Value Changes and Democratic Prospects in China

Dingping Guo*(Fudan University)

As China has made enormous progress in liberalizing markets and integrating

itself into the world economy and consequentially experienced rapid economic

growth, most citizens have gained considerable economic freedom and civil lib­

erties and raised their living standard. Such profound changes that have taken

place during the last two decades have been studied and analyzed by

Sinologists around the world. While economic and social achievements attra'-t a

lot of attention and are appreciated, political developments have been ignored

or underestimated. It is believed that there are only economic reforms without

political ones in China since Chinese political system has been left untouched

by the third wave of global democratization and the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) maintains a monopoly of power until today.

While the studies of Chinese politics almost focus on political elite and for­

mal institutions and processes, there are few systematic empirical studies of

mass political culture. As some scholars noted, the concept of public opinion

did not appear in the lexicon of contemporary Sinology until the 1980s.1)

However, with the reforms and opening up to the outside world deepening

increasingly, public opinion is becoming more and more important and indis-

*Dingping Guo L5 Associate Professor of Political Science. at Fudan University in Shanghai,

China. He holds a PhD. from Fudan University.

1) For example, Allan P. L. Uu, Mass Politics in the People's Republic: State and Society in

Contemporary ChilUI (&>ulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), p.2.

42

pensable to understanding of Chinese politics for foreign as well as domestic

observers. Therefore, some public opinion surveys have been undertaken since

the late 1980s and there appe'.:lr a few researches on the political culture and

value change in China.2)

Based on some recent surveys conducted in urban China, especially in

Beijing and Shanghai, this paper seeks to discuss and interpret the value

changes and analyze the prospects for democratic developments in China. The

surveys are as follows. (1) The Gallup International Millennium Survey con­

ducted between September and October 1999. In China, 578 urban residents 15

and older were interviewed at major cities, but only a few questions were

asked. We have no any responses to the questions about democracy, human

rights, woman's right, crime and religion. (2) The Shanghai survey on youth

development undertaken by Shanghai Committee of Chinese Communist Youth

League in cooperation with scholars from Fudan University and Shanghai

Academy of Social Sciences in June 1999. 4279 Shanghai youth between 18-35

years old were interviewed on various questions but only ones regarding to

political consciousness and cultural values are interesting to us. Among them,

there are 647 young intellectuals, 726 "white collar" youth, 976 "blue collar"

youth, 952 college students and 978 middle school students.3) (3) The political

2) Recent researches include: Qi Ming, Zhongguo Zhengzhi Wenhua: minzhu zhengzh; nan­

chan de shehui xinli yinsu (Political Cuture in China: Elements of Social-Psychological

Difficulties in Democmttc Politics) (Yun'nan: Yun'nan People's Publishing House, 1989);

Andrew J. Nathan and Tianjian Shi, "Cultural requisites for democracy in China: fmdings

from a SUIVey", Daedalus, Vo1.122, No.2 (Spring 1993), pp95-124; Yang Zhong, Jie Chen

and John Scheb, "Mass political culture in Beijing: findings from two public opinion sur­

veys", Asian SutUy, Vol.38, No.8, August 1998, pp.763-783; Tianjian Shi, "Cultural Values

and democracy in the People's Republic of China", The China Qua~v, No.162, June

2000, pp.540-559; etc.

3) In Shanghai youth SUlVey, young intellectual refers to young researcher and teacher in insti­

tute and university; "white collar" youth mainly refers to young derk and manager in com­

pany, in particular joint venture and foreign corporation; "blue coliar" youth mainly refers

to worker in factory.

Value Changes and Democratic ---/Dingping Guo 43

culture surveys conducted by Yang Zhong in cooperation with the Public

Opinion Research Institute of People's University in Beijing in 1995 and 1997, in

which 567 and 720 urban residents were sampled.

My argument in this paper is that, despite the relatively high level of trust and

satisfaction in the CCP regime, enormous value changes that have taken place

at least in the urban China have made it urgent for China to further its democra­

tic reforms. Since there are huge regional differences between urban and rural

areas, coastal east and mountainous west, developing regional democracy has

been and also will be a practical solution to the mounting problems such as

political corruption. Therefore, the paper will consist of four parts. In part one,

the characteristics of Chinese traditional values and the context of value

changes will be analyzed. Selected democratic values will be dealt with in part

two. The discussions of trust and satisfaction in the government and the CCP

are the task of part three. Part four will illustrate the problems and anxieties for

Chinese people and have a view of political reform and democratization in

China.

L Tradition and Change.

The values in taday's China originate from various different cultural sources,

including the traditional Chinese culture, Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought

ideology and western cultures. In contrast with the values in post -Mao China,

the traditional values here refer to the mainstream cultural values in ancient and

modem China from the early past to the 1970s.

1. Traditional Values

Despite the fact that many anti-traditional political movements had been

undertaken under the Communist rule after the founding of the People's

44

Republic of China (PRC), as pointed out by many scholars, there much consis­

tency and continuity remains between the traditional Confucianism and the

Chinese Communist ideology.4) Generally speaking, the most important similar­

ities in political value are as follows.

(1) Paternalism. In traditional China, people believed that all power should

emanate from above, from the center, from a single supreme ruler. Dong

Zhongshu 080-115 B.C), an eminent Confucian of the Han.dynasty, suggested

that the emperor was the son of heaven because he was mandated by heaven,

and proposed that Confucianism be prized as the ruling orthodoxy. Emperor

Wu 056-87 B.C) of the Han dynasty, adopting Dong's proposal, began advanc­

ing Confucianism, thereby enabling it to become the dominant value system in

China for about two thousand years. There had been an exaggerated ideal of

the great man as leader who is an amplification of the Confucian model of the

father as the ultimate authority in the family. Just as the father'S word was

absolute in the family, so the ruler could tolerate no challenging authorities.

(2) Moralism. Confucianism believed that moral cultivation was more effec­

tive and lasting than law. " If people are guided by politics and threatened with

punishment, they lose their sense of shame; if they are guided by morality and

treated with rites, they become mindful of shame' and personal dignity. "S)

Confucian theorists emphasize moral cultivation because of their belief that

man is naturally good. This view of the inherent good of man is fundamental in

traditional Chinese ideology. It is necessary and possible for everyone to culti­

vate this moral good. Ideally, the ruler has authority because he is morally

superior. Ordinary people would naturally follow the example of a virtuous

4) Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (The

Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985) p.l82-214.

5) See: The Analects of ConfuciUS (Politics: part 2). lhe sentence cited here has been quoted

extremely frequently by Chinese Communist publicists recently to support the "new" idea

of the rule of morality (yi de zhi guo) .aised by Chinese President and General Secretary of

the CCP Jiang Zemin at a propaganda meeting in January 2001.

Value Changes and Democratic -/Dingping Guo 45

emperor, a patriarch who served as moral exemplar. Virtue, rather than an

effective leadership performance, as a qualification for ruling was emphasized

throughout the Maoist years, with virtue defmed in terms of communist ideals.

When necessary, "sacrificing one's own life to complete one's virtue" and

"giving up life to attain righteousness" were considered the most natural things

by the Confucian and Communist ideology. Governance hinged entirely on the

moral quality of the rulers and officials over the past two thousand years.

(3) Collectivism. Though collectives differ in form and size, sacrifice of per­

sonal interests for the sake of the collective has been advocated and appreciat­

ed. Chinese culture only recognizes those who live and work for the collective

interest. An individual is hardly accepted if he single-mindedly pursues his per­

sonal fame and status openly. In a famous tract entitled "On the Training of a

Communist Party Member", Liu Shaoqi said, "The test of a Communist Party

member's loyalty to the Party and to the task of the revolution and Communism

is his ability, regardless of the situation, to subordinate his individual interests

unconditionally and absolutely to those of the Party.,,6) This tract is even now

selected as one of the most important reading materials in political education.

Collectivism is one of the central concepts in the Chinese trdditional values.

Collectives are not confined to the Communist Party and include all kinds of

organizations that supersede individuals.

As an ideal type, the Confucian and Communist values may be deSirable, but

in a closed agrarian society Without rule of law as its foundation, traditional val­

ues which were based on personal moral cultivation and aimed at the harmo­

nious relationships in a big family, proved to be utopian. Very few of the rulers

during the past two thousand years appeared to be Confucian models. On the

contrary, despotism was more characteristic. In everyday life, there was a dis-

6) Liu Shaoqi, "On the Training of a Communlst Party Member", Conrad Brandt and Benjamin

Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, ed., A IXx:umentary History qf Chinese Communism, pub­

lished by Atheneum (originally pubJi'ihed by Harvard University Press), second printing,

1967, p.336.

46

crepancy between the moral requirements and personal behaviors. Even

Confucius had professed that he could not meet the standards he set forth for a

man of virtue. Therefore, behind the scene people tend to disregard the moral

requirements of Confucianism or Communism, with their deeds separated from

their words. The proje<-'! to build "a new socialist man" was attempted with

great thoroughness and zeal in Maoist era. This kind of political education

appeared to have yielded little change in values.

2. Confucian Values Debate

There are many different interpretations of Chinese character and Chinese

culture because of the great gap between the traditional values and individual

behaviors. While there were many praises, there were a lot of criticisms at

home and abroad.

As to the relationships between Confucianism and development and democ­

racy, there are also many heated debates among scholars. For example, in the

early twentieth century, Max Weber commented that the salient feature of

Confucianism was the way it adapted to the world, rather than transformed it,

and that the Confucian values were therefore inappropriate for the economic

development. Subsequently, most scholars believed that it was Confucianism

that contributed to hinder China's modernization. However, Yu Yingshi, Du

Weiming and other Chinese scholars believe that rapid economic developments

in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore indicate that

Confucian values do not intrinsically clash with development. They suggest that

the successes of these countries and areas are fine examples of what they call

"Confucian capitalism". 7)

7) Wang Yanzhong, "Chinese values, Governance and International Relations: Historical

Development and Present Situation", Han Sung-Joo, ed., OJanging Values in Asia: Their

Impact on Gotx!rnance and DeveIq:mumt, Japan Center for International Exchange, 1999,

p.32-33.

