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Final paper Antonio Caruso ID Number: I6023297 Tutorial Group 1 (08h45-10h45) Tutor: M. CarreeDifferences and similarities, contrasts and match points: The work for a better Europe never stops0SummaryIntroduction Section 1 The UK, France and Germany: three “personifications” of more popular models 1.1 The VoC Approach 1.1.1 The role of the state 1.1.2 Labor Relations 1.2 The integration model Section 2 The EU: Functioning and governance Section 3 From top to bottom: the impact of the EU
Citation preview
Final paper
Antonio Caruso
ID Number: I6023297
Tutorial Group 1 (08h45-10h45)
Tutor: M. Carree
Differences and similarities, contrasts and match points:
The work for a better Europe never stops
0
Summary
Introduction 2
Section 1
The UK, France and Germany: three “personifications” of more 3
popular models
1.1 The VoC Approach 4
1.1.1 The role of the state 4
1.1.2 Labor Relations 6
1.2 The integration model 6
Section 2
The EU: Functioning and governance 7
Section 3
From top to bottom: the impact of the EU on member states 9
Section 4
Lobbying perspective 12
4.1 Transversal Lobbying 13
Conclusion 14
References 15
1
Introduction
From time immemorial there seems to have been a common desire for the re-creation
of a comprehensive political structure for Europe, in reminiscence of the legendary Roman
Empire; from Charlemagne to Napoleon the aspiration was one, to revive what had been the
spirit of the Roman era, with the creation of a common legal code or a common currency as a
symbol of power for example (The Economist, 2004, The History of an idea). Undoubtedly
influenced by history, in 1957 the founding fathers signed the Treaty of Rome, perhaps
unaware of what that date would signify for future generations, and in doing so gave birth to
what 50 years later is now the fulcrum of the old continent, namely the “European Union”.
More than fifty years after its birth there are still some doubts as to the effective functioning
of the EU; emblematic is the case of France and The Netherlands who have voted negatively
on the European Constitution (The Economist, 2007, Fit at 50?).
The main goal of this paper consists in the attempt of giving a general overview of
different aspects which characterize the EU and the overall impact had on member states,
hence proving the positive effects of the EU on those states, despite the opinions of many
pessimists and sceptics. Section 1 will attempt to explain and clarify reasons for the
differences which exist between the socio-political-economic patterns of the EU member
states in terms of corporatism, pluralism and statism, as existing related literature is very
broad and often unclear. In analyzing the main features of these patterns, three countries have
been selected which seem to embody the three most common systems; in turn these three,
allowing for basic variations due to the intrinsic characteristics of each country, may be used
as an initial framework for a successive classification of the socio-political-economic systems
of the other nations.
Section 2 will deal with the general purpose of the EU and how that governing body
works. This preliminary breakdown will permit, in section 3, an in-depth analysis of the
impact made by the EU on domestic systems of policy making and governance, taking into
consideration the previous classification of social, political and economic systems. In dealing
with this topic, reference will be made to the work of Schmidt (2006), who has endeavored to
explain and elucidate the concept as to how Europeanization has affected national policy-
making processes, shedding light on the manner in which this process (Europeanization) has
influenced individual member states in differing ways, depending on which position they
occupy along a continuum from statist to corporatist (Schmidt, 2006, p.671).
2
At this point, hoping to have distinguished the three main subdivisions of capitalism, and
after having given a general overview of the model of governance adopted by the EU and its
subsequent consequences on member states, always bearing in mind their native aspects, the
scope of section 4 is to analyze in what is the role of lobbyists in the EU and which bodies,
namely Parliament, Commission and Council, have a higher degree of openness and therefore
provide more access points for influence. Subsequently the focus will be on recent studies
and fresh approaches in the field of lobbying, such as, to cite Gueguèn, “Transversal
lobbying”, highlighting how old methods of lobbying are now obsolete due the remarkable
dynamism that has overtaken Europe in the past two decades, using as examples, to attach
theory to fact, the cases of two commercial giants: Nokia and Michelin.
