TITLE : Dimensions and Significance of th eCentral Asian Narcotics Trade

AUTHOR: Rensselaer W. Lee III

THE NATIONAL COUNCI LFOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN

RESEARC H

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Foreign Policy Research Institut e

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR :

Rensselaer W. Lee II I

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER :

806-08

DATE :

February 19, 199 3

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DIMENSIONS AND SIGNIFICANC E

OF THECENTRAL ASIAN NARCOTICS TRAD E

Rensselaer W . Lee III

Foreign Policy Research Institut ePhiladelphia, Pennsylvania

Global Advisory Service sAlexandria, Virginia

Submitted to

The National Council

for Soviet and East European Research

In Fulfillment

of Contract No . 806-08

February 15, 1993

TABLE OF CONTENT S

Section Page

Executive Summary 1

Introduction 5

Section OneCultivation and Production 1 1

Section TwoProspects 1 7

Section ThreeDrug Abuse Patterns 27

Section FourThe View from Russia 3 3

Section FiveConclusion 38

Tables

Table 1Percentage of Registered Addicts Using Different Illicit Drugsin Former USSR

Table 2Drug Seizures in Russia and Uzbekistan, 1987 to 1992

Table 3Raw Opium Yields per Hectare per Year in Central Asi a

Table 4Comparative Yield Figures for Opium and Legal Crop s

Table 5Comparative Law Enforcement Capabilitie s

Table 6Drug Prices, Moscow, 199 1

Table 7Narcotics Addicts and Toxic Addicts per 100,000 Populatio n

Table 8Kazakhstan Drug Addiction Rates, 199 1

Table 9Uzbekistan Addiction Rates by Localit y

Table 1 0Number of Addicts Treated in City Dispensary, Tashkent

Table 1 1First-Time Users Registered in Narcological and Psychiatric Institutions

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Central Asia long has been associated with the cultivation of drug crops .However, the region's narcotics base recently has assumed increasingly importanteconomic, political, and strategic dimensions . Powerful financial incentives driv eopium poppy farming in the economically depressed Central Asian republics .The obliteration of Moscow's direct control over these republics, the collapse o fCommunist control structures, and deteriorating law enforcement conditions i nCentral Asia and elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) ar elikely to contribute to the growth of the Central Asian narcotics trade . Theregion's relatively unsophisticated narcotics enterprises do not constitute asignificant near-term threat to the West, although the growth of a capability t orefine and market heroin would alter this assessment. Of greater immediateconcern is the capacity of drug dealers to penetrate Central Asia's vulnerabl eeconomies, influence local and national politics, and foment regional politica lstrife . The emergence of a drug-ridden Central Asia from the ruins of Sovie tcommunism would have negative implications for stability and progress i nEurasia—a reality that should underscore Western policy calculations towardCentral Asian countries and the CIS in general .

The states of former Soviet Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan ,Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, and Turkmenistan—constitute significant source region sfor illicit drugs in the CIS . The region contains probably the world's larges tunbroken swath of wild marijuana—some 125,000 to 140,000 hectares —extending through Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan . In addition, some 3,000 to 5,000hectares of opium poppy are cultivated illegally, primarily in Uzbekistan ,Tadjikistan, and Turkmenistan . Largely because of favorable climatic conditions ,Central Asia produces higher-potency narcotics crops than those found elsewher ein the former USSR . Central Asian drugs consequently are much in demand i nRussia and other CIS republics .

Drugs do not represent a new phenomenon in Central Asia. For example ,peasants have cultivated opium for medicinal needs and for use in family ritual ssuch as weddings and funerals . Yet, cultivation has acquired commercia lovertones in recent years . Poppy hectarage in Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, an d

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Turkmenistan reportedly has expanded rapidly since the mid- or late 1980s— aconsequence of Moscow's deteriorating hold over Central Asia, worsenin gconditions in the region's rural areas, and the apparently growing market fo rnarcotics, especially in the European regions of the former USSR . Although thehuge marijuana fields in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan could significantly affec tworld markets for cannabis products—and some Central Asian marijuana an dhashish is now trickling into Western markets—the region's opium cultivationbase remains relatively small by world standards . Central Asia's product mix i ssimilarly unthreatening . Peasants frequently do not extract the opium sap fro mthe poppy capsules, preferring to harvest their crops as straw, which comprise sthe entire capsule and 15 to 20 centimeters of the upper stem . Although straw i spopular among CIS addicts, who chemically convert it to a cheap heroi nsubstitute, virtually no market for this product can be documented in the West .In addition, narcotics entrepreneurs in the region are relatively unsophisticated :Heroin refining is virtually nonexistent, and no Central Asian "cartels" have take ncontrol of marketing drugs outside the region .

In the aftermath of the USSR's collapse, Russians and Western observers hav eexpressed apprehension that Central Asia will become a significant source regionfor heroin during the 1990s . Yet, Central Asia most likely will require a nexternal catalyst to precipitate their participation in the world heroin trade on an yserious scale . Central Asia's Moslem neighbors—Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, andAfghanistan—conceivably could supply Central Asia with heroin refining skills ,trafficking expertise, and entrepreneurial drive . To date, however, foreigntraffickers have shown little interest in the region. Marketing Central Asianheroin would pose problems, both because Central Asia is relatively isolated fro mWestern markets and because CIS addicts content themselves with cheap,

homemade concoctions derived from poppy straw . Nevertheless, the possibilitythat foreign traffickers will establish production facilities and heroin traffickin gnetworks in the region obviously cannot simply be dismissed .

The potential effect of the traffic on Central Asian economic and political lifeis of equal if not greater concern than the drug dealing per se . The apparentexpansion of poppy hectarage and the movement of ever-larger numbers ofpeasants into poppy cultivation would create new and powerful narcotic s"lobbies" in the region. Moreover, the actions that Central Asian states can take

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to halt this trend are not clear . Law enforcement institutions in the region hav esuffered from the collapse of the USSR and the termination of narcotics-relate dassistance from Moscow, although some republics are functioning better thanothers . Laws and criminal procedures generally are antiquated and affordcriminals numerous loopholes . The widespread local corruption has a long an dinfamous history. During the Soviet period, Uzbek, kolkhozy, and sovkhoz ywere cultivating opium and reporting the output as cotton . Corrupt Uzbekofficials would lead Soviet pilots charged with eradication missions away fro mlocalities where drug crops were produced. Drugs also constitute a factor in th epolitical instability of the region : Machinations by narcotics dealers contributedto the Uzbek-Turk clashes in the Fergana Valley in 1989 and to the Uzbek -Kirghiz riots in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) in 1990 .

The consumption of illicit substances in Central Asia and elsewhere in the CI Scontinues to trouble law enforcement and health authorities . Chemicalizedconcoctions derived from poppy straw—in effect, crude forms of heroin—arewidely popular in Russia and in the cities of Central Asia. The poppy drugculture predominates among addicts in most of the republics of the former USSR .In Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which include huge extensions of wild marijuana ,cannabis use is more prevalent . However, other troublesome trends can bedocumented, including the high rates of amphetamine consumption in Mosco wand the Baltics, the growth of amphetamine use in Kyrgyzstan, the appearance o fnew generations of powerful amphetamines and synthetic opiates in Moscow an dother Russian cities, and the extremely rapid growth of poppy addiction i nTashkent and Alma Ata .

Narcotics trafficking stands as a potentially contentious issue in Russian-Central Asian relations . Nonetheless, Russian narcotics officials currently ar ereluctant to air their views about the Central Asian republics . Their reticenceundoubtedly stems from their desire for positive results from Russia's diplomaticovertures to restore a common law enforcement infrastructure that encompasse smost of the former Soviet republics . In addition, Moscow does not possess th eresources or manifest the inclination to restore any time soon flows of narcotic sassistance to Central Asia . Yet, Central Asian drugs do not necessarily rank a tthe forefront of the Russian MVD's priorities . The growing trade in powerfulsynthetic substances—which do not originate in Central Asia—apparently

3

constitutes a more fundamental concern, at least for some Moscow officials .Even more worrisome is the entry of traditional organized crime networks int othe wholesaling and retailing of narcotics . By affiliating with these preexistin gcriminal organizations in the coming years, drug dealers can greatly expand thei reconomic and political influence in Russia .

The emerging narcotics structure in the CIS entails serious implications fo rU.S . and Western policies . The West holds a general interest in developing stabl eand legitimate societies in the post-Soviet world . The criminalization ornarcotization of political and economic life in the former Soviet republics cannotbe in the best interests of any country . The tendency of narcotics industries t oexacerbate local political conflicts constitutes another serious concern. Narcotic sassistance programs for the CIS thus would serve important Western diplomati cgoals. Furthermore, narcotics industries in Central Asia and elsewhere still ran kat a fairly rudimentary stage of development . Consequently, appropriate Wester nassistance could produce significant positive effects . The possibility that CentralAsia could assume the status of a heroin producer some time in the 1990s als oshould drive Western calculations . Uncertainties about the quality of lawenforcement institutions suggest that Western assistance initially should b emodest, focusing on legal reforms, administration of justice programs, and th etraining of relevant police forces . However, the West should not delay thedevelopment of a counternarcotics strategy for Central Asia and the rest of th eCIS . Indeed. Western inaction on the narcotics issue will jeopardize the buildin gof a stable post-Communist order in Eurasia .

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INTRODUCTIO N

The demise of communism, increasing Westernization, internal economicreform, and the disintegration of the Soviet state all create fertile soil for th egrowth of organized crime, including drug trafficking in the former USSR . Thefive states of Central Asia—Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan ,and Kazakhstan—represent an increasingly important element of this dangerou sdrug dynamic . The collapse of Moscow's authority in these republics, th eregion's generally bleak economic prospects, and (by some measures) the risin gnarcotics consumption in parts of the former Soviet Union correlate with anapparently massive expansion of drug crop cultivation in Central Asia .

MVD officials in Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, and Uzbekistan registered vastincreases in poppy sowings in these republics between 1989 and 1992 . "We seethat the planted area has expanded, and at the same time that life is moreexpensive and the economy is getting worse," says an Uzbek MVD official . 'Traffickers are financing some of this new cultivation by hiring peasants an dsometimes entire villages to plant and protect the crops . Poppy cultivation offersenormous economic returns per unit of land when compared to traditiona lagricultural crops such as cotton, potatoes, vegetables, and grapes . Not onlypeasants but also members of the upper echelons of society seemingly covet apiece of this action. In one Uzbek oblast, prominent citizens such as the head of apublic catering establishment and the deputy director of an asphalt plant werediscovered growing opium poppies during a crop eradication campaig n("Operation Poppy") conducted by Moscow in 1990 .2

Such trends might well accelerate in coming years . The resources thatgovernments can devote to drug law enforcement are extremely limited . TheUSSR's collapse resulted in the end of the subsidies from Moscow that ha daccounted for anywhere from 25 to 45 percent of public spending in Centra lAsia. As of 1992, Moscow also ceased funding counter-narcotics operations i n

Bern Bambayev . Interview with ABC News . Samarkand. May 1992 .Vladimir Berezovskiy . "Will Uzbekistan Turn into Another Colombia?" NezavisimayaGazyeta. July 9, 1991, p . 6 .

