THE DIFFERENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE IN

PATRIMONIAL AND FEUDAL SOCIETIES

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of Graduate Studies

of

The University of Guelph

BY

MARK MCKERROW

In partial fuffilment of requirements

For the degree of

Master of Arts

April, 1999

O Mark McKerrow, 1999

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ABSTRACT

THE DIFFERENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE IN PATRIMONLAL AND FEUDAL SOCETIES

Mark Wayne McKerrow University of Guelph, 1999

Advisor: Professor J. 1. (Hans) Bakker

This thesis deals with the role that feudalism plays in the emergence of capitalism.

In contrast to explanations emphasizing the nse of capitalism after the collapse of

feudalism, the emphasis here is on the development of capitalism within feudal societies.

These early capitdist developments are conceived of as managed estates ernploying free

labour. After defending and outlining the logic of the comparative method, two feudd

cases - Japan (1600-1868) and England (1 1004348) - are compared to two patrimonial

cases - The Ottoman Empire (1450-1700) and China (1368-1644). A neo-Webenan list

of preconditions for capitalism is used to direct the cornparison.

It is found that al1 four cases possess the preconditions necessary for capitalist

agnculnird conceived of as managed estates. While the preconditions have not led to

managed estates in the patrimonial cases to the extent they did in the feudal cases, the

reasons for this do not seem to be related to the feudal-patrimonial distinction.

In The Ottoman Empire managed estates are discouraged by the central

govemment's policy of maintaining a landholding class of independent cultivators - a

policy not inherent to patrimonial societies - which Iimits available labour for managed

estates. In Ming China a combination of population pressure and the requirements of wet

nce production, which made sharecropping and fixed rent tenancy economicdy

rational, served to discourage rnanaged estates.

The comparative method is discussed in light of the findings, and is found to be a

valuable approach if properly employed. The value of the use of negative cases is

stressed. The necessity of introducing new cases to test existing explmations and

possible caveats of cornparison are discussed.

1

Acknowledgements

1 would like to thank my advisor .J. 1. (Hans) Bakker for his encouragement and

support during my undergraduate and graduate programs in sociology. I would ais0 like

to th& Frans Schryer and Stan Barrett who were on my thesis cornmittee and both

offered vaiuable criticism and support during my graduate program.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2: Historical Comparative Sociology ................................................. 6

Chapter 3: Approaches to the Developrnent of Capitalism ................................... 12

Chapter 4: The Preconditions for Capitalism ........................................................ 25

Chapter 5: Categorizing the Cases ........................................................................ 38

Chapter 6: Presence/Absence of the Preconditions for Capitdism ....................... 69

Chapter 7: Causes of the Differential Development of Capitalist Agriculture .... -90

Chapter 8: Discussion ............................................................................................ 94

Chapter 9: Conclusions ....................................................................................... 100

Chapter 1:

Introduction

A Comparative Method

The use of the comparative rnethod in histoncal sociology has been criticized.

These cnticisms often seem to be leveled at evolutionary approaches and atternpts to

develop nomothetic explanations, which are not inherent to the comparative method.

When applied correctly the comparative method cm be a vaiuable research method. A

systematic application of both Mills' Method of Agreement - which compares cases with

positive outcomes - and Method of Difference - which compares positive cases to

negative cases - is usefül provided the conditions necessary for a reasonable comparison

are met, and the possible caveats of a comparative method are realized and dealt with.

Most explanations of the development of capitalism do not employ the

comparative method. or do not employ it adequately. While some explanations include

several Western European countries as positive cases, rnost do not include Japan. Those

that do include Japan generally do not include negative cases. When contrasting cases

have been introduced, it is normally only by way of brief historicai exarnples (often out

of context) to support the argument. Nothing is included to demonstrate possible

weaknesses of the argument.

The aim of this thesis is to employ both positive and negative cases in a

comparative study of the development of capitalism in feudal societies. To this end 1 will

look at two cases that are considered to have endogenously developed (a measure of)

capitalism within a feudal penod and compare them with two cases that developed

endopnous capitalism to a lesser degree wNhin a patrimonial penod. While 1 do not

address the transition fiom pre-modem to modem econornic conditions, 1 do argue that

understanding the reasons for the presence of capitalism within feudal penods and the

demh of capitalism within patrimonial petiods is a valuable step in the process of

understanding the emergence of modem capitalism.

The feudal cases, characterized by political decentralization or "parcellization of

sovereignty", are England fiom 1 100 to 1348 and Tokugawa Japan ( 1600-1868). The

patrimonial cases, characterized by political centralization, are the Ottoman Empire

focussing on 1450-1700 and Ming China (1368-1644). Most discussions of the

emergence of capitaiism in England involve the period from 1500 to 1750. This is

reasonable because it precedes (what is cornmonly thought of as) the emergence of

modem capitalism. However, England developed a dynamic economy from 1100 to

1348, and had relations best described as capitalist.

Neo-Weberian Approach

One approach (associated with Marx and Marxists) in understanding the

development of capitalism out of feudalism, involves the collapse of feudalism due to an

inherent crisis in its structure. This crisis leads to the emergence of capitalist relations of

production where there were none before.' A second approach, associated with Weber,

involves the gradual rise of capitalist relations within a society that is not predominately

capitalist. This project adopts the latter conception. The notion of a "crisis of feudalism"

is questionable on ernpirical grounds. Hilton (1976) argues the factors that make up

capitalism c m be quantified, resulting in the possibility of having societies containing

varying levels of capitalism. Bntnell (1993a) applies this thinking to England 1100-

1300. and finds that, on balance, this period in England's history was more capitalist than

the penod M O - 1500, which commonly represents the cnsis period and the introduction

of capitalist relations in Marxist analysis.

A revision of Weber's multi-causal explanation of the development of capitalism

will be used for the cornparison. Weber's multi-causal explanation is outlined in The

Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitolism, and is discussed at length in General

Economic History. Unlike the mono-causal "economic ethos" explanation that is often

attributed to Weber (erroneously 1 believe) the inulti-causal explanation includes, in

addition to an econornic ethos, other conditions - such as free labour, calculable

economic conditions that allow long-term economic planning, and technology to "free-up

labour" - that are necessary for the emergence of modem capitalism. However. Weber's

preconditions were developed inductively from the histov of Western Europe, and they

are of limited value in a comparative study that includes Japan.

Randall Collins (1997) has revised Weber's preconditions in order to enable him

to explain capitalist developments in other times and at other places. Collins uses his

revision to explain the development of what he believes is the initial step in the

development of capitalism: capitdist agriculture. Collins conceives capitalist agriculture

as managed estates employing free labour and labour saving techniques. This capitalist

agriculture, he claims, is found first within mona~tic econornies where the preconditions

for capitalism are first met. He f'urther argues that the "spilling over" of these productive

capitalist rnonastic econornies have caused capitalist booms in the secular society.

1 According to Gotleib (1984) Marx did not discuss the crisis of feudalism in detail and did not advocate an economic determinist approach. He suggests others may have applied an economic detenninist approach to emulate Marx's analysis of capitalism.

1 follow Collins' emphasis on the importance of capitalist agriculture in the

deveiopment of capitalism by focussing on the development of managed estates. 1

explore the possibility that the differential development of capitalist agriculture in feudal

and patrimonial societies is caused by the presence of the preconditions in the feudal

cases and absence of the preconditions in the patrimonial cases. In other words, I will

attempt to determine if feudaiism provides a setting in which the preconditions for

capitalist agriculture are possibie, while patrimonialism provides a setting that prevents

the preconditions. However, 1 further revise Collins' revision- Most sigificantly, 1

argue that an economic ethos is not a necessary or useful part of an explanation of the

development of capitalism and omit the economic ethos requirement altogether.

Overview of the Thesis

Chapter 2 discuses the assumptions, logic and value of a comparative historical

approach. Chapter 3 reviews aiternate approaches to the development of capitalisrn,

including those that focus on a transition within feudalism, those that focus on a

transition from feudalism, and those that ignore the role of feudalism. Chapter 4 outlines

Weber's multi-causal explanation for the development of capitalism, Collins' revision of

this model, and my further revisions. In Chapter 5, feudalism, patrïmonialism and

capitalism are operationalized in order to divide the societies into positive (feudal

societies with capitalist agriculture) and negative (patrimonial societies without capitalist

agriculture) cases. The finding of the cornparison in Chapter 6 is that the preconditions

for capitaiist agriculture are present in both positive and negative cases. This finding is

discussed in light of the traditional belief that kudal and patrimonial societies differ

widely on market freedom and the conditions that allow the ability t o make long-term

economic plans. Chapter 7 explores possible causes for the differential developrnent of

managed estates in the cases despite the presence of the preconditions in al1 of them. It is

found that different conditions within the societies - such as the requirements of wet rice

cultivation, population pressure, and goals of the central bureaucracy - worked to make

rnanaged estates econornically irrational in the patrimonial societies. It is concluded,

however, that these differences are not related to the feudai-patrimonial distinction.

Chapter 8 discusses the value of and possible problems associated with histoncal

comparative sociology. Chapter 9 summarizes the findings and discusses future research

possibilities.

Chapter 2:

Historical Comparative Sociology

Requirements for Cornparison

The whole notion of the comparability of societies has been criticized. A problem

arises when a characteristic that is shared by separate societies is explained in terms of

sirnilar intemal developments when it has in fact spread by diffusion from one society to

another or from another society to both societies. The problem of interaction c m also

occur when trying to explain dissirnilar characteristics of societies. This problem has

been emphasized by world-system adherents who point out that countries do not become

economically advanced or backward independently; instead, their development is tied to

their interaction with other countries.

The problem in both cases is that interaction between the cases has been

overlooked. In response to this problem some have emphasized the need to demonstrate

that there is no interaction between the cases in order to permit comparison. This is

demanding too much. It is not necessary to demonstrate that two societies being

compared do not affect one another in any way. It must only be the case that they do not

affect one another in such a way that the characteristic being attributed to interna1

developments should not, in fact, be attributed to interaction. For exarnple, Japan and

China are being compared with the aim of explainhg economic developments thïough

endogenous political and social conditions. This may seem unreasonable to those who

demand cultural isolation because these countries are known for their interaction. For

example, Japan h a adopted and adapted much from Chinese art and architecture.

However, these cannot be seen to be the common cause of economic developments in

both China and Japan. It is also unreasonable to claim that the trade relationship between

Japan and China could be responsible for the differential developments of these

countries. Trade between two societies is not enough to elirninate comparability; the

trade must be demonstrated to be the cause of economic outcornes.

Control in Comparison

When developing a causal explanation you attempt to explain variation with

variation. Control is introduced to increase the certainty that the variation you are

attnbuting cause to is in fact causing the variation you are trying to explain. Both

variation and control are achieved in different manners when using different approaches.

In social science experimentation variation is attained through manipulation of the

independent variable; control of extraneous factors is (often) achieved though

randornization, which is supposed to distribute other variabIes evenly among both the

expenmental and control groups.

Sometimes variation cannot be achieved through manipulation due to practical or

ethical considerations. In non-experimental research information is taken from subjects

where the variation has already occurred in the independent (and often the dependent)

variable. Control of extraneous factors must be achieved statistically. A problem with

this technique is the requirement that you need to know the variables you should control

for, and that you need to gain information on these variables in advance.

In comparative historical sociology, manipulation is impossible. Information

must be taken from cases in which the variation in both the independent and dependent

variables has already occurred. Control may be achieved in two ways: the Method of

Agreement, and the Method of Difference, as discussed in Mills7 A System of Logic.

Both are methods of elimination:

The Method of Agreement stands on the ground that whatever can be eliminated is not

connected with the phenomenon by any law. The Method of Difference has for its

foundation, that whatever cannot be eliminated is connected with the phenomenon by Law.

(Mill, 1930: 256).

The Method of Agreement consists of comparing cases that share the outcome or

quality of interest as well as a crucial sirnilarity, believed to be the cause of the outcome.

Mill illustrates this method with the cornparison of two cases. In one case the

antecedents A, B. C, are followed by the consequences a, 6, c, while in the other case the

antecedents A, D, E are followed by the consequences a, d, e. Mill concIudes A is

causally connected with a, while B, C, D, and E are not. In other words, control of

extraneous factors is attained on those variables that are not comrnon to both cases.

Mill points out that a shortcoming of this method is that one cannot be certain if A

is causally related to a, or rnerely precedes it "as day precedes night or night day" (Mill,

1930: 255). This uncertainty is due to the fact that we cannot be certain A is the only

unconditional antecedent of a; i.e. there may be an unconsidered or unrecognized

antecedent of a that is the cause.

Mill says that an axiom of the Method of Agreement is that "Whatever

circumstance cm be excluded, without prejudice to the phenomenon, or c m be absent

notwithstanding its presence, is not connected with it in the way of causation" (Mill,

1930: 255). This axiom, however, rules out the possibility of multiple causation: the

possibility that a variable not shared by the cases is responsible for a, and that there are

multiple causes for the same outcome. For exarnple, B and D may be causes of n (or A

and D etc.). Furthermore, an interaction of factors rnay be necessary to produce a. For

example, A and B or A and D rnay be necessary to produce a. If this is the case, the

finding that A is a cause is reasonable, but the finding that B and D are not is not.

