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Development Studies Working Papers
No. 2
Appraisal of Informal Political Associations and Institutions:
Implications for Democratic Decentralisation in Punjab
Asad ur Rehman
Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad
PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
ISLAMABAD
2016
Editorial Committee
Dr Zulfiqar Ali Head
Dr Huma Haq Member
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or
transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise—without prior permission of the Publications Division, Pakistan Institute of Development
Economics, P. O. Box 1091, Islamabad 44000.
© Pakistan Institute of Development
Economics, 2016.
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics
Islamabad, Pakistan
E-mail: [email protected]
Website: http://www.pide.org.pk
Fax: +92-51-9248065
Designed, composed, and finished at the Publications Division, PIDE.
C O N T E N T S
Page
Abstract v
1. Introduction 1
1.1. Background of the Study 4
1.2. Research Questions 6
1.3. Conceptual Framework 6
2. Review of Literature 10
2.1. What is Clientelism 11
2.2. Clientelistic Associations and Politics 12
2.3. Decentralised Centralisation in Pakistan 15
3. Research Design and Methodology 16
3.1. Research Methods and Sampling 17
4. Discussion and Analysis 18
4.1. Politics in Village 18
4.2. Agency and Perceptions in Local Political Field 24
4.3. Is Voting a Good Proxy for Democratisation? 27
4.4. Conclusion 30
5. Policy Implications 30
References 32
List of Table
Table 4.1. Village Level Micro Data 19
List of Figures
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 10
Figure 2. Non-candidate Based Villages 20
Figure 3. Political Associations in Candidate Based Villages 23
Figure 4. Perceptions and Agency 25
Figure 5. Conditions on Participation 28
ABSTRACT
Devolving power is currently seen as a way to deconcentrate power,
strengthen representative democratic institutions, reduce corruption and increase
collective action. These very positive features of decentralisation theory are
rather given preference over social, economic and political aspects that
influence, effect and shape any such efforts. Pakistan has seen many rounds of
decentralisation of government to local tiers. Current phase of decentralisation
stands out of all previous plans as it is being done by political not Marshal law
regimes. This study by using mixed research strategy disentangled the process
by which local governments are formed in Punjab. We have noted that informal
political forms play as much an important role as formal electoral procedures.
Our results have concurred that informal political institutions deploy traditional
cultural norms of reciprocity to confine individual and collective agencies.
These informal structures induce and incentivise certain type of political action
over others. Political actions of individuals and vote blocs are seemed collective
apparently but roles of individuals in any such collectivity are very personal.
Such pronounced personalisation of power and politics culminates into a more
fragmented polity and very little transformative political and collective action.
Keywords: Democratic Decentralisation, Democratisation in Pakistan,
Informal Political Associations, Local Bodies
1. INTRODUCTION
The fourth wave of democratic decentralisation is in process in Pakistan.
For the first time transferring of powers have delegated to third tier by a
democratic dispensation at provincial level.1 Democratic decentralisation has
attracted the attention of international organisations, civil rights advocacy
groups, political parties and states (Manor and Bank, 1999). It has been seen as
an instrument, a means to make state more responsive (Heller, 2001; Mohmand,
2008; Mohmand and Cheema, 2007), making executives more accountable
(Hicken, 2011), increase economic development (Shah, 1998) and encourage
participation through collective action at grass-root level (Manor, 1999).
Decentralisation is inherently a political affair as it redefines terms of political
participation and association among political agents and between different tiers
of state. Institutional arrangements, asymmetrical power relations, culture and
social structures contextually determine the political process. As the
development of state, polity and society is qualitatively different in post-colonial
states (Pakistan for instance), thus the nature of political associations also differ
in important ways from those of the developed countries.
Historically decentralisation, in Indian sub-continent, had remained the
privileged strategy of governance by all empires which ruled this vast territory
(Niaz, 2006; 2011). British Empire also applied the same strategy very smartly
to sustain an oppressive social order (Gilmartin, 1988). British have fused
modern state with traditional local institutions and land tenure system in Punjab
to create a political system marred by patronage2. This political system based on
personalised power had been inherited by Pakistan. Weakness of Muslim
League political organisation coupled with other contingent factors have failed
to challenge this system of internal dependency3. The presence of skewed land
distribution, differentiation of social status along caste/kinship and power
asymmetries had neither been confronted nor managed by any policy
intervention by State4. Even the path of industrialisation was only ends in the
1Earlier such attempts have made by Autocratic regimes for details see (Cheema et al.,
2005). 2For details see Maddison (1983) 3How Patronage causes internal dependency see Flynn (1974). 4All three land reforms programmes failed to mitigate seriously that structural inequalities
for details see Khan (2002).
2
creation of Robber Barons5 completely dependent on their access to state for
capital accumulation (Sayeed, 2002). These accumulations at higher level were
made at the expense of rural population. The terms of trade, exchange rate
regime and subsidies all went against the small farmer who did not get any
tangible benefit from green revolution policies6 (Gardezi, 1998). This stagnancy
in agriculture has shifted surplus value and labour to the cities where industries
were built through state intervention. However, the rural poor migrating from
rural areas also face similar behaviours of dependency and discrimination as the
labour rights were never remained the priority of any government in Pakistan7.
Therefore, the social order created and sustained by British largely has remained
intact with similar attributes across rural and urban divide in Pakistan.
Political development in Pakistan has usually seen as embedded within
the conflicting binary of Democracy and Dictatorship. The need of
democratisation has always asserted for making state-society relations more
equitable and stable. However, the systems of power that work within both
systems do not attract a reasonable attention of scholars in Pakistan (Ahmad,
1980). Both types of regimes in Pakistan, under different constitutional
arrangements, have held elections to legitimise their rule. The exercise of power
in society also reflects similar patterns and economic policies did not universally
benefit all the classes. The system of taxation, justice system, contractual
exchange regimes, power of unrepresentative institutions and social structures of
inequality have mostly remained intact in this unfolding saga of political
development. The personalised networks of political association had sustained
through coercion, intimidation, clientelism and patronage and hindered the
development of more inclusive political participation. The social hierarchy
based on status and economic endowments incentivise vertical political
associations at the cost of horizontal solidarity. Akhtar (2012) in his study of
patron-client relations in urban centres of Pakistan has provided strong evidence
that even migration to cities did not alter the hierarchical nature of social
association in Pakistan. The presence of any such hierarchy has strong
implications for political participation as the dependence of client on patron
seriously jeopardises the freedom of political agents. These social structures
deeply effect the process of democratisation and consolidation of a stable
democracy (Crook and Manor, 1998).
The political contestation is affected by social structures (Gazdar and
Mohmand, 2005) legal arrangements and political institution (Hichken, 2006),
structure of economic and political governance (Kitschelt and Wilinkson,2007)
5Papernaik coined this term to highlight the character of new industrial elite in Pakistan. 6For details see Alavi (1973). 7For a brief period during earlier years of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ZAB), labour had granted
fewer rights but then the same regime dealt with labour dissent by means of force. For details see
Khalid bin Saeed (1980).
3
and economic development (Randall and Theobald, 1998). Political parties in
Pakistan, due to multiple reasons, remain weak, dynastic, bureaucratic and less
responsive to the demands of people. Therefore, a personalised, candidate-based
political competition remained strong here. This absence of programmatic and
ideologically coherent political forces has incentivised the privileged
individuals, who can themselves amass adequate resources, to use personalised
mediums of exchange to win elections. These personalised mechanisms
completely change the meanings of electoral competition and strategically better
individuals use all their option of intimidation, access to state/government
resources and clientelism to buy votes. The institutional variables including
election laws and regulations also incentivise these candidate-based strategies in
Pakistan. The direct elections of 5 male members, two women members and one
youth member along with one chairman and vice-chairman in Punjab incentivise
local candidates to exchange votes for provision (promising) of certain benefits
(Punjab Local Government Act, 2013). The success rate of independents in both
cantonment and KP local elections indicate a strong trend that we assume
similar pattern will too replicate itself in Punjab.
From the perspective of voter, the act of voting is not an individual
obligation. Local elections in Pakistan are the most hotly contested elections in
Pakistan. However, the contestation in itself does not guarantee a more
programmatic citizen-politician link sans clientelistic relations. The political
association depends on other multiple factors (both exogenous and endogenous)
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). The voter turnout is always higher in local
bodies’ elections than national elections and face-to-face interaction between
voters, supporters and candidates also push the competition to more personalised
ends. Everybody knows that who is supporting whom and that renders the
competitors and their supporters more intimately associated with the elections.
