Digest Part 1

8/10/2019 Digest Part 1

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US vs. Toribio

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of Bohol.

The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a

permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and

33 of ct !o. ""#$, an ct regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of %arge Cattle. The act prohibits the

slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural wor& or other draft purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the ct is '"( prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in the

municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. )urthermore, he contends that the

municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, '*( the act

constitutes a ta&ing of property for public use in the e+ercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for

the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthoried e+ercise of police power of the state for it deprives

them of the en-oyment of their private property.

Issue: hether or not ct. !o. ""#$, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue

and unauthoried e+ercise of police power.

Held: /t is a valid e+ercise of police power of the state.

olice power is the inherent power of the state to legislate laws which may interfere with personal liberties. To

-ustify the state in the e+ercise of its sovereign police power it must appear '"( that the interest of the general public

re1uires it and '*( that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly

oppressive upon individuals.

The court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption,

!24R4, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, )or to do otherwise is to defeat the

purpose of the law and the intent of the law ma&ers. The act primarily see&s to protect large cattle against theft to

ma&e it easy for the recovery and return to owners, which encouraged them to regulate the registration and slaughter

of large cattle.

Several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an epidemic struc& the hilippine islands which threatened

the survival ofcarabaos in the country. /n some provinces seventy, eighty and even one hundred percent of their local

carabaos perished due to the said epidemic. This drove the prices of carabaos up to four or five5fold, as a

conse1uence carabao theft became rampant due to the lu+uriousprices of these wor& animals. 6oreover, this greatly

affected the food production of the country which prompted the government to import rice from its neighboring

countries.

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s these wor& animals are vested with public interest for they are of fundamental use for the production of crops, the

government was prompted to pass a law that would protect these wor& animals. The purpose of the law is to stabilie

the number of carabaos in the country as well as to redistribute them throughout the entire archipelago. /t was also

the same reason why large cattles fit for farm wor& was prohibited to be slaughtered for human consumption. 6ost

importantly, the respondent7s carabao was found to be fit for farm wor&.

These reasons satisfy the re1uisites for the valid e+ercise of police power.

ct !o. ""#$ is not an e+ercise of the inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the ta&ing

of carabaos for public purpose8 it -ust serves as a mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for

the protection of general welfare and public interest. Thus, the demand for compensation of the owner must fail.

B/!2 vs 9:6/!;:, ;.R. !:. <*3=<, September "", "<<" '*0" SCR >0=(Facts:

The Burial ssistance rogram 'Resolution !o. ?0 @ assisting those who only earn less than *,000Amonth of burial

assistance in the amount of >00.00( made by 6a&ati 6ayor e-omar Binay, in the e+ercise of the police power

granted to him by the municipal charter, was referred to the Commission on udit after the municipal secretary

certified the disbursement of four hundred thousand pesos for its implementation was disallowed by said

commission of such disbursements because there cannot be seen any perceptible connection or relation between the

ob-ective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of its inhabitants. ence, this

petition revolving around the pivotal issue on

Issue: hether or not Resolution !o. ?0 of the 6unicipality of 6a&ati is a valid e+ercise of police power under the

general welfare clause.

Held:

2es, municipal corporations are clothed with authority to enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may

be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary

and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public

morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the

protection of property therein.

As to the first defense of COA5 it does not hold water since C: tries to re5define the scope of police power by

circumscribing its e+ercise to public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of 6a&ati.

/t has been ruled by the court that police power is not capable of an e+act definition but has been, purposely,



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veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. /ts scope, over5e+panding to meet the e+igencies of

the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and fle+ible

response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to

e+ceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as

consistently as may be with private rights. /t e+tends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all

legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. /t covers a wide scope of sub-ects, and, while it

is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the

community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which e+ists so as to bring out of them

the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything

worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to

attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

s to the second defense of C:5 C: is not attuned to the changing of the times. ublic purpose is not

unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. s correctly pointed out by the

:ffice of the Solicitor ;eneral, the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to

provide ade1uate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social -ustice, as well as human dignity and

respect for human rights.