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the region, including aerial crop surveys and so-called Operation Popp ycampaigns—coordinated crop eradication missions. (These operations, initiate dofficially in 1986, relied on joint actions by the Soviet MVD, KG Brepresentatives, various republic organizations, and helicopters and pilots fro mthe Soviet Ministry of Defense.) Moreover, Central Asia's grim economi cconditions—widespread poverty, expanding populations, high unemployment, an dphysical isolation from world markets—probably will propel even largernumbers of Asians into the lucrative opium business . The same conditions mayencourage governments to tolerate the business . Two Central Asiangovernments, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, recently contemplated introducing theofficial cultivation of opium as a technique for earning hard currency, a sdiscussed in Section Two of this report. In addition, archaic drug laws and weakcriminal justice institutions complicate drug law enforcement in all of the CentralAsian states. Corruption is simply endemic : Throughout Central Asia, cla nloyalties and other personal ties cut across financial authority arrangements an dfacilitate the partial coalescence of mafia-type organizations (including those thatdeal in drugs) with the official power structure .

Finally, the USSR's collapse and its replacement by the CIS undoubtedly wil lbenefit drug trafficking from Central Asian and other former Soviet republics .The CIS retains a common economic space and almost transparent borders, bu tno common law enforcement structures . The sovereign member states have ye tto negotiate practical cooperation on matters such as interdiction, join tinvestigations, crop eradication, antidrug legislation, and extradition. In effect ,traffickers can roam freely around the commonwealth, but authorities are no tfree to pursue them. Furthermore, in the near absence of customs controls ,shipping drugs from Tashkent to St . Petersburg, for example, is virtually riskfree. The Central Asian states are hypersensitive about their newly-gaine dsovereignty and recoil from giving the Russian police information about localtrafficking groups or drug shipments in progress . The Central Asians resen tanything that resembles dictated policies . As a Moscow MVD officer noted in aninterview with ABC News last May, "All the new republics are suffering fro msort of national insecurity . Now that they are independent, they are not going t olisten to anyone . No one is going to tell them what to do anymore . " 3

3

Valentin Roshchin. Interview with ABC News. Moscow. May 1992 .

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Despite this rather alarming assessment, Central Asia hardly ranks currentl yas a world-class narcotics threat . The region's poppy cultivation base is on a parwith that of minor producers such as Thailand or Colombia, not with that o fmajor actors such as Afghanistan, Laos, or Burma . Opium outputs are notparticularly large: Farmers harvest much of their crop in the form of poppystraw—a product popular among CIS addicts but disdained by their Wester ncounterparts . Heroin refining in the region is essentially nonexistent . Smallquantities of Central Asian hashish, marijuana, and possibly opium are appearin gin Western European markets, but, from the European perspective, the influx o fSouth American cocaine, Southwest Asian heroin, and Polish amphetaminesrepresent far bigger threats. Moreover, the Central Asian drug trade remain sweakly organized and integrated . Organized criminal groups—narcomafias—d oexist and have developed ties with officialdom . However, transactions amongindividual actors—farmers, middlemen, retailers, and the like—still characterizemuch of the illegal drug market. Central Asian trafficking organizations aremostly local entities with a limited marketing reach . Indeed, the intra-CIS dru gtrade, including the transportation and final distribution of narcotics, usually i shandled by Caucasian groups, Azeris, Chechens, and Georgians—not by ethni cCentral Asians .

From Russia's viewpoint, Central Asia remains a significant narcotics threat .The narcotics relationship between these states and Russia is somewha tcomparable to the one between Latin America and the United States . Since thecollapse of the USSR, which obliterated Moscow's direct control over Centra lAsia's law enforcement institutions, the parallel is becoming ever more evident .The potential for conflict between Russia and Central Asia over the narcotic sissue is clear . As Yevgeniy Primakov, Chief of the Russian Intelligence Service ,declared in a recent interview, "Russia has no interest in leaving its borders ope n

so that they can be crossed by gangs carrying weapons and drugs ."4 Recreatingformal ties with MVD anti-narcotics units in Central Asia and elsewhere has bee na major objective of Russian "drug diplomacy" in the past year, as Section Fou r

of this report details . Yet, although the Central Asian states loom large in th e

4

Victor Yasmann . "Primakov Argues for Russian Control of Central Asian Borders . "RFE/RL Daily Report . No. 171 . September 7, 1992, p . 2 .

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Russian MVD's strategic concerns, their narcotics operations should be placed i nperspective. As Section Four demonstrates, the flood of drugs from Central Asi aexpected by many Russian and Western observers in the aftermath of the USSR' scollapse has not yet materialized . Furthermore, as Russia public health and polic estatistics make clear, most of the principal drugs consumed in Russia—popp ystraw, cannabis, and amphetamines—originate in Russia or Ukraine, not i nCentral Asia . The higher-potency Asian strains of cannabis and poppy strawdominate illicit drug markets in major Russian cities, but not in the country as awhole. The highest rates of drug abuse in Russia correlate almost precisely withthe major centers of poppy and marijuana cultivation in the far southern and fa reastern parts of the country . Finally, Russian MVD officials interviewed by thi swriter evince or profess more concern about new generations of dangerou ssynthetic drugs—both amphetamines and opiates—appearing in Russian market sand aborting flows of plant-based drugs from Central Asia .

Central Asia nonetheless stands as "Russia's Latin America" and poses apotential narcotics threat to the West—but the issue is not simply narcotics . TheUnited States and the West (and, for that matter, Russia) hold a general interest i nthe stable and legitimate development of societies emerging from the rubble o fthe Soviet empire . Everywhere in the world, drugs are associated withcorruption, institutional decay, and political instability. The world clearly wil lnot benefit from the evolution of new Colombias, Perus, or Bolivias in Centra lAsia or elsewhere in the CIS . Narcotics assistance and programs that addres srelated problems of organized crime and terrorism thus would constitute a logica lextension of U .S . and Western diplomacy in the region . Such programs could b eeffective to the extent that the dimensions of the CIS drug problem still ar erelatively small by world standards and to the extent that the hard-pressedgovernments in the region are dedicated to containing the problem. Of course ,uncertainties abound over the quality of the drug-fighting institutions in theCentral Asian countries . Strengthening these institutions thus should be the firs tpriority of any narcotics assistance policy .

This study analyzes in detail the narcotics scene in Central Asia and also refer sto broader drug trafficking and drug abuse trends in the CIS . Section Onediscusses the regional dynamics of cultivating and producing plant-base dnarcotics . Section Two describes the economic and institutional implications o f

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Central Asian narcotics enterprises and the factors that might promote o rconstrain the growth of such enterprises . Section Three compares drug abus epatterns in the Central Asian states with those in other former Soviet republics .Section Four describes and analyzes Moscow's current perspectives on the Centra lAsian drug trade and on other narcotics-related matters . Section Five focuses onpolicy issues and assesses the significance of Central Asian narcotics operationsand consumption in the context of overall U .S . and Western diplomatic objective sfor the region .

The research sources and methods used in the study deserve a briefexplanation. During 1991 and 1992, the author made three field trips to th eformer Soviet Union and visited a number of countries, including Russia ,Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgystan, and Kazakhstan. (The author had hope dto visit Tadjikistan—an increasingly important player in the Central Asian dru gtraffic—but a deteriorating security situation in that republic ruled out the trip . )Research conditions in Central Asia ranged from good in Kyrgyzstan and (on asecond visit) in Uzbekistan to dismal in Turkmenistan, where republic and(Ashkhabad) city MVD officials flatly refused to grant the author appointments .

The breakup of the USSR complicated the implementation of this project. InSeptember 1991, the All-Union MVD's anti-narcotics unit professed willingnes sto help the author contact counterpart MVD units in Central Asia . Of course ,such cooperation was not forthcoming . In April 1992, just before departing fo rthe CIS, the author received a fax transmission from the (now Russian) MVD' sinternational department, which observed :

Since Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, andKazakhstan are now independent states, with respect to the questio nof furnishing assistance to your research program, you will have t ocommunicate directly with the Ministries of Internal Affairs of thes ecountries .

Of course, the requisite contacts were made, but at the cost of a 6-month delayin completing this report .

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The author's interviews with health, police, and security officials in Centra lAsia and Russia—and unpublished documentary materials obtained during thes emeetings—form the backbone of this report . Officials' conversations with anABC News team that visited the CIS in May 1992 also furnished colorful insight sabout national perceptions of the narcotics problem . (The author served as aconsultant for the ABC project and hence saw some of the transcripts of th einterviews.) The quality of CIS journalism on drug abuse and drug trafficking i salmost uniformly poor . No cadres of journalists have acquired real expertise o nnarcotics matters (comparable to Michael Isikoff of The Washington Post orJoseph Treaster of The New York Times) . With the exception of a study ofKazakhstan by Boris and Michael Levin that relies on 5-year-old data, publishe dsociological research on drug use in Central Asia is virtually nonexistent . Healthministries in Central Asia proved generally reluctant to give the author nationa ldata on the sex, age, nationality, and social background of narcotics users .Consequently, one aim of this project, constructing a comparative sociologica lprofile of drug use in Central Asia, could not be fulfilled . Despite these variousconstraints, the research project produced significant information and insights o nthe dimension and significance of Central Asia's narcotics trade . The resultingreport thus should prove useful to scholars, intelligence analysts, an dpolicymakers interested in understanding current developments in thi sstrategically important region .

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SECTION ONE

CULTIVATION AND PRODUCTION

The newly independent states of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan ,Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, and Turkmenistan—represent a logical starting point fo rdiscussing narcotics cultivation in the CIS . These states do not monopolize dru gcrop production : For instance, Western Ukraine and Southern Russia constitut eimportant source regions for poppy straw, and the Russian Far East (comparableto Central Asia) contains huge stretches of wild marijuana . Russia alone is said tocontain more than 1 million hectares of marijuana . 5 However, thetetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content or morphine content of Central Asia nnarcotics categorize them as especially high quality, making them a significan tfactor in illegal drug markets in the European regions of the CIS .6 Valenti nRoshchin, the head of the Moscow Interregional Bureau for Combatting Dru gTrafficking, estimates that 40 percent of the cannabis products, 40 percent of th epoppy straw, and 95 percent of the opium seized in Russia in 1992 originated i nthe Central Asian states . However, the Russian MVD now projects that 4 0percent of the Russian market is supplied by all outside sources, primaril yCentral Asia and the Ukraine . Moreover, General Aleksandr Sergeyev of th eRussian Administration for Combatting Narcotic Traffic reports, "We haveevidence of Central Asian drugs being smuggled out to Finland, Switzerland,France, and Germany . " 7 Most of this traffic involves soft drugs—hashish an d

United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) . "Special UNDCP Fact-Finding Missionin Seven Republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States ." UNDCP, Vienna . May6, 1992, p. 4.According to DEA, the THC content of wild marijuana in the Chu Valley may reach 6 to 7percent, compared to an average of 2 to 3 percent for wild marijuana in the former USSR as awhole . DEA. Drug Trafficking and Abuse in the Former Soviet Union . Washington, D .C.October 1992, p . 6 .Michael Levin, a Russian authority on drugs, estimates the morphine content of opiu mpoppies in Central Asia to be 10 to 14 percent, compared to 5 to 7 percent in the Souther nEuropean parts of the CIS and less than 1 percent in the Baltics. Personal communication .December 7, 1991 .Aleksandr Zelichenko of the Kyrgyz MVD gives a range of 12 to 18 percent for the poppygrown in Kyrgyzstan . Author's interview, Bishkek, April 1992 .Aleksandr N . Sergeyev. Interview with ABC News in Moscow in May 1992 .G. Shalayev . "Is the Balkan Route Becoming the Russian Route?" Rossiya . August 26 t oSeptember 1, 1992, p . 7 .Author's interviews with Valentin Roshchin in Moscow in December 1992 . (Hereafter:Roshchin interview.)

