Development_Do Points Mean Prizes

8/14/2019 Development_Do Points Mean Prizes

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Development:Dopoints

meanprizes?

HowtheUKsmigrationpoliciescouldbenefittheworldspoor

DevelopmentontheMoveWorkingPaper5

byLauraChappellandSarahMulley

March2010

ipprandGDN2010

GlobalDevelopmentNetworkandInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch


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GDNandippr|Development:Dopointsmeanprizes?3

TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUKsleadingprogressivethinktank,producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.

Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.

WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible,whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogrammeextendourpartnershipsandinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.

ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:[email protected]

www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065

ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinMarch2010.ipprandGDN2010

Thepaperdrawsonanalysisconductedin2009forUKBAonskilledemigrationsdevelopmentimpacts.

Aboutippr

AbouttheauthorsLauraChappellisaSeniorResearchFellowatippr.Since2006,shehasauthoredandeditedanumberofpublicationsonmigrationanddevelopmentandtheeconomicsofmigration,bothforipprandfororganisationssuchastheOECDandUNDP.PreviouslyLauraworkedasanODIFellowatthePacificIslandsForumSecretariatinFijiandfortheLiberalDemocratPolicyandResearchUnitonTreasuryissues.LauraholdsanMScwithDistinctioninDevelopmentEconomicsfromtheSchoolofOrientalandAfricanStudies,andaBAinPhilosophy,PoliticsandEconomicsfromtheUniversityofOxford.

SarahMulleyisaSeniorResearchFellow,andleadsipprsworkontheeconomicsofmigrationandcommunicatingmigration.Beforejoiningippr,SarahwascoordinatoroftheUKAidNetwork,acoalitionofUKNGOsworkingtogethertodeveloppolicyandadvocacyoninternationalaid.ShewaspreviouslyaresearchassociateattheGlobalEconomicGovernanceProgrammeinOxford,andasenioreconomicpolicyanalystatHMTreasury.SarahhasanMPhilinInternationalRelationsandaBAinPhilosophy,PoliticsandEconomics,bothfromtheUniversityofOxford.

AcknowledgementsTheauthorsaregratefulforcommentsfromMichaelClemensandTimFinchandpublicationsassistancefromGeorginaKyriacou.ThanksarealsoduetoofficialsfromtheDepartmentfor

InternationalDevelopment,theForeignandCommonwealthOfficeandtheUKBorderAgency,withwhomusefuldiscussionswereheld.

AboutGDNGDN,basedinDelhi,strivestopromotehomegrownexpertiseindevelopmentresearch.Ithelpsresearchersfromthedevelopingandtransitioncountriestogeneratenewknowledgeinthesocial

sciencesandbuildresearchexcellence,shareresearchoutput,data,andexperiencesacrossregionsaswellastoapplyresearchtopolicyandinformpolicymakers.

GDNistheworldslargestnetworkofresearchersandpolicyinstitutionsdedicatedtopromotingpolicy-relevantresearchforthepurposesofdevelopment.GDNhassignificantexperienceworkingonmigrationissuesthroughdesigningandimplementingglobalresearchprojectsthatemphasizedevelopingcountryperspectivesonmigration.

www.gdnet.org


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Asmigrationhasrisenoverthepastfewdecades,publicdemandsformanagedmigrationhaverisentoo.IntheUK,theGovernmenthasrespondedtothisdemandwiththePointsBasedSystem(PBS),

whichaimstoselectthemigrantstheeconomyneedsmost.However,whilethismakessensefortheUK,itneglectsthefactthatmigrationcanaffectothercountriestootheobjectivesofthePBSarecurrentlyexclusivelyfocusedonUKpolicyobjectives.

ThisneglectisstrikingasthereisalmostnootherareaofUKpolicywhichissoclearlyinternationalinitsscopeandyetwherethesoleobjectiveistomaximisebenefitstotheUK.WeargueinthisreportthatimpactsondevelopmentshouldbefactoredintoUKmigrationpolicy.

Theimpactsofmigrationarethoughttobebothpositiveandnegative.Forexample,remittances(moneythatmigrantssendbacktotheirfamiliesandtoothersinthecommunity)arenowatleastasimportantasaidorforeigndirectinvestmentassourcesofincomeformanydevelopingcountries.Ontheotherhand,thereareconcernsthatskilledemigrationorbraindrainwhichcanbeexacerbatedbypoints-basedsystemsliketheUKsthatexplicitlyseektoattractthemostskilledpeoplecan

deprivedevelopingeconomiesoftheirbestpeople.

ThispaperexaminesthenatureofmigrationsdevelopmentimpactsingreaterdepthandaskshowtheGovernmentcanensurethattheUKsmigrationpoliciescontributepositivelytothelivesofsomeoftheworldspoorestpeople,aswellasbenefitingBritishcitizens.Whilewenotethatunskilledmigrationpotentiallyofferssignificantdevelopmentbenefits(benefitsthatarecurrentlylostbecausetheGovernmenthasclosedtierthreeofthePBS,whichwouldallowforlow-skilledmigrationfromoutsidetheEU),wefocusinparticularonskilledmigration,becausethisistheareainwhichwethinkthereismostpossibilityforshapingpolicy.

Skilledmigrationisoftentermedbraindrainbecauseofthenegativeimpactsthatitispresumedtohaveonacountrysstockofskillsandhumancapital.Wesuggestthatwhileskillstocksareimportant

andthesekindofimpactsmustbetakenintoaccount,skilledmigrationcanhavewiderdevelopmentalimpacts,manyofwhicharepositive.

Ouranalysissuggests,infact,thatskilledemigrationmayactuallybenefitmostdevelopingcountriesthroughacombinationofeffects.Whileitmayhavenegativedevelopmentalimpactsonskillstocksintheshortrun,inricherdevelopingcountries(thosetermedmiddleincomecountries,withGNIpercapitaofmorethanUS$975)theseseemlikelytobecounteractedbyreturningmigrantswhobringbackskills,plusotherdevelopmentpromotingresources,likemoneyandideas.Also,whileskilledmigrantsareabroadtheymaymakeimportanttransfersandcontributions,buildingtradelinks,forexample,andtransferringattitudes,knowledgeandremittances.Insomemiddle-incomecountriesimmigrationmayalsoplayapositiverole.

Braindrainisofgreaterconcerninlow-incomedevelopingcountries(definedasthosewithaGNIper

capitaofUS$975orless),becausetheybenefitlessfromskilledimmigration,skilledmigrantsreturn,andmanyofthetransfersandcontributionsthatthediasporacanpotentiallymake.However,evenhere,alimiteddegreeofskilledemigrationstillappearstohavepositivedevelopmentaleffects.Thisisfirstlybecauselowincomecountriesseemlikelytobenefitfromremittances,whichmaybesentmoretolowincomecountriesthanmiddleincomeones.Inaddition,however,lowincomecountriesseemtoprofitfromstrongincentiveeffectswhichmotivatepeopletoincreasetheirlevelsofeducationsoastoincreasetheirchancesofmigration(asskilledpeoplearemorelikelytobeabletomigrate,partlybecauseofthestructureofmigrationmanagementsystemsliketheUKspoints-basedsystem).

Thisincreasedincentivetoup-skillcanhelptocompensateforthedirectnegativeimpactsthatskilledemigrationimposesuponacountrysstockofskills,potentiallyevencounteractingitentirely.Indeed,inmostlowincomecountriesitseemslikelythattheincentiveeffectwillcompensatefor

skilledemigration,asithasamorepowerfuleffectinpoorercountries.Theevidencesuggeststhatinplaceswherelessthan30percentofthetotalskilledpopulationliveabroad,theincentiveeffectsmayoutweighthenumbersofskilledpeopleemigrating,meaningthatthestockofskillsacountryhasisthesame orevengreater thanitwouldhavebeenwithoutskilledemigration.However,where

Executivesummary


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skilledemigrationisverysubstantial(above30percent)asitisincountrieslikeHaiti,SierraLeoneandSomalia,forexample itseemsthepositiveeffectsofremittancesandincentiveeffectsmaynotoffsetthedamagecausedbybraindrain.Thesearethecountrieswhichwarrantthegreatestattentionfromgovernmentconcernedwithaddressinganyharmcausedbyskilledemigration.UKgovernmentpolicyshouldnot,however,justbedrivenbypreventingharmtodevelopingcountries.Itshouldalsoattempttoincreasesomeofthepositivecontributionsthatmigrationcanmaketodevelopment.Buthowcangovernmentdothis,whilealsomeetingtheUKsownmigrationpolicyobjectives?Whatapproachshouldbetaken?

WesuggestthattherearethreepossiblepositionsthattheGovernmentcouldtaketoresolvemultipleandpotentiallycompetingobjectiveswithrespecttomigrationanddevelopment:

1.Donoharm MigrationpolicywouldbesetinordertomaximisebenefitstotheUK,withthecaveatthatnopartofmigrationpolicyshouldbeharmfultodevelopmentobjectives.Thismightinvolvedecisionsaboutmigrationpolicybeingsubjecttosomekindofinternationaldevelopmentimpacttest.

2.Developmentasanaddedbenefitofmigrationpolicy MigrationpolicywouldstillbesetprimarilywithaviewtomaximisingbenefitstotheUK.Oncethistesthadbeenmet,internationaldevelopmentwouldbeasecondorderobjective.Forexample,iftheUKneededskilledworkers,thechoiceofwherethoseworkersshouldcomefromwouldbedeterminedbyinternationaldevelopmentconsiderations.

3. InternationaldevelopmentaspartoftheUKsmigrationpolicyframework MigrationpolicywouldbesettakingaccountofbothUKandinternationaldevelopmentobjectives.Wheretherearetrade-offsbetweentheseobjectives,theGovernmentwouldconsiderrelativeimpacts.Forexample,whereapolicymightsacrificesomesmalldegreeofeconomicbenefitintheUKbutrepresentsasignificantgaintodevelopment,itmightmakesensetopursuethatpolicy.

Ourclearrecommendationisthat,giventheextenttowhichmigrationcanimprovelivesindeveloping

countries,andgiventheUKsstrongcommitmenttointernationalpovertyreduction,theGovernmentshouldgobeyondadonoharmposition.Migrationcanhavepositivebenefitsfordevelopment,andthisshouldbeclearlyreflectedinUKpolicy.

SowhatUKpolicyoptionsseemmostlikelytobeeffective,andwhy?

Braindraincannotbestopped GovernmentsincountriesliketheUKcannotstopskilledemigrationfromdevelopingcountries.Peoplearedriventomigratefrompoorcountriestoricheronesbypowerfuleconomicforces,andskilledmigrantsinparticularoftenhavemanyoptionsofcountriesthattheycangoto.IfskilledmigrantsaredeterredbypolicyfromcomingtotheUKtheywillgotootherdevelopedcountriesratherthanstayingathome.Policyinterventionsshouldthereforegowiththeflowofmigrationpatterns.

Tryingtoreducebraindrainmayactuallybebadfordevelopment Evenifbraindraincouldbestopped,thisshouldnotbepolicymakersaim.Inmanycircumstances,tryingtoreducebraindrainwoulddiminishmanyofthepositiveimpactsthatmigrationcanhave.Indeed,manydevelopingcountriescouldbenefit,itappears,frommoreratherthanlessskilledemigrationbecauseoftheremittancesthatmigrantssend,thediasporasthatmigrationcreates,andthepositiveincentives(intermsofeducation,forexample)thatmigrationcangenerate.Inmanyplacestheseappeartooutweighanynegativeimpactsthatskilledemigrationhas.Theeffectsonmigrantsthemselves,moreover,shouldbetakenintoaccount.Mostmigrantsimprovetheirlivesquitedramaticallybymoving,improvementswhichmightbethreatenedbyattemptstoreduceorstopskilledemigration.

Skilledmigrationcontributesmorewhenitismorecircular Thisinvolveshigherlevelsof

return(bothtemporaryandpermanent)andmigrantswhohavestronglinkswiththeircountriesoforigin.WesuggestthatchangestothePBSandUKcitizenshipframeworktoenhanceflexibilityandallowmigrantsmorefreedomtomovebackandforthastheywishwouldbean


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importantsteptowardsmakingmigrationtotheUKmoredevelopment-friendly.Thiswouldbeasimplewaytofacilitatereturnmigration,circularmigration,andstrongmigrantlinkswiththeircountriesoforigin.

IncreasedmigrationtotheUKwouldpromotepovertyreduction Insomecountriesthiswouldinvolvemoreskilledemigration(certainlytoabovefivepercent)butotherswouldbenefitfromtheopeningupofmorechannelsforlow-skilledmigration.InourviewthismeansthatthereiscertainlyreasontoexamineagainwhethertheUKistakingtherightapproachtotierthreeofthePBS.