Value Changes and Democratic -/Dingping Guo 47

Similarly, it is broadly believed that traditional Confucianism was either unde­

mocratic or antidemocratic. As Samuel Huntington points out, "Classic Chinese

Confucianism and its derivatives in Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan, and, in

diluted fashion, Japan emphasized the group over the indiVidual, authority over

liberty, and responsibilities over rights." "Harmony and cooperation were pre­

ferred over disagreement and competition. The maintenance of order and

respect for hierarchy were central values. The conflict of ideas, groups, and par­

ties was viewed as dangerous and illegitimate. Most important, Confucianism

merged society and the state and provided no legitimacy for autonomous social

institutions to balance the state of the national level. "8) The great progress

toward democratization in East Asia during recent years has made scholars

rethink the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. "Asian style

democracy" and "Confucian democracy" are examples, in which harmony, sta­

bility and consensus are emphasized as supportive elements for democracy,9)

In fact, for many years, lack of democratic values and immaturity of Chinese

political culture have been considered as an important reason why there was

no democracy or there should be no democracy in China by scholars as well as

political leaders. 10) But the democratic activists or radical scholars ridicule those

arguments and advocate that the superannuated traditional culture, which is not

suitable to modern political development, must be thrown away and western

cultural values should be wholesale adopted.

Behind those debates, there is "a stereotype of political culture theory" which

seems to argue that political culture more or less predetermines both political

structures and political behaviors and that the elements of political culture are

resistant to change.11) For example, Lucian Pye's treatment of Asian political

8) Samuel P. Huntington, 1be '!bird Wave: Democratization in the Late Tuentieth Century, The

University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p.300-30l.

9) For example, Clark D. Neher. "Asian Style Democracy", Asian Sun.~v, Vol.34, No.Il, 1994.

10) Morl Kazuko, Gendai T:vugoku Seift (Politics in Contemporary China) (Nagoya University

Press, 1993), p.262-263.

48

culture approaches the stereotype in its assumptions that political culture is

"remarkably durable and persistent"; that political culture is essentially causally

prior and that "cultural variations are decisive in determining the course of

political development."IZ)

However, empirical researches during the past decades have shown that

political culture is "plastic and malleable over time. Political culture is not des­

tiny." "Cultural patterns and beliefs do change in response to new institutional

incentives, socioeconomic development, and historical experience.,,13l Although

there are few empirical studies on political culture in China, it is no doubt that

value changes have taken place during the past two decades of drastic transfor­

mations from a closed, planned economy to open, market one.

3. Context of Change

From the time of the Opium War in the 1840s, western cultures have had

tremendous impact upon China precisely because of the yawning gap between

traditional Confucianism and western culture. Yet, China's acceptance and

absorption of western culture has been selective and intermittent. China's learn­

ing from the West since 1840s has undergone a process which began with the

learning of western technology and then moved to politics and culture,

embracing concepts such as the freedom, democracy and equality. However,

the Chinese have always been suspicious of western political philosophy, social

theories and values. As Mao Zedong pointed out, "Imperialist aggression shat­

tered the Chinese dream of learning from the West. They wondered why the

teachers always practiced aggression against their pupils. The Chinese learned

11) Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: toward consolidation (The Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1999), p.164.

12) Lucian Pye, ibid, p.20, vii.

13) Lany Diamond, Juan J. Unz, Seymour Martin Upset, PoI#ics in Detlekptng Countries: com­

paring e:xper;ences with democra£y (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p.21.

Value Changes and Democratic -/Dingping Guo 49

much from the West, but what they learned could not be put into effect. Their

ideals could not be realized."14) In fact, there had been few value changes in

China prior to the late 19705 although tremendous political changes had taken

place over the course of a century and a half.

However, fundamental value changes have been brought about by rapid

socioeconomic developments and increasing foreign exchanges as a result of

reform and open-door poliCieS. A new historic era in China began in December

1978. The signpost of this new era was the third plenum of the Eleventh

Central Committee of the CCP. It marked not only a decisive break with those

ideological and political lines of Mao Zedong which culminated in the Cultural

Revolution, but also signaled the end of nearly three-quarters of a century of

revolutionary ferment and upheavals. Even more signifkant historically, this ter­

mination of the revolutionary period was accompanied by a retreat of political

power (i.e., the party-state) from its increasingly deeper penetration into civil

society and the economy, thus reversing the fundamental trend of political

development since the May Fourth period of 1915-1921.15)

Deng Xiaoping, who took over as China's preeminent leader in 1978, pub­

licly declared his commitment to accelerating the long-delayed process of politi­

cal institutionalization in China. In a landmark speech entitled "On the Reform

of the System of Party and State Leadership", 16) Deng called for political reforms

which aimed at the democratization of political and social lives and the estal>­

lishment of a system governed by rules, clear lines of authority, and collective

decision-making institutions to replace the over-concentration of power and

patriarchal rule that had characterized China under Mao.

14) Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship", Conrad Brandt and Benjamin

Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, ibid., pAS!.

15) Tang Tsou, The Cultural Rew/ution and Post-Mao Rf{onns: A Historical Perspective, The

University of Chicago Press, 1986, p.219.

16) Deng Xiaoping, Deng XiaqJing Wen.xuan, [)j Er Juan (Selected WOI"ks if Deng XiaqJing,

Volume D) (Beijing, Rerunin Chubanshe{People's Publishing Housel, 1994), pp.320-343.

so

Since the political system was responsible for the poor economic perfor­

mance over the past thirty years, the first step in the reform process had to be

political. The reformers began by repudiating the late Mao's obsession with

class struggle and ideological trJnsformation and proclaimed that henceforth,

the "central task" of the country would be the "four modernizations" of agricul­

ture, industry, science and technology, and national defense.

To secure acceptance of the new lines by the country's vast cadre and accel­

erate the modernization drive, a set of political reform measures had been

undertaken and some political changes achieved consequentially. First, the

reformers embarked on public exposure of the mistakes of the past years, in

order to discredit past policies and make change possible. Second, ideological

transformation was put aside and political pragmatism was adopted as a reform

tactic. The precepts of Deng Xiaoping such as "practice is the sole criterion of

truth" and "seek truth from facts" sanctioned a much more pragmatic approach

to policies. The boundaries of permissible discussion were widened greatly.

Third, the experts and intellectuals, wrongly criticized in past political move­

ments, were rehabilitated. Deng declared them to be part of the "productive

forces", and hence indispensable to the modernization efforts. Fourth, rule by

law was promoted and improved. The principle of rule by law has been in

place as a goal to strive for since 1978. The fifth political reform, designed to

increase the level of competence in the party and government, was promotion

of the technically trained to leadership positions. 17)

The political reforms outlined above, although incomplete, have provided

something of a framework for economic reform. They sought to enliven the

economy by introdUCing market relations and using the profit motive, thereby

unleashing the initiative, energy and drive so lacking in the previous system.

The political-economic reform policies led to remarkable success.

17) Thomas P. Bernstein, "China: Change in a Marxist-Leninist State", James W. M0fley, eel.,

Driven I:?Y Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region, M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1993. p.46-48.

Value Changes and Democratic -/Dingping Guo 51

The intensified rural reform has given new motivation to hundreds of mil­

lions of Chinese farmers and helped develop the rural economy. Urban

reforms, began in 1984, promoted integration of the domestic market and con­

tributed to a better standard of living for urban residents. During the last two

decades, per capita income of city dwellers rose by 1,6300/0, from 316 in 1978 to

5,160 yuan in 1997. Prior to 1978, 97% of all prices were set by the state. Now,

however, over 93% are freely adjusted by market. The market mechanism is

playing a decisive role in the economy. IS)

As a result, most of the traditional values have changed in response to politi­

cal, economic and social developments.

II. De.mocratic Values

In general, it is assumed that "the development of a stable and effective

democratic government depends upon the orientations that people have to the

political process - upon the political culture."I9) But what kind of political cul­

ture is considered as necessary for the development and maintenance of liberal

democracy?

According to studies on the evolution of Western democracy, a democratic

culture encompasses tolerance of differences, acceptance of others, pragmatism

and flexibility, trust, efficacy, openness to new ideas and experiences, willing­

ness to compromise, civility of political discourse. At the level of mass culture,

citizens have to be involved in politics, seek relevant information and knowl­

edge, evaluate their leaders intelligently, participate in eJections and other politi­

cal activities to improve their government's performance. That means citizens

18) Song Tingming, ''Two Decades of Economic Retollll", China Toda;\ Vo1.47, No.10, CXtober

1998, p.ll-13.

19) Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: PoliIicaJAttitudes and Democrmy

in Fiw Nations (Princeton University Press, 1963), p.498.

52

have to maintain attitudes toward authority that are neither blindly submissive

nor completely hostile, but rather responsible even though always watchfu1.20)

In contrast with above democratic values, Chinese political culture was often

described as destined for authoritarianism. Before the 1949 Communist ascen­

dancy over China, most Chinese seemed to be politically apathetic and igno­

rant. From the 1950s to 1970s, the CCP launched a series of mass political

movements, resulted in a Chinese populace that appeared to be extremely

enthusiastic about public and political affairs. Especially during the years of the

Cultural Revolution 0966-1976), almost all the Chinese people were concemed

about and participated in politics. During reform years, Chinese people are per­

ceived to be crazy for material goods and making money and disinterested in

political and public affairs. In a word, there has been no democratic personality

in Chinese culture for a long time.

However, recent surveys showed that there were a lot of substantial changes

toward democratic values in Chinese political culture at least in advanced cities.

1. Consciousness of Independence and Individualism

Chinese people are often said to be dependent on and obedient and respect­

ful to their parents, leaders and rulers. A survey in Shanghai indicates the

young people are not so dependent and sometimes they would like to defy

their leaders if necessaty.

As table 1 shows, young people in Shanghai have been becoming quite

independent in evetyday life. There were few discrepancies in regard to inde­

pendent consciousness between the different groups of Shanghai youth rough­

ly divided by income, education and occupation. More than 95% thought that

they always or sometimes made decisions by themselves and did not rely on

others. In traditional China, people were connected with family ties. The young

20) Larry Diamond, ibid, p.166-167.