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marijuana. However, a smuggling channel apparently is being established to shipUzbek opium to the West via St . Petersburg, the Baltic countries, andScandinavia. In addition, some Southwest Asian heroin transits Uzbekistan an dTurkmenistan en route to Azerbaidjan, Georgia, and on to Turkey ; however, thelevel of Central Asian involvement in this traffic, if any, cannot be determined .

The Chu River Valley ranks as the principal source of wild high-grad emarijuana in Central Asia . The Valley runs between Kazakhstan and Kirghizi aand shelters an unbroken swath of high-quality marijuana—with a THC conten testimated at 3 to 7 percent—that encompasses some 125,000 to 140,000 hectares . 8Chu Valley cannabis dominates addiction patterns and trafficking activities i nthese republics, where cannabis-based preparations are more widely used tha npoppy preparations . The reverse holds true in the other three Central Asianstates . Table 1 summarizes these use patterns . Farmers also cultivate marijuanaillegally in Central Asia. According to the U.S. Drug EnforcementAdministration, the highest-quality marijuana found in the former USSR, so -called golden cannabis, is grown in Uzbekistan. Addiction patterns in TashkentCity differ from those in Uzbekistan as a whole (as documented later in this pape rand in Table 10), suggesting that the city or the surrounding oblast of the samename may be the site of much of this cultivation .

According to Moscow MVD sources . Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, an dTurkmenistan account for almost all of the illegal poppy crops grown in th eregion . Total cultivation is estimated at 3,000 to 5 .000 hectares—on a par withcultivation in Colombia or Thailand, but not with that of major producers such a sAfghanistan, Laos, and Burma . 9 However, cultivation apparently is expandin grapidly. The civil disturbances of the past year reportedly provoked farmers i nTadjikistan to increase poppy sowings massively . An Uzbek MVD source report s

See, for example, Tomas Svan. "The Chu Valley : This Song You Will Not Kill, You Wil lNot Stifle ." (Chuiskaya Dolina: Etu Pesnyu Nye Zadushish, Nye Ubyesh )Kazakhstanskaya Pravda . February 9, 1992.Author's interview with Sergei Kapyenkin of the Uzbek MVD in Tashkent, December 1992 .(Hereafter : Kapyenkin interview . )Author's interview with Boris Kalachev of the MVD Higher Militia School in Moscow i nMay 1992.A U.S. narcotics official report receiving an estimate of 3,600 hectares from Soviet MV Dofficials in Moscow in 1991 . Author's interview . December 1992 .

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Table 1

Percentage of Registered Addicts Usin gDifferent Illicit Drugs in Former USS R

(b y Republics1)

Non-Medical Preparation s

poppy-

ephedrine-based

cannabis

based

USSR 54 .3 24 .7 3 . 7

Russia 47 . 0(41 .0) 2

27 . 2(29 .0)

7 . 5(2 .0 )

Ukraine 76 . 0(85 .0)

6 .4 0 . 5

Byelorussia 77 .3 2 .4 4 . 1

Uzbekistan 50 .6 37 .5 --

Kazakhstan 29 . 2(15 .0)

51 . 1(65 .0)

0 . 6

Georgia 49 .5 15 .4 --

Azerbaidjan 24 .4 56 .0 --

Lithuania 70 .8 -- 3 . 1

Moldavia 41 .8 20 .9 9 . 0

Latvia 33 .3 2 .4 52 . 4

Kyrgyzstan 8 . 1(10 .0)

81 . 0(68 .0)

1 . 8

Tadjikistan 45 .1 39 .0 2 . 4

Armenia -- 43 .4 12 . 5

Turkmenistan 60 . 1(80 .0)

31 . 0(20 .0)

1 . 0

Estonia 45 .5 -- 36 .4

Residual percentages comprise polydrug addicts or thos eusing other categories of narcotics .

Figures in parenthesis denote approximate figures reporte dfor 1991 .

Sources : USSR Ministry of Health, 1989 .Russian Research Institute on Medical-Biologica lProblems of Narcology .Department of Psychiatry, Turkmen Medical Institute .

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that large multi-hectare plots guarded by hundreds of armed peasants appeare dlast summer on the Tadjik side of the Tadjik-Uzbek border . The Operation Ma k(poppy) campaign of 1990 discovered only 7 hectares of opium and marijuanacrops in Tadjikistan, but more than 48 hectares were located the followin g year.10In Turkmenistan, the MVD's drug control department reported in mid-1992 tha tthe "narcotics raw material base" of the republic, including both poppy an dmarijuana cultivation, had risen by 10 times since 1989 . Heat-resistant strains ofpoppy planted in Turkmenistan's Karakum desert account for much of tha tincrease . 11 In Uzbekistan, narcotics officials reported in April 1992 that poppysowings increased by 10 times in the previous 3 years . 12 In December, the Uzbe kMVD released figures documenting that in the first 9 months of 1992, poppyeradication rose one-third . opium seizures increased two-thirds, and poppy strawseizures exploded by 115 percent (compared to all of 1991) . Table 2 break sdown seizures between 1987 and 1992 . According to Uzbek MVD sources, a spoppy plantings increased, the characteristics of cultivation also changed .Peasants are more likely to plant opium on "ownerless" tracts in remote mountainlocations than to sow on private plots . Peasants' (or traffickers') fields are morelikely to be protected by armed guards . Opium fields are expanding in size, an dnew agricultural techniques are being introduced that enable producers to extractmore opium or straw per unit of land .

Calculating opium production in Central Asia is difficult . Estimates of annualopium yields per hectare range from between 4 and 5 kilograms to 50 kilograms ,as summarized in Table 3 . Between 10 and 30 kilograms might be a norma lrange. All these estimates assume one harvest per year from the same plot, bu tadditional harvests are possible . Alisher Dzhurayev, the former head of th eUzbek MVD's anti-narcotics unit, claimed in January 1992, "Narcotics producersuse advanced technology to grow opium-containing plants, and they extract a

Ibid .V. M. Aliyev. "Organized Crime and the Spread of Drugs in the Former USSR . "(Organizatsionnaya Prestupnost' i Rasprostranyennost' Narkotikov v Byvshik hRespublikakh SSSR.) Voprosy Narkologii . Nos. 3-4, 1992 . In press . (In Russian) .V. Zarembo . "Who Will Stop the Narcoconveyer ." (Khto Ostanavit Narkokonveier? )Turkmenskaya Iskra . June 26, 1992, p . 2 .A. Ageyev and A. Dzhurayev. Personal communication . April 1992 .

1 0

1 1

12

1 3

Table 2

Drug Seizures in Russia and Uzbekista n1987 to 1992

(in kilograms )

Russi a

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

Total 9,792 10,152 12,060 16,260 20,832 13,777 1

Raw Opium 94 36 32 35 69 4 4(65) 2

Poppy Straw 3,984 2,115 6,038 , 6,842 5,823 6,24 6

Hashish 1,028 737 811 598 658 25 9

Marijuana 3,189 6,852 4,812 8,038 12,737 6,82 1

Medicinal 34 75 98 11 30 N A

Other 1,463 337 269 736 1,515 407

Uzbekistan

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

Total 736 861 893 747 989 1

Raw Opium 3 .3 3 8 6 1 0

Poppy Straw 275 225 293 261 56 6

Marijuana 355 630 590 478 40 0

Other 103 3 2 2 1 3

9 month s2

11-month figure

Sources :

MVD Officials in the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan .December 1992 ."Special UNDCP Fact-Finding Mission in Seven Republics of The CIS ." May1992, p . 8 .

harvest two or three times per season ." 13 Nonetheless, one harvest seemingl yremains the norm for most of Central Asia, although improved farming method scould alter this picture dramatically over the next 4 years .

In fact, Central Asia's opium output apparently is relatively modest. Forexample, Uzbekistan authorities seized only 96 kilograms of raw opium—andRussia only 216 kilograms—from 1988 through the first 9 months of 1992 . Onthe other hand, as noted in Table 2, during that same period, Uzbekista nconfiscated 1,620 kilograms of poppy straw and Russia 27,064 kilograms (40percent of that total might originate in Central Asia) . Such statistics demonstratethat farmers frequently harvest their fields as straw rather than opium . InKazakhstan, police sources report that virtually all poppy production is harveste das straw . 14 The straw is usually but not always uncut—that is, the opium sap ha snot been extracted from the poppy capsule . (According to an Uzbek narcologica lspecialist, traffickers sometimes try to cheat addicts by selling them cut straw .) 1 5

These harvesting patterns sometimes are explained by the extremely labor -intensive and expensive process of extracting the opium sap, fear of detection,and the poor quality of second or third poppy growths . However, the primar yjustification apparently is economic : The farmer can earn a respectable incomefrom poppy straw, perhaps equalling or exceeding the value of opium from th esame field, as illustrated in Table 4. Central Asia's opium productio nconsequently seems insufficient to satisfy regional demands . In Turkmenistan ,addicts exchange gold, jewelry, and armaments for opium from Afghanistan .Tadjikistan's addicts import most of their opium from Afghanistan . In late 1992,Tadjik dealers were peddling Afghan opium in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan . 1 6

Some of the "Central Asian" opium that Valentin Roshchin detects flowing int oRussian markets conceivably originates in Afghanistan rather than Central Asia .

"The Black Paths of White Death." (Chernye Tropy Beloi Smerti .) Narodnoye Slovo .Tashkent . January 29, 1992, p . 2 .Author's interview in Alma Ata with Victor Gorelkin of the Kazakh MVD in December 1992 .(Hereafter: Gorelkin interview . )Author's interview in Tashkent with Safar Atabayev of the Tashkent Narcological Dispensar yin April 1992.Gorelkin interview .Author's interview with Aleksandr Zelichenko of the Kyrghyz MVD in December 1992 .

1 3

1 4

1 5

16

1 4

Table 3

Raw Opium Yields Per Hectare Per Year in Central Asi a

Source and Date

Uzbek MVDApril - May 199 2(AlisherDzhurayev ; BemBambayev )

Uzbek MVDDecember 199 2(Sergei Kapionkin )

Russian MVDDecember 199 2(Arkadi iKuznetsov )

Russian MVDDecember 199 2(Boris Kalachev ,Higher MilitiaSchool )

Location Yiel d

Uzbekistan 4 to 5 kg .

Uzbekistan usually 10 to 15 kg . ;30 kg . upper limit

Central Asia usually 20 to 30 kg . ;50 kg . under"industrial "circumstances

Kirghizia in1960s

40 to 50 kg .

Central Asia has been described as Russia's Latin America, and obviou sparallels indeed can be cited . The region is ethnically and culturally distant fro mEuropean Russia; the republics in the region now stand as sovereign states ; and asubstantial segment of Central Asia's narcotics output finds its way westward t oRussia and other former Soviet republics. Narcotics industries in Central Asia ,however, are still in a rudimentary development stage . As noted, Central Asianfarmers often do not extract the opium from poppy plants, preferring to harves tthe plants as straw . No evidence suggests that Central Asia is manufacturin gheroin or morphine base . By all accounts, trafficking organizations outside th eCIS have not yet established production bases, drug distribution networks, o rmoney laundering ventures in most of the Central Asian states . Tadjikistanpossibly represents an exception : Afghan mojaheddins fighting in the Tadjik civi lwar could offer a channel for Afghan penetration and manipulation of loca lnarcotics businesses .

