval of theLa Jolla Valley project helped to fuel thealready existing perception that the citycouncil was unwilling and/or unable to say‘no’ to powerful development interests(Weisberg, 1987). As suggested above, PropA’s proponents reasoned that current resi-dents would be less favourable to develop-


Figure 1. Planning areas: San Diego, California.

ment pressures and would protect their owneconomic interests by voting against newdevelopment. Prop A passed easily with 56per cent voter support. And for 10 years,Prop A’s proponents seemed to be right.Only three measures to approve new devel-opment in the FUA were placed on the ballot

in the decade after Prop A, and only onepassed.

Since 1996, however, property owners anddevelopers have been much more successfulin obtaining voter approval for their develop-ment projects. Between 1996 and 1998,seven of nine measures required by Prop A


Table 2. Campaign contributions to San Diego development measures, 1986–98

Vote Supporting OpposingProposition (percentage) contributions ($) contributions ($)

J 87 23 NA NAG 96a 29 8 750 6 140F 96a 31 8 750 6 140C 94 46 3 022 586 17 040K 98 52 802 098 513 294M 98 53 1 202 442 45 278H 96b 54 264 666 0E 96b 58 264 281 0C 96 60 31 532 0D 96 68 0 0N 98 71 0 0D 86 72 NA NA

aContributions made jointly to F and G campaigns.bContributions made jointly to E and H campaigns.

passed.8 Several of the successful develop-ments were enormous projects, involvinghundreds of acres and thousands of newhousing units. Thus, contrary to the predic-tions of the growth opponents, San Diego’svoter requirement has failed to prevent de-velopment in recent years.

How do we explain the recent ability ofdevelopers in San Diego to gain voter sup-port for their development projects? Severalpossible explanations present themselves.One possibility is that proponents of thesepro-development measures began to devotemore resources to their supporting cam-paigns. Developers have extremely deeppockets and perhaps they simply outspent thegrass-roots environmental groups that mighthave opposed them. This explanation is con-sistent with critics of the initiative processwho argue that, by spending vast sums indirect legislation campaigns, wealthy econ-omic interests dominate initiative outcomes(see, for example, Broder, 2000).

There are two reasons to doubt this expla-nation. The first is a theoretical reason. Pre-vious research shows that money isnecessary but not sufficient to pass initiatives(Smith, 1998; Gerber, 1999). Voters need tosee that ‘people like them’ are behind aninitiative and developers do not convey thissort of commonality of interest. The second

is an empirical reason. Experience in SanDiego shows that some of the most expens-ive measures failed, while some that passedreceived no campaign spending at all. Table2 reports campaign contributions for andagainst the 12 measures required by Prop-osition A since 1986.9 We see that the mea-sure with the most expensive supportingcampaign (Prop C of 1994) failed and severalmeasures with no supporting campaign at all(Prop D of 1996 and Prop N of 1998) passedwith large majorities. Given the patterns re-ported in Table 2, it is clear that, if campaignspending contributed to the developers’ abil-ity to pass their proposals after 1994, it wascertainly not the only factor.

A second possible explanation is that de-velopers after 1994 began to construct moremodest proposals. In other words, perhapsthe projects that passed were more modestand hence less offensive to slow-growth in-terests. This is clearly not the case. As shownin Table 3, several of the successful mea-sures embodied huge developments involv-ing thousands of acres and hundreds ofnew housing units, while some of the unsuc-cessful measures involved much smallerprojects.

A third possible explanation is that theunderlying growth preferences of San Die-gans changed. In other words, it may be the

468 ELISABETH R. GERBER AND JUSTIN H. PHILLIPS

Tab

le3.

Prov

isio

nsof

San

Die

gode

velo

pmen

tm

easu

res,

1986

–98

Vot

eM

easu

rePr

ovis

ions

End

orse

men

tsO

ppos

ition

Publ

icG

oods

(per

cent

age)