Value Changes and Democratic -/Dingping Guo 53

Table 1. Sbangbai Youth's ~ oI..Indepeoden.ce (%)

Statements Respondents Yes Sometimes No No answer

(n whatever I do, I hope "White collar" youth 6.6 49.9 42.4 1.1

to get help from others "Blue collar" youth 7.9 54.8 36.2 1.1

Young intellectual 7.1 52.7 39.4 0.8

(2) I make decisions by "White collar" youth 61.8 35.4 2.2 0.6

myself and do not rely "Blue collar" youth 61.2 35.5 2.0 1.3

on others Young intellectual 63.8 33.8 1.9 0.5

(3) I can not do anything "White collar" youth 7.2 30.6 61.0 1.2

without parents' help "Blue collar" youth 6.5 35.2 56.9 1.4

Young intellectual 7.3 29.5 62.4 0.8

(4) I rely on the unit to "White collar" youth 1

5.0 39.7 54.3 1.0

resolve my difficulties "Blue collar" youth I 6.5 i 39.4 53.0 1.1

Young intellectual 5.3 46.2 47.6 0.9

(5) I dare to insist on my "White collar" youth 26.6 59.9 12.1 1.4

own opinion even in "Blue collar" youth 24.2 63.8 11.2 0.8

the face of Ie'dders Young intellectual 25.8 63.4 9.9 0.9 I

(6) My way of life is "White collar" youth 15.3 43.8 39.1 1.8

different from others "Blue collar" youth 16.5 43.1 39.7 0.7

Young intellectual 11.1 43.0 44.9 1.0

(7) All depend on myself, "White collar" youth 37.7 41.6 19.7 1.0

others are undepen- "Blue collar" youth 40.1 43.0 15.8 1.1

dable Young intellectual 36.2 44.7 18.4 0.7

Note: (1) Sample: "white collar" youth = 726; "blue collar" youth .. 976; young intellec­

tual = 647.

(2) Actual text of question in Shanghai is "Do you belong to the kind of person

described in the following statements?".

Source: Gongqingtuan Shanghaishi Weiyuanhui (Shanghai Committee of Communist

Youth League): Shiji Zhijiao De Shanghai Qingnian: Shanghai Qingnian

Fazhan Baogao (Shanghai Youth at the Tum of Century: Shanghai Youth

Development Report) (Shanghai: XueJin Publishing House, 1999), p.260-261.

54

should pay respect to and obey their parents who in turn were expected to

nourish, protect and help them. This was the foundation and essence of pater­

nalism in which citizen..<; were connected to state in a hierarchical relationship.

But in the Shanghai survey, about 600/0 of respondents declined the help

offered by their parents, more than 30% thought they sometimes needed such

help, respondents who always needed their parent<;' help were less than 100f0.

Similarly, about half of respondent<; thought they did not need the help provid­

ed by their unit even in difficulty, which controlled all aspects of eveI)'day life

including job, house and salaI)' in the past planned economy. Only about 5%

of respondents expressed their needs for such help.

More importantly, young people in Shanghai also become more assertive in

public affairs. In the past, people, especially the young, were taught to be sub­

missive and obedient to their leaders. However, the survey shows a different

picture of Shanghai youth. Among the three groups of "white collar" youth,

"blue collar" youth and young intellectuals, respondents who thought they

always or sometimes dared to insist on their own opinions in the face of lead­

ers reached 86.5%, 88.00/0, 88.2% respectively.

In fact, those value changes are congruent with the market-oriented reforms

that began two decades ago. By introducing market mechanism and curtailing

party-state intervention, eveI)'0ne has to become an independent, autonomous

and responsible individual. They are thrown from sweeping socialist welfare

into a free but unsafe market. They gain the freedom to make decisions for

themselves but also have to responsible for what they do. No doubt, market

mechanism has fostered independence and individualism, both of which are

believed to be indispensable to democracy.

However, market-oriented reforms are also considered responsible for moral

degeneration. For example, the reforms, epitomized by Deng Xiaoping's dic­

tum, "let a part of people get rich first", have produced a great quantity of wor­

shipers of money. The social transition from central planned economy to mar­

ket economy is accompanied by the increase of selfishness and distrust of oth-

Value Changes and Democratic -IDingping Guo 55

ers. In a sutvey conducted in 1993 in Shanghai, 1587 college teachers were

intelViewed, and 29.6% endorsed the proposition "people become more and

more selftsh along with the development of market economy", 23.5% could not

decide, only less than 40% rejected the proposition.21) In 1999 Shanghai SUlVey,

as shown in Table 1, about 8()0;6 of respondents thought they only relied on

themselves and believed that others were undependable.

2. Political Interest and Knowledge

Political enthusiasm during 1980s was strong as the student movements for

political reform and freedom showed. But while the market-oriented reforms

have intensifted since the early 1990s, doing business and making money have

become the most important concerns. People, especially the young, have

become indifferent to or have lost interest in political propaganda, political

movement and political struggle. Of course, professional political operatives are

the exception. Although the ftfteenth CCP National Congress adopted Deng

Xiaoping Theory as China's guiding ideology in parallel with Marxist-Leninist­

Mao Zedong Thought, a 1998 national sUlVey indicated only 12.6% Chinese

youth considered Deng Xiaoping Theory as the most important knowledge to

learn. Instead, practical skills such as computers and human relations were con­

sidered most important. 22)

Indeed, Chinese people have lost interests in the ideolOgical politics since a

21) Shanghai Jiaowei Dangwei (The Shanghai Education Conunittee of the CCP) and Sixiang

Lilun Jiaoyu Zazhishe (Thoughts . Theory . Education Magazine), Gaodeng Xue.xiao

Shisheng Sixiang Zhuangkuang Gundong Diaocha Ziliao Xuanbian (Selected Materials on

Political Attitudes of the College Teachers and Students 1992-1997) (Shanghai), unpublished,

p.9. 22) Zhongguo Qingshaonian Yanjiu Zhongxin(China Youth & Children Research Center), Xing

Zhuangtai: Dangdai Chengshi Qingnian Baogao (New Tronds: Report of Contemporary

Urban Youth), Zhongguo Qingnian Chuban~he (China Youth Publishing House), 1999,

p.344.

56

Table 2. I..erel ofPolitkalInterest among BeijJag Umae BesJdents (%)

Very much interested Not very Not

interested interested interested

Politics in general 12.0 60.9 25.1 2.0

National affairs 14.1 65.0 19.5 1.4

Beijing affairs 22.1 64.9 11.9 1.1

Whenever we Can not meet Very often Occasional Never Tell

Discussion of 2.4 42.9 51.1 2.9 0.7 politics with others

Note: N for the combined data == 1265

Source: Yang Zhong, Jie Chen, and John Scheb, "Mass Political Culture in Beijing",

Asian Survty, VoJ.38, No.8, August 1998, p.767.

more pragmatic reform strategy was adopted in the late 1970s. But many sur­

veys show that Chinese are very interested in all kind of political information

and political discussions as their lives are influenced by politicS everyday during

the transitional years of reforms.

As Table 2 shows, about two-thirds of the respondents were interested or

very interested in politiCS in general or national affairs. Unsurprisingly, a higher

percentage of respondents in Beijing showed interest in Beijing public affairs.

While many residents are interested in national and local affairs, the people

who talk about politics with others are fewer. The survey showed less than half

of the respondents said they talked about politics often with their family mem­

bers, relatives, colleagues and friends. Overall, the interest level in politics is rel­

atively high in Beijing.

In China, Beijing may be a special city where residents show a higher level

of interest in politics for several reasons. For example, Beijing is the capital and

has always been among the most politicized cities in China, as seen in it') histo­

ry through such events as the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the start of the

Cultural Revolution, and the Tiananmen Democracy Movement of 1989.

Value Changes and Democratic -/Dingping Guo 57

We can not judge whether the level of interest in politics in Beijing is high

enough for democratic transition because there is no comparative data with

other countries in Table 2. However. according to a comparative empirical

study which is based on 1993 nation-wide survey on political culture and politi­

cal participation, the percentage (44.4%) of people in mainland China who

talked about politics with others falls between the high level (600Al) of Germany

and the low levels (32% and 38%) registered for Italy and Mexico in 1960s.23)

As known to all, Italy is a democratic society for many years and Mexico is a

country that has succeeded in political transition from authoritarianism to

democracy recently.

3. Legal Norms and Rule of Law

The principle of "rule of law" is traditionally associated with liberal democra­

cy. However, during the 30 years after the founding of the PRC, most Chinese

were ignorant of laws and mistrustful of legal channel, a reasonable position

when politics routinely superseded law. In 1978, however, Chinese leaders

began to develop ideas and institutions of legality. The new Chin~se legality is

a depoliticized view of law as opposed to the political one that viewed law as

part of politics, as a weapon of the state from the perspective of class struggle.

It acknowledged the principle of rule by Jaw, which means that there are laws

and all are equally subject to them. As a large quantity of laws have been

passed or amended and legal reforms have made substantial progress, the prin­

ciple of rule of Jaw has been advanced since the mid-l990s.

Along with the legal reform, China has launched a number of campaigns

from the early 1980s to educate ordinary citizens about the content of important

laws and about ideas such as equality before the law. Now, many citizens

believe that law is indispensable to their lives and are able to use the law to

23) Tianjian Sill, "Cultural Values and Democracy in the People's Republic of China", The

China Quarterly, No. 162, June 2000, p.54S-546.

58

Table 3. Lep1 Coosdousness amolJl SbangbN Youth (%)

Statements Respondents agree disagree Don't know No answer

Law has little to do "White collar" youth 2.8 96.2 0.6 0.4

with me if I do not "Blue collar" youth 3.1 94.4 1.7 0.8

commit crime Young intellectual 3.8 94.5 1.0 0.7

Law is vel}' "White collar" youth 92.4 4.3 2.9 0.4

important in "Blue collar" youth 93.5 4.9 1.2 0.4

evel}'day life Young intellectual 90.2 6.9 2.3 0.6

Note: Sample: "white collar" youth '" 726; "blue collar" youth .. 976; young intellectual ..

