Diana Engström, Safety Culture Specialist, SKB

Diana Engström, Safety Culture Specialist, SKB

How waste is handled

SVENSK KÄRNBRÄNSLEHANTERING

The Swedish system

Nuclear power plants

Low- and intermediate-

level waste

Health care, industry

and research

Transportation by

m/s Sigrid

High-level waste

Final Repository for

Short-lived Radioactive Waste

Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear

Fuel with planned encapsulation facility

Final Repository for

Spent Nuclear Fuel


Safety Culture in Practice at SKB

SKB`s view on Safety Culture, Human Performance and Human Factors in general

Management system

Safety Culture Self Assessment

Safety Culture Program at SKB


SKB´s view…

Culture for Safety

No blame culture

Humans as an asset

Focus on organizational weaknesses

A simple model of Safety Culture

Fix processes – not individuals

Risk Management

Behavior

Making sense

Skriver, J. (2004). A simple model of

safety culture. In D. de Waard, K. A.

Brookhuis & C. M. Weikert (Eds.), Human

factors in design (pp. 51-59). Maastricht,

NL: Shaker Publishing.


SKB´s view

• So if you feel you have a “human error” problem, don’t think for a minute that you have said anything meaningful about the causes of your troubles, or that a better definition or taxonomy will finally help you get a better grasp of the problem, because you are looking in the wrong place, and starting from the wrong position. You don´t have a problem with erratic, unreliable operators. You have an organizational problem, a technological one.

// Woods et al – Behind Human errors


Management system


Safety Culture Self Assessment

The third self assessment ongoing

as we speak

Based on document review, survey

and interviews

Based on the Simple model of

Safety Culture

Reveals organizational

weaknesses

Includes recommendations from

the analysis team

Safety Culture

Program


Safety Culture Program and implementation plan

Actions are recommended

by safety culture experts

but all the decisions about

actions are taken and

signed by the top

management and CEO

• Based on identified gaps and areas for

improvement in the self assessment

• Also based on the Simple Model of

Safety Culture

• Describes which safety culture

characteristics SKB does not

completely live up to

• Includes actions, sub goals for each

action, main goal for each action, who

is responsible, deadlines and expected

effects

• Quarterly follow up

• Results presented for top management

Line organization is

responsible for the actions

taken


An example…

Safety Culture self assessment

Safety is considered as a major priority

that is communicated from management

but there is a certain lack of clear and

concrete priorities on safety along with a

structured message

This means that safety, in certain ways,

not always were a clearly recognized

value (IAEA characteristics)

Safety Culture Program

A workshop was conducted with Top Management to define what safety means

The definition is now included in a top document (risk management)

A one day training for all personnel is conducted to spread the message (to get the understanding)

A workshop for all units and groups are planned. The aim is to break down the safety message to something concrete and useful for each and every group and unit (to get the behavior we want)


Lessons learned

• Try to avoid using maturity levels to explain your Safety Culture

• Change the processes that does not work good or as they were supposed to

• Cover all the “bubbles” in the Simple Model of Safety Culture in your actions

• Make sure you get at real change, not just a new instruction

• Commitment is crucial

• Not a one time happening

• Follow up, follow up and follow up


Thank you


Documents

Diana Engström, Safety Culture Specialist, SKB