MigrationfrompoorcountriestotheUKwillcontinuetotakeplaceforaslongaspeoplecansignificantlyimprovetheirlivesbymoving.TheUKgovernmentcannotstopthis,butitcanmakechangestoitsownrulestoensurethat,aswellasbenefitingtheUK,migrationalsohappensinawaythatimprovesthelivesoftheworldspoor.Thisshouldbeanimmediatepriorityforthecurrentgovernment,aswellasamajoritemontheagendaofthenext.


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Migrationisakeyaspectoftodaysglobalisingworld.Asnationaleconomieshavebecomeincreasinglyintertwined,andtravelandcommunicationstechnologieshavedeveloped,peoplearound

theworldhavebecomemoreawareoftheopportunitiesbeyondtheirborders,aswellasmoreabletotraveltoseekthemout.Asaresultthenumbersofpeoplemigratinghaverisen.Increasedmigrationhasledthepublicinmanycountries(particularlythosemostattractivetomigrants,includingtheUK)todemandthatthesemovementsbemoreeffectivelymanaged.Thisisunderstandableandsensible.

Migrationhassignificantimpactsonsocieties.Itmayaffectacountrysemploymentlevelsforexample(Leon-LedesmaandPiracha2004),oritsfiscalbalance(Sriskandarajahetal2005),andhasthepotentialtoaffectpublicserviceavailabilityorshapeculturalvalues.Assuch,itistheresponsibilityofastatetoitscitizenstotrytoensurethatmigration likeanyotherphenomenacontributesasmuchaspossibletotheirwellbeing,withanynegativeaspectsminimised.

Inresponsetotheseconsiderationsanumberofmajormigrantreceivingstates,includingAustraliaandtheUK,haveinstitutedpoints-basedsystems.Thesesystemstrytoidentifywhatkindsof

migrantstheireconomiesmostneed(thosewithacertainlevelofeducationorparticularskillsforexample)andallocatepointstowould-bemigrantswiththosecharacteristics.Thisallowsacountrytoselectthemigrantsitfeelswouldcontributemost(atleastineconomicterms)anddenyaccesstoothers.Skilledmigrantsinparticulartendtobeselectedbypoints-basedsystems(Docquier2006)(seeBox1forfurtherdetailsontheUKssystem).

Whilepoints-basedsystemsappeartohavebeeneffectiveinselectingthemigrantsacountrywants,theyarenotwithoutproblems.Oneissueinparticular,thefocusofthispaper,isakeypremiseuponwhichthesystemrests thatpolicyonmigrationforworkshouldbedeterminedsolelybytherecipientcountrysinterests.IntheUK,theseareeconomicinterests,butothernationalinterestssuchaspopulationtargetsandsocialindicatorscanalsobetargeted.Weidentifytwokeyproblemswiththisidea.

1.Introduction

Box1:TheUKspoints-basedsystem

EntrytotheUKviathepoints-basedsystem(PBS)isforlabour-relatedmigrationfromoutsidetheEU.Thissystemisbasedaroundfivetiers:

Tieronehighly-skilledmigrants.Thisgroupcancomeastheywish,withoutrequiringaprior

joboffer.Theyareseenashavingimportantskills(andsometimesfinancialresources)thatwillboostproductivityandtheUKeconomy.

Tiertwoskilledworkerswithajoboffer. ThisgroupareexpectedtofillgapsintheUKlabourmarket.

Tierthreelow-skilledtemporaryworkers.TheGovernmenthasannouncedthatitdoesnotintendtoopenupthistierinthenearfuture,onthegroundsthattherearenounskilledgapsthatcannotbefilledwithUKandEEAnationals.

Tierfourstudents.

Tierfiveyouthmobilityandotherschemes wheretheaimofworkingintheUKisnotprimarilyeconomic(forexample,workingholiday-makers).

Thenumberofentrantsviathepoints-basedsystemissubstantial.In2007,some82,300peoplewithworkpermitsandotherworkvisaholders(theprecursorstothepoints-basedsystem)cametotheUKfromoutsidetheEU,withmajorcountriesoforiginincludingtheUS,Canada,SouthAfrica,IndiaandPakistan(HomeOffice2008).Mostwererelativelyhighlyskilled,giventhattheGovernmenthaskepttierthree(whichmanagestemporarymigrationintolowerskilledjobs)closed.

Source:Chappelletal2009a


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First,thereisalmostnootherareaofUKpolicywhichissoclearlyinternationalinitsscopeandyetwherethesoleobjectiveistomaximisebenefitstotheUK.InawholerangeofpolicyareasthereisarecognitionthatwhileUKinterestsareimportantandmustbepursuedbytheBritishgovernment,otherimpactsshouldalsobetakenintoaccount.TheGovernmentsdecisiontomaketheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)anindependentdepartmentwitharequirementunderlawthataidbespentonpovertyreduction notonprojectsdesignedtobenefitUKcompaniesorUKforeigninterestswasastrikingdemonstrationofthisapproach.TradepolicytoohasbeenexplicitlyopenedupsothataswellasseekingtodevelopthetradeopportunitiesavailabletoBritishfirms,italsorecognisesthattradeisavitalrouteoutofpovertyforfarmers,entrepreneursandothersinthedevelopingworld.

Inthesecases,andothers,theGovernmenthasrecognisedthatincorporatingtheimpactsofUKpolicyonothercountriesintodecision-makingcanbeasmarterandmoreprogressivewayofpursuingtheUKslong-termgoalthanthepursuitofnarrowselfinterest.IfUKaidandtradehelptobuildricherandmorestablecountriesacrosstheworld,thiscanonlybenefittheUKinthelongrun,creatingpartnerswhorequirelessaidandarepotentialmarketsforBritishgoods,forexample.ItalsohasobviousbenefitsfortheUKsinternationalreputation.Itisclearlytimetoexaminewhetherthismorebalanced,longer-termperspectivecanbeappliedtoUKpolicyonmigration.

Second,itisclearthatmigrationisnotamarginalissueforothercountries,particularlythoseinthedevelopingworld.Asanumberofgroundbreakingreportshavemadeclearinrecentyears(e.g.WorldBank2005,UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme2009)migrationcanhaveverysignificanteffectsonacountrysdevelopment,bothpositiveandnegative.

Remittances(themoneythatmigrantssendbacktotheirfamiliesandtoothersinthecommunity)now:

exceedbysomemargintheamountofmoneythatdevelopedcountriesgivetodevelopingonesasaid

approximatelyequaltheamounttheyreceivethroughforeigndirectinvestment(FDI) havebeenmorestablethanbothaidandFDIthroughtheeconomicdownturn.

Remittancesplayamajorroleinboostinghouseholdincomes.InTonga,forexample,theincomesofpooresthouseholdsincreasebyamassive600percentwhenremittancesareincludedinthefamilybudget(WorldBank2006).Remittancesalsonowconstituteamajorpartofmanydevelopingcountriesnationaleconomies.Forexample,theamountofremittancesreceivedbyTajikistanisequivalentto45percentofitsGDP(UNDP2009).

Ontheotherhand,thereareseriousconcernsthatinsomecasesmigrationcandamageacountrysdevelopment,forexamplewhenitremovesanotherscarceresourcemuchneededforsustainableprogress:humancapital(Kapur2001).Aspoints-basedsystemsoftentrytoattractthebrightestand

mostskilledpeopletocometodevelopedcountries,theycanexacerbatebraindrain,deprivingpoorcountriesofthehighlyskilledpeopletheymostneed.Thisisoftenaccompaniedbyahitontheirfiscalresources,asinmanycasesdevelopingcountrygovernmentshavepaidtotrainhighlyskilledpeople,onlytoseethisinvestmentwastedwhentheymigrateandusetheirskills,spendtheirmoneyandpaytheirtaxesindevelopedcountries.

Aimsandstructureofthepaper

InthiscontextitisvitalthattheGovernmentparticularlythroughtheUKBorderAgencysInternationalStrategytakestockofhowthepoints-basedsystem(PBS)andotheraspectsoftheUKsmigrationregimemightbealteredtomaximisethedevelopmentpotentialofmigration.Thispaperexamineshowthismightbedone.Itfocusesinparticularonskilledmigration.Thisisnotbecausewethinkskilledmigrationismoreimportantthanunskilledmigrationfordevelopment(indeed,wenotethatunskilledmigrationpotentiallyoffersbiggerdevelopmentbenefits),butbecauseweperceiveagreaterappetiteintheUKforamendingpoliciesonhighlyskilledimmigrationinordertoshapemigrationsdevelopmentimpacts.IntheGovernmentsconsultationsofcitizenship,forexample,braindrainisprominentlymentioned(HomeOffice2010).


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Infact,thequestionoflow-skilledmigrationfromdevelopingcountriestotheUKiscurrentlyoffthetablewithpolicymakers.TheGovernmentscurrentviewisthattheUKsneedsforlow-skilledlabourcanbemetfromwithintheEU,sotierthreeofthePBS(whichwouldallowforlow-skilledmigrationfromoutsidetheEU)iscurrentlyclosed.Inlightofthis,wehavefocusedourdiscussionhereonskilledmigration(throughtiersone,two,fourandfiveofthePBS).

ToanswerhowtheUKsPBSandothermigrationpoliciescanmaximizethedevelopmentimpactofmigrationparticularlyskilledmigration totheUK,thepaperproceedsasfollows.Section2setsoutaframeworkforthinkingthroughtherelationshipbetween(skilled)migrationanddevelopment.Section3introducescurrentevidence.Section4thendrawstheevidencetogetherintoaframeworkthatcanbeusedtoassessanypotentialchangestopolicy.Section5setsoutthekindofpolicychangesthattheUKgovernmentmightwanttoconsider,andgivessomethoughtsabouthoweachmightwork.Section6presentsrecommendationsandconclusions.


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Thissectionexaminesthetheoryonmigrationsdevelopmentimpacts,exploringtheroutesthroughwhichmigrationcanhaveaneffectondevelopment,thekindsofimpactsitappearstohave,andthe

factorsthatshapethoseimpacts.

Howdoesmigrationhaveaneffectondevelopment?

Therearesixroutesviawhichmigrationcanshapedevelopment(ChappellandGlennie2009).Threearedirect comprisingtheactualflowsofpeoplemoving,andthreeareindirect thingsthatoccurasaresultofmigration.Webeginwiththedirectimpacts:

1.Emigrationfromdevelopingcountries:Whenpeopleleavetheircountryofbirthtomoveelsewherethiscanhaveimportanteffectsondevelopment.Asdiscussedabove,ifthepeopleareskilledthisisoftentermedbraindrain,andifitleadstoanoveralldecreaseinthenumbersofskilledpeopleinacountryorsectoritcancausethatcountryorsectorharm.Forexample,ifemigrationleadstofewerdoctorsinthecountryconcerned,thismaydamagehealthcare(Awases

etal2004).Inpoorcountries,moreover,poorerhealthservicesarenotamarginalissue.Theymeanchilddeathsbecomingevenmorecommonandunacceptablyhighrisksofmaternalmortality.Itisthesesortsofoutcomesthatthosewhowishtolimitbraindrainare,forgoodreason,lookingtoavoid.

However,understandingtheimpactsthatmigrationhasondevelopmentisnotassimpleasexaminingthedirectimpactsofmigrantsdepartures.Werethistheonlyroute,itwouldberelativelyeasytodesignpolicyprescriptionswhichcouldimprovemigrationsdevelopmentimpacts wewouldattempttoidentifythekindsofpeoplewhomakethemostimportantcontributionstothedevelopmentoftheirhomecountries,andthenexaminewhetheritispossibletoalterthePBStopreventthemfromcomingtotheUK.However,assetoutbelow,therearefiveotherroutesbywhichmigrationcanaffectdevelopmentoutcomes.Todesign

optimalpolicy,governmentmustconsiderthewholepicture,notsimplynumbersofdevelopment-promotingcitizensdepartingtheircountriesoforigin.

2.Immigrationtodevelopingcountries:Thesecondwayinwhichmigrationcanaffectdevelopmentisthroughimmigration.Althoughitissometimesassumedthatmostmigratorymovementsinvolvepeoplemovingawayfromtheworld'spoorestcountriesandtowardstherichest,infactpatternsofmovementaremorecomplexthanthis.Manymigrantsmovefromonedevelopingcountrytoanother,oftentoneighbouringcountries.InWestAfrica,forexample,manyNigeriansmovetoGhanaandmanyGhanaiansmovetoNigeria(Adepoju2005).Insomeplacesthismovementtoneighbouringcountriesispredominantlyforworkandinothersitismotivatedbywarorpersecution.