647. Source: Gongqingtuan Shanghaishi Weiyuanhui (Shanghai Committee of Communist

Youth League): ibid, p.272.

protect their rights and interests. As Table 3 shows, about 95% respondents dis­

agreed to the proposition "law has little to do with me if I do not commit

crime" regardless of education and occupation. Similarly, more than 90% con­

sidered law very important in everyday lives. In the same survey, when asked

about the solutions if your rights have been violated or your interests infringed,

the respondents who chose to consult lawyers or related legal organs reached

53.6%,50.7% and 47.6% for "white collar" youth, "blue collar" youth and young

intellectual groups respectively.24) Although thousands of laws were enacted by

the National People's Congress (NPC, China's legislature) and the local People's

Congress, the enforcement record is abysmal owing to the interference of

Communist officials, the absence of a true independent judiciary. Consequently,

while about half respondents believed in the effectiveness of legal means, a

quarter tended to ask government organs for help. There were also some peo-

24) Gongqingtuan Shanghaishi Weiyuanhui (Shanghai Committee of Communist Youth

League): Shiji Zhijiao De Shanghai Qingnian: Shanghai Qingnian Fazhan Baogao

(Shanghai Youth at the Tum of Century: Shanghai Youth Development Report) (Shanghai:

Xuelin Publishing Hom;e, 1999), p.273.

Value Changes and Democratic -/Dingping Guo 59

pie who sought help from their family members, relatives, colleagues or

friends.

One indicator of the effect of the legal education effort is the increase in law­

suits against government agencies and officials under the administrative litiga­

tion law, an act unthinkable to the Chinese in the past. Before the enactment of

the Administrative litigation Law in October 1990, Chinese citizens who were

victimized by the miscarriage of justice and the abuse of state power had no

legal recourse. Although a considerable number of citizens challenged adminis­

trative acts by fUing suit in China's courts, their claims had no legal basis and

their chances of winning were extremely small. The passage of the law in 1990

immediately unleashed a flood of new lawsuit .. against the government. The

number of such lawsuits processed in the legal system has increased steadily

from 9934 cases in 1989 to 98000 in 1998.2';) Official data for 1992 showed that

the courts upheld the government's administrative decisions in 28% of the cases

fUed, dismissed the government's decisions in 19%, forced changes in the origi­

nal government's decisions in 1.8010, and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints in

7.8%; plaintiffs withdrew their lawsuits in 37.80/0 of the cases.26) The marked

increase of lawsuits against government reflected the upsurge of Chinese legal

consciousness on the one hand, the huge gap between citizen's demand and

government's performance on the other hand.

25) Tang liang, "Kaikakuki no ryuugoku ni okeru kokka-syakai kankei no henyo" (The

Changes of Relations between State and So<.iety in China of Refonn Years), Ajia Kenkyu

(Asian Studies), Vol.46, No.2.

26) Minxin Pei, "'Creeping Democracy' in China", Larry Diamond, Marc F. Platter, Yun-han

Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, eds., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional

Challenges (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkin~ University Press, 1997), p.217. Note

that the numbers here do not add up to 100'/0. See: Millzhu yu Fazhi (Democracy and

law) (Shanghai), No.l(1995), p.6.

60

4. Public Attitudes to Democratization

Although the ideas of democracy were introduced into China one hundred

years ago, it seems that mainland China have made little progress toward

democratization owing to all kinds of reasons such as wars and revolutions.

Even after reform and open-door policies began in the late 1970s, in spite of

increasing demands for democratization and repeated dLmocratic movements,

the political transition from totalitarianism and/or authoritarianism to democracy

has not substantially launched up to now. The CCP is established as the sole

ruling party and any opposition parties or political dissidents are harshly

cracked down.

While some China scholars predi<..1 that development of the Chinese market

economy will trigger a gradual process of political democratization, others

believe that, despite substantial changes in its economy, China is not likely to

become a "liberal democracy" due to its "inherently authoritarian political cul­

ture".27) Along with the introduction of market mechanism and opening up to

the outside world (mainly Western world), Western ideas and values began to

penetrate the Chinese society. However, while some intellec1uals and college

students were infatuated with Western democratic political systems such as

multi-party system, bicameral constitution and federalism as well as political

ideas such as freedom, equality and human right, 1980s witnessed repeated

ideological struggles within the CCP. Those struggles include the anti-spiritual

pollution campaign of the early 1980s, the anti-bourgeois liberalism movement

of the middle 1980s, and the anti-western imperialist peaceful evolution (Fan

Heping Yanbian) of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

In fact, from the late 1980s, in order to solve the increasing economic and

social problems, and especially to keep political order and stability, ideas direct-

27) For example, see: Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in Cht1Ul (Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). p.l.

Value Changes and Democratic ~/Dingping Guo 61

ly contrary to democracy began to attract attentions. These bore the label of the

"neo-authoritarianism", meaning that China should have a strong and dktatorial

but technocratic government able to solve its problems, on the order of the

regimes of Park Chung-Hee in Korea, Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore during the

1960s and 1970s.

After Deng Xiaoping's inspection tour to southern China in early 1992, as the

market reforms were accelerated, the loss of central authority brought about by

the decentraliZing reforms of 19808 became obvious and it" consequence seri­

ous. As a continuation of the ideas on nea-authoritarianism, sa-called neo-con­

servatism that called for political stability, central authority, tight social control,

role of ideology and nationalism,28) prevailed in the mid-l990s.

To a large extent, neo-conservative thought reflected a deep suspicion about

liberal democracy as a way of governing China. This suspicion, fjrst raised by

nea-authoritarian thinkers, was apparently reinforced and even "justified" by

two important developments in 1990s. First, the domestic chaos and instability

brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and regime changes in

Eastern Europe forced Chinese intellectuals, including those who used to be

pro-democratic, to question the validity of democracy. They began to ask if

China could stand, or indeed needed the kind of democratic change occurring

in the former Soviet bloc that involved state dissolution, ethnic strife, civil disor­

der and mass unemployment. Second, China's mounting domestic problems,

resulting from accelerated market reform since 1992, also caused deep con­

cerns among intellectuals. China's weakness was alarming: extraordinarily rapid

economic growth was taking place very unevenly in a society with only limited

rule and under a central government whose authority was crumbling.

Corruption, crime, floating population, unemployment and income disparity all

had a destabilizing effect on the social order. Grave domestic concerns and

28) Feng Chen. "Order and Stability in Social Transition: Neoconservative Political Thought in

Post-l989 China", 7beChina Quarterly, September 1997. No.ISI, p.S93.

62

Table 4. Sdected~V~(%)

Strongly agree disagree Strongly N agree disagree

Regardless of one's political beliefs, he 40.8 45.5 11.9 1.8 1256

or she is entitled to the same legal

rights as is anyone else

The press should be given more 66.7 26.5 6.0 0.7 1259 freedom to express wrongdoings such

as corruption

Elections to local government positions 53.0 41.5 4.5 1.0 1254

should be conducted in such a way that

there is more than one candidate for

each post

The well-being of the country is mainly 31.8 39.4 23.9 4.9 1257

dependent upon state leaders, not the

masses i

In general, I don't think I should argue 26.6 42.1 24.5 6.9 1258

with the authorities even though I

believe my idea is correct

I would rather live in an orderly society 55.8 38.5 3.8 1.9 1255

than in a freer society which is prone I

I. to disruptions I

Source: Yang Zhong,Jie Chen, and John Scheb, ibid, p.77l.

uncertainties not only strengthened the position of those who consistently sup­

ported neo-authoritarian politics, but also converted many who previously

favored liberal democratic ideas to the neo-conservative camp.

Despite its differences from the official line, as Feng Chen put it, "neo-conser­

vatism can be seen as a tacit consensus between the leadership and intellectual

circles on how the reform should be carried OUt.,,29) Most of China's economic

and political reforms have been put into practice according to the visions

Value Changes and Democratic -/Dingping Guo 63

offered by neo-conservative scholars.

Those developments, however, do not necessarily mean that there are no

support or demand for democF.lcy. Ideally, a belief in the legitimacy of democ­

F.lL'Y should be held at two levels. First, as a general principle, democracy is

considered as the best (or at least the least bad) form of government possible.

Second, as an evaluation of one's own country's democmtic regime, in spite of

its failures and shortcomings, it is regarded as better than any non-democratic

regimes that might be established.30) No doubt, at the first level, democF.lCY is

supported extensively by both the elite and the masses, officials and scholars in

China. But at the second level, the belief in democratic legitimacy in China is

not deeply rooted, but instrumental and conditional on effective performance.

Therefore, Chinese people, in particular political leaders and intellectuals, tend­

ed to embrace authoritarianism at the first sign of trouble. This may explain

why political conservatism, including neo-authoritarianism and neo-conser­

vatism, repeatedly came out as solutions to crisis during different periods of

twenty century in China.·m This gap between abstract principles and behavioral

norms was also observed in political culture survey in Beijing.

As Table 4 shows, there is a complexity in the public attitudes toward

democracy and civil liberties among Beijing urban residents. Over 85% of the

respondents seemed to be tolerant of people with different political views.

93.:ZOAJ favored wider press freedom. An overwhelming majority voiced support

for a more democratic way of choosing 10C'.l1 government officials. However,

fmdings from next three questions indicated a low level of political efficacy and

29) Feng Chen, ibid, p.612.

30) Lany Diamond, ibid, pp.168-169.

31) Jiang Yihua, "Ershi Shiji Zhongguo Sixiang Shiahang De Zhengzhi Baoshu Zhuyi" (Political

Conservatism in the History of Thoughts of Twenty Century's China), Li Shitao ed., Zbisbi

Fengzi Licbang: }(jing yu Baosbu Zbijian de dongdang (The Stances of Intellectuals: fluctua­

tions between radicalism and conselVatism), (Shidai Wenyi Publishing House, 2000), pp.s7-

73.

64

to some extent the remains of authoritarian personality among Beijing residents.

