People vs. Mercado G.R. No. 116239 November 29, 2000

People vs. Mercado G.R. No. 116239 November 29, 2000

FACTS:

The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the crime of kidnapping with murder and sentencing them the punishment of death.

The defendants raised the constitutionality of death penalty and the alleged haste of the trial court in deciding the case resulting in grave and serious errors committed in convicting the accused.

ISSUES:

Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment."

Whether or not the trial courts haste in deciding the case resulted to grave and serious errors to the prejudice of the defendants.

RULING:

1. No the death penalty is not unconstitutional. As settled in People vs. Echagaray, death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is an exercise of the state's power to "secure society against the threatened and actual evil". Procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application are established.

2. No, the contention of the defendants that the speed the trial court decided their case resulted in grave and serious errors to their prejudice. A review of the trial court's decision shows that its findings were based on the records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial. The speed with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a case long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day period between the filing of accused-appellants' memorandum and the promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due dispatch. The trial court in this case committed no reversible errors and, consequently, except for some modification, its decision should be affirmed.

People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y PiloPer Curiam

Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment

Date: February 7, 1997

Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting collectively & anonymously.

Facts:

The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.

The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the verdict.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)

A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional

Held: No.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied for lack of merit.

Ratio:

Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.

The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty.

Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.

accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life.

In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"

The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds:

first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman;

Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.

second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.

Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".

The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.

Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death.

The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment

Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.

People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society

what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes.

Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.

The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and needs.

Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:

the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry

they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so

People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself.

People v Echegaray G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997Per Curiam

Facts:

The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. This was dismissed.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines.

A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant.

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Issue:

Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty.

Ratio:

One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.

The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.

Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.

Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"

Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough

Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.

The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code.

The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.

We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their cause.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."

The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be squarely applied.

We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society.

It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes."

Lozano vs Martinez Facts:

Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.

Issue: 1. Whether or not BP 22 is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt2. Whether it impairs freedom of contract3. Whether it contravenes the equal protection clause

Held: 1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into lawful contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. (Lozano vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986)Cudia vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No: 110315 , January 16, 1998

Facts:

Renato Cudia was arrested on June 28, 1989 in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. He was brought to Sto. Domingo, Angeles City which a preliminary investigation was conducted and as a result the City Prosecutor filed an information against him.

The case against him was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. Upon his arraignment,the court called the attention of the parties and contrary to the information, Renatio Cudia had committed the offense in Mabalacat and not in Angeles City. Thus the judge ordered that the case should be assigned to a court involving crimes committed outside Angeles City consequently it was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.

However, the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga filed an information charging Renato Cudio with the same crime and it was likewise assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC which resulted into two Information filed with the same crime. This prompted the City Prosecutor to file a Motion to Dismiss/ Withdraw the Information which the trial court granted.

Renato filed a Motion to Quash the criminal case filed by the Provincial Prosecutor on the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitionfor which he had been arraigned in the first criminal case, and which had been dismissed despite his oppositionwould violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, stating that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the ground that the petition could not have been convicted under the first information as the same was defective. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City did not have theauthority to file the first information.

Ruling:

No.It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, theoffense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No.1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:

Sec. 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:

b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution. As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.

Thus Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

People v. Obsania

rape

In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the followingrequisites must have obtained in the original prosecution/ double jeopardy attaches when:a. a valid complaint or informationb. a competent courtc. defendant had pleaded to the charged. defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent dismissal with express consent of the defendant constitutes waiver

PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA [23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-24447; 29 JUN 1968]

Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counselmoved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs inthe info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.

Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.

In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counselthere can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal. PEOPLE VS. COURT OF SILAY [74 SCRA 248; G.R. NO. L-43790; 9 DEC 1976]

Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then were charged with Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document. After the prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidencespresented were not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised penal code defining the crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that their case be dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed because according to them, it was done with the consent of the accused therefore waiving there defense of double jeopardy. The accused on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional for the accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff.

Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico in double jeopardyHeld: Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on a motion of the accused however this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the prosecution had not been able to do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution of another case. As it was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint, second would be that such complaint be filed before a competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent of the accused in which were all present in the case at bar. There was indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it was proven that the case used against the accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which translates to acquittal. It explained further that there are two instances when we can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency of evidence and second, when the proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was the first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar where there was dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar the approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the accused which the law despises.