Biradri act as the pivot around which local bodies politics spin (Ahmed, 2009).
This nature of competition is more prone to violence as it was the case in KP
province8. Mohmand (2011) has concluded that voters in rural Punjab usually
vote in groups; she names those groups vote-blocks. These informal institutions
negotiate terms with the candidates on the behalf of member of the groups. .
How these vote-blocks organise, act and participate in local bodies’ elections
needs further investigation with a larger sample. However, one could speculate
that more intimacy and incidence of face-to-face interactions at local level
would dissolve the fine distinction of boundaries among different vote-blocs at
local level.
This study relies on the empirics of a survey that had been conducted to
understand the perception and practices of people about political associations in
multiple villages of District Sialkot. The time and resource constraints have
8More than eight persons died while around hundred got serious injuries in 2015 Local
Bodies election in KP.
4
bound me to keep its scale smaller. The choice of Sialkot was the result of
research objectives, as I wanted to see the impact of economic development,
occupational changes and education levels on political associations. Sialkot is
one of the most developed districts in Punjab that has extensively industrialised
and ranks high on Human Development Index (Haroon and Khan, 2007). Due to
a high rate of land parcelisation, dependence on agriculture gradually became
low while flow of the remittances provided real opportunities for social
mobility9. Economic development theoretically free the individual from
bondage of dependency, enhance cognitive sophistication of voter, scale up
social networks density and increase transaction costs of individual exchange
(Chandra and Wilkinson, 2007; Hopkin, 2006). These structural and cognitive
changes are antagonistic to traditional patron-client relation that had been
created and sustained through control on land. How some people who are
supposedly economically better off, holding more sophisticated and modern
worldview and enjoying higher rates of social mobility use their vote and what
would be its implications for democratic decentralisation are the actual
objectives of this survey. This study would be divided into following sections 1)
Background and Conceptual Framework 2) Review of Literature 3) Research
Design and Methodology 4) Findings and Discussion 5) Conclusion and Policy
Implications.
1.1. Background of the Study
The beginning of third democratic interregnum at national level in 2008
was a result of political crisis generated by the mobilisation and collusion of
different social forces against Musharraf regime. The main opposition parties
against Musharraf regime have signed a Charter of Democracy in 2004. The
consensus developed in that charter was to strengthen the institutions of
representative democracy and making it more responsive to the needs of
common people. Eighteenth amendment was the culmination of that agreement
that was approved by both houses of parliament in 2010. Article 140-A was also
amended and third tier of representative government was made mandatory on all
provinces. This Article states that,
“Each province shall, by law, establish a local government system and
devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility and
authority to the elected representatives of the local governments”
(Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 2012.). However, no clear-
cut instruction for the incumbency period of the local government, the
relative nature and extent of authority vis-à-vis provincial government
was determined. Another shortcoming was the absence of any time limit
9The flow of remittances is one of the highest in Sialkot District.
5
that provincial government must adhere to for holding local elections10.
Either this shortcoming in legislation was left for political reasons is out
of the scope of this study but safely it can be said that it has provided
provincial political bosses with multiple excuses to transfer power by
holding elections. Ironically, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and
Pakistan Peoples Party, (both beneficiaries of this new democratic
interregnum and founders of COD) have showed the lukewarm response
to these constitutional obligations and used every kind of dilatory
methods to meet their ends11.
Punjab government has legislated and passed local bodies’ act 2013 that
is a classical rendition of 1979 local act. A comparison made by Shafaqat (2014)
among all four provinces has concluded that Punjab has passed one of the most
un-democratic local bodies law that provide less visible political, fiscal and
administrative authority to local tiers. The causative factors influencing
reluctance of provincial political elite is the fear of losing political capital that is
the necessary condition for earning economic pay-offs that would be invested to
consolidate political power12. As for third time date of local elections has been
announced and first stage of cantonment elections have been piloted under the
same law, it can safely be guessed that no real autonomy could be gained out of
this practice13. On the other hand, my field experience has reflected multiple
behaviours of local political agents with reference to local government elections.
The local elections in Pakistan are the most competitive political exercise.
While during national elections turn out remains abysmally low but local
elections have fought in a competitive rivalry. The long history of personalised
politics at local level (that has begun during colonial times) has institutionalised
a distinct logic of competition embedded within a matrix of parochial local
identities. The demand for public goods is although an important component of
local political competition but central importance is still attached with
personalised exchanges between candidates, patrons/vote-block leaders and
vote-block participants. The politics at national and provincial level is becoming
more programmatic but local politics is still entangled within candidate-centred
10UNDP (UNDP and Jaffar Hassan, Amjad Bhatti, 2013), PILDAT
Seminar on federalism 11Development Advocate Pakistan (2014): Volume 2, Issue 1. 12The political clientelism is one of the reasons of economic corruption in developing
countries. The middle classes can mobilise, through different ethnic, caste or kinship idioms,
political power that could upset political elite. Political decentralisation would increase competition
for prerequisites attached with political office. The scarce availability of development funds would
increase factionalism at local level and party bureaucracies are actually aware of the consequences
for such increased factionalism. For middle class mobilisation see M Khan(1999). 13Punjab government has already announced 13 district autonomous bodies separately for
supervising Health, education, transport and revenue departments that would not come under the
purview of any elected council.
6
political associations14. Most of the respondents, key informants and participants
were not positive about the introduction of political parties at local level. The
most probable explanation could be that political party would destabilise the
informal settings of local political alignments. Punjab governments also inclined
towards holding non-party based local elections and this accord of dispositions
at both ends of political continuum points towards a deep-rooted political logic
which is created, nourished and sustained by colonial regime. In the wake of
such huge social and economic transformation (discussed below) persistence of
such political associations, has a deep implication for all efforts being made to
enhance democratisation in a developing post-colonial state like Pakistan.
1.2. Research Questions
I have divided this investigation into following interlinked research
questions:
(1) What are the forms and nature of local political associations in
relatively modernised rural areas?
(2) How these informal associations influence the agency of its
participants?
(3) What are the implications for such voting practices on the process of
decentralisation?
1.3. Conceptual Framework
The political condition of developing countries, at present, could not be
comprehended without locating the development of political system in historical
perspective (Maddison, 2013; Mamdani, 1996; Niaz, 2011). History shapes the
social structure of any society through a cumulative influence of geography,
political and economic organisation. Village in India has remained the primary
unit of production that generated surplus-value which had been consumed by
ruling elites (Gupta, 2001). Contrary to a popular depiction of a social harmony,
historically Indian village has remained a socially differentiated location filled
with parochial localism (Ambedkar, 1948).
Traditionally village social life was regulated by social hierarchy
maintained through caste inequities. Colonial shock did not change this internal
social organisation of village and the social inequality among different groups
has remained intact. By synchronising customary with legal, colonial regime has
created new institutions of governance that were highly differentiated along
social and economic hierarchies15 (Cheema, Mohmand, and Patnam, 2009).
14 For details about different kind of political associations in democracy, please see Kitschelt
and Wilkinson (2007). 15 This village level governing bodies were named as Village Proprietary Bodies (VPB). The
inclusion into these bodies has determined by land ownership and caste category.
7
These new institutions were responsible for resolving internal conflict and
helping state to keep social control intact. Ali (1988) has marvelously
demonstrated the negative role played by colonial regime in Punjab that stunted
social evolution and political development of rural Punjab. Since then although a
lot has changed, such as agriculture has lost its centrality in economic
production and increasing opportunities of employment in other sectors have
dented this previous social stratification (Hassan, 2002). These customary
governing bodies have lost its effective juridical and moral authority and
advantage of arbitration in maintaining peace through effective conflict
resolution16. Increasingly, the trend reflect that most of the disputes have settled
through police and court of law which, put high premium on access to these
institutions through local patrons/ brokers and politicians 17(Bodemann, 1982).
The competition for political power has also been deeply influenced by
economic modernisation; new sources of economic prosperity have attracted
fresh competitors from non-agrarian sectors who vie for power, to increase their
personal riches and social standing18. Some commentators argued that politics
itself has become one of the most profitable economic venues in Pakistan1920.
However, Gazdar and Mohmand (2006) have argued that reduction in economic
inequality is still not able to cut social inequality in villages of Northern Punjab.
