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RURAL BANK OF ANDA, INC., ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF LINGAYEN-

DAGUPAN

GR155051 May 29, 2007 Ponente: CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley,

Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3. CadastralLot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imeldas Park, while

on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-

5201-A and on the south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help ofChristians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1.

Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent Roman

Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6375

(TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed byboth respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley. In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered

the construction of the fence separating Lot 736 from the national road to prevent the caretelasfrom parking because the smell of horse manure was already bothering the priests living in the

seminary. The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the east, west, and center and

has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any time of the day. Subsequently, theSangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed and approved Resolution Nos. 104[5] and

105.[6] Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot.

Resolution No. 105 authorized the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years

with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 with an area of 252 square meters.

In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fencewas being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of

Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss thesituation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the

Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped.Respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the

sawali fence and restore the concrete fence. On 20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informedrespondent that the construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but

that he was willing to discuss with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736.Hence, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions, Injunction andDamages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,

Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction.

ISSUE: WON Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are

valid with regards in Executing a lease agreement to the Rural Bank of Anda, Inc

HELD: No.


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RATIO:

Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not have title over

Lot 736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land ManagementServices in Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to

their office. Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and

uninterrupted possession of Lot 736. However, the records reveal otherwise. Even the witnessesfor respondent testified that Lot 736 was used by the people as pathway, parking space, andplayground.On the other hand, the Municipality of Binmaley alleged that it is the sole claimant

of Lot 736 based on the Property Identification Map, Tax Mapping Control Roll of the

Municipality of Binmaley, and the Lot Data Computation in the name of the Municipality ofBinmaley. However, these documents merely show that the Municipality of Binmaley is a mere

claimant of Lot 736. In fact, the chief of Survey Division of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources, San Fernando City, La Union testified that the cadastral survey of Lot 736,

which was surveyed for the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989, had not been approved. Thecadastral survey was based on the Lot Data Computation of Lot 736 which was likewise

contracted by the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989.

The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the seminary, or

the church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736. Lot 736 was also used for parking

and playground. In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in general. Both respondent and

the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since Lot 736 has neverbeen acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of acquisition, Lot 736

remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state. As held in Hong Hok v. David:

There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or

their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any

other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain. For it is well settled

that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the

government. It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode ofacquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L.

Reyes follows: The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463

involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been acquired by any private

person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public

domain.

This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands

and waters of the public domain. Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: All

lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of

potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources

are owned by the state.

Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without prior grant

from the government. Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its

authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently,

the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is

also void.


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ISAGANI CRUZ VS. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

GR135835 December 6, 2000 Ponente: PER CURIAM

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and

mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions ofRepublic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of

1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its

Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States

ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resourcestherein, in violation of the regali an doctri ne embodied in Section 2, Ar ticle XI I of the

Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn,

defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands,

bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of

the indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral

lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,

development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestraldomains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of

natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the

ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife

sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."

(8) that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might

even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.

Moreover, they also question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers andjurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes

involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the

due process clause of the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which

vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;


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"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain

and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,

Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development

Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied

first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and

that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving

indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the

indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP

Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationshipof the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous

relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule

infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17,Article VII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

WON certain provisions of the R.A. 8371 IPRA otherwise known as Indigenous PeoplesRights Act of 1997 are unconstitutional?

HELD: No.

RATIO:

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained,

the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is

DISMISSED.


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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CELESTINA NAGUIAT

GR134209 Jan. 24, 2006 Ponente: GARCIA,J:

FACTS:

This is an application for registration of title to four parcels of land by Celestina Nuguiatlocated at Botolan, Zambales. Applicant(respondent) alleges that she is the owner of the said

parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LIDCorporation which likewise

acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga, and Fausto Monje and theirpredecessor in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than 30 years. The

Republic filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

occupation of the lands in question since June12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the monuments oftitle and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of

a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for, and that the parcels of land applied for are part of

the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to privateappropriation.

ISSUE:Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable

lands of the public domain and the applicants registration of title will prosper.

HELD:No, applicants registration will not prosper.