Section 1
The UK, France and Germany: three “personifications” of the more
popular models
As the topic dealt with in this first section has already been studied innumerable times
by several scholars, each having proffered their personal conclusions, one initial goal of this
paper is to formulate a comprehensible classification of the models of capitalism which have
developed in the advanced industrialized economies of Europe whilst at the same time, aided
by empirical evidence, attempting to define their principal features. To this end three nations,
the UK, France and Germany, will be presented as illustrative cases.
As Schmidt stated, in Europe during the post second world war period, three different
varieties of capitalism were developed and established, the first being of a pluralist mould,
which scholars labelled “liberal market economy”; the second being based on corporatist
principles, thus defined “coordinated market economy” and the last, developed principally in
France, being referred to as “state capitalism”(Schmidt, 2003 p.527). In the academic ambit,
the latter has been, and still is, at the centre of many disputes between different scholars, as
many of them do not consider it necessary to classify an ulterior model of capitalism as, they
affirm, in today’s world this particular one has lost its empirical validity due the deregulation,
3
privatization and liberalization of financial markets (Schmidt, 2003 p.527). They also believe
that “state capitalism”, under certain aspects, could be seen as a mutation of the other two
forms of capitalism and therefore should not be classed as an individual form.
Notwithstanding their arguments, this thesis follows the idea of Schmidt in asserting the
existence of a third form, namely “the Statist model” (Schmidt, 2003 p.526).
1.1 The VoC Approach
According to the VoC (Varieties of Capitalism) approach, proposed by Soskice and
Hall (1999), in wanting to identify and classify the differences between the political and
economic institutions of various countries, it is necessary to keep in mind that each country,
throughout its history, has followed a different route to economic growth, due to national
circumstances, their diverse cultures, varying approaches to and modes of administration and
numerous other significant factors. In this way the equilibrium created within these
institutions varies, reinforcing some and weakening others, but in any case, in principle, the
assemblage of complementary institutional patterns is generally limited (Knell & Srholec,
2007 p.42). Starting from this idea, Hall and Soskice have outlined two main modes of
coordination, the first liberal, the second corporatist, to which this paper adds the Statist
model, comparing it from time to time with the its two precedents. As the field of analysis for
these institutions is broad, the focus of attention here will be placed solely on two main
aspects; respectively: the role of the state and labour relations. By observing how these two
aspects interact in the UK, Germany and France, the analysis will reveal which position each
country holds on the pluralism - corporatism scale.
1.1.1 The Role of the State
The role of the State is analyzed through a behavioural study of political authorities,
particularly those of governments, investigating ways in which various aspects in the life of a
country are regulated; for example concerning the formulation and implementation of
economic policies, social policies or safety policies. By so doing it is possible to discern
different levels of government action, from pure spectatorship to the opposite extreme of
tough leadership. Hence, according to the way in which the government’s role is perceived,
one can deduce which model is incorporated by that country.
In the UK, since the second world war, the state has tried to cover a role of pure
spectatorship, with the aim of limiting an over-invasive presence and influence on the market,
4
by avoiding to take action as an arbitrator amid economic agents, preferring to leave the task
of general administration to self governing bodies. Nonetheless from time to time it has
continued to provide help for companies in difficult situations, for example by intervening
with policies of nationalization or by conducting planning tests (Schmidt 2003, p.528).
Unlike the UK, in Germany the state has always aimed at promoting business activities, very
often intervening in the market, providing funding for the industrial sector and supporting
innovation with high financial contributions for research and development, with the scope of
rendering the economic framework as favourable as possible for reaching an elevated level of
monetary growth and witnessing a healthy development of national productivity. A
superficial glance at this system might give the impression that such a concentrated
involvement on behalf of the state would hamper the market from proceeding autonomously
or from following the trends of competitors, but in actual fact, while on the one hand there
are firm state regulations which cover the more crucial aspects of business (those which
could, if handled imprudently, provoke negative effects on the market), on the other, more
often than not, the actual administration is left to the market agents themselves. For this
reason the German state is known as a “facilitator”.