Over 70010 of the respondents believed that the well-being of the country' is

mainly dependent upon government leaders, not the masses. Also as shown in

the table, the majority of those surveyed did not want to challenge the authori­

ties, even when they believed their ideas were correct. An overwhelming

majority of the respondents preferred stability and order to freedom.

In Table 1, we have noted that over 85% of respondents in 1999 Shanghai

youth survey believed they dared to insist their own opinions even in the face

of leaders. There seems to be a huge discrepancy between Beijing and

Shanghai. Perhaps, the following three point.<; can account for the difference.

First, historically, Shanghai is a modem and highly-westernized commercial city

and Beijing is a imperial capital. Second, the respondents surveyed in Shanghai

are young people. Third, the wording of the questions is different, for example,

in Shanghai survey, it is not clear whether there is a conflict between leader

and me when I insist on my own opinions. In general, most of Chinese people

would not like to challenge the authorities.

The belief in stability and order has been held extensively during the last two

decades. Chinese people are afraid of chaos (Juan). This fear is rooted in

Chinese political culture. It is also rooted in the experiences of the pre-1949

period, and especially in those of the Cultural Revolution. Further more, many

Chinese believe that there is a conflict between order and freedom, in other

word, liberalization may cause instability. Indeed, both the elite and the masses

associate instability with free societies, especially after what happened in the

former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries as they became liberalized

during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Chinese language, especially in the

CCP ideology, liberalism (Ziyou Zhuyi) and libemlization (Ziyouhua) are pejo­

rative words although freedom or liberty (Ziyou) is embraced by more and

more Chinese people.32) It is this emphasis on order and stability that forms the

32) An interesting fac't is that both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping have articles against liberal-

Value Changes and Democratic -/Dingping Guo 65

psychological foundation of authoritarian regime in China.

m. Identity and Trust

Findings from the recent surveys in Beijing and Shanghai indicate that enor­

mous value changes have taken place during the last two decades although

there are remains of traditional Confucianism. Foreign cultural values have

been actively and widely absorbed and assimilated in contemporary China as

international exchanges grows and globalization intensifies. The traditional val­

ues such as paternalism, moralism and collectivism have been eroded. For

example, in the West, individualism is universally recognized as respect for

one's own interests and rights and those of others. But in China, where collec­

tivism had often been overemphasized, individualism was condemned as being

synonymous to being selfish, neglecting the overall interests and benefiting

oneself at the expense of others. However, the national survey interviewed

6534 urban youth between 14 and 28 years old in 199R indicated that 49.10/0 of

the respondents endorsed the proposition that everyone subjectively serves

himself and objectively serves others. In the same Stllvey, only 22.6% of the

respondents rejected the proposition, the percentage of respondents who could

not decide reached 28.4%.55) The differences between Chinese and Western

values are diminishing and the similarities between them are growing. As

shown in the recent surveys, democratic values are extensively supported espe­

cially in urban China.

ism or liberalization. See: Mao Zedong, "Fandui Ziyou Zhuyj"'( Against Uberalism); Deng

Xiaoping, "Qizhi Xianming de Fandui Zichan Jieji Ziyouhua"(Firmly against Bourgeois

Liberalization), Selected Works ofDeng Xiaapil1g, Volume 1II. Renmin Chllban~he (People's

Publishing HOllse, 1993), pp.l94-197.

33) Zhongguo Qingshaoruan Yanjiu Zhongxin(China Youth & Children Research Center), ibid,

p.352.

66

Since value changes have taken place and democratic values have been

embraced to some extent in China, what, then, are the public attitudes to the

nation and government of China that upholds the CCP leadership and the

Marxist-Leninism ideology during the era of globalization and democratization?

1. National Identity

HistOrically, China regarded itself as the Central Kingdom CZhongguo) and

was full of conceit for a long time. But when the Western countries had devel­

oped enough strength from modem technology and industrialization to support

their expansionist efforts, China had been pushed around, plundered and

carved up by one countIy after another, ever since Britain went to war in 1839.

The People's Republic of China was founded after the CCP came to power in

1949, which ended the semi-colonial history of modem China and declared the

beginning of the new socialist China. Two years after Mao Zedong's death, the

second leadership with Deng Xiaoping at the core sought to open to the out­

side world on its initiative. Unsurprisingly, Chinese were ashamed and cha­

grined by the fact that socialism had produced only meager results in the pre­

ceding thirty years in comparison with the other nations of East Asia. Chinese

were aware of the extent to which China had fallen behind internationally.

There was not only Japan, which had forged ahead with stunning speed, but

also the "four tigers" of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, all of which

had outpaced China with regard to rapid modernization.

One result of open-door policy is a sharply increased foreign presence in

China. There are more and more academic and cultural exchanges between

China and foreign countries. Chinese government has sent thousands of schol­

ars and students abroad, particularly to Japan and the United States, thereby

giving them intense exposure to foreign values and ideas. As a result, in con­

trast to erstwhile self-concert, the sense of self-humility spread over the whole

country. Socialism and Marxism were doubted, and the CCP was believed to be

Value Changes and Democratic ~/Dingping Guo 67

responsible for the backwardness. Even patriotism that is taken for granted

almost all over the world was challenged. Some people criticized unfairly dur­

ing the Anti-rightist Movements or the Cultural Revolution asked why we must

love the motherland since we were forsaken and were not loved by our moth­

erland.34)

To solve the belief crisis mentioned above, the CCP has taken a series of

measures since as early as 1982. At the Twelfth Party Congress of 1982, the CCP

Table 5. Level of National Identity among Shanghai Youth (%)

Statements Respondents Agree Disagree Do not know

I am proud to be a Chinese Young intellectual 93.3 1.7 5.0

"White collar" youth 92.3 1.6 6.1

"Blue collar" youth 93.2 1.2 4.7

College students 93.0 I

4.8 2.2 I

Middle-school students 94.8 I

2.8 2.4

We should advance Young intellectual i 95.3 1.3 3.4 I

patriotism further I "White collar" youth 94.3 l.6 4.1 I

during the era of "Blue collar" youth 94.0 I 1.2 4.7

globalization College students I

3.6 95.1 i 1.3 I

Middle-school students 93.8 4.0 2.2

To love the motherland is Young intellectual 83.4 7.4 9.2

to love the socialist China "White collar" youth 81.1 7.7 11.2

"Blue collar" youth 88.4 4.2 7.4

College ~tudents 74.9 21.4 3.7

Middle-school students 83.3 12.8 3.9

Sample: young intellectual"" 647; "white collar" youth = 726; "blue collar" youth .. 976;

college students .. 952; middle-school students "" 978.

Source: Gongqingtuan Shanghaishi Weiyuanhui (Shanghai Committee of the

Communist Youth League), ibid, pp.180-182.

34) For example, this attitude was apparent in the film script "Unrequited Love" written by Bai

Hua. Also see: Tang Tsou, ibid, p.228.

68

mised the task to create a "socialist spiritual civilization" that would offer CCP

members effective moral protection against the corrosive effects of "bourgeois

Iibemlization" and other unwanted by-products of China's structuml reforms

and opening to the outside world. In the political report delivered at the

Congress by Geneml Secretary Hu Yaobang, he asserted, "capitalist forces and

other forces hostile to our socialist cause will seek to corrupt us and harm our

country." Confronted with such a challenge, Hu called upon all CCP members

to hold firmly to the party's established ideals, moral values and organizational

discipline.3S)

In the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen cmckdown on the student democm­

cy movement, the CCP and Chinese government were faced with pressures

from abroad and home. Recognizant of incompetence of the Communist ideol­

ogy, Chinese leaders consciously cultivated nationalism as new glue to unite

the country. Communism was discredited as a result of the Tiananmen Incident

and Soviet Union's collapse. Therefore, Jiang Zemin and others used the educa­

tion system and propaganda to nurture a national pride in response to foreign

pressures.

In august, 1994, the CCP promulgated "An Outline of Implementation of

Patriotism Education", in which the trinity of patriotism, collectivism and social­

ism was emphasized and the patriotism education for youth was given overrid­

ing priority. 36) Meanwhile, some scholars suggested that Chinese leaders use

nationalism to enhance and consolidate the political legitimacy. For example,

defining nationalism as precious, "natural" political resources that can be

exploited to maintain and strengthen the unity and consensus of a political

community, Xiao Gongqing advocated it was the time for Chinese leaders to

make good use of nationalism to fortify the legitimate basis and restructure the

35) Richard Baum, "The Road to Tianarunen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s", ed., Roderick

MacFarquhar, The Politics of China: the eras of Mao and Den!? (Cambridge University Press,

1997), pp. 348-349.

,(6) Renmin RiIYao (People's Daily), September 6, 1994.

Value Changes and Democratic ~/Dingping Guo 69

moral values for dle CCP regime}7)

Chinese leaders use patriotism instead of communism to educate the young

people, in particular students. Consequentially, nationalism has become much

stronger since the 1990s. The 1999 Shanghai SUlVey showed a very high level

of national identity among the young people contrary to dle "identity crisis"

theory.38l

As Table 5 shows, over 92010 of the respondents felt that they were proud to

be Chinese. More than 93% agreed that we should advance patriotism during

the era of globalization. On average, 82.2% identified the congruence between

patriotism and socialism, and endorsed the proposition that loving the mother­

land is to love the socialist China. What attracts our attention is the college stu­

dents group among which only 74.9% identified the congruence between patri­

otism and socialism, and 21.4% denied the congruence, three times more than

the average of non-students groups.

In fact, in a 1993 national sUlVey on youth's social consciousness, the result

was far more serious and terrible than the responses of college students in

1999. According to that sUlVey, only 37% of the respondents correlated patrio­

tism with socialism and agreed to the proposition that loving the motherland is

to love socialism; 38.2% believed that loving the motherland did not necessarily

mean loving socialism; 24.8% indicated that loving the motherland meant "not

anti-socialism" at least.39l By contrast, the results in 1999 survey are very

promising and favorable, especially from the perspective of the huge efforts in

37) See: Xiao Gongqing, "Minzu Zhuyi yu Zhongguo Zhuanxing Shiqi de Yishi Xingtai"

(Nationalism and Ideology during the Transitional period in China), Zhanlue yu Guanli

(Strategy and ManaementXBeijing), No.4, 1994.