Applicants registration of title for said parcels of land will not prosper because the said

land is a public forest lands. Forest lands unless declassified and released by positive act of theGovernment so that they may form part of the disposable and agricultural lands of the public

domain, are not capable of private appropriation. Forests, in the context of both Public Land act

and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber,mineral lands and national parks do not necessarily refer to a large tract of woodland or an

expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. Here, respondent never presented the

required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifyingthe land applied for as alienable and disposable. For unclassified land, as here, cannot be

acquired by adverse occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into

private ownership and be registered as title.


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CARINO VS INSULAR GOVERNMENT

212 U.S. 449 February 23, 1909 Ponente: ARELLANO, C.J.:

FACTS:

Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error

because the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application.

For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors

had held the land as recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for holding

cattle>father had cultivated parts and used parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture).

From the years 1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail. In1901, he filed a petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were

registered to him but process only established possessory title. Even if the applicant have title, he

cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts theProvince of Benguet among others from its operation

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for

a long period of time.

HELD: YES.

RATIO:

Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land.

Under the Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds,it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription."

For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30 years.

Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against

him or his father ever was made. Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser. Theremust be a presumption against the government when a private individual claims property as his

or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof.


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ALFREDO CHING VS COURT OF APPEALS

GR L-59731 January 11, 1990 Ponente: PARAS, J.:

FACTS:

In 1960 Spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan acquired a property in the

Province of Rizal containing an area of 51,852 square meters pursuant to a judgment of a court in

a land registration case.By virtue of a deed of sale, Ching Leng bought a portion of the subject

property and TCT No. 91137 was issued on September 18, 1961 was issued in his favor.

On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of

America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now

RTC) Branch III, Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng

docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in the"Daily Mirror", a newspaper of general circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7,

1965. No oppositors appeared at the hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after

presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was appointed administrator of Ching Leng'sestate on December 28, 1965 and letters of administration issued on January 3, 1966 (pp. 51-53,

Rollo). The land covered by T.C.T. No. 91137 was among those included in the inventory

submitted to the court.

Thirteen (13) yearsa after Ching Lengs death,a suit against him was commenced on

December 27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo for reconveyance of the above saidproperty. That on account of the fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the

present, and it is not known whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be

served by summons and other processes only by publication. Summons by publication to Ching

Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court in its order dated February 7, 1979. Thesummons and the complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general

circulation in the province of Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12 and 19, 1979. Despite

the lapse of the sixty (60) day period within which to answer defendant failed to file a responsivepleading and on motion of counsel for the private respondent, the court a quo in its order dated

May 25, 1979, allowed the presentation of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was

rendered on June 15, 1979 awarding the property to Asedillo.

ISSUE(S):

WON a dead man Ching Leng and/or his estate may be validly served with summons anddecision by publication.

WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.

HELD: No, publication is not a valid way to serve summons.


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No, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction.

RATIO:

Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam,

the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased

defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter'sdeath. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475 [1976])the decision of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of

jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with

summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject

of legal relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).

The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original

land registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in accordance with

Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in

connection with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P.

Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng

was already in the other world when the summons was published he could not have been notifiedat all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte proceedings for

cancellation of title could not have been held.

A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to

therein (Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issuedand that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria"

or title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda. de Medina

v. Cruz, G.R. No. 39272, May 4, 1988).


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CASTILLO VS ESCUTIN

G.R No. 171056 13 March 2009 Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO,J:

FACTS:

Petitioner Dinah Castillo is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel),married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to satisfy the judgment

in her favor, petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister

Perla K. Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 squaremeters, situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax Declaration

No. 00449.

Petitioner upon verifying the ownership of the said lot was able to secure an Order issued

by the Department of Agrarian Reform approving the application of Summit Point Golf &

Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713. She

was also able to get from the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification stating that

Lot 13713, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00554-A, was in the name of co-owners Raquel,Urbana, and Perla; and a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 00554-A itself. Lastly, the

Register of Deeds of Lipa City issued a Certification attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or

patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and the public

auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002. Before the scheduled public auction

sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country ClubSubdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation (Summit Realty. The

public auction still pushed through and Petitioner bought Raquels 1/3pro-indivisosharein Lot 13713.

When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes for her 5,000-square-meter share

in Lot 13713, she was shocked to find out that her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was

cancelled. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and overlapping with the 105,648 squaremeter parcel of land known as Lot 1-B, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.

