Diaz Spanish

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-1155. June 30, 1947.]

SORIA DIAZ, recurrente-apelante, contra SERVANDO ESTRERA Y SOLEDAD DE LOS SANTOS, recurridos-apelados.

D. Manuel A. Zosa y D. Robustiano D. Dejaresco en representacion de la recurrente y apelante.

D. Hipolito Alo en representacion de los r ecurridos y apelados.

SYLLABUS1. PRUEBA; FALTA DE OBJECION A LA PRESENTACION Y ADMISION DE UN DOCUMENTO EN EL TRIBUNAL A QUO; CASO DE Al TOS. Los abogados de la recurrente no solo no objetaron a la presentacion y admision del documento cuando el abogado de los recurridos lo sometio in open court para que lo considerase el tribunal a quo, sino que, despues ya de dictada la sentencia, tampoco llamaron la atencion del Juzgado, mediante una mocion de reconsideracion, hacia su supuesto error. Asi que por primera vez se plantean en esta instancia la objecion y excepcion. Lo menos que puede decirse es que el planteamiento resulta demasiado tardio.

2. PADRE E HIJO; PATRIA.POTESTAD; RENUNCIA. La patria potestad es renunciable. No solo no hay nada en nuestras leyes y en nuestra jurisprudencia que prohiba esa renuncia, sino que una ley de la Legislatura Filipina, la Ley No. 3094, promulgada el 16 de Marzo, 1923, la permite y autoliza expresalnente. (Sanchez de Strong contra Beishir, 53 Jur. Fil., 353; Agosto 15, 1929.)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RF.NUNCIA POR MADRE SOLTERA A FAVOR DEL PADRE ADULTERINO. Si la patria potestad y los derechos de custodia sobre un menor se pueden renunciar validamente a favor de una institucion, a tenor de la ley y jurisprudencia citadas ,por que la madre soltera de una niila habida con un hombre casado no puede renunciar a la custodia que, desde luego por ley le compete primordialmente, a favor del padre, sobre todo si, como en el presente caso, la mujer legitima del padre adulterino presta su activo consentimiento a la estancia y crianza de la niiia en la casa paterna? Es por ventura que el padre, siquiera sea adulterino, tiene menos derecho que una institucion impersonal, de existencia solo juridica, para ejercer los privilegios de la naturaleza? Por que el padre no ha de poder alimentar, criar y educar a su hijo adulterino, y tenerlo en su casa para estos fines, sobre todo cuando ello no causa ninguna perturbacion en los sentimientos y estado de la familia legitima?

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REVOCACI6N DE LA RENUNCIA; CASO DE AUTOS. La unica cuestion que queda ahora por determinar y resolver es si la recurrente puede volver sobre su acuerdo sin motivo razo nable, es decir, si puede rescindir el documento de renuncia por su sola y exclusiva voluntad, porque si, porque le da la real gana de hacerlo, sin alegacion ni prueba de que el padre recurrido o los recurridos hayan incurrido en alguna accion u omision que les incapacite para seguir ejerciendo sobre la nia D los derechos de custodia. La resolucion de esta cuestion tiene que ser necesariamente en contra de las pretensiones de la recurrente. Ella solo podria recuperar la custodia renunciada si el padre recurrido dejara de cumplir los deberes que le incumben, esto es, alimentar, criar y educar a la nii;a como se debe; pero ya hemos visto que no hay ninguna alegacion ni prueba a este efecto. Todo lo contrario, consta en autos que los recurridos estan en mucho mejores condiciones que la solicitante para dotar a la nia de comodidades.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSIDERACION DE LA RENUNCIA. El argumento de que el documento en cuestion es nulo por falta de causa o consideracion es a todas luces futil. No debe buscarse una consideracion material porque los mismos abogados de la recurrente dicen que el cuerpo de la nia D esta fuera del comercio de los hombres. No se trata de una compraventa o permuta. La consideracion aqui es el bienestar de la nia. En el asunto de Slade Perkins contra Perkins (57 JUI . Fil., 227, Septiembre 12, 1932) hemos declarado que "el bienestar de un menor es de ordinario la consideracion predominante en la cuestion de su custodia." Los sentimientos naturales y propios de la paternidad o maternidad, por respetables que sean, tienen que ceder a dicha primordial consideracion. Y no se relaja la regla tar solo porque se trata de hijos adulterinos.

D E C I S I O N

BRIONES,M.:

La recurrente, Soria Diaz, ha interpuesto el presente recurso para que se expida un mandamiento dehabeas corpus"ordenando que los recurridos Servando Estrera y Soledad de los Santos (esposos) le entreguen el cuerpo de la nia Dulcisima Diaz," de dos anos y medio de edad, que ahora se halla en poder de dichos recurridos. No hay disputa acerca de los siguientes hechos: que la recurrente servia como criada en casa de los conyuges recurridos; que Servando Estrera tuvo relaciones con su criada, y como resultado esta dio a luz a la nia Dulcisima el 19 de Enero de 1944; que la recurrente continuo sirviendo en casa de los recurridos hasta principios de Agosto, 1946, en que por motivos que no aparecen claramente en autos ella salio de dicha casa retirandose a su pueblo y llevandose consigo a la niila.

Hay conflicto de alegaciones sobre como volvio la niila al poder de los recurridos. Segun la solicitud, estos se valieron de la fuerza, con la ayuda de algunos miembros de la policia militar estacionados en el pueblo de Dumanjug, Provincia de Cebu. Los recurridos niegan, en su contestacion, esta imputacion, y alegan que la nina les fue devuelta con el consentimiento de la recurrente.

Segun el acta de la sesion de 30 de Septiembre, 1946, firmada por un escribano delegado del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Cebu, no se celebro ninguna vista sobre la solieitud. "No hearing" dice el acta "was had in the above-entitled case; only oral arguments presented by both parties. The court gave Attorney Alo (abogado de los recurridos) time to petition for the legal adoption of the child by the respondents by virtue of the manifestations of Attorney Zosa" (abogado de la recurrente). (Acta de la sesion de 30 de Septiembre, 1946, firmada por el interprete y escriballo delegado Simoun V. Canton, folio 45, exp. del Juzgado.) Esto, por un lado.