Conversely, in France, the main purpose of the state is to preserve the identity of the
nation and promote “national interest” and “national will” (Kohler & Koch, 1998 p.12). As a
direct consequence of this the state’s intervention in the market is intense, taking wide range
action on nearly all fronts, from mediation in inter-firm relations, to the provision of
economic incentives and loans, sometimes with extremely low interest rates or even on
occasion without demanding any fiscal return at all; all with the sole aim of preserving and
maintaining employment and improving production in sub-developed areas, impersonating in
this way the role of an orchestral conductor (Schmidt 2003, p.530).
Owing to the never-ending economic challenge, which had its beginnings in Europe
and around the world in the early ‘70s with the first oil crisis and which was accentuated by
several economic after shocks, many countries have been forced to review their modes of
governance. Regarding the three nations under examination, it is note that the UK’s
noninterventionist structure became even more liberal. Dissimilarly in Germany, due to the
complexity of its organization, the process of reform was extremely slow and did not begin
until the early ‘90s. France, however, has experienced a change of direction, with the state
renouncing the leadership role and adopting an “enhancing role” (Schmidt, 2003 p.533), thus
positioning itself on the scale somewhere between Britain and Germany.
5
1.1.2 Labor Relations
Although the two main aspects considered when analyzing labour relations are the
stringency of rules for the hiring and firing of workers, and the regulation of working hours,
there are still other facets which upon reflection (Knell & Shrolec, 2007 p.50) can explain
effective discrepancies between diverse labour markets and link these conclusions to the
tendencies of countries, whether corporatist or pluralist. Attention here will be placed on the
strictness of EPL (employment protection legislation) and on the percentage of collective
bargaining coverage.
The UK records a very low level of EPL. It utilizes a basic system of regulations in an
aim to reach the highest possible degree of flexibility and mobility in the labour market.
Rules are straightforward regarding the assumption and expulsion of personnel, and the state
offers an exceptionally low level of social security, so reconfirming its role as a spectator.
Moreover, an investigation of the percentage of collective bargaining coverage reveals that
only 33% of employees are covered by a collective agreement (Knell & Shrolec, 2007 p.52).
Germany instead presents a comparatively high level of EPL, being more oriented
towards job security, towards the maintenance of posts and also long-term employment; more
rigid rules are implemented regarding hiring and firing, and the state has a very active role in
the overall regulation of the labour market. Looking at the percentage of collective bargaining
coverage, in Germany as much as 68% of the employed workforce has a contract as a result
of collective bargaining (Knell & Shrolec, 2007 p.52).
Finally, the situation in France is quite different; although the EPL level is high, over
recent years the state has attempted to increase flexibility, for example in the regulation of
weekly working hours, but the state is always central to overall decision making, once again
confirming its role of “conductor”. In fact the percentage of collective bargaining coverage is
nearing 100%, actually stabilising at 93% (Knell & Shrolec, 2007 p.52).
1.2 The Integration model
Siaroff (1999) proposes an alternative method to that of VoC for verifying the
position held by any one model in a corporatist-pluralist continuum, which measures the
degree of “Integration” of countries. The term integration is defined as a cooperative model
in which economic administration focuses on the long term and involves various social
partners at various levels of management, from wage configuration to the formulation of
national policies regarding competitiveness. (Siaroff, 1999 p.189).
6
Several factors are considered when defining the degree of integration of a state, from
the number of strikes effected to the legal and state support of trade unions; from the extent
of co-determination in the workplace to the nature of national industrial adjustment. (Siaroff,
1999 p.194). Hence, to pursue the work of Siaroff and measure the average level of
integration of representative EU countries over the past 50 years, on a scale of 1 to 5, wherein
1 indicates non-integrated economies, or rather those strictly pluralist, and 5 indicates
integrated economies, or rather those which lean more towards corporatism, it is evident that:
Germany has always maintained a high degree of integration, its average score being 4,125,
expressing a high level of corporatism. On the other hand the UK has registered an average
level of integration equal to 2 on the scale, so maintaining its pluralist and liberal reputation,
whereas France has experienced a slight increase in its level of integration, but still remains,
as far as this aspect is concerned, closer to the English model rather than that of Germany
(Siaroff, 1999 p.198).
