Digests for June 13-1

7/28/2019 Digests for June 13-1

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Estrada v Desierto GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2,2001 Ponente : Puno, J.

Facts :

1. In 1998, Joseph Estrada was electedPresident of the Philippines, while Gloria

Macapagal- Arroyo was elected Vice-President.The president was accused with corruption,culminating in Ilocos Sur GovernorChavitSingsons accusations that the presidentreceived millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

2. The Senate and the House of Representativesbegan early investigations regarding theaccusation, while key socio-political figureslike Cardinal Sin, former Presidents Aquinoand Ramos, the vice president, senior advisersand cabinet members called on the president toresign, and resigned from their cabinet poststhemselves.

3. The impeachment trial began on 7 December2000, with 21 senator-judges presided over byChief Justice HilarioDavide. At a point when11 senator-judges ruled against opening asecond envelope of evidence showing thepresidents P3.3 billion bank account underthe name Jose Velarde, the publicprosecutors resigned and a mass demonstrationat EDSA began.

4. CJ Davide granted Senator Raul Rocosmotion to postpone the impeachment trial untilthe House of Representatives resolved the lackof public prosecutors.

5. With the defection of more officials and ofthe army and police from the Estradaadministration, the president attempted toappease public sentiment by announcing a snapelection and by allowing the second envelopeto be opened. The measures failed, and thecalls for resignation strengthened.

6. On 20 January 2001, the presidentnegotiated with representatives of the vice-president. News broke out that Chief JusticeHilarioDavide would administer the oath ofpresidency to the vice president at EDSAShrine. Estrada issued two statements - one

stating reservations on the constitutionalityof Arroyos presidency, and another statingthat he is incapable of dispensing hisresponsibilities as president, thus allowingArroyo to be the acting president.

7. The Arroyo administration was met withacceptance by the different branches ofgovernment, by majority of the public, and bythe international community. The impeachmenttrial was closed, despite sentiments such asthose of Senator Defensor- Santiago that theimpeachment court had failed to resolve thecase, leaving open questions regardingEstradas qualifications to run for other

elected posts.

8. The Office of the Ombudsman proceeded tofile a series of cases regarding thecorruption of Estrada. Estrada filed a motioncompelling the Ombudsman to refrain fromfurther proceedings until his term as

president was over. He also filed a petitionto be confirmed as the lawful and incumbentpresident, temporarily unable to fulfill hisduties, thus making Arroyo an acting presidentonly.

9. The Supreme Court ruled a) to inform theparties that they did not declare the Officeof the President vacant on 20 January 2001, b)to prohibit either party from discussing in

public the merits of the case while in itspendency, c) to enjoin the Ombudsman fromresolving pending criminal cases againstEstrada for 30 days.

Issues:

I. Whether the petitions present a justiciablecontroversy.

II. Assuming that the petitions present ajusticiable controversy, whether petitionerEstrada is a President on leave whilerespondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

III. Whether conviction in the impeachmentproceedings is a condition precedent for thecriminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In

the negative and on the assumption thatpetitioner is still president, whether he isimmune from criminal prosecution.

IV. Whether the prosecution of petitionerEstrada should be enjoined on the ground ofprejudicial publicity

Ruling:

I. The petitions present a justiciablecontroversy because the cases at bar poselegal, and not political, questions. Hence,the cases are within the jurisdiction of theCourt to decide.

Definition of politicalquestions: ...those questions which,under the Constitution, are to bedecided by the people in their sovereigncapacity, or in regard to which fulldiscretionary authority has beendelegated to the legislative orexecutive branch of government. --Former CJ Roberto Concepcion

Arroyos government is NOTrevolutionary in character, since heroath was taken under the 1987


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Constitution.

EDSA II is an exercise ofpeople power of freedom of speech andthe right to assembly. It is intraconstitutional in this regard (withinthe scope of the Constitution). The

resignation of Estrada that it causedand the subsequent succession of ofArroyo are subject to judicial review.

II. Estrada is NOT a President on leavewhile Arroyo is Acting President.

Under Section 11 Article VII,Estrada says that only Congress has theultimate authority to determine whetherthe President is incapable of performinghis functions in the manner provided bysaid provision.

Hence, Arroyo has no power tojudge Estradas inability to do his job

as President.

However, both houses ofCongress expressed their recognition andsupport of Arroyo as the new President,and it is implicitly clear in thisrecognition that Estradas inability isno longer temporary. Thus, Congress hasrejected Estradas claim of inability.

Furthermore, Court cannotexercise its judicial power to revisedecision of Congress in recognizingArroyo. To do so would be to transgressprinciple of separation of powers, sincethis is a political issue. III. Estradacontends that he has not been convictedin the impeachment case and that heenjoys immunity from all kinds of suit.

Executive immunity provisionof 1973 Constitution was no longerincluded in the 1986 Constitution. Thisis in accordance with SC ruling in InRe: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbentPresidents are immune from suit or frombeing brought to court during the periodof their incumbency and tenure but not

beyond.

When the president hasresigned, then proper criminal and civilcases may already be filed against him

IV. Estrada argued that respondentOmbudsman should be stopped fromconducting the investigation of thecases filed against him because ofprejudicial publicity on his guilt, andthat respondent has also developed bias.

In People v Teehankee, Jr. andLarranaga v Court of Appeals it was laiddown that the right of an accused to a

fair trial is not incompatible to a freepress. Responsible press.

Our judges are smart enough toknow the law and to disregard cameradrama and off-court evidence. Theirexposure to media does not affect their

impartiality.

LAMBINO V COMELEC

GR 174153 25 OCTOBER 2006 Ponente: JusticeCarpio

DOCTRINE | The Supremacy of the ConstitutionFACTS

15 FEBRUARY 2006 - The LAMBINO GROUP (RaulLambino, EricoAumentado, and othergroups) gathered signatures to create aninitiative petition to change theConstitution.

25 AUGUST 2006 The Lambino group filed apetition with the COMELEC to hold aplebiscite to ratify their petition.They cited Section 5(b), Section 5(c)and Section 7 of RA 6735 (The Initiativeand Referendum Act)

According to the Lambino group, they wereable to collect 6,327,952 signaturesamounting to 12% of the votingpopulation, and at least 3% of thevoters per district. They also claimed

that COMELEC registrars verified thesesignatures.