Por otro lado, en la breve transcripcion de las notas taquigraficas tomadas acerca de los procedimientos habidos en la referida sesion de 30 de Septiembre, consta lo siguiente:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sr. Zosa:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Estamos dispuestos a someter el asunto para la decision del Honorable Juzgado con los escritos ya presentados con tal que el compailero Alo admita que la chiquilla Dulcisima Diaz es hija adulterina del recurrido Servando Estreraxxx

. . . Si el compaero admite estor hechos, vamos a someter ya el asunto con los escrito ya presentados

"Sr. Alo:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Admitimos.xxx

"Juzgado:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"La madre de la chiquilla es soltera?


"Era soltera cuando concibio y dio a luz la chiquilla.

"Juzgado:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"La contencion ahora de la peticionaria es que mientras en lo que a ella respecta es hija natural, en lo que respecta al recurrido Servando Estrera es hija adulterina.

Juzgado:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Someten ustedes el asunto para la decision del Juzgado con vista de los esci itos de una y otra parte ya presentados ante el Juzgado?

"Sir Alo:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Estamos conformes a someter el asunto de acuerdo con las alegaciones y sometemos este documento signado por la solicitante para la consideracion del Juzgado, con su correspondiente traduccion (las culsivas son nuestras).


"Entonces pedimos permiso para someter en diez dias un memorandum de autoridades para sostener nuestra contencion.

"Juzgado:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Quieren ustedes que el Juzgado decida el asunto sin presentacion de memorandum o van a someter memorandum?


"Voy a presentar jurisprudencias.


"No es porque quisieramos sacrificar el porvenir de la chiquilla porque hay tecnicismos que nos favorecen, pero si los recurridos aman a la chiquilla, sugerimos que adopten a la chiquilla y vamos a renunciar la custodia de la chiquilla (las cursivas son nuestras).


"Bueno, tal como esta la proposicion, aceptamos" (t. n. t., pags. 1, a, 3 y 4, folios 46, 47, 48 y 49, exp. del Juzgado).

Y aqui termina la transcripcion de las notas taquigraficas. Por no se sabe que motivos la recurrente no presto su consentimiento a la adopcion; asi que esta fracaso, y el Juez Macadaeg hubo despues de dictar sentencia desestimando la solicitud dehabeas corpusy disponiendo lo siguiente, a saber:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In view of the foregoing, the Court believes and so holds that the custody of the minor Dulcisima should remain with the respondents in this case. The petition therefore is hereby dismissed without special pronouncement as to costs.

"The decision of this Court should not be interpreted to mean that the herein petitioner is deprived from visiting her child. Respondents are hereby warned that they should not unreasonably refuse the petitioner to visit her."cralaw virtua1aw library

Del fallo asi dictado se ha interpuesto la presente apelacion.

La regla 102, seccion 1, Reglamento de los Tribunales, reza lo siguiente:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. To whathabeas corpusextends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ ofhabeas corpusshall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."cralaw virtua1aw library

Habiendo las partes sometido este asunto al Juzgado de Primera Instancia para su decision con vista tan solo de los escritos de alegaciones, sin previa celebracion de juicio contradictorio, es obvio que solo pueden tomarse en consideracion las alegaciones no discutidas de ambas partes, descartandose naturalmente las expresamente negadas y redarguidas, pues para enjuiciar estas ultimas hubiera habido necesidad de someterlas a prueba, y ya hemos visto en la transcripcion de las notas taquigraficas que en el presente caso la articulacion de pruebas quedo dispensada por convenio manifiesto de las partes. Por tanto, la alegacion expuesta en la solicitud dehabeas corpusde que el "11 de Agosto de 1946, en el municipio de Dumanjug, Cebu, su nia, Dulcisima, fue sacada de ella (la recurrente) mediante fuerza, sin su consentimiento y sin derecho ni autoridad, por Servando Estrera y Soledad de los Santos, con la ayuda, cooperacion y directa participacion de varios miembros de la policia militar," no puede tomarse en cuenta, pues dicha alegacion ha sido negada categoricamente en la contestacion de los recurridos, quienes afirman positivamente que "no sacaron del poder de la peticionaria a la niIia Dulcisima mediante fuerza, sino que con el consentimiento de la peticionaria." (Contestacion de los recurridos, folio 20, exp. del Juzgado.)

En cambio, obra en autos un documento que tiene importancia decisiva para la resolucion de este asunto-documento que acertadamente se ha tenido en cuenta por el Juzgado a quo al dictar sentencia a favor de los recurridos. El documento, redactado en el dialecto bisaya-cebuano, fue suscrito y otorgado por Soria Bernardo Diaz, la recurrente, el 20 de Febrero, 1944, siendo testigos instrumentales Geronimo Castaeda y Arcadio Mendoza. No se niega su autenticidad. He aqui su traducci6n al espanol:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A quien concierna:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Hago constar que yo, Soria Bernardo Diaz, filipina, mayor de edad y vecina del pueblo de Badian, Cebu, doy ami hija Dulcisima que nacio en la propia casa de los esposos Senor y Sefiora de Servando B. Estrela, del puebio de Mandaue, Cebu, debido a su amor grande a mi hija y como correspondencia a sus preocupaciones y gastos con motivo de mi parto he ofrecido a ellos sin ninguna vacilacion o deseo de tener la referida nina.

"Hago entender que cuando firme este documento ha cesado mi utoridad sobre mi hija y si en los dias futuros intentare intervenir, reclamando dicha nii;a y sacandola, yo podria ser acusada ante los tribunales del pueblo para que me castiguen por la infracion, que yo cometiere de este contrato que he firmado.

"He firmado esto en este dia 20 de Febrero del ano 1944 en presencia de los testigos que firman abajo.(Fda.) "SORIA BERNARDO DIAZ

"Madre de la nia(Fdo.) "Geronimo Castaeda

"Testigo(Fdo.) "Arcadio Mendoza

"Testigo"Uno de los errores que los abogados de la recurente senaan en su alegato se refiere a este documento de renuncia porque, en efecto, asi debe ser considerado: renuncia la custodia o patria potestad. Se excepcionan contra la accion del Juzgado a quo al tomarlo en cuenta como uno de los fundamentos de su sentencia. Dicen que el mismo no se presento formalmente como prueba y por eso no esta marcado ni identificado como exhibito o anexo. Mas todavia: aseveran con toda formalidad que no tuvieron oportunidad de formular objecion contra su admision. La breve transcripcion de las notas taquigraficas que nos hemos esforzado por reproducir mas arriba, desmiente esta aseveracion. El abogado de los recurridos Sr. Alo sometio el documento al Juzgado en plena sesion diciendo lo siguiente:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph


"Estamos conformes a someter el asunto de acuerdo con las alegaciones y sometemos este documento signado por la solicitante para la consideration del Juzgado con su correspondiente traducion." (T.n.t., pag. 3, folio 48, expediente del Juzgado.)