Finally, Central Asian narcotics organizations remain weakly integrated an dlargely local in scope . A Samarkand cartel or its equivalent in other Centra lAsian states has yet to emerge . Trafficking organizations based in the regio nrarely distribute narcotics beyond the frontiers of their respective republics .Central Asian traffickers occasionally sell marijuana, hashish, poppy straw, o ropium to "foreign" dealers—for example, Azeris, Chechens, Georgians, o rgypsies—who then transport the drugs to Moscow, St . Petersburg, and otherEuropean CIS countries and most frequently also distribute the drugs in thesecities . Of course, transportation and distribution are highly profitable : Forinstance, purchasing a kilogram of opium in Russia in late 1992 cost 2 millio nrubles, 4 to 10 times the price in Tashkent . Given these incentives, some analystsactually wonder why Central Asia has not participated more extensively in theintra-CIS drug trade .

Soviet sociological research on criminal organizations furnishes some insigh tinto drug trafficking patterns among the former Soviet republics . In agroundbreaking study published in 1977, Anzor Gabiani, a Georgian sociologist ,described a multi-regional trafficking ring headquartered in Georgia andencompassing five republics, including Kazakhstan (depicted in Figure 1) . Theorganizer of the ring, Andriasova, resided in Tbilisi (although she possibly wasnot an ethnic Georgian) . Andriasova's organization included a courier ,

1 5

Table 4

Comparative Yield Figuresfor Opium and Legal Crops

(in rubles, mid-late 1992, per hectare )

Crop Pric e(rubles)

Annual Yiel d(kilograms)

Gross Income(rubles )

Raw 300,000 to 270 81,000 t oCotton 480,000 per ton 129,60 0

Potatoes 17,000 to 870 14,790 to25,000 per ton 21,75 0

Vegetables 30,000 per ton 1,880 56,40 0

Grapes 17,500 per ton 762 13,33 5

Opium 200,000 to 10 to 30 2,000,000 t o500,000 pe rkilogram

15,000,00 0

Poppy 8,000 to 15,000 1,000 to 6,000,00 0Straw per kilogram 1,200

Sources :

Press office of the President of Uzbekistan .Tashkent City Narcological Dispensary .Uzbek MVD .

Artyunyan, who also was based in Tbilisi . Artyunyan traveled to Kazakhstan topick up morphine powder in Chimkent from Saidkulov, who in turn obtained th edrug from a prime source with connections to the state pharmaceutical factory i nthat city. These examples emphasize that although Central Asia was the source o fthe morphine, the entrepreneurial brains behind the trafficking network wer ecentered elsewhere in the Soviet Union . This pattern apparently still holds true —Central Asians continue to rely on outside organizers to move their drugs to th eEuropean region of the CIS .

1 6

Figure 1A Soviet Morphine Rin g

Prime Source i nI Chimkent (Identit y

Unknown)

Group of Criminal sWho Protect Andriasov aand Arutyunyan

MiddlemanSaidkulovin Chimkent

Aide and Courie rArutyunyan i nTbilisi

OrganizerAndriasovain Tbilisi

Group of Retai lDealers i nYerevan

Retail Deale rGrikurov (Addict )

Tbilisi

Retail Deale rAtoyan (Addict )

Tbilisi

Group of Retai lDealers i nMoscow

Retail DealerKvirkvell a

(Addict )Tbilis i

1

Prime Source" has obtained the morphine illegally from the Stat eChemical Pharmaceutical factory in Chimkent, Kazakhstan .

Source :

Anzor Gabiani, Narcotism (Narkotizm) :

Concrete Sociologica lResearch Based on Materials of the Georgian SSR .

(Tbilisi, 1977) ,p . 45 .

SECTION TWO

PROSPECTS

Central Asia still operates in a backwater of the international narcotics traffic .The poppy cultivation is not large by world standards . The region's principalpoppy product, poppy straw, enjoys virtually no market outside the CIS . Heroinproduction in the region is still virtually nonexistent, and the growth of such a nindustry is restricted by geographical isolation from Western markets and by th eavailability of cheap heroin substitutes (khimka and khanka, as discussed in th efollowing section) . Narcotics trafficking in Central Asia increasingly is assumin gthe status of an organized business, but ethnic Central Asian traffickers have bee nunable or unwilling to develop extensive marketing and distribution channel soutside of their respective republics . Moreover, international drug criminals arenot swarming to Central Asia—possibly because they perceive few immediateprospects for integrating the region into their ongoing business activities .

Of course, the advent of heroin refining in Central Asia could considerabl ychange the region's backwater image . This possibility obviously must be factore dinto U.S., European, and Russian assessments about the future narcotics threa tposed by the region . Given the torpor and disorganization that characterize theCentral Asian trafficking scene, establishing heroin production may require a noutside catalyst . Yet, Central Asia's growing economic ties with its Moslemneighbors—including experienced narcotics producers such as Turkey, Iran ,Pakistan, and Afghanistan—will offer a conduit for transferring refining an dtrafficking expertise throughout the region . Drug dealers in countries such a sTurkey and Iran—which punish drug offenses harshly—could see the peso an dweak Asian states as alternative ancillary sites for heroin refining facilities . Asdiscussed in Section Two, Central Asia's geographical isolation from Wester nmarkets and the availability in the CIS of a cheap heroin substitute (acetylate dconcoctions from poppy straw) may retard the growth of heroin production i nthe region . So far, foreign (non-CIS) trafficking organizations exhibit littl einterest in the region. Nonetheless, the curse of heroin may not be far offmarkets for the drug are growing worldwide, and Central Asia possesses the ra wmaterial, if not yet the entrepreneurial talent, to capitalize on these opportunities .

1 7

Moreover, current trends point to a future "narcotization" of the economie sand the governing institutions of the Central Asian states. Peasants will continueto grow more diverse and larger drug crops . Greater quantities of opium ,hashish, and poppy straw will circulate in CIS drug markets, and la wenforcement officials in Central Asia and other CIS states are ill-equipped t ocounter this expansion . The drug traffickers' infiltration of police agencies andgovernment institutions will spread to more localities and will reach highe rpolitical levels .

Two factors underlie this rather grim assessment : the extremely high relativ ereturn from poppy cultivation and the limited capabilities of Central Asian la wenforcement agencies . The difference per-land-unit income from poppy (bot hstraw and raw opium) versus legal crops is depicted in Table 4 . Evenincorporating very conservative assumptions, an Uzbek farmer reaps enormou searnings from a hectare of poppy . Assuming an opium yield of 10 kilograms pe rhectare per year and a price of 200,000 rubles per kilogram, the farmer's incom ecan soar to 20 times the income from a hectare of cotton, 35 times that from ahectare of vegetables, and 150 times that from a hectare of grapes . Similarly, aCentral Asian farmer could earn 450 to 500 times more by harvesting onehectare of poppy than he could by working in a kolkoz for an entire year . In thecontext of Central Asia's collapsing legal economies, high unemployment rates ,and abysmally low rural standards of living, such disparities could wel lprecipitate a widespread burst in poppy cultivation . According to a recent articl ein Rossiya, the cultivation of drug crops in Tadjikistan already has become "theprincipal means of survival for many persons ." 17 The possibility that Centra lAsia's economies could come to depend largely on the production and export o fnarcotic substances seems a very real prospect at this juncture .

The tremendous earnings that can be realized from opium sales of cours eprompted recent discussions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan about reinstating lega lpoppy cultivation. Neither country now ranks as a significant producer of illega lopium or straw, but both farmed opium before 1974 . Kirghizia's opium wasshipped to the state pharmaceutical plant in Chimkent, Kazakhstan, for

17

Yuriy Kushko. "May Allah Help in the Struggle Against Satanic Potions ." Rossiya .August 26-September 1, 1992, p . 7 .

1 8

1 8

1 9

processing . (In the early 1970s, Kirghizia accounted for 16 percent of th eworld's supply of legal opium .) In 1974, the USSR imposed a nationwide ban oncultivating poppies with a high morphine content . Kirghizia's state opiumplantation, which at one time extended over 2,000 hectares and employed 20,00 0people, was cut down . Smaller fields in Southern Kazakhstan also were

eliminated.18 The leakage of as much as 40 percent of Kirghiz opium productio ninto the illicit drug market apparently prompted the ban . In the late 1980s orearly 1990s, the Chimkent plant—the only installation manufacturing opiat edrugs in the former USSR—stopped processing opium alkaloids . (After 1974 ,the raw materials had been imported, predominantly from India .) The pattern ofregular thefts of opium and morphine from the plant over more than 20 year salso may have contributed to the decision to halt production of these drugs .Today, the plant is operating at a much-reduced capacity and is manufacturin gother pharmaceutical drugs, including cough medicine containing ephedrine ,which the addicts can process into amphetamines .

Economic conditions compelled Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to reconside rthese prohibitionist policies . In early 1992, the government of Kazakhsta ncontemplated cultivating poppies on a small scale in Taldy-Kurgan oblast . Thisscheme definitely was dropped, according to Kazakh MVD and Health official sinterviewed by this writer in December 1992 . "All our officials are categoricall yagainst legalizing cultivation," affirmed Vladimir Artemenko, the chairman o fthe Kazakh branch of the International Association for Struggle Against Dru gAbuse and Drug Trafficking, which is headquartered in Moscow . 19 In the firsthalf of 1991, the Kyrgyzstan government began evaluating a project to growpoppies in three oblasts—Talass, Naryn, and Issyk-kul . The proposed cultivatio narea originally comprised 9,000 hectares in the three oblasts, but by late 1991 ,the prospective area had been scaled back to 200 hectares and confined to Talas soblast . In early 1992—under enormous pressure from Russia, the Unite d

For an excellent survey of Kirghizia's pre-1974 opium industry: Karpak Kurmanov ."Contemporary Problems of Fighting Drugs in Kyrgyzstan" (Aktual'nye Problemy Bor'by iNarkomaniei v Kyrgyzstanye) . Izvestiya Akademii Nauk Kyrgyzstana . No. 3 . 1991, pp .24-31 .See also: Boris Kalachev and Nikolai Osipov . "The Colombian Syndrome in Central Asi a"(Kolumbiiskiy Sindrom Srednei Assi) . Moskovskiye Novosti . October 6, 1991, p . 6 .Gorelkin interview .Author's interview in Alma Ata with Vladimir Artemenko in December 1992 .

1 9

Nations, the United States, and domestic opponents—the idea was abandone daltogether .

Rather curiously, Felix Kulov, one of the original architects of the legalizatio nmovement and a former Kyrgyz MVD chief, became vice president of th erepublic in early 1992 . Legalization was viewed in part as a bargaining chip .One MVD representative who attended a July 1991 international meeting in AlmaAta of narcotics experts suggested to United Nations representatives tha tKirghizia should either be allowed to produce opium and opium products for theworld market or should be compensated by the international community for no tdoing so . 20 In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, decisions not to cultivate poppie sdoubtless were taken with regret . Kazakhstan's president, Nursultan Nazarbayev ,reportedly told an American researcher that his country's interest was served b yallowing some opium growing . 21 After the anti-legalization decision in hi scountry, Felix Kulov continued to tout the economic benefits of growing opium ."The economic advantages from production [of opium] are so great that the ywould significantly improve the situation in the republic," he said in an intervie wwith the Kyrgyz newspaper Republic in late February 1992.22 In May 1992,Kulov told an ABC news team that Kyrgyzstan could have earned $250,000,00 0in the first year and more in subsequent years from legalizing opium— acalculation that presupposed the processing of opium into pharmaceutica lproducts . "Of course," observed Kulov, "Legal production of opium wouldbecome a national tragedy . . .although from a purely economic point of view, w ecould quickly become rich from this ." He further noted, "We don't have an ycrop or industry that could give similar profits ." 23 The point could hardly beclearer. Kyrgyz and Kazakh leaders undoubtedly will continue emphasizing th esacrifices that their countries have endured by not cultivating opium, hoping tha tthe international community will compensate them with increased aid or othermaterial benefits .