Mohmand (2011) in her dissertation also highlighted the importance of kinship
networks in making political association. Akhtar (2012) in his study of
patronage in urban areas has argued that kinship persistence is a sign of
hegemony that propertied classes to maintain an inherently exploitive system.
Qadeer (1999, 2000 and 2006) has argued that most of the rural areas in
Punjab has reached to a spatial dimension that could not be rural anymore.
Agriculture has taken a back seat because of large increase in population and
shrinking of land parcel. Population explosion and crisis in agriculture
production is pushing people to look for alternative means. The role of kinship
as regulating village social life has tremendously reduced while extended family
16 Not all of the studied villages had any functioning panchayat and if some of its vestiges
were present, their effectiveness was questionable and their decisions had usually been challenged
by aggrieved party in formal legal institutions. 17 Another notable trend is the emergence of lawyer as a new intermediary that advocate on
the behalf of its client. The lawyer movement has improved the social and economic status of lawyer
who is more aggressively defending/favoring his clients vis-à-vis other state institutions (rightly or
wrongly). The violent incidents in Daska are rightly indicating the growing tension between state
and civil society. 18 Fifty percent of the respondents in this study have still attached to factions that lead by
Agriculturalist while fourty eight percent are associated with patrons who are in service/ retail
sectors. The landowners themselves expand their enterprise to other sectors but still land is a source
of prestige for them, although its economic viability has relatively reduced. 19 During survey thirty-eight percent of the respondents stated that candidates contest
elections for self-enrichment while only three percent have stated serving people as the key reason. 20 For details, see Annexture1 in Khan (2009).
8
is no more remained the central locus of economic organisation. This trend has
changed the land-market in villages where demand for housing is reducing the
farming space. These socio-economic changes at household and village level
have forced/pushed people to migrate towards cities. However, the cultural ethos
of socialisation, association and patronage has erected themselves in similar
patterns at urban centre. Lyon (2002) has concluded that culture of power at
urban centres or rural areas are based on patronage, and its impacts at political
associations are quite similar.
The reciprocity is one of the basic human instincts, we associate with
others, to build relations, care for others and demand similar from others21. The
self-centred individual of neo-classical economic theory is not found anywhere
across the cultures and regions (Henrich and Boyd, 2005). Just like economic
agents political agents do feel the compelling force of reciprocity to influence
their decisions about supporting/ voting any party or candidate (Lawson and
Greene, 2011). The candidates use these human instincts through provision of
personalised benefits to clients and this normative method makes political
manipulation of the voter easy. This normative framework also reinforces the
clientelistic exchange that provides intrinsic benefits to both parties involved in
exchange and reduce the cost of monitoring clients (Lawson and Greene, 2011).
The clientelistic association is an anathema to the idea of democratisation
as it creates dependency, block horizontal solidarity, stunt collective action and
produce bad policy outcomes (Flynn, 1974; Heller, 2001; Keefer, 2009). This
inequality of status, access to skill, knowledge or resources re-enforce a social
hierarchy that undermine the development of progressive and programmatic
political system that is accountable and responsive to the needs of marginalised
social groups. Modernisation theorists like Huntington (1968) and Rostow
(1951) has put forward the idea of simultaneous modernisation of politics, social
structures along economic modernisation. However, there is ample evidence
available across the board about the persistence of social inequalities and
clientelistic associations even if the economies become modernised (Kitschelt
and Wilkinson, 2007; Scott, 1972). The collective action is not possible without
prior horizontal social solidarity demanding for universal non-excludable public
goods. However, the negotiated nature of Pakistani state, absence of
programmatic political parties and political hegemony of ruling bloc has
crucially limited the frontier of redistributive political action in Pakistan
(Akhtar, 2008; Chaudhry, 2013; Keefer, 2009; Keefer, Narayan, and
Vishwanath, 2003; Mohmand, 2011; Qadeer, 2006). The theory of
democratisation and its variants of decentralisation idealise the virtuous function
of local democracy in making state/ government responsive. Whether it would
21 Sociability is an important human instinct which reminds of gregarious nature of human
specie. For details on human instincts please see https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Angell/
Angell_1906/Angell_1906_p.html.
9
be possible in a polity mired in clientelistic political association, no conclusive
answer is yet available (Keefer, 2009)
Social transformation is on course in Pakistan based on changes in
economic organisation. Modernisation has the tendency to directly affect the
fundamentals of any social order through redistribution of resources among
different classes and groups. New social classes demand more share in economic
pie through political mobilisation that results in new political settlements
between state and society (Khan, 1998; Sayeed, 2002). How these
transformations are affecting the political association, structure political
competition and influence the perceptions and practices of relatively well-
informed and independent citizens in Pakistan? This study using a holistic
framework will try to investigate this question.
Thus for this study I have used multiple analytical tools borrowed from
literature. As the focus of this study is the impact of informal associations on the
new institutionalisation of local bodies in Pakistan, therefore I have divided the
analytical tools into three categories of a) state formation and local governments
in colonial times b) postcolonial state society relations and its transformation
and c) how these transformations are associated with changes in local informal
political associations particularly in rural Punjab.
It is in this context that I have borrowed concept from Kenny (2013) who
asserts that centripetal and centrifugal forces force ruling elites to opt for any
type of state formation. In this lieu Manor (1999) explicates a well-knit
explanation of forces that pushed states at the start of 21st century to pursue
decentralisation as one of the key policy options to avoid fragmentation.
Similarly, Zaidi (2005) and Cheema et al. (2005) also narrate the political
economy, context and causes of different forms of local bodies experimented by
different regimes. We have borrowed from them the conceptual understanding
of local context in which local bodies are historically located.
Second category we used in this study is borrowed from an ongoing
debate of social transformation that has implicated and transformed Pakistan.
Hassan (2002) professes that Pakistan has changed in many unprecedented
ways, historically, spatially, demographically and socially. Qadeer (1999, 2006)
particularly focuses on spatial and demographic aspect of this transformation
and introduced a new concept of ‘Ruralopolise’ to understand these changes and
their impacts on social and political lives of individuals. Akhtar (2008)
introduced a concept of ‘overdeveloping state’ to challenge old theorisation of
state by Alvi (1972) in Pakistan. He used this concept to emphasise the
important and evolving role of intermediate classes in political economy of
Pakistan.
Last analytical category I have borrowed from literature is the role of
informal political associations and how these shape agency of individuals,
communities and state. Shandana (2011) has used the concept of vote-bloc to
depict the informal associations at local level in Punjab. We have borrowed this
10
concept and patron-client relationships (Scott, 1972) to study that how these
institutions effectively shape agencies and formal institutions of political
contestation.
Fig. 1. Conceptual Framework
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Overall shortage of research in Social Science coupled with quality
concerns have made it very difficult to study transient and changing societal
phenomenon in Pakistan (Gardezi, 2002; Zaidi, 2002). The only rescue is the
rich empirical and theoretical data available across the globe for sharpening
methodologies to study conditions within the host country. Concept of
clientelism, patronage, patron-client relations, particularistic model of political
11
participation has been treated differently by researchers working in diverse
disciplines of Social Science (Graziano, 1976). This diversity in methodological
framework makes it difficult to capture the essence of clientelism for any
meaningful analytical purpose (Hicken, 2011). The illusive nature of this
concept presents further quandary when it is used for comparative studies that
span across the boundaries of countries and disciplines. To identify and locate
the nature and functioning of clientelistic association with reference to
democratic decentralisation also puts another limitation on this review.
Therefore, keeping in focus abovementioned constraints this section will try to
build a synthesis from literature over clientelism, its properties, consequences
and implications for democratic decentralisation.
2.1. What is Clientelism
Hicken (2011) has rightly argued that resilience of clientelism to sustain
itself in all kinds of societies, political systems and cultures has been a source of
anguish for researchers across disciplines. It is present in highly developed
economies and even flourishing in the old democracies of America, Europe and
Asia (Boix and Stokes, 2007; Roniger, 2004), relish high incidence in the urban
alleys of South America (Auyero, 2000), function perfectly well through-out the
great expanse of Africa (Berman, 1974), and present in its myriad forms in Asia
stretching from Arab world to the urban communities of Taiwan (Scott, 1972).
