DEWEY. By Nature and By Art (1944)

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Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

By Nature and by ArtAuthor(s): John DeweySource: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 11 (May 25, 1944), pp. 281-292Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2019270 .

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VOLUME XLI, No. 11 MAY 25, 1944

THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHYBY NATURE AND BY ART

IURRENT philosophicaltheories of knowledgeare strangelyxJ neglectful f the implications nd consequences f therevolu-tion that has taken place in the actual subject-matter nd methodsof scientific nowledge. In substance, his revolutionmaybe saidto be one from knowledgethat is such "by nature" to scientificsubject-matterwhich is what it is because it is "by art." Theclassic scheme, ollowingAristotle,held that the subject-matterfscience, s the highestgrade of knowledge,s what it is because ofcertain nherent orms, ssences, r natures. These indwelling ndconstitutivenatures are eternal, immutable,and necessary. It

followed that in the Greek-medieval ystemall sciences, fromastronomyo biology,were concernedwithspeciesor kinds,whichare immutably he same and eternally eparatedfromone anotherby thefixednatures forming heir nherent ssences or Being.Otherforms fknowledge, uch as were called sense-perceptionand opinion,were also what theywereby the nature of theirin-herentBeings; or,morestrictly, y the unchangeableand incor-rigiblepartiality r defect fBeing whichmarked hem. For overagainstfixedand eternalspecies constituted y inherent ssentialformswere the thingsthat change; thingsthat are generatedandperish. Alteration,modifiability, utability, re ipso facto proofof instability nd inconstancy. These in turn are proofof lackofBeing in its fullsense. It is becauseoflack,orprivation, f self-containedand self-sufficienteing that some thingsare variableand transient,now one thingand now another. The lack of in-herentnaturesor essences s equivalentto dependence upon cir-cumstances hat are external,this dependenceupon what is out-side beingmanifestedn theirvariability. In classic terminology,scienceis concernedwith"formal causes," that is, with inherentnatureswhich "cause" thingsto be what theyare. Sense-knowl-edge and opinionare inferior ormsof knowledge oncernedwiththingswhichby theirnatures are so mutable that knowledgeofthem is itself unstable and shifting-as in the case of thingstouched,heard,seen,

281


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282 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYIt should not be necessary o dwell upon the fact that accordingto what is now science what the ancient scheme relegated to aninferiorposition,namely,efficientnd material "causes," consti-

tutes the only legitimate ubject-matter f natural science, ccept-ance of the view that essentialforms or natures are its subject-matter accounting for the sterilityof science during the periodbefore he scientific evolution ccurred. According o the ancientdoctrine, he subject-matter f sense-knowledgend opinion on oneside, and of science on the other, re forever eparated by a gulfthat is impassable for the reason that it is cosmological andontological-that is, due to the very "being" of the subjects in-volved. In what now constitutescience, he differences methodo-logical. For it is due to methodsof inquiry,not to inherentna-tures. Potentially the subject-matters f sense and opinion aresciencein the making; they are its raw material. Increased ma-turityof theprocedures nd techniquesof inquiry will transformtheirmaterial nto scientific nowledge. On the otherside, thereis no subject-matter f the scientific ind which is eternally thesameand notsubject to improvement ithfurther evelopmentnefficacyf inquiry-procedures.The scientific evolution,whichput science upon the road ofsteady advance and ever increasing fertility,s connectedwithsubstitution f knowledge by art" for that said to be "by na-ture." The connection s not remote nor recondite. The artsare concernedwith production,with generation,with doing andmaking. They fall, therefore,withinthe domainof thingswhichin the classicscheme re mutable, nd of which, ccording to thatscheme, cientific nowledge s impossible. Accordingto the pres-ent conduct of science and accordingto its conclusions, cienceconsists fknowledge f ordersof change. While this factmarksa completedeparturefromthe classic view, it does not suffice fitselfto justifycallingscientific nowledge n art, though t pro-vides a conditionwithoutwhich that designation is not war-ranted, for it completely reaks down the grounds upon whichafixed nd impassable inewas originally rawn between hesubject-matters fscienceand ofart. For it connects cience withchange.The consideration that completes the ground for assimilatingscience to art is the fact that assignmentof scientific tatus inany given case rests upon facts which are experimentally ro-duced. Science is now the product of operations deliberatelyundertaken n conformitywith a plan or project that has theproperties f a workinghypothesis. The value or validityof thelatter s tested, s in the case of any art, by whathappens in con-sequence of the operationsit instigatesand directs. Moreover,