Author's interview in Bishkek with Aleksandr Zelichenko of the Kyrghyz MVD in Apri l1992. (Hereafter: Zelichenko interview.)Nancy Lubin . "Central Asia's Drug Bazaar." The New York Times . November 16, 1992 ,p. A16 ."Personal Opinion of Felix Kulov (Osoboye Mneniye Feliksa Kulova) ." Respublika .February 21, 1992 .Felix Kulov interview with ABC News in Bishkek in May 1992 .

20

2 1

22

23

20

Central Asia also is propelled into high-level drug production by a practicalreality : The capabilities and quality of law enforcement institutions in the Centra lAsian states are so anemic that they invite additional illegal activity . Constraintson effective law enforcement include the limited manpower and resource savailable to anti-narcotics units, the antiquated legal codes that govern the wor kof these units, and the pervasiveness of corruption in local police forces ,especially those in areas known for high-density poppy cultivation .

The capabilities of drug law enforcement units in Central Asia aresummarized in Table 5 . The collapse of the USSR has taken its toll on anti-dru goperations in the region . Before 1992, Moscow furnished helicopters ,manpower, money, equipment, herbicides, and satellite imagery to the Centra lAsian republics, but this assistance terminated when the USSR dissolved . Thecessation of assistance produced consternation among Central Asian narcotic sofficials . As two Uzbek MVD officials, Alisher Dzhurayev and Anatoly Ageyev ,wrote in a personal communication to the author in April 1992 :

How, in a newly created Commonwealth of Independent States, wil lwe implement such measures on customs controls, crop eradicationcampaigns, improvement of criminal laws, exchange of informatio non crimes, and controls on precursor chemicals? 24

Another republic official, Bern Bambayev, told ABC News in May, "We are stil lasking Russia for help." Kyrgyzstan's top narcotics official, AleksandrZelichenko, asked the author during a visit in April to "tell Aleksandr Sergeye v[the head of the Russian MVD's anti-narcotics administration] that he should pu tsome money here . "25

By the end of 1992, drug enforcement prospects in Central Asia were fairlybleak, albeit better in some republics than others . In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan ,narcotics units have no access to helicopters . In Kyrgyzstan, according toZelichenko, "We're creating mobile units on horses, in cars, and on foot to reac h

Ageyev and Dzhurayev, op. cit.Bem Bambayev . Interview with ABC News in Samarkand in May 1992 . (Hereafter:Bambayev interview . )Zelichenko interview .

2425

2 1

Table 5

Comparative Law Enforcement Capabilitie s

State No . of Police Access to Vehicles Organizational OtherEngaged in Helicopters Aspects Equipment

Anti-NarcoticsWork

Russia 1,500

(to Yes :

from NA Separate anti - NAincrease to MVD Internal narcotic s3,500

in 1993), Troops and administration i n60 in Moscow Transport Moscow, but no

Police or nationwide syste mfrom military

Kazakhstan 400 No 40 Narcotics service 100 dogssubordinate tocrimina linvestigationdivisions at al llevel s

Kirghizia 180 No 8 Centralized 6 millionnational anti- rublenarcotics budget, 2service, modeled computers ,on U .S . DEA 1 antiqua-

te d

Uzbekistan 113,

10

in Yes :

from 25 Narcotics service NATashkent Air Force subordinate to

crimina linvestigationdivisions at al llevel s

Turkmenistan NA Yes NA Similar to NoUzbekistan orKazakhstan

Sources :

Uzbek, Russian, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, MVDs, and press articles .

the most inaccessible places ." As Table 5 indicates, Kyrgyzstan is making do witha ridiculously small anti-narcotics budget, about $40,000 at mid-1992 rates o fexchange . On the other hand, Turkmenistan police reportedly did use helicoptersin that country's Mak-1992 campaign . In Uzbekistan, a decree from the office o fthe president gave anti-narcotics units access to three Ministry of Defens e(probably Air Force) helicopters, beginning in July 1992. The Defense Ministrypays the pilots' salaries, and local governments provide fuel, food, and landin gfacilities. (According to MVD officials, the helicopters were commissioned for 6hours per day for 1 month.) As already noted, the Uzbek MVD mounted arelatively successful Operation Poppy campaign in 1992, eradicating about one -third more hectares of opium than in the previous year . However, Serge iKapyenkin, the republic's chief narcotics officer, expressed concern that resourceconstraints might prevent continuing the arrangement with the Ministry o fDefense in subsequent years . 2 6

Anti-narcotics forces in the various CIS states exhibit important structura ldifferences. Kyrgyzstan's drug control unit is probably the most organizationall yadvanced in the CIS, but it also normally may be one of the worst equipped .Kyrgyzstan's 180-man force constitutes a unified, separate anti-narcotics service ,modeled somewhat after the U .S . Drug Enforcement Administration. InKazakhstan and Uzbekistan, anti-narcotics police are subordinate to crimina linvestigation departments at all levels, jeopardizing the unity of command an dgenerating jurisdictional conflicts . In Russia. General Sergeyev's 60-man anti -narcotics administration was detached from the MVD's criminal investigatio nhead administration in early 1991, but Sergeyev has not been able to acquir econtrol over the rest of the 1,500 to 3,500 police supposedly dedicated to anti -narcotics work in the Russian Federation . The importance of unified comman dand control for anti-narcotics work cannot be overemphasized . Kyrgyzstan'ssuccess in creating such a system is laudable and should be taken into accountwhen designing U.S . and Western anti-narcotics programs for Central Asia .

Law enforcement agencies also confront additional and fundamental lega lobstructions . Three former Soviet republics—Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, an d

26 Kapyenkin interview .Zelichenko interview with ABC News in Bishkek in May 1992.

22

Russia—have decriminalized drug use, creating yet another obstacle to effectiv edrug enforcement . 27 Furthermore. Kyrgyzstan plans to implement a similar pla nsome time this year . Kazakhstan and Russia eliminated civil penalties for dru guse, although such penalties will remain in Kirghizia's planned anti-dru glegislation ; Turkmenistan's drug law requires that drug users be fined or submi tto medical observations, but fines seldom are imposed . Although legalizing drug sof course constitutes a complex and controversial issue, eliminating penalties fordrug use while retaining them for drug trafficking merely contributes to th eprosperity of narcotics enterprises .

Legal codes in Central Asia, Russia, and other CIS countries do no tincorporate effective conspiracy statutes . Under current laws, arresting th eorganizers of narcotics enterprises is next to impossible—criminals must b eapprehended in the process of committing a crime . In a May 1992 interview ,ABC News asked Bern Bambayev, an Uzbek MVD officer, why it was so difficul tto arrest, charge, and convict people involved in planting opium . Bambayevresponded, "First you have to prove they did the planting . You have to catc hthem on the field at the moment of harvest ." Police can use informants, butBambayev notes, "Even if someone is willing to talk to us, they won't testify i ncourt, or they will recant their testimony"—a pointed commentary on the judicia lsystem's inability to protect witnesses against reprisals by drug criminals .28 InUzbekistan, a ludicrous provision in the 1987 drug code allows traffickers t oescape criminal liability if they voluntarily surrender their drugs, permitting th etraffickers themselves to determine the timing of surrender to protect themselve sagainst police raids. In practical application, traffickers in Uzbekistan keep drugstashes in their residences, complete with a prepared statement declaring thei rintention to turn the drugs over to the authorities . 29 In Kazakhstan, crimina lcodes require two civilian (non-police) witnesses to any drug bust, clearly tyin gthe hands of law enforcement officials and increasing the probability that arres t

Kazakhstan decriminalized in mid-1991, Turkmenistan in the late 1980s, and Russia i nDecember 1991 .Bambayev interview .Imomdzhan Safarov . "The Battle Against Storage and Sale of Narcotic Substances" (Bor'b as Khranyeniyem i Sbytom Narkoticheskikh Sredstv) . Dissertation Submitted for Candidate' sDegree in Jurisprudence . Uzbek Academy of Sciences. Tashkent. 1990, p. 22 .

2 7

2 8

29

23

plans will be leaked to the criminals involved. Such obsolete criminal codesobviously must be revamped before drug law enforcement can be effective . 30

Finally, law enforcement must overcome widespread corruption . Instances ofcorruption at the oblast and raion levels were widely reported during the Sovie tperiod, especially in the opium republics of Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, an dTurkmenistan. In Uzbekistan, drug corruption boasts a long and storied history .According to the Uzbek MVD's Sergei Kapyenkin, in the early 1980s in th eKarakalpak ASSR, sovkhozy and kholkozy were planting opium "using tractor sand other advanced agricultural technology ." In 1982, an enormous 13-hectareplot was discovered on one kolkhoz in that oblast . Officials in the ASSR Partyand government apparats were heavily implicated in the illegal poppy cultivation .Kapyenkin observes that this activity conceivably was linked to the so-calle d"cotton scandal" of the period—officials were fabricating cotton productio nfigures for land used to cultivate opium. Beginning in 1984, the year that th ecotton scandal first came to light, a crackdown on Karakalpak was instigated, n odoubt at the behest of Moscow . Eradication teams destroyed 214 hectares ofpoppy plants in the ASSR in 1984, more than they leveled in the entire republi cof Uzbekistan in 1991 . A total of 61 more hectares were cleared between 198 5and 1987 . "At that time, we had the problem under control," said Kapyenkin ."But at the end of the 1980s, farmers again began cultivating opium i nKarakalpak. "3 1

The pervasiveness of corruption in Soviet Uzbekistan is further documente dby the deliberate misdirection of eradication teams . Before the Union broke up ,Uzbek officials sometimes would deliberately mislead Soviet helicopter pilot stasked with eradication missions, encouraging them to fly around or away fromprotected poppy fields . Wise to the deceptive practices of their hosts, the Sovie tpilots themselves sometimes would manage to locate the fields . In 1991 inUzbekistan, operatives of the Soviet MVD's elite Dzherzhinskii division swoope ddown on a 2-hectare poppy plot in Samarkand oblast and were greeted by a nangry peasant who asked them, "Why did you come here? We already gav emoney to the raion. Wasn't it enough?" Despite these protestations, th e

30 Gorelkin interview.31

Kapyenkin interview .

24

eradication team destroyed roughly one-third of the illegal plot, planning t oreturn the next day to finish the job . Their intentions were thwarted, however :A television correspondent accompanying the mission was informed that Uzbe kofficials in the oblast criminal investigation department had pressured thei rsuperiors to cancel the mission . 32 In an interview late in January 1992, the then -narcotics chief of the Uzbek MVD, Alisher Dzhurayev, accused raio ngovernments—Samarkand, Surkhandaya, and Karakalpak—of "unconcern ,connivance if not worse" in their handling of the poppy trade . Responding to aquestion on whether drug distribution in Uzbekistan was comparable to that i nColombia, Dzhurayev noted the emergence of "organized narco-structures" in th erepublic, although he stressed that such groups lack the "professionalism" an d"experience" of their Colombian counterparts . 33 Traffickers' inroads into thesociety may already be considerable, however. On an April 1992 visit toTashkent, this writer was told by a former Soviet militiaman (now a consultant t othe Uzbek Supreme Soviet's Committee on Defense, State Security, andProtection of War Veterans' Rights) that Uzbek drug dealers actually hol dpositions in the government bureaucracy, state economic enterprises, and politicalparty organizations .