D19

8617

8ac

rela

ndtr

ansf

erSi

erra

Clu

bN

one

291

acre

sof

open

spac

ean

d72

for

indu

stri

alde

velo

pmen

t$

mill

ion

toci

tyof

San

Die

goJ

1987

Chr

istia

nun

iver

sity

and

Non

eSi

erra

Clu

bN

one

23a

750-

acre

indu

stri

alpa

rkC

1994

Bet

wee

n14

780

and

Plan

ning

grou

pPl

anni

nggr

oup

6000

acre

sof

open

spac

e,ne

w46

1750

0re

side

ntia

lun

itsSi

erra

Clu

bsc

hool

san

dfu

nds

for

SR-5

6C

1996

Con

stru

ctio

nof

two

hote

lsPl

anni

nggr

oups

Non

e$1

2.6

mill

ion

for

open

spac

e60

Sier

raC

lub

D19

96D

esig

nate

Nav

alT

rain

ing

Cen

ter,

Sier

raC

lub

Non

eN

one

68M

arin

eC

orps

Rec

ruit

Dep

otan

dA

irpo

rtas

urba

nise

d(a

llow

ing

com

mer

cial

deve

lopm

ent)

E19

9672

-acr

ere

side

ntia

lPl

anni

nggr

oup

Non

eO

pen

spac

ean

deq

uest

rian

trai

ls58

deve

lopm

ent

F19

9613

-acr

ere

side

ntia

lN

one

Plan

ning

grou

p14

-acr

ew

ildlif

e31

deve

lopm

ent

corr

idor

G19

9632

.8-a

cre

com

mer

cial

Non

ePl

anni

nggr

oup

Roa

dsan

d21

acre

sof

29de

velo

pmen

tSi

erra

Clu

bw

etla

ndre

stor

atio

nH

1996

1134

-acr

ere

side

ntia

lPl

anni

nggr

oup

Plan

ning

grou

p25

0ac

res

ofop

ensp

ace,

54de

velo

pmen

tSi

erra

Clu

bfu

nds

for

SR-5

6,an

dsc

hool

sK

1998

1410

-acr

ere

side

ntia

lPl

anni

nggr

oup

Plan

ning

grou

ps28

0ac

res

ofop

ensp

ace,

52de

velo

pmen

tSi

erra

Clu

bfu

nds

for

SR-5

6,sc

hool

san

dfir

est

atio

nsM

1998

2102

-acr

ere

side

ntia

lPl

anni

nggr

oup

Non

e15

0ac

res

ofop

ensp

ace,

53de

velo

pmen

tSi

erra

Clu

bfu

nds

for

SR-5

6,sc

hool

s,an

dpo

lice

and

fire

stat

ions

N19

9830

acre

land

tran

sfer

for

Plan

ning

grou

pN

one

47.7

acre

sof

open

spac

e71

com

mer

cial

deve

lopm

ent

Sier

raC

lub


case that, after 1994, San Diego voters sim-ply wanted a larger housing stock, more jobsand additional commercial services. How-ever, this explanation is also not supportedby the existing evidence. Recent surveysshow that large majorities of San Diego resi-dents still rate growth-related problems astheir biggest concerns and believe that thecity is growing too rapidly (Baldassare 2000,2001). Additionally, voters have not writtena blank cheque to developers. Despite ap-proving seven new developments in recentyears, voters have handily rejected others,often during the same election.

A fourth possible explanation is that theneed to obtain voter approval forced devel-opers to adopt different strategies vis-a-visinterest groups in the community. This expla-nation is consistent with the theoreticalliterature on voting in direct legislation elec-tions and, as we will demonstrate, is sup-ported by the data in San Diego and in othercommunities that have voter requirements inplace. In brief, our explanation is as follows.We argue that, after several failed attemptsimmediately following the imposition of thevoter requirements, developers changed theway they interacted with interest groups inthe community. The need to obtain majorityvoter support forced developers to negotiatedirectly with interest groups, particularly lo-cal community planning boards and environ-mental organisations, over the terms ofdevelopment. Interest groups endorsed theresulting measures and these endorsementsprovided powerful signals to voters. In returnfor these interest group endorsements, devel-opers provided a range of local public goodsthat the community and environmental or-ganisations demanded on behalf of their con-stituents. These public goods offset some ofthe negative externalities created by the newdevelopment and, in effect, compensated cur-rent residents for some of the costs theywould incur. Thus, by forcing developers toform coalitions with local interest groups,voter requirements empowered different in-terests and created different political pro-cesses from the traditional city hall land useprocess.