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BY NATURE AND BY ART 283science s assimilatedto theconditionsdefining n art by the factthat,as in the case of any industrialart, productionof relevantand effectiveonsequencesdepends uponuse of artificially esignedappliances and apparatus as means of execution of the plan thatdirects heoperationswhichare undertaken.

IIIt is an old and familiar tory hat "nature" is a word ofmanysenses. One of its senses has been mentioned. Accordingto it,thenatureof thatwhich s undergoing nvestigation, ay combus-tion, electricity, r whatever, s the subject-matter f scientificgeneralizations.We still use theexpression the nature" of some-thingor other in this sense, though, imagine,with decreasingfrequency. But whenwe do use it in this sense, its meaningisradicallydifferent romthat possessedby the same expression nthe classic scheme. For it no longer designatesa fixedand in-herentessence,or Being, that makes facts to be what they are.Instead, it signifiesn order of connected hanges, n orderwhichis found to be fruitfully ffectiven understanding nd dealing

withparticularchanges. The differences radical.'Anothermeaningof "nature" is cosmological. The word isused to stand for theworld,f r theuniverse, or the sum total offactswhich ctuallyand potentially re thesubject of inquiryandknowledge. With respectto this sense of "nature, ancientphi-losophyhas an importatit dvantage over the general tenor ofmodernphilosophy. For while modernphilosophy s conformableto actual scientific ractice n eliminating n ontologicaldifference,or a differencen kinds of Being, between the eternal and thechanging, t has, unfortunately,endedto substitutefor this dif-ferenceone equally fixedbetweensupposed subjectiveand objec-tive ordersof Being.2 "Unfortunately is in f ct too mild andneutrala word. For thenet effect as been to set up a seat andagencyofknowing veragainstNature as that known. Hence the"knower" becomes n effect xtra-natural. Historically, he factsof the case are easilyexplainable. For while in the Greekversionmind n both ts sensible nd its rationaloperationswas a culminat-ing manifestation r terminal"end," of natural facts, in the.medieval version (out of which moderntheorygrewwithoutout-

1- t may be remarked n passing that the old sense of the "nature"I of athing still prevails in discussion of moral and social subjects; and this factmay explain the continuedstagnation and infertility f inquiry in these fields.2 Virtual synonyms re ''mental " and " physical"I orders,and " personal"and " impersonal, taken as separate and opposed with ref rence to their in-herentstuff or subject-matters.