Esto demuestra palpablemente que el abogado Sr. Alo tenia en sus manos el documento; que el Juzgado lo tenia ante si; y que el Sr. Zosa, abogado de la recurrente, tambien lo tenia delante y podia haberlo examinado, y es de presumir que lo examino. No solo el Sr. Zosa no objeto a la presentacion y admision del documento, sino que guard6 absoluto silencio sobre el mismo. Mas aun: al final de sus manifestaciones sugirio que los recurridos adoptasen legalmente a la nia,." . . y vamos a renunciar la custodia de la chiquilla," termino diciendo (t. n. t., pag. 4, folio 49, exp. del Juzgado). Frente a esta actitud del abogado de la recurrente, de claro y positivo allanamiento a que el Juzgado tomase en cuenta el referido documento al dictar su sentencia como el Juzgado no habia de sentirse autorizado para considerar dicha actitud en su faz y en todo su valor (face value), sin imaginarse que hubiera parapetada en ella alguna reserva mental? No tienen acaso los tribunales derecho a descansar en la sinceridad de los abogados que les auxilian en la muy noble, muy elevada tarea de administrar justicia? Desde luego que los procedimientos judiciales, las vistas, ofrecen amplisima oportunidad para el despliegue de la habilidad y del talento; pero los abogados jamas deben olvidar aquel candor y aquella sinceridad que hacen que por encima de todas las habilidades resalten y prevalezcan la verdad y la justicia en la triunfal belleza t de sus atributos.

Los abogados de la recurrente no solo no objetaron a la presentacion y admision del documento cuando el abogado de los recurridos lo sometio ln open court para que lo considerase el tribunal a quo, sino que, despues ya de dictada la sentencia, tampoco llamaron la atencion del Juzgado, mediante una mocion de reconsideracion, hacia su supuesto error. Asi que por primera vez se plantean en esta instancia la objecion y excepcion. Lo menos que puede decirse es que el planteamiento resulta demasiado tardio

La cuestion, por tanto, ahora se reduce a determinar y resolver si, con vista del documento de renuncia de que t se ha hecho merito, la recurrente tiene derecho a recobrar la custodia legal que le competia sobre su hija natural antes del otorgamiento de dicho documento custodia que paso a los recurridos despues de otorgado el mismo. De como resolvamos esta cuestion depende el resultado de la solicitud dehabeas corpus. Si, a pesar de ese documento, ella tiene derecho a recuperar la patria potestad renunciada, el mandamiento debe expedirse; de lo contrario, no.

La patria potestad es renunciable. No solo no hay nada en nuestras leyes y en nuestra jurisprudencia que prohiba esa renuncia, sino que una ley de la Legislatura Filipina, la Ley No. 3094, promulgada el 16 de Marzo, 1923, la permite y autoriza expresamente. El articulo 1 de dicha ley dispone:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ARTICULO 1. Toda institucion publica o cualquiera sociedad benefica o caritativa, incorporada con arreglo a las leyes de las Islas Filipinas y debidamente autorizada para ello por el Secretario del Interior por medio del Comisionado de Bienestar Publico, que tenga por objeto recibir, amparar, cuidar, colocar para su adopcion y consentir en la adopcion, o mejorar la situacion de los nios huerfanos desamparados, abandonados o maltratados, cuyas ensei;anzas no sean contrarias a los principios cristianos de moralidad, estara facultada para recibir, ejercer autoridad, ensenar, educar, amparar, cuidar, disponer y colocar para la adopcion y consentir en la adopcion de cualquier menor de diez y ocho aos de edad, cuando el padre y la madre, o la pelsona o personas que tengan legalmente derecho a actuar como tutores de dicho menor entreguen a este, mediante escrito, al cuidado y custodia de dicha institucion o sociedad, y despues de hecho esto la persona del citado menor estara bajo la custodia legal de dicha institucion o sociedad para 108 fines expresados en esta Ley: . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

El articulo 2 de la misma ley reza:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 2. Una vez que un nio haya sido entregado, a tenor de lo que se dispone en el articulo precedente, y que haya sido aceptado por dicha institucion o sociedad, los derechos de sus padres naturales, del tutor de su persona, si lo hubiere, u otro encargado de su custodia caducaran, y dicha institucion o sociedad mientras tenga la autorizacion prevista en el articulo primero de esta Ley tendra el derecho a la custodia y a la autoridad sobre dicho nio durante su menor edad, y estara autorizada para cuidarle, educarle, enseiarle y para colocarle provisionalmente o para su adopcion en un hogar apropiado, y para consentir en su adopcion conforme con las leyes de las Islas Filipinas, y de la manera que mejor crea conveniente para su bienestar." (Las cursivas son nuestras.)

Y el articulo 3 prescribe:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 3. Sera ilegal para todo menor asi entregado o encomendado el dejar, sin causa razonable, a la persona, institucion o sociedad, y para aualquier individuo inducir o intentar a inducir a un menor a que deje a dicha persona, institucion o sociedad que tenga el cuidado, custodia o tutela de dicho menor, a tenor de lo dispuesto en esta Ley. Cualquier infraccion de este articulo sera castigada con prision que no exceda de un ao, o con una multa que no exceda de dos mil pesos, o con ambas penas a la vez, a discrecion del tribunalxxx