129642 and Tax Declaration No. 00949-A, both in the name of Francisco Catigbac (Catigbac).

On 25 July 2002, TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was cancelled and TCT No.

T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty was issued in its place.

Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman to charge theofficials privy on the disputed property. She averred that: (1) The supposed Deed of Absolute

Sale in favor of Summit Realty executed on 22 July 2002 by Leonardo Yagin , as Catigbacs

attorney-in-fact, did not express the desire of Summit Realty, as vendee, to purchase Lot 1-B or

indicate its consent and conformity to the terms of the Deed. (2) That being a corporation,Summit Realty could only act through its Board of Directors. (3) That Catigbac had long been

dead and buried. Thus, petitioner argued, Yagin no longer had authority to execute on 22 July


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2002 the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B in favor of Summit Realty, making the said Deed null

and void ab initio. (4) That the Special Power of Attorney dated 6 February 1976 granted Yagin

the right to sue on behalf of Catigbac, yet it was Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case No.00-0376, and Yagin had no participation at all in said case. (5) Lastly, petitioner questioned

why, despite the cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac and the issuance in its

place of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty, it was the former cancelled titlewhich was used as basis for canceling petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. TaxDeclaration No. 00949-A was thus still issued in the name of Catigbac, instead of Summit

Realty.

Escutin, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, relying on the finding of Examiner Juanita H.

Sta. Ana (Sta. Ana), refused to have the Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance registered. He

likewise denied petitioners request to have her Affidavit of Adverse Claim annotated on TCT

No. T-134609.Neither did the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon find any probablecause to criminally charge private individuals

Petitioner sought recourse from the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals promulgatedits finding no reason to administratively or criminally charge respondents. Hence, this petition

for certiorari to Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON petitioners title evidenced by tax declaration must be upheld rather than thatcovered by certificate of title

HELD: NO. As between Catigbacs title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioners title,evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is, in the absence of

any other certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbacs

ownership of Lot 1-B.

RATIO:

The court even clarified the distinction between a title and certificate of title. Titleis

generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that whichis the foundation of ownership of property, real or personal. Title, therefore, may be defined

briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation

of ownership of property.Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership;it is not the title to the land itself. Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an

Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a

Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the original registration.

Catigbacs certificate of title is binding upon the whole world, including respondent

public officers and even petitioner herself. Court has ruled that tax declarations and

corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title to or ownership of a real property

inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the same.Petitioner acquired her title to the5,000 square meter property from Raquel, her judgment debtor who, it is important to note,

likewise only had a tax declaration to evidence her title.

The cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was not because of theissuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but of the fact that Lot 1-B, which


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encompassed the 5,000 square meters petitioner lays claim to, was already covered by TCT No.

181 (and subsequently by TCT No. 129642) in the name of Catigbac. A certificate of title issued

is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the personwhose name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. Therefore,

upon presentation of TCT No. 129642, the Office of the City Assessor must recognize the

ownership of Lot 1-B by Catigbac and issue in his name a tax declaration for the saidproperty. And since Lot 1-B is already covered by a tax declaration in the name of Catigbac,accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same property or portion thereof in the name of

another person, not supported by any certificate of title, such that of petitioner, must be

cancelled; otherwise, the City Assessor would be twice collecting a realty tax from differentpersons on one and the same property.

Petitioners allegations of defects or irregularities in the sale ofLot 1-B to Summit Realty

by Yagin, as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact, are beyond the jurisdiction of the Office of the DeputyOmbudsman for Luzon to consider. It must be remembered that Summit Realty had already

acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-134609, in its name over Lot1-B, which constitutes

conclusive and indefeasible evidence of its ownership of the said property and, thus, cannotbe collaterally attacked in the administrative and preliminary investigations conducted by

the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree

categorically provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot

be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. For thissame reason, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant petitioners prayer in the instant Petition for

the cancellation of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.


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RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS vs RD PARANAQUE

G.R No. 133240 15 November 2000 Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO,J:

FACTS:

Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name from

Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by SEC. As a

consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer certificates

of title over real properties owned by them, all of which were under the old name. For this

purpose, petitioner instituted a petition for amendment of titles with the RTC Paraaque City.