Developingcountriesalsoexperiencemigrationfromcountriesoutsidetheirregion,includingmigrantsmovingthereforbusiness,forfamilyreasonsandforworkinthedevelopmentprofessions.Insomecasesimmigrationmaysubstantiallycompensateforemigration,andsomedevelopingcountriesarenetimmigrationcountriesinthattheyreceivemoremigrantsthantheylose.ThesecountriesincludeCoteDIvoire,LibyaandGabon(SASIGroupandNewman2006).

3.Return:Recentresearch(e.g.seeLucasandChappell2009)hasemphasisedthatmigrationforsettlementisonlyonecomponentofinternationalmigratorymovements.Inaglobalisedworldwithbettercommunications,manymigrantsmovemorethanonce,andwiththeintentionofonlystayinginthedestinationcountryforshortperiods.Evidencesuggeststhatskilledmigrantstendtobemoremobilethantheunskilled(Finchetal2009).Insomecasesthisleadstosupermobility,particularlyamongeliteswhocanmovebetweenmanycountriesinsearchofthebest

opportunities.Inothers,itmeansreturnmigration,withpeople(particularlytheyoung)spendingaperiodabroadbeforereturninghome.Wherethishappens,skilledemigrationcanbecomebraincirculation,withthelossofskillstodevelopingcountriesonlybeingtemporary.

2.Skilledmigrationanddevelopment:understandingimpacts


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Moreover,returnmigrantsoftenbringassetsbackwiththem.Thesecanincludenewskills,ideas,andwaysofdoingthings(braingain),aswellashardfinancialassets.OnestudyofJamaica,forexample,showedthatthemajorityofreturnedmigrantssaidthattheexperienceoflivingabroadhadmadethemmorecommittedtotheneedforgenderequalityinJamaicaanattitudewhichmustbeconsideredanasset,howeverintangible.Italsoshowedthatthemajorityofreturningmigrantsreturnedwithsomefinancialassets.Asub-groupofthesemigrantsindicatedthattheyhadreturnedtostartanewbusinessortakeupnewemployment,whichtheseassetswouldpresumablyhelpthemtoachieve(Thomas-Hopeetal2009).

Similarly,whenadoctordepartsapoorcountryshemaytemporarilyreducethestockofhealthcareprofessionalsinthatcountry,butifshereturnsseveralyearslaterhavingstudiedandworkedinadifferentenvironmentshemaybringbackmoreskillsandnewideas.Asaresult,theoverallimpactofhermovementmaybepositiveratherthannegative.

4.Incentives: Movingnowfromdirecttoindirectwaysinwhichmigrationcanaffectdevelopment,weturntotheroleofincentives.Migrationhasthepowertotransformthelivesofpeoplefromdevelopingcountries.Ithasbeencalculatedthatmigrantscanseetheirincomeincreasefifteen

fold,seeeducationenrolmentincreaseby95percentandseetheriskofchildmortalityreducesixteenfold(UNDP2009).Theprospectofthislevelofpersonaladvancementisclearlygoingtobeveryattractiveandassuchhasthepotentialtochangebehaviour.Specifically,ithasbeensuggestedthatwould-bemigrantslookattheconditionsunderwhichpeoplemigrate,andchangetheirbehaviourinordertobemorelikethetypicalmigrantandhaveagreaterlikelihoodofsuccessfullymigrating.

Thiseffectisvitaltodebatesonbraindrainbecauseifskilledpeoplearemorelikelytobeabletomigratethanthelessskilled(which,underpoints-basedsystemstendstobethecase),orifthereturns(suchaspay)arelargerforskilledthanunskilledmigration,thismaygivepeopleanextraincentivetoinvestinskills.Theseincentiveeffectswouldnothelpdevelopmentifallthosewhoup-skilledemigrated,butthatisnotthecase.Inotherwordsitispossiblethatbraindraincan,

byinducingotherswithinthelabourmarkettocontinueineducationanddeveloptheirskills,turnintobraingain,havingapositiveratherthannegativeeffectonacountryspoolofskilledcitizens(Docquier2006).

5.Remittances:Aswellasbringingfinancebackwiththemwhentheyreturn,migrantsarealsoaveryvaluablesourceoffinancewhiletheyareintheircountryofdestination,bysendingremittances,assetoutinsection1.Remittancesareimportantbothatthemacrolevel providinglargeamountsofscarcefinancetodevelopingcountriesaswellasatthemicrolevel,whereevidencesuggeststheyplayaroleinreducinghouseholdandevencommunitypoverty.

6.Othertransfersanddiasporacontributions:Diasporasarenotjustasourceoffinancialsupporttotheircountriesoforiginthroughremittances,however.Whiletheyareabroadmigrantsareofteninclosecontactwiththeirfamiliesandothersintheircountryoforigin(Thomas-Hopeetal2009)andthereforehavethepotentialtoshapetheirattitudes,valuesandactions.

Forexample,astudyofJamaicashowedthatwhereahouseholdhadamembercurrentlylivingabroadtheyweremorelikelytospendmoneyonhealthcare,whatevertheirbudget.Inotherwords,theyplacedahigherpriorityonhealthcarethanhouseholdswithoutamemberlivingelsewhere.Moreover,theirpatternsofhealthcarespendingweredifferenttohouseholdswithoutmigrants.TheyspentlessontraditionalmedicinesandmoreonthekindsofhealthcareJamaicanmigrantswouldbeusedtointhecountriestheymoveto(primarilytheUK,USandCanada).Thissuggeststhattheattitudesandideasofthemigrantsmayhavefilteredbacktotheirhouseholdsandledthemtochangetheirattitudestowardshealthcare(LucasandChappell2009).

Thesekindsofinfluencescangofarbeyondimpactsonmigrantshouseholds.Forexample,

diasporacommunitiesfromdevelopingcountrieshavebeenshowntohaveimportantimpactsonpolitics,asinIraqandSriLankainrecentyears(Vertovec2006).


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Havingsetoutthesixmechanismsbywhichmigrationcanaffectdevelopmentitisimportanttodiscussthenatureoftheseimpacts.Theexamplessetoutaboveshowhowdiversemigrationsdevelopmentimpactsare,includingeffectsonnationalhealthcareprovision,genderequality,businessstartups,nationalskillstocks,nationalfinancialresources,householdpoverty,householdattitudestohealthcareandpoliticalgovernance.Aholisticviewofdevelopmentsuggeststhatimpactsinalltheseareasmatter.Indeed,anychangethatincreasestheopportunitiespeoplehavetoimprovetheirlives,whethereconomic,socialorpolitical,shouldbeclassedasenhancingdevelopment(ChappellandSriskandarajah2007).

Itisparticularlyimportantheretoemphasisethattheimpactsofskilledmigrationshouldnotjustbeviewedthroughthebraindrain/braingainlensofwhethermigrationleadstomoreorfewerskilledpeoplelivinginadevelopingcountry.Whilethiscanbeanimportantdevelopmentissue,andisasensiblefirstimpacttoexamine,migrationsdevelopmentimpactsgofarbeyondthelevelofacountrysstockofskills.

Inaddition,itshouldbenotedthatmigrationcanhavedevelopmenteffectsatfourdifferentlevels.Itcanaffectthemigrantthemselves,itcanaffecttheirhouseholdsandfamilies,itcanaffecttheir

communities,anditcanaffecttheircountries.Allfourlevelsofimpact,onallaspectsofdevelopment(economic,socialandpolitical),througheachofthesixchannelssetoutabove,shouldbeconsideredbypolicymakers.

Factorsthatshapemigrationsdevelopmentalimpacts

Theanalysispresentedaboveonlygetsuspartofthewaytounderstandingmigrationsdevelopmentimpacts.Thekindofmigrationtakingplaceandthecontextinwhichithappensarevitalinshapingitseffects.Forexample,thoughwecansaytheremightbearelationshipbetweenreturningmigrantsandtheskillsbaseofacountry,wecannotsaynecessarilywhetherthiswillbepositive,becausethemigrantshavegainedvaluableskillswhilelivingabroad,ornegative,asmigrantshavede-skilled,spendingtheirtimeabroadworkinginjobswhichdidn'trequiretheirexpertise(socalledbrainwasteaparticularproblemforirregularmigrants).Here,whatmigrantsdowhiletheyareawayisvital.

Itisimportant,then,toidentifythefactorsthatshapehowmigrationaffectsdevelopment.Drawingonpreviousresearch(seeChappellandGlennie2009,ChappellandSriskandarajah2007,Heath2009,Kapur2001,Lucas2001andMaimboandRatha2005)wewouldsuggestthefollowingfactorsareparticularlyinfluential:

Thetotalnumbersofpeoplemoving.Thismattersbecausetheeffectsofapersonmigratingwillvarydramaticallydependingonhowmanyothershavealsoleft.Weexaminebelowwhetherthereisalevelofmigrationabovewhichextramigrationappearsdamaging.

Theenvironmentinamigrantscountryoforigin.Thisincludestheeconomic,politicalandsocialclimateandthewaysinwhichtheseshapetheopportunitiesopentothemigrant.Generally,thoughnotalways,thebettertheenvironmentinamigrantscountryoforigin,themorelikelyitisthatmigrantswillwanttointeract(andconsiderreturning).

Theenvironmentinthecountryofdestination.Themorepositive,receptiveandopenanenvironmentmigrantsexperience,themorelikelyitistheywillbeenabledtopositivelyinteractwiththeirplaceoforigin.

Thelengthoftimemigrantsspendabroad.Someresearchsuggeststhatshorterperiodsoftimeawaymeanmoreinteractionwiththemigrantscountryoforigin,astiesremainstronger(moreremittancessentback,forexample;seeDustmannandMestres2009).

Themigrantsreasonsformoving.Wheremovementisvoluntaryitappearsthatthebenefitstothemigrantandtheirfamilyaregreater(LatorreandChappell2009).Thisisatleastinpartbecausethemigranthasbeenabletoplantheirmove,andanticipateanynegativeconsequencesinadvance(forexample,arrangealternativechildcarearrangementsiftheyareleavingtheirchildrenbehind),aswellasmakeplanstomaximisethepositiveaspectsofmigration(forexample,arrangealowcostwayofremittingmoney).Voluntarymigrantsarealsomorelikelytoengageconstructivelywiththeircountryoforiginwhileaway.


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Thelegalstatusofthemigrantintheircountryofdestination.Thebulkofresearchsuggeststhatirregularmigrantsgainlessfrommigrationthanthoseinthecountrylegally,astheycanearnlessmoney,aremoreatriskofbeingexploited,andarelessabletouseanddeveloptheirskills.Thisisbadfortheirowndevelopmentandmeansthebenefitstheycangeneratefortheircountryof

originalsotendtobesmaller(Sabates-Wheeleretal

2007).Irregularmigrantsarealsolesslikelytoreturn,giventhattheylackthedocumentationthatwouldenablethemtomoveacrossborderswitheaseandthatiftheyleavetheircountryofdestination(eithervoluntarilyorasaresultofdeportation)thebarrierstosubsequentmigrationareveryhigh(Finchetal2009).

Howestablishedamigrantcommunityisabroad.Thesizeandhistoryofamigrantcommunitycanbeimportantinshapingmigrantsactivitiesanddevelopmentalimpact.Ifacommunityiswellestablishedtheyappearmorelikelytoengageinthedevelopmentoftheircountryororigin.

Thesocio-economicanddemographiccharacteristicsofthemigrant includingtheirgender,ageandskills.Anumberofanalysessuggest,forexample,thatwomentendtoremitagreaterproportionoftheirincome(e.g.seeMartin2007).

Thesocio-economicanddemographiccharacteristicsofthemigrantshousehold includingtheirincomelevel,averagelevelofeducationandsize.Migrantswhocomefrompoorerhouseholds,forexample,mayremitmoreastheyfeelastrongerobligationtohelpthoseleftbehind(WorldBank2006).

Thesectorsmigrantsworkin.Somesectors,particularlyhightechnologysectors,havegreaterpotentialforknowledgeacquisitionandthereforetechnologytransfer.Theyalsotendtobefastmoving,sofirmsandcountriesinthedevelopingworldgainmorefromup-to-dateinformationtransmittedthroughmigrantnetworks.Inslowermovingsectorstheseadvantagesarenotasimportant.