The petition aims to change the 1987Constitution, specifically, Sections 1-7 of Article VI (The Legislature), andsections 1-4 of Article VII (TheExecutive), and seeks to add ArticleXVIII (Transitory Provisions).

The changes sought by the groups petitionwould change the form of government inthe country to unicameral-parliamentary.

The Lambino group would have wanted aplebiscite asking the people if theywanted to change the 1987 Constitution,specifically changing government to aunicameral-parliamentary form.

31 AUGUST 2006 COMELEC denied thepetition, citing rulings in Santiago vCOMELEC and the inadequacy of RA 6735 toamend the Constitution.

The Lambino group filed a writ of certiorariand mandamus to compel the COMELEC to


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grant their petition because a) Santiagois not a binding precedent and b) theirpetition expresses the will of thesovereign people.

Various individuals and parties filedpleadings in support of and against theLambino groups petition. Among them,the Binay group, the Solicitor- General,former President Estrada, and differentpolitical parties. They were calledintervenors for the case.

10.Opposing intervenors questioned thefollowing: a. The Lambino groups standing tofile the petition

The validity of the signature gatheringcampaign

The compliance with the minimum number ofsignatures for an initiative petition(Section 2 Article XVII of theConstitution)

The nature of proposed changes as revisions,and not mere amendments

e. The compliance with RA 6735, limitinginitiative petitions to one subject

ISSUES

Whether the Lambino Groups initiativepetition complies with Section 2 ArticleXVII of the Constitution regardingamendments to the Constitution through apeoples initiative;

Whether the Supreme Court should visit itsruling in Santiago v COMELEC declaringRA 6735 incomplete, inadequate orwanting in essential terms andconditions to implement the initiativeclause on proposals to amend theConstitution;

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in denying due course to theLambino Gr oups petition

RULING

The petition does not comply with Section 2Article XVII of the Constitution.

Section 2 provides for the amendmentof the Constitution throughinitiative petition by thepeople.

However, the Constitutional Commissionwas very clear in theirdeliberations that any initiativepetition must contain the fulltext of the proposed amendmentsbefore being signed by thepeople.

The Lambino group merely submitted acopy of the signatures, whichthey gathered together with aquestion on whether or not theyagreed to a shift to aunicameral-parliamentary form ofgovernment.

It is also unclear whether the Lambinogroup circulated copies of theirproposed amendments, but even ifthey did, Lambino himselftestified to circulating only a

very limited number of copies.

Without the full text of the proposal,the people signing the petitioncould not have known what Lambinointended to allow Parliament tochoose the end of their term, tofurther amend the Constitutionwithout reason, to discriminateagainst senators by choosing thePrime Minister from among theHouse of Representatives, etc.

Section 2 only allows peoples

initiative to amend theConstitution, and not to reviseit. The proposed petition whichchanges the form of government isa revision of the Constitution,which can only be carried out bythe Congress (3/4 vote) or by aConstitutional Convention.

A revisit of Santiago v COMELEC is notnecessary.

a. Regardless of any reversal in the Santiagodecision, this petition will still

warrant dismissal based on its failureto comply with Section 2 of Article XVIIof the Constitution.

b. Even if RA 6735 were valid to implementpeoples initiatives, these initiativesmust first comply with the Constitutionbefore any RA.

c. Even if the Lambino group complied with theConstitution, they still violate RA6735 because their signatories did notsign the petition but were merelyattached to the petition signed by the


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Lambino group.

d. Furthermore, the petition violates RA 6735that states that petitions submitted tothe electorate must contain no more than1 subject.

3. COMELEC did not commit a grave abuse ofdiscretion in dismissing the initiative.

a. COMELEC upheld the Supreme Courts rulingin Santiag o and PIRMA (Peoples Initiative forReform, Modernization and Action) v COMELEC.

CONSTI 1TOPIC: Judicial Review

The authority given to the Supreme Court bythe act establishing the judicial system ofthe United States to issue writs of mandamusto public officers appears not to be warranted

by the Constitution.

February 24, 1803

5 US (1 Cranch) 137 Marbury

vs. Madison

PONENTE: Marshall, CJ

FACTS : The late President of the US, Mr. Adams,

nominated applicants, including William

Marbury, to the Senate for their consentto be appointed justices of the peace ofthe District of Columbia

Senate advised and consented to theappointments

Commissions in due form were signed bythe said President appointing themjustices and the seal of the US was indue form affixed to the said commissionsby the Secretary of State, JohnMarshall, but they were not deliveredbefore the expiration of Adams term aspresident

Thomas Jefferson refused to honor thecommissions, claiming that they wereinvalid

Marbury applied directly to the SupremeCourt of the United States for a writ ofmandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretaryof State, James Madison, to deliver thecommission

ISSUES :1. Does Marbury have a right to the

commission?2. Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?3. Does the Supreme Court have the

authority to review acts of Congress and

determine whether they areunconstitutional and so valid?

4. Can the Congress expand the scope of theSupreme Courts original jurisdictionbeyond what is specified in Art 3 of theConstitution?

5. Does the Supreme Court have original

jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?

RULING/HELD + RATIO :1. Yes, Marbury has a right to the

commission.The grant of the commission to

Marbury became effective when PresidentAdams signed the order. The ordergranting the commission takes effectwhen the Executives constitutionalpower of appointment has been exercised.This will happen when the last actrequired from the person possessing thepower has been performed.

2. Yes, the law grants Marbury a remedy.

The very essence of civil libertyconsists in the right of everyindividual to claim the protection ofthe laws whenever he receives an injury.One of the first duties of government isto afford that protection. When thePresident of the US appointed him asjustice of peace, he already had legalrights to the office for 5 years, whichin turn, gave him a right to thecommission. And the refusal to deliveris a violation of that right and hencehe is entitled to a remedy.

3. Yes, the Supreme Court have theauthority to review acts of Congress and

determine whether they areunconstitutional and valid It is the duty of the Judicial

Department to interpret the law. And iftwo laws conflict each other, the Court

must decide on the operation of each. Ifcourts are to regard the Constitutionand the Constitution is superior to anyordinary Legislative act, theConstitution and not such ordinary act,

must govern the case to which they bothapply.

4. No, Congress can not expand the scope ofthe Supreme Courts originaljurisdiction beyond what is specified in

Art 3 of the Constitution that statesthat:The Supreme Court shall have originaljurisdiction in all cases affectingambassadors, other public ministers andconsuls, and those in which a stateshall be a party. In all other cases,the Supreme Court shall have appellatejurisdiction.