The care for the poor is generally recognied as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted

e+ercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

s to the third defense of C:5 there is no violation of the e1ual protection clause in classifying paupers as

sub-ect of legislation. aupers may be reasonably classified. 9ifferent groups may receive varying treatment.

recious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes

have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant5farmer from the bondage of the

soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attriute of sovereignty, which was orn with civili!ed

government. "t is founded largely on the maxims, #$ic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas% &use your property so as not

to impair others' and #$alus populi est suprema lex% &the welfare of the people is the supreme law'. "ts fundamental

purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. (olice power is the power to

prescrie regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of

the people. "t is the most essential, insistent, and illimitale of powers. "n a sense it is the greatest and most

powerful attriute of the government. "t is elastic and must e responsive to various social conditions. The care for



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the poor is generally recogni!ed as a pulic duty. The support for the poor has long een an accepted exercise of

police power in the promotion of the common good.

Note: This decision, however must not be ta&en as a precedent, or as an official go5signal for municipal

governments to embar& on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole5outs for motives political or otherwise.

Note further:

olice power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may

e+ercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the

inherent powers of the State. valid delegation of police power may arise from e+press delegation, or be inferred

from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation8 and as a general rule, municipal corporations may

e+ercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect

to the powers e+pressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as

empowering them to do the things essential to the en-oyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Theso5called inferred police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in e+press

terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the

additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the ob-ects of its creation by e+ercising such powers.

)urthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such measures of the power as are

necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public

necessity. Thus, not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the e+ercise of the police power but the

municipality does also.

6unicipal governments e+ercise this power under the general welfare clauseD pursuant thereto they are clothed

with authority to enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge

the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health,

safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and

general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.

S % E9:R E/% % C:RT as C i ty 4 ng inee r o f 9agupan C i ty , and F! S . C;F/:

a s R e g i s t e r o f 9 e e d s i n 9 a g u p a n C i t y ,

,vs.

;R4;:R/: B4R!R9: and :!. 6CR/: :)/%9 as udge of the Court of )irst /nstanceof angasinan

)actsD

The municipal board of 9agupan City enacted an ordinance regulating subdivision plans over parcelsof

land in the City 9agupan.Section ". 4very proposed subdivision plan over any lot in the City of 9agupan,



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shaltbefore the same is submitted for approval andAor verification by the Bureau of

%andsandAor the %and Regis t ra t ion Commiss ion, be previous ly submi t ted to the Ci ty4ngin

eer of the City who shall see to it that no encroachment is made on any portiono f t he p u b l i c d oma in , t h at

the on in g ord ina nce and al l oth er per t in ent rul es and regulations are observed.Section *. s

service fee thereof, an amount e1uivalent to 0.30 per s1uare meter of every lot resul tin g or win res ult from

such subdiv ision shal l be charged by the City 4ngineerGs :ffice.Section 3. /t shall be unlawful for the

Register of 9eeds of 9agupan City to allow theregistration of a subdivision plan unless there is prior written

certification issued by theCity 4ngineer that such plan has already been submitted to his office and that

the same is in order.The court of first instance declared said ordinance void for being in conflict with ct

#<?.Section " of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section ## of ct #<?, because thelat ter law does not

re1uire subdivision plans to be submitted to the City 4ngineer before the same is submitted for

approval to and verification by the ;eneral %andRegistration :ffice or by the 9irector of %ands as

prov id ed fo r in Sect io n >= of sa id ct. Section * of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of

Section ## of ct #<?, the latter being silent on a service fee of :.03 per s1uare meter of every lotsub -ect of such subdivision application8 Section 3 of the ordinance in 1uestion alsoconflicts with Section ##

of ct #<?, because the lat ter law does not mention of acert i f icat ion to be made by the City

4ngineer before the Reg is ter of 9eeds all ows registration of the subdivision plan8 and the last section of said

ordinance imposes apenalty for its violation, which Section ## of ct #<? does not impose. /n other

words,:rdinance ** of the City of 9agup an imp oses u pon a subdivis ion own er addi tional conditions.

/ssueD hether or not the e+ercise of police power thru the enactment of the ordinance valid

eldD !o. The local governments should e+ercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegationfrom the

national legislature under the general welfare clause. /n the instant case, :rdinance !o. **suffers from

the addi tional defect o f violat ing this authority for legi slation in contr avention of thenational law by

adding to its re1uirements

Yrasuegui v. A!" #$% SC&A '$( )*++,-

Facts: etitioner was a former international flight steward of %, herein respondent. etitioner was dismissed

because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company. etitioner claims that he was illegally

dismissed.

Issue: hether or not petitioner was discriminated against when he was dismissed.

Held: etition denied. To ma&e his claim more believable, petitioner invo&es the e1ual protection clause guaranty of

the Constitution. owever, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution

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cannot be invo&ed. ut differently,the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invo&ed against acts of private individuals.

