SANLAKAS VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY by MartinTINGA; FEBRUARY 3, 2004

FACTS:

Three hundred junior officers and enlisted men from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) staged a mutiny by storming the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City on July 27, 2003

The mutineers cried of corruption in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; demanded for the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP)

In lieu of the said mutiny, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and called on the AFP to suppress the rebellion

The mutiny ended on the evening of July 27, 2003 After negotiations with the soldiers to return to their barracks, the

President lifted the state of rebellion five days later on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435

Petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa (PM), and Social Justice Society (SJS), in relation to Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, contend that:

o The declaration of a state of rebellion is not required to call out the armed forces

o Due to the cessation of the rebellion, there exists no factual basis for the imposition of a state of rebellion in an indefinite period (the mutiny ended on the evening of July 27, 2003; the state of rebellion ensued for five days until August 1, 2003)

o The report circumvents the report requirement, which requires the President to make a report 48 hours after the proclamation of martial law

Petitioner Suplico, et al., contends that the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is an indirect exercise of emergency powers

o Said petitioner contends that under Section 23 (2), Art. VII of the Constitution, such exercise of emergency powers is exclusive to Congress, and that the declaration made by the President thus results to the latter’s usurpation of their said exclusive power

Petitioner Senator Pimentel contends that the presidential issuances constitute an unwarranted exercise of martial law power, which is baseless under the Constitution

o Said petitioner fears that the said declaration of the President may pave way for the unconstitutional imposition of warrantless arrests

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not petitions are moot and academic2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing3. Whether or not a declaration of a state of rebellion is required to call out

the armed forces4. Whether or not there is factual basis for the imposition of a state of

rebellion5. Whether or not said declaration constitutes exercise of emergency

powers6. Whether or not the issuances are tantamount to exercising martial law

powers

HELD/RULING:

1. Petitions are moot and academic, although the Supreme Court recognizes jurisdiction over cases that are capable of repetition yet evading review

The petitions are deemed moot and academic, because the state of rebellion has been lifted already on August 1, 2003

The Lacson vs. Perez precedent proved that this case is capable of repetition; in the said case, an angry mob that stormed Malacanang on May 1, 2001 has compelled the President to call upon the AFP and PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1

In this case, the Supreme Court went on to assess the validity of the President’s declaration

2. Petitioners Sanlakas, PM, and SJS , have no legal standing to sue; Petitioners Suplico et al. and Pimentel (Members of Congress) have standing to sue

Whereas petitioners Sanlakas et al. are considered “people’s organizations” that represents the interest of the people, the Supreme Court is still observant of the rule that only real parties in interest or those who would suffer a direct injury from the controversy, are the ones who may invoke the judicial power

Petitioners Members of Congress have made clear the validity of their legal standing, since their contention involving the alleged usurpation of the President of their constitutional power speaks of their incurrence of direct damage

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3. For purposes of exercising the calling out power, the President is not required to declare a state of rebellion

Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution : …whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution grants the President, in her capacity as Commander-in-Chief, the following powers:

o Calling out powero Power to suspend the writ of habeas corpuso Power to declare martial law

In order for the President to exercise the latter two powers, these two conditions must exist:

o Actual invasion or rebelliono Exercise of said power required for ensuring public safety

The aforementioned conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power

The Constitution of the United States of America (USA) serves as the foundation of the overall concept of the President’s power as Chief Executive and Commander-In-Chief

Residual executive powers of the President, as suggested by Justice Cortes, rests upon the President

o Such is due to the highly unitary and centralized nature of the Philippines government

o Exemplified in Marcos vs. Manglapus, wherein residual executive power is practiced by the President by barring the return of former President Marcos due to perceived threats of destabilization against the government and other forms of socio-political disturbances

4. There is factual basis for the implementation of a state of rebellion

Section 18 (3), Art. VII of the Constitution : The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, ad must promulgate its decision thereon within three days from its filing.

No proof was shown by the petitioners that the President has acted without factual basis

5. Power exercised by the President in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces is in consonance with her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief

There was no instance wherein the President has acted beyond her powers as both Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief

6. No. Said declarations are not tantamount to the declaration of martial law

No indication that military tribunals have taken over jurisdiction over civil courts

No indication of curtailment of civil and political rights No indication of President’s encroachment of other branches of

government No indication of attempt, at all, that President attempted to exercise

martial law

Petitions DISMISSED.

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