The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently

because the titles sought to be amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds

of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands

covered by the subject titles are located in Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that thesubject titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City. Hence, petitioner

filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition impleading instead as respondent the

Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in Paraaque City.

In the meantime, however, the court a quohad dismissed the petition motu proprio on the

ground of improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of

Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City. Petitioner filed with the lower court a

Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. On the other hand, in view of the dismissal of the

petition, the lower court also denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition.

The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial court did not acquire

jurisdiction over the resbecause it appeared from the original petition that the lands are situated

in Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Paraaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction

over the case, it could not have acted on the motion to admit amended petition.

ISSUE: WON the subject parcels of land are located in Paranque City hence venue was properly

laid

HELD: YES. In the case at bar, the lands are located in Paraaque City, as stated on the faces of

the titles. Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed the petition in the place where the lands are

situated, pursuant to the following rule:

Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest

therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area

wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.


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RATIO:

Petitioner although named as respondent the Register of Deeds of Pasay City is under the

mistaken impression that it was still the custodian of the titles to lands in Paraaque. Later,

petitioner learned that a Register of Deeds for Paraaque City had taken over the record andcustody of titles therein. Petitioner, thus, promptly moved for leave of court to amend its

petition. This, to our mind, was justified. In preparing its amended petition, petitioner likewisecorrected its allegation on the location of the lands involved. Before the amended petition wasfiled, the trial court had already dismissed the petition based on improper venue. It relied on the

allegation in the petition that the lands are located in Pasay City. However, the titles of the land,

copies of which were attached to the petition, plainly show that the lands involved are situated inParaaque City. The trial court should have considered these annexes, as these form an integral

part of the pleading.At the very least, the trial court should have allowed petitioner to amend its

petition, for this was still a matter of right on its part.

Petitioner correctly invoked the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in seeking theamendment of its certificates of title. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over matters

involving the registration of lands and lands registered under the Torrens system is conferred bySection 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property Registration Decree, viz:

Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.--- Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands

throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the

Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction

over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and

interest therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear

and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through itsclerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all

pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for landregistration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuancethereof.More specifically, jurisdiction over petitions for amendments of certificates of title, such

as the one brought below, is provided for by Section 108 of P.D. 1529, thus:

Amendment and alteration of certificates.--- No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the

registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same

by the Register of Deeds, except upon order of the proper Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). A

registered owner or other person having an i nterest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of

Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by peti tion to the court upon the

groundthat the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant inchoate appearing on

the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or

been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on anyduplicate certificate; or that the name of any person on the certi fi cate has been changed; or that the registered

owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs

or creditors will thereby be affected, or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has

not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground and the court

may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a

new certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as

it may consider proper.


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INTESTATE ESTAE OF DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO vs CA

G.R No. 103727 1 December 1996 Ponente: HERMOSSISIMA, JR. J;

FACTS:

The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claimto the ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of

approximately 173,000 hectares or 214,047quiniones,on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled

Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the SanPedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and

Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig

and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City

Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in

the south

They filed complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance

with damages and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 byEngracio San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San

Pedro y Esteban against Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey AntonioNoguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R. Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco,

Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung

and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol Hills

Realty Corporation and Jose F. Castro.

It was alleged (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that the aforenamed defendantswere able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the subject

estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977, 313624,

279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating from OriginalCertificate of Title No. 614[9]

and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124, bothderivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the aforesaid defendants were able to

acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain portions of the subject estate in their

names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates ofTitle Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by and through a final and executory decision dated

March 21, 1988 in relation to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest

Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central BankCirculars dated April 7, 1971, April 23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4)

that the issue of the existence, validity and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated

April 25, 1894 which covers the subject estate had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate

in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag,Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B.

Then the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and also the Court ofAppeals. Hence this petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON the Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and therefore the lands covered orclaimed under such title are not included in the estate of the deceased
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/dec1996/103727.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/dec1996/103727.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1996/dec1996/103727.htm#_edn9


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HELD. YES. The Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents Buhain,

Ocampo and Dela Cruz. Under the Torrens system of registration, the titles of private

respondents became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree. Moreimportantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued under the Torrens system,

enjoy the conclusive presumption of validity.