/ndeed, the FS Supreme Court, in interpreting the "#th mendment, which is the source of our e1ual

protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the e1ual protection erects no shield against private conduct,

however discriminatory or wrongful. rivate actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the e1ual

protection guarantee.

Atiena vs. CO/0!0C 12.&. No. 3+,#44 5ece6ber *+" 3%%'7

Facts: rivate respondent ntonio Sia was elected mayor of the6unicipality of 6adrile-os, Cebu in the "<== local

elections obtaining a plurality of "*? votes over petitioner %ou tiena. )ollowing Sia7sproclamation by the

6unicipal Board of Canvassers, petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC 1uestioning the results of the

elections in a number of precincts in the municipality. Conse1uently, in the revision ordered by the lower court,

petitioner obtained a total of *,=*? votes, a plurality of "* votes over the private respondent. The RTC rendered its

decision declaring petitioner the winner of the municipal elections and ordering the private respondent to reimburse

petitioner the amount of 300,=>?."< representing petitioner7s e+penses in the election protest.

The C:64%4C en banc issued an :rder setting aside thepreliminary in-unction and thereby allowing petitioner to

assume as mayor of the 6unicipality of 6adrile-os pending resolution of his appeal. owever, following the

synchronied elections of 6ay "", "<<*, the residing Commissioner of the C:64%4C7s Second 9ivision issued

an :rder dismissing petitioner7s appeal for being moot and academic pursuant to the Commission7s decision in

Resolution !o. *#<# declaring the election protest and appeal cases arising out of the anuary "=, "<== elections

dismissed and terminated as of une 30, "<<*. Thereupon, private respondent sought clarification of the order of

dismissal of 4C !o. *05=< referred to the protest case in the Regional Trial Court or to the appeal case in

C:64%4C. /n response, the Second 9ivision of C:64%4C stated that it is only the appeal case that was dismissed

for being moot and academic, not the money -udgment of the trial court.

Issue: 9id the C:64%4C abuse its discretion in reversing that portion of the trial courtGs decision awarding

election e+penses in theamount of 300,=>?."<H

Held: !o. The :mnibus 4lection Code providesD Ictual or compensatory damages may be granted in all election

contests or in 1uo warranto proceedings in accordance with law.J rticle *"<< of the Civil Code mandates thatD

I4+cept as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an ade1uate compensation only for such pecuniary

loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.J

Thus, in addition to specific provisions of law allowing actual or compensatory damages in certain situations, the

Civil Code elaborates that the proper setting for allowance of actual or compensatory damages occurs in breaches of

obligations, i.e., in cases of contracts and 1uasi5contracts, and in crimes and 1uasi5delicts, where the defendant may

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be held liable for all damageswhich are the natural and probable conse1uences of the act or omission complained of.

;iven this setting, it would appear virtually impossible for a party in an election protest case to recover actual or

compensatory damages in the absence of the conditions specified under rticles **0" and **0* of the Civil Code, or

in the absence of a law e+pressly providing for situations allowing for the recovery of the same. /t follows, naturally,

that in most election protest cases where the monetary claim does not hinge on either a contract or 1uasi5contract or

a tortious act or omission, the claimant must be able to point out to a specific provision of law authoriing a money

claim for election protest e+penses against the losing party. This, petitioner has been unable to do.

Section *>< of the :mnibus 4lection Code merely provides for the granting of actual and compensatory damages in

accordance with law. That it was the intent of the legislature to do away with provisions indemnifying the victorious

party for e+penses incurred in an election contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission clearly attributable to

the losing party cannot be gainsaid. The intent, moreover, to do away with such provisions merely recognies the

ma+im, settled in law that a wrong without damage or damage without wrong neither constitutes a cause of action

nor creates a civil obligation.

Rubi v. rovincial Board of 6indoro



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(etition for haeas corpus in favor of Rui and other Manguianes of the (rovince of Mindoro. "t is

alleged that the Maguianes are eing illegallydeprived of their lierty y the provincial officials of that province.

Rui and his companions are said to e held on the reservation estalished at Tigao,Mindoro, against their will,

and one )aalos is said to e held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at *alapan for havingrun awayform the reservation.

FACTS+

The provincial governor of 6indoro and the provincial board thereof directed the 6anguianes in 1uestionto ta&e up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of %a&e !au-an, selected by the provincial governor and

approved by the provincial board. The action was ta&en in accordance with section *"#> of the dministrative Code

of "<"$, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the /nterior as re1uired by said action. etitioners, however,

challenge the validity of this section of the dministrative Code

Una. Resolution !o. *>5 adopted by the provincial board pursuant to Sec.*"#>. Stipulates the necessity to gather the

6anguianes in a reservation area.