38) Mori Kazuko, "Tyugoku no Identity Crisis"(China's Identity Crisis), ed., Mori Kazuko, Shi;o Keizaika no Naka no 7yugoku (China in the Process of Economic Marketization) (Nihon

Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, Tokyo, Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1995), pp.1-26.

39) Gongqingtuan Shanghaishi Weiyuanhui (Shanghai Committee of the Communist Youth

League), ibid, p.181.

70

Table 6. The Most Important Aim for the United Nadons In the Future ('10)

China 8 Asian lowest highest countries

To improve the health of human being 25 19 13 27 To give humanitarian aid in times of natural ~1ers 15 30 14 44 To give humanitarian aid in times of warlconflict 10 28 10 34 To prevent of war by intervention 34 31 27 43 To maintain peace by anned forces 5 21 5 37 To develop into a world government 10 11 8 22 To protect human rights I 0 38 0 52

Note: The 8 Asian countries (areas) and their sample size are China (578), Korea (1509),

Japan (321), Taiwan (526), Singapore (506), Malaysia (014), Thailand (510) and

Philippines (1000).

Source: The Gallup Millennium Survey conducted in September.October, 1999.

patriotism education by the CCP during the last decade.

The Gallup Millennium survey provided complementary data for the high

level of national identity in China. There are no questions directly related with

national identity in the survey, but we can observe the consistency between

respondents' choices and China's official stance and foreign policies. As shown

in Table 6, in sharp contrast with the average 380h of the respondents in 8

Asian countries and areas who indicated that protecting human rights should

be the most important aims for the United Nations in the future, there was

nobody who thought so in China. The average 21% envL<>aged that maintaining

peace by armed forces should be the most important aims for the United

Nations in the future in 8 Asian countries and areas, but the respondents who

chose this answer in China is only 5%, less than one-fourths of the Asian aver­

age. We also note that the respondents who thought that preventing of war by

intervention should be the most important aims for the United Nations in the

future reached 34% in China, the second highest after 43% in Taiwan, certainly

higher than the average 8 Asian countries and areas.

Value Changes and Democratic -/Dingping Guo 71

The Gallup Millennium survey was conducted in September-October, 1999,

that is, five months after the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade

which provoked outrage and indignation and caused massive students

demonstrations in China. Considering this background, the results shown in

Table 6 are very understandable, and to great extent, logical. Chinese people

showed great national cohesive force when faced with foreign challenge.

5. Trust and Satisfaction

While Chinese people show a high level of national identity, there is also

high support for market-oriented reforms and open-door policies adopted by

the CCP and government since the late 1970s. A local survey, in which about

two thousands college students were interviewed between 1992 and 1997, indi­

cated the increasing support for government policies. In 1997, 85% college stu­

dents agreed to the proposition that establishing socialist market economic sys­

tem was the only correct road to prosperity and greatness; 92% thought the

policies of central government were effective and fruitful. Therefore, a rate as

high as 96% was optimistic about the political and economic developments.40)

The same survey also showed a slightly high level of trust in the third leader­

ship group with Jiang Zemin at the core. In 1992 survey, 35.5% and 47.7% of

college teachers respectively considered the third leadership group worthy of

deep trust or satisfactory.41) At the same time, 8.5% and 50.8% of the college

students respectively considered the third leadership group worthy of deep

trust or satisfactory.42) Students are more critical to the CCP regime than their

teachers. So, this percentage is relatively low since Chinese leaders are calling

40) Shanghai Jiaowei Dangwei (The Shanghai Education Committee of the CCP) and SWang

LilunJiaoyu Zazhishe (Thoughts· TheaI)' . Education Magazine), ibid, p.157.

41) Shanghai Jiaowei Dangwei (The Shanghai Edu(''ation Committee of the CCP) and SWang

LilunJiaoyu Zazhishe (Thought~ . TheaI)'· Education Magazine), ibid, p.l.

42) Shanghai Jiaowei Dangwei (The Shanghai F.ducation Committee of the CCP) and SWang

LilunJiaoyu Zazhishe (Thought~ . TheaI)' . Education Magazine), ibid, p.81.

72

Table 7. Level ofTniSt in PoIltical Ptindples among S~ Youth

Statements Respondents Agree disagree Do not know

Only under the leadership of Young intellectuals 83.4 4.4 12.2

the CCP, can China realize "White collar" youth 78.8 4.2 17.0

the modernization "Blue collar" youth 84.') 4.1 11.4

College students 76.0 16.8 7.1

Middle-school students 77.9 16.2 5.8

Deng Xiaoping theory is the Young intellectuals 90.1 1.9 8.0

fundamental guarantee for "White collar" youth 86.5 1.9 11.6

the realization of modemiza- "Blue collar" youth 91.1 1.0 7.9

tion in China College students 88.8 6.2 i 5.1

Middle-school students 92.6 4.0 i 3.3

Socialism system will have Young intellectuals 71.1 6.0

I 22.9

stronger survival power in "White collar" youth 67.6 6.0 26.4 I the twenty-one century "Blue collar" youth 78.0 3.9 ! 18.1

! College student~ 72.7 16.4 i 10.9

Middle-school students 81.3 11.7 I

7.0

Sample: Young intellectuals = 647; "White collar" youth = 726; "Blue collar" youth '"

976; College students = 952; Middle-school student~ = 978.

Source: Gongqingtuan Shanghaishi Weiyuanhui (Shanghai Committee of the

Communist Youth League), ihid, pp.178-179.

for high level of support. We do not know the recent results of this question

because this kind of question was not asked after 1992. However, since the

third leadership became stronger and China has made greater progress in eco­

nomic developments under the third leadership, the trust in the third leadership

group could have risen during the middle and late 1990s.

Fortunately, there are some questions about political attitudes to the CCP

leadership, Deng Xiaoping theory and socialist system, that is, three of the four

cardinal principles in 1999 Shanghai survey. The results are shown in Table 7.

The four cardinal principles were put forward by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 and

Value Changes and Democratic -/Dingping Guo 73

reaffnmed in the preamble to the 1982 constitution by stating that "Under the

leadership of the CCP and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong

Thought, the Chinese people will ... continue to adhere to the people's democ­

ratic dictatorship and follow the socialist road". After the Soviet Union's collapse

and the end of cold war, especially when China have experienced f'dpid eco­

nomic growth of two decades and become increasingly involved into the wave

of globalization, what are the public attitudes to the four cardinal principles that

are considered as outdated by many radical scholars and democratic activists?

According to the 1999 Shanghai survey, on an average, 80.12% of the respon­

dents believed that the CCP leadership is important and indispensable to

China's modernization. 89.82% agreed to the proposition that Deng Xiaoping

theory, namely, the Marxism in contemporary China is the fundamental guaran­

tee for the realization of modernization. 74.14% envisaged that socialism system

would have stronger survival power in the twenty-one century. The high per­

centage on Deng Xiaoping theory may be the results of the education cam­

paign conducted since 1993. Particularly, Deng Xiaoping theory was elevated

as the guiding ideology together with Marxism-leninism-Mao Zedong Thought

at the fIfteenth CCP congress in 1997.

By contrast, socialism was not so favored by Shanghai youth. A rate as high

as 26.4% of the "white collar" respondents had reservations about the proposi­

tion that socialism would be stronger in the future. The college student respon­

dents who declined the proposition reached 16.4%. Many people were

shocked by the failures of socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern

Europe and lost confidence in socialism. Why a larger part of people believed

in Deng Xiaoping Theory is because the socialism with Chinese characteristics

under the name of Deng Xiaoping is not original socialism. In fact, in a 1993

Shanghai survey, a percentage as high as 19.8% of the college student respon­

dents and 14.1% of the college teacher respondents believed that the socialism

with Chinese characteristics was substantially the capitalism under the leader­

ship of the CCP. Meanwhile, 32.4% of the college teacher respondents did not

74

Statements Respondents Agree Disagree Donat know

Citizens can participate in Ihe Young intellectuals 60.7 26.2 13.1

national and local political "White collar" youlh 61.1 25.9 13.1

affairs more directly "Blue collar" youth 53.5 29.6 16.8

Citizens' opinions can exercise Young intellectuals 27.0 62.8 9.2

influences on Ihe decision- "White collar" youlh 30.0 58.7 11.3 making of government "Blue collar" youth 30.7 53.1 16.2

Chinese society will become Young intellectuals 62.6 20.1 17.3

more and more democratic "White collar" youlh 64.3 17.3 18.4

"Blue collar" youth 58.2 21.9 19.9

Sample: Young intellectuals = 647; "White collar" youlh .. 726; "Blue collar" youlh ..

976.

Source: Gongqingtuan Shanghaishi Weiyuanhui (Shanghai Committee of the

Communist Youlh League), ibid, pp.l83.

reject this proposition.43)

In 1999 Shanghai survey, there were also a few questions about the public

attitudes to political developments, in particular democratization in China. The

results are shown in Table 8.

As Table 8 shows, Shanghai youth were slightly satisfactory with the achieve­

ments in political developments. About 60% of the respondents believed that

Chinese citizens could more directly participate in the national and local politi­

cal affairs. Furthermore, they were cautiously optimistic about the future of

democratization in China. On an average, over 60% endorsed the proposition

that Chinese society would become more and more democratic. But a national

survey in 1987 showed only 32.44% of respondents were optimistic about

democratization in China in sharp contrast with 46.15% who were not opti-

43) Shanghai Jiaowei Dangwei (The Shanghai Education Corrunittee of the CCP) and Sixiang LilunJiaoyu Zazhishe (Thoughts· TheaI)" Education Magazine), ibid, p.92, p.9.