Migrantstieswiththecountrytheyhaveleftbehind.Anemotionalattachmenttothemigrantshomecountry,orfamilyleftbehind,cansignificantlyaltertheimpactofmigration.Forexample,

manyCaribbeanmigrantshaveareturnideology,meaningtheyintendtoreturnoneday.Evidencesuggeststhesetiesdobringpeopleback(Thomas-Hopeetal2009,GibsonandMcKenzie2009).Butwhethermigrantsreturnornot,thisideologyalsomeanstheirtieswithfamily,friendsandinstitutionsintheircountryoforiginarelikelytobestronger,facilitatingstrongerinteractions(ConwayandPotter2007).Insomecasesmigrantsmayfeeltheyneedtoearntherighttoreturninthefuturebyassistinginthepresent.

Theseshapingfactorsareparticularlyimportantbecausetheysuggestarangeofwaysinwhichpolicymakerscaninfluencethedevelopmentimpactsofmigration.WewouldsuggestthattheUKpolicyframework,throughimmigrationpolicy(includingthePBS),integrationandanti-discriminationpolicies,labourmarketregulation,andcitizenshipandsettlementpolicies,canpotentiallyshape:

thecharacteristicsofthepeoplewhoarriveintheUKasmigrantsfromdevelopingcountries howmanyofthemcome

thecountriestheycomefrom

theenvironmenttheyenterhereandthekindsofexperiencestheyhave

thelengthoftimetheyspendhereandtheirfreedomtomovebackandforth(ornot)astheywish

thenatureandstrengthofthetiestheyhavewiththecommunitiestheyhaveleftbehind.

UKpolicycanthereforepotentiallyexertapowerfulinfluenceondevelopmentoutcomes.


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Havingsetoutbroadlyourunderstandingofhowmigrationaffectsdevelopment,wenowexaminewhatthelatestevidencetellsus.Welookatwhatweknowaboutmigrationscurrentimpactsthrough

eachofthesixroutes,stressingimpactsbothonskillsstocksandwiderdevelopmenteffects,andwehighlightwhichcontextualfactorsseemparticularlyimportantinshapingoutcomesineachcase.ThisshouldgivetheUKgovernmentasenseofwhatpoliciescouldbechangedinordertooptimiseimpacts.

Emigration

Welookfirstathowskilledmigrationdirectlyaffectsdevelopmentthroughthedepartureofmigrants.Table1showssomeofthecountrieswiththehighestratesofbraindrain,rankedbytheproportionoftheirskilled(tertiaryeducated)peoplewhoarelivingintheOECD(thisisthebestdatawehaveonbraindrainthereisnocomprehensiveevidenceavailableaboutskilledmigrationtononOECDcountries).

3.Evidence:theimpactofskilledmigrationondevelopment

Table1:ProportionofskilledpeoplefromdevelopingcountrieslivinginOECDcountries

Country Proportionofskilledpeople

Guyana 89%

Jamaica 85%

Haiti 84%

TrinidadandTobago 79%

CapeVerde 67%

Barbados 64%

Gambia 63%

Fiji 62%Bahamas 61%

Malta 58%

Mauritius 56%

SierraLeone 53%

Suriname 48%

Ghana 47%

Mozambique 45%

Liberia 45%

Lebanon 39%Kenya 38%

Laos 37%

Uganda 36%

Eritrea 34%

Cyprus 33%

Angola 33%

Somalia 33%

ElSalvador 31%

SriLanka 30%

Nicaragua 30%

Ireland 30%

Source:Docquier2006


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Whilethefiguresabovemaylookdramatic,itshouldalsobenotedthattheextenttowhichdevelopingcountriesareaffectedbybraindrainvarieswidely1.Manydevelopingcountriesarenotwitnessinglarge-scaleskilledemigration.Forexample,Docquierestimatesthat23percentofdevelopingcountrieshavelessthanfivepercentoftheirskilledpeopleabroad(Docquier2006),andTurkmenistanforexamplehaslessthanonepercentofitsskilledpeoplelivingabroad(WorldBank2005).

Wherebraindrainissevere,however,ittendstooccuralongsidemajorshortagesofskilledpersonnel,withstocksofscientists,engineersandhealthprofessionalsoftenidentifiedasworryinglylow(GibsonandMcKenzie2009).Forexample,in2002theGhanaHealthServicefoundthatitsphysicianworkforcewasexperiencinga47percentshortfallinnumbers,withanursingworkforcethatwasevenmoredepleted,missing57percentofthestaffitwouldneedjusttobefunctioningatanadequatelevel(BuchanandDovlo2004).

However,itisnotinevitablethatskilledemigrationreducesskillstockstodamaginglevels.Itisimportant,first,toexaminetheextenttowhichrawbraindrainmightbecompensatedforbyotherchannels(suchasimmigration),sothatoverallskillstocksdonotfall.Itisalsocrucialtoexamine

whethertheimpactoffallingskillstocksondevelopmentmightbecounteractedinanyotherwaybyother,positive,impacts(so,forexample,whilestocksofdoctorsmightfall,householdincomesmightrisebecauseofremittancessentback,makingpeoplelesslikelytobecomeillinthefirstplace).Evenmoreimmediate,though,isthequestionoftheeffectsthatemigrationhasondevelopment,byitself.Wewouldsuggestfourissuesdeserveparticularattention:

Impactsofmigrationontheindividual

Mostanalysesofbraindrainhavefocusedfirmlyontheimpactsonthetotalnumbersofskilledpeopleinaparticularcountryorsector.Thisfocusonthecountrylevel,however,canobscuresomeoftheotherimportantdevelopmentimpactsthatskilledmigrationcanhave.

Asemphasisedinsection2,developmentimpactsincludethoseatanindividuallevel,including

impactsonthemigrantthemselves.Anumberofstudies(e.g.Pritchett2006)haveshownthatmigrationisthemosteffectivestrategyavailabletoanindividualtoraisehisorherstandardofliving,beyondcommondevelopment-promotinginterventionssuchasestablishingabusiness,increasingtheirlevelofeducationorhavingaccesstoland.

Despitethis,however,theapproachesusedtocalculatetheimpactsofmigrationtypicallyleaveoutthiseffect.Analysesoftheeffectsofmigrationinthehostcountryusuallyonlyincludeeffectsonthosebornthere,andeffectsinthehomecountryusuallyonlyincludethoselivingthereatthatmomentintime,meaningbenefitsaccruingtomigrantsaremissedinbothcalculations.Butwhenmigrantsarepeoplebornindevelopingcountriestheyarepartofthegroupwhichthedevelopmentprojectseekstoassist,anddramaticimprovementsintheirlivesthroughtheopportunitiespresentedbymigrationshouldnotbediscounted.Theyshouldinsteadberecognisedasamajorbenefitof

skilledemigration.Barrierslimitingthecontributionsofskilledpeople

Thedamagingeffectsthatbraindrainproducesatthenationalorsectorallevelmightnotbenearlyasharmfulasiscommonlythought,eveniftheydoleadtoanetlossofskills.Oftenthethoughtexperimentconjureduptoconsiderbraindraininvolvesassumingthepersonconcernedwasdoingsomethinghugelysociallyuseful,forexampleworkingasamidwifeoranurse,andtheimpactofbraindraininvolvescalculatingthenumberofbirthstheycouldideallyhavesafelydeliveredeachyear,orthenumberofinjectionstheycouldhavegiven.Butperhapsourthoughtexperimentismisleading.Perhapsourmidwifeornursedoesnothavethemedicalequipmentordrugstoallowthemtoutilizetheirskillstothefullandsotheyarenotproductivelyemployedintheirhomecountry.Onlywhenwebegintounderstandwhatremovingthemfromtheirworkinvolvescanwebegintocalculatethe

impactofskilledemigrationonthecommunitymigrantshaveleft.

1.ThoughthefactthatitonlyaddressesemigrationtotheOECDisproblematic,wedonotthinkthis

invalidatesthisanalysis.Weexpandonthislaterinthissection.


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Anumberofpapershaveshownthatinmanypoorcountriestherearedomesticbarrierstoskillsbeingdeployedinthemostvaluableway,evenwhenskilledpeopleremainwithinthecountry(Clemens2009,BuchanandDovlo2004,Awasesetal2004).Theseincludethefactthat:

Skilledpeoplemaybeunemployedorinjobsthatdonotrequiretheirskills aparticularlysignificantproblemincountrieslikeEgyptwherethereischronicunder-employment.

Theskilledtendtoconcentrateinurbanareas,sothatthoseinruralareas whoincludemanyofthepoorest maystilllackaccesstotheirskills.

Inanumberofcountries,thosewithskillsthatcouldbeofuseinpublicservices(likedoctorsandnurses)appeartofindtheprivatesectormoreattractive,asforexampleinSouthAfricawherethemajorityofpubliclytraineddoctorsworkinprivatemedicine(Clemens2009).ManypubliclytraineddoctorsinGhanaarealsofoundintheprivatesector,wherewagesaremuchhigher(BuchanandDovlo2004).Thismattersfordevelopmentbecausethepoorestpeopleareunlikelytobeabletoaffordprivatesectormedicine.

Skilledpeopleseffectivenessmaybelimitedbyalackoftheothertoolstheyneedtodotheirjob

properly.Forexample,anursecanonlygivetensofvaccinationsadayifshehasthevaccineandsterilisedneedles.Evidencefrommanycountriessuggeststhatskilledpeopleoftenlacktheseotherinputsthatarerequiredforthemtobeeffective.

Theextenttowhichthesebarrierstogetherlimitthecontributionsofskilledworkerstodevelopingcountrylabourmarketsismuchdebated(seeClemens2009andDocquier2006forcontrastingperspectives)anditundoubtedlydiffersdependingonthecountryandworkersinquestion.However,itisimportanttorecognisetheunderlyingpointthataskilledworkeronlycontributesasmuchastheycantoaneconomyintherightenvironment.Skilledemigrationmaynotbethesole,orevenmajor,impedimenttoconvertingaskilledworkforceintosubstantivedevelopmentgains.

Allthissaid,however,skilledandeducatedpeoplearenotonlyofbenefittoacountrybecauseoftheirroleinthelabourmarket.Arangeofevidence(e.g.ConwayandPotter2007,Kapur2001)makesclearthatskilledpeoplemakeimportantcontributionstotheinstitutionaldevelopmentofacountry,topoliticsandtoculture.Evenifskilledpeoplearenotabletousetheirskillsintheircountryseconomy,theymaystillplayanimportantsocialroleandwhentheydepartthisinfluencedisappears.Thissocialeffectisdifficulttoisolate,butmostoftheevidencesuggestsitissignificantandisonereasonwhybraindrainshouldbeconsidereddamaging(ifitisnotcompensatedforthroughotherchannels,aswillbediscussedbelow).

Rootcausesofmigration

Itisimportanttorecognisethatmigrationmaynotbeagenuinecauseofpooroutcomesindevelopingcountries,indeeditmaybemoreaccuratelyinterpretedasasymbolofpoordevelopmentorevenadirectresultofit.Inthepreviousexample,ifthenursewholackstheequipmentsheneeds

tocarryoutvaccinationsleaves,itwouldnotbecorrecttosaythatmigrationwasthecauseofpoorvaccinationratessinceshecouldnothavecarriedoutthevaccinationsevenifshehadremained.Indeeditmaybethatthelackofequipmentiswhatcauseshertomigrate,asshefeelsfrustratedthatsheisunabletocarryoutherworkproperly.

Severalstudiesshowthatwantingtousetheirprofessionalskillsinasupportiveenvironmentisanimportantmotivationforskilledmigration(e.g.seeBuchanandDovlo2004,Chappelletal2009b).Alternativelyitcouldbethatathirdfactor,suchasarmedconflict,istheunderlyingcauseofboththelackofmedicalequipmentandofthenursesdecisiontomigrate.Simplyobservinghighratesofmigrationfromdevelopingcountriesdoesnotmeanthattheyareacauseofalackofdevelopment.Itmaybethatthelackofdevelopmentiscausingpeopletomigrate.

Clemensmakesthispointclearlyusinganexamplefromanotherfield.Hesuggeststhatnoonewould

sayhyperinflationiscausedbyshopkeepersdecidingtoraisepricesrapidlyeventhoughthisisstrictlycorrect.Inasituationofhyperinflation,shopkeeperschoicesmerelyreflecttheunderlyingcause theGovernmentsdecisiontounderminethevalueofmoneybyprintingfartoomuch.


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ThereforethestatementthattherearenotenoughdoctorsinGhanabecausetheyaremigrating,forexample,couldbesaidtolackmeaning.Weneedtolookbeyondmigrationitselfandsearchfortherealcausesofdeparture.Thisisdoublyimportantbecausethefactorsthatmakeskilledpeopledecidetoleaveacountryinlargenumbersarelikelytobethecausesofotherdevelopmentalproblemsaswell(Clemens2009).Focusingonbraindrainmaybeadistractionifourobjectiveistotacklethemajorunderlyingconstraintstodevelopment.