This explanation is consistent with theview that procedures matter in terms of whogets what. Environmental interests in particu-lar complained that the city hall ‘growthmachine’ in San Diego was unresponsive totheir demands to provide stronger provisionsfor environmental protection in their land usedecisions (Caves, 1992).10 With the impo-sition of voter requirements, these interestswere able to extract much stronger environ-mental provisions from developers. How-ever, our explanation also underscores thepoint, common in the literature on land eco-nomics, that voter requirements and otherrestrictive zoning procedures affect winnersand losers, but do not necessarily changepatterns of economic activity—i.e. they donot halt development (see Coase, 1960).

In the following sections, we subject ourexplanation to more rigorous scrutiny.Specifically, we consider the effects of voterrequirements on interest group politics, pub-lic goods provision and policy outcomes in asample of California communities.

Interest Group Politics: Building Coalitionswith Community Organisations

San Diego’s experience with voter require-ments suggests that one important conse-quence was a change in how interest groupsand developers interact in the land use pro-cess. Our explanation of what changed inSan Diego is that developers formed coali-tions with key interest groups and this inter-est group support was critical to the passageof pro-development measures after Prop A.To what extent does the empirical evidencein San Diego and other California communi-ties systematically support this explanation?

First, consider the latter part of this ques-tion, whether interest group support wascritical to the passage of pro-developmentmeasures after Prop A. It turns out that theformat of the ballot used in California localelections, and the supporting documentationreceived by all California voters, allows us aunique opportunity to test for the influence ofinterest group support on the passage of ini-tiatives. Each registered voter in California


receives two ‘ballot pamphlets’, one from theSecretary of State and one from his/hercounty of residence. The ballot pamphletsdescribe each state-wide and local ballotmeasure, respectively, including the officialtitle and summary of the measure, as well assigned arguments for and against. Researchon the dynamics of direct democracy elec-tions indicates that voters can and do usethese sorts of endorsement to help link theirown interests with the (known) positions ofcredible endorsers (Lupia, 1994; Bowler andDonovan, 1998). In other words, interestgroup endorsement can serve as low-costinformation short-cuts or cues.

To test the impact of interest-group en-dorsements on voter support for required de-velopment initiatives, we coded two types ofendorsement for each of the 29 measures thathave been placed before voters in Californiacommunities as a result of pre-existing voterrequirements.11 These measures are describedin Table 4. The first type of endorsementincludes those from community planninggroups. In each city and county in California,local community organisations participate inthe land use process. Members of these plan-ning groups are elected in local elections, forterms ranging from two to four years. Thegroups make non-binding recommendationsto city or county planning commissions, citycouncils or county boards on most land usedecisions. For each measure, we created avariable coded one if an official communityplanning group signed a supporting argumenton the ballot pamphlet and coded zero other-wise. We created a second variable codedone if a community planning group signed anopposing argument on the ballot pamphletand coded zero otherwise.

The second type of endorsement includesthose from environmental organisations. En-vironmental organisations are actively in-volved in a wide range of policy debatesincluding many land use and developmentissues. On the 29 measures in Table 4, anumber of organisations that claimed to beenvironmentalist took positions on the issues.Some were well-known national organisa-tions; others were not. To include only those

endorsements that most voters would recog-nise and consider reliable sources of infor-mation, we created two variables, coded oneif the local chapter of the Sierra Club took aposition on the measure (again, one variableidentifying ‘yes’ endorsements, the otheridentifying ‘no’ endorsements), and eachcoded zero otherwise.

Interest-group endorsements have a sub-stantial effect on a measure’s electoral suc-cess. Table 5 reports the results of six OLSregression analyses. In each model, the de-pendent variable is the measure’s vote share.The independent variables are dummy vari-ables indicating the measure’s endorsements.We see that the effects of the interest groupendorsements are as hypothesised. In models1–4, a measure’s vote share is positively andsignificantly related to whether it receivedSierra Club or community group support andis negatively and significantly related towhether it received opposition from eithergroup. In model 5, the directions of theseeffects hold when we control for the mea-sure’s other endorsements, although none ofthe coefficients is statistically significant.This lack of significance is clearly due, atleast in part, to the high degree of collinearitybetween the independent variables. When wedrop any one of them from the model, thesigns on the remaining coefficients remainthe same and several of the effects againbecome significant.