If the Legislature had thediscretion to apportion the judicialpower between Supreme and inferiorcourts according to the will of thatbody, then this section will be entirelywithout meaning. If Congress remains at


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liberty to give this court appellatejurisdiction where the Constitution hasdeclared their jurisdiction shall beoriginal, and original jurisdiction madein the Constitution, is form withoutsubstance.

5. No, the Supreme Court does not haveoriginal jurisdiction to issue writes ofmandamus

To enable this court to issue amandamus, it must be shown to be anexercise of appellate jurisdiction, orto be necessary to enable them toexercise appellate jurisdiction.

Application for write of mandamus was deniedand Marbury did not get the commission.

NOTES :

Writ of Mandamus court order for someone toexecute a certain dutyAppellate Jurisdiction the power of a courtto review and revise a lower courts decision

CONSTI 1TOPIC: Judicial Review

The main issue is the legitimacy of theElectoral Commission as the final judge oncontests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National

Assembly but with relation to the class topicit is the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.Key issue: Separation of power

JULY 15, 1936 63 PHIL 139Jose A. Angara

vs.Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel

Castillo and Dionisio C. Mayor

PONENTE: Laurel, J.

FACTS : Sept. 17, 1935 4 person race for the

position of Member of the NationalAssembly (refers to the legislature ofthe Commonwealth of the Philippines from1935 to 1941) for the 1 st District of

Province of Tayabas Oct. 7, 1935 Jose A. Angara wasproclaimed Member-Elect (Losers wereYnsua, Castillo, Mayor)

Nov. 15, 1935 Jose A. Angara took hisoath of office

Dec. 3, 1935 Resolution No. 8 waspassed by the National Assemby

RESOLUTION CONFIRMING THE PROCEEDINGS OFTHOSE MEMBERS WHO ARE NOT AGAINSTPROTEST FILED.

Resolved: That the proceedings ofelection of Deputies against those not

been duly submitted a protest before theadoption of this resolution are, for thepresent, are approved and confirmed.

Adopted, December 3, 1935.*From google translate, original inSpanish.

December 8, 1935 - Pedro Ynsua filedbefore the Electoral Commission a"Motion of Protest" against the electionJose A. Angara, being and pushing thatYnsua be declared elected member of theNational Assembly for the first districtof Tayabas, or that the election of saidposition be nullified

December 9, 1935 - the ElectoralCommission adopted a resolution,paragraph 6 of which provides:

The Commission will not consider anyprotest that is not filed on or before

this date.* From google translate, original inSpanish.

December 20, 1935 - Jose A. Angara,filed before the Electoral Commission a"Motion to Dismiss the Protest", (a)that Resolution No. 8 of the NationalAssembly was adopted in the legitimateexercise of its constitutionalprerogative to prescribe the periodduring which protests against theelection of its members should bepresented; ( b ) that the aforesaidresolution has for its object, and is

the accepted formula for, the limitationof said period; and ( c ) that the protestin question was filed out of theprescribed period;

December 27, 1935 - Pedro Ynsua, filedan "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal"alleging that there is no legal orconstitutional provision barring thepresentation of a protest against theelection of a member of the NationalAssembly after confirmation

December 31, 1935 - Jose A. Angara,filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answerto the Motion of Dismissal"

the Electoral Commission promulgated aresolution on January 23, 1936, denyingAngaras "Motion to Dismiss theProtest."

ISSUES :1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over

the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy?

2. Has the said Electoral Commission actedwithout or in excess of its jurisdiction inassuming to the cognizance(recognition) ofthe protest filed against theelection of the Angara notwithstanding theprevious confirmation of such election by
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legislaturehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_of_the_Philippineshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legislature


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resolution of the National Assembly?(*Note: The Electoral Commission wasassembled after Resolution 8 was passed )

RULING/HELD + RATIO :6. Yes, That in cases of conflict between

the several departments and among theagencies thereof, the judiciary, withthe Supreme Court as the final arbiter,is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflictand allocate constitutional boundaries.That judicial supremacy is but the powerof judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one

branch or agency of the governmenttranscends the Constitution, which isthe source of all authority.

7. No, We hold, therefore, that theElectoral Commission was acting withinthe legitimate exercise of itsconstitutional prerogative in assumingto take cognizance of the protest filedby Pedro Ynsua against the election ofJose A. Angara, and that the resolutionof the National Assembly of December 3,1935 can not in any manner toll the timefor filing protests against theelections, returns and qualifications ofmembers of the National Assembly, norprevent the filing of a protest withinsuch time as the rules of the ElectoralCommission prescribe.In view of the conclusion reached by usrelative to the character of the

Electoral Commission as a constitutionalcreation and as to the scope and extentof its authority under the facts of thepresent controversy, we deem itunnecessary to determine whether theElectoral Commission is an inferiortribunal, corporation, board or person.

NOTES :

Summary of the points in the opinion, its alengthy read. Just to let you know of theother points that were used. In bold are those

that are related to the topic for class.

( a ) That the government established by theConstitution follows fundamentally thetheory of separation of power into thelegislative, the executive and thejudicial.( b ) That the system of checks and balancesand the overlapping of functions and dutiesoften makes difficult the delimitation ofthe powers granted.( c ) That in cases of conflict between theseveral departments and among the agenciesthereof, the judiciary, with the SupremeCourt as the final arbiter, is the only

constitutional mechanism devised finally toresolve the conflict and allocateconstitutional boundaries.( d ) That judicial supremacy is but the

power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and isthe power and duty to see that no one

branch or agency of the governmenttranscends the Constitution, which is thesource of all authority.( e ) That the Electoral Commission is anindependent constitutional creation withspecific powers and functions to executeand perform, closer for purposes ofclassification to the legislative than toany of the other two departments of thegovernments.( f ) That the Electoral Commission is thesole judge of all contests relating to theelection, returns and qualifications ofmembers of the National Assembly.( g ) That under the organic law prevailingbefore the present Constitution went intoeffect, each house of the legislature wasrespectively the sole judge of theelections, returns, and qualifications oftheir elective members.( h ) That the present Constitution hastransferred all the powers previouslyexercised by the legislature with respectto contests relating to the elections,returns and qualifications of its members,to the Electoral Commission.( i ) That such transfer of power from thelegislature to the Electoral Commission wasfull, clear and complete, and carried withit ex necesitaterei the implied power inter

alia to prescribe the rules and regulationsas to the time and manner of filingprotests.( j ) That the avowed purpose in creatingthe Electoral Commission was to have anindependent constitutional organ pass uponall contests relating to the election,returns and qualifications of members ofthe National Assembly, devoid of partisaninfluence or consideration, which objectwould be frustrated if the NationalAssembly were to retain the power toprescribe rules and regulations regardingthe manner of conducting said contests.( k ) That section 4 of article VI of the