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284 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYgrowing omeofitsmajor tenets)soul and mindtookon definitelysupernaturaltraits. These traits, in a more or less attenuatedform,reappear in the extra-naturalknowing "subject" of mod-ern philosophy s that is set over against the natural world as"object."To complete he statement f the termsof the questionunderdiscussion,t is necessary o noteexplicitly he sense of "nature"and " natural in which heycontrastwith" art and " artificial."For in thecosmological enseof nature,the sayingof Shakespeareholdstotheeffecthatnature s made betterbyno meanbutnaturemakes that mean; in the third sense of natural (that just men-tioned), science s definitelynd conclusively matterof art,notofnature.We most readilylay hold of themeaningof this statement ypresenting o ourselves pictureofan astronomical bservatoryra physical aboratory. And we have to includeas part of thepic-turethe roleof collections f booksand periodicals,whichoperatein themost ntimate nd vital working onnectionwiththe othermeans by which science is carried on. For the body of printedmatter s what enables the otherwisehighlyrestrictedmaterialofimmediate erception o be linkedwithsubject-matters avinganindefinitely ide spatial and temporalrange. For only in fusionwithbook-material oes what is immediately resenttake on sci-entific tatus,and only in fusionwiththe latterdoes the formercease to be "theoretical" in the hypothetical ense of that word.For onlyas culturally ransmittedmaterialwith ts deep and widescope is anchored,refreshed,nd testedthrough ontinuallyhere-and-nowmaterialsprovidedby direct experimentalobservationsdoes it becomea warrantedpart of authentic cience.A further ualificationhas to be added to completethe state-mentthat sciencewith respectto both methodand conclusions san art. For there s a sense in whicheveryform of knowledgeis an affair f art. For all knowledge, ven themostrudimentarysuch as is attributable o low-grade rganisms,s an expressionofskill in selection nd arrangement f materialsso as to contributeto maintenanceof the processesand operationsconstitutingife.It is nota metaphorical xpression o say thatat the very east allanimals know how, in virtue of organic structureand physio-logical processes n connectionwithtrans-cuticular onditions, odo thingsof thissort. When,then, t is said that science,as dis-tinctfromothermodesofknowledge,s an art,the word "art" isused witha differentialroperty. The operationsof search thatconstitute he art or skill markingothermodes of knowledgede-velop intore-search.


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BY NATURE AND BY ART 285A more concrete qualificationof the art which constitutesscientific nowledge s its dependence upon extra-organic ppli-ances and instrumentalities,hemselves rtificiallydevised. The

scientific evolutionmay be said to have been initiatedwhen in-vestigators orrowed pparatus and processes from the industrialarts and used them as means of obtaining dependable scientificdata. The use of the lens was of itself almostenoughto revolu-tionize the scienceof astronomy. As we look back, we note thatthe bulk of early knowledgewas in fact built up through he pur-suit of industrialand mechanical arts. The low social status ofartisans (in which class were included sculptors, rchitects, aint-ers of pictures,musicians, n fact all producers save thosework-ing with words) was "rationalized" in the doctrineof the in-herently nferior tate of all knowledgeof this kind. At best, itwas "empirical" in the disparagingsense of that word. Funda-mentally, he scientific evolutionconsisted of transformationf"empirical" into experimental. The transformation as effected,historically, y adoption,as means of obtaining scientific nowl-edge,of devices and processespreviously mployed n industry oobtain"material" ends-in that sense of "material" which denti-fies "matter" with the menial and servile. After a period inwhich natural knowledgeprogressedby borrowingfrom the in-dustrialcrafts, cience enteredupon a period of steadyand ever-accelerated growthby means of deliberate nventionof such ap-pliances on its own account. In order to mark this differentialfeature of the art which is science, I shall now use the word"'technology. 8Because oftechnologies, circularrelationship etween he artsof productionand science has been established. I have alreadyspokenof the dependenceof science as now conducted upon theuse of appliances and processes uch as were once confined o the"utilitarian" and "practical" ends to which a subordinate and"base" statuswas attributed ocially and morally. On the otherhand, before the application in a return movement f science inthe industrial arts, productionwas a routine affair. It wasmarkedby imitation nd by following stablishedmodels and pre-cedents. Innovation and inventionwere accidental rather thansystematic. Application of scientific conclusions and methods8 While a number of writers have brought forward the facts which areinvolvedin this view,Dr. Clarence Ayres, as far as I am aware, was the firstone explicitly to call science a mode of technology. It is probable that Imighthave avoided a considerable amount of misunderstanding f I had sys-tematically used "technology" instead of "instrumentalism" in connectionwith the view I put forth regarding the distinctive quality of science asknowledge.