5I8ala9a. Section *"#> of ct !o. *$"" 'dministrative Code of "<"$(5 stalishment of non-*hristians upon sites

selected y provincial governor

Section *$>< of the same Code

Refusal of a non-*hristian to take up appointed haitation &penalty'

/SSF4SD

6ain D hether the 6anguinaes are illegally held on account of the unconstitutionality of the law which authoried

their captivity and therefore a writ ofhabeas corpus should be granted.

Sub5issuesD

".( hether or !ot Section *"#> of the dministrative Code of "<"$ is constitutional.*.( hether or !ot Section *"#> of the dministrative Code deprive a person of his liberty without due

process of law.

Ruling D

!:. rit not granted.

/ssue no."D Constitutionality of Sec. *"#>

"( There was a valid delegation of legislative power.

a. hat cannot be delegated is the power to ma&e laws but the legislature can confer authority as to its

e+ecution. This delegation is valid and can be conferred to the e+ecutive department or official. b. Case at bar K Sec. *"#> merely confers to the governor the power to e+ecute the law

*( The law does not discriminate a particular religion. The court discussed in the case the history of the term

Lnon5Christians. The term does not refer to religion 'or lac& thereof( but tonatives of the hilippine/sland of a law grade civiliation.

/ssue !o.*D 9ue rocess and Sec. *"#> 'Concept of due process of laws(".( The law provides for the rights of the citiensa. ones %aw provides LThat no law shall be enacted in said /slands which shall deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property withoutdue process of law, or deny to any person therein the e1ual protection

of the laws.

". %iberty 5 Civil %iberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be en-oyed in a

civiliedcommunity, consistently with the peaceful en-oyment of li&e freedom in others. The right to

%iberty guaranteedby the Constitution includes the right to e+ist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint orservitude.



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*. /n general, it may be said that %iberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done

by freemenb.

The liberty that the law spea&s of, li&e all the other rights, is regulated*.( Rights can be ta&en away but not withoutthe due process of laws

i. 9ue process of law means simply . . . first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the

general powers of thelegislative department of the ;overnment8 second, that this law shall bereasonable in its operation8 third, that it shall beenforced according to the regular methods of procedure

prescribed8 and fourth, that it shall be applicable ali&e to all thecitiens of the state or to all of a class.

ii. The pledge that no person shall be denied the e1ual protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute

which is applicableto all of a class.

The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.

!egislative intent of Sec. *3'# and &esolution No. *#

Basically, the law is pursuant to the ob-ective of the ;overnment to civilie these people because if they

remain as they are, they are a burden to the state8either they are a threat to the lives and properties of the civilied

people or they are prone to abuseAslavery by the educated ones.

5Reasons set forth in the preambleD '"( The failure of former attempts for the advancement ofthe non5Christian people

of the province8 and '*( the only successfully method for educating the 6anguianes was to oblige them to live in

apermanent settlement. The Solicitor5;eneral adds the following8 '3( The protection of the 6anguianes8 '#( the protection of the public forests in which they roam8 '>( the necessity of introducing civilied customs among the

6anguianes.

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Secretary of the /nteriorD To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and onaccount of their ignorance,they will commit crimes and ma&e depredation, or if not they will be sub-ect to

involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.

"

HISTO&Y )of the non ;Christians<-

A.

Before c1uisition of the hil. by the FS5

The Spaniards introduced the idea of gathering non5christians in one place to civilie them as they were deemed as a

bac&ward race.5

/n implementing this concept, they have established laws to govern all indios, provincial authorities to implement

the said laws, armed5forces to protect the new towns andpunish rebellious indios.

=.

fter c1uisition of the hil. by the FS

5 hilippine organic law recognied a dividing line between the territory not inhabited by 6oros or other non5Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by 6oros or othernon5Christian tribes.5 There were different laws denote an an+ious regard for the welfare of the non5Christian inhabitants of the

hilippines and a settled and consistent practice with reference to themethods to be followed for their advancement.

5The term Inon5 ChristianJ refers not to religious belief, but, in a way, to geographical area, and, more directly, to

natives of the hilippine /slands of a low grade of civiliation,usually living in tribal relationship apart from settledcommunities.