RATIO: By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16, 1976, the

system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish

titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the LandRegistration Act within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until

August 16, 1976. Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a re-classification of their

lands. Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership.

Moreover, the court found that the then heir-judicial administrator Engracio San Pedro

who filed the complaint for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages in G.R.

No. 103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge Bagasaos Decision of April 25, 1978 in support

of the Titulos validity notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the said Decision had already beenset aside by Judge Fernandez Order of November 17, 1978. The court is in accord with Court of

Appeals courts holding insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was not registered under

Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the

registered titles of the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.

In the SCs mind, the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the Torrens system

is the lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with the provisions ofP.D. 892. In both cases, the petitioners-heirs were not able to present the original of Titulo de

Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the petitioners-

heirs failed to produce the Titulo despite asubpoena duces tecum(Exh. Q-RP) to produce it as

requested by the Republic from the then administrators of the subject intestate estate, Engracio

San Pedro and Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As an alternative to prove theirclaim of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners referred to a document known as hypoteca

allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said hypoteca was neither properly identified norpresented as evidence. Likewise, in the action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance

with damages, the petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead,

only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo was presented.


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LEGARDA vs SALEEBY

G.R No. 8936 2 OCTOBER 1915 Ponente: JOHNSON,J:

FACTS:

Consuelo Legarda and N.M. Saleeby are owners of adjoining lots in Ermita, Manila.

Between their lots is a stone wall which is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. On March 2, 1906,

Consuelo and her husband presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration to register their

lot. The registration was allowed on October 25, 1906. They were then issued an original

certificate and the title was registered. Both included the wall. T he said wall and the strip of land

where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906.

On March 25, 1912, the predecessor of N.M. Saleeby presented a petition in the Court of

Land Registration for registration. The court decreed the registration of the land which also

included the wall. The plaintiffs Consuelo and Mauro, her husband, discovered that the wall hasalso been registered to N.M. Saleeby. They presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration

for adjustment and correction of the error where the wall was indicated in both registrations.

However, the lower court contended that during the pendency of the petition for the

registration of the defendants land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said

lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

ISSUE: WON Legardas registration shall prevail

HELD: YES

RATIO: The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the

same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be

wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. Hogg adds however that, "if it can bevery clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that

the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be

rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive.

The primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder

of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If

those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained

by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose astrip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose

within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged

or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakesare bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is

the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to

minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of therespective parties to avoid them. In the present case, Saleeby was the first negligent (granting


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that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing

the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the

registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure toappear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against

him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had

his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground forimpugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction."Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose

the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes

his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why thedoctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.

Courts have decided that in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act,that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original

parties. In case of successive vendees, the general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater

right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only.

Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee ofthe owner of the later certificate.

Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and

be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights

in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent

purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included inan original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by

virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall,

registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to Saleeby.

The court ruled that defendant Saleeby cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser"because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not beapplied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original

certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of

the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the recordcontains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an

innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of

the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to

establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limitedonly to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the

torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original

certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world.

Furthermore, the court ruled that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and

his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like

the case at bar rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of nonegligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to

rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had

full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second


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original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with

which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from

such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of anyact of negligence. It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired

equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied

with all the requirements of the law should be protected.


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TALUSAN VS TAYAG

G.R. No. 133698. April 4, 2001 Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J:

FACTS:

Petitioners bought the subject property covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.651 from its owner Elias Imperial, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Said property

would be sold at public auction on December 9, 1985, to satisfy the delinquencies in its realtaxes from previous owner Elias Imperial.

Apparently, Elias Imperial left the country to migrate without assigning an agent to sellhis property.

When the public auction was held, it was Respondent Hernandez who won the bidding.He then subsequently sold it to Dante Tayag. Petitioner filed a preliminary injunction against the

sale, averring that they are in actual, continuous possession of the said property.

Respondent Tayags contention: that he was buyer in good faith in a regular and lawful

public bidding in which any person is qualified to participate; that lower court has no

jurisdiction; that the public auction sale complied with the requirements of Presidential DecreeNo. 464 hence, the same is lawful and valid; that Tayag is not bound by the alleged [D]eed

of [S]ale in favor of the [petitioners] by Elias [I]mperial, because it was not registered and

recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City.