To comprehend such a resilient set of practices in varying contexts divide the
political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists and economists globally over
the structural and political properties of clientelism. Graziano (1976) and
Hitchens (2011) with an interlude of half a century both agree that dyadic
structure of exchange is the central pivot of clientelism. However, both borrow
this insight from Scott (1972) who has noted that patron-client relation could
only exist between persons with unequal economic resources, social status or
position. Graziano (1976) has argued extensively, building on the theoretical
insights of Mancur Olson that both programmatic (multi-agent) and inter-
personal types of clientelism could subsume into dyadic structures. The
modernisation of economy, expansion of voting franchise and population
explosion in developing countries, by changing structure of social relations,
have turned this dyadic relation into Triade and a new agent is now entering
between patron-client; political broker (Muno, 2010). Many brokers are now
functioning under the tutelage of one patron and connecting client with high
patron (Muno, 2010).
Hitchens (2011) has added three more elements for structurally
delineating the concept of clientelism for analytical means, namely contingency,
hierarchy and iteration. However, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) have
propounded a separate model for understanding clientelistic exchange. Their
conceptualisation explains the concept by using principal-agent model of
12
political delegation, which has been commonly used in political science
(Hitchens, 2011). Muno (2010) has seen asymmetry of power, personalised
face-to face interaction, reciprocity and voluntarism as primary elements that
structure clientelistic associations. On the other hand, another line of
postcolonial theoreticians like Chatterjee (2013), Gupta (2012) and Pandey
(2015) have located the roots of clientelist politics embedded within the
indifference of political system for marginalised segments of society. This
differentiates society in different blocs that vie for scarce resources vis- a-vis
state. These marginalised groups have no other options but to unite their voting
powers to defend their rights (Chatterjee, 2013). However, these theoreticians
particularly ignore the existence of power and its transmission mechanism
carried off by these networks (Martin, 2014). The presence of monitoring,
asymmetrical power relations and absence of any meaningful opportunities have
made clientelistic exchange viable, resilient and exploitive (Hicken, 2011; Lyne,
2007; Muno, 2010).
Building on these insights over the structuring of clientelism, other
theoretical propositions labeled these kinds of analyses as situational analyses,
which provide micro snap but neglect the larger picture. The equilibrium of
internal dependency that support the class power at national level is sustained by
these micro-structures of association and exchange present in every
neighborhood (Flynn, 1974; Rothstein, 1979). Theorists working in Marxist and
Dependacia schools have highlighted the interlinkages that exist between
capitalist development and clientelist politics (Flynn, 1974; Frank, 1969;
Rothstein, 1979). Akhtar (2008), in his expanded study of post-Bhutto politics in
Pakistan, has considered clientelism as an outcome of politics of common sense
forced by hegemonic bloc to blunt the politics of resistance. Mohmand (2011)
also highlighted the targeted nature of public goods that have created a
clientelistic association of politics in Punjab, Pakistan. Summarising the
structural debate over clientelistic relation, I now move to my next objective.
What are the political properties of clientelistic association?
2.2. Clientelistic Associations and Politics
Politics in Pakistan is factional and factions are formed around personal
loyalties (Lyon, 2002). Individuals allied to these alliances prefer long term
benefits and securities over short times perquisite and the nature of loyalty is
instrumental/ contractual rather than affectional; instrumental between clients
and patrons while contractual among patrons (Barth, 1959). The continued
opposition among competing factions of Swati Pathans was the for control of the
scarce resource—Land. However, the same opposition could exist among
opposing factions for capturing other forms of scarce resources i.e. access to
state or market (Akhtar, 2008; Mohmand, 2008). Scott (1972) has concurred that
13
interpersonal relations are located into a continuum of social exchange. Goods,
gifts, favors, perquisites all travel from one pole of the continuum to other with a
binding obligation of reciprocity. Exchanges made in economic sphere would
demand reciprocity in political sphere. Graziano (1979) has bifurcated the
benefits accrued from any social exchange into a) intrinsic benefits b) extrinsic
benefits. Most of the clientelistic exchanges made between clients have intrinsic
benefits attached to these and thus structure an internal dependency of client
over patron. Blau (1964) has also asserted that the two basic functions of social
exchange are to a) create bonds of friendship and b) superordination. The less
privileged section of society, for developing consensus, are manipulated and
coerced to exchange their “power of vote” for material inducements (Javid,
2011; SK Shandana Khan Mohmand, 2011). The lack of any direct connection
between state and people has forced them to look for other means of
intermediation that could provide security (Lyon, 2002). The continuous
meddling with democratic process in Pakistan has reduced any scope for
consolidation of horizontal solidarities at local level (Akhtar, 2008). On the
contrary dictatorial regimes have instrumentalised the use of vote for gaining
legitimacy (Alavi, 1972; Mohmand, 2011 and 2008). General Ayub Khan has
tried to counter the hegemony of landed elite through aligning middle-class
farmers of canal colonies with regime (Sayeed, 2002). Genral Zia ul Haq and
General Pervaiz Musharraf regimes treaded the same path of patronising new
political entrepreneurs who banked over clientelistic political associations to
secure their seats22. The atomisation of individual, refusal of state for provision
of any security and dwindling opportunities for social mobility have serious
consequences which increase the propensity of individual to depend more on
patrimonial and localised networks to gain at least a semblance of security and
psychological stability (Güneş-Ayata and Roniger, 1994; Niaz, 2014).
Mahmood Khan (2004), Gazdar (2003) and Javed (2013) have found significant
presence of inequality, poverty and skewed opportunities for social mobility in
Pakistan. These all studies indicate a highly stratified society with inequalities in
economic resources, social status, access to state and information: a perfect
breeding ground for clientelistic politics to prevail.
Another strand of researchers including Lawson and Greene (2011) have
attributed that clientelism prevails through the manipulation of instincts of
reciprocity by politicians. It is an interesting perspective because every day
needs at local level are usually fulfilled by a new type of patrons, who are not
coercive and foolhardy (Shami, 2010). The stagnation of economy, corruption,
red tapism and rising cost of living have forced people to get into these kinds of
social exchanges that could only be sustained by reciprocity of the clients in
22Qadeer (2006) has pinpointed the subsiding role of kinship as an organising principle of
social life in Pakistan. However, its importance in political arena is actually increasing.
14
political sphere. However, the unequal distribution of wealth, resources and
status are the underlying structures without which such personal exchanges
would not be possible (Mohmand, 2011; Shami 2010).
Patron-client relations have deep implications for political development.
Huntington (1965) noted that the key element of political development is
participation or mobilisation. Modernisation usually awoke social forces that in
pursuit of social and economic power gradually politicised the whole structure
of governance (Khan, 2002; Niaz, 2010). New political alliances are forged and
elites use this increasing participation rate for their own intra-elite struggles
(Keefer, 2009). This kind of participation and mobilisation could not lead to any
mature, concrete and progressive collective action that would challenge the
exclusive and exploitive political/ economic institutions grafted by colonial
powers in most of the developing countries (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
Modernisation although push forward the thrust of democratisation through
expanding political franchise but local modes of thought, social structures and
cultural values effectively shape these developments (Inglehart and Baker, 2000;
Qadeer, 2006). The process of social modernisation is as much necessary as its
economic variant for development of any political system. Nevertheless,
ironically in any programme of decentralisation implemented in Pakistan the
aspect of social modernisation has attracted little attention of policy makers. The
informal rules that organise primordial identities become an instrument through
which resourceful patrons forge alliances and disseminate patronage (Cheema,
Khwaja, and Qadir, 2006; Lyon, 2002; Mohmand, 2008; Mohmand and Gazdar,
2007). The penetration of market exchange in social formation of Pakistan has
changed the class structure of Pakistan (Rahman, 2012). Nayab (2011) has
estimated that sixty-one millions of population in Pakistan is now enjoying
middle-class life styles. Do their (Middle-class) political associations,
worldviews, cultural norms and social practices have seen any change? If yes,
what is the nature of this change? Unfortunately, very little we can say with the
present state of information.
However, generally a tacit consensus is present over the importance of
middle classes as an agent of sustainable economic development (Easterly,
2003), stable political system (Collier, 1999; Leventoğlu, 2005), economic
growth (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007) and deepening of democracy Birdsall
(2000). However, theorists of South Asian political economy Khan (1999),
Sayeed (1995 and 2002) and Akhtar (2008) have highlighted a very different
role that middle classes played in the postcolonial history of these countries.
