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I. POLITICAL LAW
PEOPLE V PERFECTO
"The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force."public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
FACTS: This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article criticizing the Senate and its members in general, about it to the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery."
Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.
The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from Spanish to American sovereigntyWhether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel
HELD: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things.
Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.
"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks."
DECISION:
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
----- Will a law be abrogated by the change of Spanish to American Sovereignty over the Philippines?The Supreme Court held that Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were representative of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. It was no sense a continuation of the old laws. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only in bated breath.The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.
Judgement is REVERED and the defendant and appellant ACQUITTED.
MACARIOLA V ASUNCION
FACTS: In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their inheritance involving parcels of land located in Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola, after determining the legibility of the parties to inherit rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter, the counsels of the parties submitted a project partition reflecting the preference of the parties. The project partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly authorized by Macariola as counsel. The judge then approved the project partition. The decision became final in 1963 as well.
Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold the property to judge Asuncion in 1965.
On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with “acts unbecoming a judge” on the ground that he bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was involved in a civil case decided by him; this act by Asuncion is averred by Macariola to be against Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which provides:
"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action,
either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession".
Also, Macariola said that Asuncion’s act tainted his earlier judgment. Macariola said that the project partition was unsigned by her and that what was given to her in the partition were insignificant portions of the parcels of land.
According to the petitioner, respondent allegedly violated Article 1491 (5) of the New Civil Code and Article 14 (1) and (5) of Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Sec. 12 XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of Canons of Judicial Ethics.
ISSUE: Is Article 14 of the Code of Commerce still in force?
HELD: Article 14 partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees like justices and judges. Said provision must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated. As such, Article 14 is not in force. The respondent is not found to have violated the articles invoked by the petitioner but he was advised by the Court to be more discreet in his private and business activities.
----The provision in the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges, justices, etc., (public officers) from engaging in business within the territorial jurisdiction of their courts is political in nature and therefore, said provision was deemed abrogated when there was a change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States at the turn of the century. Political laws are deemed abrogated if there is a change of sovereignty and unless re-enacted under the new sovereign, the same is without force and effect.
The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the property in 1965 – 2 years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the property directly from any of the parties since the property was directly bought by Galapon, who then sold the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that Galapon acted as a “dummy” of Asuncion. Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition; or that what she got were insignificant portions of the land.
II. CONSTITUTION
LOPEZ V DELOS REYESDISSENT JUSTICE JOHNS
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III. INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION
FRANCISCO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FACTS: On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint (1st impeachment complaint) was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and 7 Associate Justices for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes”.
On October 22, 2003, the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint for being insufficient in substance, although it was sufficient in form.
On October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint or 4months and 3 weeks since the filing thereof, a 2nd impeachment complaint was filed with the House’s Secretary General by Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Funtabella against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).”
The 2nd impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/ Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Due to the events that took place, several instant petitions were filed against the House of Representatives, mostly contending that the filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates Article XI Section 5 of the Constitution that “no impeachment proceedings shall be INITIATED against the same official more than once within a period of one year ” ; and that sections16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 12th Congress are unconstitutional as well.
The House of Representatives argues that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file", and concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and the 7 Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate".
Section 3 (2), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution3 ways to file an impeachment complaint:1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or 2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member (of the House of Representatives); or3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules (of the 12th Congress)Impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated:1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution issufficient in substance; or2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance; or 3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of averified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House
ISSUES:1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense?2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional.3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
HELD:1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition.
2. Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term “initiate” a meaning different from “filing.”
3. Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
----To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
*** The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers
CIVIL LIBERTIES V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.
----
Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?
No. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution "must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
IV. SELF-EXECUTING AND NON SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSISFACTS: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
-----As the Filipino first policy was deemed self executing, the court ruled that the qualified Filipino entity must be given preference by granting it the option to match the winning bid because the provision. The Supreme Court, therefore, directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
The rule is that (from Agpalo) in the case of doubt, the constitution should be considered self executing rather than non self executing. Such is the case with Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution which states that “in grant of rights and privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipino”. According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.
Furthermore, (agpalo) in its plain ordinary meaning the term patrimony pertains to heritage . the constitution speaks of national patrimony , it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the constitution could have very well used the term natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos and therefore an example the Manila hotel which has become a landmark a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.
The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners, and this is not to be taken lightly as Nationalism is inherent in the concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and
concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.
PAMATONG V COMELEC
Prefatory Statement:
Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies (COCs) for the 2010 Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for President. Among the lesser known presidentiables include someone called "Manok" (because apparently he can mimic a cock's crow), a six-star general, and a future "emperor of the world." Considering that we would be having automated elections next year and the list of all candidates are to be written in the ballots while voters are supposed to shade the circles corresponding to their choices, would all 99 candidates be included? No. Aside from disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants, the Comelec can also motu propio deny due course to the COCs. Aside from the qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a candidate should also have the capacity and resources to launch a national campaign.
Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates violate this constitutional provision?
FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to
enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.
TONDO MEDICAL CENBTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA). It provided for five general areas of reform:
To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; Secure funding for priority public health programs; Promote the development of local health systems and
ensure its effective performance;
Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies;
Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP)
On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government units.A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,”
The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation.
The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political department.
ISSUE: Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates the constitution?
HELD: YES. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that the HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This contention is unfounded. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution areconsidered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing. In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights. Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the afore cited case of Tañada v. Angara. Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners
are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA. In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children to assistance and special protection, including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, they are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but rather, the electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their votes.
------The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.
1. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing. Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution — specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 — the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara, wherein the Court specifically set apart the sections as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented. Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
2. Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the compensation of the DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be abused or disabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: “[T]he president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987. It is an exercise of the President’s constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.
V. AMENDMENT VS REVISION
LAMBINO V COMELEC
FACTS: Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. That said number of votes comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters with each legislative district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters. This has been verified by local COMELEC registrars as well. The proposed amendment to the constitution seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions”. These proposed changes will shift the president bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of the Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution – this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al contended that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within that case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 ArtXVII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full text of the proposed amendments.Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be parliament to enact more rules.There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar. ----- The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People, The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives, The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.