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286 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYliberatedproduction rom hisstate-a state justifyinguse of theadjective "empirical" in its disparaging sense. Through incor-porationinto the arts of productionof the methodsand conclu-sions of science,theyare capable of becoming"rational" in thehonorificenseof thatword. The phrase"rationalizationof pro-duction" states a fact. Indeed, it may be said that the distinc-tionbetweenscienceand othertechnologiess not intrinsic. It isdependentupon cultural conditionsthat are extrinsicto bothscience and industry. Were it not for the influence xertedbythese conditions, he difference etweenthemwould be conven-tional to the point of being verbal. But as long as some tech-nologies are carried on for personal profitat the expense ofpromotion f the commonwelfare,the stigma of "materialism"will continueto be attached to industrial technologies, nd thehonorificdjective "idealistic" will be monopolizedby the tech-nologywhich yields knowledge-especially if that knowledgeis"pure" -that is, in theclassic view,uncontaminated y beingputto "practical" use.

IIIValuable instruction oncerning numberof mootedproblemsin the theoryof knowledgemay be derivedfrom the underlyingprinciplesof the priordiscussion. One of them,perhapsthemostobvious on the surface, s the fact that many classificationsnddistinctionswhichhave been supposed to be inherent r intrinsicto knowing nd knowledge re in fact due to socio-cultural ondi-tionsofa historical, nd thereforeemporal nd local, sort. Thereis the fact (upon which have dwelt at length n previouswrit-

ings) of the arbitraryand irrelevantnature of the sharp linedrawnin the classic philosophical raditionbetween"theoretical"and "practical" knowledge. The gulfthat was supposedto sepa-rate them s in factmerely logical corollary f theview thattheproper subject of scientific nowledge s eternal and immutable.The connection f sciencewithchange and the connection f themethodsof sciencewithexperimentalproductionof change havecompletely itiated hisdoctrine. The infertilityfnaturalknowl-edge before adoptionof the experimentalmethod s attributable,in large measure,to the fact that ancient and medieval sciencetookthematerialofordinary bservation as is"; that s, in lumpsand chunksas given"naturally" in a ready-made tate. In con-sequence,the only treatment o which it could be subjected wasdialectical.What is not so obvious upon the surface is that a theoryofknowledgebased upon theconductand conclusions f sciencedoes


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BY NATURE AND BY ART 287away, once and for all, with the fixeddifferenceupposed to existbetween sense-knowledge nd rational-knowledge. The sensoryaspect of knowledge s strictly n aspect. It is distinguishablenintellectual analyses that are undertakenfor special purposes.But it is not,as it was long takento be, a special kind of knowl-edgenoryeta separate componentn knowledge. It is thataspectof the system f knowledge,n and by which knowledge xtendingacross an indefinitelyxtensive patial and temporalrangeof factsis anchored nd focalized n that which s here-and-now. Withoutdemonstrated nchorage of this sort, any system,no matterhowwell organizedwith respectto internal consistency,s "theoreti-cal" in the sense of being hypothetical. On the other hand, the"rational" aspect of knowledge s constitutedby the corpus ofextantknowledgewhichhas been constituted y prior nquiriesandwhich s so organized s to be communicable-andhenceapplicableto resultsof further nquiry by which the old system s correctedand extended.The principle underlying hese special matters s that the legi-timate subject-matter f a theoryof knowledge consists of factsthat are known at a given time, with, of course, the proviso thattheproceduresby which this body of knowledgehas been built upare an integralpart of t. This view of thegroundsof a competenttheory f knowledge tands n open opposition o that whichunder-lies the epistemologicaltheory: the postulate, namely, that nosubject-matters entitledto be called knowledgeuntil it has beenshownto satisfy onditions hat are laid down prior to any case ofactual knowledge nd independently f any conclusionreachedinthe courseof the inquiries by which knowledge n the concrete sarrived at. The completeness f the oppositionbetween the twopostulatesmay be judged from he following onsideration. Uponthe groundof the firstpostulate subject-matters entitled to thename of knowledgewhen it is determined y the methods of in-quiry, test, verification,nd systematic rrangement, r organiza-tion,which re factuallyemployedn thesciences. Upon the otherbasis, theantecedent onditions pply to any and every case, good,bad, and indifferent.Hence they re of an entirely ifferentrderfromthefactsof actual investigation, est,and verification, hichwarrant use of the name "knowledge" in its honorific ense inactual instances.It was then inevitable,fromthe standpoint of logic, that theepistemological approach culminated in the Kantian question:How is knowledge ossible anyway (ueberhaupt)? If the questionwereput withreference o the "possibility" of any other subjectunder investigation, he existenceof the subject-matter nder in-