These classes by aligning themselves with ruling bloc have popularised a
peculiar idiom of politics that strengthen patronage based political system. There
is a huge gap in literature that could help, by zooming-in at micro-level, to
understand the actual political practices of middle classes in Pakistan. Generally,
there is a consensus that middle classes in Pakistan welcome autocratic regimes
15
and work as a patron of upper classes to downplay the building of any resistance
movement (Akhtar, 2008; Hassan, 2002). This study would also add to literature
the middle class political practices in Pakistan.
2.3. Decentralised Centralisation in Pakistan
The disenchantment with centralised and bureaucratic state has lost its
developmental fervour and charm globally and democratic decentralisation has
turned into a new-born faith (Heller, 2001). The voodoo of democratic
decentralisation is so much intoxicating that its proponents have forgotten that
most of the developing countries have controlled and managed by colonial
power through decentralised methods of governance. Kenny (2013) has
proposed another analytical framework to understand the uneasy relationship
between centralisation and decentralisation by locating the state formation in the
social forces of centripetal and centrifugal forces in developing countries. State
managers in Pakistan remained occupied with actual or imagined threats since
very first day and thence the colonial model of governance with few cosmetic
changes have remained intact (Waseem, 1997). The internal dissent against
over-centralisation has curtailed through dual tactics of coercion and consent. In
the wake of external and internal threats of aggression and disintegration the
central state has relented to a political settlement, which in the absence of any
useful description could be said ‘decentralised centralisation’. The centrifugal
forces of dissident regional elites, urban middle classes and disgruntled elements
were circumvented using controlled decentralised centralisation. Cheema et al.
(2005) have decried the use of local governments by dictatorial regimes to build
clientelistic networks that could help the regime at the cost of society and
political system. Waseem (1997, 2011 and 2012) has identified that
personalisation of politics is the direct outcome of devolved political systems of
Martial Law regimes. These practices of dictatorial regimes have developed a
peculiar kind of political attitudes and practices that hindered social
transformation; most valued objective of democratic decentralisation. Ironically,
it has led to depoliticisation of politics and rendered socially marginalised
groups unable to build horizontal solidarities. The international donors that have
pushed funded and facilitated developing states to decentralise paradoxically
helped these very states to penetrate the isolated village societies in the name of
development (Ferguson, 1994). After the recent attempt of decentralisation
during Musharraf regime one can observe the offices of provincial and district
administrative agencies dealing with citizen with the similar Hauteur of higher
bureaucracy; A relic of by-gone days of Raj. The scarce public goods (health,
sanitation facilities, roads, schools and other social utilities) are largely
demanded by all section of society (accept those who can purchase them
privately). The preferential provision of these social utilities had tied
obnoxiously to a complex clientelistic network that linked villages with towns
16
and town with capitals. The personalisation of politics, as concurred by Waseem
(1992) has bonded local politicians with voters/citizen in dyadic structure of
exchange facilitated through primordial loyalties. Hicken (2011) has argued that
with modernisation of economy the role of information has increased manifold
to meet the economic ends. The shift in occupational structure forced migration
to urban centres or daily commutation to find work a routine (Gupta, 2005). The
ignorance and lack of information for a migrant or commuter makes it necessary
to get it from a patron/ broker who is from his village or Biradri. Blau’s social
exchange framework has embedded exchange within the logic of reciprocity
(PM Blau, 1964). The information exchange, provision of social utilities to a
village/ community, getting a job for son/ daughter, getting a birth certificate or
registration of Nikah, all these exchanges have conducted within clientelistic
structure of unequal exchange. The norms of reciprocity demand from the
beneficiary to return these favors through voting to get the supply of these goods
intact. This exploitive cul-de-sac for a common person is the product of already
de-centralised experiments of Pakistani state, which de-centralise to control
political fallouts of socio-economic transformation (Rafi et al., 2006). Therefore,
there is a need to look at successful decentralisation attempts that actually
decentralise more power to local communities. Heller (2001) in his comparative
study of three states has drawn few conclusions that demands attention from all
stakeholders in Pakistan. He argued that success of decentralisation in Kerala,
Port Algere and South Africa has stood upon a) high incidence of political
mobilisation of people b) programmatic and ideologically cohesive political
parties that have support of local volunteers c) vibrant civil society. While in
Pakistan the civil society is weak, political parties are dynastic and ideological
debate is absent opting for clientelistic politics is more rewarding for both
politicians and voters.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The approach of research that attempt to investigate an evolving,
transitory and varied social reality should be eclectic (Qadeer, 2006), iterative
(Mohmand, 2010) and mixed (Lieberman, 2005). Longitudinal observations are
required to collect qualitative data that help in getting reflexive understanding of
social approaches. Postcolonial states and societies have faced the impacts of
modernity and modernisation differently from their Western counterparts
(Kaviraj, 2000). The political integration preceded social integration and the role
of state increased manifold in offsetting the drastic impacts of socio-economic
transformations (Chatterjee, 2011). The role of tradition, indigenous social
structures and modes of production in sub-continent was completely at odds
with Western experience (Kaviraj, 2005). Therefore, contestation over state has
remained a peculiar aspect of postcolonial politics. The modernisation ironically
reinvented tradition in both these countries which is evident in the consolidation
17
of political Islam/ Hindutva, politicisation of caste and emergence of Biradri as
an instrument of political mobilisation (Niaz, 2010 and 2012). Qadeer (2006)
has called it as grafting of modern political form on traditional/ customary social
forms and instrumentalisation of kinship to build political capital. The economic
modernisation does not give way to the social and political modernisation as
once modernisation theorists believed it. As the focus of our research is to
describe the political actors, structures, economic relation and effect of all these
on democratic decentralisation largely and especially its political aspect
therefore this study has used descriptive research design.
3.1. Research Methods and Sampling
Different research paradigms23 use different set of methodological
techniques to inquire social reality (Neuman, 2006). Purists on each side have
argued about the suitability and rigor of their own research techniques (Johnson
and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). This study has used mixed research methods to
triangulate and compare the validity of different observations and results.
Triangulation becomes a necessary technique, especially while investigating a
case where the responses could show biasness or completely wrong, value
bound and infest with endogeneity (Jick, 1979). Especially the political
associations have mostly layered meanings for both the patron and client.
Respondents feel uneasy about telling the exact nature and extent of their
associations. Therefore, building a rapport is a foremost requirement for getting
the actual knowledge about overlapping entanglement of political, social and
economic spheres of life at grassroot. For that purpose, I have stayed within
local community for an extended period of three months. Daily life interactions
with villagers of every caste/ class and denomination have enabled me to get
firsthand knowledge of the locality, community and its associations.
Mapping the political context was the next exercise that was conducted.
What are social categories dividing people along the axes of classes/castes?
How power has distributed among these social categories? What social,
economic, historical and general characteristics affect political settlements?
These questions need a qualitative framework for identifying the dimensions and
variables that could be operationalised for data collection. Power analysis is a
method usually used by donor organisations (Pearce, 2012; Petit Jethro, 2013)
for understanding the political economy of any area24. Interviews with local
patrons, candidates and voters were conducted to understand the local political
context.
23Neuman (2000) has discussed about three different research paradigms 1) Positivistic, that
use natural science methodology 2) Interpretive, more inclined to use ideographic methodological
techniques 3) Critical Social Science, use reflexive ontology to criticise both subject and content. 24Therefore 12 in-depth interviews and 6 Focus Groups Discussions (FGDs) (one for each
village) were conducted.
18
For conducting survey, we have used multi-cluster sampling technique to
draw a representative sample from Daska Tehsil of Sialkot district25. Total
number of Union Councils, according to 1998 census, were 24 and 20 percent of
these, 6 were selected in the sample. The distance from district/ Tehsil
headquarters and economic organisation of the village were controlling
variables26. The introduction of these controls had been carried out for better
understanding the effects of modernisation on social structures and political
associations at village level. The primary unit for survey was household and
from each village forty households were selected through stratified random
sampling. Caste was the variable around which sampling strata were
constructed. Alongside household questionnaire, a village questionnaire was
also used to collect social, administrative and economic data of the selected
villages of all six Union Councils.
4. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
This section is divided into two parts. In first part I have developed, a
village based political itinerary of household-candidate associations. Banking on
the fieldwork and qualitative data collected through in-depth interviews/
participation observation and FGDs I divided villages into two categories a)
candidate based villages b) non-candidate based villages. The second section
also covers the perceptions of households about the usefulness of democratic
decentralisation and limitation of political participations at local level, while the
impact of modernisation on the structure of political participation is assessed
through changes in class structure. This section also includes the implications of
these political associations for 1) Social/ Political development 2)
Accountability 3) Collective action 4) Democratic decentralisation.
4.1. Politics in Village
The sampling scheme has led me to choose six Union Councils randomly
and then one village from each Union Council was randomly selected. The
village selection was treated with another qualification; whether or not the
candidate for Union Council chairmanship resides in chosen village. This
criteria is being used by scholars in Pakistan to measure the distribution of social
utilities during Musharraf era (Cheema and Mohmand, 2006). We use it for
checking its impact on the formation of political associations.
25 I have used Population Census Report 1998 as my base for sampling. However, in 2002
another Tehsil has carved out of Daska, Sambrial, and half of Daska Union Councils have pushed
into Sambrial. Therefore, this survey covers two out of four Tehsils of District Sialkot. 26 Access to village also played an important role for this selection as the nature of
questionnaire demanded rapport building and confidentiality therefore to get such data local
intermediation was an important factor.
19
Table 4.1
Village Level Micro Data Village Candidate Based Non-Candidate Based
Ghoinkey
Voters Non-
farm*
PD** Gas City*** Commuters Voters Non-
farm
PD Gas City Commuters Village
4000 75% Jatt No 12km 75% 800 60% Gujjar Yes 15km 60% Ralioke
Gojra 9000 50% Jatt No 10km 50% 5000 40% Jatt Yes 7km 60% Badoke
Jinddo
Sahi
2500 40% Jatt
No 7km 50% 550 95% Jatt Yes 8km 70% Lodikay
*Percentage of population employed in non-farm sector ** Politically Dominant Biradri *** Distance of nearest Tehsil
Headquarter
As the data has already revealed that with respect to social utilities non-
candidate based villages score better while with respect to non-farm
employment non-candidate based villages mark differently. Candidate based
villages are large and economy is more agriculture oriented and access to city
for all villages is approximately same. In the following I discuss the nature of
their political association by choosing one village from each category.
4.1.1. Politics in Non-Candidate Based Village
Ralioke is a non-candidate based village inhabited and dominated by
Gujjar27 Biradri. The structure of political association is relatively amorphous
and dispersed in contrast to candidate based village. Relative affluence and
equality of social status also leads to further fragmentation of community as
competition among different power brokers catches in. Villagers feel easy while
discussing about the caveats of one or other candidate and radiate a freer attitude
with an air of confidence. The fragmentation of village social life has reached
very high levels and Dera system of feudal times has completely lost its vitality
and utility. Intimidation, harassment and coercion despised by everyone in
strong words. At face value, every individual evokes high moral standards in
explaining his political inclinations and associations. While when the same
questions were triangulated, answers become quite different and sometimes even
opposite. For example, when I asked about the qualities in ideal type of
politician/ candidate the answer usually was related to different connotations of
non-discriminatory. While in real life the same person could be active
participant in one of the competing vote-blocks. The reasons for this dissonance
in thinking and praxis are structural and indicate a relative repugnance that
people feel from existing state of politics.
Biradri as a prime face of political activity dominates local government
political assessments and alignments.28 However, there is an increasing
27One of the biradri dominated every village and there is no association found between
candidate/ non-candidate based classifications in dominance of any kinship network. 28We have taken the definition of Biradri same as Alavi (1976). ‘Horizontal fraternal ties
between contemporaries’.
20
fragmentation within Biradris along internal lineages (Sub- Biradris) that act as
an important factor of political organisation29. The reasons for block formation,
supporting one or the other candidate, therefore become much personalised in
nature and effect political competition.
Fig. 2. Non-candidate Based Villages
The structure of political association in this village is infested with
presence of multiple vote blocks. For local politics, different blocks inside
village, developed around individuals who act as their representative to the
29 Internal fissures within Biradris are associated with both acquired wealth and social status
by different households working in modern sectors.
21
politician. Basic principle around which vote-block is organised could be
Biradri, neighbourhood or intersection of mutual benefits of members. Vote-
blocks are not permanent and mostly last only for election. The reasons behind
formation of such vote-blocks are to develop a pressure group that could extract
benefits in future.
The village is divided into five unstable vote-blocks. Most of the
households usually manifest their formal attachment with politics just by voting.
While few participate in political field with higher frequency and for them,
differentiation between social, political, and economic fields disappear. Along
the continuum of participation these categories could describe the intensity of
political participation a) voter b) supporter c) broker d) candidate. Voters have
limited concern for formal politics other than casting vote, while supporters and
brokers show long-term interest in politics for various reasons30.
The relationship between VBL and its associates is both horizontal and
vertical and VB comprises two types of membership a) permanent/core b)
seasonal. The relationship between cores of vote-block is usually horizontal as it
provides the strategic power to the leader and seasonal membership come
whenever their interest is aligned with them.
All vote-block leaders belonged to high social status groups31, although
agriculture is not their source of political authority and wealth anymore. Two of
them are employed in public sectors and draw political power through using
their office for patronage distribution. Third one ran a successful business
enterprise and earned enough with effective market links to provide small-scale
loans and employment to villagers. Fourth, leader has had the financial support
of influential brothers working in multinational corporations. Last vote-block is
formed of Malik Biradri, who felt despised by other Gujjar households and act
as political brokers of an influential political family of the region.
The associational structure of village politics is graphically explained
above. These informal institutions of vote-block perform an important function
of regulating power within village32. All factions struggle for dominance, to earn
respect and prestige vis-à-vis other rivals. The differences usually among them
are petty and very personal in nature. Every household is free to join one or
another block by making an astute cost benefit analysis. The physical coercion is
negligible but monetary losses and threats of job loss are usually deployed to
maintain loyalty. One of the most important and self-sustaining element of
reproduction of this associational structure is the instrumentalisation of
30 The reasons could be personal, social and economic. Brokers usually get attach with any
bigwig and establish a parasitic relationship that connects politicians with voters. Supporters are
friends or family (extended) members who increase their status or future material opportunities by
supporting a candidate. 31 Agricultural Castes. 32 Vote-blocks use both as guard against excessive power by low status kinship groups and
for welding power by others.
22
traditional norm of reciprocity. The inequality in physical endowments,
educational attainment and differential access to scarce public and market
resources increase the importance of intermediate brokers. The villagers with
their lesser interaction to outside world and cultural inhibitions feel comfortable
to rely on their Biradri or village fellows for daily life issues. Moreover, in the
face of shocks, most of households become vulnerable and in absence of any
safety nets, the very same people rescue them. This has led to cementing a
relation of reciprocity constructed around exchange. The broker/ patron expects
that his noble act of generosity should be paid albeit in different currency, by
casting a vote on his recommendation. Thus a subtle form of association
emerges out that has developed new fancy tools of curbing and limiting the
popular function of participation by manipulating affectional ties and human
instincts.
4.1.2. Politics in Candidate Based Village
Jindo Sahi is a candidate based village and the associational structure
for local politics is very traditional. Physical infrastructure related to
sanitation, education and communication in this village was relatively in poor
condition from other studied villages. The population size was large and
poverty was much more evident. The social structure was also more pluralistic
as between Jatt and Rajput Biradri a large portion of Christian and Rawal
Biradri part of village community. The tension between rival vote-blocks was
visible and geography of village settlements itself speak about that. The Jatt
and Rajput households were neatly separated by large settlements of Christian
and Rawal households. The politics was regarded as a sensitive issue and the
freedom of association and easy attitude towards politics was mostly missing
in this village.
Jindo Sahi (candidate based) village pronounced a neat division into two
competing factions formed around primordial identities of caste and represent all
social categories inhabiting the village space. Rajput family heads one of the
vote-block whose core made up of few households belonging to Gujjar and
Kashmiri Biradri. Rajputs are relatively large landowners and migrants from
Gurdaspur Tehsil. The other block is composed of Jatt Biradri and earns good
fortunes via employment in public sector jobs. They are locals (muqammi) and
use this identity to cement their internal group solidarity. There are also present
about 35 households of Christian community, which are mostly employed in
low-scale government jobs. Rawal Biradri was made the majority of this village
that is relatively poor and mostly self-employed in small scale vending jobs.