Petitioners contend that the auction sale was invalid, because several requisites regarding

notice and publication were not satisfied. Thus, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether the auction sale of the subject condominium unit should be annulled on the

grounds of (a) non-publication of the notice of delinquency for the payment of property tax, (b)

lack of personal notice of the sale or public auction of the subject property and (c) equitable

considerations

HELD: NO. For purposes of real property taxation, the registered owner of a property is deemed

the taxpayer and, hence, the only one entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and the resultantproceedings relative to an auction sale. Petitioners, who allegedly acquired the property through

an unregistered deed of sale, are not entitled to such notice, because they are not the registered

owners. Moral lessons: real property buyers must register their purchases as soon as possible

and, equally important, they must pay their taxes on time.


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RATIO:

The Non-Publication of Notice of Real Property Tax Delinquency

Petitioners assert that the tax sale should be annulled because of noncompliance with the

requirement of publication prescribed in Section 65 of PD 464. In this regard, the court ruled thatunlike land registration proceedings which are in rem, cases involving an auction sale of land for

the collection of delinquent taxes are in personam. Thus, notice by publication, though sufficient

in proceedings in rem, does not as a rule satisfy the requirement of proceedings in personam. Assuch, mere publication of the notice of delinquency would not suffice, considering that the

procedure in tax sales is in personam. It was, therefore, still incumbent upon the city treasurer tosend the notice of tax delinquency directly to the taxpayer in order to protect the interests of thelatter.

In the present case, the notice of delinquency was sent by registered mail to thepermanent address of the registered owner in Manila. In that notice, the city treasurer of Baguio

City directed him to settle the charges immediately and to protect his interest in the property.Under the circumstances, the court ruled that the notice sent by registered mail adequately

protected the rights of the taxpayer, who was the registered owner of the condominium unit.

Lack of Personal Notice of the Sale or of the Public Auction of the Subject Property

Petitioners also contend that the registered owner was not given personal notice of the

public auction. They cite Section 73 of PD 464, the pertinent portion of which is reproducedhereunder:

x x x. Copy of the notices shall forthwith be sent either by registered mail or by messenger, or through messenger,

or through the barrio captain, to the delinquent taxpayer, at the address shown in the tax rolls or property tax records

of the municipality or city where the property is located, or at his residence, if known to said treasurer or barrio

captain. x x x

The above-cited provision, however, shows that the determination of the taxpayers address to

which the notice may be sent is the treasurers discretionary prerogative. In this case, the citytreasurer deemed it best to send the notice of public auction to the residence of the taxpayer. The

former validly exercised this option, inasmuch as the address of the latter was known to him.

Moreover, it was more practical and favorable to the registered owner that the notice ofdelinquency be sent to his permanent residence in Manila, because he was using the subject

condominium unit merely as a vacation house and not as a residence.

To reiterate, for purposes of the collection of real property taxes, the registered owner of theproperty is considered the taxpayer. Although petitioners have been in possession of the subject

premises by virtue of an unregistereddeed of sale, such transaction has no binding effect with

respect to third persons who have no knowledge of it.

The importance of registration and its binding effect is stated in Section 51 of the PropertyRegistration Decree or PD 1529, which reads:


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Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registered land may convey,

mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms,

deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instrument as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mor tgage, lease or

other volun tary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or effect registered land, shal l take effect as a

conveyance or bi nd the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the part ies and as evidence of au thor ity

to the Registry of Deeds to make registrati on.

The act of registrat ion shal l be the operative act to convey or af fect the land insofar as thi rd persons are

concerned,and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the Office of the Register of Deeds

for the province or the city where the land lies.

Thus, insofar as third persons are concerned, it is the registration of the deed of sale thatcan validly transfer or convey a persons interest in a property. Inthe absence of registration, the

registered owner whose name appears on the certificate of title is deemed the taxpayer to whom

the notice of auction sale should be sent. Petitioners, therefore, cannot claim to be taxpayers.

For this reason, the annulment of the auction sale may not be invoked successfully.


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HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC

GR179987 April 29, 2009 Ponente: BERSAMIN, J:

FACTS:

Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-

Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters.

Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and

his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful

possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was

originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino

Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being

Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it

among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all

the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban

and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot

9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was

sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11

June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property

was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.

3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,

1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had

failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public

domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in

the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23

February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of

Malabanan.

Issue:

In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered

under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property

Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945

or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for

registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous,


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exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June

12, 1945 or earlier?

HELD/RATIO:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b)of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their

predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and

occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of

acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title

to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not

require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of

possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as

it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of thePublic Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further

confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that

under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial

property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a

declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government

manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or

the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the

property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the

public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires

ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure

registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired,

one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires

ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faithand with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse

possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just

title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has

acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There


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is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-

interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that

petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax

Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail

themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the

subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence

that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence,

conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as

alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the

public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition

by prescription.


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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y.

DE JESUS

G.R. No. L-40912, September 30, 1976 Ponente: MARTIN, J:

FACTS:

In 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the

Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent of a 33-hectare land situated in Barrio Libaron, Municipality of

Davao. In 1934, the Bureau of Lands accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land.

One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr. Jose Ebro submitted a bid of

P100.50 per hectare. The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for the reason

that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to participate in the bidding for non-service of

notice on him of the scheduled bidding. In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October

4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously

submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the

land at P100.50 per hectare. Then, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of

Award.

In 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of de

Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No.5436 (E-3231) of

Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes, the said

application is hereby amended so as to exclude therefrom portion "A."

In 1956,President Magsaysay proclaimed the questioned lot for medical center sitepurposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital. Whereupon, on December 6, 1969,

petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare

Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee

simple" title to the land on the strength of Proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical

center site purposes.

Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant

Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration on the ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had

acquired a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the

Director of Lands. A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on theclaim that the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot belongs to him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over a full

12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for

medical center site purposes.


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HELD: YES, pursuant to the executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical

center site purposes.

RATIO:

Right of Mindanao Medical Center

Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area

of 12.8081 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a portion thereof occupied

by the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances.

Proclamation No. 350 of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao

Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly

sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive

of a "fee simple" title or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center.

Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving

public lands, provides that:

"Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to

the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private

corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act,

Act 496] and shall become registered lands."

Re Power of the executive to issue the proclamation with regards reclassification

It would be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the

Medical Center has registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion

and the reasonable appurtenances, and not on the full extent of the reservation, when the

Proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares to the Center.

Certainly, Proclamation No. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized

competence of the President to reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public

domain for a specific public use or service.

The land reserved "shall be used for the specific purposes directed by such executive

order until otherwise provided by law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141)

authorizes the President to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public

domain as reservations for the use of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its

branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, . . . or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public

interest requires it, including reservations for . . . other improvements for the public benefit."


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FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 133250, July 09, 2002 Ponente; CARPIO, J:

FACTS:

The Commissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila

Bay with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).

Meanwhile, Public Estates Authority (PEA) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,

tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These reclaimed areas were transferred to

the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project.

CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be

funded and owned by PEA. By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517transferring lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles by the Register of Deeds

of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine

corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI

entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially

when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain.

Petitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of

preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and

from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA andAMARI entered into an Amended JVA and petitioner claims that the contract is null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to

Amari of certain land, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 Constitution

HELD: YES, they are void for being in contravention of the Constitution.

RATIO:

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the

Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.

Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and

possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. The King, as the sovereign ruler


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and representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines

except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.

Portion (the 157.84 hectares) of the reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,

now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public

domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transferownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine

citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Portion

which comprises (the 592.15 hectares) the submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable

natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to

disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such

classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then

can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural

resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged

areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the

reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public

service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will

be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private

corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Only when

qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of

the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of the

public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA asprivate lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations

from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around and

transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single

private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional

ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.


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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NICANOR DOLDOL

G.R. No. 132963 September 10, 1998 Ponente: ROMERO, J:

FACTS:

Respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Misamis Oriental. He filed an

application for saltwork purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest Development. The

Director of Forestry, however, rejected the same. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of Misamis

Oriental passed a resolution reserving the lot Opol Cadastre as a school site. This reserved lot

unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol. In accordance with said resolution, the Opol

High School transferred to the site in 1970. Seventeen years later, on November 2, 1987, then

President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area, including the portion

in dispute, for the Opol High School, now renamed the Opol National Secondary Technical

School. Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended projects, the school made severaldemands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused to move.