The Method of Difference involves comparing cases that have the outcorne of

interest (positive cases) with cases that do not (negative cases). The finding that the

positive cases share a common element the negative cases lack suggests the element

shared among the positive cases is the cause of the outcome- Mill illustrates this method

by cornparing a positive case with the antecedents A, B, C and consequences a, b, c, to a

negative case with the antecedents B, C, and consequences b, c. From bis, Mill

concludes A is the cause of a; either A alone or A in conjunction with some other

circumstances present.

Again, this method suffers from the inâbility to explore al1 antecedents of the

positive outcome, and cannot determine if A is causally related to a or rnerely precedes it.

An axiom of this method is that "Whatever antecedent cannot be excluded

without preventing the phenomena, is the cause, or a condition of that phenomena" (Mill,

1934: 256). One of the problems with the use of this method is that it is often assumed

that those antecedents that are present both when the consequence occurs and when it

does not are not causally related to the outcome of interest. In other words it is assumed

that a constant cannot explain variation. However, it is possible for an element shared by

the positive and negative cases is responsible for the positive outcome in the positive

case. A common element rnay be responsible for the different outcornes due to different

circumstances. Referring back to the exarnple, B may have been the cause of a, but rnay

have completely different effects in the absence of A.

In addition to the problem of contextuai effects obscuring the role of a constant as

the cause of differential outcornes, Barrett (1992: 27) points out that the cumulative

effects of variables may obscure the role a constant may play as a cause of a different

outcome between cases. A condition necessary, possibly even of prirnary importance, for

explaining an outcome may be present in both positive and negative cases, but may not

have the sarne effect in both cases due an unshared factor. For exarnple, B may be the

prirnary cause of a, but be in itself insufficient to cause it, while A is only the additional

push necessary to bring about a.

WhiIe a lirnited number of cases require non-statistical methods to attain control

there is no sirnilar rzplacement for statisticd significance. The goal of achieving

statistical significance is to increase the certainty that the relationship between the

variables is not a rnere coincidence. You want to have enough cases to be certain that an

apparent relationship could not have occurred by chance. This certainty cannot be

achieved to the sarne degree in historical sociology because of the lack of cases. In the

present study, there are only two positive cases. It could easily be the case, statistically

speaking, that the relationship between feudalism and the emergence of capitalism is

mere coincidence - they could have nothing to do with one another. Perhaps if there

were more cases of feudalism they would not al1 develop into capitalism. However, those

engaging in historical comparative sociology realize that correlation is in itself not

compelling, and thus concentrate on explaining the "internai mechanisms of change",

which make the belief in a causal relationship more reasonable.

Why Compare Societies?

I mentioned previously that some consider the use of control in historical research

problematic. In addition to the empirical considerations mentioned above, some adhere

to an axiomatic position that denies a priori the possibility of usefully comparing

societies; instead, each society is seen to be unique because each society is the result of

unique circumstances. I disagree with this position. While 1 do not advocate the search

for nomothetic laws, I do hold that similar social structures will have similar dynarnics

leading to similar outcomes.

Chapter 3:

Approaches to the Development of Capitaiism

There are a variety of explanations for the development of capitalism. Some

employ feudalism as the sole cause, some include feudalism as an important elernent, and

some do not include it at dl. A variety of these explanations are reviewed here. It is

found that these explanations are problematic because they do not incorporate the

Japanese case or do not introduce negative cases for control.

Marxian Approaches

Maurice Dobb (1963) emphasized features internai to feudalism when explaining

the "cnsis of feudalism". He argued that, due to a game of conspicuous consumption,

lords continuously increased the level of exploitation of the serfs. This encouraged serfs

to leave the land. Lords were then forced to abandon feudal relations for profit-oriented

production for exchange or sale or lease of land to rich peasants.

Sanderson (1994) points out that such an explanation is problematic because other

agrarian societies that have ernphasized conspicuous consumption have existed that did

not continually increase the exploitation of serfs.

Sweezy (1976) argues that feudalism does not contain intrinsic elements

necessary for a change in productive relations. An extrinsic element - international trade

- was the necessary impetus to the move towards capitalism. The developrnent of market

relations and cities arose with international trade. There was a move away from feudal

relations when peasants fled to the cities, and lords saw the possibility for wealth in the

new market relations.

This argument is countered by the historical evidence that trade and cities

developed within the feudal system (i.e. they were not the effects of an extemal

influence), and that the response to the growth of trade was different in different areas

(e-g. changes from dues to rent in England took place in the areas furthest from towns,

and Eastern Europe ernployed serfdom as a response to increased grain trade). There is

also no reason why lords could not simply squeeze more out of serfs when faced with

markets. In addition, Sweezy's trade-onented explanation does not account for the

expansion-crisis-growth pattern found in European feudalism.

Guy Bois attempts to explain why such a cycle of crises leads to increasing levels

of capitalist relations. Each cnsis leads the lords to perceive their traditional methods of

sustaining their hegemony as ineffective, and this leads them to increase the use of hired

labour and production for exchange (Gottlieb, 1984: 10). Bois' explanation, however,

fails to explain the development of capitalist agriculture in England pnor to its

development in France, when France had been feudal longer than England.

To account for the difference between England and France Brenner introduces the

importance of the political relationship between the Crown and the peasants. In France,

the monarchy used the strategy of keeping the peasants free, which enabled them to

maintain their land, while in England the peasants were relatively weak, and lost their

land to the aristocracy, who leased the land to agicultural capitalists.

Perry Anderson also includes political considerations. He argues the explanation

of historical change should not be restricted to economic causes, and that it is not useful

to isolate the economic realm in pre-capitalist societies in which economic production,

political power and juridical power are fused. If economic relations alone were important

in explauùng the rise of capitalism in Europe then other societies with large land

ownership, small peasant production, economic coercion, and limited comrnodity

production should have developed capitalisrn. Anderson adds that the political dimension

of the "parcellization of sovereignty" was necessary for the ernergence of capitalism.

Parcellization of sovereignty led, most irnportantly, to the development of autonomous

towns, which encouraged production. Anderson descnbes the crisis of (western)

feudalism, which is necessary to d o w changes in the political-economic system.

increased population on limited quality land led to the use of marginal land. The

resulting reduction of pasturage led to a reduction in per capita output (due to use of

marginal land and less fertilizer) which in tum led to famine. Famine led to a labour

shortage that led to restrictions on lords' demands. This led to the leasing out of land to

capitalist agriculturists because this became economically more rational.

In Eastern Europe where land abundance could not dlow for the causal chain to

begin, the explanation for the eastern variant of the Absolutist State must be found

elsewhere. For Anderson, the pressure of the powerfùl Western Absolutist States is

primarily responsible for the development of the Eastern AbsoIutist State. The rnilitarily

powemil western countries forced the East to keep up. A key distinction between the

eastern and western versions of the absolutist States is the econornic efficiency and

development of towns within the West. These differences are largely responsible for the

earlier emergence of capitalism in the West. While there were towns in the East they

were not as large and were controlled by landed aristocracy. In contrast, the western

cities were an alternative for the serfs in the West, and this caused the concessions the

lords eventually had to grant the producing class.

The above explanations are not acceptable because they do not account for

Tokugawa Japan, which is d so feudal. iapan never experienced a demographic crisis,

did not have truly autonomous cities, and was isolated from foreign uade during the

Tokugawa period, FoIlowing Brenner, Yarnarnura ( 1979) argues that Japan's agrarian

landholding patterns led to the sarne consequences as the enclosures in England.

However, Brenner's explanation of the rise of capitalism does not fit the England 1 100-

1350 case that did not experience anything Like enclosures that resulted in a large class of

dispossessed cultivators.

However, some explanations do incorporate the Japanese case, and argue that it is

has the sarne dynamics as Western European countries.

Social Evolutionary Explanations

Stephen Sanderson (1994) rejects explanations of the development of capitalism

that do not account for both the European and Japanese cases. He lists five relevant

similarities between the European States to first develop capitalism (England and the

Netherlands) and lapan: size, which facilitated communication and reduced political

expenses; geography, which facilitated maritime transportation; climate, which reduced

the possibility of entering into peripheral economic relationships (due to agricu1tura.I

potential); demography, which pressured increased agricultural production; and political

structure (1994: 39-42).

Arnong these factors political structure - narnely feudalism - which leads to the

freedom of merchants, is seen as the most important. UnIike Weber, Sanderson does not

see the requirement of historically unlikely conditions for the emergence of capitalism-

Instead, he sees the emergence of capitalism as inevitable. Once trade reached a "critical

mass" capitalisrn resulted. The expansion of trade and the freedom of merchants have

been advancing for 4500 years, since the beginning of agarian societies. Capitalism

emerged in Japan and Northwest Europe first because thek political systems allowed

merchants freedom that other pre-capitalist political systems did not.

Sanderson's approach incorporates the Japanese case; however, it fdters in the

face of evidence from the negative cases. This will be disclissed later (Chapter 8) after

the negative cases have been introduced,

Sanderson's approach has been criticized for its social evolutionary perspective.

This approach has been influentid in the history of sociology. August Comte argued for

the study of societies as integrated wholes. These whoIes should be studied with the aim

of arriving at laws:

The conception of invariable naturd laws. the foundation of every idea of order, will have

the same philosophical efficacy here as elsewhere, as soon as it was suffrciently generalized

to be applied to social phenomenon, thenceforth referred, like al1 other phenornena to such

laws (Comte in Allahar, 1995: 59).

Comte developed the Law of Three Stages, which States that al1 societies p a s

through three successive stages: theological, metaphysical, and positivistic. The third

stage is required for rational progress because it promotes peaceful economic activity.

Spencer also believed in a nomothetic evolutionary development of societies.

While the compounding of societies influences their development, societies are seen to

develop into industrialized nations endogenously; less developed societies simply need

more time to develop into industrialized societies.

While social evolutionary theones posit the development of an economically

advanced society from a less advanced society. they had largely been presented as

descriptions of advanced and less advanced societies until Rostow (1962) attempted to

overcome this limitation. In The Stages of Economic Growth (1962) he presented the

intermediate stages a Society passes through on its way to development. Ali societies

begin with the stage of traditiondism, pass through stages where the preconditions for

increased production and economic take-off occur, and result in the fifth stage of "high

mass consumption".

This theory is problematic. As Frank points out, "No underdeveloped country has

ever managed to take off out of its underdevelopment following Rostow's stages" (Frank,

in Allahar, 1995: 76). The theory is ahistorical: it ignores the significantly different paths

developed nations have taken, and implies that developed countries have a history of

development while underdeveloped countries have no history.

Allaha. argues that evolutionary theoi-ies act to free developed nations from any

responsibility they may have had for the lack of development of other areas, as well as

discouraging developed nations from interfenng in the "natural path" undeveloped

nations are on (Allahar, 1995: 77-78). More historically oriented development theorists

known as (structural) dependency theorists have attacked these theories. They charged

that underdeveloprnent better describes many less developed countries. They are not in a

natural state, but one developed through interaction with other, more developed, nations.

World-systems theory has developed in response to the evolutionary approach and

the problems associated with treating cases as independent entities. Despite not

focussing on the feudalism to capitdism argument, they are discussed because of their

influence and the challenge they pose to the "non-interactive" comparative approach

taken here.

World-Systems Theory

Emanuel Wallerstein descnbes his attempt to find a suitable unit of analysis for

studying social change as one of the starting points for his work in world-systems theory.

He came to realize that dealing with cases in isolation did not capture the forces acting to

change politically defined nations. Instead, it was necessary to deal with the larger

system of which various nations were a part: the modem world-system. Because

countries are part of the same system it is of little vaiue to compare them in isolation to

determine the causal factors responsible for their outcomes. He sees what are believed to

be internal developments as the result of interaction with other countnes. Because there

is only one modem world-system there is nothing to compare it to, and it is only possible

to understand the system by exploring its history.

According to Wailerstein's system, countries fail into one of four categories: core,

periphery, serni-periphery, and externai. Core states are those that have the mosi highly

skilled labour force, are the most highly industrialized, have the least coercive forms of

labour, and have the strongest govemments. The periphery has the least skilled

workforce, is the least industrialized, has the most coercive forrns of labour, and has the

weakest govemments. The core states import labour intensive raw materials and export

technology intensive finis hed produc ts. The serni-perip hery includes those countries

attempting to attain core status, which are often the rniddlemen in core-periphery

relations and relationships. Extemal areas are those that have not been incorporated into

the system.

The modem world-system is heId together economically. This is in contrast to

previous systems, such as the Roman Empire, which were held together politically.

Econornically based systems allow a more efficient flow of wealth to the few and away

from the many. The type of system unity - political versus economic - is not merely of

classificatory importance. "Capitalism has been able to flourish precisely because the

(modem) world-economy has had within its bounds not one but a multiplicity of political

systems." (Wailerstein, 1974: 348). Political disunity is as crucial to the modem world-

system as political unity was to previous systems. This disunity allows capitalists to

maneuver more fkeely. "Capitalisrn is based on the constant absorption of economic loss

by political entities, while economic gain is distributed to 'private' hands" (Wallerstein,

1974: 348). This is only possible because the economy operates beyond the control of

any single polity. The differential strength of the polities within the system allows the

effective operation of transnational economic entities (Wallerstein, 1974: - 354).

However, at least some strong States are required to protect the core's interests.

While he is opposed to cornparisons that assume isolated development,

Wallerstein compares different roles countries have in and with the world system to

explain economic differences between politically defined entities. For example, he

explains the differential development of Poland and Russia by the different timing of

their entry into the world-system. By entering the system earlier than Russia, Poland was

transformed into a peripheral state while Russia, with its later entry, developed into a

semi-peripheral state.