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5ue rocess and Sec. *3'# )and>or &es. *#-

"( The non5Christians do not have the right conception of liberty

a. There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in arightful way. Theyunderstand liberty as the right to do anything they will going from one place to another in the

mountains, burning and destroyingforests and ma&ing illegal caiMgins thereon.

b. !ot &nowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are

being deprived thereof without due process of lawH

*(The guarantee of due process does not apply to non5Christians

a. But does the Constitutional guaranty that Gno person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of

lawG apply to a class ofpersons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in arightful wayH To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to

what liberty is. /t will mean, inthe case at bar, that the ;overnment should not adopt any measures loo&ing to the

welfare and advancement of the class of personsin 1uestion. /t will mean that this people should be let along in the

mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even theremotest hope of coming to understand liberty in itstrue and noble sense.

The non5application of the due process guaranty to them is for public welfare and also their own benefita.

Shall we, after e+pending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance

and superstition,now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invo&ed in their favor that Constitutional

guaranty that no person shall bedeprived of his liberty without due process of lawH To allow them to successfullyinvo&e that Constitutional guaranty at this time willleave the ;overnment without recourse to pursue the wor&s of

civiliing them and ma&ing them useful citiens. They will thus left ina permanent state of savagery and become a

vulnerable point to attac& by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation todeal with our bac&ward brothers.

b. /n short, everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in civiliation and

material prosperity may be assured.Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not ma&e them slavesor put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not wor& for anybody but for

themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.

Conclusion

5 The right to liberty is not absolute

The remedy for any oppressed 6anguian is to see& for the official7s removal from office The government has the power to restrain freedom of citiens to some e+tent

)urther, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citien is unduly interfered without when the degree of

civiliation of the 6anguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the

hilippines. !or can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go bac& to our definition of due process of law and e1ual protection of the law, there e+ists a law 8 the law seems to be reasonable8 it is enforced

according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed8 and it applies ali&e to all of a class.

ction pursuant to section *"#> of the dministrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without

due process of law and does not deny to him the e1ual protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations inaccordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. e are further of the opinion that

section *"#> of the dministrative Code is a legitimate e+ertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the

/ndian policy of the Fnited States. Section *"#> of the dministrative Code of "<"$ is constitutional.etitioners arenot unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. abeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the trueruling of the court. Costs shall be ta+es against petitioners. So ordered.



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CO&ONA ?S UNIT05 HA&=OU& I!OT 2& NO 3*(%,+ CAS0 5I20ST

FACTS:

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Ang Tiba@ v. CI& 12& '$'%$" *( Februar@ 3%'+7

n anc, /aurel &'1

Facts:

Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of ng Tibay, laid off =< laborers, who were members ofthe !ational %abor Fnion '!%F(, due to alleged shortages of leather materials. The !ational %abor Fnionfiled a

complaint for unfair labor practice against ng Tibay, alleging therein, among others, that Toribiodominates the

!ational or&ers7 Brotherhood '!B( of ng Tibay, another union in the company, and that Toribio discriminated

against the !%F and un-ustly favoring the !B, which he allegedly dominated. TheCourt of /ndustrial Relationsruled in favor of !%F, due to the failure of ng Tibay to present records of theBureau of Customs and Boo&s of

ccounts of native dealers in leather and thus to disprove !%F7s allegation

that the lac& of leather materials as a scheme to discharge !%F members. The Supreme Court, however,reversed the

decision, finding no substantial evidence that the =< wor&ers were dismissed due to their union affiliation oractivities. Thus, the Solicitor ;eneral, in behalf of the Court of /ndustrial Relations filed a motion for

reconsideration, while the !%F filed a motion for new trial, praying that the case be remanded to the Court of

/ndustrial Relations.

Issue: hether the C/R7s freedom from the rigidity of procedural re1uirements prescribe special



12

re1uirements of due process in administrative cases.

Held:

The Court of /ndustrial Relations 'C/R( is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,and the ct

re1uires it to act according to -ustice and e1uity and substantial merits of the case, without regardto technicalities or

legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may informits mind in such manner

as it may deem -ust and e1uitable. The fact, however, that the C/R may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural re1uirements does not mean that it can, in -usticiable cases coming

before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential re1uirements of due process in trials

andinvestigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in

proceedings of this character, to wit

a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit

evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the citien shall be protected by the rudimentary

re1uirements of fair play. b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after the party is given an opportunity to present his case and

to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the

corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or

persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration.

c. ile the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. decision with absolutely nothing to

support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle

that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. %aw is both agrant and a limitation upon power.

d. !ot only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be substantial.