In view of Doldol's refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a complaint for

accion possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro who ruled in the school's

favor and ordered Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed uling that

Doldol was entitled to the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for thirty-two

years, from 1959 up to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1991.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Doldol has better right of possession over the land in question

HELD: NO. Doldol had been occupying the portion reserved for the school site only since 1959.

The law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public domain must be

from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of

imperfect title. Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed

lot since his occupation of the same started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945.

RATIO:

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable

public land and that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of

the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land


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Act. Then, by operation of law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the

necessity of title/certificate of tile being issued.

The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable in

accordance with the District Foresters Certification. Doldol thus meets the first requirement.

However, he was lacking the requirement of occupation of not later than June 12, 1945. Theprivilege occupying public lands with a view of pre-empting confers no contractual or vested

right in the land occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or

acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to divesting by the government

of title thereof stands even though this may defeat the imperfect right of settler. Lands covered

by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired. In

sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the land in dispute.


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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARMENCITA M. ALCONABA; LUISITO B.

MELENDEZ; CONCEPCION M. LAZARO; MAURICIO B. MELENDEZ, JR.; and MYRNA

M. GALVEZ

G.R. No. 155012 April 14, 2004 Ponente: DAVIDE,JR:

FACTS:

Respondents filed before the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna, an application for registration of

title over five parcels of land situated in Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. They stated they are

the sole heirs of Spouses Melendez, original owners of the Lot. Their parents had been in

possession of the said property since 1949, more or less. After the death of their parents, they

partitioned the property among themselves. Since then they have been in actual possession of the

property in the concept of owners and in a public and peaceful manner.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the following grounds:

(a) neither the respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to the

property or have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation

of the land in question since 1945 or prior thereto; (b) the muniments of title, i.e.,tax declaration

and tax receipts, presented by the respondents do not constitute competent and sufficient

evidence of a bona fideright to registration of the land.

The trial court found that the respondents have sufficiently established their family's

actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession of the subject property for more than fifty-

seven years, commencing from the possession of their predecessors-in-interest in 1940, and thatsuch possession was in an adverse and public manner. Likewise, it found that the land in

question is alienable and disposable and is not within any reservation or forest zone. Upon

appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are able to establish their right to the registration of the

land as an imperfect title

HELD: NO. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: that the

land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and that

they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the

same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945.

There is no doubt that the subject property is part of the disposable and alienable agricultural


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lands of the public domain. But it is not clear as to when it was classified as alienable and

disposable by proper authorities.

RATIO:

Year of classification as alienable and disposable public land

There is nothing to support respondents claim that 1925 is the date of the approval of

such project or the date of the classification of the subject property as disposable and alienable

public land. It is settled that a person who seeks registration of title to a piece of land must prove

his claim by clear and convincing evidence. The respondents have failed to discharge the burden

of showing that Lot 2111 was classified as part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands

of public domain as of 12 June 1945 or earlier.

Open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession

Respondents have miserably failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject

property under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since 12 June

1945. The trial court and the Court of Appeals based the finding of fifty-seven years of

possession by the respondents and their predecessors-in-interest on the testimonies of

Carmencita and Mauricio. If the asserted possession lasted for a period of fifty-seven years at the

time they testified, the same must have commenced sometime in 1940, or at the time that

Carmencita was just 5 years old and Mauricio, about 3 years old. It is quite impossible that theycould fully grasp, before coming to the age of reason, the concept of possession of such a big

tract of land and testify thereon nearly six decades later. In short their testimonies could not be

relied upon to prove the adverse possession of the subject parcel of land by their parents.

In any case, respondents' bare assertions of possession and occupation by their

predecessors-in-interest since 1940 or since 1949 are hardly "the well-nigh

incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Proof of specific acts of

ownership must be presented to substantiate their claim. Respondents cannot just offer general

statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. Even granting

that the possession by the respondents' parents commenced in 1940, still they failed to prove thattheir predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession

and occupation of the subject land under a bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership.

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