Wallerstein presents his theory in opposition to those theories of the development

of capitalism that focus on the isolated development of a country. Therefore, it may

appear that an explanation of the emergence of capitalism that emphasizes a country's

political system and the development of necessary conditions such as Weber's approach

would be in opposition to Wallerstein's explmation. This is not necessarily the case.

Firstly, Wallerstein's world-systems have "a beginning and an end", indicating separate

regions, now part of the world-system, have a history pnor to their involvement in the

system. This pnor history may help to explain why some couniries have become core

States while others have become periphery, or semi-periphery (a point recognized by

Wallentein). Also, while Wallerstein may de-emphasize endogenous explanations, they

are not logically excluded by the assertion that interaction with other counuies is a

determinant of econornic outcome.

Eric Wolf aiso advocates a focus on interaction in explaining social development.

According to Wolf in his Europe and the People Wirltout History (1983)' the division of

political economy into separate disciplines with strictly demarcated boundaries has

naturally led to treating cases in isolation. Sociology developed as the study of social

order and its principal question was "What created order in society?" Wolf argues that

explanations in sociology focused on shared noms and the transition to heterogeneous

beliefs, which were seen as intemal developments. Anthropology has developed sirnilar

problems. There are recognized difficulties in distinguishing separate cases from

members of the same group, with emphasis oscillating between evolutionism and

diffusion.

Wolf s anthropological siudy of the development of capitalism fills in covering

tems such as "periphery" with anthropological detail from a Marxist perspective. He

emphasizes the "development of material relations, rnoving simultaneously on the level

of the encompassing system and on the micro level." (Wolf, 1982: 23). In other words,

Wolf is attempting to fil1 in the work of Wallerstein and Frank by including the effects

the world system has on the "micro populations snidied 6y ethnologists and

anthropologists" (Wolf, 1982: 23).

Wolf discusses the connections between different geographical and cultural areas

at 1400, and argues that vade routes are responsible for cultural diffusion, and that

conquests result in the combination of cultures. He argues it is unreasonable to assume

cultural isolation even prior to European expansion.

This may be acceptable as far as some culturai characteristics go; however, it is

one thing to say that the cultures have adopted and adapted characteristics and another to

argue that economic and political systems do not have intemal dynamics operating

independently of outside influences. Wolf does not convincingly demonstrate that

endogenous developments are not also important in the econornic realm.

Janet Abu-Lughod's world-system approach posits Wallerstein's modem world-

system neglects its own origins and concentrates too heavily on Europe. She argues a

global world-system was active as early as 1250 C.E. with Asia, especially China, as the

core, and Europe in a peripheral position. The decline of China's economy during the

Ming Dynasty, coinciding with a strengthening of trade networks between the

Mediterranean and Northwest Europe, led to the nse of the West. It was not intemal

characteristics of the West that caused its increase in economic activity, but the working

of the worid-system, and the decline of the East, which weakened ties and trading routes

between China and the Mediterranean.

Frank ( 199 1 a, 199 1 b), following traditional world-system theories, argues that

there is a worId econornic system, and that countries' fortunes are tied to their

participation in this system. Drastically different fiom traditional theories, Frank

maintains the system has operated for 5,000 years in a qualitatively uniform rnanner.

Frank daims that al1 of the characteristics Wallerstein used to differentiate the post-1500

world-system from the pre-1500 world can be found pnor to 1500. In response to

Wallerstein's claim that the dijfeerentia specifica of the modern worId system is the

ceaseless accumulation of capital Frank retorts that "...accumulation played a central if

not the central role in the world system far beyond Europe and long before 1500 ..."

(Frank. 1991a: 173 emphasis in original). He recognizes no qualitative shift in the 16"

century, only a quantitative shift of capital accumulation patterns to the favour of Europe.

hsularity

Although not normally considered a sociologicd variable, insularity must be

rnentioned: it is difficult not to notice the two positive cases are both islands of

approximately the sarne size, while neither of the negative cases are islands. LMacFarlane

(1997) dealing with the problem of how both England and Japan escaped the "Malthsian

Trap", finds insularity to be a major determinant of economic development. "If Japan

and England had not both been large islands, it seems inconceivable that they would have

developed in such an unusual way." (1997: 388). Insularity, he ciaims, gave both

England and Japan a respite from prolonged rnilitary effort, which reduced taxes, which

in tum encouraged merchants and trade. Insularity also allowed both to escape a

destruction of their politicai and econornic systems.

The importance of insuiarïty on the development of capitaiism is beyond the

scope of this thesis. It is sufficient to say that it is not a necessary (e-g. France developed

capitalism and is not an island) or sufficient (e-g. Ceylon is a large island that did not

develop capitaiism) condition for the development of capitalism.

Weberian

Much of the work around Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spint of

Capitalism deals with the various ways his thesis can and should be interpreted. Turner

(1974) presents a useful typology of interpretations of Weber's theses regarding the

emergence of capitdism- The first is idealistic determinism, which holds that Weber

contended that certain Protestant beliefs caused capitalism. It is difficult to maintain that

Weber adhered to this approach. Weber, in the Protestant Ethic, says the theory that the

reformation caused the emergence of modem capitalism would be "foolish and

doctrinaire" (Weber, 1976: 91). The second interpretation is that the- asceticism of

Protestantism was a necessary condition for the emergence of capitalism, which is only

part of a larger multi-causai model, which includes other factors such as free labour and

technology. This interpretation is supported by the introduction to the Protestant Ethic,

and is expounded at length in General Economic History. The third interpretation, based

more on Weber's methodological work than on his empincal studies. is that Weber was

not deding with causal variables, but trying to describe affinities between social

meanings: the way in which certain ideas and social processes "seek each other out" in

history. The fouah interpretation is that Weber sought to elaborate Marx's econornic

materialism with a "political and military materialism".

The interpretation of Weber's work as a rnulti-causal model, which stipulates that

certain preconditions must be met to allow the development of capitalism, is employed

here. While it is not reasonable to use the preconditions as Weber presents them to

explain capitalism in Japan and in England before the Reformation, the preconditions c m

be altered to allow their use in times and at places for which Weber had not developed

them.

Chapter 4:

The Preconditions for Capitalism

Weber's Preconditions

Weber defines capitalism as the provision of human needs Y b y pnvate

businesses seeking profit" (Weber, 1961: 207-208). By this definition capitalism has

existed in various places and at various times in societies that would not be considered

capitalist. What he was interested in is not isolated capitalism - working within a larger.

non-capitalist economy - but, capitaiisrn as the "leading and continued rational

econornic system. Weber's argument in General Economic Histop is that certain

conditions must be present for this type of capitalism to exist, and that these conditions in

tum required conditions and so on.

Weber's conditions for capitalism:

Private approprintion of al2 the means of production. This rneans that land,

buildings, and material must be available for sale as private property. This enables ai1

significant means of production to be under a single management structure so that

decisions of maximal efficiency can be made.

Labour that is free tu work in response to demnnd.

Trading that is not limited by irrational restricrions. Trading must be free of

class monopolies on consumption of certain products (e.g. certain types of dress). Also,

limitations on long-distance trading, such as warfare and robbery, must be minirnized.

Calculable law in adjudication and public administration. Examples include

pnvate property rights over the factors of production and the transferability of these

rights through financial institutions, formal freedom for labourers, and legally protected

markets. Calculable law is necessary to encourage and allow long term planning. The

importance of the presence this precondition becomes apparent when one considers its

absence; long term planning is not reasonable when the confiscation of property is a

possibility, or conditions upon which the plans were devised are subject to unpredictable

change.

Commercialization of economic life. Stock companies were important because

they removed important economic transactions - such as forced loans for war expenses

that were usuaily without interest and frequently not repaid - from compulsory law, and

put them into the realm of voluntary economic interests (Weber, 196 1: 280). They are

also important because they allowed expensive projects to be undertaken privately

(Weber, 196 1 : 28 1).

hd~rstrial technigue. Industriai techniques, such as the use of the steam engine

and mechanical looms, removed natural barriers to production, freed up labour, and

helped to remove the econornic sphere from traditional constraints (196 1 : 305-6).

Econornic ethic. The econornic ethic is most clearly understood through its

contrast: the "dualistic" ethic of many pre-modem societies. This dualistic ethic stresses

fairness within one's group - be it kinship, caste, class etc. - and ruthless and unfair

dealings with outsiders. Both of these attitudes discourage capitalism. The attitude taken

towards in-group members discourages gain at another's expense and encourages

traditional exchanges, while the attitude taken towards outsiders discourages long-term

gain, a necessary part of modem capitalism. A non-dualistic ethic prornotes the equal

treatment of al1 people in business dealings, which are driven by the desire to maintain

long-term business relationships that will yield long-term econornic gains.

The background conditions for these conditions include a bureaucratic state, and

citizenship rights. The bureaucratic state is necessary primarily for the development of

caiculable law. To develop thorough bureaucratization a formalistic code based on

citizenship is necessary.

The ultimate conditions are those conditions that are the preconditions for

bureaucracy and citizenship. As preconditions for bureaucracy Weber Lists literate

administrators, transportation and communication technology, writing and record keeping

implements, coinage, and centrally supplied weapons. As preconditions for citizenship,

he includes a self-supplied, disciplined arrny, and a religious tradition consistent with the

idea of citizenship and arnenable to city-centered worship. These were necessary for the

development of citizenship because citizenship originated through the banding together

of warriors into cities in medieval Europe, for mutual protection. The cities developed

and enforced their own laws that applied equally to al1 members of the city.

Weber's causal chah Ieads from conditions favorable to bureaucratization and a

rnilitary and religious combination favorable to the development of cities with

citizenship, through to the conditions necessary for long-term, large-scale capitalism.

Collins' Revision of Weber

It is clear that Weber was not developing a mode1 for the emergence of

capitalisrns; instead, he was trying to describe the historical development of capitalisrn in

the West. Randall Collins, however, believes that Weber's explanation is valuable for

understanding capitalistic developments sirnilar to modem capitalism at different times

and in different places. He modifies Weber's explanation to make it more easily

applicable to non-European cases (Collins, 1986: 26-34).

Collins rernains tnie to many of Weber's preconditions and conditions necessary

for the emergence of capitalism. However, he modifies the technoiogy requirement; he

argues technology is required for its cdculability, not its effrciency, thereby eliminating

the need for extensive mechanization. He later changes the technology requirement again

arguing that non-technological innovations in rice cultivation are aIso significant. He

omits the requirement of the commercialization of economic life at the outset.

Collins applies the causal chain to situations where he believes capitalism

emerged but has gone unrecognized primarily because of its association with

monasteries, normaily thought of as non-capitaiist (especially by Weber).

The first case is within the reformed monasteries - especidly the Cistercians - of

the high-middle ages in Europe. Citing indicators of capitalist econornics, such as the

increased interest in rnechanization, Collins reasons that a form of capitalisrn was

operating during this time. He finds it developing first, not throughout society, but within

certain monastic orders. Using the Cistercian Order as an example, he shows that the

monasteries employed rational cdculation, mechanization of parts of the production

process, and were essentially engaged in a capitalist enterprise.

It is argued this was possible because the conditions necessary for capitalism were

met. The Cistercian Order was able to acquire land, and manage their operations as they

desired because they did not allow thernselves to become dependent on the surrounding

aristocracy. They constituted something of a mobile labour forcs because they were

willing and able to move to areas and into endeavors that provided the greatest economic

retum. Celibacy prevented the melding of personal with institutional rights and

properties. Canon Law and the Papal Cuna provided the legal frarnework which allowed

calculability and, to an extent, equality that prevented the authontarian tendencies of

bureaucrac y.

Collins claims this capitalist surge, due to the spillover of monastic capitalism

into the secular economy, was actually the first instance of capitalism (in Europe); the

capitalism associated with the Reformation is actually the second cycle of capitalism

rnistaken for the f ~ s t ,

Collins next applies the chain to Buddhist monasteries in China. After dispelling

the rnisconception that Buddhism was not important in China's history and that China has

been econornically backward throughout its history, Collins outlines the similar role

reformed Buddhist monastenes played in the development of a capitalist enclave in

Medieval China. The monasteries were able to develop capitalism because the

preconditions were met within their economy: land was donated to the monasteries, they

had a supply of labour, they were free to plan efficient enterprises, and the Vinaya or

monastic laws made the monasteries a self-goveming group with intemal citizenship.

In Collins' more recent article (1997), where he applies the mode1 to the Japanese

case, he claims there have been only three types of economic structures in worid history:

1. kinship organized networks.

2. agrarian-coercive societies in which a military class appropriates the land and extracts

the surplus.

3. capitalist market economies with a dynamic of self-transforming growth.

He adds that self-transfomiing capitalism has historically gone through three key

phases:

A) a small leading sector within agrarian coercive societies sets the capitalist dynamic in

motion.

B) market structures make agricultural production dynamic.

C) industrial revolution sets off the expansion of n ~ n a ~ c u l t u r a l production (Collins,

1997: 843).

The mode1 is then applied to dernonstrate that the Buddhist temples of Medieval

Japan developed a capitalist economy. The temples controlled land, labour and capital,

and they were able to manage them with efficiency. Labour was relatively free to move

where it was needed within the rnonastic organization, and land and wedth were donated

by the aristocracy as a way of demonstrating wealth and piety (Collins, 1997: 855).

