CITY OF PASIG VS COMELEC

FACTS:On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be separated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Brgy. Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.

Meanwhile on Sep. 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.

Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend/cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the COMELEC on June 19, 1996, and March 12, 1997, respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute.

According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended/cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court. ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be suspended/cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the 2 local governments. HELD:

A case involving a boundary dispute between LGUs presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.While it may be the general rule that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil in the interest of good order, the SC can very well suspend action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely interrelated/linked to the first.

While the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it cannot deny that portions of the same areas are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the RTC of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed barangays.

A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Primarily because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility.

In Mariano Jr., vs. COMELEC, the importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of an LGU cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of an LGU<. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of LGUs will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people’s welfare.

Merely because a plebiscite had already been held in regard to a proposed barangay does not necessarily render a pending petition for settlement of a boundary dispute involving said barangay moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo RTC.

MUNICIPALITY OF STA FE VS MUNICIPALITY OF ARITAO

Facts:

In 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in Nueva Vizcaya, filed before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the Determination of Boundary Dispute involving the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. The trial was almost over when the court realized its error. The court suspended the proceedings and referred the case to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya. The Sanggunian adopted Resolution 64 adjudicating the two barangays as part of respondent’s territory. The Sanggunian approved the Committee’s recommendation but endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC for further proceedings.

In the RTC, respondent moved to consider Resolution 64 as final and executory. The RTC denied the motion ruling that since there was no amicable settlement in the Sanggunian, the latter cannot issue a “decision” favoring a party. The court held that, under the law in force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an opportunity to amicably settle with the intervention and assistance of the Provincial Board and that in case no such settlement is reached, the court proceedings shall be resumed.

Respondent filed a motion praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction since the power to try and decide municipal boundary disputes already belonged to the Sanggunian. The RTC granted the motion. The CA affirmed.According to the CA, a new legislation can be given retroactive effect so long as it is curative in nature. Thus, the LGC vesting jurisdiction to the Sanggunian was given retroactive effect.

Since the Local Government Code of 1991 is the latest will of the people expressed through Congress on how boundary disputes should be resolved, the same must prevail over previous ones. It must be emphasized that the laws on the creation of local government units as well as settling boundary disputes are political in character, hence, can be changed from time to time and the latest will of the people should always prevail. In the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that Regional Trial Courts no longer have jurisdiction over boundary disputes.

Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction

Held: No

Ratio: October 1, 1917 (Revised Administrative Code)- jurisdiction with the provincial boards of the provinces in which the municipalities are situated; June 17, 1970 (RA 6128)- jurisdiction with the CFI of the Province where the municipalities are situated; February 10, 1983 (BP 337 or the 1983 Local Government Code); January 1, 1992 (LGC); - Sangguniang Panlalawigan where the municipalities are situated, appeal with the RTC.

This Court agrees with petitioner’s contention that the trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint when it was filed on October 16, 1980 since the prevailing law then was Section 2167 of the RAC, as amended by Sec. 1 RA 6128, which granted the CFI the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of municipal boundary disputes. Municipality of Sogod reveal that it dealt with the trial court’s dismissal of cases filed for lack of jurisdiction because at the time of the institution of the civil actions, the law in force was the old provision of Sec. 2167 of the RAC, which empowered the provincial boards, not the trial courts, to hear and resolve such cases.

The difference in the factual setting notwithstanding, Municipality of Sogod still applies in the sense that similar thereto the pendency of the present case has also been overtaken by events – the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the enactment of the LGC of 1991. As shown above, since the effectivity of R.A. No. 6128, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has been the primary tribunal responsible in the amicable settlement of boundary disputes between or among two or more municipalities located in the same province.

With the LGC of 1991, however, a major change has been introduced – that in the event the Sanggunian fails to effect a settlement, it shall not only issue a certification to that effect but must also formally hear and decide the case within the reglementary period. Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 outlines the procedure for the settlement of boundary disputes. Unlike Ra 6128 and BP 337, the LGC of 1991 grants an expanded role on the Sanggunian concerned in resolving cases of municipal boundary disputes.

Aside from having the function of bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the amicable settlement of the case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now specifically vested with original jurisdiction to actually hear and decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its implementing rules and regulations. This situation, in effect, reverts to the old rule under the RAC, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 6128, under which the provincial boards were empowered to

investigate, hear the parties and eventually decide the case on the basis thereof. On the other hand, under the LGC of 1991, the trial court loses its power to try, at the first instance, cases of municipal boundary disputes. Only in the exercise of itsappe ll ate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal, should any party aggrieved by the decision of theSangguniang Panlalawigan elevate the same.

The RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under the rules, it was the responsibility of the court to dismiss an action “whenever it appears that [it] has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Indeed, the RTC acted accordingly because at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss its want of jurisdiction was evident.

It was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction as the choice of the proper forum was crucial – for the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time by this Court as it would never become final and executory.

Likewise, the standing rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action; otherwise, the inevitable consequence would make the court’s decision a “lawless” thing. As correctly pointed out by the RTC it will be a futile act for the Court to rule on the case concerning a boundary dispute if its decision will not after all be followed by the people concerned because the decision is totally unacceptable to them. How then can the Court enforce its decision?

Petitioner contends that the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the LGC of 1991 on the settlement of municipal boundary disputes should be applied prospectively. The Court is not unmindful of the rule.

MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA VS MADRONA

FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement. No amicable settlement was reached.

The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a complaint to settle the boundary dispute. Petitioner municipality filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the RTC denied the same.

RTC: it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. that Section 118 of the Local Government Code had been substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that Section 118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON Section 118 of the LGU on boundary dispute settlement applies.

WON respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.

HELD: No, Section 118 does not apply. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction

POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SECTION 118 THEREOF; PROCEDURE FOR SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN A COMPONENT CITY OR MUNICIPALITY AND A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY; ORMOC IS NOT A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY IN CASE AT BAR. —

“Sec. 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. — Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:

“(a)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.

“(b)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.

“(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.

“(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.

“(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above.”

Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other — or between two or more highly urbanized cities — shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government units involved. There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it continued to exist and operate as such. However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent component, city created under Republic Act No. 179.

Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.

SECTION 451 THEREOF; CITY; CLASSIFICATION; ORMOC IS DEEMED AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY IN CASE AT BAR. — Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a city independent of the province. In fact, it is considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code, which apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is neither a

declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city.

REMEDIAL LAW; B.P. BLG. 129; GENERAL JURISDICTION OF RTCs TO ADJUDICATE ALL CONTROVERSIES EXCEPT THOSE EXPRESSLY WITHHELD FROM THEIR PLENARY POWERS; CASE AT BAR. — As previously stated, “jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties.” It must exist as a matter of law and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. It should not be confused with venue. Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers. They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.