Datalimitations

Isitpossibleforpolicymakerstoidentifyandrespondtobraindrainaccuratelyandquickly,shouldtheydecideto?Doingsoreliesondatabeingavailablewhichshowswhereskilledemigrationistakingplace.Asmentionedpreviously,thebestdataonbraindrainisadatasetcompiledbyDocquierandMarfouk(seeDocquier2006),butasisoftenthecasewithmigrationthereareanumberofproblemswiththeavailabledata:

ItonlyreferstomovementstotheOECD,leavingoutskilledmigrationtoneighbouringcountriesandtotheArabianGulf(bothcommondestinationsforemigrantsfromdevelopingcountries),aswellasotherkindsofmovement.Thoughthiscertainlyleadstoanincompletepicture,we

suggestitisnotafatalproblem.MostskilledmigrantsprobablydoheadforOECDcountrieswherethedemandandrewardsfortheirskillsarelikelytobegreatest,evenifmigrantsasawholegotomorediverselocations.

ThedatasetusesthecensusesofOECDmembercountriestomeasurethenumberofskilledmigrantsineachlocation.Censuses,thoughagoodsourceofinformationinmanyways,areonlyconductedeverytenyearsandinvolvecollectingvastamountsofdatawhichmaynotbeprocessedquickly.Thismeansthatthedatawillonlybeupdatedten-yearlyandmayevenbeout-of-dateatthemomentofrelease.

Tocalculatetheextentofbraindrainwearenotjustrelyingondatatoaccuratelyshowhowmanyskilledmigrantsarelivingabroad,wealsoneedittotellushowmanyskilledpeopleremain

intheircountryoforigin,inordertoworkouthowbigaproportionofthebrainshavedrained.Insomecasestheseestimatesoftheskilllevelsofpeopleremainingathomearemissing(andhavetobeestimatedusingdataonsimilarcountries)whichwillaffecttheaccuracyofoverallbraindrainestimates2.

Thesedatasetscannotgiveusanyinsightintothequestionoffiscalimpactsofbraindrain,astheydonotcontainanyinformationonwherethemigrantsstudiedandwhetheritwasfundedbythegovernmentoftheircountryoforigin.

Thisdatacannotbeusedtoexaminesector-specificshortages,onlynational-levelshortages.Thisisproblematicbecausesomeresearchshows(Docquier2006)thatcertaincountriesexperienceskillshortagesinspecificsectors(suchasmedicine)evenifatanaggregateleveltheyhaveenoughskilledpeople.Wethinkthisproblemisunavoidableandpolicymakersmustrecognise

thatatpresentsectoralandoccupation-basedsolutionstobraindrainareimpractical.

Theseproblems,whilesignificant,donotleadustoconclude,however,thatcurrentdatacannotbeusedtodesignpolicymeasurestoaddressbraindrainwheredesired.Theavailabledataisstillofagoodenoughqualitytosignalwhenacountrymaybeexperiencingasevereandprolongedbraindrainatthenationallevel,andallowustodesignpoliciestoaddressthis,shouldtheysowish.

2.Someresearch(Docquier2006)testshowmuchusingdifferentdataonskillstocksaffectstheresults.Whenmeasuresofbraindrainarecalculatedusingadifferentmeasureofskilllevelsindeveloping

countriestheyhaveabouta90percentcorrelationwiththeestimatesgeneratedusingthestandardskill

measures.


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Wefinishthissectionwithasummaryofthekeypointsmadeaboutemigrationwhichmustbeborneinmindindevisinganypolicyresponses:

ImmigrationThereismuchlessinformationavailableaboutimmigrationtodevelopingcountries,partiallybecausedataonthesemovementsispoorerthandataonmigrationtothecountriesoftheOECD,asdiscussedpreviously.However,weareabletoputtogethersomeanalysisofwhatistakingplace.

Evidenceonimmigrationtodevelopingcountries

Asdiscussedissection2,developingcountriesdoexperienceimmigrationandsomehavemorepeoplearrivingthanpeopleleaving.Insomeofthecaseswherethelargestnumbersofpeoplehavearrived,however,thisisnotlargenumbersofskilledpeoplemovingintothecountryforworkwhoarethereforeinapositiontofillgapsthatresultfrombraindrain.

Forexample,muchoftheimmigrationtoCotedIvoire,historicallyoneofthedevelopingcountries

withthehighestlevelsofnetimmigration,hasinvolvedlow-skilledpeopleseekingoutworkinagriculture.LibyatoohasexperiencedhighlevelsofimmigrationbutmanyofthesepeoplearetransitmigrantswhointendtoleaveLibyaintheshorttomediumterm,usuallytogotoEurope.Inothercases(forexample,ThailandandKenya)manyofthemigrantsarerefugeeswhoareusuallynotinapositiontofindskilledworkeveniftheyhavethenecessaryskillset.

Ontheotherhandthereareprominentmigratorymovementstodevelopingcountrieswhichdoinvolveskilledpeopleinapositiontousetheirskills.OneexampleisthemuchdiscussedmovementofChinesenationalstoAfrica,manyofwhom(atleastaccordingtoanecdotalevidence)areskilledbusinesspeople.Therearealsomigrantsmovingbetweendevelopingcountrieswhoareexplicitlyrecruitedtofillgaps,forexampleCubanandNigeriannurseswhohavebeenrecruitedtofillskillsgapsinJamaica(Thomas-Hopeetal2009).Moreovertherearealsoprofessionalsinthedevelopment

industry,includingbothWesternnationalsandthosefromotherdevelopingcountrieswhoundertakearangeofskilledjobs.

Summary:Emigration

Countriesarenotallaffectedbybraindraintothesameextent.Somedevelopingcountriesexperienceverylittle(withlessthanfivepercentoftheirskilledpeoplelivinginOECDcountries)whereasothersexperiencedramaticratesofdeparture(withmorethan80percentoftheirskilledpeoplelivinginOECDcountries).

Skilledemigrationisnotthesolecauseofproblemsinsectorsorcountrieswithlownumbersofskilledpeople.Indeedinmanyplacesitappearsthatitisnotevenamajorcause.Domesticproblems(likelowemploymentlevelsorlackofotherresourcesrequiredbyskilledpeopletodotheirjobs)meanthatthecontributionsofskilledpeopleareoftenlimitedevenwhentheyremainathome.Insomecasesmigrationappearstobemoreofasymptomthanacauseofpoordevelopmentoutcomes.

Despitethis,incountrieswhereverylargenumbersofpeoplemigratetheremaystillbeacaseforexploringpotentialpolicyresponsestotrytoboostskillstocks.

Itispossibletoidentifythesecountries,thoughdataproblemsprecludeanypolicyapproachesbasedonaddressingsectoraloroccupationalskillsshortages.Poordataalsolimitstheapplicabilityofoptionsthatrelyonveryaccurateandregularlyupdatedinformation.

Anypotentialsolutionmustappreciatethedevelopmentalbenefitsgainedbythemigrantsthemselvesthroughleaving.

Anypotentialsolutionmustalsoaddressthereasonsthatpeopleleave.Thisisparticularlyimportantasthesemotivatorsarelikelytoalsobethesourceofotherdevelopmentproblems.


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Impactsofimmigration

Twoquestionsshouldbeaskedaboutthisimmigration.First,arethenumbersandtypesofmigrantsmovingabletoplayasignificantroleinmitigatingbraindrain?Somestudies(Kapur2001)suggestthatthereareapproximately100,000foreignexpertsworkinginAfrica,whichisaboutthesame

numberoftertiaryeducatedAfricansworkingintheOECD.Thissuggestsimmigrationmayplayasignificantroleinmitigatingbraindrain,atleastinsomeAfricannations.Second,wemustaskifimmigrationisanefficientwayofaddressingbraindrain.Thereareacoupleofpotentialreasonswhyitmightnotbe.

Whileimmigrantsmayformallyhavetherequiredskillsets,itcanbearguedthatbecausetheyareimmigrantswithoutthesamelevelsoflocalknowledgeasnationalstheywillbeunabletocontributeasmuchasaskillednationalwould,eitherthoughtheirworkorinbroadersocialterms.Werejectthisargument.Researchindevelopedcountriessuggeststhatimmigrantshavethepotentialtoplayasgreataroleasnationalsofthosecountries(Sriskandarajahetal2007)andinsomecasesprovidethingsthatlocalpeoplecannot,suchasnewperspectives(Nathan2008).Itseemslikelythatthesefindingscanbetransferredacrosstoimmigrantstodevelopingcountries.

However,asecondconcernaboutimmigrationtodevelopingnationsisthatitisanexpensiveandinefficientwayofobtainingaskilledpopulation.Thecostsofpayingforskilledexpertsindevelopment,forexample,iswellknown.Foreignstaffareoftenpaidondifferentpayscalestodomesticallyrecruitedpersonnelandinsomecasesthesecostsconsumealargepartofdevelopmentbudgets.Moreover,highwagesarenottheonlycostsassociatedwiththisgroup.Therearealsotransactioncostsassociatedwithgettinganimmigrant/foreignexpertinposition.Thesecouldbeabsorbedeasilyweretheyone-offcosts,butwhereimmigrantsmakeupasubstantialstockofthepeopleinasectorandturnoverishigh(asisoftenthecaseinthiscontext)thesecostsarelikelytobecomeconsiderable.

Return

Weturnnowtotheevidenceonreturn(whichincludestemporaryreturn,includingcirculationbetweencountries,aswellasmorepermanentreturn).Drawingonourtheoreticaldiscussioninsection2,itisimportantforustounderstandanumberofissues,includingthenumbersofpeoplewhoreturn,whethertheycomebackwithassets(financialornon-financial)andtheeffectsofthisondevelopment.Wealsoexploretheroleofcontextualfactors,whichappearveryimportantinshaping

thecontributionsthatreturnhas.

Immigration

Immigrationispartofmigrationflowstodevelopingcountriesandinsomecasesitisasignificantpartofthepicture.Itshouldnotbeignoredindiscussionsofskilledmigration.

Developingcountriescanbenefitfromimmigration.Itcanbringinskillsandmaybringpeoplewithnewattitudes,knowledgeandassets.Itisimportant,then,thatdevelopingcountriesimmigrationpoliciesstrikeabalancebetweencontrolandopenness.Inmanycasesthismeansashifttowardsgreateropenness.

CountriesliketheUKshouldrecognisetheinterrelationshipbetweentheirownmigrationpoliciesanddevelopingcountrypolicydecisions.DevelopingcountriesoftenrespondtodecreasedaccessfortheircitizenstocountriesliketheUKwithreciprocalmeasures.ThissuggeststhatanyalterationsmadetothePBSthatrestrictaccessfordevelopingcountry

nationalsmayalsoreduceimmigrationpossibilitiestothatcountry.ThiscouldbebadbothforBritishcitizenswishingtotravelthereaswellasthedevelopingcountrysabilitytoboostskillstocks.


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Numberofmigrantsreturning

Thereceivedwisdommaybecharacterisedas:highlyskilledmigrantsdonotonthewholereturntoadevelopingcountryoforigin,exceptperhapsifithasalreadydemonstratedastrongandsustainedperiodofeconomicgrowth(see,forexample,Docquier2006).However,recentresearchsomewhat

contradictsthistraditionalviewandsuggeststhatreturntomanycountriesisrelativelycommonandispossiblybecomingmoreso.

ipprandGDNfindthatreturnisrelativelyfrequentacrossarangeofcountries(thecountriesexaminedincludeGeorgia,Ghana,Jamaica,MacedoniaandVietnam),suchthatbetweenaround12percentand37percentofthosewhooriginallyemigratedappeartohavereturned(ipprandGDN2010).Thisequatestobetween0.6percent(Vietnam)and8.9percent(Jamaica)ofthepopulationsofeachcountrybeingreturnees.

Contextofreturn

Someresearchsuggeststhatratesofreturncanbeevenhigherinsomeplaces,withresearchintothebehaviouroftheveryhighlyskilledinthePacific(GibsonandMcKenzie2009)suggestingaroundathirdofthehighlyskilledgroupfromeachcountryarereturnedmigrants,wholivedabroadpreviouslybuthavenowreturnedtotheircountryoforigin.Itseemslikely,however,thatfindingsfromthePacificstudiescannotnecessarilybegeneralised.Thesenationsaredistinguishedbyseveralfactors,beingmostlymiddleandhigh-incomecountries,aswellasplaceswithaverystrongsenseofcultureandofextendedfamilialties,bothofwhichfeedintothecreationofreturnideologies,asdiscussedinsection2.