Clearly, then, there exists a strong rela-tionship between whether a measure was en-dorsed by an interest group and the voteshare it received. Less immediately clear,however, is the other part of our explanationabout interest group politics: to what extentdo voter requirements force developers tointeract differently with local interestgroups? Did interest group politics changeafter the passage of a voter requirement mea-sure? On the one hand, we recognise thatinterest groups are heavily involved in thelocal policy process in general, and the tra-ditional land use policy process in particular,even in places that pass and utilise voterrequirements. On the other hand, two piecesof evidence strongly suggest that voter re-

471DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND LAND USE POLICY

Tab

le4.

Req

uire

dde

velo

pmen

tm

easu

res,

Cal

ifor

nia

com

mun

ities

,19

86–2

000

Yes

Juri

sdic

tion

Mea

sure

Yea

r(p

erce

ntag

e)E

nvY

esE

nvN

oC

omm

YC

omm

N

San

Die

goPr

opos

ition

D19

8680

10

10

San

Die

goPr

opos

ition

J19

8723

10

11

Pow

ayPr

opos

ition

J19

9060

00

00

San

Die

goPr

opos

ition

C19

9446

01

01

Oce

ansi

dePr

opos

ition

G19

9431

00

00

San

Die

goPr

opos

ition

C19

9660

10

10

San

Die

goPr

opos

ition

D19

9668

10

10

San

Die

goPr

opos

ition

E19

9658

00

10

San

Die

goPr

opos

ition

F19

9631

01

01

San

Die

goPr

opos

ition

G19

9629

01

01

San

Die

goPr

opos

ition

H19

9654

10

10

Nap

aC

ount

yM

easu

reW

1996

160

10

0N

apa

Cou

nty

Mea

sure

X19

9614

01

00

San

Die

goPr

opos

ition

K19

9852

11

11

San

Die

goPr

opos

ition

M19

9853

10

10

San

Die

goPr

opos

ition

N19

9871

10

10

Oce

ansi

dePr

opos

ition

V19

9855

00

00

Ven

tura

City

Mea

sure

C19

9955

00

00

Nap

aC

ount

yM

easu

reG

2000

400

10

0V

entu

raC

ount

yM

easu

reF

2000

730

00

0E

scon

dido

Prop

ositi

onJ

2000

290

10

0E

scon

dido

Prop

ositi

onK

2000

370

10

1E

scon

dido

Prop

ositi

onL

2000

480

01

0E

scon

dido

Prop

ositi

onM

2000

330

00

0E

scon

dido

Prop

ositi

onN

2000

290

00

1E

scon

dido

Prop

ositi

onO

2000

360

10

1E

scon

dido

Prop

ositi

onP

2000

380

10

1E

scon

dido

Prop

ositi

onR

2000

280

00

1V

entu

raC

ityM

easu

reM

2000

540

00

0


Tab

le5.

Eff

ect

ofin

tere

stgr

oup

endo

rsem

ents

onvo

tem

argi

n,m

ultiv

aria

tere

gres

sion

anal

ysis

,C

alif

orni

ade

velo

pmen

tin

itiat

ives

,19

86–2

000

(N�

29)

Inde

pend

ent

Mod

el1

Mod

el2

Mod

el3

Mod

el4

Mod

el5

Mod

el6

vari

able

DV

�V

ote

DV

�V

ote

DV

�V

ote

DV

�V

ote

DV

�V

ote

DV

�V

ote

Sier

raC

lub

Yes

0.18

(0.0

7)0.

08(0

.11)

0.13

(0.0

6)C

omm

unity

Yes

0.18

(0.0

6)0.

06(0

.11)

Sier

raC

lub

No

�0.

18(0

.06)

�0.

10(0

.07)

�0.

11(0

.06)

Com

mun

ityN

o�

0.15

(0.0

6)�

0.08

(0.0

6)�

0.09

(0.0

6)C

onst

ant

0.40

(0.0

3)0.

39(0

.03)

0.52

(0.0

4)0.

50(0

.04)

0.47

(0.0

5)0.

48(0

.04)

Adj

uste

dR

20.

180.

230.

250.

150.

320.

34

Not

e:St

anda

rder

rors

inpa

rent

hese

s.


quirements have changed the way that inter-est groups are involved in policy formation.First, voter requirements tend to come aboutprecisely because interest groups feel theyare excluded from the traditional local policyprocess. Most voter requirements are placedon the ballot by slow-growth interestgroups.12 These groups incur substantialcosts in their efforts to draft, qualify andcampaign for the voter requirement. We in-terpret their decisions to take costly action asevidence that the proponents of voter re-quirements perceived they were being ex-cluded under traditional local politicalprocesses. Their presence at the negotiatingtable after passage of the voter requirement,as documented by numerous newspaper ac-counts and self-reports by the developers andthe groups themselves, suggests that thevoter requirement changed the degree of in-terest group involvement, at least to someextent.