Various sects within Buddhism supplied the economic ethic. There was a general

moving away from ostentatious temple display and magic in the "reformation" of

Buddhist monasteries circa 1175. Some forrns of Zen stressed work as a meditative

practice; Soto Zen preached an attitude of concentration in normal activities rather than

an escape from the world.

Monasteries also supplied the bureaucratic legalism and property rights necessary

for capitalist planning. The monasteries had an interna1 code and "full-scale bureaucratic

structure" (1997: 858). Monk annies were able to enforce property rights.

Confiscation of monastery land during the reunification secularized the capitalism

of the monastenes. The Tokugawa penod is best seen as "füll fledged agicultural

capitalism" (1997: 860). Those who stress the Meiji Restoration as a period of

unprecedented appearance of capitalism in Japan are misled by the non-industrial nature

of Tokugawa Japan's capitalism (1997: 86 1).

He adds that religious organizations are a likely place for the leading capitalist

group to emerge. They are protected by secular mlers, mobilize resources and social

energy from al1 sectors of society, receive land and other contributions, and have some

autonomy within otherwise conservative agarian coercive economies (1997: 849).

Collins claims the capitalizations of the wider econornies in Japan circa 1600 and

England circa 1250 are the result of a "spilling ove? of the methods of the monasteries

into secular society. He places his emphasis on dernonstrating that the preconditions and

conditions for capitalism are met within the monastic economy, and pays less attentiori to

the presence of the preconditions and conditions in the wider society into which the

effects are supposed to spill. The interest here is an examination of the presence of the

preconditions in the wider society, and the value of the feudal-patrimonial distinction in

understanding their presence or absence.

Further Revision of the Preconditions

1 have further revised Collins' revision. While originally intending to include it, 1

have omitted the precondition of an "econornic ethos". Because this is a major deviation

from a Weberian approach 1 shall discuss my reasoning at length.

Initialfy it was my belief that ideas were important in explaining the development

of capitalism. Based on this belief 1 looked for belief systems - religious, social etc. -

that appeared to have a relationship with an 'economic ethos'. 1 was looking for ideas

that could promote the development and working of capitalisrn, or ideas that could easily

be converted - possibly secularized - into ideas that could promote the development and

working of capitalism. There is an inherent problem in looking for such ideas: "if one is

bent on tracing sirnilar motifs in thought to their ultimate origins, it is always possible to

find 'precursors' for every idea" (Mannheim, 1968: 60fn). To resolve this problem 1

decided to accept only those ideas that seemed, undeniably, to be strong supports for an

economic ethos such as teachings of the value of work and reinvestment.

As I read the matenal on Japan 1 found that this restriction was quite acceptable -

every idea undeniably promoted an economic ethos. In some cases the job was done for

me: the ideas and beliefs presented were followed by a statement indicating that this idea

or belief may have been in part responsible for Japan's rapid economic success because

of its affinity with capitaiist ideals. It becarne obvious that the project of looking for

ideas to explain Japan's econornic development had been done many times over and with

great success. The probIem now seemed more acute: not only was 1 biased by the

interpretation delivered by the authors, 1 felt 1 was not receiving an adequate account of

ideas that were possibly opposed to the developrnent of an economic ethos. The material

on the other cases was often sirnilar: the ideas that could be used to account for current

economic development were highlighted.

It seemed as though a process of elimination had been carried out. Given space

restraints, greater space had been given to those ideas that were useful in explaining

economic development, while ideas that were not were downplayed. Should I employ

the sarne technique and focus on ideas consistent with an econornic ethos in Japan and

England, and focus on ideas opposing and economic ethos in the Ottoman Empire and

Ming China? Iudging from the econornic developments these ideas would seem to have

had the greatest impact in the respective counuies.

This approach is wholly inappropriate. It is not reasonable to make the

assumption that the ideas consistent with an economic ethos had the greatest effect in the

cases in which capitalism emerged and ideas inconsistent with an economic ethos had the

greatest effect in the cases in which capitalism did not emerge. Economic development is

to be explained; it is not to do the explaining. It is circular reasoning to use the economic

developrnent of a society to select which beliefs had a greater effect in that society and

then use these beiiefs to explain econornic development.

Upon considering the problem further 1 believe there are two problems associated

with the approach of looking for antecedents to the rise of capitalism in belief systems.

The first problem is the variety of relationships that cm be argued to exist between old

ideas and new socially transforming ideas. The relationships employed are of three

types:

1. The belief system has a straightforward effect on econornic developrnent. In

other words there is a prima facie relationship between the belief systems and

econornic development. This approach is oiten used to account for the Iack of

econornic developrnent in Islarnic societies.

2. The belief system, seemingly unrelated to econornic development, has an

effect on economic development. This approach is demonstrated by Bellah's

explanation of the nse of capitalism in Japan (Bellah, 1957).

3. The belief system, although apparently inconsistent with econornic

development, had the unintended consequence of promoting economic

development. For exarnple, Weber argues that elements of Protestantism,

apparently opposed to gain for gain's sake, resulted in economic development

in the West.

Sometimes these approaches are used in conjunction. Collins (1997) argues that

some Buddhist ideals had unanticipated results, while others had straightforward results.

The problem is, given these options, it is possible to explain any economic development

with any set of beliefs-

The second problem, d u d e d to above, is that many ideas and beliefs exist

simultaneously in large societies such as Japan, China, The Ottoman Empire, and

England. Some of these ideas will be consistent with an econo,mic ethos and some will

not. How does it corne to be that some ideas are more influential than others, knowing

that it is not reasonable to explain the selection of an idea out of a group of ideas by the

result of this selection (econornic development)? There are two straightforward

explanations to the selection. The first is that an ethic promoting capitalisrn expanded its

influence through a successful 'survivai of the fittest' contest against other ideas. The

success of those having a capitalist spirit could have led others to adopt such a spirit

themselves. The second is that a capitalist spirit is merely superstructure that has either

ernerged, or has been selected (or transformed) due to the structure of the economic base.

If either of these explanations is correct, then a search for an antecedent to the rise of

capitalism in belief systems is unwarranted. If ideas are mere superstructure, then they

are the effect, not the cause of capitalism. If they have won a survival of the fittest

contest, they are still part of the cause, but finding thern will not be a useful explanation if

they exist in al1 societies. Both of these explanations are anticipated and rejected by

Weber in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

"One c m easily see", States Weber, "the limits of the concept of selection as a

means of historicai explanation. In order that a manner of life so well adapted.. .should

be selected at dl,..-it had to originate somewhere, and not in isolated individuals alone,

but as a way of life cornmon to whole groups of men. This origin is what reaily needs

explanation" (1976: 55). Furthermore, he argues that an econornic ethos cannot be easily

understood as superstructure, which developed to meet the ideological needs of the

economic base. To the contrary "The spirit of capitalism.. .had to fight its way to

supremacy against a whole world of hostile forces" (1976: 56). Furthermore, in the

United States "...the spirit of capitalism ... was present before the capitalistic order"

(1976: 55).

The important point is that for Weber, the first step is to explain the development

of unprecedented ideas (hard work, thrift, and reinvestment) from other ideas (Protestant

beliefs). This is important to recoajpize because the Protestant Erhic and the Spirit of

Capitalism is often portrayed as an example of the sociology of knowledge; however, it

more accurately employs the aims and techniques of the history of ideas. The sociology

of knowledge attempts to explain relationships between knowledge and social factors

(e.g. class), whereas the history of ideas seeks to "...understand how new beliefs and

intellectual fashions are introduced and diffused ..." (Lovejoy, 1960: 20, emphasis in

original) by employing explanations on the level of ideas. It is important to be clear what

your purpose is when trying to explain using ideas. If you are trying to explain

unprecedented ideas, then it may be reasonable to emphasize existing ideas. However, if

you are trying to explairi the selection of an idea out of a group of ideas then you need

sornething to explain the selection, not the idea.

I disagree that the "spirit of capitalism" meets the criteria of an unprecedented

idea. Samuelsson indicates examples of nearly identical spirits existing in 1450 France

(Samuelsson, 1961: 63-66). 1 also argue against Weber's claim that the capitalist spirit is

not a manifestation of widely held motives of personal gain/greed/avarice etc. Weber

argues these motives have always existed, but have never led to modem capitalism;

instead, adventure capitalism, booty capitalism, and piracy resulted. 1 believe that these

pre-capitaiist economic enterprises and modem capitalism are not the result of a

fundarnentally different ethos. Instead, they are different manifestations of essentially the

same ethos under different sociai conditions. The reason for the different results is that

social structural conditions rnust be present to allow for capitalist techniques to be

employed profitably.

1 propose that an understanding of the role of ideas in the development of

capitalism is not one of cause but of effect. Socid conditions allow for the development

of capitalist processes and techniques; specific ideas and ideals consistent with capitalisrn

are then selected on the basis of their compatibility. Iust as, through a process of

elimination, authors look for and stress ideas consistent with econornic development at

the expense of other ideas, people looked through this sarne group of ideas in an attempt

to justify new behaviors. It is a platitude to Say that people look to justify their actions

with established beliefs.

It has been suggested that ideas and material causes of capitalism are dialectically

related; ideas are the principle movers at one time and material causes at another. One is

not the independent variable and the other the dependent; the interplay between the two is

the cause of change. While this approach may be valuable in many instances 1 do not

believe that ideas other than a desire for wealth are necessary for the explanation of the

rise of capitalism. While it may be possible to find societies that demonstrate that a

desire for wedth is not an inherent human trait, 1 believe a desire for wealth is present in

sufficient supply in al1 of the cases considered here.

The precondition of cdculability should also be discussed at this point. Weber's

requirement is for a conception of law that does not exist in pre-modem societies to the

extent that it does for the period to which Weber's preconditions are intended to apply.

Collins deals with this by inserting, wherever possible, laws that apply to monasteries. In

the case of England, Canon Law provides the cdculability required for investment in

agriculture. Collins' approach to finding calculabilty in pre-Tokugawa Japan is

somewhat different. Here cdculability is supplied through the ability of the monasteries

to defend their interests. It is not supplied by the belief in abstract principles, but by the

strength of amies. The meaning of calculability employed here is sirnilar to that used by

Collins in that it accepts calculable conditions irrespective of their cause. Calculability is

a situation in which producers can plan for the future due to a stability in social relations

in which confiscation and arbitrary behavior of officiais is not a pressing concem. It is

not important if it is supplied by abstract principles or force or anything else; it is only

important that it be supplied.

To surnrnarize, the preconditions for capitalist agriculture, conceived as managed

estates, are:

Free labour

Lnnd market

Markets free from control

Econornic calculabilis)

Entrepreneurid organization of the rneans of production

Chapter 5:

Categorizing the Cases

Not d l people agree that traditional societies can be meaningfully ancilor usefully

divided into feudal and patrimonial societies. Sorne of the alternate ways of categorizing

traditional societies as well as criticisrns of the feudal-patrimonial distinction will be

discussed before tuming to the development of working definitions of feudalism and

patrimonialism.

Alternatives to and Criticisms of the Feudal-Patrimonial Distinction

Eisenstadt (1963) classifies empires by qualities of their political systems. His

criteria for classification are:

1. The extent to which political activities are organized into roles, and the extent to

which the political roles are separate from other roles.

2. The extent to which the political role holders are organized into groups that do not

correspond to traditional groups.

3. The nature of the political goals: what the goals are, who determines them, etc.

4. Type of authority legitimation (Eisenstadt, 1963: 8-9).

Using different intersections of these qualities, he finds seven different types of

societies. One of these, Historical Bureaucratie Empires (HBEs), is the topic of his The

Political Systems of Empires (1963). One of the features of HBEs that distinguishes them

from other types of societies is that their political sphere has a limited autonomy ( 1963:

19); the political sphere is partly separate from other organizations.

Another feature is the source of the restrictions on activity within the political

sphere, In traditional societies activity within the political sphere is restricted primarily

by tradition; in modem societies it is restricted primxily by the interests and operation of

the non-political spheres. In HBE activity within the political sphere is restricted equally

by both.

After delineating the conditions necessary for the development and perpetuation

of HBEs Eisenstadt discusses the transformations HBEs rnay make into other types of

societies. He argues HBEs do not always follow the sarne developmental path. It is not

always the case that an HBE transforms into a more highly differentiated society. It may

also become a more traditional "pre-bureaucratic society" (e.g. his patrimonial or feudai).

I do not think it is usef'ul to evaluate Eisenstadt's classification system, or any

other classification system, apart from the purposes for which it is being used. Even i f ,

as Hamilton (1985) suggests, Eisenstadt believes that he has captured a reai group (or

seven reai groups) it is of little value to discuss the "reality" of concepts. Instead,

classification systems should be judged according to their usefulness in explanation. I

have chosen not to employ Eisenstadt's classification system, not because it does not

make meaningful distinctions between societies, but because 1 do not think it is useful for

explaining capitalism. Eisenstadt's classification may be useful for explaining some

things - such as the political decisions and struggles that go on within some pre-modem

societies - but it does not seem valuable for studying the emergence of capitalism because

it has no predictive power: some HBE developed capitalism while others did not.