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. /t means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as ade1uate to support a conclusion. The statute provides that Gthe rules of evidence prevailing in courts oflaw and e1uity shall not be controlling.G The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative

boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed

incompetent in -udicial proceedings would not invalidate the

administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable fle+ibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to -ustify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. 6ere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor

does not constitute substantial evidence.e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record

and disclosed to the parties affected. :nly by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to &now and meet the case against them. /t should not, however,

detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authoried legal

methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of

in1uiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but theirreport and decision are only advisory. 'Section <, C "03.( The C/R may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute

of any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of in1uiry, a provincial fiscal, a -ustice of the

peace or any public official in

any part of the hilippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or publicofficial such powers and functions as the C/R may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the e+ercise

of the Court itself of any of its powers 'Section "0(

f. The C/R or any of its -udges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and factsof the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. /t may be that thevolume of wor& is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the C/R personally to decide all

controversies coming before them. There is no statutory authority to authorie e+aminers or other subordinates to

render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, to solve the difficulty.

g. The C/R should, in all controversial 1uestions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can &now the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of

this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

hilco6sat v. Alcua 12& ,',3," 3, 5ece6ber 3%,%7



13

n anc, Regalado &'1

Facts: By virtue of Republic ct >>"#, the hilippine Communications Satellite Corporation

'/%C:6ST( was granted a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the hilippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated e1uipment and facilities for international satellite

communications, the authority to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver

telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals. By

designation of the Republic of the hilippines, it is also the sole signatory for the hilippines in the greement andthe :perating greement relating to the /nternational Telecommunications Satellite :rganiation '/!T4%ST(, as

well as in the Convention and the :perating greement of the/nternational 6aritime Satellite :rganiation

'/!6RST(, which two global commercial

telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by various states in line with the principlesset forth in Resolution "$*" 'OE/( of the Fnited !ations7s ;eneral ssembly. Since "<?=, /t has been leasing its

satellite circuits to %9T, hilippine ;lobal Communications, 4astern Telecom, ;lobe 6ac&ay Cable and Radio

Corp. /TT, and Capitol ireless or their predecessors5in5interest. The satellite services thus provided by

/%C:6ST enable said international carriers to serve the public with indispensable communication services,such as overseas telephone, tele+, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and television

standard conversion from 4uropean to merican or vice versa.

/t was e+empt from the -urisdiction of the then ublic Service Commission, now !ational

Telecommunications Commission '!TC(. owever, pursuant to 4+ecutive :rder '4:( "<? issued on "$ une"<=$,

it was placed under the -urisdiction, control and regulation of !TC, including all its facilities and services and thefi+ing of rates. /mplementing said e+ecutive order, !TC re1uired /%C:6ST to apply for the re1uisite

certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders,as well as the

corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. :n < September "<=$, /%C:6ST filed with !TC anapplication for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating

and maintaining since "<?$, to continue providing the international satellite communications services it has li&ewise

been providing since "<?$, and to charge the current rates applied for

in rendering such services. ending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue tooperate and maintain the facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.

:n "? September "<=$, /%C:6ST was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its e+isting

facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging.

This authority was valid for ? months from the date of said order. hen said provisional authority e+piredon"$ 6arch "<==, it was e+tended for another ? months, or up to "? September "<==. Thereafter, the !TC further

e+tended the provisional authority of /%C:6ST for another ? months, counted from "? September "<==, but itdirected /%C:6ST to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of ">Q on the present authoried

rates. /%C:6ST assailed said order.

Issue: hether the !TC is not re1uired to provide notice and hearing to /%C:6ST in its rate5fi+ing order,

which fi+ed a temporary rate pending final determination of /%C:6ST7s application.

Held:

The !TC, in the e+ercise of its rate5fi+ing power, is limited by the re1uirements of public safety, public

interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which con-ointly more than satisfy the re1uirements of a validdelegation of legislative power. The !TC order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio,

without notice to /%C:6ST and without the benefit of a hearing. Said order was based merely on an initial

evaluation, which is a unilateral evaluation, but had /%C:6ST been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in 1uestion was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the conse1uentdeterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to !TC. The order pertains e+clusively

to /%C:6ST and to no other. Reduction of rates was made without affording /%C:6ST the benefit of an

e+planation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate

reduction. /%C:6ST was not even afforded the opportunity to cross5e+amine the inspector who issued thereport on which !TC based its 1uestioned order. hile the !TC may fi+ a temporary rate pending final

determination of the application of /%C:6ST, such ratefi+ing order, temporary though it may be, is not e+empt

from the statutory procedural re1uirements of notice and hearing, as well as the re1uirement of reasonableness.ssuming that such power is vested in !TC, it may not e+ercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner.