Secondly, it is clear that, over time, theinteraction between developers and interestgroups has changed. In the first election afterpassage of the Proposition A voter require-ment measure in San Diego, developers ne-glected to engage local community andenvironmental groups in the formation oftheir development proposals and appealeddirectly to voters. Their measure (J of 1987)failed miserably, with only 23 per cent of thevote. Over time, we observe developers moreactively soliciting the involvement (and en-dorsements) of interest groups and, after1994, virtually all of the measures on the SanDiego ballot had some formal involvementfrom community and/or environmental inter-est groups. Additionally, newspaper accountsindicate that the two post-1994 measures thatdid not receive endorsements from either theSierra Club or a community planning groupfailed to do so because the developers did notcome to the bargaining table with these or-ganisations.13 Representatives of the SierraClub, when questioned by reporters abouttheir opposition to these proposals, claimedthat they could not support propositions that‘by-passed community involvement’ (Weis-berg, 1996). Unfortunately, we do not have

systematic evidence that developers excludedlocal interest groups in the formation of theirdevelopment proposals before the passage ofProp A.

The Cost of Interest Group Endorsements:Private Provision of Public Goods

The second piece of our explanation of theeffects of voter requirements concerns thecosts of interest group endorsements. Weargue that developers provide public goodsto obtain these endorsements. Based on inter-views with interest group representatives, de-velopers and others involved in the land useprocess in San Diego, plus in-depth analysisof the development agreements for the pro-posed projects, we have identified a range oflocal public goods that developers providedas part of some of their proposed develop-ments. These public goods are primarily oftwo types. One type includes public servicesand facilities such as schools, senior centres,community centres, child-care facilities, tran-sit centres, street and highway repairs, andpark improvements. Some of these facilitiesand services are required of developers byexisting city laws and planning agreements;many others, however, are above and beyondany requirements or existing agreements.More importantly, they are often located incommunities outside the planned develop-ments or at the boundaries of the planneddevelopments where they will be accessibleto both current and future residents. Thus, weinterpret these public goods as being targetedat current residents, whose interests are rep-resented by the community planning boardsand whose support is necessary for approvalof the projects. In other words, it appears thatthe developers are providing these local pub-lic goods in return for the community groupendorsements and hence the support of localresidents. These are local public goods thatcash-poor municipalities may have difficultyproviding.

The second type of public goods includesenvironmental concessions such as openspace set-asides, protection of environmen-tally sensitive parcels, steps to promote spe-


Table 6. Effect of public goods on interest group endorsements, logistic regression analysis,California development initiatives, 1986–2000 (N � 29)

Model 1 Model 2Independent variable DV � Yes endorsement DV � No endorsement

Public Good 1.71 (0.92) � 1.60 (0.81)Constant � 1.71 (0.77) 0.81 (0.60)Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11

cies and habitat preservation, and environ-mentally friendly landscaping and construc-tion practices. We believe that developers areproviding these environmental concessionsin order to obtain the endorsements of en-vironmental interest groups. These benefitsare viewed by representatives of the environ-mental organisations as mitigating or offset-ting some of the negative consequences ofgrowth. Unlike the local public goods pro-vided to obtain the endorsements of com-munity planning groups, which are targetedat residents in the immediately surroundingneighbourhoods, these environmentalbenefits appeal to citizens across the city.Support of these voters is critical when aninitiative requires the electoral support ofvoters who live some distance from the pro-posed development, as is the case in SanDiego.

Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult tobe certain whether these local public goodsand environmental concessions are providedas a direct consequence of the voter require-ment. Any large-scale development pro-posal—whether or not it is subject to voterapproval—contains many, many provisions,including the number, placement and charac-ter of structures, as well as supporting infra-structure and public facilities. Someprovisions are required by law, since devel-opers may be required to provide the infra-structure necessary to support their newdevelopment. However, implementation ofthese state laws leaves much room for in-terpretation and the final project, whetherapproved by a city council or by voters, oftencontains a complex bundle of provisions in-cluding public goods. Hence, it is extremely

difficult to determine which public goodswould have been provided in the absence ofvoter requirements and which are provided inresponse to this institutional constraint.