Los abogados de la recurrente arguyen que la Ley No. 3094 autoriza solo la renuncia para los casos de adopcion, y el presente caso no lo es, pues no se habla de adopcion en el documento de que se trata, y ademas la recurrente de ningun modo consiente que su hija sea adoptada por los recurridos. El argumento es evidentemente erroneo. De la fraseologia misma de la ley, transcrita arriba, resulta evidente que el hacer arreglos para la adopcion del menor es nada mas que uno de los fines la institucion benefica a que se refiere la ley, siendo los otros fines el "recibir, amparar, adiestrar, educar, ayudar, cuidar . . . de cualquier nino menor de 18 aos, cuando el padre y la madre o la persona o personas legalmente facultadas para actuar como tutores del referido chiquillo lo entreguen, por escrito, al cuidado de dicha institucion o sociedad, y la persona del nifio estara en adelante bajo la custodia legal de dicha institucion o sociedad para los fines aqui expresados." Y notese, ademas, lo que categoricamente dice la ley, a saber: desde el momento de la entrega a la institucion, los derechos de los padres naturales . . . sobre el menor caducaran, y la institucion o sociedad tendra plena autoridad y derecho para cuidarle, educarle, adiestrarle y hacer arreglos para su adopcion por alguna persona responsable y le buena reputacion, pudiendo suplir legalmente a los padres o al tutor en el consentimiento a la adopcion. Es mas: a ley provee ciertas penas para el menor o la persona que e induce a dejar sin motivo razonable a la persona o institucion a cuyo cuidado haya sido encomendado de acuerdo con dicha ley.

En el asunto de Sanchez de Strong contra Beishir (53 Jur. Fil., 353, Agosto 15, 1929) se trato de cuestionar la validez de la renuncia de la patria potestad bajo los terminos de la Ley No. 3(J94. Esta Corte sostuvo la validez y legitimidad de la renuncia.

Ahora bien; si la patria potestad y los derechos de custodia sobre un menor se pueden renunciar validamente a favor de una institucion, a tenor de la ley y jurisprudencia citadas, por que la madre soltera de una nia habida con un hombre casado no puede renunciar a la custodia que, desde luego por ley le compete primordialmente, a favor del padre, sobre todo si, como en el presente caso, la mujer legitima del padre adulterino presta su activo consentimiento a la estancia y crianza de la nia en la casa paterna? Es por ventura que el padre, siquiera sea adulterino, tiene menos derecho que una institu impersonal, de existencia solo juridica, para ejercer privilegios de la naturaleza? Por que el padre no de poder alimentar, criar y educar a su hijo adulterino, tenerlo en su casa para estos fines, sobre todo cuando no causa ninguna perturbacion en los sentimientos y tado de la familia legitima?

Sin embargo, se arguye que no hay ninguna ley que autoriza expresamente la renuncia de la patria potestad a favor del padre adulterino. Pero hay alguna ley que lo prohiba? No solo no la hay, sino que tenemos ciertos preceptos legales de los cuales cabe inferir la permisibilidad y ligitimidad de esa renuncia. Tenemos, en prime lugar, el articulo 143 del Codigo Civil que, entre otra cosas, dispone lo siguiente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw libraryxxx

"Los padres y los hijos ilegitimos en quienes no concurre la condicion de hijos naturales, se deben, por razon de alimentos, lo auxilios necesarios para la subsistencia. Los padres estan adema obligados a costear a los hijos la instruccion elemental y la enseanza de una profesion, arte u oficio."cralaw virtua1aw library

Y el articulo 149 del mismo Codigo Civil preceptua que

"El obligado a prestar alimentos podra, a su eleccion, satisfacerlos, o pagando la pensiOn que se fije, o recibiendo y manteniendo en su propia casa al que tiene derecho a ellos."cralaw virtua1aw library

En el asunto de Ortiz contra Del Villar (57 Jur. Fil., 21, Agosto 1, 1932) hemos declarado lo siguiente:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . El recurrido, aunque padre adulterino, teniendo obligaciones impuestas a el por la ley en favor de estos menores, como la de alimentarles y la de costear su instruccion en alguna extension, siquiera para el cumplimiento de estas obligaciones, tiene, a falta de otro derecho mejor, mejor titulo que la solicitante para tener en su poder a dichos menores."cralaw virtua1aw library

Se arguye que en este asunto la que solicitaba la custodia legal era solo una tia de los menores, mientras que en el asunto que nos ocupa es la madre que se dice con enfasis tiene evidentemente mejor derecho que el padre adulterino. La contestacion a esto es que cualquier derecho mejor que hubiera podido tener la recurrente como madre natural de la menor Dulcisima, caduco cuando renuncio al mismo en virtud del documento de que tantas veces se ha hecho merito.

La unica cuestion que queda ahora por determinar y resolver es si la recurrente puede volver sobre su acuerdo sin motivo razonable, es decir, si puede rescindir el documento de renuncia por su sola y exclusiva voluntad, porque si, porque le da la real gana de hacerlo, sin alegacion ni Prueba de que el padre recurrido o los recurridos hayan incurrido en alguna accion u omision que les incapacite para seguir ejerciendo sobre la nina Dulcisima los derechos de custodia. La resolucion de esta cuestion tiene que ser necesariamente en contra de las pretensiones de la recurrente. Ella solo podria recuperar la custodia renunciada si el padre recurrido dejara de cumplir los deberes que le incumben, esto es, alimentar, criar y educar a la nina como se debe; pero ya hemos visto que no hay ningllna alegacion ni prueba a este efecto. Todo lo contrario, consta en autos que los recurridos estan en mucho mejores condiciones que la solicitante para dotar a la nina de comodidades.

El algumento de que el documento en cuestion es nulo por falta de causa o consideracion es a todas luces futil. No debe buscarse una consideracion material porque los mismos abogados de la recurrente dicen que el cuerpo de la nia Dulcisima esta fuera del comercio de los hombres. No se trata de una compraventa o permuta. La consideracion aqui es el bienestar de la nia. En el asunto de Slade Perkins contra Perkins (57 Jur. Fil., 227, Septiembre 12, 1932) hemos declarado que "el bienestar de un menor es de ordinario la consideracion predominante en la cuestion de su custodia." Los sentimientos naturales y propios de la paternidad o maternidad, por respetables que sean, tienen que ceder a dicha primordial consideracion. Y no se relaja la regla tan solo porque se trate de hijos adulterinos. Es verdad que en un pasado ya bastante remoto estos desgraciados no gozaban de ningun derecho: tal era la repugnancia que la sociedad sentia contra ellos. Pero es indudable que, aunque lentamente, su condicion ha ido mejorando y humanizandose firmemente en el concepto social. Desde las Siete Partidas que casi no les concedian nada hasta el Codigo Civil que les reconocio los derechos que ahora tienen, el avance de su condicion ha sido considerable. Y es igualmente indudable que la tendencia social en todos los paises civilizados y cultos es a ser cada vez menos opresiva, mas liberal y mas humana hacia estos seres desafortunados que, naciendo al mundo sin ninguna culpa de su parte, ya tienen bastante desgracia con el cumulo de prejuicios e inhibiciones sociales que pesan sobre ellos.