Indeed,familyandsocialtiesareapowerfulmotivatorofreturnwherevertheyarefound,asrepeatedstudieshaveshown(e.g.seeFinchetal2009,GibsonandMcKenzie2009,Pollardetal2008).Thispointisreinforcedbyworkthatshowsthatwhereimmediatefamilymembersareabletomigratealongsidethemaineconomicmigrant,tiestotheorigincountryareweakened(LucasandChappell2009)andreturnseemslesslikely(Faini2003).

Theimportanceofcontextinshapingreturnisdemonstratedbyfurtherresearch.Astudyfromthe1990s(Finn1997,quotedinLucas2001)lookedatwhetherornotforeignstudentsintheUSreturntotheircountriesoforigin(thegroupconcernedwerestudyingforaPhDinscienceorengineering).ItfoundthatwhileitwasverycommonforstudentsfromcountrieslikeJapanandSouthKoreatogoback(only13percentofJapanesePhDsand11percentofSouthKoreanPhDsrespectivelyremainedintheUSfiveyearsaftergraduating),thiswasveryuncommonamongthosefrompoorerand/orlesspoliticallyfreecountries:88percentofstudentsfromChinaremainedintheUSfiveyearslater,aswellas79percentofthosefromIndia3.

Insum,currentevidencepaintsamuchmorenuancedpictureofwhoreturnsandwhythanpreviousresearchhadsuggested,andalsopossiblyfindsreturntobemorecommonthanpreviouslysuspected.Indeed,itcouldbesuggestedthatthemajorityofmigrantsprobablyatleastconsiderreturn(either

permanentlyortemporarily),eveniftheydonotalwaysmakethemove.However,migrantsthathaveseveredfamilialtieswiththeircountryoforiginand/orcomefromcountriesthatarefaringverybadlyseemlesslikelytoconsiderreturn.Butthesemigrantsaside,itappearsthattheincreasedmigrationwearewitnessingwithglobalisationischaracterisednotjustbyincreasedmigrationforpermanentsettlementabroad,butalsobyincreasedlevelsofsupermobility,circulationandreturn.

Effectsofreturn

Tounderstandtheeffectsofreturnitisusefultoexaminewhatreturningmigrantstakebackwiththemandwhattheydooncetheyhavereturned.Assetoutinsection2,evidencefromJamaicasuggeststhatreturningmigrantsusuallybringbacknew,oftenprogressiveattitudes(becomingmoresupportiveofgenderequalityforexample)andfinance,throughsavingstheyhaveaccumulatedabroad(Thomas-Hopeetal2009).Variousstudiesalsosuggestthatsomereturnedmigrantshad

undertakenformalstudyabroadwhichtheymaynothaveundertakenhadtheyremainedathome

3.Recentchangesinthesecountriesmaymeanthattheyarenowvieweddifferentlybytheirmigrants,astheresearchwasconductedsomeyearsago.


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(Batistaetal2007),increasingtheirformalskilllevels,thoughtheextentofthiseffectappearsrelativelylimited(e.g.seeNikolovskietal2009).

Otherstudiessuggestthatmanyhighlyskilledmigrantsplayaroleintechnologydiffusionontheirreturn(e.g.Lucas2001),bringingbacktechnicalandotherknowledgethathelpsboostthe

competitivenessoffirmsintheircountriesoforigin.InIndia,forexample,returningmigrantsappeartohaveplayedamajorroleinestablishingIndiashighlysuccessfulITindustry(Kapur2001).

Togetherthisevidencesuggeststhatthereturnofthehighlyskilledmayhaveastrongandpositiveimpactondevelopmentoutcomes.First,returncanhaveimportantdirectimpactsonskillstocks.Incountrieswheresocialandfamilialbondsarestronganddevelopmentoutcomesarenotpoor,manymigrantsappeartoreturn(thoughstillaminority,itappears,ofeveryonewhooriginallyemigrated),meaningthatthebraindrainisnotapermanentloss.Moreover,somewillhaveformallyupgradedtheirskillswhileaway,sothatmigrationhasaddedtotheirskillsets,andtheirreturnbringsextraskillstotheircountriesoforigin.Itseemsunlikely,however,thatinthemajorityofcountriesthesetwoeffectstogetherwillcompensateforthedirectlossofskillsthroughemigration.Stocksofskilledpeoplewillstillprobablybelowerthanifemigrationhadnothappenedinthefirstplace.

However,thesecondeffectthatreturnmigrationhasondevelopmentisthatreturningmigrantsappeartobringbackwiththemahostofnewattitudes,knowledgeandfinancialassets,allofwhichcancontributetodevelopment,andwhichtheycouldnothavegainedwithoutemigrating.Theseeffectsarenotdependentontheimpactthatreturnmigrationhasonformalskillstocks(thenumbersofskilledpeoplewhoreturn).Rather,researchmakesclearthatoverallnumbersarelessimportanttothesesortsofeffectsthantheeffortofindividuals.Oneortwopeoplecantransformacommunityoranindustry.

ConwayandPotter,forexample,documentthecontributionsmadebyamigrantwhoreturnedfromDetroittoTrinidadandwasinstrumentalinenergisingtheSantaRosaCaribCommunitytosymbolicallyreclaimandpreserveCaribindigenoustraditions.ReturnmigrantswerealsoinstrumentalinenergisingacommunityinPuertoRicotothwartanenvironmentalthreattotheirhomesbycampaigningagainstMonsanto.Theyhavealsobeenpartoftheincreasingactivityinrecentyearsofnon-governmentalorganisationsinsomeCaribbeanislands,whohaveundertakensuccessfulconservationinitiatives,amongotherprojects(ConwayandPotter2007).Finchetal similarlydocumenttheincreasedengagementofreturnedmigrantswithvariousprogressiveissuesandcausesonreturningtotheircountriesoforiginfromtheUK.PakistanireturneeshighlightedhumanrightsinparticularandGhanianmigrantsenvironmentalissues(Finchetal2009).

Summary:Return

Recentevidencesuggestsskilledmigrantsdoquiteoftenreturntodevelopingcountries,bothtemporarilyandpermanently,contrarytopreviousreceivedwisdom.

Returnismorelikelyundercertainconditions:-Ifthecountryoforiginhasasatisfactorylevelofeconomicdevelopment(theleastdevelopedcountriesareprobablydoingtoopoorlyformanymigrants),andpoliticalfreedoms.-Ifthemigranthasimmediatefamilyinthecountryoforigin,orotherstrongfamilyorculturalties.

-Ifpolicyinthecountryoforigindoesnotdiscouragereturnormakeithardforthemigranttomaintaintiesintheirorigincountry.Unfavourablepoliciescoulddamagetheideologyofreturnwhichnotonlypromotesreturnitselfbutalsoenhancesothertiesbetweenmigrantsandthoseintheplacestheyhavecomefrom(likethesendingofremittances).

Inmostcountriesreturnislikelytopartiallycompensateforthedirectimpactsofemigrationonskillstocks,bybringingsomeskilledpeopleback,someofwhomwillhaveupgradedtheirskillswhileaway.However,returndoesnotlooklikelytocompletelyreversetheimpactoftheinitial

emigrationonskillsinmanyplaces. Manyreturneescomebackwithotherassets,likefinance,whichmakeimportantcontributions

todevelopmentinavarietyofways.Evenasinglereturneecanhaveamajorimpactonacountrysdevelopment.


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Incentives

Thequestionofincentivesisvitaltounderstandingtheneteffectofmigrationonskillstocks,asmostoftheresearchthathasbeendonesaysitisthis notimmigration,return,oranyoftheotherchannelsweareabouttoexamine thatismostlikelytomitigatetheeffectsofskilledemigration,at

leastintermsofitsdirectimpactsonskillsstocks.Itisimportantfirsttoreprisethewayinwhichthisrouteworks.Formanypeoplemigrationisbyfarthebestpersonalstrategyforpersonaladvancement(andtosupporttheirfamilythroughremittances).Asitiseasiertomigratewithahighlevelofskills(becauseofsystemslikethePBSwhichpreferskilledmigrantstounskilled)itseemslikelythatpeopleindevelopingcountriesmayinvestmoreinskillsthantheyotherwisewouldhavedoneinordertohaveagreaterchanceofbeingabletomigrate.Moreover,asnotallthesepeoplewillsubsequentlyleavethecountry,itwillretainsomeskilledpeoplewho,withouttheexistenceofhighlyskilledmigrationaroundthem,wouldnotbeasskilled.

Thekeyquestionisthestrengthofthiseffect.Istheincentiveeffectfairlymarginal,onlyleadingtoafewpeoplegainingskillswhodonotsubsequentlymigrate?Orisit(atleastinsomecountries)strong

enoughthatthecountryendsupwithmoreskilledpeoplethanitwouldhaveinascenariowherethereisnoemigration?

Evidenceonincentiveeffects

Thebestevidenceonincentiveeffectstendstosuggestthattheeffectsarestrongandpositive.In-depthandrigorousstudiesofFijiandCapeVerdeshowthatevenincountrieswithveryhighratesofskilledemigration(andbothareinthetop10braindraincountriesgloballyaslistedpreviously)theincentiveeffectoutweighstheeffectofdepartures,leavingthecountriesbetteroffthantheyotherwisewouldhavebeen.InFiji,despitethefactthatthecountrymayhavelost40percentofoneethnicgroup(Indo-Fijians)tomigrationsince1987,andthevastmajorityeitherasskilledmigrantsorastheirdependents,thetotalnumbersofskilledIndo-FijiansremaininginFijihasrisen.Thepaper

carefullymarshalsevidencetoshowthatitwasincentiveeffects,ratherthananyoftheotherroutes,thatwereatwork(ChandandClemens2008).

InCapeVerdetheresultsaresimilarlypositive.Thoughthecountryisexperiencinghighratesofskilledemigration,whichmightbeexpectedtoreduceskillsstocks,thisresearchfoundthatifemigrationweresomehowstoppedthenumbersofskilledpeopleinCapeVerdewouldfalldramatically.Thisisalmostentirelybecausetheincentivetogaineducationinordertomigratewoulddisappear.TheauthorsestimatethatifnooneinCapeVerdewasabletoemigrate,theeducationalachievementofthepeoplelivinginCapeVerdewouldbesignificantlylessthanitisnow,withnumbersofpeoplewithprimaryandsecondaryeducationfallingbyaboutathirdandthosewithtertiaryeducationdroppingbyabout40percent(Batistaetal2007).

Thiscountryspecificworkiscomplementedbystudiesthatlookatskilledemigrationandskillstocks

acrossvariouscountries.Asetofpapershavetrieddifferentapproachestoexaminehowskilledemigrationaffectsstocksofskills,eachexaminingwhatdetermineswhetherskilledemigrationhasapositiveornegativeimpactonskillsstocks,andtheysuggestthattheirfindingsaretheresultoftheincentiveeffect(Beineetal2007)(thoughitmaybe,asBatistaetalpointout,thatotherroutesofimpactarealsoinfluencingtheiranalysis(Batistaetal2007).

Cumulatively,thisworksuggestsacoupleofkeyfindings.First,uptoacertainlevel,skilledemigrationhaspositiveimpactsonskillstocks.Inotherwords,somecountriescanhavetoolittlebraindrain.Theywouldbenefitfromtheincentives(aswellasthereturnandtheremittances)thatskilledemigrationwouldinduce.Second,aboveacertainlevel,braindrainisdamaging,andincreasinglyso(meaningthatthedamageisnotlinearbutexponential).

Thekeyisfindingwherethisdividinglinebetweenbenefitandharmisdrawn,andwhetheritfallsindifferentplacesfordifferentcountries.Takingthelatterquestionfirst,thelatestevidence(Beineetal2007)suggeststhatincentiveeffectspredominantlybenefittheverypoorestcountrieslow-incomecountriesandperhapssomeofthelowermiddle-incomecountries.Bycontrasttheyfindthatskilledemigrationhaslittlebenefitthroughincentivesforrichercountries.


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Regardingwherethelinebetweenbenefitandharmisdrawn,thispaperandothers(Beineetal2006,Docquier2006)suggestthat,forthepoorestcountries,whereskilledemigrationisbelowfivepercentofthecountryspopulationthenationwouldbenefitfromhavingmore skilledpeopleabroad.Thebestproportionofpeopletohaveawayissomewherebetween10and20percent,andwhentheproportionawayisabove30percentthenharmmaybetakingplace,andincreasinglysoasskilledemigrationrisesabovethatlimit.