Eric Wolf uses Marx's concept of the mode of production to highlight the social

relationships of labour within societies. He defines production as a "cornplex set of

mutually dependent relations arnong nature, work, social labour and social organization"

(Wolf, 1982: 74). Modes of production are the major recumng ways production is

organized. Instead of adopting Marx's modes, Wolf recognizes that M m ' s system may

not be historically accurate or usefd for al1 projects. He adopts the capitalist mode of

production (discussed later) and develops the tributary and the kin-ordered modes.

The tributary mode of production is characterized by the accumulation of surplus

wealth by an elite employing non-economic coercion. The labourers are dlowed access

to the means of production, but they are constrained through a relationship of ruled to

d e r , which includes a forced payment of a portion of their production to the d e r . This

mode of production consists of a continuum with cornplete centralization of power at one

end and fragmentation of power at the other. These extremes correspond to what Marx

refers to as the "Asiatic mode of production" and the "feudal mode of production"

respective1 y.

Wolf argues that ciassification systems that distinguish between centralization of

power and decentralization of power are ideologically biased. Feudalism gives a short

p e k d of European history a greater status and a quality of purity (a pure form of a social

type) that is unwarranted, while the Asiatic mode of production serves to highlight the

division of the free West and the un-free East. Wolf emphasizes these are actually

variants of the same mode of production, and he downplays the importance of political

centralization.

To distinguish between the capitalist and tributary modes of production he adds

that the trading that occurred dunng the tributary mode was based on buying low and

selling dear, which included alliance with powers that would prevent an open market. It

relied on political and rnilitary power to "seize zones of supply", ensure monopolies, etc.

In the kinship mode of production much of the social labour is embedded in

padcular social relationships, such as relationships of affinity and consanguinity. A

leader c m only accumulate so much power within the kinship system because others can

check his power through similar efforts at intermarriage and the accumulation of

dependents. Chiefs who want to break through the limitations of the kinship network

must secure an independent power either by altering some of his resources to the

mechanisms of another mode of production or by entenng relationships with another

mode of production. To do so he must acquire new forms of political domination.

These are not intended to exhaust the possible modes that have existed; instead,

they are developed because they are parsimonious in understanding the spread of

capitalism and the effect it has on societies with other types of economic systems.

It is unusual that Wolf is hostile to the feudal-patrimonial distinction because he

States elsewhere that there can be many possible divisions, and that the choice of

divisions should be made on the value they have for dealing with a given problem. The

refusa1 to admit a meaningful difference between feudalism and patrimonialism seems

questionable when Wolf himself contrasts the differences between Europe on the one

hand and China and India on the other. He points out the different role merchants had in

societies with different levels of political centralization, and how this ultirnately had an

effect on econornic development.

Wolf is not alone in denying the value of the feudal-patrimonial distinction.

Frank denies the value or scientific merit of feudalism:

... is it still sensible to hold on for dear life to the supposedly scientific histoi-ical

categories of . . ,feudalism, capitalism, socialism - or, indeed any such "scientifically

defined "modes of production" or ideologicdly defined "systems" and "isrns"? 1

beIieve NOT! (Frank, 1991b: 24).

Instead, he believes that feudalism, capitalism, and socialism are "ideological

modes". Those who support socialism employ the concepts of feudalism and capitalism

because they make the possibility of a fûrther transition to sociaiism more plausible.

Supporters of capitalism use them because they allow them to distinguish between

capitalist and socialist countrïes. Rather than argue for a new set of modes Frank claims

that there have been no hindarnental transitions from one mode to another, and argues

that a continuous process of accumulation underlies ai1 periods-

FeudaIism

Others do recognize the value of the feudal concept. In the classic work

Ferldalisrn in History Strayer and Coulborn (1965) define feudalism as a politicai system.

It is not an economic or social system although it shapes both of these. The essential

relationship in a feudal society is that between vassal and lord: political power is

embedded in personal rather than insûtutional relationships. Strayer adds that a

definition of feudahm must exclude non-feudal societies:

To obtain a usable concept of feudalism we must eIiminate extraneous factors and

aspects which are common to rnany types of society; feudalism is not synonymous

with aristocracy; feudalism is not a necessary concomitant of the great estate worked

by dependents or senile labor; feudalism is not merely the relationships between

lord and man, because this existed in a non-feuda1 society. It is only when rights of

govemrnenr are attached ro lordships and fiefs thar ive can speak offully developed

feudalisrn. (1965: 16 emphasis added).

Perry Anderson (1974a; 1974b) delineates modes of production - e.g. slave,

primitive, feudd - and political organization types - e.g. absolutist state - and the crises

that cause their downfall and allow the emergence of a new mode of production/political

organization.

The slave mode of production depends on geographical expansion to acquire

slaves, because slave populations do not perpetuate their population (to the required

extent) through reproduction. The crisis of the slave mode of production is reached when

geographical expansion is prevented, Anderson argues that this crisis is one of the

leading causes of the internal collapse of the Western Roman Empire.

The primitive mode of production is exemplified by the Germanic Tribes outside

of the boundaries of the Roman Empire. It includes communal ownership of land and a

warrior aristocracy. The Germanic Tribes were able to overtake the Western Roman

Empire while it was in decline but still intact. As a result a synthesis of the two modes of

production was produced.

This synthesis was the feudal mode of production, which in its pure form

consisted of serfdom, manoraiism, extra-economic coercion of peasant by lords, vassal

hierarchy and "parcellization of sovereignty". The extent to which the pure type was

developed depended on the proper mixture of Roman (slave mode of production) and

Germanic (primitive mode of production) hentage. The Carolingian Empire developed

pure feudalism because it had equal Roman and Germanic influences. Feudalism

developed differently, and later, in the northwest (Scandinavia) where there was no

Roman influence. Feudalism was imponed in the East and was delayed because of

constant invasions from Asia.

Weber's Patrimonial and Feudal Ideal Types

One of Weber's best-known concepts is the ideal type. In the Methodology of the

Social Sciences Weber says:

An ideal type is forrned by the one sided accentzratiorz of one or more points of view

and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and

occasionally absent concrere individual phenomenon, which are arranged according

to those one sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct

(Weber, 1949: 49 emphasis in onginai).

Weber developed different kinds of ideal types and indicated that ideal types had

different uses ( B q e r , 1976; Watkins, 1973). Regarding the ideal type, in the

Methodology of the Social Sciences Weber states that "Its hnction is the cornparison with

empincal reality in order to establish its divergences or sirnilarities" (1949: 43).

However, in Econamy and Sociev Weber likens the use of ideal types to making

calculations in a vacuum in the natural sciences: the results only approximate what

actually wilI happen in practical situations (or real situations in social science) (Weber,

1968: 20). For the purposes of classifying the cases, 1 am interested in employing

Weber's feudal and patrimonial ideal types in the manner advocated in the Methodology

of the Social Sciences. In other words as what Watkins (1973) cails 'holistic concepts',

which are supposed to give a bird's eye view of a whole social situation for the purpose

of comparing actual societies to.

While Weber's patrimonial ideal type will be less familiar to most than his feudal

ideal type it has been widely used in describing and studying pre-modern societies. For

example, Bakker argues that, despite disputations from Geertz, patrimonialism more

closely approximates the pre-colonial Indic civilization of Southeast Asia than other

influential models (Bakker, 1988), and that patrïmonialism helps to understand the

process of bureaucratization and attitudes toward mlers in Indonesia. The patrimonial

ideal type is valuable when you are dealing with feudalism and are ernploying the

comparative method; pavimonialism provides control through contrast while allowing

comparability through resembiance.

To understand Weber's feudal and patrimonial ideal types, and their relation to

one another, they must first be situated within his broader frarnework. Weber lists three

main types of authority: rationd, traditionai, and charismatic. Traditionai authority is

legitimated through the belief in the "virtue of the sanctity of age-old d e s and powers"

(Weber, 1978: 226). Rulers are designated according to traditional rules and are obeyed

because of their traditional status. "Personal loyalty, not the official's impersonal duty,

determines the relations of the administrative staff to the master." ( 1978: 226-7). Within

such a society obedience is owed not only to tradition but also to the decisions of the

d e r . This may lead to a conflict when the ruler's decisions significantly differ from

accepted tradition (1978: 227). Weber delineates the types of societies characterized by

traditional authority. The first group is comprÏsed of societies in which the d e r has no

persond administrative staff. It includes Gerontocracy (rule by elders), and

Patriachalism (rule through inheritance) (1978: 23 1).

The categorization for those traditionai societies with an administrative staff is not

so clear. At one time they are divided into Patrimoniaiism (in which the administrative

staff and military personal are persond instruments of ruler) and Estate-Type domination

(in which administrative staff has appropriated particular powers and economic assets

from the ruler). At another time a similar division of Prebendalism (involving the

maintenance of retainers by benefices) and Feudalism (involving the maintenance of

retainers by fiefs) is presented. In a later section (although written earlier

chronologically) the division is Patrimonialism and FeudaIisrn.

1 feel that the best classification system is mentioned only briefly by Weber

(1978: 1086). In it patnmonialism is the narne given to al1 traditional societies with an

administrative staff. These societies form a continuum of the centralization of power. At

one end - patriarchal patrimonialism - the power is concentrated in the rufer. At the other

end - feudalism - power is spread out arnong a ruling group with independent power.

Weber did not intend for Patrimonialism to be seen in opposition to feudalism; feudalism

is actuaily a variant of patnmonialism, which should be contrasted with patriarchal

patrimoniaiism. Bakker (1987, 1988) employs a similar schema of Patrimoniai-

Prebendalism and Patrimonial-Feudalism, which emphasizes the fact that the two systems

are variants of a type, and are not somehow "opposites". However, Bendix's (1962)

patrimonialisrn-feudalism schema will be used because. while somewhat misleadinp, it

employs the most familiar terminology.

Having decided on a tenninology it is now necessary to fil1 out the two ideal

types. One important distinction between feudalism and patrimonialism is the form of

support of the "administrative staff' (1978: 235). Support by means of a fief is

associated with feudalism while support by means of a benefice is associated with

patrimonialism.

Both fiefs and benefices are granted for the return of services. The fief is usually

land and the services are usuaily rnilitary, although neither is necessarily the case. Fiefs

may be granted for religious services as well. Nthough they may not start out as such

fiefs become hereditary on the condition that the heir meets certain requirements.

Requirements for holding a fief always include a high status, such as a knightly status.

The relationship between fief holder and granter is one of mutual obligation; the holder is

required to fulfill his obligations to the lord while the Iord is not pennitted to retract the

fief without faiiure to fblfill obligations on the part of the vassal. The vassal has

sovereignty over his fief, with limited exceptions such as the personal presence of the

lord or an agent of the lord. A vassal may divide part of his fief into smdler fiefs and

s a n t them to sub-vassals, a process known as sub-infeudation. The vassal and sub-

vassal have the same relationship as the lord and vassal while the sub-vassal and the lord

are not expected to have obligations to one another.

A benefice rnay take many forrns: ailowances in kind or in money (stipends), the

right to the use of land, the appropriation of taxes, etc. Benefices are not hereditary in

principle, although benefice holders fight for and sometimes achieve this right. Benefice

holders may come from a variety of backgrounds, with many originally being slaves or

persona1 dependents of the d e r . In place of the mutual obligations and the irrevocability

on the part of the Iord, a benefice entails a defined task or set of tasks the benefice holder

is responsible for while the d e r has no obligations to him. A benefice holder may be

deprived of his benefice at any time for any reason.

The benefice-fief distinction is of paramount importance because it is related to

the distribution of power. With the granting of fiefs power becornes decentralized. Each

vassal has his own rnilitary force answerable to him, not to the lord. While each vassal's

rnilitary force may be less than the lord's, the possibility of the vassals protecting one

another against the lord made the lord's rule precarious and dependent on the support of

the vassals. The granting of benefices does not entail the decentralization of power

because benefice holders are unable to develop an independent power base.

Related to "concentration of powei' is the arbitrariness of mle under a

patrimonial system versus the stereotyped mle under a feudd system. While restricted by

tradition, tradition in a patrimonial society usually includes an arbitrariness of rule. In

addition, the d e r is able to have his rulings enforced in new matters where tradition has

not been established. In contras, feudalism is more stereotyped with less room for

arbitrary decisions on the part of the lord; unwritten codes become rigid with the lord

unable to change them to his advantage.

The feudal-patrimonial classification does not allow for a problem-free

classification of societies. Dunng the Norman and Angevin reigns England displayed

tendencies of both feudalism and patrimonialism, with shifts dong the continuum. While

it had the components of vassalage, fiefs, sub-infeudation, etc., at times the king was able

to remove fiefs, and maneuver unchallenged. Dunng the r e i p of King Henry II,

mercenary annies took the place of knightly armies supplied by the barons, which gave

the king a freedom of action out of place with the feudal ideal type model. Similarly, the

Tokugawa shoguns could remove the daïmyos (vassals) or switch their positions. The

grants given the samurai (sub-vassals) by the daimyo were more like benefices than fiefs.

Ideal types, however, are not intended to divide societies into those that have d l

the characteristics of feudalism and none of the characteristics of patrimonialisrn (or vice-

versa); no society will fit neatly on one end of the feudal-patrimonial continuum. Nor

will any society be correctly located on only the patrimonial-feudal continuum. Actual

societies will be charactenzed by an intersection of different ideal types. For example, al1

cases considered here contain facets of the modem bureaucracy ided type. As ideal

types, patrimoniaiism and feudalism are not expected to represent any actud case;

Weber's ideai types are one-sided exaggerations of histoncal reality that do not occur in

their pure form.