Value Changes and Democratic ...... /Dingping Guo 75

mistic.44) However, when asked whether citizens' opinions exercised influences

on the decision-making of government, most of respondents showed a sense of

frustration and a average percentage as high as 58.2% believed that citizens'

opinions had no influences on the policy-making of government. Similarly, in

Beijing survey, 72.2% of the respondents believed that suggestions and com­

plaints made by the public to the government were often ignored.4S)

Empirical studies have shown that even in the advanced democracies or the

third wave democracies, citizens tend to be cynical about the responsiveness of

the political system to their concerns. For example, a comparative study

showed that 65% of the respondents in Taiwan and 71% in Korea did not

believed that the government took the interests and opinions like themselves

into account when making important decisions.46) Furthermore, we have found

the similar results in Gallup Millennium Survey. According to the survey results

based on the 7 Asian countries and areas of Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore,

Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines, only a average 20% of the respondents

believed that their governments responded to the will of the people.

6. Some Explanations

We have presented some trends of political support and trust in China, but

can not systematically compare them with other Asian or Western countries.

However, generally speaking, there is a relatively high level of support and

trust in politics in contrast with the declining political support and spreading

public skepticism discovered in the advanced industrial democracies.47) The

remains of Chinese deferential political cultural tradition may partly account for

44) Qi Ming, ibid, p.97 .

45) Yang Zhong, Jie Chen, and John Sebeb, ibid, p.779.

46) Yun-han Chu, Lany Diamond, and Doh-chull Shin, "Halting Progress in Korea and

Taiwan",joumal of Democracy, 12.1 (2001), pp.122-136.

47) Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, ed-;., Disaffected Democracies: Wbats Troubling the

Trilateral Countries? (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 200()), pp.7-13.

76

this difference. But as shown earlier, enormous value changes have taken place

since China adopted the market-oriented reform policies and opened up to the

outside world in late 1970s. Therefore, we tty to explain the discrepancy from

the following perspective.

Robert D. Putnam and his colleagues had introduced a model for explaining

declining public trust. That is, "public satisfaction with representative institutions

is a function of the information to which citizens are exposed, the criteria by

which the public evaluates government and politics, and the actual perfor­

mance of those institutions".48) This model can be also applied to explain the

high public trust and satisfaction in China with modification and adaptation. To

put it concretely, the public trust in China will be interpreted from the perfor­

mance of government, cliteria of evaluation, information and political experi­

ence.

First, the performance of government has ameliorated. Indeed, measuring

performance objectively is a challenging task. One obvious approach is to mea­

sure macro-economic outcomes. As analyzed above, China have experienced

amaZingly rapid growth, especially along the coastal areas such as Shanghai.

Consequently, the living standard of Chinese citizens has been raised many

times. In Beijing survey, 88.4% of the respondents agreed that "my living condi­

tions have noticeably improved since the reforms in 1978"; 65.2% believed that

"my social status has noticeably improved during the last two decades"; and

90.1% said: "I am confident that China will become an economic power in the

twenty-one century".49> 111is good feeling contributed very much to the high

score on the Communist regime.

Second, the criteria of evaluation are geared toward developmentalist and

materialist direction in contrast with a post-materialist direction in the industrial

democracies. Of course, this does not mean that Chinese people have no politi-

48) Susan]. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, p.23.

49) Yang Zhong,Jie Chen, andJohn Scheb, ibid, p779.

Value Changes and Democratic -/Dingping Guo 77

cal demands and China has no political issues. But as Deng Xiaoping put it,

"economic works are the biggest politics for the present; economic issues are

the overriding political ones. ,,;()) The CCP gave priority to economic affairs and

regarded economic development as the fundamental Criteria for judging all

policies and measures. Considering China has experiences of a semi-colonial,

semi-feudal society, and its productive forces lag far behind those of the devel­

oped industrial societies, this developmental backwardness has laid down

restrictions on the political demands of Chinese people: They are more con­

cerned with the living conditions and consequentially more easily satisfied with

the rapid growth and economic betterment.

Third, the lack of infonnation inhibits public discontent with government and

politics. Although Chinese citizens show more interests in and have more

knowledge of political affairs, and there are more and more mass media avail­

able to them, an important fact is that there is no tme freedom of the press. So,

any public criticisms to the CCP regime and Chinese leaders and the four cardi­

nal principles are not pennitted. During the past two decades, mass media

have increased nearly ten times, but no one can challenge the CCP authority,

even publish severe criticisms to the supreme le-.lders or the CCP. In fact, most

of the new periodicals do not touch on politics, offering instead the latest per­

spective on sports, fashion, music and movie. Chinese leaders reserve the right

to shut down publications that in their view promote opposition to the CCP

rule. Although the global information technology revolution is said to have per­

forated such walls, for instance, E-mail.theInternet.cellphones.Chinese gov­

ernment has reportedly been strengthening restrictions on the infonnation

available on the Internet. Moreover, according to a 1998 national survey on the

14-28 years old urban youth, 69.1% of the respondent'> said they had no condi­

tions for using the Internet and visiting web site. 51) Therefore, Chinese citizens

50) Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wen.xuan (Selected Wolils of Deng Xiaoping) <Beijing:

Renmin Chubanshe, People's Publishing House) Volume II, p.194.

78

are fed with official view everyday by the government-controlled mass media.

There are only one-side stories on Chinese media. Chinese public has been

indoctrinated with the repeated official views and those views are gradually

transformed into public attitudes.

Fourth, political experience strengthens the confidence in the government

and politics. Political experience with democracy and alternative regimes has

sizable independent effects on political attitudes and values, often overpower­

ing those of the country's level of socioeconomic development, the individual's

socioeconomic status, and the regime's economic performance.'m There is no

political experience with democracy in Chinese history. From the transient

experiments with democracy induding multi-party politics in 1912-1913 that

failed in the restoration of imperial system by Yuan Shikai, most Chinese peo­

ple, in particular the CCP, draw a lesson that Western-style demcx:racy is not

suitable to Chinese soils. After experiencing all kinds of political turmoil in wars

and revolutions, Chinese people are appreciating vety much the national inde­

pendence, political stability, social order and economic prosperity during the

last two decades. Furthermore, since they have no experience with democracy

and are admiring democra(:y, albeit not in the Western tenns, Chinese people

tend to be satisfied with the recent achievements in democratization in compar­

ison with the personal cult, dictatorship and (:ruel class struggle in the past, in

particular during the Cultural Revolution. As some scholars observed, though

little has been achieved thus far in the way of actual democratization, the insti­

tutional foundations for genuine democracy are slowly taking shape. For exam­

ple, the maturation of the rule of law, the emergence of the National People's

Congress and local People's Congress as power player, and village self-govern­

ment and grass-root democratization are important components of this evolu­

tionary process.S3) This is why a majority of respondents are content with the

51) Zhongguo Qingshaonian Yanjiu Zhongxin (China Youth & Children Research Center), ibid,

p.339. 52) Larry Diamond, ibid, p.l62.

Value Changes and Democratic ~/Dingping Guo 79

political developments in the past and optimistic about the democratization in

the future.

IV Problems and Prospects

As analyzed above, although political manipulation may have influenees to

some extent, it is obvious that both Chinese government policies and the CCP

regime have been supported and trusted by the majority of ordinary urban citi­

zens. The strong support is mainly based on economic achievements and social

progress. On the other hand, although political development was not as rapid

as economic development and survey showed there was a sense of frustrations

about political efficacy, most people are optimistic about future democratization

in China. Therefore, we can c1rdw a conclusion that China is not on the verge

of collapse owing to the putative legitimacy crisis at least for the time being.

However, this does not mean there is good governance in China.

1. Regional Differences

In this paper, for the most part, we have examined the value changes by

using the survey data collected in urban areas such as Shanghai and Beijing. It

should be made dear that both Shanghai and Beijing are not representative of

the rest of China, because there are huge regional differences between the

urban and rural areas, the coastal east and mountainous west.

The reforms began in rural areas twenty years ago and some changes took

place indeed along with the implementation of responsibility system. But

farmer's incomes are growing almost three times more slowly than urban

incomes. However, taxes on rural communities are growing faster than those in

the cities, leading to an increasing gdp between the haves in the urban areas

53) Minxin Pei, ibid, pp.224-225.

80

and the have-nots on the fann. The income ratio between urban and rural resi­

dents was 2.36 in 1978. It decreased to 2.14 in 1985, but increased to 2.38 in

1987, 2.79 in 1995, 3.2 in 2000.54) Therefore, silent battles have been raging for

the past decades between fanners and local government officials squeezing

hard for more tax revenue. Through those battles, the village autonomous com­

mittee has been set up and grass-root democracy has been experimented as an

institutional innovation, which consequentially is said to contribute to ease the

conflicts between rural cadres and farmers.

In fact, grass-root democracy did not work well as expected at some rural

areas. In some parts, China's tax battles have reached the boiling point. A num­

ber of riots have erupted in the heartland of rice- and wheat- growing villages

during the recent years. For example, security forces killed two fanners and

wounded 20 others during a clash April 15, 2001 in the Jiangxi village of

Yuntang.

Under such circumstances, high support of and trust in local government are

not expected. A survey showed there was huge discrepancy in trust in govern­

ment between metropolis and agrarian area. There were 80.94% of metropoli­

tan respondents who said they had trust in government in sharp contrast with

53.53% of rural respondents. 55) The same survey also showed that trust in gov­

ernment decreased along with the scale of city.

But this does not necessarily mean the Chinese peasants are going to revolt

against the CCP regime because they for the most time are discontent with only

local government and officials. As peasants in rebellion in the feudal society

revolted against only corrupt officials but not emperors, most of peasants still

54) Zhong Dajun, "EIyuanJiegou dui Zhongguo Shehui de Yingxiang" (The Influences of Dual

StuLture on Chinese Society), eds., Ru Xing, Lu Xueyi, Chan TIaolu, 2001 Nian: Zhongguo

Shehui Xingshi Fengxt yu Yuce ('[be Year 2001: Ana(ysis and Prediction o/Social Situations

in China), (Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chuban~he, Social Scieno:!s Doc'Umentation Publishing

House, 2(01), p.198.

55) Qi Ming, ibid, p.69.

Value Changes and Democratic ~/Dingping Guo 81

express faith in Beijing to solve theirproblems~ To iron out the regional ditifer­

ences, Chinese government has been promoting a lot of projects such as great

west development strategy that are expected to bring hope for the poor west­

ern Chinese peasants.