As the foregoing analysis suggests, narcotization of the economies an dgovernment structure of Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states coul dconstitute an increasing problem in the 1990s . The narcotics threat, however ,also takes another form. In many parts of the developing world, the narcotic strade is associated not only with corruption but also with heightened civi lhostilities and escalating societal violence . Strong evidence suggests that dru gdealers played an important role in the ethnic clash between Meshketian Turk sand Uzbeks in the Fergana Valley in May-June 1989 and the ethnic conflict a yea rlater between Uzbeks and Kirghiz in Osh, just over the Uzbek border i nKirghizia . Traffickers cynically donated narcotics to youthful rioters on both

Interview. Television correspondent accompanying ABC News team . May 1992 .Aleksandr Pogonchenkov . "Holiday of General Evil" (Prazdnik Obshchei Bedy) .Moskovskii Komsomolets . January 18, 1992, p . 3 . (In Russian . )Alisher Dzhurayev . "The Black Paths of White Death ." op. cit.On Central Asian Drug Trafficking and Corruption see also : Graham Turbiville . "NarcoticsTrafficking in Central Asia: A New 'Colombia' in the World Drug Trade ." Paper prepare dfor conference, "Narcotics in the CIS Region ." Sponsored by the U .S. State Department atthe Meridian International Center . Washington, D .C. September 11, 1992 .

3 2

33

25

sides during these incidents, attempting to exacerbate hostilities and thus draw theattention of police and security groups away from the poppy harvesting thattraditionally occurs during May and June . Although these incidents apparentlydid not involve the use of drug money to finance anti-state or separatis tmovements—the prevailing pattern in Peru, Burma, Lebanon and elsewhere—they nonetheless offer a dismal commentary on the potentially destabilizin geffects of narcotics trafficking enterprises . 3 4

34 Interview. Vyacheslav Tarbeyev. Press Office of the President of Uzbekistan . Tashkent.December 1992 .Boris Kalachev . "Mafia, Drugs and Weaponry" (Mafiya, Narkotiki i Oruzhiye) . Situatsiya .Number 6. September 1990, p . 2 .

26

SECTION THREE

DRUG ABUSE PATTERN S

Poppies and cannabis plants of varying narcotic strength grow profusel ythroughout the territory of the former Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, drug sderived from poppies and cannabis are well represented in addict preferences, a sTable 1 indicates . In roughly 10 of the former Soviet Republics, addict sappearing in medical registers are more likely to use poppy substances thancannabis or other illicit drugs . In the other five republics, marijuana oramphetamine use constitutes the dominant consumption pattern . Clinicallyspeaking, poppy products pose the most serious narcotic threat in these republics .Such products have a distinct configuration in the remnants of the USSR . In mostof the former Union, drug addicts favor concoctions extracted from poppy stra w(the bulbs and upper stem of poppy plants) and, more rarely, from raw opium .The straw is boiled and converted to koknar, a kind of poppy tea, or is mixe dwith acetic anhydride and other chemicals to form a compound known as khimka ,a crude liquid heroin that addicts inject intravenously . Raw opium also can b econverted to an injectable heroin-type product, khanka, by using a less elaborateprocess than that used to make khimka. In Central Asia, a major source regionfor poppies, "acetylation" of opium or straw is far more common in cities than i nrural areas, where episodic smoking or eating of raw opium for medicinal o rritualistic purposes is deeply ingrained in the traditional culture .

Police in Russia and Central Asia seize far more poppy straw than opium, a sevidenced in Table 2, suggesting that poppy straw is the raw material of choicefor many CIS addicts . Economic factors explain this preference . As documente din Table 6, at 1991 Moscow prices, a kilogram of straw cost approximately 4,00 0rubles. In contrast, a kilogram of raw opium sold for 300,000 rubles, almost 10 0times as much. Perhaps for the same reason, heroin—which of course is muchmore expensive than opium—seldom is available in the CIS republics, althoug hsmall quantities of heroin from Iran and other Southwest Asian countriescirculate episodically in Moscow and St. Petersburg . Moreover, heroi nproduction has not emerged in the CIS, even in the opium-rich republics o fCentral Asia. For the majority of the addict population, acetylated poppy strawor opium concoctions may represent a cheap acetylate substitute for heroin .

2 7

Synthetic drugs—drugs manufactured from chemicals rather than agriculturalproducts—are assuming the status of a growing problem in CIS countries .Ephedrine derivatives already account for a significant share of dru gconsumption in Estonia, Latvia, and Armenia . According to Valentin Roshchin ,50 percent of Moscow's drug addicts use amphetamines exclusively or i ncombination with other drugs .35 Amphetamines also are gaining popularity in th e

distant reaches of Central Asia . According to the Kyrgyzstan MVD's anti -

narcotics service, 21 small laboratories for manufacturing ephedrone, a chea p

ephedrine derivative, were discovered in that republic in 1991 . The drug usuallyis manufactured by the addicts themselves, often in their own kitchens, fro mcough medicines and other pharmaceutical drugs containing ephedrine .

Ephedrone apparently is popular in Moscow . In 1992, Moscow police close d

down 180 laboratories that produced ephedrone . Ominously, in Russia,ephedrone is being supplemented by a new generation of amphetamines, mor epowerful substances such as phenamine and pervitin . These drugs are produce dnot by "addicts with shaking hands," to use General Sergeyev's term, but b yhighly qualified chemists who sometimes use the premises and equipment of

scientific research institutions for their illicit activities . Moreover, synthetic

opiates—particularly methadone and trimethylfentanil, produced primarily i nunderground laboratories in Azerbaidjan—are appearing in Moscow, St .Petersburg, Nizhnii Novgorod, Ulyanovsk, and other Russian cities . The use oftrimethylfentanil—a new-age drug that a Russian MVD chemist reports contains anarco-active ingredient 5,500 times as powerful as morphine—is spreadin grapidly among Muscovite addicts . Russian anti-narcotics officials estimate thateach month some 10,000 ampules (50,000 to 100,000 milliliters) enter the illici tdrug market in Moscow . These officials now view the new generations o fsynthetic narcotics as a more serious menace to public health and a more difficul tchallenge for law enforcement than the plant-based concoctions that traditionall y

have dominated Russia's urban drug scene . 36

The prevalence of drug abuse varies significantly by republic and by region ,as illustrated in Table 7, which lists drug-use rates for former Soviet states . B y

35

Roshchin interview .36

Shalayev, op. cit.

2 8

Table 6

Drug Prices, Moscow 1991 in Rubles

Raw Opium (per kilogram) 300,00 0

Poppy Straw (per kilogram) 4,00 0

Hashish (per kilogram) 5,00 0

Marijuana (per kilogram) 4,70 0

Morphine (per gram) 2,00 0

Phenadone-Methadone (per gram) 2,500

Sources : Russian Ministries of Health and Internal Affairs .

the end of 1990, Turkmenistan and the Ukraine, both indisputably popp ycultures, tallied the highest addiction rates—the largest number of registere daddicts per 100,000 population—in the former Soviet Union . Byelorussia and

Armenia registered the lowest rates . The Central Asian states exhibit tremendou s

variations in addiction rates : For example, in 1990, Turkmenistan's addictio n

rate was ten times that of Tadjikistan . Moreover, addiction rates also vary widely

sub-nationally . In Uzbekistan, the concentration of addiction in Tashkent ,

Samarkand, and Karakalpak oblasts may correlate with especially extensive popp y

production in these oblasts . Yet, as Table 10 demonstrates, cannabis addict soutnumber poppy addicts in the city of Tashkent—the reverse of the pattern for

the republic as a whole . In Kazakhstan, high addiction rates are associated partl yalthough not entirely with known drug-producing localities such as Chimkent and

Dzhambul, as illustrated in Table 8 and Table 9 . In Russia, of the 15 oblasts an dautonomous republics that register extremely high rates of addiction—more tha n

45 persons per 100,000 population, compared to a Russian average of 19 pe r

100,000—13 are in Southern Russia or in the Russian Far East, known centers ,

respectively, of poppy straw and marijuana production . Two other localities ,

Kalingrad oblast and the Tuva ASSR, also may serve as drug cultivation zones ,

although data are not readily available . 37 In 1988-1989, Anzor Gabiani

conducted a seven-region survey of narcotics use among secondary schoo l

students, providing additional insights into the geography of drug use . According

to the survey, 45 .8 percent of the respondents in Primorskiy Krai (in the Russia n

Far East) and 17 .2 percent in Stavropol Krai (in Southern Russia) had tried drug s

at least once . The survey documented a somewhat lower prevalence, 14 . 6

percent, in Tashkent City . Other regions sampled—including Novosibirsk and

Gorkiy oblasts and Moscow City (in Russia), Lvov oblast (in Ukraine), and th e

Latvian SSR—recorded rates of only 6 .0 to 9.0 percent . 3 8

Other substance abuse patterns in the former USSR are worth noting .Addiction to toxic substances not classified as narcotics—glue, acetone, hai r

Ageyev and Dzhurayev, op. cit.In contrast, Uzbekistan has no equivalent sub-national units with addiction rates of more tha n45 per 100,000, and Kazakhstan has only one, Dzhambul oblast, which coincide sgeographically with the enormous stretches of wild marijuana in the Chu River Valley .Anzor Gabiani . "Alcohol, Narcotics and Toxic Substances" (Alkogol, Narkotiki iToksicheshiye Veshchestva) . Unpublished paper . Tbilisi. 1989, p . 9 .

37

38

2 9

Table 7

NARCOTICS ADDICTS AND TOXIC ADDICT SPER 100,000 POPULATION 1985, 1989, 199 0

BY UNION REPUBLIC

1985 1989 1990 199 1

USSR 13.8 22.2 23.7

RSFSR 10.1 17.9 19.1 18 .7

Ukraine 19 .6 38 .3 41 . 3

Moldavia 2.3 6 .9 7 .9 - -

Byelorussia 1.1 3 .7 4 . 6

TOTAL 11.8 22.0 23.5

Latvia 3.4 13.5 15 .0

Lithuania 5 .8 10.4 N/A

Estonia 2.3 7.8 7 . 7

TOTAL 4.3 11.0 N/A

Georgia 17.4 17.5 18 .3

Armenia 10.9 6.3 6 . 2

Azerbaidzhan 7.5 15 .6 19 . 7

TOTAL 11.6 14.4 16.4

Turkmenia 161.7 100.9 94.8 85 .9

Kirghizia 32.2 26.7 26.9 28 . 2

Tadzhikistan 4.5 8 .5 9 . 5

Uzbekistan 12.3 20.7 20.6 19 .0

Kazakhstan 16.4 27.6 27.4 26 .5

TOTAL 25.3 30.3 27.6

Sources: Russian Research Institute on Medical-Biological Problems of Narcology ;Department of Psychiatry, Turkmen Medical Institute ; United Nations Dru gControl Program.