Constitution repealed not only section 18of the Jones Law making each house of thePhilippine Legislature respectively thesole judge of the elections, returns andqualifications of its elective members, butalso section 478 of Act No. 3387 empoweringeach house to prescribe by resolution thetime and manner of filing contests againstthe election of its members, the time andmanner of notifying the adverse party, andbond or bonds, to be required, if any, andto fix the costs and expenses of contest.( l ) That confirmation by the NationalAssembly of the election is contested ornot, is not essential before such member-


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elect may discharge the duties and enjoythe privileges of a member of the NationalAssembly.( m) That confirmation by the NationalAssembly of the election of any memberagainst whom no protest had been filedprior to said confirmation, does not andcannot deprive the Electoral Commission ofits incidental power to prescribe the timewithin which protests against the electionof any member of the National Assemblyshould be filed.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Conditions for the Exercise of JudicialReviewSummary: This was a case questioning theconstitutionality of the Probation Act thatwas used by Cu Unjieng as basis for hispetition for probation. It tackled whether ornot the question of constitutionality wasraised properly and whether or not theProbation Act is constitutional based on theconditions stated.

November 16, 1937G.R. No. L-45685

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING

CORPORATION Petitioners , vs. JOSE O. VERA,Judge . of the Court of First Instance of

Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, Respondents .

LAUREL, J FACTS:

- The criminal case, People v. Cu Unjiengwas filed in the Court of First Instance(CFI) in Manila, with HSBC interveningin the case as private prosecutor onOctober 15, 1931.

- The CFI rendered a judgment ofconviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to anindeterminate penalty ranging from fouryears and two months of

prisioncorreccional to eight years of prison mayor. (Jan. 8, 1934)

- Upon appeal, it was modified to anindeterminate penalty of from five yearsand six months of prison correccional toseven years, six months and twenty-seven

days of prison mayor , but affirmed thejudgments in all other respects.- Cu Unjieng filed a Motion for

Reconsideration and four successivemotions for new trial which were alldenied on December 17, 1935. Finaljudgment was enteredon Dec. 18, 1935. Hefiled for certiorari to the SupremeCourt but got denied on Nov 1936. The SCsubsequently denied Cu Unjiengspetition for leave to file a secondalternative motion for reconsiderationor new trial, then remanded the case tothe court of origin for execution ofjudgment.

- Cu Unjieng filed an application forprobation before the trial court, underthe provisions of Act 4221 of thedefunct Philippine Legislature. Hestates he is innocent of the crime; hehas no criminal record; and that hewould observe good conduct in the

future.- CFI Manila, Judge Tuason referred CuUnjiengs application for probation tothe Insular Probation Office whichrecommended DENIAL on June 18, 1937.

- CFI Manilas seventh branch, Judge Vera,set the petition for hearing on April 5,1937.

- The Private Prosecutor, HSBC, filed anopposition to granting of probation ofCu Unjieng, assailing theconstitutionality of the Probation Actsince it violates the equal protectionof laws and gives unlawful and improperdelegation to provincial boards.

- CFI Manila concurred in the oppositionof HSBC except with respect to thequestions raised concerning theconstitutionality of Act. 4221.

- Section 11 of Art 4221 states that theact shall only be applied in thoseprovinces wherein the probationaryofficer is granted salary not lower thanprovincial fiscals by respectiveprovincial boards.

- In Sept. 14, 1937, the City Fiscal ofManila concurs for the first time withthe issues raised by the otherpetitioner and files a supplementarypetition affirming issues raised byHSBC, arguing later on Oct. 6, 1937,that probation is a form of reprieve,hence Act 4221 bypasses this exclusivepower of the Chief Executive.

- Hence this petition in the SupremeCourt.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the constitutionality of

Act 4221 has been properly raised inthese proceedings;

2. If in the affirmative, whether or notAct 4221 is constitutional based onthese three grounds:

a. It encroaches upon the pardoningpower of the executive

b. It constitutes an unduedelegation of legislative power

c. It denies the equal protection ofthe laws

HELD/RATIO:1. Yes. Constitutional questions will not

be determined by the courts unlessproperly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a


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determination of the case, lismota .Constitutionality issues may be raisedin prohibition and certiorariproceedings, as they may also be raisedin mandamus, quo warranto , and habeascorpus proceedings. The general rulestates that constitutionality should beraised in the earliest possibleopportunity (during proceedings ininitial/inferior courts). It may besaid that the state can challenge thevalidity of its own laws, as in thiscase. The well-settled rule is that theperson impugning validity must havepersonal and substantial interest in thecase (i.e. he has sustained, or willsustain direct injury as a result of itsenforcement). If Act 4221 isunconstitutional, the People of thePhilippines have substantial interest inhaving it set aside.

2. a. No. There exists a distinction

between pardon and probation.Pardoning power is solely withinthe power of the Executive.Probation has an effect oftemporary suspension, and theprobationer is still not exemptfrom the entire punishment whichthe law inflicts upon him as heremains to be in legal custodyfor the time being.

b. Yes. Section 11 of the Act. 4221raised a problem. It states thatthe act shall apply only on

provinces that provide salary onprobation officers. This givesthe administrative board of everyprovince the power to determinefor themselves, whether or not toapply the law or not throughproviding or not providing salaryfor probation officers. ProbationAct does not lay down anydefinite standards by which theadministrative boards may beguided in the exercise ofdiscretionary powers. Thistherefore becomes a surrender oflegislative power to the

provincial boards. It isunconstitutional.c. Yes. Due to the unwarranted

delegation of legislative power,some provinces may choose toadopt the law or not, thusdenying the equal protection oflaws. It is unconstitutional.

Topic: Mootness (topic elaborated inDoctrines/Notes)

Pormento , plaintiff-appellee, vs.