ESMENA VS. POGOY [102 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-54110; 20 FEB 1981]

Facts: Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged with grave coercion inthe Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded Not Guilty. No trial came in after the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the priests telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the complainants reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to complainants failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy

Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was due to complainants incapability to present its evidence due to non appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be present, that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second, that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution.

Tupaz v. Ulep

GR. No. 127777, October 1, 1999

Facts: State Prosecutor filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City an information against herein petitioner Petronila C. Tupaz and her late husband, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr., as corporate officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation for nonpayment of deficiency in corporate income tax for the year 1979 but was later dismissed and denied upon reconsideration.

Subsequently, the same prosecutor filed two (2) informations before Regional Trial Court (RTC), for the same alleged non-payment of deficiency of corporate income tax for the year 1979, one was raffled to Branch 105 while the other to Branch 86. Respondent Judge Ulep issued an order directing the prosecution to withdraw the information in Branch 86 after discovering that said information was identical to that filed with Branch 105. The prosecutor withdrew the information and was granted. But later on filed a motion to reinstate the same, stating that the motion to withdraw information was made through palpable mistake, and the result of excusable neglectto which the respondent Judge granted the motion over the objections of the petitioner. Petitioner files this petition assailing that respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information because the offense has prescribed and exposed her to double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not the reinstatement of the criminal information has exposed petitioner to double jeopardy

Held: Supreme Court ruled on the affirmative. The reinstatement of the information would expose her to double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. In the instant case, there was a valid complaint filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for accused-petitioners consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the accuseds conformity. As petitioners consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case. Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against petitioner in violation of her constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy.

DOUBLE JEOPARDYArticle 2, SECTION 21- Philippines Constitution

----- Attachment of jeopardy -----

People v. Ylagan

physical injuries

A defendant is in legal jeopardy when he was put to trial in the following conditions:a. in a court of competent jurisdictionb. upon a valid complaint or informationc. after he has been arraignedd. after he has pleaded to the information

without the consent of the accused does not mean over the objection of the accused or against the will of the accused ; mere silence or failure to object

People v. Balisacan

homicide Existence of a plea is an essential requisite in order that the accused may be in jeopardy. In this case, he first entered a plea of guilty and subsequently, he was ed to testify on the mitigating circumstances and he said he acted in self defense: this had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty; court should have required a new plea.

Cudia v. CA

requisites in order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy/ substantiate an claim of jeopardy

a. a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the secondb. first jeopardy must have been validly terminatedc. second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit of frustration thereof. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution

----- Termination of jeopardy -----

1. Bustamante v. Maceren

reopening of a case

No re-opening of a case may be ordered of a criminal case after accused has started serving his sentence; a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served or the defendant ha waived in writing his appeal; withdrawal of plea of guilty does not constitute waiver of defense of double jeopardy timely invoked.

People v. Obsania

rape

In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the followingrequisites must have obtained in the original prosecution/ double jeopardy attaches when:a. a valid complaint or informationb. a competent courtc. defendant had pleaded to the charged. defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent dismissal with express consent of the defendant constitutes waiver

Rivera v. People

transportation of marijuana

VERBAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL which was not reduced into writing may be set aside by the judge and enter a new one duly signed by him, reinstating the case

Cuison v. CA

double homicide

The promulgation of only one part of the decision i.e. liability for civil indemnity, is NOT A BAR, to the subsequent promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability doctrine on double jeopardy same as in Cudia and Obsania cases.

People v. Velasco

homicide and frustrated homicide Requisites to successfully invoke double jeopardy (refer to Obsania); Where an acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or an appeal on a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule; An acquittal is final and unappealable ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY whether it happens at the trial court of before the Court of Appeals; doctrine that double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial may apply only when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process.

Salcedo v. Mendoza

homicide through reckless imprudence

General rule: dismissal of criminal case upon motion or with express consent of accused will not be a bar to the subsequent prosecution of the accused for the same offense. EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: when dismissal is grounded upon the right of the accused to a speedy trial. This amounts to a judgment of acquittal on the merits which bars the subsequent prosecution of accused for the same offense

Oriente v. People

homicide; lead pipe

It is well settled that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy; Courts have the inherent power to amend their decisions to make them conformable to law and justice; change in penalty by the RTC did not involve the consideration of new evidence but a mere correction

People v. Cajigal

homicide to murder

The change of the offense charged from homicide to murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution;