Section 2
The EU: Functioning and governance
The main goal of this section is to understand how the European governance mode
works, but first of all we need to be clear on the function of the EU and what are the main
tasks of the three main European institutions. First, the European polity is defined as “sui
generis”, since it is governed without a government (Kohler & Koch, 1998, p.2); the making
of decisions on a European level has a strong impact on all member states which, by virtue of
their membership, are forced to receive and implement the policies determined upon, even if,
given the inherent characteristics of Europe, the European mode of governance does not
conform to the usual principles of democratic rule. Where there is no government and no
democratic representation, the ways and means of governing will be different. Without either
government or democratic representation the array of procedures and modes of governing
will be different (Kohler & Koch, 1998, p.2).
One main focus, which has long been, and still is, at the centre of disputes is that
concerning the amount of influence that the three main pillars of the EU, namely the
European Parliament, the Commission and the Council, individually hold; this discussion has
7
particularly regarded the role of the former. The role of the EU Parliament in the
community’s legislative procedure has mutated from being inexistent to being consultative
and what is more, to possessing an authority which goes beyond consultative; in fact at the
present time the task of the EU parliament is to propose legislation, take decisions and make
amendments (Bouwen, 2002, p.380), although major decision-making is still largely a
prerogative of the Council of Ministers and The Commission. However this increasing
significance of the EU Parliament is also due to the fact of its essence as the only body to
enjoy the succession to power as the result of a democratic election involving all European
citizens, although the details and the distribution of seats differ from state to state, due the
autonomy of each in organizing elections.
The Commission is considered to be the most important institution in policy-making
processes, since it promotes the common interests of Europeans, encouraging member states
to implement policies of intergovernmental consensus; moreover, article 149 of the EEC
Treaty states that the Commission holds veto power, meaning it has the power to withdraw or
modify at any time any procedure leading to the adoption of a Community act (Bouwen, 2002
p.379).
Finally, the Council of Ministers has the most important role in the EU legislative process, as
it is the supreme decision-maker and, above all, the forum in which variant purposes and
powers of member states can be reconciled. The policy of the council being made up of
ministers from member states ensures that the national interest prevails, so to identify the
domestic interests of member states is of crucial importance. The Council has both executive
and legislative power, although it shares the legislative power with the EU Parliament in the
co-decision procedure. In general four main legislative procedures can be outlined: 1)
consultation procedure; 2) assent procedure; 3) co-operation procedure; 4) co-decision
procedure. Depending on which procedure is used the Council has the power to influence the
final shape of legislative proposal (Bouwen, 2002, p.381).
Given the imbalances between European institutions, the mode of governance cannot
help but be affected as the EC is both a compact body and a plurality of protagonists, be they
collective, corporate or individual, and also because the latter participate in the European
political process, thus influencing, in differing ways, policy-making processes (Kohler &
Koch, 1998, p.7).
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is necessary to distinguish between the terms
“governance” and “government”. We can define governance as the array of processes and
8
modes by which the complex system of the citizen’s preferences is translated into effective
political choices, or else as a plurality of interests and different visions coming together in
order to define a common course of action, primarily by obtaining the consensus of all
parties. Instead, the term government refers directly to that party equipped with indisputable
rights, whose policies and decisions become binding, whilst at the same time acknowledging
that it also is subject to a certain control under established procedures (Kohler & Koch, 1998
p.1).