2. Political Corruption

The most serious threat to the governance in China is political corruption. In

spite of the proclaimed great success against political corruption, perennial

abuses and corruption continue to emerge and become more and more seri­

ous. Chinese President Jiang Zemin and others in the leadership have routinely

issued calls to fight corruption no matter how highly placed. Although thus far

only one Politburo member (Chen Xitong) has been convicted of corruption,

corruption allegations have reached the vice-chairman of the Standing

Committee of the NPC (Cheng Kejie), the vice-minister and vice-governor level,

among which one of the governors (Bu Changqing) was sentenced to death in

March 2000. Corruption at unprecedented level in the history of the People's

Republic has further undermined the legitimacy of the regime and has become

one of the biggest causes of political instability and economic disorder. Many

surveys show repeatedly that corruption is the biggest concern in today's

China. When asked "what is the serious problem in today's China? (circle

three)", most respondents (61.%) chose "corruption". And then, there were lay­

off and unemployment (51.0%), overflow of counterfeit (41.70/0), violence

crimes (28.3%), unfair redistribution (22.5%), drug trafficking 08.5%), moral

depravity 05.3%), prostitution 03.3%) and others (2.8010),56)

Another sUlVey on the political elite's attitudes toward political and social sit­

uations conducted in October 2000, also showed corruption had become the

first enemy to the CCP regime. When asked to rank four problems accor~g to

56) Zhongguo Qingshaonian Yanjiu Zhongxin(China Youth & Children Research Center), ibid,

p.348.

82

Table 9. The ra.t'lkJng of poBtkal and soda! problems by the CCP cadres (Ufo,

N-128)

Political and social problems First Second Third Fourth ITotal percentage Ranking of four choices

Comlption 24.2 14.1 21.1 10.9 70.3 1

The SOEs problem 6.3 17.2 14.1 12.5 50.1 2

Income gap 15.6 17.2 6,3 8.6 47.7 3

Unemployment 5.5 19.5 8.6 9.4 43.0 4

Peasants' burden 11.7 10.9 10.2 3.1 35.9 5

Moml decay 8.6 5.5 13.3 7.8 35.2 6

Violence crimes 17.2 4.7 3.9 8.6 34.4 7

Regional difference 55 2.3 7.H 12.'5 28.1 8

Serious accidents 1.6 1.6 3.1 11.7 18.0 9

Falun Gong 0.8 0.8 3.1 2.3 7.0 10

Poverty 0.8 1.6 2.3 2.3 7.0 10

AtTe'drs of wages 0.0 0.8 1.6 3.9 6.3 12

Inflation 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.6 2.4 13

Other 2.4 3.1 4.7 4.7 14.9

Notes: (1) SOEs = state-owned enterprise

(2) Falun Gong is a semi-Buddhist spiritual movement that was outlawed as evil

cult in China.

Source: Ru Xing, Lu Xueyi, Chan Tianlu, 2001 Nian: Zbongguo Sbebui Xingsbi Fengxi

yu Yuce (7be Year 2001: Ana(ysis and Prediction of Social Situations in Cbina),

(Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, Social Sciences Ixx:umentation Publishing

House, 2001), p56.

seriousness, the total percentage of respondents who chose corruption was

70.3% while 24.1% ranked it as the first choice. The results are showed in Table

9.

According to Table 9, besides corruption, the serious political and social

problems include the state-owned enterprise problem (50.1%), income gap

(47.7%), unemployment (43.0%), peasants' burden (35.9%), moral decay

(35.2%), violence crime (34.4%), regional differences (28.1%), serious accident

Value Changes and Democratic ~/Dingping Guo 83

(l8.00Al). What deselYe our attention is that the percentage of corruption is

much higher (20.2%) than that of the second serious problem.

In most cases, the Communist party members were corrupt and implicated in

all kind of scandals. So, the Communist Party's reputation and image has been

seriously damaged. When asked "what do you think of the Communist party

member in your surroundings", 44.7% respondents answered that most

Communist party members were not different from the masses; 10.1%

believeed that most Communist party member were not as good as the

masses. 57)

More serious is that some people begin to doubt whether the Communist

Party can be successful in the anti-corruption struggle without fundamental

political reforms such as introducing the multi-party system. In a 1992 sUlVey of

the college teachers' attitudes in Shanghai, 23.5% of respondents could not

reject the proposition that corruption can not be properly addressed without

the introduction of the multi-party system. 58)

3. PoIiticaJReform

In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, political reform for democratization

was emphasized hy Chinese leaders as well as political activist'). Until the late

1980s, political reforms aimed at huilding socialist democracy with Chinese

characteristics had been discussed widely and experimented with to some

extent. However, as socioeconomic problems such as inflation, disorder, cor­

ruption and instability appeared and worsened from the late 1980s, political

order, centralization, efficiency and stability became the supreme targets

Chinese leader pursued for economic and political development. The political

reforms introduced since the early 1990s have been cautious to a fault.

57) Zhongguo Qingshaonian Yanjiu Zhongxin(China Youth & Children Research Center), ibid,

p.352.

58) Shanghai Jiaowei Dangwei, ibid, p.2.

84

As in the other East Asian countries, the Chinese developmental state has

been strengthened, the government capacity improved and the political system

institutionalized to great extent. Although the political institutions of the PRC

remain essentially Leninist in that the CCP continues to enjoy monopoly of

power and independent media, and autonomous Irade unions are almost whol­

ly absent, it is obvious that the Chinese political system has partly adapted to its

changing environment.

Unlike the 1950s, the Communist Party is more "middle class", and its leaders

are better educated and more highly differentiated. Public officials with higher

capacity are performing new functions in an envirorunent in which the law has

become increaSingly important. Government decision-making is increasingly

based on rational considerations as authorities struggle to develop the economy

in a market.59) Recently, General Secretary of the CCP Jiang Zernin raised the

so-called "theory of the three representations" - that the CCP must represent

the most advanced production forces, the most advanced culture, and the com­

prehensive interests of people. Obviously, Chinese leaders want the party to

absorb more elements including intellectuals, professions, hi-tech personnel,

and even private entrepreneurs, who are seen as embodiments of advanced

production forces and culture in the new century. This also indicates that

Chinese are ready to jettison Lenin's and Mao's obsolete ided of the Communist

Party being the party of workers, the vanguard of the proletariat.

A successful developmental state sooner or later must face a crisis caused by

its extreme imbalance between advanced economy and authoritarian regime.

Authoritarian regimes have a mixed efficacy, in that their performance is some­

times creditable. Such regimes can not, however, translate that efficacy into

political legitimacy in the way democracies can.W)

59) John P. Bums, "The People's Republic of China at 50: National Political Reform", The China

Quarterly, No.l59, September 1999, p.593-594.

(0) Juan J Linz, "Transitions to Dem<x.TaCy", Geoffrey Priclham, ed., Transitions to Democracy:

Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe,

Value Changes and Democratic ~/Dingping Guo 85

China bas made great achievements through its market-oriented economic

ref onus and limited political refonus, that is, through its state-led development

strategy since the early 1980s. As the market-oriented refom1S have been inten­

sifying since the mid-l990s, it is necessary for China to further political reform

and promote democratization within a changing environment, especially faced

with the impact of rapid economic development and social change, under the

pressure of globalization with entrance to the wro, and in order to prevent

social and economic crisis, strengthen the legitirna<::y of the CCP and maintain

political stability.61) Indeed, at the plenary session of the poli<::y-setting CCP

Central Committee in October 2000, it was decided that the party should

"strengthen the construction of democracy" and encourage "citizens to partic­

ipate in politics in an orderly manner". At the same time, the survey on political

elite's attitudes showed the political reform was the biggest concern among the

CCP cadres.

4. Regional Democracy

As the CCP has repeated, China is a socialist country, and without democracy

there can be no socialism or socialist modernization. Although democratization

is a gradual process that can not be accomplished overnight, how to advance

this process in an orderly and steady way has become a task of exigency for

China scholars as well as Chinese leaders.

Considering there are huge regional differences in economic development

and cultural value, there must be an imbalance in the transition from authoritar­

ianism to democracy across the country. In fact, a nascent federalist structure is

Dartmouth Publishing Company Umited, 1995, p.l46.

61) Wang Guixin, 'Jim'nan Er Manchang De Gaige: Zhengzhi Gaige Ershi Zhounian Fansi"

(Hard and Long Refonn: Reflections on the Twenty Year.; of Political Reforms), U~ Zhifeng,

ed., Zhongguo Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige Wenti Baogao (Reports on the Political R8forms in

China), Zhonguo Dianying Chubanshe, 1999, p.35-36.

86

emerging in China as a result of rapid economic and political decentralization,

which augurs well for future regional democratic breakthroughs.62) In other

words, under a decentralized political system, every region can experiment

with the democr.!tic reforms with its own chamcteristics. lberefore, the democ­

mtizing process may proceed at a faster pace in regions, especially in those

where socioeconomic conditions and cultuml values are more hospitable to

democmtization.

During the last two decades, the local People's Congress has made more

progress toward democratization than the national one. lbe central leadership

has allowed more political contestation at sub-national People's Congress than

at the national level because local legislative contestation is less threatening to

the state capacity than political opposition at the national level, and also serves

the goal of controlling bureaucf'.!tism and promoting local incentive.63) If this

process continues and political contestation at the local level extends to more

regions and creeps up to national level someday, the regional democf'.!cy will

trigger the democf'.!tic tf'.!nsition at the national level.

lbe expansion of direct elections in the ruml areas also shows that China has

made steady progress toward regional democf'.!c)'. The direct village elections,

one of the most encouraging political reforms during recent years in China,

partly have helped to prevent corruption and maintain stability in the country­

side. They indicate that popular participation can be constructive to and sup­

portive of the legitimacy of the government, and consequentially helpful to

economic and political development.

62) Minxin Pei, ibid, p.226.

63) Ming Xia, "Political O1ntestation and the Emergence of the Provindal People's Congress as

Power Player in Chinese Politics: a network explanation", Journal o/comemporary China, (2000), 9(24), p.214.

Value Changes and Democratic ~/Dingping Guo 87

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