It is possible, however, to make threepoints that are consistent with the argumentthat developers trade public goods for inter-est group endorsements. The first is that onlyone of the San Diego propositions that failedto offer substantial public goods receivedinterest group endorsements.14 Thus, it is ap-parent that the provision of public goods is atleast necessary, though perhaps notsufficient, for interest group and voter sup-port.

The second point is that the relationshipbetween endorsements and public goodsholds across the larger set of 29 developmentmeasures. In Table 6, we report the results oftwo logistic regression analyses.15 For eachmeasure, we create a dummy variable codedone if the measure included significant publicgoods and coded zero otherwise. 16 Incolumn one, the dependent variable is adummy variable coded one if a measure re-ceived a supporting endorsement from eitheran environmental interest group or a com-munity planning group and coded zero other-wise. In column two, the dependent variableis a dummy variable coded one if a measurewas formally opposed by either type of inter-est group. We see that the provision of publicgoods is positively related to the odds ofreceiving a supporting endorsement and isnegatively related to the odds of receiving anopposing endorsement.

The third point is that, even after wecontrol for whether a development pro-posal contained public goods, we find that


endorsements still have a significant indepen-dent effect on vote share. In Table 7, wereport the results of five regression analyseson our sample of the 29 California develop-ment measures that came about due to voterrequirements. In column one, we report therelationship between a measure’s vote share,whether it included public goods andwhether it received a supporting environmen-tal endorsement. In columns two throughfour, we substitute each of the other threeendorsement variables and, in column five,we include the three endorsements and thepublic goods variable. In each case, we seethat, while public goods are positively andsignificantly related to support for the devel-opment measures, the effects of endorse-ments, in terms of sign, magnitude andstatistical significance, remain largely un-changed. In other words, it appears that theinterest group endorsements are of value,above and beyond the public goods that bringthem about, and that developers actively pur-sue these endorsements through the provisionof these public goods. Additionally, in termsof judging the relative impact of endorse-ments and public goods on the decisions ofvoters, it is worth noting that, while severalof the proposals that offered substantial pub-lic goods failed, no proposal failed that re-ceived the endorsement of both the SierraClub and a community planning group.

In sum, interest group endorsements comeat a substantial cost to developers. To obtainthese endorsements, developers provide arange of local public goods and benefits.These benefits are unique in that they arenegotiated and provided privately with littleformal input from elected representatives.17

In other words, voter requirements haveforced developers to trade public goods forprivate development rights.

Policy Consequences of Voter Requirements:Some Preliminary Observation

In addition to the impact of voter require-ments on the land use policy process, theexperience in San Diego suggests that voterrequirements may also affect policy out-

comes in important and sometimes unantici-pated ways. Perhaps the most strikingexample is the case of Proposition J of 1987.Proposition J was a measure that sought ap-proval for the development of a commercialoffice park and a Christian university in thefuture urbanising area. This developmentwas approved by the city council prior to thepassage of Proposition A. Given its location,however, the passage of Prop A negated thecouncil’s approval and required that the de-veloper obtain voter approval instead. Themeasure lost overwhelmingly in a specialelection in 1987, thereby effectively rescind-ing the council’s approval for the project.Thus, by shifting the power to approve newdevelopment from elected representatives tocurrent residents, Prop A resulted in the can-cellation of a major development project thatwould have been allowed under the previousregime.

There are a number of other ways that SanDiego’s voter requirement appears to havechanged policy outcomes as well. It seems,for example, that voter requirements mayhave increased the optimal scale of develop-ment. When developers must provide ex-pensive public goods and services inexchange for interest group endorsements,the ability to compete may be limited todevelopers with sufficient capital to cover thecosts of these goods. In other words, if theprice of the Sierra Club’s endorsement isprotecting 300 acres for permanent openspace, few small developers can afford thatprovision.

A second possible policy consequence ofvoter requirements may be an increase inhousing costs. Economists argue that by re-stricting supply, zoning restrictions increasethe costs of housing. In the case of voterrequirements, since developers must pay theprice of providing public goods in order togain voter approval for their projects, theymay try to pass on these costs to futureresidents by increasing the prices of the newhomes. Furthermore, to the extent that smalldevelopers are priced out of the housingmarket, there may be less price competitionfrom smaller developers.