En meritos de lo expuesto, se confirma la sentencia objeto de apelacion sin pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas. Asi se ordena.

Moran, Pres., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perf ecto, Bengzon, Hontiveros, y Tuason, MM., estan conformes.

Separate Opinions

HILADO,J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur in many of the views expressed in the majority opinion, but dissent from the final disposition arrived at therein as well as certain other points presently to be mentioned.

Of course, under the law parents of illegitimate children who are not legally recognized natural ones do not have parental authority (patria potestas) over the latter (2 Manresa, 5th ed., 13-15; 2 Sanchez Roman, 1136). However, under article 143 of the Civil Code, such parents are under obligation and have the duty to give limited support, as therein specified, to such children of theirs. And it has been held by this Court in Ortiz v. Del Villar (57 Phil., 19, 20), that for the fulfillment of this duty (pursuant to article 149 of the same Code) the parent bound to give support has the optional right to have child in his custody. In the case, then, of parents and illegitimate children situated as the parties litigants and the child in the instant case are, the only right which may be said to be possessed by the illegitimate parent to the custody of the illegitimate child is not the patria potestas but merely a derivative or consequence of the obligation or duty to give support. And in such cases, believe we are all agreed that the mother comes ahead of the father, both in respect to the obligation and duty to the support and to the derivative optional right to have the child in her custody. Should the mother be unable to adequately furnish the support provided by law, her derivative optional right to have the child in her custody would logically and necessarily disappear.

The duties of parents toward their children being grounded on natural law itself and being of a sacred character, it has always been considered that they are vable (Reyes v. Alvarez, 8 Phil., 723, 725, 726; 2 Manresa, 5th ed., 21). Consequently, even by virtue of the document supposedly thumbmarked by petitioner on February 20, 1944, and transcribed in the majority opinion her duty to give the above-mentioned support to her child Dulcisima was not waivable, and consequently could not have been waived. And so long as she is bound by any, article 149 above cited gives her the right to elect between giving the support by paying the pension that may be fixed or receiving or maintaining in her own house the child entitled to such support. And so long as this is so, no one not even the adulterine father could take the child from her custody.

The case having been submitted without the production of evidence in the court below, I am of opinion that it should be remanded thereto for the production of evidence upon the point of whether or not petitioner can adequately give the support provided by law, so that it maybe determined whether or not she has the right to have the minor Dulcisima in her custody for the purposes of the fulfillment of that obligation. I am unable to agree to the determination of this vital question without the production of evidence.

PADILLA,J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I dissent. The majority affirms the judgment appealed from dismissing the petition for a writ ofhabeas corpusupon the ground that the petitioner, the natural mother of the minor, waived her parental authority (patria potestas) over said minor; that our law and jurisprudence do not prohibit such waiver; that as proof thereof, Act No. 3094 expressly authorizes it; that in the case of Sanchez de Strong v. Beishir (53 Phil., 331),such waiver was upheld by this Court; and that the petitioner, who seeks to recorder the custody of her minor child, cannot go back on her word or withdraw or cancel the waiver, without proof that appellee Servando Estrera had committed or failed to do an act which would disqualify him to continue exercising the parental authority over the person of the minor.

Article 155 of the Civil Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The father, and, in his default, the mother shall have with respect to their unemancipated children

1. The duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means, . . .; and

2. The right to correct and punish them in moderation."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 553, Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 4091, provides: "The father, or, in case of his death or legal disqualification, the mother, of a minor child, is to be deemed the natural guardian of the child, and as such is entitled to the custody, and care for the education of the minor, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

To have the custody of the unemancipated children is not only a right but also a duty. It is a duty that cannot be waived except as provided by law.

Article 167 of the Civil Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Parental power is terminated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. By the death of the parents or of the child;

2. By emancipation;

3. By adoption of the child."cralaw virtua1aw library

So that by giving their consent to the marriage of a minor who is 16 but less than 20 years of age, if a male, and 14 but less than 18 years of age, if a female (secs. 2, 9, Act 3613), or by giving their consent to the adoption of such minors (sec. 3, Rule 100), their parents may waive their parental authority. These are the only ways parental authority (patria potesas) may be waived or terminated. Another mode is that authorized by Act 3094; but as there are no public institutions or benevolent charitable societies involved in this case, the act referred to has no application to the case at bar. The waiver relied upon by the court below not being any of the means prescribed by law must be of no validity and effect.

In the case of Sanchez de Strong v. Beishir, supra cited by the majority in support of its opinion, this Court says: "Both the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure in dealing with cases of adoption, and said Act No. 3094, itself, authorize the renunciation of the patria potestas and the rights to the care and custody of infants, such renunciation being the basis for the purposes of said laws." (P. 333.) Note that this Court speaks of adoption under the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, which is one of the ways how patria potestas may be waived or terminated, as provided for in article 167 of the Civil Code.

Articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code do not furnish any basis for the conclusion that patria potestas may be waived in a manner other than those prescribed by law.

The obligation of the father to support his illegitimate child which may also be considered as a right is subject to that of the natural mother to have the custody of her minor child a right superior to the obligation of the illegitimate father. The case of Ortiz v. Del Villar, 67 Phil., 19, has no application to the case at bar, because what was there decided is that the right of an illegitimate father is superior to that of an aunt of the minor.

If the waiver by the petitioner of her parental authority (patria potestas) is not authorized by law, it is unnecessary to pass upon the question whether or not she can go back on her word. The right of the natural mother to have the custody of her minor child is not only granted by law but also is a natural right, so much so that in the case of Legare v. Cuerques, 34 Phil., 221, this Court says: ". . . when the minor is under parental authority of his mother, who at the time exercises it as an acquired right, then, until it is extinguished or until she who has acquired and exercised it has been deprived thereof, no other person may acquire or exercise the same; and the manner of its cancellation and deprivation has been set forth hereinabove." (P. 226.) And the manner of its cancellation and deprivation is that "she has died or the minor child has died or that the latter has been emancipated or adopted." (P. 225.)