Estrada , defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. 191988August 31, 2010Ponente: Corona (CJ)

FACTS

Private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada waselected as the President of the Republic ofthe Philippines in the May 11, 1998 elections.He sought the same position in the May 10,2010 elections. In opposition to respondentscandidacy, petitioner Evillo C. Pormento fileda petition for disqualification. The petitionwas denied by the Commission on Elections(COMELEC), and the motion for reconsiderationhe subsequently filed was denied by theCOMELEC en banc. Petitioner then filed apetition for certiorari on May 7, 2010, a merethree days away from the date of theelections.

Private respondent was not elected the secondtime he vied for the position.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent is covered by theban on the President from any reelection

HELD NO. Since respondent only vied for the

position and was not elected, there is nojusticiable controversy to be decided by theSupreme Court. The ban itself is on

reelection, which would mean that a person,once elected for the position, cannot beelected again.

The Court denied and dismissed the pettiion.

DOCTRINES/NOTES

Judicial review can only be rendered ifthere is an actual ongoing controversybrought before the Court by real partieshaving adverse interests, which would beconsidered a justiciable question.Otherwise, the Court will be providingits opinion on a matter in which the

issues involved are already academic anddead. Such is not included in the powergiven to the Court.

The Court should exercise judicialrestraint in an issue mooted bysubsequent events. In this case, thesubsequent event is the fact thatrespondent did not win the elections,which would render the decision of theCourt as to the issue at hand useless.

CONSTI LAW 1

Topic: Mootness


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February 15, 2008

G.R. No. 177927Florante S. Quizon , petitioner,

vs.Hon. Commission on Elections (2 nd Division),

Manila, Atty. Arnulfo H. Pioquinto (Election Officer,

Antipolo City),and Roberto Villanueva Puno , respondents.

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J. -----Facts:

Petitioner Quizon and private respondentPuno were congressional candidates forthe First District of Antipolo Cityduring the May 14, 2007 national andlocal elections.

On April 17, 2007, Quizon filed aPetition for Disqualification and

Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) against Puno, claiming the latteris not a resident of the First Districtof Antipolo City.

Puno was declared the winner and so onJune 5, 2007, Quizon filed this Petitionfor Mandamus alleging that the COMELEChad not rendered a judgment on hisprevious petition.

On July 31, 2007, the COMELEC SecondDivision promulgated its Resolution,dismissing the instant Petition forDisqualification and Cancellation of theCOC of respondent Roberto V. Punobecause he is a resident of the FirstDistrict of Antipolo City.

The petition for mandamus was thusmooted by aforementioned Resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for mandamus

holds merit to resolve Quizons pendingpetition for respondent Punosdisqualification

Held: NO. Petition DISMISSED. Because a

Resolution was already issued by theCOMELEC while the petition for mandamus

was pending, the instant case was thenrendered moot already. The issuance of awrit commanding COMELEC to resolve thepetition for disqualification will nolonger serve any purpose because thereis a decision already.

o The principal function of thewrit of mandamus is to commandand expedite, not to inquire andadjudicate. Furthermore, the writof mandamus lies to compel theperformance of a ministerial dutyonly. When the act sought to beperformed involves the exercise

of discretion, the respondent mayonly be directed by mandamus toact but not to act in a certainway. The Court may only compelCOMELEC to exercise suchdiscretion and resolve the matterbut it may not control the mannerof which it will exercise saiddiscretion.

o A moot case is one that ceases topresent a justiciable controversyby virtue of supervening events,so that a declaration thereonwould be of no practical use orvalue.

Re. Saturnino V. BermudezNo. L-76180 | October 24, 1986

Quick points:This case seeks to clarify who are theincumbent Pres and VP referred to in ArticleXVIII, Sec. 5 of the proposed 1986Constitution. Note that after the February1986 Snap Elections, Makasiar named Marcos asPres and Tolentino as VP, while Teehankeenamed Aquino as Pres and Laurel as VP. Thecourt dismissed the case as a) it is notwithin their jurisdiction, the petition is ineffect a suit against the President and s/heis immune from suits during her incumbency,and b) there is no cause of action, it beingin public records and common public knowledgethat Aquino and Laurel are the incumbent Presand VP, and in view of the fact that the

Aquino Govt. is THE Philippine Government, defacto and de jure.

Context: Post-EDSA I Revolution. The 1986 Constitutionhas been drafted but has not yet beenratified. The case in the syllabus is underFreedom Constitution.

Related Law / Provision(s): Article XVIII, Section 5 of the proposed1986

Constitution :Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbentPresident and Vice-President elected in the

February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes ofsynchronization of elections, hereby extend tonoon of June 30, 1992.

Facts: Impleading no respondents, and with referenceto Article XVIII, Section 5 of the proposed1986 Constitution, Mr. Bermudez petitioneddeclaratory relief for the court to declareand answer the question of the constructionand definiteness as to who, among the presentincumbent President Corazon Aquino and VicePresident Salvador Laurel and the electedPresident Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice


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President Arturo M. Tolentino, being referredto under the said section 7 [sic] of ARTICLEXVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of theproposed 1986 Constitution, refers to. Thatis, the petitioner asked the court to declare

WHO are the incumbent Pres and VP referred toin the aforementioned article.

Issue:Whether or not the petition holds in Court

Ruling:The Court dismissed the petition based on, a)the Courts lack of Jurisdiction over thematter and 2) lack of cause of action.

Lack of Jurisdiction it is elementary thatthis Court assumes no jurisdiction overpetitions for declaratory relief. Thepetition also amounts, in effect, to a suitagainst the President, when the President,during her incumbency and tenure, is immunefrom suits or from being brought to court.

Lack of cause of action It is a matter ofpublic record and common public knowledge thatthe Constitutional Commission refers thereinto incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino andVice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to noother persons. The Court added that inprevious cases questioning the legitimacy ofthe Cory Aquino Government (e.g. LawyersLeague vs Pres Aquino), the Court dismissedsuch cases stating that the legitimacy...isnot a justiciable matter. It belongs to the

realm of politics where only the people of thePhilippines are the judge. And thepeople...have accepted the government ofPresident Corazon C. Aquino which is ineffective control of the country so that it isnot merely a de facto government but in factand law a de jure government.

Concurring OpinionsMelancio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., andFeliciano, J.J.