This village lacks any sanitation facility, no high school for boys or girls and
without the provision of gas. Most of the households lament that all surrounding
villages enjoy cheap fuel but due to intra-village factionalism around petty
issues, their village denied the supply of gas fuel.
23
Fig. 3. Political Associations in Candidate Based Villages
Due to the presence of strong vote-blocks33 with strong outside linkages
through their association with political parties use their access to coercive forces
of state to further their own agendas. The choice available to the households is
limited because they have either to vote one block or other. To get the support of
the Rawal or Christian Biradri use of intimidation is common from both sides.
The low-income status of majority populations, lack of alternatives forced them
to enter into clientelistic relations with either of the blocks. Most of the spoils
offered by patterns remain intrinsically personal garnish by emotive appeals to
any gift exchange in recent or distant past34. Even the presence of political
allegiance with national parties does not improve the bargaining power of junior
partners of vote-blocks vis-à-vis leaders of their respective vote-blocks. The
extent, intensity, and dependency that clientelism produces is found to be higher
in candidate based than non-candidate village.
33 Who are strategically aligned with two factions of Pakistan Muslim League 34 One of the key informants has narrated an incident that how during one of the election
campaigns one of the vote-block leader (VBL) went to a household asking for votes for a particular
candidate. The timing of the visit was after midnight when all members of the household were
sleeping. The reason behind this audacity was that some ten years ago the VBL has helped in
securing public job for one of the son. Naturally, he was expecting some kind of reciprocity for that
his act of generosity.
24
Both villages receive almost similar level of development projects, are at
similar distance from city centres, linked with towns through metaled roads and
majority of population is employed in non-farm sector. Then why difference in
associational structure of politics exists? The most reasonable explanation could
be the emergence of hostility around kinship identity, its politicisation and the
bearings of direct competition between candidates based in same village. The
structure of competition directly influences the structure of association. The
freedom of choice got limited and that certainly disturbed the development of
social forces in ways different than the other category village. This example also
highlights the still abundant influence of social structures on political association
in Pakistan in spite a lot of economic transformation. The social transformation,
a noble objective of politics, is still not in sight.
It can be concluded from the abovementioned discussion that candidate
based villages tend to provide little political freedoms to socially marginalised
groups. The political dependency in the candidate based village is high. The
animosity between two rival factions block emergence of any alternative at local
levels. Although in non-candidate based village the element of coercion weighed
little still political dependency is available. This political dependency is usually
caused by the inequality of status, income and differential access to other scarce
resources. This inequality incentivises the households to choose one or other
faction to increase its access to these valuable resources. Although the
bargaining power vary in different villages among households, vote-block
leaders and candidates but in absence of any horizontal solidarities candidates
and faction leaders extract more benefits out of this relationship. The
clientelistic nature of such relations is mostly remained hidden because of the
norms of reciprocity that made it possible for both patron and clients to label this
association in more humane manner. However, this type of political association
creates an internal dependency that negatively influences development of social
and political institutions.
4.2. Agency and Perceptions in Local Political Field
Households overwhelmingly supported democratic decentralisation, as it
will increase efficiency in the provision of public goods and increase
opportunities for creating political agency. This positive response is very much
in agreement with decentralisation proponents who suggest that representative
governments are the only way through which local demands of people could be
satisfied. In policy literature the political aspect of decentralisation has also been
emphasised that provides local governments legitimacy and support of the
population (Mohmand, 2008). The democratisation literature also emphasised
the importance of accountable executives to their principals. Without this
accountability, the excesses of power (for which bureaucratic system is
notorious for) could also affect the democratic decentralisation. To make an
25
executive accountable it is important to develop political institutions that
decrease opportunities for moral hazards.
Therefore, to unravel the crisscross of representation the key is to find out
the ways, methods and underlying reasons that guide candidature at local level.
Responses of households in this regard tend to diverge all theoretical
assumptions that policy makers so often propound to support the supposed
democratic dividends of decentralisation. When asked about the reasons for
which candidates contest elections the responses were negative, bordering
cynicism. Majority of the voters have lamented that reasons for candidates
getting into election competition are usually to sustain power or acquire self-
enrichment (Fig; 3). This implies a strong divergence between the desires of the
ideal and unfolding of the real that is influenced by the presence of inequalities
inherent in local structures (Vries, 2007). The people at gross level actually want
empowerment and more say in managing their social lives but social inequality,
personalization of politics and complete obsoleteness of previous social
collective institutions block realization of these ideals.
Fig. 4. Perceptions and Agency
5.22
37.83
27.83
13.04 14.35
serve self-enrichment enhance power sustain power patronizerelatives
Why Candidaties Contest Election
0
20
40
60
80
Percent
Evaluating a Candidate
education integrity wealth influence biraderi religion
26
‘Influence’ is an important barometer that voters use for measuring the
efficacy of any candidate (Fig: 5). In local parlance ‘Influence’ has different
meanings for different people. Fieldwork observations35 have highlighted that
voters evaluate influence of any candidate with respect to a) their access to state
agencies b) private enterprises in market i.e. financial and industrial sector c)
muscle to protect their supporters from any intimidations of other political
players. Why these kinds of qualities are required in any candidate? One of the
explanations could be that only a person with such qualities could do politics of
spoils and protect its voters from any kind of reprisals from opponents. As the
saying goes “Politics is not a job of decent man36 in Pakistan” only a powerful
man with high stocks of contacts and influence over thana could afford doing
politics. During my stay at one of the villages, I have observed police, through
increasing police patrols, intimidation also played as an election strategy to
manage dissent37.
With decreasing efficacy of extra-legal (thuggish38) channels of coercion,
intimidation has gown down new forms of legal coercions developed through
state agencies to meet political ends. In one of the sample villages the last LG
elections (held in 2005) were also rigged as the ruling party connived with local
administration in favor of one of the candidates39. This reflects the alarming
level of ineptitude and incapacity on the part of state agencies to draw a
universal principle for provision of basic amenities at local level. These
35 Interviews with different elements of local politics during mapping exercise have
provided us with differential meanings different respondents attach with the term influence. 36Siyast Sharif Aadmi ka kam nahin ha. 37 That candidate is nephew of an incumbent MNA of ruling party. The intimidation is very
much part of political culture in Pakistan. 38 The patrons to retain their social control in Punjab relied heavily on thuggish elements
called Rasa Geer in local parlance. 39 Village Six in our sample and then ruling party was PML (Q).
84
8 8
Yes No Do not know
Local Governments will be beneficial for Village
percent
27
divergences in perceptions about political decentralisation give way to different
practices that are in conflict with the demands of democratic participation.
All responses indicate an underlying cynicism about the nature and form
of politics. Nevertheless, in real life households have no other options than to
vote the same old people whom they perceive not as their well-wishers. They
have to join the political arena and cast their votes but on terms which are not
determined by them. Why this is the case? In the following is discussed
structural imperative of participation and its ideological undertakings in next
section.
4.3. Is Voting a Good Proxy for Democratisation?
Participation rate in local elections is remained lacklustre recently.40
Party pull in local election factors in very low and voter turnout explicitly
depends upon the efficacy of political machine that a candidate managed to
create on Election Day41. This machine consists of his (candidate) supporters,
vote-blocks that he managed to pin with him and independent voters who
exchange their votes for any promised/ given benefits. Therefore, even if the
voter turnout increases in some constituencies the terms and limitations of such
participations must be examined keenly for considerate comprehension of the
phenomenon.
As most of the households interviewed have shown keenness towards
making their contribution in political process, about ninety percent of the
households vote regularly in elections, but the inspiration for such participation
does not come from any abstract notions of participative democracy or
collective action but for immediate, contingent and emotive reasons42. The
village as a unit of production hit very badly due to the crisis in Agriculture. The
erstwhile principle of social organisation that knits a village into one little
communitarian unit has lost its vitality, Anthropologists has called that system
as Vartan Bhanji43 (Alavi, 1972; Eglar, 2010). This informal system, which was
rooted in affective ties earlier, has given rise to other forms of informalisation
that pivots around instrumental relations. In addition, that instrumentalisation is
evident from the actual voting preferences that respondents have made during
political deliberations44.
40 http//:www.Tribune/story/876025/low-turnout-mars-lg-in-cantonment-boards. 41 One usually heard a lot this one saying about election ‘Half election has been fought
before election day and other half on election day’. 42 Yes, response from any household head does not mean that all members of that household
would participate with similar enthusiasm. In addition, emotive elements play important role
especially in the making of core vote-block groups. 43 An indigenous informal/unwritten code of conduct that regulate social exchange in
Punjabi Village life. 44 Although local government elections are yet to be held in Punjab but before the
postponement of elections in 2014 all election practices were taking place in 2014.