The stringency of the law may be due to the fact that the substitution of a new perhaps artificial for a natural parental authority is not the ordinary or normal course in life. Without the sanction of the competent authorities, the substitution should have no legal effect. With it, the new parental authority would be as permanent as the natural which would be replaced. Permanence should not be exchanged for insecurity.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment appealed from should be reversed, and another entered granting the writ as prayed for.

TRANSLATED VIA GOOGLE TRANSLATE1. TEST; NO OBJECTION TO THE PRESENTATION AND ADMISSION OF A DOCUMENT IN COURT A QUO; AN Al TOS. - Lawyers for the appellant not only objected to the submission and approval of the document when the lawyer for the plaintiffs submitted it in open court that it considered the court a quo, but, after already the sentencing, also called the attention of the Court, by a motion for reconsideration, to his alleged error. So first they raised in this instance the objection and exception. The least one can say is that the approach is too Late.

2. FATHER AND SON; CUSTODY; DISCLAIMER. - The parental right is waived. Not only is there nothing in our laws and in our case law prohibiting such a waiver, but a law of the Philippine Legislature, Law No. 3094, enacted on March 16, 1923, the permits and autoliza expresalnente. (Strong against Beishir Sanchez, 53 Jur Fil, 353;.. August 15, 1929.)

3. ID .; ID .; ID .; RF.NUNCIA BY SINGLE MOTHER FATHER FOR adultery. - If parental rights and custody rights over a child can give validly on behalf of an institution, in accordance with the law and cited case law, that the single mother of a Niila light with a married man can not give up custody since then by law is responsible primarily for the father, especially if, as in this case, the legitimate wife of the adulterous father gives his consent to stay active and raising the niiia in the family home? It is by chance that the father, if only adultery, has less right than an impersonal institution, the only legal existence, to exercise the privileges of nature? For the father not to be able to feed, raise and educate their adulterous son, and have it in your house for this purpose, especially when it does not cause any disturbance in the feelings and state of the legitimate family?

4. ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; REVOCACI6N WAIVER; Case. - The only question that now remains to be determined and resolved is whether the appellant can return to their agreement without nable razo reason, that is, if he can terminate the waiver for its sole and exclusive will, because if that gives you real desire to do so without argument or evidence that the father appealed or challenged are guilty of any act or omission which incapacitates them to continue exercising on D child custody rights. The resolution of this question must necessarily be against the claims of the appellant. She could only regain custody resorted waived if the parent fails to fulfill the duties incumbent on it, that is, feeding, raising and educating the NII, to as it should; but we have seen that there is no allegation or evidence to this effect. On the contrary, the record shows that the respondents are in much better condition than the applicant to provide the girl amenities.

5. ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; CONSIDERATION OF RESIGNATION. - The argument that the document in question is invalid for lack of cause or consideration is all futile lights. It should not be sought a material consideration because the same lawyers recurrent say the girl's body D is outside the commerce of men. It is not a purchase or exchange. The consideration here is the welfare of the child. In Case against Perkins Perkins Slade (57 JUI. Phil., 227, September 12, 1932) we stated that "the welfare of a child is usually the predominant consideration in the issue of custody." The by respectable natural and feelings of parenthood, they are, have to give primary consideration to that. And the tar rule does not relax just because it's adulterous children.

D E C I S I O N

Briones, M.:

The appellant, Soria Diaz, has brought this action for a dehabeas commandment corpus is issued "ordering the respondents Servando Estrera and Soledad de los Santos (husbands) will deliver the body of the girl sweet Diaz," two and a half years old, who now is in the hands of those respondents. There is no dispute about the following facts: that the appellant served as a housemaid for spouses appealed; Servando Estrera had intercourse with his maid, and as a result this gave birth to the sweetest girl on January 19, 1944; the appellant continued to serve in house resorted to early August, 1946, that for reasons not apparent from her car came out of that house retiring his people and taking them to the Niila.

There are conflicting claims about how Niila turned to the power of the respondents. According to the application, they made use of force, with the help of some members of the military police stationed in the village of Dumanjug, Cebu Province. The respondents deny, in its defense, that complaint, and claim that the girl was returned to them with the consent of the appellant.

According to the minutes of the session of September 30, 1946, signed by a deputy clerk of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, any view on the solieitud are not welcome. "No hearing" - says the record - "was had in the above-Entitled case;. Only oral arguments presented by Both parties The court gave Attorney Alo (lawyer appealed) time to petition for the legal adoption of the child by the Respondents by virtue of the manifestations of Attorney Zosa "(lawyer of the applicant). (Minutes of the meeting of September 30, 1946, signed by the chief interpreter and escriballo V. Simoun Canton, folio 45, exp. The court.) This, on the one hand.

On the other hand, in the brief transcript of the shorthand notes taken about procedures incurred in the aforementioned session of September 30, it consists of the following: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"Mr. Zosa: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"We are ready to refer the matter to the decision of the Honorable Court with written and presented so that the compailero Alo admit that the girl is sweet Diaz turned adulterous daughter Servando Estrerax x x

. . . If the facts blind support partner, we will now refer the matter to the written and presented

"Mr. Alo: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"We admitted.x x x

"Court: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"The mother of the girl is single?


"I was single when I conceived and gave birth to the child.

"Court: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"The contention now is that while the petitioner in relation to it's natural daughter, in regard to Servando Estrera is turned adulterous daughter.

Court: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"They submit the matter to you the decision of the Court with a view of the itos esci of both sides already submitted to the Court?

"Sir Alo: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"We will conform to refer the matter according to the allegations and submit this document signed by the applicant for consideration by the Court, with its corresponding translation (the culsivas added).


"So we asked permission to submit a memorandum within ten days of authorities to support our contention.

"Court: chanrob1es 1aw virtual library

You want the court to decide the matter without presentation of memorandum or will submit memorandum?


"I will present jurisprudence.


"Not because we want to sacrifice the future of the girl because there are technicalities that favor us, but if the respondents love the child, suggest you adopt the little girl and will give custody of the girl (emphasis added).