14

Categoriing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of

statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise

provided by the applicable law. !TC has no authority to ma&e such order without first giving /%C:6ST a

hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon acomplaint, a summary investigation, or upon

the commissionGs own motion.

0strada v. Sandiganba@an 12& 3',#$+" 3% Nove6ber *++37

n anc, ellosillo &'

Facts:

:n # pril *00", the :ffice of the :mbudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan = separate /nformations,doc&eted asD 'a( Criminal Case *?>>=, for violation of Republic ct 'R( $0=0, as amended by R $?><8 'b(

Criminal Cases *?>>< to *?>?*, inclusive, for violation of Sections 3, paragraph 'a(, 3, paragraph 'a(, 3, paragraph

'e(, and 3, paragraph 'e( of R 30"< 'nti5;raft and Corrupt ractices ct(, respectively8 'c( Criminal Case *?>?3,

for violation of Section $, paragraph 'd(, of R ?$"3 'The Code of Conduct and 4thical Standards for ublic:fficials and 4mployees(8 'd( Criminal Case *?>?#, for er-ury 'rticle. "=3 of The Revised enal Code(8 and, 'e(

Criminal Case *?>?>, for /llegal Fse :f n lias 'Commonwealth ct "#*, as amended by R ?0=>(. :n "" pril

*00", oseph 4strada filed an :mnibus 6otion for the remand of the case to the :mbudsman for preliminary

investigation with respect tospecification d of the charges in the /nformation in Criminal Case *?>>=8 and, for reconsideration Areinvestigation

of the offenses under specifications a, b, and c to give the accused an opportunity to file counter5affidavits andother documents necessary to prove lac& of probable cause. The grounds raised were only lac& of preliminary

investigation, reconsideration A reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lac& of probable cause.The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were

never raised in that :mnibus 6otion thus indicating the e+plicitness and comprehensibility of the lunder %aw. :n

*> pril *00", the Sandiganbayan, Third 9ivision, issued a Resolution in Criminal Case !o. *?>>= finding that a

probable cause for the offense of plunder e+ists to -ustify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused. :n*> une *00" petitionerGs motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan. :n "# une *00", 4strada

moved to 1uash the /nformation in Criminal Case *?>>= on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not

constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the

mended /nformation for lunder charged more than one '"( offense. :n < uly *00", the Sandiganbayan denied petitionerGs 6otion to Nuash.

Issue: hether the lunder law, and the information, are clear to inform 4strada of the accusations against him as toenable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

Held:

s it is written, the lunder %aw contains ascertainable standards and well5defined parameters which would enablethe accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section * is sufficiently e+plicit in its description of the acts,

conduct and conditions re1uired or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and

particularity. s long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are sub-ectto it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. /t must sufficiently guide



15

the -udge in its application8 the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation8 and more importantly, the

accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. /ndeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that

what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill5gotten wealth of at

least >0,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Section ", paragraph 'd(, of the lunder%aw. erein, the amended

/nformation itself closely trac&s the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various

elements of the offense which 4strada is alleged to have committed. There was nothing that is vague or ambiguousthat will confuse 4strada in his defense. )actual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily

understood and provide ade1uate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Fpon such une1uivocal

assertions, 4strada is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an

intelligent defense. There is no basis for 4stradaGs claim that the Supreme Court review the nti5lunder %aw on itsface and in its entirety. facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad

because ofpossible chilling effect upon protected speech.

The theory is that when statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent constructionsuggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society

of constitutionally protected e+pression is deemed to -ustify allowing attac&s on overly broad statutes with no

re1uirement that the person ma&ing the attac& demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute

drawn with narrow specificity. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in

terrorem effect resulting from their very e+istence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the Statemay well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.

/n the area of criminal law, the law cannot ta&e chances as in the area of free speech. The void5for5

vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or re1uires the doing of an act in terms so vague thatmen of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first

essential of due process of law. The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that a governmental purpose

may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected

freedoms. The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing ontheir faces statutes in free speech cases. :n its face invalidation of statutes has been described as manifestly

strong medicine, to be employed sparingly and only as a last resort, and is generally disfavored.