Following the approach of Kohler & Koch in classifying the diverse modes of
governance, two main criteria should be kept in mind: the first is the “organizing principle of
political relations”, which in turn could be based on consociation principles or inspired by the
majority rule; the second distinctive criteria concerns the “constitutive logic of the polity”,
which will depend on whether the objective is the “common purpose” or for “parallel
interests”. Out of the combination of these four categories, four modes of governance are
defined (Kohler & Koch, 1998 p.11): 1) Statism, based on majority rule and common
purpose; 2) Corporatism, which combines co-association with common purpose; 3)
Pluralism, which incorporates majority rule and parallel interest; 4) Network governance,
which builds on consociation and parallel interest.
Having defined four macro categories, we are now able to identify the mode of European
governance: this falls into the Network category of governance, since the most suitable
governing principle at European level is consociation, and also because its nature as a
supranational organization confines it to a pursuit of parallel interests, rather than to aim for
the common purpose (Kohler & Koch, 1998, p.14), which would mean at times seeking to
reach a compromise, given the many parties involved in the decision-making processes.
After this brief overview of which institution in the EU is the most important, the definition
of their roles and the classification of the European mode of governance, the following
section will deal with the question of what is the EU’s impact on national policy making and
governance.
Section 3
From top to bottom: the impact of the EU on member states
The process of Europeanization refers to different phenomena and pattern changes
related to the construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules,
9
procedures, policies and norms, which initially are defined and enforced at EU-level and
subsequently incorporated at domestic level, having differing impacts due to the diverse
political culture, traditions, social support, that is to say related to the socio-political-
economic patterns of the countries. Moreover, Europeanization has influenced not only the
traditional decision-making processes at domestic level, but also the routes by which the
overall societal actors can influence the European policy making process.
Ever since its origins the Achilles heel of the EU has been the problem relating to
enforcement, as compliance records vary significantly across the member states, this
depending mainly on institutional fit, capacity and willingness to implement policies
(Schmidt, 2006, p.672); indeed looking at the juncture reached by the transposition of
European policies, the EU faces a big challenge, not only in ensuring that each member state
implements the policies, but more importantly, that these rules are applied uniformly,
wherever countries have the right to choose how to implement the diverse policies, that is
when the European Directive is declared but does not directly come into force, being passed
instead to a national level.
As stated in section 2, the EU has a Network mode of governance, meaning that
interested parties have reasonably open access to and influence upon policy formulation,
while keeping in mind that stakeholders can bring their influence to bear only during the
initial phase and not during implementation when the policy is set and legal and regulatory
enforcement is the rule. In this way the EU has pluralized the national policy-making
processes, bringing it closer to a model of “Transnational Pluralism”, since the locus of
interest is now Brussels and not the national capitals. It has also tried to affect the
implementation processes in member states, promoting more legalistic and regulatory ways
of enforcement instead of facilitating the modes based on administrative discretion or self
regulation (Schmidt, 2006 p.671). In general the impact of Europeanization is differential, in
fact the more the pattern in a member state is statist, the more the Europeanization of national
policy making will be irrepressible, whereas the contrary happens with a corporatist country;
this is due to the diverse institutional fit of the countries, as the closer the fit, the less is the
disruption; according to Schmidt, we consider pluralism as a new default option between the
two (Schmidt, 2006, p.673).
It will be useful to distinguish possible diverse interaction between both EU and
national decision processes in order to understand what will be the impact of specific
policies; for example, when the EU has a strong leadership at the decision making stage,
without peripheral participation but with much opposition most probably the societal
10
participation and cooperation on the treatise in question will be at risk; whilst when the
European decision-making process is very strong with high participation and level of
cooperation then the voice of national leadership in a given member state and subsequent
opposition will be reduced; summarily, when there is an alignment between the EU pattern
and the national one, then there will be no important changes. For this reason, when the EU is
more pluralist or corporatist in policy-making, it influences the traditional statist patterns by
pushing them towards pluralism or corporatism, whilst the more the EU policy-making
process is pluralist or statist, the higher will be the likelihood of a shift for traditional
corporatist patterns towards pluralism or statism (Schmidt, 2006 p.676).
Referring to the conclusions of the first section, in which were presented as case
studies three nations, the UK, Germany and France, defining them as prototypes of three
different patterns, respectively pluralist, corporatist and statist, it is now possible to see what
the overall impact of EU policy-making processes has on these three countries in relation to
their different frameworks.