"Well, as is the proposal, accept" (TNT, pp. 1 to 3 and 4, pages 46, 47, 48 and 49, exp. Of the Court).

And here ends the transcription of stenographic notes. For it it is not known that grounds the appellant consented to the adoption; so this failure, and the judge was Macadaeg sentencing after dismissing the application for habeas corpus and providing the following, namely: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"In view of the foregoing, the Court Believes That and so holds the custody of the minor Should REMAIN sweet With the Respondents In This case. The petition THEREFORE is hereby dismissed without special pronouncement as to costs.

"The decision of esta Court Should not be interpreted to mean HEREIN That the petitioner is deprived from visiting her child. Respondents are hereby Warned That They Should not unreasonably refuse the petitioner to visit her." Cralaw virtua1aw library

The ruling was issued so brought the present appeal.

Rule 102, Section 1, Rules of the Court, reads as follows: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. - Otherwise EXPRESSLY Except as provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus Shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by any person Which is deprived of His liberty, or by Which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. "cralaw virtua1aw library

Having the parties submitted the matter to the Court of First Instance for decision in view only of the pleadings, without holding of adversarial proceedings, it is obvious that only merit consideration uncontested allegations of both parties, discarding naturally the reproved expressly denied and then to prosecute these latter would have been no need to test them, and we have seen in the transcript of the shorthand notes that in this case the joint testing demonstrated stay dispensed by agreement of the parties. Therefore, the argument put forward in the application for habeas corpus that "August 11, 1946, in the municipality of Dumanjug, Cebu, his girl, sweet, was taken out of it (the appellant) by force, without their consent and no right or authority for Servando Estrera and Soledad de los Santos, with the help, cooperation and direct participation of several members of the military police, "it can not be considered because this allegation was categorically denied in the reply of the respondents who say positively that "there took the power of the petitioner to niIia sweet by force, but with the consent of the petitioner." (Answering the respondents, folio 20, exp. The court.)

However, in the case file a document that has decisive importance for the resolution of this issue-document rightly been taken into account by the court a quo in sentencing for the respondents. The document, written in Bisaya-Cebuano dialect, was executed and delivered by Bernardo Diaz Soria, the appellant, the February 20, 1944, being instrumental witnesses Geronimo Castaneda and Arcadio Mendoza. Its authenticity is not denied. Here is your traducci6n to Spanish: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"To Whom It May Concern: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"I certify that I, Soria Bernardo Diaz, Filipino, of legal age and resident of the town of Badian, Cebu, I give my sweet daughter who was born in the home of Lord and Servando Sefiora B. Estrela spouses, the puebio Mandaue, Cebu, because of their great love for my daughter and correspondence to their concerns and expenses on the occasion of my birth I have offered to them without any hesitation or desire for the girl concerned.

"I understand that when you sign this document has ceased my uthority about my daughter and whether in future days will try to intervene, claiming that Nii; ay removing it, I could be accused before the people's courts to punish me for the infraction, I commit this contract I signed.

"I have signed this on this day February 20 1944 in the presence of the undersigned witnesses.(FDA.) "SORIA BERNARDO DIAZ

"Mother of the girl(Signed.) "Geronimo Castaneda

"Witness(Signed.) "Arcadio Mendoza

"Witness"One of the mistakes that attorneys recurente senaan in his plea refers to this waiver - because, in fact, so should be considered: resignation custody or parental rights. They are excepted against the action of the court a quo to take it into account as one of the foundations of his sentence. They say that it was not formally presented as evidence and therefore is not marked or identified as exhibito or annex. But still: they assert with any formalities that had no opportunity to make objection against admission. The brief transcript of the stenographic notes that we have endeavored to reproduce above, belies this assertion. The lawyer appealed Mr. Alo submitted the document to the court in full session by saying: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph


"We will conform to refer the matter according to the allegations and submit this document signed by the applicant for the consideration of the court with its corresponding translation yet." (TNT, p. 3, page 48 of the court file.)

This demonstrates palpably that the lawyer Mr. Alo was holding the document; what the Court had before it; and that Mr. Zosa, the appellant's lawyer, also had it before and could have examined it, and presumably it examined. Not only Mr. Zosa not object to the submission and approval of the document, but guard6 silence on it. Moreover, at the end of their suggested demonstrations that challenged legally adopt the child ,. ".. And we will give custody of the girl," I end up saying (tnt, page 4, page 49, exp of the Court..) . Faced with this attitude of the lawyer of the applicant, clear and positive raid on the court took into account that document to deliver judgment and the court had not feel authorized to consider such an attitude on his face and the full value ( face value), without imagining that she had barricaded in any mental reservation? They have perhaps the law courts to rest in the sincerity of lawyers who assist them in the very noble, very high task of administering justice? Of course, judicial procedures, views, offer amplisima opportunity for the deployment of skill and talent; but lawyers must never forget that candor and sincerity that make above all highlight skills prevail and truth and justice in the triumphant beauty t of its attributes.

Lawyers for the appellant not only did not object to the submission and approval of the document when the lawyer of the respondents submitted it ln open court that it considered the court a quo, but, after already the sentencing, also drew attention the Court, by a motion for reconsideration, to his alleged error. So first they raised in this instance the objection and exception. The least one can say is that the approach is too Late

The question, therefore, is now reduced to determine and decide whether, viewing the waiver that has become t merit, the complainant is entitled to recover legal custody racing him on his natural daughter before the granting of the document - custody happened to the respondents granted after it. How we solve this question depends on the result of the application of habeas corpus. If, despite that document, she is entitled to regain custody waived the injunction should be issued; otherwise not.