- The Supreme Court cannot declare who were the duly elected Pres and VP in the

absence of evidence and of a

legislature. The petition should beaddress not to this court but to otherdepartments of government...Thecertified [election] returns aretransmitted to the Legislature whichproclaims...who were duly elected... Inthe absence of a legislature, we [theCourt] cannot assume the function ofstating, and neither do we have thefactual or legal capacity to declare whowere elected Pres and VP. No factualand lega l capacity as copies of thecertified returns...have not beenfurnished to this Court, nor is there aneed to do so.

Cruz, J.- Dismissed the petition, seeing no actual

conflict of legal rights, as theConstitution we are asked to interprethas not yet been ratified and istherefore not yet effective.

Definition of Terms:Declaratory Relief a judges determinationof the parties rights under a contract orstatute for information (not for any courtorder). An official declaration of the statusof a matter in controversy.

De facto by fact

De jure by law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ITOPIC: Standing

QUICK SUMMARY/IMPORTANT POINTS and RELATION TOCOURSE TOPIC/DOCTRINE:The petitioners of this case questioned theconstitutionality of section 4 of BatasPambansaBlg. 52 because it sets limits forretired elected officials regarding age,pending cases and their eligibility to run.Dumlao is a former governor of Nueva Vizcayacovered by the said provision while Igot andSalapantan are taxpayers who also found theprovisions in Batas PambansaBlg. 51, 52 and 53to be unconstitutional. The SC ruled theprovisions to be valid except for prima facieevidence being a factor for judgingeligibility.

January 22, 1980 No. L-52245PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT AND ALFREDO

SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

(PONENTE: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. ) FACTS

Substantive FactsDumlao is a former Governor of NuevaVizcaya who has filed his certificate ofcandidacy for Governor in the forthcoming elections. He questioned theconstitutionality of section 4 of BatasPambansaBlg. 52 because he felt that itwas directed towards his specific casehe being 65 years old and a retiredelected official who has receivedpayment of the retirement benefits.Igot and Salapantan are taxpayers andvoters for the coming elections. Theyquestioned section 4 of the BatasPambansaBlg. 51 regarding a judgment ofconviction being final before being anissue for running for office.

Procedural Factso Original action was done at the

SC.o There are procedureal


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infirmities. Dumlaos petition isalien from Igot and Salapantanspetitions. Judicial reviewfollows certain functions butthis petition in particular doesnot meet all.

Important DATES and

LAWS/ISSUANCES/DECREESBatasangPambansaBlg. 52 section 4BatasangPambansaBlg. 51 section 1Art XII-C section 2 of the Constituion

ISSUES WON the first paragraph of section 4 of

Batas PambansaBlg. 52 regarding age andretirement limits is unconstitutional

WON the second paragraph of section 4 ofBatas PambansaBlg. 52 regarding primafacie evidence being grounds fordisqualification is valid

RULING/HELD + RATIO The SC declared that the FIRST PARAGRAPH

is VALID .1. Dumlao has not been adversely

affected by this paragraph becauseno case has been filed against himin the COMELEC. The question isposed in the abstract. Igot andSalapantan would have been qualifiedas the proper party if, astaxpayers, the issue was aboutappropriation of public funds but itwas not. The case was stillentertained though because of publicinterest in the case.

2. The COMELEC has primary jurisdictionover Dumlaos case because section 2Art. XII-C of the Constitutionleaves COMELEC in charge ofqualifications of all electedofficials.

3. The thought behind the age limit isso that younger blood may beincorporated into the politicalsphere but retirement in itself maybe in question.

4. The provision applies to Dumlaobecause he is already retired fromthe same office of which he wishesto run for again. The fact that hechanged his mind on the matter iswhat brought him to thispredicament.

The SC declared that the SECONDPARAGRAPH is NULL and VOID .1. There is a constitutional provision

that states that the accused shallbe presumed innocent until thecontrary is proved. This paragraphcontravenes that because a candidateis disqualified from running onlybecause charges have been filedagainst him. It condemns before oneis truly heard.

2. Time constraints will prevent onecharged with acts of disloyalty fromproving his innocence since

elections are imminent. NOTES: (OPTIONAL)

Equal protection: persons similarlysituated are similarly treated

[CONSTI 1 | YU | D2017]

Date June 16 2009Title GR 187883 Lozano (P) vs. Nograles (R)

Ponente CJ PunoDoctrine Justiciability

FACTS P filed for the nullification of House

Resolution 1109 that called for theconvening of the members of Congress forthe purpose of amending or revising theconstitution

ISSUES WoN the Court has justiciable

jurisdiction in deciding abstract,hypothetical, or contingent questions

HELDPetition DISMISSED

Does the Court have justiciablejurisdiction in deciding abstract,hypothetical, or contingent questions?

o NO. While th e Courts power ofjudicial review may be awesome,its scope is limited only toactual cases and controversiesdealing with parties with actuallegal claims. The Court is in no

position to decide on actions yetto be executed.

o In the present case, HR 1109 did not adversely injure or prejudicesaid Ps since the resultanteffect of the HR has yet totranspire and therefore could not

warrant an intervention from theCourt.

o Furthermore, Art VIII Sec 1 ofthe 1987 Constitution mandatesthat the Courts settle onlyactual controversies involvingrights which are legallydemandable and enforceable, asgoverned by the rule of locusstandi or the standing to sue. Inthe present case , Ps locusstandi, a necessary requirementfor constitutional questions toflourish, has not been proven since:

P has yet to demonstratethat he personallysuffered some actual orthreatened injury because


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of the allegedly illegalconduct of govt

Ps alleged injury isfairly traceable tochallenged action

Ps alleged injury may beredressed by the legal

remedy of the Court

Quotable QuoteMoreover, while the Court has taken anincreasingly liberal approach to the ruleof locus standi, evolving from the stringentrequirements of personal injury to thebroader transcendental importance doctrine,such liberality is not to be abused. It isnot an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that provenothing but their cerebral deficit. (CJ Puno,2009)

[CONSTI 1 | YU | D2017]

Date Sept 17 2009Title GR No 177857-58 COCOFED (P) v Republic

(R)Ponente J. Velasco Jr.

Doctrine Justiciability

FACTS P filed a civil class action suit in

behalf of all coconut farmers for theretrieval of the sequestered shares andassets of said members of P in the UCPBowned by alleged Marcos crony Eduardo

Cojuanco Jr. R contends that theseshares and assets were sequestered onthe basis that said items were ill -gotten wealth, that these coco levyfunds, by its nature, were taxes thatshould be used for public purposesalone, yet it has been ruled in previouscases that Cojuangco et al used saidcoco levy funds for their personal gain.