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288 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYquirywould be thestarting oint. It suffices,orexample, o showthat cancerexists for thequestionas to its possibility o be simplythe questionof thespecific onditions f an actuality. Onlyin thecase of knowledge s it supposed that the question of its "possi-bility" is one whichputs actuality nto total doubt until certainuniversal antecedent onditionshave been laid downand showntobe satisfied.In the case of cancer,for example,the question of possibilitymeans that our knowledge s still in a doubtfuland indeterminatestate, so that research is going on to discover the characteristicproperties,conditions,and consequences of facts whose actualexistence ets theproblem. Yet strangely nough (strangely,pro-vided, that is, historical-culturalactsare left out of account) thedogmaticand contradictory ssumptionthat there exists knowl-edge of the conditionsof knowledgeprior to and conditioningevery pecificnstanceof knowledge rrogated o itself hename ofa criticaltheory f knowledge!

IVI do not proposeto discuss further his contradiction, eyondsayingthatthe contradictionwill be obviousto anyonewho viewsthe matter n termsof the factsof knowledge,nsteadof in termssuppliedby the history fphilosophical ystems iewed n isolationfromothercultural events. I propose ratherto set forth omeofthe historical-culturalonditionswhich generatedin general theepistemological ssumption f prior conditions o be satisfied;andwhich, n particular, ed to the "subject-object" formulaaboutthese conditions. One of the influentialfactors consists of the

conditions xistingwhenthescientific evolution ookplace. It ishardly possible to over-emphasize he fact that these conditionswere those of revolt not merely gainst long accepted intellectualdoctrines ut also againstcustoms nd institutionswhich werethecarriersof these doctrines, nd which gave them a support ex-traneous to their own constituents. Because of causes whicharepsychologically dequate, if not factually so, the word "social"has cometo be regarded s applicabletothat which s institutionallyestablishedand whichexertsauthoritybecause of this fact. Theadjective "individual" is identified n this basis withthat whichmarks departurefrom he traditionally nd institutionallystab-lished, especially f the departure s of a quality involvingrevoltand a challengeto the rightful uthority f traditionand custom.These conditionswerefullyand strikingly resentat the timeof the rise of modern cience. Every book on the history f phi-losophymentions he fact that the philosophical iteratureof the


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BY NATURE AND BY ART 289fifteenthnd subsequentcenturies s markedby treatises, ssays,tractates, hat deal with the methodsto be adopted and pursuedif scientific nowledge s to be actually obtained. The negativeaspect of these new ventures s assault, overt or implicit, pon allthat had long been accepted as science. There was in effect,fnot openly, an assertion that currentlyaccepted subject-matterwas hardly more than a systematized ollection of errors andfalsities. The necessity of radically new proceduresof assaultupon existing"science" was uniformly reated as an affairofmethod. It was because of the methodshabituallyused and sanc-tioned that existing"science" was stagnant,and so far removedfrom its proper mark-understanding of nature. Other docu-mentsupon rightmethodsmaynothave used thewords of FrancisBacon's Novum Organum,much less endorsed ts precepts. Buttheywere at one with himin proclaiming he necessity f a com-plete break with traditionalmethods nd in stark opposition o thetenetsof theOrganonofAristotle.If the movement f protest, evolt, nd innovation hatwas ex-pressed n these documents nd put in practice n the new astron-omy and "natural philosophy" had been confined o "science"in its technical nd isolatedaspect, therewould not have been thecrisisthatactuallyoccurred. The factsconstituting hat is called"the conflict f science with religion"'-or theology-clearly andconvincingly rove that themovement f innovation, rotest, ndrevoltwas notso confined. The new sciencewas treated s morallyhereticaland as a dangerous menace to the very foundations f astable and just social order. Upon the Continent, specially,itwas treated as rebellion against divinely established authority.In a more fundamental way than in the ecclesiasticmovementnamedProtestantism,t was a protestagainst establishedfounda-tions n moralsand religion. Its opponentsmade this point clearwhen ts proponents ailed to do so.Statedin slightly ifferenterms, he subject-object ormulationof the conditions o be satisfiedbefore any subject-matter as aright to the honorable title of "knowledge" has to be viewed invitally intimate onnectionwith those movements n political andeconomic nstitutionswhich popularly bear the name "individual-ism." For, as has been already remarked, ny departure fromtraditions and customs that are incorporated n and backed byinstitutionshaving firmly stablished authority s regarded as"individual" in a non-social nd anti-social ense by the guardiansof old forms n church nd state. Only at a latertime,when t ispossibleto place events n a long historicperspective nstead of inthe short-time rowded and broken perspective of what is im-