Tab

le7.

Eff

ect

ofpu

blic

good

son

vote

mar

gin,

mul

tivar

iate

regr

essi

onan

alys

is,

Cal

ifor

nia

deve

lopm

ent

initi

ativ

es,

1986

–200

0(N

�29

)

Inde

pend

ent

Mod

el1

Mod

el2

Mod

el3

Mod

el4

Mod

el5

vari

able

DV

�V

ote

DV

�V

ote

DV

�V

ote

DV

�V

ote

DV

�V

ote

Publ

icgo

ods

0.15

(0.0

5)0.

14(0

.06)

0.14

(0.0

5)0.

17(0

.05)

0.13

(0.0

5)Si

erra

Clu

bY

es0.

13(0

.06)

0.10

(0.0

6)C

omm

unity

Yes

0.13

(0.0

6)Si

erra

Clu

bN

o�

0.14

(0.0

5)�

0.07

(0.0

6)C

omm

unity

No

�0.

14(0

.05)

�0.

10(0

.06)

Con

stan

t0.

33(0

.04)

0.33

(0.0

4)0.

42(0

.05)

0.40

(0.0

4)0.

41(0

.05)

Adj

uste

dR

20.

350.

350.

380.

390.

47

Not

e:St

anda

rder

rors

inpa

rent

hese

s.


A third possible policy consequence ofvoter requirements is their effect on electedrepresentatives. In many communities thathave voter requirements, the requirementscover only a small share of the total develop-ment that occurs within the jurisdiction. Ur-ban growth boundaries, for example, onlycover development on the community’s geo-graphical fringes; other requirements pertainonly to large developments or projects thatrequire major amendments to the com-munity’s general plan. Most of the rest of theland use decisions that these communitiesmake remain the purview of elected repre-sentatives and the community’s planningstaffs.

It is quite possible, however, that the pres-ence of voter requirements may affect thedecisions made through the traditional landuse process in these communities. Whenelected representatives see strong voter sup-port for proposals that contain significantenvironmental concessions or local publicgoods, these representatives may themselvesdemand that developers provide similargoods and services in return for approval oftheir projects. In the San Diego County com-munity of San Marcos, for example, a projectrecently approved by the city council con-tained many of the same sorts of provision asthe voter-approved projects in nearby SanDiego, including a 19-acre city park and a13-acre commercial centre, each of whichwould serve both future and current residents(Berhman, 1999). In San Diego County, theCounty Board of Supervisors required devel-opers of a nearly 3000-acre residential devel-opment to contribute $17.2 million toimprove freeways. The developers alsoagreed to build a Boys and Girls Club and awater reclamation plant near the develop-ment and to set aside 1845 acres for openspace and parkland (Balint, 1998). All ofthese provisions were above and beyond anypre-existing agreements or mitigations.

Finally, there are potential redistributionalconsiderations. None of the developmentsthat voters have approved in San Diego con-tains provisions for low-income housing. Un-like elected representatives, who represent

and may need the votes of low-income con-stituents, current residents have little econ-omic incentive to demand low-incomehousing in their own back-yards. It is ofcourse possible that current residents in somecommunities may demand low-income hous-ing on ideological grounds. However, thevoters of San Diego had apparently not beenso ideologically motivated. It will be interest-ing to see whether voters in other communi-ties consider low-income housing to be apre-condition for their approval of residentialdevelopment projects.

Discussion

Experience with voter requirements in SanDiego and other California cities and coun-ties suggests that transferring some propertyrights to current residents can slow growthtemporarily. Over time, however, developersadapt to the new institutional environmentcreated by voter requirements. Rather thanchoosing not to build, developers simplyshift their energy and resources from lobby-ing elected representatives to negotiatingwith the unelected interest group representa-tives of the voting public. This outcome isconsistent with similar findings regarding therobustness of development activity to slow-growth policy efforts (Logan and Zhou,1989; Donovan and Neiman, 1992).