----- Same offense; ordinance and states -----People v. Relova

theft of electricity; punishable by an ordinance and the RPC A person who was charged for violating a city ordinance which was dismissed for prescription of the offense may not be charged again under the RPC; claim of double jeopardy is available even if prior offense charged under an ordinance is different from subsequent offense charged in a statue where both offenses spring from the same act; where an offense is punished by different sections of a statute, the inquiry, for the purpose of double jeopardy, is on identity of offenses charged. In contrast, where an offense is penalized by an ordinance and a statute, the inquiry is on the identity of acts; Identity of offenses (examining elements of the two offenses); identity of acts (examining the locus or such acts in time and place); For double jeopardy to be available, not all technical elements of the first offense need be present in the definition of the second offense; Damages, civil liability will continue to be heard

People v. City Court of Manila

the defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper when there is no identity of the offenses charged. Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same evidence required to prove the other; An appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal by the trial court SHALL NOT constitute doublejeopardy if:a. the dismissal is made upon motion or with express consent of the defendant;b. dismissal is NOT an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case;c. question to be passed upon the appellate court is purely legal (if dismissal is incorrect, case will be remanded to the court of origin)

----- Rule on supervening facts Melo v. People

physical injuries; injured party dies; homicide The rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case, there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction, the injured person dies, the charged for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

People v. Buling

[less] serious physical injuries; X-ray; two physicians; two complaints -

The prosecution of the accused for less serious physical injuries is a bar for his prosecution with serious physical injuries. If the X-ray examination disclosed the existence of a fracture when the second examination was made, this must have been present during the first examination; There was therefore no supervening fact which would justify application of the rule of double jeopardy.

PEOPLE vs. CA (GR No. 142051)

review disguised as certiorari / acquittal is final

Respondents Francisco and Pacao were acquitted by the Court of Appeals. The People, through a writ of certiorari, allege errors of judgment or misappreciation of evidence on the part of the CA, not errors of law or jurisdiction. This is an erroneous application of the extraordinary writ of certiorari because the Supreme Court cannot inquire into factual matters unless there is a blatant abuse of authority on the part of the lower court. Regardless of its nomenclature, the petition is actually one for an ordinary review of the factual findings of the lower court. It was practically an appeal disguised as a petition for certiorari and for the SC to entertain such would violate the constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Unless there is a mistrial, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable pursuant to double jeopardy. This is regardless of whether it is decided by the trial court or the CA.

DD: A decision of acquittal becomes final immediately and bars the re-opening of the case. The exception is when the prosecution was denied due process.

PSB v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005FACTS: Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (petitioner), respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy (respondent spouses) were charged with estafa thru falsification of a public document in the Regional Trial Court.

Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for trial.

After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as the accused. The trial court dismissed the case.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied petition holding that the trial court was correct in granting the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of proper identification of the accused. But even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.

Thus this petition. The Solicitor General contends that the trial courts dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was tainted with grave abuse of discretion thus, double jeopardy does not apply in this case.

ISSUE: W/N Double Jeopardy is applicable in the case at bar?

HELD: YES. For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first criminal case:

(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;

(b) The court had jurisdiction;

(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and

(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.[15]

On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial.[16] A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception. Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal.

As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all present in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they entered not guilty pleas. Finally, Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on respondent spouses.

Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that [a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.

Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the Constitution and Section 7, the courts are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal.

People vs. City Court of Manila [GR L-36528, 24 Septembe 1987]