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290 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYmediately ontemporary,an so-called "individualism" be seen tobe as "social" in origin, ontent, nd consequences s are the cus-tomsand institutions hichare in processofmodification.

In this culturalsituation, he fact that philosophers s unlikeas Descartes and Berkeleyboth refer to the seat and agent ofknowledge as "I" or an "ego," a personal self, has more thancasual significance. This referenceis especially significant asevidence of thenew climateof opinion ust because no attempt tjustification ccompanied t. It was taken to be such an evidentmatter hatno argument n its behalf was called for. Referencesand allusions of this kind are the forerunners f the allegedly"critical" attemptof Kant to frame an account of the conditionsofknowledgen terms f a "transcendentalego," afterHume haddemonstratedhe shakycharacter of the "empirical" self as thesource and agent of authenticknowledge.If we adopt the customary ourse of isolatingphilosophies ntheir historicalappearance which is their actuality from othersocio-cultural acts, f we treat the history f philosophy s some-thing capable of being understood n the exclusive termsof docu-ments abeled philosophical,we shall look at the outstandingfea-ture of modernphilosophy s one of a conflict etweendoctrinesappealingto "sense-experience"as ultimate uthority nd theoriesappealing to intuition nd reason, a conflict eaching a supposedsolution in the Kantian reconciliation of the a priori and thea posteriori. When thesephilosophies re placed in theirculturalcontext, heyare seento be partners n a commonmovement, othschoolsbeing in revoltagainst traditional science in its methods,premises,nd conclusions,while bothschoolsare engaged in searchfor a new and differenteat of intellectualand moral authority.There are indeed significant ifferencesetween the two schools.But when these are historically iewed, they appear as differencesof emphasis,one school incliningto the "conservative" phase ofculturalinstitutions,nd the otherschool to the "progressive" orradical phase.While thoseaspectsof thenewsciencewhichexpress nitiative,invention, nterprise,nd independence f custom(on the groundthatcustoms re more ikelyto be distorting nd misleadingthanhelpful n attainingscientific nowledge) are necessaryconditionsfor generationof the subject-objectformulation, hey are farfrombeing its sufficientondition. Unquestionedpersistenceoffundamental traditioncontrolledprotest against other customs.Medieval institutions entered n belief in an immaterial oul orspirit. This belief was no separate item. It permeated everyaspect of life. The drama of the fall, the redemption, nd the