The Patrimonial-Feudalism Distinction and Capitalism

Weber believed that patrimonialism discouraged the emergence of capitalism.

The arbitrariness of patrimonial mle, especially regarding economic innovations, served

to discourage the development of capitdism, with its requirement of calculability and

predictability (1968: 1094). Traditionalkm sets Iimits on formal rules; the ruler does not

want to becorne restricted by forrnalized rules. Officiais7 interests were in maintaining

order, and their stable salaries put them in opposition to the acquisitive nature of

entrepreneurs (1978: 1094). Patrimonial rulers granted monopolies for fees or for a share

in the revenue (1978: 239). Lastly, patrimonial rule is associated with welfare state

policies that pacify the subjects (1975: 240).

Feudalism also had characteristics that discouraged capitalism. The personal

bonds and knightly style of life were in opposition to the relationships and lifestyles

inherent in capitalism (1978: 1005). The fief was not salable (1978: 1 100). When

venturing into the production of goods, lords tried to impede competing cities through

extra-econornic means (1975: 1101). Despite these hindrances Weber adds that

feudalism may allow a gradua1 development of capitalism because there is less

opportunity for the powerful to gain al1 the wedth, allowing the excess to flow into the

hands of the bourgeoisie ( 1978: 1 102).

FeudaIism as Decentralized Political Authority

Despite the fact that patrimonialism and feudalism are often represented as

opposites they are not intended to be categories into which societies fit or do not.

However, for the purposes of this thesis, feudalism and patrimonialism must be

operationalized in order to classify the cases.

Patrimonialism and feudalism are multi-faceted concepts. There is, as this

chapter illustrates, little agreement on the definition of feudalism (and hence what should

be included under patnrnonialisrn). For the purposes of classification I will focus on

what 1 believe is the single most important aspect of the feudal-patrimonial distinction:

political decentralization. Those cases with highly centralized political power will be

classified as patrimonial, while those cases in which political power is decentralized, or

in which there is a "parcellization of sovereignty" in Anderson's terms, will be

designated as feudal.

While they did not commit such a gross simplification of historkai reality by

focussing exclusively on the decentralization of political mhority Strayer, Anderson and

Weber al1 emphasize this element. Weber's comments indicate that he believed this was

one of the most important variables in explaining the differentid development of the

West and the East. Furthemore, many of the other elements can be seen as corollarïes of

this single elernent. '

Capitalism

Different definitions of capitaiism have been forwarded. Sorne ernphasize trade.

Some deny the importance of trade and concentrate on ownership of the means of

production. Others deny both and focus on efficient production.

Marxian definitions of capitalist mode of production include the following

components: capitalists control the means of production; labourers are denied

independent access to the rneans of production; labourers must sel1 their labour to the

capitalists; and the maxirnization of surplus vdue is attained through accumulation and a

constant improvement of the methods of production, including labour organization and

technology (Wolf, 1982: 78). By necessity the capitalist mode of production includes a

division of classes between those in possession of the means of production and those

without possession. Capitalism is to be distinguished from other accumulations of wealth

by the active use of wealth in production and the control of the means of production.

Capitalism shall be defined here as an econornic system in which there is a drive

towards eflcient techniqries in production. Efficient techniques are defined as those

resulting in a greater output in product per input of labour. IncIuded under this definition

are efficiency-oriented techniques that do not require capital investment. Such drives

towards efficiency are first found in agriculture. Here the focus is on the managed estates

that efficiently organize land and labour, and employ Iabour saving techniques.

The Mancian criterion of feedback of profits into the means of production is not

seen as a necessary component of capitalism. While it may be cornmon in

' This is not to say decentralization of political authority causes feudalism. On the contrary. feudalism is seen to be the result o f military requirements when warfare involves combat techniques requiring ski11 and expensive weaponry

industrialization, agriculture often relies more on inexpensive techniques than on capital

reinvestrnent

This definition allows for the development of capitalisrn, or capitalist encIaves, in

periods not known as capitalist.

Now that the definitions have been operationalized, the cases must be classified.

THE OTTOMAN EMP- (1450-1700)

Patrimonial or Feudal?

Initially, the Ottoman Empire appears, undeniably, to be a patrimonial state.

Weber's discussion of sultanism as a specid exaggerated form of patrimoniaiism would

seem to be based in part on the Ottoman Empire's highest political-religious position of

sultan. However, the Ottoman Empire is counted as feudal by sorne, because it inchdes

important distinguishing characteristics of feudalism. In the early phases of the Empire,

rulers from conquered territories were made into vassals of the sultan; later, mounted

warriors, who made up a large portion of the Empire's rnilitary, were granted fiefs for

military service. However, the Ottoman Empire did eventually develop into a

patrimonial state with highly centralized political authority.

In the early period of the Ottoman Empire, especially during periods of rapid

expansion by Orkharn (r. 1326- 1362) and Murad 1 (r. 1362- 1389), rulers of conquered

territories were made vassais, and were required to participate in Ottoman campaigns.

With the accession of Bayezid 1 'The Thunderbolt" (r. 1389-1402) the powerful Beys of

Anatolia rose up in revolt. However, Beyezid's ability to put down their revolts

dernonstrated the power of the Sultan to control core areas. While Beyezid attempted

centralization, his successor, Mohammed 1 (r. 1413- 142 1) had to renirn land and greater

freedom of action to Anatollian States. This early period, while not properly feudal, is

also not properly patrimonial. Shifts in the nature of the central politicai apparatus and its

military support during the reign of Mohammed II the Conqueror (r. 145 1-1481) changed

the Ottoman Empire into a patrimonial state proper. Some historians place the "reai"

begînnings of the Empire at the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, when Mohammed II

gained much of the power and prestige necessary to centralize authority.

The most important single innovation of the Ottoman sultans in developing

centralized power was the ghularn - a group of slaves personally dependent on the

sultan.3 Only non-Muslim, non-Turkish people were eligible. The ghufarn were mostly

children of dhimmis (Chrisuans living within the Ottoman Empire) although they could

be acquired as gifts or by purchase. Al1 ghulam were converted to Islam. The most

promising received a palace education, which included military, religious and statecraft

training. The most able of these became govemors of provinces (sanjak-begi); govemor-

generals of several provinces (beglerbegi); viziers, holding a seat in the Diwan; or the

Grand Vizier. Those not chosen for a palace education were sent to Anatolia for labour.

Most of these eventually went to IstanbuI to become jannisaries, (househoid soldiers).

Also among the palace pard were the "Sipahis of the Porte", a non-feudal, mounted

regiment. While the majority were of non-Muslim origin, it was possible for a Muslim

bom to belong to the Sipahis of the porte.' It was during the reign of Bayezid 1 (r. 1389-

1402) that members of the ghulnm came to dorninate administration. The ghulam

numbered approximately 7000 during his reign (Inalcik, 1976: 28).

Slaves should not be confused with the image of slaves as the lowest strata of society. The position of jannisary, while initially resisted by the parents of eligible children, eventually came to be sought aftcr due to its prestige and monetary rewards. ?t later became possible for Muslirn-boni to belong to the jannisaries.

The reai push towards centralized power came from Mohommed II "She

Conqueror". He successfully repressed an uprising of the jannisaries, and subsequently

expelled many jannimries from the corps. He increased their pay, ass iped their

commander from among their ranks, improved their weapons, and increased their number

from 5,000 to 10,000 (Inalcik, 1976: 46). This reformed corps, personally responsible to

the sultan, was able to overpower any opponent in the imperial domains or the marches.

The jannisan-es were responsible for garrisoning conquered castles and ensuring the

sultan's orders were obeyed.

After his successful capture of Constantinople (1453) Mohornrned II disrnissed

his Grand Vizer, began to appoint his own slaves to this position, and enlarged its

responsibilities. Governors, timar holders, taxation off~cers and executive officers

responsible for applying the sultan's decrees were also mostly of ghularn origin. The

Shnri'n (the traditional source of Islarnic social, political and economic laws) proclaimed

the administration of justice to be the domain of the ulema (the highest religious council),

but the execution of justice fell into the hands of the sultan's personal dependents. While

the Grand Vizier supervised the administration of both finance and justice, he was not

pennitted to give direct orders to the commander of the janissaries, thus preventing him

from acquiring the whole range of state power. The sultan also held the authority to

develop new laws without the intervention or supervision of Shari'a jurists, and

Mohammed II reacted forcibly to attempts at intervention on the part of the rilema

(Inalcik, 1976: 48). Mohammed II was the first sultan to clairn leadership based on three

traditions: Turkish, whose history dictated that a member of the Tnbe of Kayi shall be

chosen ruler of the marches; Islamic, which dictates that a great Ghazi shall lead the

jihad; and Byzantine (Inalcik, 1976: 4 1-42).

Future sultans were rarely as strong as Mohammed II was; however, the

centralized state he developed was not successhilly challenged from within the empire

during the period under consideration. This claim may seem strange given the histoncal

reality of the weakness of some future sultans. Episodes illustrating such weaknesses

include the assassination of sultans with ttieir subsequent replacement by those who hold

the favour of the jannisaries; the "sultanate of the womrn", a period where, through

palace intrigue, real power was held by the sultans' "mothers in Law"; and the reign of the

Kupriii Grand Viziers who held virtually absolute power. These episodes ail demonstrate

that some of the patrimonial criteria Weber developed are not met by the case of the

Ottoman Empire. However, these are not examples of threats to centrdized power, but

shifts in who holds the power, the centralization of which remained largely unthreatened..

Most claims that the Ottoman Empire was feudal center on the sipczhis (note that

the sipahis and the "Sipahis of the PorteJ' are not the sarne, although both are mounted

forces). This is a group of mounted warriors, far more numerous than the household

forces, who received a timar (land gant) and were required to go on campaigns and

supply their own rnilitary equipment. Furthemore, if they were granted additionai land

for outstanding performance, they were required to supply other mounted soldiers (jebeli)

for campaigns. What makes this land tenure system non-feudal is that the sipahis'

relationship with the peasants was strictly defined by the Porte (Ottoman central

govemment). Despite these important differences, the fiefs were in practice heritable

within Iimits. However, the inheritance of a tirnar did not usually involve inhentance of

the same timar held by the father. This discouraged the development of a power base

upon which de facto sovereignty could be based (Moutafchieva, 1988: 37).

An important division in timars also prevented political decentralization. There

were three grades of h a r , with the largest going to high oficials such as govemor-

generals. Whiie these larger fiefs involved usufruct and the requirement of supplying

mounted warriors (jebelï), they were strictly not heritable; the fief went with the

appointment, not with the holder of the office.

To sumrnarize, there is no sovereignty apart from the centra1 niler's sovereignty.

Furthemore, this sovereignty could not be won by force because the design of the

political system maintained political centralization and resisted the centrifugai forces of

enfeofment.

Endogenous Capitalism?

Gocek (1996) argues the dernise of the Ottoman Empire was directly related to

indigenous bourgeoisie forces, but her account cannot be interpreted as an endogenous

development of capitdism. The introduction of enlightenment thought led to

disenchantment with the political structure; secret societies were developed by

intellectuals to promote rational government reforms. This, in conjunction with new

nationalist rnovements, was responsible the development of the Turkish nation state. It

cannot be said this was endogenously developed capitalism: clearIy the ideas and ideals

were imported from Europe. Most importantly the capitalization occurred long after the

period we are interested in here.

To the contrary agricultural technique remained largely traditional during the

period 1450-1700.

MING CHINA

Patrimonial or Feudal?

China's dynasties have been characterized by varying degrees of politicai

centralization; the Ming Dynasty may be considered the epitome of politicd

centralization whiie the Chou Dynasty may be regarded as feudai. Despite fluctuations,

since the first unification of China under the Ch'in Dynasty China's politicd system has

been highly centralized. The Ming dynasty has been chosen from arnong these politically

centralized dynasties because it confoms closely to many of the facets of Weber's ideal-

type patrimonial society. With the emphasis on political centralization it rernains an

exemplar of a patrimonial society. Furthemore, the Ming Dynasty is a long period in

which economic development could occur free from interference of political upheaval.

A challenge can be made to this selection: an "econornic revolution" occurred

during the period 700-1 100 (Elvin, 1973), which involved an increase in trade, and the

development of capitalistic production techniques. Collins' (1986) argues this is an

exarnple of capitalism, similar in cause to the capitalism that emerged in England 1100-

1348. Certainly, if this is the case, then we have a counter example to the daim that

capitalism emerges only from feudalism. This issue cannot be dealt with here. It is

noteworthy, however, that this economic revolution did not continue during the highly

centralized Ming Dynasty.

The Ming Dynasty has many similarities with the Ottoman Empire. Like the

Ottoman Empire, the centralization of the Ming Dynasty was contnved largely under a

single ruler. Like the Ottoman Empire the degree of centralization waxed and waned

with political events and the personal ability of the rulers. The Ming also had periods and

institutions similar to those of the Ottoman Empire that could lead to a (mistaken)

categorization of the Ming as a feudal society, but also like the Ottoman Empire the

centralization was never senously challenged.

The Ming Dynasty was founded by Zhu Yuanzhang in 1368. Zhu Yuarizhang,

after consolidating his power in the Yangtze River region, was able to easily dislodge the

Mongul mlers of the Yuan Dynasty. Government and taxation systems were reorganized

to achieve centraiization. To accomplish centralization he resorted to a tyrannical nile

and political purges. It is estimated that no less than 100,000 people were killed as a

result of his trials; victims included high officiais, army officers and other notables.