Parental authority is waived. Not only is there nothing in our laws and in our case law prohibiting such a waiver, but a law of the Philippine Legislature, Law No. 3094, enacted on March 16, 1923, and expressly authorizes the permits. Article 1 of the Act provides: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"Article 1. Any public institution or any beneficial or charitable corporation incorporated under the laws of the Philippine Islands and duly authorized for this purpose by the Secretary of the Interior through the Public Welfare Commissioner, whose purpose is to receive, protect, care, placed for adoption and consent to the adoption, or improve the situation of homeless children orphaned, abandoned or abused, whose Ensei; Anzas not contrary to Christian principles of morality, will be entitled to receive, exercise authority, teaching, educate, protect, care for, provide and place for adoption and consent to the adoption of anyone under eighteen years of age, when the father and mother, or pelsona or persons legally entitled to act as guardian of the less delivered to this, by letter, to the care and custody of that institution or company, and after this is done the person the child will be cited in the legal custody of the institution or society for 108 purposes stated in this Act. . . "Library cralaw virtua1aw

Article 2 of the Act reads: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 2. Once a child has been delivered, according to what is described in the preceding article, and who has been accepted by that institution or society, the rights of natural parents, the guardian of his person, if any, or other responsible for the custody expire, and that institution or company while you have the authorization provided for in Article I of this Act shall have the right to custody and authority over that child during his minority, and will be authorized to take care of, educate, and to provisionally enseiarle for adoption or put him in a proper home, and to consent to its adoption in accordance with the laws of the Philippine Islands, and how best see fit for their welfare. " (Emphasis added.)

And Article 3 states: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 3. It will be illegal for anyone under so delivered or entrusted to leave, without reasonable cause, the person, institution or society, and individual aualquier induce or attempt to induce a child to leave that person, institution or company having the care, custody or guardianship of the minor, in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Any breach of this article shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, or both penalties together, at the discretion of the courtx x x

The appellant's lawyers argue that Law No. 3094 authorizes the waiver only in cases of adoption, and the present case is not, because it does not speak of adoption in the document in question, and also the recurring product consents so that her daughter is taken by the respondents. The argument is clearly wrong. In the same phraseology of the law, transcribed above, it is clear that making arrangements for the adoption of the child is nothing more than one of the purposes the charity that the law is concerned, the other end being the "receive, protect, train, educate, help, care... of any child under the age of 18, when the father and the mother or the person legally authorized to act as guardians of that boy deliver it in writing to the care of the institution or society, and the person of the child will be in the legal custody ahead of that institution or company for the purposes specified here. " And note, moreover, what the law says categorically, namely from the time of delivery to the institution, the rights of the natural parents. . . on the lower expire, and the institution or company will have full authority and right to take care of, educate, train him and make arrangements for adoption by any person responsible and reputable and can legally replace the parent or guardian consent to the adoption. What's more: a certain law provides penalties for the child or the person and leads to unreasonably let the person or institution in whose care has been entrusted in accordance with the law.

In Case of Strong against Beishir Sanchez (53 Phil. Rep., 353, August 15, 1929) are trying to question the validity of the waiver of parental rights under the terms of Law No. 3 (J94. This Court He upheld the validity and legitimacy of the resignation.

However; if parental rights and custody rights over a child can validly renounce in favor of an institution, in accordance with the law and cited case law, that the single mother of a girl taking a married man can not give up custody which of course by law is responsible primarily for the father, especially if, as in this case, the legitimate wife of the adulterous father gives his consent to stay active and raising the child in the family home? It is by chance that the father, if only adultery, has less impersonal institu law, only legal existence, to exercise privileges of nature? For the father not to feed, raise and educate their adulterous son, have it in your house for this purpose, especially when it does not cause any disturbance in the feelings and state of the legitimate family?

However, it is argued that there is no law that specifically authorizes the waiver of parental rights in favor of adulterous father. But there is a law against it? Not only there is not, but we have certain legal precepts which can be inferred the permissibility and ligitimidad of that resignation. We have, in prime place, Article 143 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides: virtual library chanrob1es 1awx x x

"Parents and illegitimate children who do not attend on the condition of natural children, should, on account of food, aid needed for subsistence. Adema Parents are required to pay for their children's elementary instruction and teaching a profession, trade or occupation. "cralaw virtua1aw library

And Article 149 of the same Civil Code stipulates that

"The obligation to pay maintenance may, at its option, satisfy, or paying the pension to be fixed, or getting and keeping at home you are entitled to them." Cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case of Ortiz against Del Villar (.. 57 Jur Fil, 21, August 1, 1932) we said: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"... The under appeal, although father adultery, having obligations to the by law in favor of these children, like to feed them and to afford their instruction to some extent, even to comply with these obligations, has, lack of a better law, better title than the applicant to be in possession of such children. "cralaw virtua1aw library

It is argued that in this case requesting legal custody was only an aunt of children, whereas in the present case is the mother - said with emphasis - has evidently better right than the adulterous father. The answer to this is that any better right than could be recurring as the natural mother of the child sweet, deciduous when I give the same document under which so often has merit.

The only question that now remains to be determined and resolved is whether the appellant can return to their agreement without good reason, that is, if he can terminate the waiver for its sole and exclusive will, because if, because it gives the actual wins so, no argument or evidence that the father appealed or challenged are guilty of any act or omission which incapacitates them to continue exercising on sweet nina custody rights. The resolution of this question must necessarily be against the claims of the appellant. She could only regain custody resorted waived if the parent fails to fulfill the duties incumbent on it, that is, feeding, raising and educating the child as it should; but we have seen no ningllna allegation or evidence to this effect. On the contrary, the record shows that the respondents are in much better condition than the applicant to provide the girl of amenities.

The algumento that the document in question is invalid for lack of cause or consideration is all futile lights. It should not be sought a material consideration because the same lawyers say the appellant's body sweetest girl is out of business men. It is not a purchase or exchange. The consideration here is the welfare of the child. In Case against Perkins Perkins Slade (57 Phil. Rep., 227, September 12, 1932) we stated that "the welfare of a child is usually the predominant consideration in the issue of custody." The by respectable natural and feelings of parenthood, they are, have to give primary consideration to that. And the rule is not relax just because it comes from adulterous children. It is true that in a remote past these unfortunate enough not enjoy any right: such was the disgust felt that the society against them. But it is clear that, albeit slowly, his condition has improved and humanized firmly on the social concept. Since Seven Games that almost did not grant them anything until the Civil Code which recognized them the rights they now have, the progress of his condition has been considerable. And it is equally clear that the social trend in all civilized countries and religions is becoming less oppressive, more liberal and more towards these unfortunate human beings who, born into the world without any fault on his part, already have enough trouble with the accumulation of social inhibitions and prejudices that weigh on them.

In merits of the above, the judgment under appeal without comment as the coast is confirmed. So it is ordered.

Moran, Pres., Paras, Fair, Paul, Perf ecto, Bengzon, Hontiveros and Tuason, JJ., Concur.

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