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BY NATURE AND BY ART 291eternaldestinyfor weal or woe, of the soul was all-controllingnthe accepted view of the creation and history f the universe andof man. Belief in the soul was so far from being just an intel-lectual tenetthat poignant.motion nd thedeepestand mostvividimages of which man is capable centered about it. The churchthat administered he concernsof the soul was in effect he domi-nant educationaland political institution f the period.Secularizingmovementsgradually undermined the monopolyof authoritypossessed by the church. Althoughinterests of anaturaltype did not supersede upernatural nterests, heytendedto push themout of a central into a peripheralposition. Butsupernaturalconcernsretainedsuch forcein moral and religiousmattersthat the theoryof knowledgewas routed through thechannels theyhad worn after the facts of sciencewere wearinga natural channel. This roundaboutchannel seemed,because oftheforceof habit,more"natural" thanany indicatedby the factsof science. The enormous ap betweenknowledge-factsnd episte-mological theorywhichmarks modernphilosophywas instituted.In spite of revolt and innovation, hehold of the belief in thesoul as knowing ubject upon the attitudeswhich controlledtheformation f the theory of knowledgewas so firm hat it couldnot be broken until the institutions, pon which the belief in itsconcretevalidity depended had undergonedefinitedegeneration.Revoltand innovationwere sufficient,owever, o bringto ex-plicit and emphatic tatement ne aspect of the Christiandoctrineof the soul, an aspect which was kept covert and hidden in thedominant nstitutionalism f the Middle Ages. This aspect wasthe ndividual or singularnatureof the subject of sin, redemption,punishment, nd reward. Protestantism nsisted upon makingthis aspect of the Christianpositionovert and central n religiousmatters. The writers who were concerned with the new scienceperformed similartaskin thetheories f knowledge heypromul-gated. The hold of the old doctrine,even upon those most in-different o its theologicalphases, is shown in the persistenceofbeliefin an immaterialmind,consciousness, r whatever, s beingthe seat and agentofknowledge. The influence f the beliefuponthenew science,even with ts fundamental evoltand innovation,is exhibited n identificationf the subject and agent of soundknowledgewith "individuals'" who had freed themselvesfromthepervertingnd deadening ffectf custom nd tradition. Eventoday thosewho deny in words that mind and consciousness reorgansofknowledge, eplacingthemwith an organic body or withthe nervous systemof the organism,attribute to the latter anisolationfrom he rest of nature (includingtransmitted nd com-


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292 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYmunicatedculture) whichis muchmore than reminiscent f thelonely solationof the medievalsoul.It tookmorethantheundeniablebut negativefact ofthegrad-ual attenuation nd decay of the importance nce attachedto thesoul as seat of knowledge o effectn adequate elimination. Thenew movement f science had to achieve, on the ground of itsownmethods nd conclusions, positiveconquestof thoseaspectsofnaturalfactthatdeal with ife and human historybeforecom-pleteelimination ould occur. Only duringthelast hundredyears(less than that in fact) have the sciences of biology, culturalanthropology,nd history, speciallyof "origins," reacheda stageof developmentwhich places man and his workssquarelywithinnature. In so doingtheyhave supplied the concrete nd verifiedpositive facts that make possible and imperativelydemand for-mation of a systematic heoryof knowledge n which the factsof knowledge re specified r describedand organizedexactly asare thefactsof the scienceswhichare the relevantsubject-matterof a theory f knowledge. Only in thisway will the factsof ourknowledge-systemsnd thoseofthe theory f knowledge e broughtinto harmonywith one another, nd the presentglaring discrep-ancybetween hembe done away with. JOHN DEWEY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

CAN WE CHOOSE BETWEEN VALUES?V ALUE theory an becomeveryesoteric, s it occasionally endsto becomein the technicalperiodicals. But there are alsocertainelementary, ot to say naive, aspects of human valuationthat should not be lost sight of. Above all-and this is not sonaive-an attemptmustbe made to choose amongthe values pre-sentedby a culture. Howeverrisky or impertinent,hat effortsnecessary. Any asepticrefusalto make moral choices s to do nomore hanacceptuncriticallyhoices hat othershave already made.Some assumptionsunderlying uch an attemptwill be presentedhere. And a preliminary ne will be the way the term"value"itself s being understood:values, at least so far as theyparticu-larly concern thics, re theresultsofman's long-time references-preferences in the centralarea encompassinghis basic attitudesof life,his deep-rooted astes and interests, is objects of respectand reverence.The Biological Basis of Value Decision.-There can be littlequestionthat the startingplace for decision about humanvalues

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DEWEY. By Nature and By Art (1944)