In the UK the EU has not played a very significant role in regards to the changes in
policy formulation as the nation developed direct lobbying strategies which were effective in
the EU policy formulation process (Coen, 1998); conversely regarding policy
implementation, the UK has experienced several problems since the increase in regulations
emanating from the EU replacing the customary informal arrangements of the administration
of rules being handled by independent regulatory agencies. This represents an important
challenge not only for governing practices but also for the procedural ideas on democracy,
hence the increasing sway will probably advance the likelihood of legal conflict, thereby
undermining the traditional process of conflict resolution (Schmidt, 2006 p.684).
In Germany the EU has not played a great part in either policy formulation or
implementation, as, for example regarding implementation, the German notion of regulation
is very similar to that of the EU, since it assumes universal applicability of the rules (Dyson,
1992), and so the increase in regulations emanating from the EU does not cause any kind of
consternation; concerning policy formulation, in Germany the combination of consensus-
oriented state-societal relations and federal arrangements with an additional high regard for
the law, implies that Germany’s decision making culture is very close to that of the EU
(Schmidt, 2006, p.686).
Lastly, in France, although the statist model is historically characterized by a reactive
approach of society against the state, over the years there has been a significant change of
course, dictated by the increasing importance of policy formulation and implementation
11
processes of social actors; albeit these changes are mainly due to the internal dynamics, there
is no doubt that the EU has been a very important dynamic in this process of reform
(Schmidt, 2006 p.683), pushing the French pattern towards greater pluralism with more
societal consultation and regulatory implementation.
Section 4
Lobbying perspective
In this last section, after the definition of the different patterns across countries in
section 1, having seen in section 2 the functioning of EU and its mode of governance and
having analyzed the differential impact of EU in section 3, now the aim of this part is to
understand how the different EU’s stakeholders, namely firms, EU associations and national
associations, lobby at European level throughout the use of the “exchange theory”, proposed
by Bowuen (2002), and with the new forms of lobbying, like the “transversal lobbying”
according to Gueguèn (2007).
In analyzing the European decision-processes by adopting a similar approach to the
traditional exchange theory model, Bouwen proposes a new framework for those
organizations who want to affect the decision-making processes, asserting that the most
important element, at the heart of any decision process, is information, which, when
furnished in the exact quantity and at the right moment, allows “access” and consequently the
possibility of influence; the political currency in the EU is information (Eising, 2007 p.386).
Nevertheless Eising criticizes Bouwen, as he affirms that access in itself does not directly
imply influence, as although the provision of good information permits access, it could
transpire that, after the furnishing, one cannot really aim at influencing the processes, since
the desired objectives may be different from those actually accomplished (Eising, 2007
p.387), because, as Eising stated, the access is affected by resource dependencies,
institutional opportunities and by the capabilities of interest groups (Eising, 2007 p.385).
In analyzing the structure and competencies of the EU, Eising finds several different
access points, subdividing in degrees of importance the three main pillars of the EU, namely
the EU Parliament, the Commission and the Council, and asserting that the Commission is
considered the most important access point, given the difficulties to obtain satisfactory results
12
after a proposal is passed from the Commission to the Parliament and then to the Council for
the co-decision procedure; therefore interest groups should focus their attention principally
on lobbying the Commission (Eising, 2007, p.387).
Notwithstanding this, given the escalating role of the EU Parliament in recent years,
its importance as a lobbying objective has consequentially increased, although it should be
taken into consideration that that the formation of its members is a result of election by
national voters, so there is a higher likelihood that the MEP’s (members of European
parliament) are more open than the Commission to issues such as the environment or
unemployment (Eising, 2007 p.388); for this reason Kohler & Koch have defined this link
between the MEP’s and interest groups as “coalitions of the weak” (Kohler & Koch, 1997: 6-
7).