Table 8

Kazakhstan Drug Addiction Rates, 199 1(by oblast )

RegisteredAddict s

Oblast (per 100,00 0(unless otherwise specified) population )

Aktyubinsk (27 .9) 1

Alma Ata 19 . 6

Atirau 19 . 0

East-Kazakhstan 21 . 4

Dzhambul (57 .6 )

Dzhezhazgan {43 .7 )

Karaganda {38 .5 )

Kzyl Orda 19 . 7

Kokchetav 7 . 9

Kustanai 11 . 7

Mangistausk {31 .7 )

Pavlodar 11 . 0

North Kazakhstan 10 . 5

Semipalatinsk 17 . 3

Taldy-kurgan 24 . 8

Turgai 2 . 5

Uralsk 21 . 7

Tselinograd 18 .2

Chimkent

{41 .3 )

Alma Ata (city)

{39 .6 )

Leninsk (city)

2 . 5

Kazakhstan National

26 . 5

Source : Ministry of Health, Kazakhstan .

1

Enclosure--{)--signifies addiction rates higher than th enational average .

Table 9

UzbekistanAddiction Rates By Locality

Oblast, ASSR, or CityAddict s

per 100,00 0

Karakalpak (31 .2) 1

Andizhan 9 . 5

Bukhara 18 . 8

Dzhizak 13 . 6

Kashkadar 12 . 3

Namangan 7 . 8

Samarkand {42 .0 )

Surkhandarya 15 . 0

Syrdarya 18 . 4

Tashkent (oblast) {19 .6 )

Fergana 14 . 5

Khorezm 10 . 8

Tashkent (city) {28 .9)

Uzbekistan National

19 . 0

Source : Ministry of Health, Uzbekistan .

1

Enclosure--{)--signifies addiction rates higher than thenational average .

spray, weed killer, and the like—is relatively uncommon in republics wher eplant-based drugs are readily available . In 1989, according to Health Ministrydata, the ratio of drug addicts to toxic addicts was approximately 18 :1. in Ukraine,13 :1 in Central Asia, 7 :1 in Lithuania (a poppy-growing state), 4 :1 in Russia(where drug crops tend to be concentrated in the extreme southern and easter nreaches of the country), 2 :1 in Byelorussia, and 1 :1 in Latvia .39 Sociological dataon drug abuse are unfortunately sparse for the former USSR, but extant datasuggest that the age and sex of users vary considerably among republics an dregions . Turkmenistan might have the oldest contingent of addicts of any CI Scountry . According to public health data from that republics in 1987, 92 percen tof the addict population was at least 30 years old, and 69 percent was more tha n50 years old. In contrast, according to a 1990 Russia MVD report, 58 percent o fdiagnosed addicts in Russia were less than 30 years old . According to a 198 8study by Soviet sociologists Boris and Michael Levin, 69 percent of a Kazakhsta ncontingent of 428 users and addicts was less than 29 years of age .

Published sociological research by Gabiani, Kerimi, and the Levins—andother data sources—suggest that a significant majority of drug users are males .but this predominance is greater in the southern regions of the former USSR tha nin the northern regions . In the late 1980s, the proportion of female users totale dapproximately 3 percent in Kazakhstan, 8 percent in Georgia, and 9 to 10 percen tin Turkmenistan and Tashkent City. According to a 1990 MVD report, some 1 0to 11 percent of Russian users were female. However, Gabiani's 1988 survey o fgeneral user populations (rather than secondary school students) demonstrate dthat Gorkiy and Lvov oblasts and Latvia harbored much higher percentages o ffemale users—17 percent, 19 percent, and 28 percent, respectively . Possibly themore westernized the country or region, the larger the i elative size of the femal e

39 Data provided by Vadim Pelipas . All-Union Research Institute for Medical-BiologicalProblems of Narcology . September 1990 .

30

Table 1 0

Number of Addicts Treated in City Dispensary ,Tashkent, by Drug, 1989-199 1

Type Addictio n

Poppy Straw-related or Opium

Morphine

Cannabis

1989

1990,

108

12 9

43

5 6

353

397

199 1

17 2

68

409

Cannabis andEphedrine inCombination

Othe r

Total

38

3 0

50

4 1

592

653

2 8

4 4

72 1

Source : Tashkent City Narcological Dispensary

drug-taking contingent. In the United States, for instance, a 1990 survey by theNational Institute for Drug Abuse indicates that among current (past-month )users, males outnumber females by ratios of less than 1 .5 to 1 . 40

Is drug use increasing or decreasing in the post-Soviet republics? Som estatistics suggest that addiction in these republics already has peaked . As Table 1 1notes, the number per 100,000 of first-time addicts registered by narcologica land psychiatric institutions reached a high in 1987 in most of the republics, astatistic that reveals a close association between increased drug abuse an dGorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign, which operated from 1985 to 1987 . Adifferent measure of drug use, the number of registered addicts per 100,000 ,increased through 1990 in most republics, as detailed in Table 7 . In CentralAsian countries, the increase was especially significant in Tadjikistan, although itsaddiction rate is still the lowest of any Central Asian state . In contrast ,Turkmenistan registered a significant decline in the addict population . Theregistry follows a 5-year rule : Addicts with no medical history of drug abuse areremoved from the register after 5 years . Yet, after 1990, these numbers decline dfor most of the republics for which information is available, as documented i nTable 7 .

However, the demise of the USSR coincided with the general deterioration o fthe statistical system and treatment facilities run by the health ministries .Analysts consequently must be cautious when interpreting the above data . Certainlocalities stress different trends . Nina Kerimi, a Turkmeni psychiatrist, believe sthat urban drug abuse rates are rising in Turkmenistan, despite the national tren dof declining addiction. A Kazakh narcologist, Zhuldizbek Alimkhanov, told th e

Anzor Gabiani . "Narcotics in the Mirror of Sociology" (Narkotiki v Zerkale Sotsiologii) .Unpublished paper. Tbilisi . 1989, p . 2 .Boris Leyin and Michael Leyin . Narcotics Addiction and Narcotics Addicts (Narkomaniya iNarkomany) . Moscow : Prosvyeshcheniye . 1991, pp . 77-78 .N. B . Kerimi and L . S . Ladyshev. "Dynamics of Incidence and Illness of Opium Addiction "(Dinamika Zabolyevayemost' i Bolyeznosti Opiinoi Narkomaniei v Turkmenistanye v 1959 -1988 gg) . Voprosy Filosofii . Number 2, 1991, p . 27 .Russian MVD. "Problems of Drug Addiction in RSFSR" (Problemy Narkomanii vRSFSR) . Unpublished document. September 1990, pp . 2-3 .Authors interview with Staff of Tashkent City Dispensary . April 1992 .National Institute for Drug Abuse : National Household Survey on Drug Abuse : Highlights .1990.Department of Health and Human Services . Washington, D .C. 1991, p . 11 .

40

3 1

Table 1 1

First-Time Users Registered in Narcological and Psychiatric Institution s(per 100,000 population )

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 199 0

USSR 1 .2 1 .4 1 .6 2 .2 2 .3 3 .3 5 .1 7 .1 5 .0 4 .3 4 . 0

Russia 1 .1 1 .0 1 .3 1 .6 1 .5 1 .8 3 .5 6 .1 4 .4 3 .9 3 . 2

Ukraine 1 .3 1 .6 2 .5 4 .5 5 .8 8 .8 12 .1 12 .8 8 .2 6 .5 7 . 1

Byelorussia 0 .3 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .1 0 .3 1 .0 1 .2 1 .4

1 1 .1 1 . 6

Moldavia 0 .1 0 .2 0 .1 0 .2 0 .4 0 .9 3 .1 3 .5 1 .6 1 .4 1 . 6

Latvia 0 .3 0 .1 0 .4 0 .1 0 .9 1 .1 2 .3 3 .9 3 .6 4 .0 3 . 5

Lithuania 0 .5 0 .4 0 .8 1 .1 0 .4 0 .8 2 .6 4 .4 2 .4 2 . 6

Estonia 0 .1 0 .5 0 .2 0 .3 0 .5 0 .1 1 .1 1 .7 1 .8 1 .3 0 . 3

Georgia 3 .0 3 .3 3 .2 1 .9 2 .3 2 .1 1 .9 2 .8 2 .7 1 .9 6 . 7

Azerbaidjan 0 .1 0 .3 0 .9 1 .0 1 .0 1 .0 1 .8 4 .1 6 .1 4 .5 5 . 5

Armenia 0 .6 0 .5 1 .7 1 .3 1 .0 1 .0 1 .1 1 .4 0 .9 0 .7 0 . 9

Kazakhstan 1 .3 2 .4 2 .2 3 .4 2 .0 3 .3 4 .3 8 .3 6 .2 4 .6 3 . 8

Kirghizia 3 .1 4 .7 4 .0 4 .4 3 .0 3 .2 4 .4 8 .4 6 .8 6 .2 4 . 1

Tadjikistan 0 .4 0 .4 0 .2 0 .4 0 .3 0 .6 1 .5 2 .8 2 .0 2 .8 2 . 0

Turkmenistan 12 .8 10 .6 10 .4 11 .2 6 .7 13 .0 13 .1 20 .6 13 .4 210.2 7 . 7

Uzbekistan 0 .7 1 .5 1 .2 1 .0 1 .6 2 .5 4 .4 5 .3 4 .2 4 .1 3 .3

Source : Russian Narcology Institut e

author that the number of poppy addicts treated in the Alma Ata city dispensaryincreased "from 33 or 34 to around 100" between 1991 and 1992 . Similarstatistics for Tashkent demonstrate a steady increase in the number of popp yaddicts, from 108 in 1989 to 129 in 1990 to 172 in 1991 . Poppy addicts als oincreased as a percentage of all addicts, from 18 percent to 24 percent .41 (Asnoted, the majority of patients in the Tashkent clinic are being treated fo r

cannabis-related, not poppy-related, dependence .) Although drug addiction i srising in some areas, data simply are not available that confirm an epidemic ofdrug abuse sweeping the countries of the former Soviet Union .

41

Author's interview in Ashkhabad with Nina Kerimi in May 1992 .Author's interview in Alma Ata with Zhuldizbek Alimkhanov in December 1992 .Tashkent statistics furnished in 1992 by Dildrava Abduliyeva of the Tashkent Narcologica lDispensary .

3 2

SECTION FOU R

THE VIEW FROM RUSSIA

The collapse of the USSR obliterated Moscow's direct control over the la wenforcement institutions of the Central Asian republics . Beginning in 1992 ,however, the Russian MVD began working diligently to rebuild ties with it scounterparts in Central Asia and elsewhere in the CIS . Russia's new drugdiplomacy scored a triumph of sorts last October in Kiev, when the interio rministers of all the former Soviet republics except Latvia and Lithuania signed alandmark anti-drug agreement that committed the signatories to cooperate agains tdrug dealing and money laundering . The agreement skirted particularlycontentious issues such as infra-CIS extraditions and crop eradication (although i tdid call for joint research to identify environmentally safe methods o feradication) . The ministries agreed to establish both joint operative-investigationgroups "as needed" and an all-CIS data bank on drug trafficking, which will b ebased in Moscow . To date, however, precious little practical cooperation can b edocumented . "There is no money," explained General Sergeyev to the author las tDecember . 42 No renewed flows of financial or technical assistance from Mosco ware contemplated. "We have enough problems of our own," declared Sergeyev' sdeputy, Arkadii Kuznetsov . 43 Furthermore, unsettled political conditions an dsovereignty concerns in the new states likely will inhibit cooperation .