Acquisition of said shares and assetswere authorized by RA 6260 (1971) thatestablished the Coconut Investment Fund(CIF), as subsequently amended by PD 276(Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund),PD 582 (coconut Industry DevelopmentFund (CIDF), PD 755 (Acquisition ofCredit bank for Coconut Farmers anddistribution of Shares therewith), PD961 (Codification of Coconut Laws), PD1468 (Revised Coconut Industry Code),and LoI 926 (Coco Levy be placed inUCPB). Transactions were handled by thePhilippine Coconut Authority (PCA).

After EDSA I, the Aquino administrationissued EO 1 (Creation of PCGG), EO 2(ill-gotten wealth may come in the formof shares of stocks, etc), and EO 14(Sandiganbayan as the court of exclusiveand original jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth cases)

Sandiganbayan, in both Civil Cases Nos0033-A and F, subsequently sequesteredsaid shares and items on the basis ofthe unconstitutionality of PD 755, PD961, and PD 1468. Hence this petition.

ISSUES

WoN the Sandiganbayan has justiciablejurisdiction to decide in this case WoN the Sandiganbayan has the

justiciable right to review theconstitutionality of assailed PDs

HELDPetition DENIED

Does the Sandiganbayan have justiciablejurisdiction to decide in this case?

o YES. Jurisdiction of a court overa specific subject matter, assettled in Magay v. Estiadan anAllied Domecq Philippines v Villon , is clearly conferred bylaw. Basic is the rule thatjurisdiction over the subject

matter is determined by the causeor causes of action as alleged inthe complaint.

o In the present case, PD 1606, asamended by RA 7975 and EO 14vests the Sandiganbayan with theoriginal and exclusivejurisdiction over civil andcriminal cases institutedpursuant to and in connectionwith EO 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, orcases of ill-gotten wealth.

Does the Sandiganbayan have thejusticiable right to review theconstitutionality of assailed PDs?

o YES. As settled in Ynot v.Intermediate Appellate Courtlower courts, while mindful inthe fact that the examination ofconstitutional questions isgenerally reserved for theSupreme Court, are nonethelessnot prevented from resolving thesame whenever warranted, subjectonly to review by the SupremeCourt.

o In the present case, theSandiganbayan resolved itself todecide on the issue ofconstitutionality of the assailedPDs since this is the core ofthe Ps complaint: that insofaras the coconut levy is concerned,these decrees had been enacted astools for the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth for specificfavored individuals and wherethe defense is grounded solely inthe very laws theconstitutionality of which arebeing questioned we find more


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reason to resolve thisconstitutional question at thisstage of the proceedings (June20, 1989).

o QED: It has been held that thedetermination of a constitutionalquestion is necessary whenever itis essential to the decision ofthe case, especially when thecase of either one party isanchored on the constitutionalityof the assailed statute.

Salonga v. Cruz Pao G.R. No. L- 59524

Doctrine:

Cases involving matters of great publicimportance or posing important legal questionsneed not be dismissed even though the same had already become moot and academic. The SupremeCourt has the symbolic function of

educating (the members of the) bench and (the) bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.

Facts: A rash of bombings occurred in theMetro Manila area in the months of August toSeptember, 1980. On September 6, 1980, VictorLovely almost killed himself as a result ofthe explosion of a bomb in his room. Severalpictures showing JovitoSalonga and his wifetaken during the party of Cong. Raul Daza werefound in his possession. He was charged withsubversion and illegal possession of firearms.

On Sept. 20, 1980, the younger brother ofVictor, Romeo was presented on national TV andstated in an interview that his brother,Victor, went to the petitioners housemultiple times and that the day after their2nd visit, newspapers came out with almostidentical headlines stating in effect that thepetitioner was linked to the bombings.

Minutes after the Oct. 19, 1980 speech ofPresident Marcos, a bomb exploded. Those whowere implicated by Lovely were arrestedthereafter. The petitioner was placed underhospital arrest and was later transferred toan isolation room at Fort Bonifacio. He wasreleased and allowed to travel forhumanitarian reasons on November 1981.Petitioner contends that there is no primafacie evidence that would corroborate the casecharged against him. A series of pleadings andmotions ensued thereafter.

On January 1985, respondent Judge granted themotion of the Fiscal to exclude the petitionerin the subversion case. Such motion would deemthe case to be moot and academic.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court canpromulgate a ruling in a case where thesubject mater of such had already become moot

and academic?

Held: Yes. In the case at bar, the SupremeCourt still promulgated a ruling even thoughthe petitioner had already been freed fromdetention and excluded from criminalproceedings. Such act is rooted from the

symbolic function of the Court to educate itsmembers on the Constitutional guarantees ofthe Constitution and to rule on casesinvolving matters or great public importance.

Javier vs. Commission on Elections

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

TOPIC: SYMBOLIC/MATTERS OF GREAT PUBLICIMPORTANCE

QUICK SUMMARY/IMPORTANT POINTS and RELATION TOCOURSE TOPIC/DOCTRINE:September 22, 1986

144 SCRA 194

EVELIO B. JAVIER petitioner, vs. THECOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F.PACIFICADOR, respondents.

(PONENTE: CRUZ, J

FACTs

Petitioner and PrivateRespondent were candidates for theBatasangPambansa in Antique (during theMay 1984 elections)

Petitioner approached theCommission to question the canvassreturns of the elections, because ofwhat he called attempts to railro ad theprivate respondents proclamation.

His complaints were dismissedand the respondent was proclaimed thewinner by the 2nd Division of theComission.

Petitioner then came to theSupreme Court, arguing that theproclamation was void as it should havebeen made by the Commission en banc andnot merely one of its divisions (enbanc: term used to indicate that all ofthe judges on an appeals court panel areparticipating in a case)


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Petitioner was gunned down inbroad daylight while the court was stillconsidering his case (dated: February11. 1986)

The Private Respondent hassince gone missing, People Power

overthrew the Marcos Regime, and theBatasangPambansa was abolished therebyrendering the issues of this case mootand academic

Justice Cruz maintains thatdespite it being moot and academic:Justice demands that we act then, notonly for the vindication of the outragedright, though gone, but also for theguidance of and as a restraint upon thefuture. (emphasis added), which is whyhe rejected the motion of the SolicitorGeneral to dismiss the petition.