As a final consideration, owing to the infrequency of meetings, the Council of
Ministers is rarely the target of lobbying; interest groups focus their attention and efforts
rather on government departments at national level (Eising, 2007 p.388).
4.1 Transversal Lobbying
Considering the ongoing development of the EU in the last 50 years, it is logical that
methods of lobbying have changed according to the different phases to which Europe has
been subject, for instance, in the early years the most common method was fusional lobbying,
namely a hand in hand relationship between commission and professional officials. Over the
years the approaches have evolved, principally in diplomatic lobbying and then, with the
introduction of the single market, to a strategic form. Bearing in mind the continuous
development of the EU and the increase in the number of member states, nowadays the
companies, interest groups or associations have understood that the most effective mode of
influence consists in so-called “transversal lobbying” (Gueguen, 2007 p.13).
What exactly is transversal lobbying? It consists in the ability to build relationships
which pervade the overall chain of values, from the highest to the lowest levels, from the
producer to the consumer (Gueguen, 2007, p.15), radically transforming the common image
of a lobbyist as, in this new acceptation, lobbying does not consist in putting pressure on
people, but rather in aiding them to arrive at a common solution (Gueguen, 2007, p.135);
therefore, the new channels of influence will be characterized by a proactive approach rather
than an oppositional approach (Gueguen, 2007, p.17).
13
To “involve the whole chain of values” means to be supported by the majority of the
parties who are either directly or indirectly influenced by the introduction of such norms or
rules; an empirical example of this mode of action is found in the Michelin company, leaders
in the manufacture of tyres, which in its lobbying strategy pushed for the implementation of
an international ranking system of tyres based on the Rolling Resistance level (Hanoteau,
2009 p.37), enjoying the political support of almost all its chain of values, from upstream to
downstream industrial partners, for example Peugeot PSA, French car maker, or by Rhodia,
French chemicals manufacturer (Hanoteau, 2009 p.39), in this way succeeding to obtain the
desired results.
To return to the first mentioned proactive approach, emblematic is the case of Nokia,
company leader in mobile devices, which in attempting to influence and reshape various
European directives concerning the environment, such as RoHS (2002/95/EC) and WEEE
(2002/96/EC) (Kautto, 2009, p.104) , has opted for a more collaborative way of acting against
the policy-makers, by adopting more constructive strategies, seeking to strengthen its
credibility and build trust within the Commission, providing necessary information,
managing most of the time to attain to the desired objectives.
Conclusion
This paper has endeavoured to give a panoramic overview of the EU situation; a
prerequisite was a prior analysis of the different socio-political-economic patterns developed
in Europe after the Second World War, so as to then follow on to an analysis of the European
governance and its function, thus enabling us to comprehend how European policies have a
differential impact in member states due to the diverse configuration of the institutions in
place, in terms of corporatist, pluralist and statist systems. The last section dealt with the
topic of lobbying at EU-level, classifying the three main European bodies, Parliament,
Commission and Council, in relation to their degree of openness, in terms of influence, to the
various stakeholders, focusing finally upon a new approach of lobbying, namely transversal
lobbying, now very common since the number of members in the EU has increased
considerably, specifically amounting to 27 countries. Despite the great achievement of this
goal, many are still sceptical and pessimistic regarding the EU, not understanding that the EU
is not a ready defined organism, set to function, but rather a continuous work in progress.
14
Naturally this great expansion will require some changes and improvements, but we should
look at the EU not as a “super state”, but rather as a framework in which nations can
strengthen each other, together prosperously pursuing the path which leads to integration
(The Economist 1999, My continent, right or wrong).
References
Bouwen, Pieter (2002) Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access,
Journal of European Public Policy 9(3), p.365-390.
Coen, D. (2001) ‘The European business interest and the nation-state: large-firm
lobbying in the European Union and member states’, Journal of Public Policy 18(1):
75-100.
Dyson, K. (1992) ‘Theories of regulation and the case of Germany: a model of
regulatory change’, in K. Dyson (ed.), The Politics of German Regulation,
Dartmouth:Aldershot/Brookfield.
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