From the stand-point of the growth oppo-nents who originally advocated voter require-ments, these initiatives have failed tosignificantly slow growth. Nevertheless, it isimportant to recognise that even if voterrequirements do not stop growth, they stillaffect the land use process and outcomes inimportant ways. By forcing developers tointeract differently with interest groups in thecommunity, the types of development thatresult, and the patterns of compensation tothose who pay the costs of development,differ from the outcomes of the traditionalland use process. Voter requirements providea mechanism for groups such as environmen-tal organisations to participate meaningfullyin negotiations over the terms of develop-ment. In a community like San Diego, where


environmental interests have found quite lim-ited success in securing representation onelected bodies such as city councils andcounty boards, this represents a significantnew political opportunity for these organisa-tions. In addition, voter requirements forcedevelopers to internalise some of the exter-nalities produced by their actions. Indeed,voter requirements force developers to com-pensate precisely those interests who aremost immediately and negatively affected bygrowth—current residents, especially thosein immediately adjacent neighbourhoods. Tothe extent that developers can pass on theseincreased costs, in the form of higher pricesfor their new homes, this creates a curioussituation whereby it is not the developersthemselves, but rather the future residents,who provide these public goods to currentresidents.

Notes

1. California law requires all cities and countiesto have a general plan that describes its goalsand guidelines for future development (seeDurkee et al., 1990 for a summary of rel-evant state laws in California).

2. California is extreme in the number and visi-bility of local land use initiatives in generaland of voter requirements in particular. How-ever, it is by no means unique. Cities andother local governments in most states fre-quently place land-related policy measures toa public vote and, where these involve char-ter amendments or have revenue implica-tions, are often required to do so (seeRenner, 2002).

3. In some communities, two measures ap-peared on the ballot—one sponsored bygrowth opponents, the other placed on theballot by growth advocates. These competingmeasures were attempts to provide a lessrestrictive alternative and/or to confusevoters (see Dubin et al., 1992 for a dis-cussion of competing development initia-tives).

4. There are a number of federal and state lawsand regulations that provide some broadparameters on land use (dealing with issuessuch as safety, environmental/conservation/species preservation and non-discrimi-nation), but the details are largely delegatedto local governments.

5. The ‘growth machine’ thesis has spawned

large literatures on both sides of the debate(see Jonas and Wilson, 1999, for a recentreview).

6. Proposition A requires developers seekingapproval of a project in the future urbanisingarea to have their proposal placed on theballot as a referendum by the city council oras a direct initiative. If their proposal issupported by a majority of voters, the devel-opers are allowed to proceed. However, intwo cases, proposals have appeared on theballot as part of the settlement of a lawsuitbrought against the city of San Diego bydevelopers (see Weisberg, 1996 and Ristine,1985).

7. The city’s general plan and progress guidedesignates three planning areas: urbanised,planned urbanising and future urbanising(see City of San Diego, 1993).

8. No measures appeared on the 2000 ballots,the last election year at the time of thiswriting.

9. Spending figures for these measures are notavailable. However, it appears that all of thecampaigns spent virtually all of the contribu-tions they received. Therefore, contributionsprovide a good proxy for expenditures. Ontwo sets of these measures (E and H of 1996and F and G of 1996), all contributions werereported as supporting both propositions.

10. There are notable exceptions to the pattern ofexclusion of environmental interests from thecity hall land use process. In ‘slow-growth’places like Santa Barbara, Palo Alto, Boulderand Portland, environmental interests domi-nate local government and have effectivelyslowed or limited growth without the need toresort to institutions like voter requirements.

11. Representatives from a number of othergroups and organisations endorsed one ormore of these 29 measures as well. While itis of course possible—indeed, probable—that these other endorsements also affectedcampaign dynamics, we limit our analysis tothe two that are most consistent across mea-sures and communities, and for which wehave the strongest theoretical expectations.

12. As discussed above, there have been severalmeasures that were placed on the ballot bypro-development interests in response to ini-tiatives sponsored by slow-growth interests.These efforts are clearly defensive efforts bygrowth advocates.

13. These two propositions are F and G of 1996.14. The exception is Proposition D of 1996. It

should be noted, however, that Proposition Ddid not call for new development but wasintended to remove an inconsistency betweenSan Diego’s Progress Guide and GeneralPlan.

DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND LAND-USE POLICY 479

15. We employ logistic regression because thedependent variables are binary. A linearprobability model produces similar (and infact, stronger) results.

16. These public goods include new public fa-cilities, streets and highways, parks and en-vironmental set-asides. Sixteen of themeasures offered one or more public goodswhile thirteen did not.

17. In most cases, city government officials wereinformally involved in the negotiations.

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