ISSUES

1. Was the Second Division of the Commissionon Elections authorized to promulgate itsdecision of proclaiming the private respondentthe winner of the election?

RULING/HELD + RATIO

Sec 3 of Art 12-C of the 1973Constitution, which was: The Commission onElections may sit en banc or in threedivisions. All election cases may be heard anddecided by divisions except contests involvingmembers of the BatasangPambansa, which shallbe heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwiseprovided by law, all election cases shall bedecided within ninety days from the date oftheir s ubmission for decision. wasinterpreted by the Solicitor General to allowthe divisions of the Comission to decide pre -proclamation controversies in this case assaid controversy was not a contest at thetime. SG describes that a contest shouldinvolve contention of both parties for thesame office where the one contesting wants notonly to oust the intruder but also to be putinto office. Commission decides controversiesafter proclamation

SC calls the SGsinterpretation irrational and could nthave been the intent of the framers ofthe Constitution. Interpreting it thisway gives more powers to the divisionthan to the Commission en banc.Constitution clearly intended for theCommission to get full authority forelection cases (supported by the 1978Election Code, Sec 175)

Further, the SC defines theterm contest as any matter involvingthe title or claim of the title to an

elective office, made before or afterthe proclamation of the winner, whetheror not the contestant is claiming theoffice in dispute.

The purposes of Sec 3 (Art 12-C 1973 Consti) could not have been

achieved had the Commission been onlybeen able to act en banc after theproclamation (it would have been toolate). WHEREFORE, let it be spread inthe records of this case that were itnot for the supervening events that havelegally rendered it mood and academic,this petition would have been grantedand the decision of the Commission onElections dated July 23, 1984, set asideas violative of the Constitutio n.(emphasis added)

CONCURRING and DISSENTING OPINIONS

Justices Melencio-Herrera and Felicianoconcurred, the later adding Sec 2&3 of Art 12-C of the Constitution do not distinguishbetween pre and post proclamation or the termscases and contests.

Francisco de Agbayani vs. PNB G.R. No. L-23127 29 April 1939

Doctrine: Effects of Declaration ofNullity/Operative Fact

Facts:

Plaintiff obtained a P450 loan maturing onJuly 19, 1944

1945, EO No. 32 under President Osmena helda debt moratorium for the next 4 years.

1948, RA 342, extended the debt moratoriumfor another 8 years which extended thedebt moratorium to 1965.

In 1953, SC declared that RA 342 is

unconstitutional through RuttervsEsteban.

In 1959, the balance amounted to P1,294.

In July 13, 1959 PNB filed extra-judicialforeclosure.

July 19, 1959, the plaintiff was grantedwrit of preliminary injunction.

The lower court decided favoring De Agbayanifrom proceeding with an extrajudicial


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foreclosure sale.

Issues: 1. WoN the statute subsequentlydeclared unconstitutional shall have legaleffects

Held:

1. Yes, the statute subsequently declaredunconstitutional shall have legal effectsalthough only for the period between 1945 to1953.

Ratio:

According to the orthodox view, theunconstitutionality of the said actcould not be the basis for any legalrights or duties nor can it justifylegal acts under it.

The orthodox view may also not be realistic.It is an accepted doctrine that prior tothe declaration of unconstitutionality,the act must have been in force andcomplied with.

In effect only 8 years has been prescribedfrom March 10, 1945 to May 18, 1953 whenruling over Rutter vs. Esteban waspromulgated.

Planters Products, Inc. vsFertiphil Corp G.R.No 1660066 14 March 2008

Facts:

Planters Products, Inc and Fertiphil Corpare domestic, private corporationsproviding fertilizers and agriculturalproducts such as pesticides.

In 1985, President Marcos, through hislegislative powers, issued Letter ofInstruction (LOI) 1465. Imposing a levy

of P10 per bag of fertilizer untilPlaners Product, Inc. becomesfinancially viable.

From 1985 to 1986, Fertiphil has remitted anamount of P6, 689, 144 to the Fertilizerand Pesticide Authority which is thedespository of PPI.

FPA voluntarily stopped the collection ofafter the Edsa Revolution.

Fertiphil demanded a refund, however, PPIrefused.

Fertiphil filed a complaint for collectionand damages, questioning theconstitutionality of LOI 1465.

PPI argues in defense that Fertiphil has nolocus standiin the case because it hasno personal and substaintial interest

nor will it sustain direct injury as aresult of its enforcement.

PPI continues by saying that incidence ofthe levy fell on the ultimate consumeror farmers themselves, not on theseller fertilizer company.

Issues:

1. WoNFertiphil has locus standito questionconstitutionality of LOI No. 1465. Held:

Petition is denied

Fertiphil has locus standi because itsuffered direct injury; doctrine ofstanding is a mere proceduraltechnicality.

Fertiphil has passed some or all of the levyto the ultimate consumer, but that doesnot disqualify it from attacking theconstitutionality of the LOI or seekinga refund.

The fact of payment is sufficient injury toFertiphil.

Castro vs. Deloria GR NO 163586

Doctrine:

Acts performed under the impression of constitutionality of a law cannot be undone by the mere subsequent declaration of nullity of the law or its interpretation, thus thedeclaration can only have a prospectiveapplication.

Facts:

Sharon Castro was charged by the Ombudsmanbefore the RTC Guimaras for Malversation ofPublic Funds amounting to 556, 681. 53 pesos.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty and filed amotion to quash on the grounds of lack ofjurisdiction and lack of authority of theOmbudsman to conduct the preliminaryinvestigation and file the Information.

RTC denied the Motion to Quash on March 20,


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2001. Petitioner was found guilty by the RTCand again by the CA for the crime ofMalversation of Public Funds.

Issue:

1) Whether or not at the time of filing of

the Information (after Uy v.Sandiganbayan) the Ombudsman still hadthe prosecutorial powers to prosecutethe petitioner even though it was laidout in Uy v. Sandiganbayan that the sameshall be limited only to casescognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

2) Whether or not the ruling in Uy v.Santiago can be applied in the presentcase without violating the ex- postfacto law proscription in theConstitution

Held:

Petition denied. SC reconsidered its 1999ruling on March 20, 2001 and held that theOmbudsman has powers to prosecute not onlygraft cases within the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan but also those cognizable byregular courts filed or pending at the timewhen its 1999 ruling was operative on theissue. A judicial interpretation of the lawconstitutes part of the law as of its passage.

Documents

Digests for June 13-1