Still, Russia hopes that a CIS-wide framework for drug law enforcement ca nbe established. This belief leads Russian officials to be extremely circumspect indiscussing the issue of Central Asian drugs . Sergeyev consistently emphasizesthemes of cooperation rather than conflict in law enforcement relations betwee nRussia and Central Asia . As Sergeyev told ABC News in May :

Author's interview in Moscow with Aleksandr Sergeyev in December 1992 . (Hereafter :Sergeyev interview . )Author's interview in Moscow with Arkadii Kuznetsov in December 1992 . (Hereafter :Kuznetsov interview . )

42

43

33

Whereas earlier I could have exercised power and made decision sdown there, now I don't have that power. But I don't think I nee dthe power, because we are all professionals—we all support eac hother .44

In June, Sergeyev refused to let reporters photograph a map in his office tha tdetailed the intra-CIS drug routes—apparently for fear of offending the leader sof the former republics .45 In December, he told the author, "Our relations withour Central Asian colleagues are excellent, as the Kiev agreement demonstrates . "Sergeyev's deputy, Arkadii Koznetsov, affirmed in an interview with the autho rthat same month, "You understand that our political relations with Central Asi aare sensitive . I cannot comment on the drug situation there . "46

This new Russian party line on Central Asia doubtless disguises deep politicaldivisions between Russia and the states in the region about drugs and othe rmatters. Yet, Central Asia may not rank as high on the strategic concern list o fRussian narcotics officials as a casual observer might expect . For example, mos tof the poppy straw, marijuana, and amphetamines consumed in Russia originat e

in Russia and the Ukraine. (Higher-quality Central Asian straw and cannabis a swell as opium are more prevalent in major Russian cities than in the republics a s

a whole.) Synthetic opiates, especially trimethylfentanil, arrive mainly fro mAzerbaidjan. Central Asians do not conduct the bulk of drug transactions i nRussian markets, and Central Asia does not yet produce heroin . The highest ratesof drug addiction in Russia are found in zones where Russian drug crops ar e

cultivated . Finally, incomplete seizure statistics for 1992 suggest that the breakupof the Union has not produced a flood of Central Asian drugs into Russia n

markets, as evidenced in Table 2 . Narcotics-wise Central Asia does pose a threatto Russia (and potentially to the West), but the current dimensions of the proble mshould not be overstated .

Sergeyev interview in Moscow with ABC News in May 1992 .Vladimir Nazarov. "A Country on the Needle ." Kuranty . June 17, 1992, p . 4 .Sergeyev interview .Kuznetsov interview .

44

45

46

3 4

MVD officials also express apprehension about a future flow into Russia o fWestern-type hard drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and LSD . Such drugs currentlyrepresent a negligible share of Russian and CIS illicit drug markets, although th eincreasing economic integration of the CIS with the West could alter this equatio nconsiderably . As Valentin Roshchin explained : "If ruble convertibility i sachieved, a tremendous flood of drugs could pour toward us ."47 Yet, neither aconvertible ruble nor a Russian mass market of upscale Western drugs seem slikely to materialize in the immediate future . Significantly, two representative sof Colombia's Medellin Cartel visited Moscow in the spring of 1992—but thepurpose of the visit was not to establish a foothold in the Moscow drug market ,but rather to recruit Russian couriers to move cocaine into Western Europeanmarkets . (Such a roundabout route is justified both by the relatively high pric eof cocaine in Western Europe and by the still relatively low vigilance of Wester nEuropean authorities vis-a-vis narcotics shipments from former Soviet countries . )For Russia, the primary "foreign" drug threat still arises from Central Asia, th eUkraine, and Azerbaidjan .

Russian narcotics officials today are perhaps preeminently concerned about th egrowth of organized drug businesses and the development of links between dru gcrimes and other forms of organized crime . According to MVD sources, in theformer USSR, some 320,000 to 350,000 drug dealers and approximately 2,00 0criminal groups deal narcotics . 48 The illicit drug market exhibits varyin gdegrees of organization . The percentage of recorded drug offenses committed b ygroups compared to individuals ranges from 12 percent in Uzbekistan to morethan 50 percent in Moscow . 49 The Russian (not usually ethnic Russian) group sare evolving into increasingly elaborate and perhaps increasingly powerfu lorganizations . For example, a Moscow drug gang might comprise people wh ospecialize in different aspects of marketing drugs—transporting, storing ,wholesaling, and retailing—and also might employ security guards, hit men(boyeviki), money launderers, and other professional criminals . In contrast t o

V. Urvantsev . "Will We Curb The Drug Business?" Pravda . November 23, 1992, p . 6 .Aliyev, op . cit.Drug Enforcement Administration . Drug Trafficking and Abuse in the Former Soviet Union.October 1992, p . 11 .On Medellin Cartel visit: Kuznetsov Interview .Roshchin interview .Ageyev and Dzhurayev, op. cit.

4748

49

3 5

hand-to-hand transfers of drugs, systems of passwords and hiding places no wcharacterize the street sale of drugs in Moscow and other Russian cities .

Drug dealers also are imposing social costs . Proceeds from narcotic salesfrequently are laundered in the private sector, a process that Roshchin claim s"taints the character and future of free enterprise" in Russia . In 1991, 24 percentof the employees of joint enterprises and cooperatives who were subjected t ocriminal proceedings were prosecuted for drug crimes . 50 (Traditional stateindustries also are not exempt from charges of laundering drug money, a sGeneral Sergeyev has observed .) Furthermore, drug-related corruption i swidespread . According to a recent article in Pravda, "Virtually every wholesaledrug dealer has a cover in law enforcement bodies and institutions of power . "The article darkly referred to a narcotics lobby in the Russian parliament that i ssidetracking the adoption of a proposed anti-corruption law and that already ha spushed through a law decriminalizing drug use. 5 1

Crime authorities such as Aleksandr Sergeyev and the Security Ministry' sAleksandr Gurov emphasize that narcotics organizations in Russia are still ayoung industry, lacking the size, sophistication, institutional connections, andpolitical linkages of their counterparts in the West . Yet, as Sergeyev observed,traditional organized crime groups "are beginning to actively trade i nnarcotics . "52 For example, Azeri or Chechen clans may manage a multiplicity o fcriminal operations such as protection rackets, prostitution, arms smuggling ,drugs, commodity speculation, gambling, and weapon sales . Drug dealersacquire local power and influence and international contacts throug hmemberships in these preexisting criminal structures . (Russian MVD source sreport that Italian narcotics money was invested in the Belgrade Hotel, reputedl ya stronghold of one of the Chechen groups and ostensibly an Intourist hotel .)53

Roshchin interview .Roshchin interview with ABC News in May 1992 .Georgy Ovcharenko . "Russia on the Needle?" Pravda. October 3, 1992, p. 6 .Sergeyev interview with ABC News .Author's interview outside of Moscow with Aleksandr Gurov, Major General with th eMinistry of Security, in December 1992 .Interview in Moscow with Sergei Aydyenko of the Russian MVD in December 1992 .Kuznetsov interview."This Mafia Does Not Recognize Thieves in The Law." (Eta Mafiya Nye Priznayet Vorov vZakonye) . Komsomol'skaya Pravda . April 25, 1992, p . 3 .

5 0

5 1

5 2

53

3 6

As organized criminal groups add narcotics to their felonious repertoires, the yincreasingly threaten economic and political stability in Russia . The capability o fthese organizations to trade dangerous commodities—such as narcotics ,conventional weapons, nuclear materials, and nerve gas—classifies them as a rea lmenace to the West as well .

3 7

SECTION FIVE

CONCLUSIO N

Central Asian republics are extremely eager to receive outside assistance fro mthe West or from Russia to help cope with an apparently growing narcotic sthreat . Requirements that officials most commonly mentioned in conversation swith the author include helicopters (or funds to rent them from non-polic eagencies), herbicides or biological agents to destroy crops, aerial crop surveys ,crop substitution programs (emphasized by leaders in Uzbekistan), assistance i ndrafting new criminal codes, and advice on countering money launderingoperations. Officials' aid requests emphasize that the narcotics problem now i ssufficiently small to be manageable, but will grow to mammoth proportions if n oaction is taken . ABC News asked Bem Bambayev last May whether a drug carte lcould be formed in Uzbekistan that would become as infamous as the cartels no woperating in the West . Bambayev replied:

Yes, that problem is very real, but to fight this we need the mean sand the resources which we don't have right now . If the disease i snot choked while it is young, it will expand and grow .

Aleksandr Zelichenko employed a different version of the same argument in hisconversation with ABC News .

It is very worthwhile to invest money in one republic so you don'thave a second Bolivia or a second Colombia on your hands . . .You'vealready invested millions in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and the resultsare minimal . So maybe today it is better to invest a little i nUzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kirghizia rather than having to inves tmillions more later . 54

Of course, such pleas must be carefully considered . However, lawenforcement in Central Asia and Russia suffers not only from inadequat eresources, but also from antiquated drug laws and weak criminal justic e

54 Bambayev interview .Zelichenko interview with ABC News in May 1992 .

38

institutions . The local bureaucracy in some oblasts is heavily compromised b ydrug dealers, although police officials in Tashkent seem competent, energetic, an ddedicated . In Tadjikistan, the continuing civil conflict between Islamic extremist sand former Communists argues against offering assistance to that republic at thi stime . Selecting appropriate programs for specific countries is a difficult call .Administration of justice programs, particularly those focused on legal reforms ,represent a logical first step for most of the Central Asian republics . Thedecision to supply money, herbicides, and equipment should be made case b ycase. The author's personal preference would be establishing a pilot program inKyrgyzstan to fund crop surveys, train law enforcement officials, improve datacollection and analysis, and enhance official access to illegal cultivation zones .On paper, at least, Kyrgyzstan's centralized anti-narcotics force appears les svulnerable to jurisdictional disputes and to local corruption than law enforcemen tbodies elsewhere in the CIS . Equipping that force thus might be assessed as asound investment from the law enforcement viewpoint . Of course, supply-sideprograms in Central Asia or other parts of the world confront dauntingchallenges . Economic conditions in the region may inevitably stimulate th espread of narcotics trafficking, regardless of any actions taken by other nations .As Bambayev told ABC News throughout last May :

Even if Moscow were still around, people would still be plantingopium, because the money involved is so huge . There is no industryin the area. Everyone is involved in agriculture, and that doesn'tbring much money . 5 5

Yet, the West should take heed of events in Central Asia . The narcotics trad ein the region perhaps is still small enough to be contained, as Bambayev an dZelichenko suggest-certainly the material in the report supports this conclusion .Moreover, no nation's interest is served by the unchecked spread of narcotics an dby the criminalization of political and economic institutions in Central Asia an dother regions formerly in the Soviet Union . Organized criminal formations areacquiring power and influence everywhere in the CIS (and in Eastern Europe),and narcotics trafficking enterprises are fueling this process . Yet, crime andcorruption do not represent the only concerns . The geostrategic implications o f

55 Bambayev interview .

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an aggressive narcotics industry in post-Communist Eurasia are extremel ydisturbing . Central Asia not only functions as a significant narcotics producer i nthe CIS, but also constitutes a centuries-old battleground for competing nationa land ethnic interests . Drugs and associated trafficking operations thus fuel analready incendiary political dynamic now characterized by ethnic clashes, borderdisputes, religious challenges to state authority, and the activities of neighbor ssuch as China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey . Consequently, developing an appropriat eanti-narcotics policy for Central Asia and for the post-Communist worl dgenerally should rank as a high priority for the international community. Indeed,actions that the United States and other Western countries take to addres snarcotics trafficking could contribute significantly to building a stable, post-Communist order in Eurasia .

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