Twocaveatsmustbeaddedtothiswork,bothofwhichsuggestthatskilledemigrationmaybeevenmorepositivefordevelopmentthanthisworksuggests.First,thecountryspecificstudiesdiscussedfirstinthissectionwereofthenon-low-incomecountriesFijiandCapeVerde,withtheformeratleastinvolvinglevelsofskilledemigrationsubstantiallyhigherthan30percent(levelsofskilledemigrationinCapeVerdearesubjecttosomedispute,thoughallareagreedtheyaresignificant).Accordingtothecross-countrystudiesthesecountriesshouldbeexperiencingsignificantnegativeimpactsonskillstocksasmigrationwouldnotprovideastrongenoughincentivetoinvestinskillstobalanceoutbraindrain,butthatisnotwhatthepapersfind.Thissuggeststhatinsomecountriesatleast,emigrationmayinduceincreasedinvestmentinskillseveninmiddle-incomeandhighemigrationcountries.

Second,thefindingthatincentiveeffectsarestrongestinthepoorestcountriesbutweakerinricheronessuggestsafairlyneatcomplementaritywitheffectsthatoperatethroughtheotherroutes.Whilemiddle-incomecountriesmaynotgainasmuchinskillsthroughincentiveeffects,itseemslikelytheywillgainmorethroughreturn,andaswillbediscussedlater,possiblythroughtransfersfromthediaspora.Theyarealsolikelytomakebetteruseoftheirskilledpeopleinthefirstplace,asbarrierstotheireffectiveness,suchasalackofotherinputs,arelikelytobelower.

Remittances

Remittancesareapowerfulcontributortodevelopment,havingthepotentialbothtoboostskillstocks(byincreasinghouseholdbudgetsforeducation)andtoaffectmanyotheraspectsoflifeindevelopingcountries.

Remittancesascontributorstodevelopment

Lookingfirstatthecontributionofremittancestoeducationoutcomes,andthereforeskillsstocks,itseemsthatonthewhole,increasedremittancesleadtoincreasedspendingoneducation,whichinsomecaseswilltranslateintoimprovedattendanceofschoolandhighereducationalattainment(e.g.

Summary Incentives

Incentiveeffectsmeanthatsomeskilledemigrationcanactuallybebetterforacountrythannoneatall.

Thebestevidencesuggeststhatlow-incomecountriesinparticularwillbenefitfromskilledemigrationthroughincentiveeffects.Thesecountriesshouldcertainlyhavemorethanfivepercentoftheirpopulationlivingabroadtoensurethattheirskilllevelsathomeareoptimised,andideallytheywouldhavebetween10and20percentoftheirskilledpopulationlivingelsewhere.

Thebenefitsotherdevelopingcountriescanderivefromskilledemigrationarelessclear.Itseemsthatincentiveeffectsareweakerthewealthieradevelopingcountryis(thoughwithsomeexceptions,suchasFijiwhichappearstobebenefitingeventhoughithashigherincomelevels).However,giventhatmanyoftheotherpositiveimpactsthatmigrationcanhavetendtobestrongerinbetter-offcountries,thefactthatincentiveeffectsareweakerhereisoflessconcern.

Ourmajorconcernintermsoftheimpactsthatskilledmigrationmaybehavingondevelopmentshouldfocusinparticularonlow-incomedevelopingcountriesthathavemorethan30percentoftheirskilledpeopleabroad.ThisgroupcomprisesHaiti,Gambia,SierraLeone,Ghana,Mozambique,Liberia,Kenya,Laos,Uganda,EritreaandSomalia.


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seeLucasandChappell2009,CoxandUreta2003).Thisappearsinmostcasestobetheresultofhouseholdbudgetsexpanding,permittinggreaterinvestmentinschooling.Somepapers(e.g.FajnzylberandLpez2007)demonstratenuanceswithinthisresult,showingforexamplethattheeffectdiffersdependingontheeducationalachievementoftheparentsandtheincomeofthehouseholds,buteveninthesemorenuancedanalyseswegenerallystillfindapositiverelationshipbetweenremittancesandinvestmentinschooling.

Thereislittleevidence,however,whenconsideringalltheroutesthroughwhichskilledmigrationcanaffectskillstocks,thatsuggeststhattheeffectthatremittanceshaveoneducationishugelyimportant.Whensetagainstincentiveimpacts,forexample,theeffectofremittancesappearsvaluablebutisperhapsmoremarginalthansomeoftheotherroutes.

Beyondeffectsonskillstocks,however,remittancescanbepowerfulcontributorstodevelopment.Evidencesuggests,forexample,thattheyreducepovertyandreducetheriskshouseholdsfaceastheytendtocontinueorevenincreaseintimesofcrisis,forexamplehavingtendedtoholdsteadyinmostcountrieseventhroughtheglobaldownturn(Rathaetal2009).Theyalsohaveimportantmacroeconomicbenefits,suchasboostingstocksofforeignexchange.

Remittancesarenotadevelopmentpanacea.Evidencesuggeststhatalongsidethesepositiveattributestheycanalsohavesomenegativeimpactsinsomecountries,forexamplesometimesaffectingexchangerates,makingdevelopingcountryexportslesscompetitive.However,theseeffectsarenotfoundeverywhereandaregenerallynotconsideredtooutweighremittancessignificantbenefits.

Remittancesfromskilledandunskilledmigrants

Akeyquestioninvolveswhetherskilledmigrantsremitasmuchandasfrequentlyasunskilledmigrants.Thereceivedwisdominthisareaisthattheydonot.Ithasalsobeensuggestedthatbecauseskilledmigrantstendtobebetteroffthanunskilledmigrants(havingbeenabletoaffordtoinvestineducationandbecomeskilled)theirremittanceswillbesentpredominantlytothericherin

society,doinglittletotacklepovertyandincreasinginequality.Bothoftheseassumptionsshouldbeexplored.

Tacklingfirstthequestionofwhethertheskilledremitasmuchastheunskilled,almosteveryacademicstudythatexploresthisissuesuggeststhatbiggercontributionsaremadebytheunskilled(e.g.seeAgunias2006,FajnzylberandLpez2007,Kapur2001).Indeed,onepaper(Ghosh2006)citesastudythatfoundthatinLatinAmerica,eachadditionalyearofeducationthatamigranthasreducesthelikelihoodthattheyremitby7percent.Theusualexplanationgivenforthisisthatskilledmigrantsaremorelikelytomigratewiththeirfamilies,andtheyaremorelikelytoremaininthecountryofdestination,beinggrantedcitizenshipandsoon,bothofwhichmayweakentheirlinkswiththeircountryoforigin.Totheextentthatthisistrueitwouldcertainlyatleastpartiallyexplainwhytheskilledmaycontributeless.

However,arecentstudyhascontinuedtofindthattheunskilledremitmore,evencontrollingforfamilylocationanddurationofstay.Itsuggeststhattheresultmaybeadditionallyaffectedbythefactthatskilledmigrantscomefrombetter-offfamilies,andthatthemigrantthereforefeelslessimperativetosendmoneyback(DustmannandMestres2009).

Setagainstthisevidenceisthefactthatmanycountriesareactivelyaimingtoensurethatalargerproportionoftheirmigrantsareskilled,onthegroundsthatthiswillresultinlargerremittances.ThesecountriesincludeBangladesh(InternationalOrganisationforMigration2005),thePhilippines(OrozcoandFerro2008a)andPakistan(OrozcoandFerro2008b).Inothercases,analysesofwhyremittancestoparticularcountrieshaverisenattributetheresulttoanincreasingproportionoftheirmigrantsbeingskilled(e.g.Chisti2007).Therearetwopotentialexplanationsforthisapparentcontradictionwiththeacademicfindingsabove.

First,itisimportanttoclarifywhatmakingagreatercontributionmeans.Someoftheacademicanalysesexamineeitherifskilledorunskilledmigrantsaremorelikelytoremitorhowgreataproportionoftheirincomeeachgroupsends.Itispossiblehoweverthateveniffewerskilledmigrants


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remitandthosethatdososendbackasmallerproportionoftheirincome,theycouldstillearnsomuchmorethantheunskilledthatonaverageeachskilledmigrantstillsendsmoremoneyback.Itislikelythatthisexplainssomeoftheapparentcontradiction.Otherrigorousanalysesdirectlycomparetheaverageamountsentbyeachkindofmigrant,however,andstillfindtheunskilledsendmore.Thisisimportant,andwebelieveprobablysuggeststhat,onthewhole,unskilledmigrantsdoremitmore.However,whilethismightbetheoveralltrend,itseemslikelythatoutcomesvarybycountryandcontext.

Turningtothesecondissueofwhetherornotskilledmigrantsremittancesarepredominantlysenttoricherhouseholds,therebyexacerbatinginequality,theevidencewehaveexaminedisverymixed.Oneimportantfindingtodiscusshereistheemergingevidencethatmigrantsdonotonlysendremittancestotheirhouseholds,butspreadthemmuchmorewidelythroughoutthecommunity.InJamaica,forexample,almostathirdofhouseholdsreceiveremittancesfrommigrantsthatbelongtootherhouseholds,andabouthalfoftheseremittancesaresentbetweenpeoplewhoarenotrelated(LucasandChappell2009),potentiallyspreadingthebenefitsofremittancesmuchmorewidelyacrosstheincomespectrum.Evidencefromotherstudiescorroboratesthistrend(e.g.seeWorldBank2009).

Othertransfersanddiasporacontributions

Thefinalwayinwhichmigrationcanaffectdevelopmentisthroughtheotheractionsofthediaspora,beyondsendingremittances.Thisinvolvesothertransferssuchasofknowledgeandskills,andotherinteractionsandcontributionswhichoccurforexamplethroughbuildingtradelinks,participatinginpoliticsandactingasinformalambassadorsfortheircountry.

Transfersofknowledgeandskills

Someofthiscontributioncomesthroughthetransmissionofideas,asdescribedinsection2,whereJamaicanmigrantsmayhavetransferredtheirattitudesabouthealthcaretotheirfamilies(Lucasand

Chappell2009).Thediasporacanalsotransfertheirskills,bybeingmentorsandsharingtheirprofessionalexpertise,perhapsthroughshort-termvolunteeringordevelopmentprojects.ThishastakenplacerecentlyinSierraLeone,whereonediasporaorganisationalonehashelpedmorethan800businesses,providingthenwithtwoweekvolunteeringvisitsfrommembersoftheSierraLeoneancommunityintheUK(Ekongetal2009).

Similarly,theIraqidiasporahavehelpedwithbuildinglocalgovernancecapacityandeconomicdevelopmentinIraq(BrinkerhoffandTaddesse2006).Skilledandprofessionalpeopleappeartohavethegreatestimpactsinthissortofskilltransfer,thoughtheireffectsvarydependingonthelocalcontext.Forthebestoutcomesitisimportantforthemtobeenteringasupportivelocalenvironmentratherthanonethatismistrustfulofdiasporaintervention(Ekongetal2009,Kuznetsov2006).

Creatingeconomicopportunities

Inaddition,thediasporaplayavitalroleincreatingeconomicopportunitiesfortheirpopulationsathome.Thereissomefairlysolidandconsistentevidencethatsuggeststhatmigrationenhancestradelinks,FDIandtransfersoftechnology(Kuznetsov2006).Migrants,especiallytheskilled,have

Summary Remittances

Thoughtheyarenotwithoutnegativeimpacts,remittancesmakemajorcontributionstodevelopmentinmanycountries.

Skilledmigrantsappear,ingeneral,tosendlessremittancesthanunskilledmigrants.Thisimpliesthatmaximisingthedevelopmentoutcomesofmigrationmightinvolveincreasingunskilled,ratherthanskilledmigration.

Skilledmigrantsdoremit,however.Theyseemlikelytoremitmorewhentheyhavestrongfamilytiesintheircountryoforiginandwhentheyarestayawayforshorterdurations.Aspolicycanshapethesefactorsithasastrongroletoplayinpotentiallyincreasingremittances.


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knowledgeoftechnologies,productsandopportunitiesinbothplaceswhichmeansthattheycanspotwheresomethingmightbesourcedfromonecountryandappliedinanother,orwherethereisanopportunitytobeseized.Aswellasbenefitingthemigrant,thiscanhavemajorspilloverbenefitsforotherslivingintheircountriesoforiginanddestination.

TheextenttowhichmigrationaffectsFDIseemstobeshapedbytheeconomicandpoliticalclimateincountriesoforigin,whichneeds,amongotherthings,toprotectpropertyrightsandprovidesomeeconomicopportunity(Docquier2006,Hyop-LeeandSaxenian2009,Kapur2001).Italsoappearstobeinfluencedbythesizeanddevelopmentofthediaspora,withlargerandmorewellestablishedcommunitiesmakinggreaterinvestments(Docquier2006).