Centralization was possible due to a sirnplified organization of the economy.

Taxes were assessed, whenever possible, in kind. Furthemore, the payment had to be

delivered by the taxpayers, under the supervision of village leaders, to designated

warehouses, which were sometimes in far-off locations. Many functions of the

government were supported directly through taxation - local cornmunities were required

to supply office attendants, jail keepers, etc. Many official posts were not paid: the

positions were filled as payrnent of taxes. The strong centralization and simplification

was in part a reaction to the failure of the Sung Dynasty to resist foreign domination,

which was believed to be due to its economic organization (Huang, 1988: 153).

Following Zhu Yuanzhanp's reign there was a succession dispute (1398-1402), in

which the designated heir (Zhu Yuanzhang's grqdson) was challenged by the heir's

uncle. During this period there was a spilt in power between factions favoring each side -

of the dispute. However, this short penod of limited political decentrdization does not

chalIenge the categorization of the Ming Dynasty as patrimonial.

Like the Ottoman Empire, the Ming Dynasty had a landholding military class.

The population was divided into rnilitary and civil registrations. The military house holds

were to pay Iower taxes, and, where possible, be given grants of land. Furthemore,

rnilitary responsibilities were hereditary. However, this group, often remiss in their

military readiness, did not develop into an independent power. They did not have

sovereignty in their land, and they were not given large areas of productive land or the

ability to enfeof sub-vassals, which may have enabled them to attain de facto sovereignty.

The nobility were given stipends, not fiefs, and held their positions at the pleasure

of the emperors (Hucker, 1970: 13).

Endogenous Capitalism?

It may seem unreasonable to use China as a case that did not develop capitalism

endogenously because some scholars contend that China would have developed

capitalism if it was not for foreign interference at a crucial point in its history. A growth

in trade and marketing systems was developing in the Yangtze region in the Qing

Dynasty. Market towns developed that employed wage labour, and whose elite were

merchants. Water transport already existed to support trade and fiscal institutions

employing letters of credit and bills of exchange were developed. However, Fairbanks

(1992) argues these developments could not Iead to capitalism because of rural conditions

in China; the farm household had so little land that they had to be partly comrnerciaiized

to exist. Factory labour could not compete with the low labour costs of this system.

Huang adds with regards to the thesis China would have developed capitalism

indigenously that "China was nowhere close to such an eventuality" (Huang, 1988: 198).

Few innovations in agicultural technique were introduced during the Ming

Dynasty (Perkins, 1969: 56). Those that were, such as the human-drawn plough, were of

a labour intensive nature. In fact, there was a trend towards less efficient agricultural

techniques, including the use of inferior farm implements, because of their lower cost.

TOKUGAWA JAPAN

Patrimonial or Feudal?

Japanese feudalism is often associated with the Tokugawa penod (1600-1868).

However, Japanese feudalism existed pnor to the Tokugawa era, during the Muromachi

and Sengoku Eras.

The Development of Feudalism

The development of feudalism in Japan began in the Kamakura Period, but the

Kamakura Penod is not properly feudai. The acquisition of shoen land by Bnk~fir

(central military govemment) officiais led to the development of feudalism in the

Muromachi and Sengoku ~ e r i o d s . ~

At the beginning of the Kamakura Penod the shogun vassalized shrrgo

(provincial-level cornmanders of rnilitary forces) and tater jito (land stewards of an

3state). Despite these feudal elements it would be unreasonabIe to cal1 the Kamakura era

5 One issue regarding the relationship between feudalisrn and capitalism is the paradox between warfare and economic growh. Warfare is seen by many to be both a part of feudalism and a deterrent to economic development. However, Tokugawa feudalism was relatively free frorn war. Even in medieval perïods, warfare in Japan was "not in fact especially deadly or destructive. The damage done by warfare to the true econornic foundation of the country, its nce fields and its forests, was almost negligible" (Sanson, 1964: 18 1). Feudal warfare in Europe was not as destructive as may be imagined. The relative absence of the productive cIass in warfare allowed production to continue nearly unabated, and codes of chivalry and heavy armor Iimited casualties arnong the rufing class.

The shoen is a scattered g o u p of land holdings owned by local notables (kaibatsa ryoshu) but given to aristocratic proprietors (Ryoke) for tax exemptions. The proprietors were in no way feudal vassals: they were not warriors, and resided in Kyoto (away from their potential source of power) potential. They held land without obligation of any service to the shogun

feudal in the sense of political decentralization because the shugo and jito had no political

authority apart from the Bakufu,

Shugo were able to develop independent power through additions to their duties

such as the enforcement of land-related disputes - they were able to not enforce decisions

perceived to be disadvantageous to themselves, and could demand payrnent from

successful litigants for enforcement services (Akira, 1990: 241) - and the collection of

hanrei (a nce tax) - which he could use to reimburse warriors for their military expenses

during the Nambokucho disturbance7. Shugo later acquired control over haif of the shoen

land under their jurisdiction, and were able to develop vassal relationships with local

w ~ o r s through grants of this land. The shugo developed wealth through rniscellaneous

taxation and serni-legd extractions. The position of shugo becarne heritable, which

allowed the development of strong vassal relationships and local power.

During the Muromachi Period the shugo took complete control of the provinces

and installed permanent administration complete with strongholds and fortifications.

They resided in Kyoto, while deputy shrigo directly governed the provinces from the

shugosho (the governing office).

Like the shugo, the jito were not intended to be an independent holders of power.

However, the jito increased the area of land under their personal control to half the land

they were responsible for. They acquired contiguous landholdings, militarized upper-

dass peasants, and adopted the practice of single heir inheritance of iandholdings.

Through these processes the jito becarne regional overlords. Shugo were generally more

powerful than jito, and were able to vassalize them.

' A perïod beginning of the Muromachi era when there were rwo rival courts.

During the Murornachi era the Bakufi had considerable control over the shugo.

The shugo were required to reside in Kyoto; this was both a sign of the shogun7s power

and a deterrent to the development of power by the shrrgo. After the Onin War (1467-

1477) the power of the shogun was drastically reduced, and the requirement to reside in

Kyoto could not be enforced. The shugo returned to their domains, where they increased

their power and personai authority. War spread to the countryside where it lasted for

about 100 years. During this time, known as the Sengoku f eriod ( 1477- 1570): there was

continuous threat and practice of gekokujo, the overthrow of superior persons by inferïor

persons. The powerfui regiond lords of this era, the Sengoku dairnyo, were far more

independent, economically and politically, than the shugo daimyo had been, and they

began to fight one another for regional hegemony.

Tokugawa Feudalism

Japan was largely unified around 1570 by Oda Nobunaga. Toyotomi Hideyoshi

furthered the process of unification. Tokugawa Ieyasu consolidated central power by

defeating his rivals at the Battle of Sekigahara. By 1615 Ieyasu had regranted land he

had either won from his opponents or gained through lack of heir to his supportersg.

Approximately one-quarter of the land and important cities such as Edo and Osaka were

under direct Bak~lfir control. Virtudly al1 of the remaining land was divided into hans

(fiefs), each one being granted to one of approximately 250 daimyo. The emperor's

prestige was enhanced for legitimacy, but his powers were even further reduced (Hall,

1978: 168). Each daimyo had sovereignty within his han, but was required to maintain

The Onin war was a baronial dispute that was fought in Kyoto because of a shogunal succession dispute. The war lasted for ten years, and engaged over 200,000 soldiers at one time. When it was through Kyoto was destroyed.

law and order. The shogun did not directly tax the daimyo, but could make regular

extractions. The daimyo in tum granted privileges to samurai. the daimyoPs military

class sub-vassais.

There are significant differences between the feudalism of Tohgawa Japan and

the feudalism of England 1100-1348. The shoguns were more powerful and more

controlling of their vassals than the English Kings were. The relationship between the

daimyo and the shogun emphasized the dnimyo's responsibilities over the sho,w's

responsibilities. The power of the shogun was maintained, as well as demonstrated, by

the sankin-kotai system, which required the vassals to leave their hans and reside in Edo

for a designated period of time and leave their farnilies in Edo upon their retum. 'O This

discouraged the daimyo from encroaching on the shogun's prerogatives. The shogun was

also able to reassign daïmyos to different hans.

Another innovation to prevent the decentralization of power was the heino-brtrzri

system, which separated the warriors from the peasant class. Both daimyo and samurai

were required to reside in castle towns. Samrcrai, rather than being enfoeffed with land,

were granted stipends of rice.

Tokugawa Japan differs frorn European feudalism because of its strongly

centralized state. Weber indicates Tokugawa Japan is feudal, but differs from the

feudalism of Western Europe because of the power of the shogun. Rieschauer finds that

while having a feudal political structure, "Culturally, and to sorne extent economically,

Tokugawa Japan had a postfeudal rather than a strictly feudal society" (Rieschauer, 1965:

9 In addition to his supporters there were Tozoma ("outside lords") who had not actively supported Ieyasu but were too powerful and remote to easily challenge 'O Although normally descrïbed as yeariy, the times differed greatly. Daimyo from more distant hans had longer intervals between required stays at theù Edo residence

45). It could be argued that it is unreasonable to categorize Tokugawa Japan as feudal

because it contains important elements of both feudal and patrimonial ideal types.

Despite this plausible interpretation, Tokugawa Japan is classified here as feudal because

it is charactenzed by the decentraiization of politicai authority.

Endogenous Capitalism?

Japan expenenced "rapid economic growth during the 16& century" (Reischauer,

1965: 44) in part due to foreign trade, mosî notably with China. Tokugawa Japan

experienced continued economic growth, despite an almost complete lack of international

trade. Efficient agriculturai and manufacturing techniques were introduced and

developed. The daimyo and shogun were interested in agricultural improvements

because this was their main source of revenue. They instructed peasants in new

techniques, promoted Iand reclarnation and encouraged diligence (Tsuchiya, 1977: 154).

Improvements in agriculture included irrigation techniques and the increased rate of the

introduction of seed varieties. Labour saving devices such as water wheels used for

pounding -popular by middle of Tokugawa period (Tsuchiya, 1977: 155) - and "threshing

chopsticks" and the "one-thousand tooth shredder" used for threshing Cotton and

rapeseed (Toshio, 199 1: 5 14) were employed. The circulation of agricultural books such

as "The Complete Agriczclturalist" by Miyazaki Antei, and Yasasada7s "Encyclopedia of

Agricrrlr~ire" indicates the interests in productive agriculture. Landholdings were run as

managed estates for commercial crops (Yarnamura, 1978).

ENGLAND 1100-1348

PatrimoniaI or Feudal?

Despite obvious feudal characteristics there is some question of the extent of

political decentralization in England's history. At times the king appeared to have

absolute power, while the barons have been powerless to oppose him. Wallerstein has

argued that England's development into a core state was due largely to the political

centrakation of its absolutist state (Wallerstein, 1972). This absolute power of the king,

however, has only existed at certain times in England's history, and is only absolute in

cornparison to other European states, where the arïstocracy sometimes had comparativety

less power. In other words, arnong feudal states, England has more centralization of

power than some, but has much less than the patrimonial cases.

Upon defeating the Anglo-Saxons, William I "The Conqueror" was crowned King

of England. He enfeofed his supporters as barons, but left the existing political structure

largely unchanged." In 1086 he required d l vassals and their sub-vassals to swear

allegiance directly to him in the Salisbury Oath. While William was able to hold tight

control over his vassals, subsequent kings were not always so strong. The signing of the

Magna Carta by John 1 and the Provisions of Oxford by Henry III demonstrate the

strength of the combined efforts of the barons.

The barons were granted large tracts of land and were required to maintain a

military force for service to the king. The constant requirement for battle service ensured

these forces would be maintained - England was engaged in frequent rnilitary carnpaigns

in Wales, Scotiand, Ireland, and the continental territones. The barons on the Welsh

I I Anglo-saxon England could also be considered feudal (Postan, 1972), but is not of interest to us here

marches and Scottish border were especiaily war-ready. English continental temtories

held had to be defended while those temtories believed to be attainrible required baronid

support in offensive warfare.

The barons were able to constnict strong fortresses that required a months-Iong

siege by the king's forces if they were to be overtaken. In the event of a rebellion by the

vassals, the king's forces alone were demonstrated to be insufficient in resistance.

English kings were required to be wary of the interests of their vassals.

Despite the fact that, unlike Tokugawa daimyos, barons and their subvassals

officially yielded their sovereignty to their lord in his presence or the presence of his

officiais, barons and their subvassals held sovereignty in their fiefs and could govern

them free from interference.

Endogenous Capitalism?

WhiIe it is more widely agreed that England, rather than Japan, developed

capitalism endogenously, it is not as widely agreed it did so prior to 1350. English

capitaiisrn is associated with the mechanization of the textile industry and the

capitalization of agriculture that took place after the enclosures- However, like

Tokugawa Japan, Medieval England was developing capitalism. It was not industrial

capitalism, nor did it invotve al1 econornic actors, but capitaiist relations were developing

during this penod in the form of managed estates. "Around 1300 the management of

demesne involved making detailed accounts of productive and commercial operations"

(Bntnell, 1993b: 366). The 13" century saw the techniques of treatises on estate

management, which encouraging efficient organization, accurate rnethods of accounting

and yearly control of accounts by auditors, widely employed (Gimpel, 1988: 38).