Facts: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, was accused of violating Section 7, in relation to Section 11, Republic Act No. 3060 and Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, in two (2) separate informations filed with the City Court of Manila on 4 April 1972. On 7 April 1972, before arraignment in the 2 cases, the City Fiscal amended the information in Criminal Case F-147347 (for violation of Section 7 in relation to Section 11, RA 3060), by alleging that the accused, "conspiring, and confederating together, and mutually helping each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously publicly exhibit and cause to he publicly exhibited completed composite prints of motion film, of the 8 mm. size, in color forming visual moving images on the projection screen through the mechanical application of the projection equipment, which motion pictures have never been previously submitted to the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview, examination and censorship, nor duly passed by said Board, in a public place, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]." On the other hand, the information in Criminal Case F-147348 (for violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code) was amended to allege that, on the same date, 16 July 1971, the same accused, "conspiring and confederating together and actually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and publicly exhibit, through the mechanical application of movie projection equipment and the use of projection screen, indecent and immoral motion picture scenes, to wit: motion pictures of the 8 mm. size, in color, depicting and showing scenes of totally naked female and male persons with exposed private parts doing the sex act in various lewd and lascivious positions, among other similarly and equally obscene and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]." On 31 May 1972, upon arraignment, Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges. The other accused Pangilinan, was not arraigned as he was (and he still is) at large. On 26 June 1972, Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in the 2 cases, on the ground that said informations did not charge an offense. The motion was denied on 17 July 1972 and the cases were set for trial on 7 August 1972. No hearing was held on 7 August 1972, however, as Gonzales moved for postponement of the trial set on said date and the trial set on 2 other dates. On 15 November 1972, Gonzales moved for permission to withdraw his plea of "not guilty" in Criminal Case F-147348, without however, substituting or entering another plea. The Court granted the motion and reset the hearing of the cases for 27 December 1972. On 27 December 1972, Gonzales moved to quash the information in Criminal Case F- 147348 on the ground of double jeopardy, as there was according to him, also pending against him Criminal Case F-147347, for violation of RA 3060, where the information allegedly contains the same allegations as the information in Criminal Case F-147348. In an order dated 20 January 1973, the City Court dismissed the case (Criminal Case F-147348). After the dismissal of Criminal Case F-147348, or on 7 February 1973, in Criminal Case F-147347, Gonzales changed his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of "guilty" for violation of RA 3060. He was accordingly sentenced to pay a fine of P600.00. On 10 February 1973, the People filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 20 January 1973, dismissing Criminal Case F- 147348. This was however denied by the court in its order dated 16 March 1973, and in its amended order dated 16 March 1973. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether the prosecution under RA 3060, and a similar prosecution under Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, constitutes double jeopardy.

Held: It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. All these requisites do not exist in this case. The two (2) informations with which the accused was charged, do not make out only one offense. In other words, the offense defined in section 7 of RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the offense defined in Article 201(3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motion pictures. The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the 2 laws involved would show that the 2 offenses are different and distinct from each other. The nature of both offenses also shows their essential difference. The crime punished in RA 3060 is a malum prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be proved because it is presumed, while the offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is malum in se, in which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient. Considering these differences in elements and nature, there is no identity of the offenses here involved for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in the other. Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same evidence required to prove the other. The defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper.

PEOPLE vs. RELOVA ordinance & law / if based on same act , double jeopardy applies Manuel Opulencia was charged for violating Ordinance No. 1 Series of 1974 of Batangas City for having made unauthorized installations and wirings in his ice plant to lower his power bill fraudulently (typical jumper). He pleaded not guilty although he admitted to the presence of such unauthorized installations w/in his ice plant. However, given the fact that the case against him has prescribed the trial court was constrained to dismiss the case against him on the ground of prescription. Being a light felony, it prescribed 2 months after the discovery the asst. fiscal filed the case 9 months thereafter, way beyond the prescriptive period. Later on, the fiscal filed a case against Opulencia, this time for Theft of electric power, punishable under the Revised Penal Code . Opulencia answered w/ a Motion to Quash.

Double jeopardy operates when an ACT is prosecuted under an ordinance, and then later the same act is prosecuted under a statute and vice versa. The 2nd sentence of the provision makes reference to ACTS , not offenses as provided in the 1st sentence. Conviction or acquittal under either constitutes a bar to prosecution for the same act . Thus, even if the offenses charged under the ordinance and the law are different, if the charges under the law and ordinance are based on the same act, double jeopardy applies. In this case, there is obviously only one act sought to be punished although different offenses are alleged. Thus, double jeopardy protects the accused.

PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L-45129; 6 MAR 1987]FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of thePhilippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the groundof double jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of BatangasElectric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the plants electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. TheAssistant fiscals claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia. Issue: Whether under the information in case 16443, Opulencia could if he failed to plead double jeopardy be convicted of the same act charged in case 16054, in which he has already been acquitted.

Held: The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. The Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case. Thus, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. Acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find. It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.

PEOPLE VS. BRACAMONTE

G.R. No. 95939; June 17, 1996

FACTS:

On October 6, 1987, appellant Florentino Bracamonte, together with Manuel Sapon and Ernie Cabral, stood charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide after they were positively identified by Violeta Parnala, the owner of the house and the mother of one of the victims.

Parnala and her husband arrived home from the Kingdom of Jehovahs Witnesses and were confounded when their housemaid refused to heed their call from the outside. Parnala was surprised to see three men emerge from inside the house. The three men then dashed off.

Found inside the house were the bodies of 6-year old Jay Vee and the Paranalas housemaid, Rosalina. Some items, amounting to P1,100, were also found to have been missing. Thus, the charges.

Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in 1989 while Sapon and Bracamonte were at large until the latters arrest in October of the same year. Appellant Bracamonte denied the charges and interposed the defense of alibi. Appellant also contended that there was no circumstantial evidence that will link him in the crime and that Parnala couldnt possible know him to merit identification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bracamontes defense of alibi and Parnalas lack of personal affiliation with Bracamonte are worth discharging the appellant of the crime.

RULING:

It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very easy to concoct. In order that this defense may prosper, it must be established clearly and convincingly not only that the accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but that likewise it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof. In the instant case, appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the victims house at the time the crime was committed.

Positive identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of the accused. Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of any reason or motive why Parnala should testify against him. There is also nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires that in order for there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must know the latter personally. If this were the case, the prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in most instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the victim. The witness degree of closeness or familiarity with the accused, although may be helpful, is by no means an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive identification.

The Court noted that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused, were charged and convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with homicide only although two persons were killed. In this complex crime, the penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of killings accompanying the robbery. The multiplicity of the victims slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

People vs. Jabinal

55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974

Facts:

The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Courts ruling in People vs. Mapa.

As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.

Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.

Issue:

Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?

Ruling:

The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.

Reason:

The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

People vs. Jabinal

February 27, 1974

Facts:

On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a revolver without the requisite license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration because,although he had no license or permit, he had appointments as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the said firearm. The accused further contended that in view of his appointments, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero. The trial court found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa**.

The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Courtsrulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.

Ruling:

The appellant was acquitted.Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides that, Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system. The interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally passed, since the courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities isa restatement of the legal maximlegis interpretatio legis vim obtinet the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

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*The accused were acquitted for through their appointment as confidential/secret agent they were deemed to be peace officers. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying firearms without license.**Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that the law did not explicitly provide that secret/confidential agents are among those who are exempted from acquiring a license to carry a firearm.

PEOPLE vs. FERRER Anti - Subversion Act The Anti-Subversion Act outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other subversive organizations, and punishes any person who knowingly and by obvert acts affiliates himself, becomes, or remains a member of the said Party or any similar subversive organization. It is alleged to be a bill of attainder. A Bill of Attainder is a law w/c inflicts punishment w/o trial. It substitutes a legislative act for a judicial determination of guilt. The issues are resolved as follows:

The mere fact that it singles out the CPP and imposes a burden upon it is insufficient to deem it as a Bill of Attainder nevertheless, the said law does not apply solely to the CPP but to any other organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing the government. Under the law, the guilt of the accused must still be judicially determined. The court must still prove that the accused joined knowingly and w/ intent to attain its specific objective to overthrow the government; hence it is not an ex post facto law.

The judgment expressed in the legislation regarding the criminal nature of the CPP is so universally acknowledged as to be certain and judicially noticeable. The SC on many occasions has found the CPP to be an illegal organization, engaged in armed struggle for the purpose of overthrowing the government, etc.

If a statute is a Bill of Attainder, it is necessarily also an ex post facto law. The said law, however, punishes acts committed AFTER the enactment of the law. It applies prospectively, not retroactively. Members of the CPP have the opportunity to renounce their affiliation or discontinue their criminal acts; hence the penalties are not inescapable. The law is not an ex post facto law; neither is it a bill of attainder.

People vs. Ferrer [GRs L-32613-14, 27 December 1972]

Facts: On 5 March 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. On March 10, Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-amended information (Criminal Case 27), recites "That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines. That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are present, to wit: (a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities; (b) That the crime was committed by a band; and (c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity." Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder. Meanwhile, on 25 May 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, charging Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed. On 21 July 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) Republic Act 1700 is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denies him the equal protection of the laws. Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of 15 September 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. The Supreme Court resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.Issue: Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the nature of a Bill of Attainder.

Held: Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder. Herein, when the Anti-Subversion Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is used solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. Were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power. Further, the statute specifically requires that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is that Congress thereby assumes judicial magistracy, then it must be demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainder reaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposes are inescapable. Section 4 of Anti-Subversion Act expressly states that the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed "After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with, become or remain members of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association" after 20 June 1957, are punished. Those who were members of the Party or of any other subversive association at the time of the enactment of the law, were given the opportunity of purging themselves of liability by renouncing in writing and under oath their membership in the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciation shall operate to exempt such persons from penal liability. The penalties prescribed by the Act are therefore not inescapable.

PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972]

Facts:

Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA,inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exerciseunder freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issues:

1. Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post f