Thecharacteristicsofthemigrantsthemselvesmattertoo,withthediasporamorelikelytoinvestiftheyareentrepreneurs(ratherthanprofessionalsoremployees)and,perhapsunsurprisingly,iftheyarewealthy(Kapur2001).Wherealltheseconditionsarefavourable,theextentofinvestmentfromthediasporacanbeverysignificantindeed,asinChinawhichin1995hadmorethantwo-thirdsofitsaccumulatedFDIcomingfromHongKong,MacauandTaiwan(Lucas2001).

Diasporasroleincreatingtradeisalsofoundquiteconsistentlyacrossstudiesandwhereconditionsarerightitappearstocontributesignificantlytodevelopment.ExaminingglobalbilateraltradingpatternsRauchandTrindadefoundthattheproportionofacountryspopulationthatisethnicChinesesubstantiallyincreasesbilateraltrade,insomecases(suchasbetweensoutheastAsiannationswheretherearelargenumbersofethnicChinese)bymorethan60percent(RauchandTrindade2002).Keytothisarethefamilialandculturalnetworksbetweenpeoplewithacommonnationalbackground.

Skilledmigrantsappearmoreimportantthanmigrantsperseintradeexpansion.HeadandReislookingatCanadafoundthatoveralla10percentincreaseintheaccumulatedstockofpermanentimmigrantsfromatypicalcountrywasassociatedwithaonepercentincreaseinCanadianexportstothatcountryandathreepercentincreaseinimports.Theeffectwasmuchlarger,however,forindependentskill-basedmigrantsthanfamily-based,refugeeorbusinessimmigrants(HeadandRies1998).

Theroleofmigrantsintechnologytransferisalsobelievedtobeverysignificant(Kapur2001,Kuznetsov2006,Lucas2001),andmayhappeninanumberofdifferentforms,includingthroughnetworksofprofessionalsinteractingandsharingknowledge,asKoreaandSouthAfrica,forexample,aretryingtopromote.Itmayalsoresultfromthemovementofpeoplebetweenmarkets,andtheestablishmentofbusinessesbymigrantswhohaveworkedatthecuttingedgeofatechnologyandestablishabusinessthatworksinthatsectorbackintheirhomecountry,asITentrepreneurshavedoneinIndiaaftermovingbackfromtheUS(ChappellandGlennie2009).Thegreatestadvantagesfromtechnologytransfercomewhenthemigrantsareworkinginfastmoving,knowledgeintensivesectorswheretherearepremiumstoup-to-dateandin-depthknowledge.

Summary Otherdiasporatransfersandcontributions

Diasporascontributeinmanifoldwaystodevelopmentbesidesthroughremittancesandreturn.

Thesecontributionscaninsomecasesbeverysignificant,asappearstobethecasewithtradeandFDIundercertaincircumstances.

Thebenefitsappeartoaccrueparticularlyasaresultoflarge,skilledandwellestablisheddiasporaswhohavestronglinkswiththeirplaceoforigin.Theyarealsoenhancedwhenmigrantscomefromrelativelyeconomicallysuccessfuldevelopingcountries,andwhentheyareentrepreneursorworkintechnologicallyadvancedsectors.Assuchtheyaddtothereasonswhywemaybelessworriedaboutskilledmigrationfrommiddle-incomecountries,particularlylargernationssuchasIndiaandChinawhohavesubstantial,long-standingdiasporas.


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SummaryofSection3

Fromthediscussionsinthissectionitshouldbeclearthatsimplyexperiencingthedepartureofskilledpeopledoesnotmeanthatacountryisbeingdevelopmentallyharmed.Itisunderaparticularsetofcircumstancesthatskilledemigrationappearstodamagedevelopment.Akeydividinglineappearsto

bewhetheracountryisclassedaslow-incomeornot.Thosewithhigherlevelsofincomemaybenefitlessfromincentiveeffectsbutcorrespondinglyappeartogainmorefromreturn,fromthediasporasnon-remittancetransfersandcontributions,andalsopotentiallyfromimmigration.Withinthenon-low-incomegroupourgreatestconcernmaybeaboutsmallcountries(whichDocquierclasseswiththosewithfourmillionpeopleorless[Docquier2006]),wherethediasporaspotential(tocreatetradelinksandsoon)appeartobeless.ThisincludescountriessuchasFiji,CapeVerdeandTrinidadandTobago.

Turningtolow-incomecountries,thisgroupappeartobenefitlessfromskilledmigrantsreturn,frommigrantsnon-remittancetransfersandcontributionsandpotentiallyalsofromskilledimmigration.Wherelevelsofemigrationarenottoohigh,thesecountriesshouldbenefitfromstrongincentiveeffectswhichmotivatepeopletoincreasetheirlevelsofeducation,andalsofromremittances.But

wherebraindrainisverysubstantial(sayabove30percent)itseemsunlikelythattheseeffectsareenoughtomakeskilledemigrationapositivedevelopmentalphenomenon.Low-incomecountrieswithhighlevelsofskilledemigration(andwecanidentifyeleven:Haiti,Gambia,SierraLeone,Ghana,Mozambique,Liberia,Kenya,Laos,Uganda,EritreaandSomalia)maypotentiallybedamagedbyit.

However,itisofcoursepossiblethatinsomeofthesecountriesskilledpeopleareunabletocontributeasmuchaswemightlikethemtobecauseofotherconstraintstotheireffectiveness(likenurseslackingneedles),anditalsoseemslikelythat,fortheindividualmigrantsconcerned,leavingtheircountryimprovestheirprospectsenormously.Itisstillhardtosay,therefore,thatwecanconcretelyidentifyskilledmigrationasharmingthedevelopmentofthepeoplefromthesecountries.Wethink,however,thattheydeservecloseattentionascountrieswherebraindrainmaybeofconcern.

Inadditiontoidentifyingcountriesthatwethinkmostlikelytobeexperiencingdamagefrombraindrain,wehavealsobeenabletoestablishthatthedevelopmentimpactsofmigrationarenotsimplyaboutpreventingharm.Manyofthewaysinwhichmigrationcanaffectdevelopmentarepositive.Remittances,forexample,onthewholeimprovedevelopmentoutcomes,asdoreturn,immigration,andmigrantsnon-remittancetransfersandcontributions.Thismeansthatwhilesomepolicyoptionsmaybeaboutreducingtheharmcausedbybraindrainandthereforemayonlyapplytocountriessufferingdamagingbraindrain,otherinterventionscouldapplytoalldevelopingcountries.Boostingremittancessentbyskilledmigrants,forexample,wouldhelpthepoorinStLuciaasmuchasinLiberiaanditwouldmakesensefortheBritishgovernmenttosupportboth.


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Aframeworkforassessingpolicyoptions

Bringingtogethertheanalysisandevidencediscussedhere,wecanestablishafewkeycriteriafor

assessingtheoptionsforanyamendmentstotheUKsPBS,oranyotherrelevantpolicies.Wesuggestthatforanypotentialpolicychange,questionsaboutfouraspectsofmigrationanditsimpactsareasked:

1.Migrationflows Whatimpactswouldthepolicyhaveondevelopingcountrymigrationflowsemigration,immigration,andreturn(includingtemporaryreturn)?

2.ExperiencesintheUKWhatimpactswouldthepolicyhaveondevelopingcountrymigrantsexperiencesintheUK(forexampleintermsofemployment,skillsdevelopmentandintegration)?

3.Transfers WhatimpactswouldthepolicyhaveontheamountofmoneyremittedbymigrantstodevelopingcountriesfromtheUK?Whatimpactswouldithaveontheothertransfers(forexampletransfersofskills,networksandinnovation)frommigrantsintheUKtodeveloping

countries?

4. IncentivesWhatimpactswouldthepolicyhaveonincentivesindevelopingcountries?

Thisframeworkallowsustothinkthroughhowapolicychangemightalteranyofthefourkeyaspectsofthemigrationanddevelopmentpictureflows,migrantsexperiences,transfersandincentivesandoneachaspectaskifthechangethattakesplaceislikelytohaveapositiveornegativeimpactondevelopmentoutcomes.

Wesuggestthatthemostpositiveeffectswouldoccurunderthefollowingcircumstances:

MigrationflowsbetweendevelopingcountriesandtheUK

Legalmigrationofhighlyskilledworkersfromdevelopingcountries,butnotfromcountriesthat

aresufferingduetodamagingbraindrain(especiallylow-incomeorsmallmiddleincomecountrieswithmorethan30percentofskilledpeoplelivingabroad).

Legalmigrationofunskilledworkersfromdevelopingcountries,particularlyfromthepoorestcountriesandcommunities.

Migrantsfromdevelopingcountriesgobackforvisitsandshortstays,maintainingtheirlinks.

Significantratesofpermanentreturnbymigrantsfromdevelopingcountries,andbyskilledmigrantsinparticular.

ExperiencesintheUK

Skilledworkersfromdevelopingcountrieshavetheirqualificationsandskillsrecognised,andcanaccessappropriateskilledemployment.

Unskilledworkerscanaccesshigh-qualityjobsthatmeetUKemploymentregulations.

Allworkersfromdevelopingcountriesaresupportedtomaintainanddeveloptheirskills(includinglanguageskills).

Migrantsaresupportedandenabledtomaintainlinkswiththeircountryoforigin.

Transfers

Migrantscanaccessreliableandlow-costremittanceservicestosafelysendfundstotheirfamiliesandcommunities.

Migrantsandmigrantgroupsaresupportedtotransferskills,contactsandexperiencewithcolleaguesandcommunitiesleftbehind.

UKfirmsandemployersthatbenefitfromaccesstoskilledworkersfromdevelopingcountries,especiallythosesufferingasaresultofbraindrain,alsomaketransfers,contributingtothecostsofeducationandtraininginsendingcountries.

4.Linkingtheevidencetopolicy


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Incentives

Accesstomigrationroutesprovidesincentivesforindividualsandcommunitiestoinvestineducationandtraining.

Currentandpotentialpolicyobjectives

IftheUKGovernmentsonlypolicyobjectivewereinternationaldevelopment(andtheGovernmentcouldcontrolandshapemigrationflowsthroughpolicy)wewouldbeabletodesignasetofmigrationpoliciestoachievethisvisionofpro-developmentmigrationtotheUKfromdevelopingcountries.Thisisnot,however,thecase.TheGovernmenthasarangeofotherverylegitimate policyobjectivesthatarerelatedtomigrationanddevelopment,someofwhichmightcomplementattemptstoenhancemigrationsdevelopmentimpactsandotherswhichraisethequestionoftrade-offs.

Morespecifically,thecurrentsetofpublicserviceagreements(PSAs targetssetbytheComprehensiveSpendingReviewbytheTreasuryandPrimeMinister,whichdepartmentsareheldaccountableforachieving)containthreerelatedobjectives:

1.ReducepovertyinpoorercountriesthroughquickerprogresstowardstheMillennium

DevelopmentGoals

2.Ensurecontrolled,fairmigrationthatprotectsthepublicandcontributestoeconomicgrowth

3.Buildmorecohesive,empoweredandactivecommunities.

ThemigrationPSADeliveryAgreement(thesecondobjective)recognisesthelinksbetweenmigrationanddevelopment.Thereisastrongfocusondevelopment(orlackofit)asadriverofmigration,butthescopeformigrationtosupportdevelopmentisalsoacknowledged:

DFIDalsoworkswiththeHomeOfficetoensurethatUKandEUpoliciesarecoherent,take

accountoftheimpactonpovertyreductionanddevelopmentinpartnercountries,andwhere

possiblesupportdevelopmentobjectives.

TheinternationalpovertyreductionPSADeliveryAgreement(thefirstobjective)alsomentionsmigrationbutonlyonce(withrespecttotheEU),whereasitmakesmorethan30referencestotrade.

Althoughatastrategicleveltherearesomeattemptstomakemigrationanddevelopmentpoliciescoherent,therealsoappeartobesometensionsbetweentheGovernmentsobjectivesonmigrationanddevelopment.Thekindofmigrationpatternsthatwouldbepro-development,setoutabove,donotentirelyfitwiththeGovernmentscurrentinterpretationofthekindofimmigrationflowsthatareneededtocontributetoeconomicgrowthandcohesivecommunities.Threemaintensionsareworthnoting.

TheGovernmentscurrentpositionisthattheUKeconomyhasnoneedforlow-skilledmigrationfromoutsidetheEU,althoughlow-skilledmigrationfromdevelopingcountrieswouldbegoodfordevelopment.

ThePBSspecificallytargetshighlyskilledworkersasmostvaluabletotheUKeconomyandprovidesroutesforpermanentsettlement.Insomeplacesthiscouldcontributetoproblematicbraindrain,

Documents

Development_Do Points Mean Prizes