16

ustice Secretar@ v. !antion 12& 34%'$#" 3( October *+++7

Resolution n anc, (uno &'1

Facts:

:n "3 anuary "<$$, then resident )erdinand 4. 6arcos issued residential 9ecree "0?< rescribing the

rocedure for the 4+tradition of ersons ho ave Committed Crimes in a )oreign Country. :n "3 !ovember

"<<#, then Secretary of ustice )ran&lin 6. 9rilon, representing the ;overnment of the Republic of the hilippines,signed in 6anila the 4+tradition Treaty Between the ;overnment of the Republic of the hilippines and the

;overnment of the Fnited States of merica. The Senate, by way of Resolution "",e+pressed its concurrence in the

ratification of said treaty. /t also e+pressed its concurrence in the 9iplomatic !otes correcting aragraph '>('a(,

rticle $ thereof 'on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an e+tradition re1uest upon certification bythe principal diplomatic or consular officer of the re1uested state resident in the Re1uesting State(. :n "= une "<<<,

the 9epartment of ustice received from the 9epartment of )oreign ffairs F. S. !ote Eerbale 0>** containing a

re1uest for the e+tradition of 6ar& imene to the Fnited States. ttached to the !ote Eerbale were the ;rand ury

/ndictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the F.S. 9istrict Court, Southern 9istrict of )lorida, and other supportingdocuments for said e+tradition.

imene was charged in the Fnited States for violation of 'a( "= FSC 3$" 'Conspiracy to commit offense or

to defraud the Fnited States, * counts(, 'b( *? FSC $*0" 'ttempt to evade or defeat ta+, # counts(, 'c( "= FSC

"3#3 ')raud by wire, radio, or television, * counts(, 'd( "= FSC "00" ')alse statement or entries, ? counts(, and '4(* FSC ##"f '4lection contributions in name of another8 33 counts(. :n the same day, the Secretary issued

9epartment :rder *#< designating and authoriing a panel of attorneys to ta&e charge of and to handle the case.

ending evaluation of the aforestated e+tradition documents, imene 'on " uly "<<<( re1uested copies of theofficial e+tradition re1uest from the FS ;overnment, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and

that he be given ample time to comment on the re1uest after he shall have received copies of the re1uested papers.

The Secretary denied the re1uest. :n ? ugust "<<<, imene filed with the Regional Trial Court a petitionagainst the Secretary of ustice, the Secretary of )oreign ffairs, and the 9irector of the !ational Bureau of

/nvestigation, for mandamus 'to compel the ustice Secretary to furnish imene the e+tradition documents, to give

him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the e+tradition re1uest, and

thereafter to evaluate the re1uest impartially, fairly and ob-ectively(8 certiorari 'to set aside the ustice Secretary7sletter dated "3 uly "<<<(8 and prohibition 'to restrain the ustice Secretary from considering the e+tradition re1uest

and from filing an e+tradition petition in court8 and to en-oin the Secretary of )oreign ffairs and the 9irector of the !B/ from performing any act directed to the e+tradition of imene to the Fnited States(, with an application for the

issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary in-unction. The trial court ruled in favor ofimene. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. :n "= anuary *000, by a vote of <5

?, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the ustice Secretary to furnish imene copies of the

e+tradition re1uest and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment

with supporting evidence. :n 3 )ebruary *000, the Secretary timely filed an Frgent 6otion for Reconsideration.

Issue: hether imene had the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an e+tradition process

.&uling : residential 9ecree '9( "0?< which implements the R5FS 4+tradition Treaty provides the time when ane+traditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for e+tradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing

of the petition for e+tradition in the e+tradition court 'Section ?(. /t is of -udicial notice that the summons includes

the petition for e+tradition which will be answered by the e+traditee. There is no provision in the Treaty and in 9"0?< which gives an e+traditee the right to demand from the ustice Secretary copies of the e+tradition re1uest fromthe FS government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the re1uest is still undergoing

evaluation. The 9) and the 9:, as well as the FS government, maintained that the Treaty and 9 "0?< do not

grant the e+traditee a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an e+tradition process. /t is neither an

international practice to afford a potential e+traditee with a copy of the e+tradition papers during the evaluation stageof the e+tradition process. imene is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the e+tradition process7

evaluation stage.



17

)urther, as an e+tradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an e+tradition

proceeding is not a&in to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily

apply to the former. The procedural due process re1uired by a given set of circumstances must begin with a

determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has beenaffected by governmental action. The concept of due process is fle+ible for not all situations calling for procedural

safeguards call for the same &ind of procedure.

Thus, the temporary hold on imeneGs privilege of notice andhearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he

decide to resist the re1uest for his e+tradition to the FS. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental

fairness is assured a party.

Documents

Digest Part 1