28
Fig. 5. Conditions on Participation
The informal political institutions of vote-block45 are present in each
village studied in this research. The constitution of vote-blocks varies in
candidate and non-candidate villages. The candidate villages are divided more
neatly in cohorts and freedom of choice is limited as well as the bargain power
for any household. Non-candidate villagers enjoy relatively greater freedom for
political association with higher bargaining power. The findings tend to diverge
from SK Mohmand (2011) as thirty percent of the respondents do not agree that
they vote as being part of any faction. This reflects that historical variables i.e.
land tenure system, migration; state-led modernisation and climate have a
differential impact on the formation of political associations in old settled
districts of Punjab. There are also certain similarities as the sway of kinship
idiom on the alignment of political associations is significantly present. Figure 6
illustrates that Biradri and Neighborhood still hold important position with
reference to the formation of political association. However, while interpreting
these responses following caveats ought to be observed. 1) both categories are
not exclusive, as same Biradri groups inhabit most of the neighborhoods. 2)
vote-blocks membership is not permanent and changes by every election 3)
schism within Biradri is abundant and same Biradri could be divided into many
antagonistic vote-blocks 4) occupational castes usually vote independently from
Biradri vote-blocks46 5) the independence of voter from traditional bondage does
not provide any substantial awareness about how to use this freedom 6)
45 I have used vote-blocks/ factions interchangeably for this study. 46 Occupational castes have usually considered as marginalised segments of village
community. However, larger part of occupational caste populations have migrated to cities (both
small and large) and remaining enjoy relatively more prosper life. However, the agriculturalists are
not happy with this state of affairs as they complain about the changed attitudes of Kammis.
29
inequality in status, access to job market, credit market, information and state
agencies push voters to depend on personal networks to access these scarce
goods47. Most of the households participate and vote for much personalised
reasons. Any candidate who could deal with such fragmented population
increases his chances in elections. However, the terms he will offer to these rival
blocks would depend upon the organisational capacity and electoral size of these
blocks. Meeting the contingent demands for club goods, private favors,
provision of loans and buying of votes are strategies that now candidates use in
local elections.48
With little availability of development funds, low level of social
expenditure and lack of uniform access to information at market place means
these scarce resources would be captured by those who have a greater access to
state and market. Households in my data set are neither ignorant nor
economically dependent for their livelihood. Therefore, they use their votes as
an instrument, a token of investment in distant future. The vote for an individual
does not carry the same meaning or purposefulness as it for an American or
European citizen.
The above-mentioned household responses about their political practices
are although only reflections of personal opinions but point towards certain
trends those other scholars have also found in other parts of the country. All
these responses echo the presence of a clientelistic relation between Principal
(Citizen) and Agent (Politician) banded through affective ties of kinship and
sustained through norms of exchange-reciprocity. So, much dispersed and
inherently weak principal divided along multiple cleavages provide greater
strategic advantage to candidate in this political game. But for candidate to
actually have the upper hand few things are necessary a) Good name b) His
personal networks c) Good amount of fortune d) Access to the state institutions.
These highly prized attributes provide an edge to candidate against his
opponents49. Then once again, it is left with the ingenuity of candidate to play
his card intelligently to secure a win50 why such influence is important for
evaluating a candidate? It has lot to do with the overall insecurity and patriarchal
norms of society and other veils of oppression existing in Pakistani society
(Gazdar, 2007).
47 These observations have been made during my extended stay at field locations in 2014
and 2015. 48 While interviewing different political brokers, ex-union council Nazim and potential
candidates for new elections we have come through another insight. One of the ex-Nazim from UC 1
has claimed that local elections are the most expensive elections as the role of money has increased
manifold in these elections. 49 Thana and kitchehri played very important role in local elections and having good
influence over these
Institutions increase winning chances for a candidate. 50 A male vote-bloc leader at village 1.
30
4.4. Conclusion
Last sections discussed, with the help of household data, about the
political perceptions and practices of households at local Union Council level
politics. The trends emerged out of data reflect that, voters at large, shown a
cynical disposition towards politics but at same time positively hope that
democratic decentralisation will improve the provision of social utilities. Then
most of them vote regularly but their motives/ causes behind voting are
completely at odds with agreed universal practices of vote casting. At the very
local level of village where there is contingent and face-to-face interaction,
affectional ties, envies and rivalries go hand in hand with inequalities of social
and economic status, voting gets a personalized activity. The modernisation has
greatly altered the economic organisation of the rural society but inequalities of
social status and modes of cultural affinities are still present. Due to the
incidence of inequality of access to scarce public resources and information,
vertical political associations dominate the sphere of political association.
Horizontal, rules and norm base impersonal ties are just present among core
groups of vote-blocks who always belong to higher social status groups and
mostly fall in high-income brackets too. Their internal solidarity and access to
information increase their power of organisation and political mobilisation in
election times. Through holding this access to stock of resources, they induce a
political culture of patronage. And common voter/ household has no choice but
to get into an exchange-relationship either with one of the vote-blocs or directly
with candidate himself, who himself also heads one of the vote-bloc. In the
absence of any programmatic political party, which can provide an alternative
way of political organisation, these informal ways of politicking would
undermine all efforts of political development through grassroot
democratisation.
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The introduction of political parties at local level is a welcoming
decision51. However local government election results in cantonment areas and
KP province clearly shows some disturbing trends. 1) Incumbent party at
national/provincial level will lead the local elections 2) Independent candidates
will remain in second position.
Firstly, conceptual framework clearly explicates that incumbent political
government at higher tiers would influence the outcome of local elections
through legislative procedures, bureaucracy and their local incumbents. Thus,
the provincial governments tried their best to avoid any opponent party to come
into power. Secondly, the political parties have ridden with factions locally and
it would be difficult for parties to organise party based elections at village level.
51 Village councils have elected on non-party bases in KP.
31
KP government already has experimented with election of non-party elections
for village councils. The local government law explicitly states that chairman/
vice-chairman of village council would be contesting jointly. This would create
problems for both candidates and parties. Parties would be inviting intra-
factional tensions at local level while candidates would find it difficult it too
difficult to put joint candidates. Therefore, non-party based elections would be
the most appropriate policy option to manage the dissent and chaos local level.
Nudging away the village council, the recent election results have shown
that either siding with incumbent party or independent is the safest option for
any candidate. Parties because of their meddlesome internal affairs have still to
develop a free and fair internal mechanism to award tickets, money, access to
party leaders or influence at local level are standards for distribution of
nomination tickets. All parties in Pakistan are without any internal democracy
and dynastic machines of dispensing patronage (UNDP, 2013). Party
organisations are dubious and internal elections are out of agenda. Rather than
giving any ideologically cohesive programme these parties rely on power
politics and distribute nomination tickets to those who has his/her own personal
following. This means that candidate has to finance his whole election campaign
himself and party would not share any of the burden. This financial cost paved
the way for politically induced economic corruption that is used for both self-
enrichment and patronage extension (M. H. Khan, 1998). The way local political
associations have created and managed means the candidate will neither be
accountable to voters nor its party bosses.
Secondly, independent candidates would themselves feel free to join or
make alliance any of the party after elections, and most probably, it would be the
incumbent party. The huge success of independents indicates two trends 1)
Voters still feel happy to negotiate with local patrons whom they know
personally 2) The trust on political parties, with reference to local elections, is
very low. This is because political parties in Pakistan are political machines and
political bosses are not answerable to their supporters. The irony is that voters
depend on these local (independent or party based) political patrons to access
scarce public resources. Therefore, following policy inferences are extracted
through this study:
(1) New holistic political economy research agenda is required that helps
in providing new insights for effective transformative policy
formulation.
(2) Political parties lacked ideological support at grassroot level. Until
this can’t be done personalisation of politics will rule the political
roost at lower level. Therefore, the need is to make political parties
internally more democratic and representative to people.
(3) Informal intermediary institutions exist and influence the outcomes.
It is the need of the time that rather than practising European models
32
for grassroot our policy discourse should incorporate local informal
institutions into legal structures which will eventually reduce the
cultural alienation that people feel from these types of local
government institutions especially in rural areas.
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