The Cornparison

The positive cases are, therefore, Tokugawa Japan ( 1600- 1868) and England from

1100-1348. The negative cases are the Ottoman Empire from 1450-1700 and Ming

China (1368-1644).

England and Japan fulfil the requirements of The Method of Agreement in which

positive cases are compared. While selection is inherently limited when using historical

cases. important variables should be varied for control if possible. Ln this case the role of

foreign trade is controlled; England engaged in extensive foreign trade, while in

Tokugawa Japan there was virtually none.

The requirernents of the Method of Difference are fulfilled through cornparison of

the positive cases and the negative cases. The negative cases should be as sirnilar as

possible to the positive cases except on the crucial differences. Selection of the cases has

been guided by this requirement; both positive and negative cases alike are large,

bureaucratic, pre-modern societies.

It was discussed earlier that a problem with The Method of Difference is that

important causal variables may be overlooked because it is assumed that factors constant

between the positive and negative cases are not causaily related to the outcome of

interest; Le., it is possible that something cornrnon to both patrimonial and feudai cases is

the leading cause of capitalism, but that the feudd cases have additional factors that gives

them an extra push towards capitalism. However, it is recognized at the outset that al1 of

the cases considered here had important elements required for the development of

capitalism. The task is seen to explain the paradox of how advanced societies such as

The Ottoman Empire and China failed to develop econornically despite the presence of

68

such eiements. It is the crucial difference between the cases we are primarily interested

in.

Chapter 6:

PresenceIAbsence of the Preconditions for Capitalism

Now that the cases have been separated into patrknonial and feudal societies, it is

necessary to deternine if they do indeed differ regarding the presence of the

preconditions for capitrtlisrn-

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1450-1700)

Free Labour

The Ottoman Empire's political system is based on the free status of its agicultural

producers to prevent the developrnent of independent political power by local notables

who seek to control servile labourers. Cultivators were free to work for wage !abour. In

addition there were landless peasants, requiring an income for taxes, who could be hired

as cultivators (halcik, 1994: 15 1).

Market for Land

Almost al1 land in the Ottoman Empire was miri, or state-owned land. This land

was granted to the reaya, members of the productive class (in contrat with the askeri or

miiitary class), through a contract requiring them to cultivate the land and pay taxes and

designated dues to the state. This is known as the cip-hane system and was the most

widely employed land tenure system. Some land was given to sipahis, but this land was

generally organized in the same manner, with the reuyci paying their taxes to the sipahis.

Both timars and cifr-hane plots were iegally inahenable and indivisible, although, in

practice this was not always the case (halcik, 1994: 146).

However, not al1 miri land was parceled out to peasants. Some miri land, known

as Mukataalu land, was leased by the government under a simple contract under which a

lump sum was to be paid for tithes (Inalcik, 1994: 108). -M~ckataczlu lands changed hands,

and could be exploited however the propnetor saw fit.

Vaqfs were also outside the miri system. Vaqfs were developed to pay for certain

public projects and services. Sornetimes quality, but normally inferior land was granted

to wealthy subjects who would reclaim the land, and give part of the revenue to public

works. The Vaqfs represent another way large landholdings could be accumulated. The

fact that revenue goes to public works wouid not, in itself, discourage the introduction of

efficient techniques because of the proprietors' ability to retain surplus above the

predetermined "donation".

Free Markets

State monopolies, while privately managed, were based on government finances

(Inalcik, 1994: 6 1-62). The Porte was especially concerned with control of silver and

gold mines, which were an object of contention between Ottoman Empire and the West

(Inalcik, 1994: 58). Although private merchants were involved in the process, their

activities were directed by the Porte. In the 1470s Mohammed II put land and water

control systems suitable for rice production under central control because of the

importance of rice in campaigning.

The flow of foodstuffs into Istanbul was considered an important responsibility of

the govemment. In tirnes of shortage it would regulate prices, which involved regulating

pnces in the area of production (Faroqhi, 1994: 496). The populace and the palace troops

couid not leave the provisions for Istanbul to market forces because famine would lead to

revolts. Europe, especiaily Italy, offered higher prices for grain, but the Porte restricted

its export (Inalcik. 1994: 182). Only those selected by the state could ded in cereals

(halcik, 1969: 1 19).

This having been said, the interference by the Porte in the economy has been

exaggerated. While the Porte restricted legal exportation during times of shortage,

exportation did occur. Controls on the pnce of grain were limited by the reluctance of

producers to sel1 (Inalcik, 1994: 185). Tax exemptions and freedoms were granted to

merchants and artisans to attract them to new capitals (Inalcik, 1978~: 207). Merchants

were appreciated in Islam, and their activities were not prescrïbed or lirnited (Inalcik,

1969: 99).

CaIculabIe Law

The Sharia'a provides the knowledge of right and wrong in matters of politics,

economics, society, and religion. Weber pointed out that the Sharia 'a could, in principle,

be a basis for the developrnent of calculable law in lslarnic societies (Turner, 1974: 236).

In practice, however, the Sharia'a was not used in this way. While his legitimacy was

based on religious principles, the sultan had siyaset, political and executive power as

against his religious functions. The principle of uifgave a mler the power to make non-

Sharia'a decisions when necessary (Inalcik, 1978a: 108). This was not uncornrnon

because developrnents not anticipated in the Shnria 'a were cornmonplace (Weber, 1993:

208). Furthemore, Sharia'a legitimization was clairned, to land systems in particular,

only after they were imposed (Inalcik, 1978b: 222).

From some of Weber's writing one gets the impression there are no laws in

patrimonial societies; in the absence of custom the ruler and his retainers make personai

and unpredictable rulings. This is simply not the case. Large bureaucratic societies

cannot exist without some stability, and this is in part supplied though official decrees,

which are not reversed every day. Suleiman II ' n i e Magnificent" was also known as

"The Lawgiver". He developed kanun-names for each province that established tax rates,

rules of land possession, transference and inhentance under a timar. as well as conditions

when the laws did not apply (Inalcik, l978a).

Entrepreneurid Organizaüon of Capital

Sipahis had little control over their timars. They were entitled to the tax revenue

and certain dues (kduk), but did not have sovereignty in their property; both taxation and

dues were regulated by the Porre (Inalcik, 1994: 71). The Porre even tried to control the

actual collectors of the rent to whom the sipahis delegated collection (Inalcik, 1994: 74).

Furthemore, the sipahis demonstrated their inability to manage their own plots due to

rnilitary obligations, and, as a result, demesne was abolished in favour of adding former

demesne to rent land in 1539 (Inalcik, 1994: 1 17- 1 18).

The emphasis on free cultivators supplied with their own land was the ideal, but

not the only form of agricultural organization. Approximately ten percent of land was

outside miri system. The Vaqf represents an important departure from this model. As

previously mentioned, proprietors were not always entirely altmistic. They were

interested in securing revenue for themselves and their farnily. The portion of revenue

and public projects to be undertaken in return for the gant were established at the start,

encouraging surplus production for the benefit of the proprietor. Owners welcomed any

labour to extend arable land; labour was generally the limiting factor because most

potentid labourers had their own plots (Inalcik, 1994: 122).

The Porte generaily encouraged land reclamation to increase its tax base (Inalcik.

1994: 170). It would offer lower taxes or no tax at all for a iimited time on reclaimed

land. For exarnple, sipahis could reclaim land and not pay taxes until a new land survey

recorded the land.

Labour, land, and free markets were avaiiable for entrepreneurial organization in

a context of calculable econornic conditions. However, what has been termed capitalist

agriculture - managed estates - were not widespread.

MING CHINA

Free Labour

Wage labour is not generally associated with Ming China. This is in part due to

the belief that slavery was widespread during the Ming Dynasty. This misconception is

probably in part due to accounts of slaves willingly offenng themselves to office-holders.

In fact, owning slaves was outiawed during the Ming for al1 but office holders. This

resulted in former slaves trying to office-holders to be their new masters. In addition,

translation has led to confusion because the same word was used for what are normally

thought of as slaves, in addition to several other types of dependant labourers (Chao,

1986: 155-156).

Wage labour i i not part of the image of traditional China. However, hired

workers on a wage b a i s were common even as early as the Warring States Period (Chao,

1986: 133). During the Ming Dynasty approximately ten percent of the rural labour force

was engaged in wage labour (Chao, 1986: 140). Legal codes, recognizing a distinction

between shorter and longer-term agreements, indicate the government endorsed the use of

wage labour (Chao, 1986: 145).

Land Market

The government did own land. Some was govemment land inherited from the

Sung and Yuan Dynasties and some was confiscated from those who actively opposed

the rise of the Ming Dynasty (Heijdra, 1998: 476). However, the majority of land was

privately held. Despite the govemment's ability to confiscate land or reassign it to

princely estates, land continued to be bought and sold (Heijdra. 1988: 476). Private

contracts for, and public records of land transfers and sales indicate land was alienable

and diat this pracùce was accepted and endorsed by the govemment.

While there is some disagreement on land concentration dunng the Ming - Chao

(1981) argues land was dispersed arnong smdl and medium-sized landlords while more

traditional reports argue there was a concentration among the elite - al1 agree land was

bought and sold freely.

Free Markets for Comrnodities

The central govemment supplied itself with centrally produced goods, and

controlled al1 essential comrnodities such as salt and iron (Hucker, 1970: 31-32).

According to Hucker, merchants were involved in govemment monopolies, but a free

movement of goods was prevented. The govemment controlled the activity of merchants.

They required govemment supplied passes (as did d l citizens) to move about the country

(Hucker, 1970: 3 1). The central government "...virtually announced to the nation that

China, as a large conglomeration of village communities could be content and happy

without the complications of commerce" (Huang, 1988: 153-154). Foreign vade was

outlawed; European trade was restricted to srnall-scale activities on the south Coast until

the end of the Ming (Hucker, 1970: 22).

Many scholars see these views as exaggerations. Brook says that on balance, the

Ming Dynasty neither supported nor opposed commerce (Brook, 1998: 677). The re-

opening of the Grand Canai for the payment of rice tribute was a boon to the sale of

surplus agriculniral products and commodities produced for the market. Private use had

always been pennitted on the canal, initially at no cost, and later for toll fees. While

there were penalties for selling above market pnce or gaining a monopoly, the market

pnce was detennined by comparing prices in the market, not developed artificially by the

government (Brook, 1998: 671). The distribution of state monopolies was left in the

hands of merchants, not taken over by the state (Brook, 1998: 683).

Markets could develop wherever they were profitable (Brook, 1998: 685).

County markets increased in number and frequency throughout the Ming Dynasty, and

they were officially recognized, though not officially monitored (Brook, 1998: 68 1).

Some county markets developed into market towns, which coincided with a general shift

from marketing surplus to producing for the market (Brook, 1998: 688).

Calculability

There were Iaws and law codes in Ming China; however, most of the laws issued

by the government were directed at customs such as ancestral instruction that stressed

personal conduct. There was no concept of abstract justice, and rulings were based on

social stability. The class of those involved, and the possible social repercussions of

decisions were of paramount importance (Hucker, 1970: 71). Both officials and

emperors made legal decisions, but the emperor could overtum any decision at any time

(Hucker, 1970: 48). Fairbank remarked that "people generally avoided litigation"

(Fairbank, 1992: 183), and added that Chinese law was vertical: it was designed to

resolve conflicts between the state and the individud, not between individuals (Fairbank,

1992: 183-1 84). Statutes were irnprecise and conindictory To appeal to the letter of the

Iaw was to disregard true morality.

The idea that such arbitrariness in Chinese law has prevented economic

development is not new; Adam Smith proposed that possibly China had ". . .acquired that

full complement of riches which the nature of its laws and institutions permits it to

acquire" (Smith, 1982: 174).

Too much c m be made of the arbitrariness of law in Ming China by looking at

specific practices. Over the long run practices were remarkably stable. Precedents

carried out a great ded of weight in the tradition-oriented Confucian State. Fiscal

policies enacted at one time were assumed to be useful at later times. Even ministers

were restricted by precedent (Huang, 1969: 77-78). The Confucian frarnework was rigid

and formal and stifled innovation in governmental procedures (Huang, 1969: 124).

Accounts of arbitrary action by emperors in personal-political affairs must not

lead to the judgement that prediction was not possible in the economic realm. The image

of a Chinese ruler sentencing his officials to floggings or long prison sentences for what

seern to be rninor offences (or no offences at all) are disturbing, but the image of an

emperor frequently interfering with landholding agreements is unredistic. Such matters

were attended to either on a local level by officials or on a village level by the clairnants.

Either way, custom and law assured the cdculability required for economic investment.

Entrepreneurial Organization

Despite the concentration of land, the trend was away from managed estates

because of the unavailability of cheap labour (Chao, 1983: 309). There were agricultural

management books, but they advised against managerial landlordism. Shen's Handbook

for Agrictilture, written in the 1630s, demonstrated that the net income to the Iandowner

from a managed estate would be no higher than if the land was rented out (Chao, 1982:

309) while the efforts involved in supervision of a managed estate would be greater.

Generally, because of the costs of supervision and high renting prices, closely managed

estates were not profitable and did not develop (Heijdra, 1998: 524).

Despite these trends, large-scaie agriculture was present in Ming China. Labour

and land were available for the entrepreneurid organization in a context of free markets

and calculable econornic conditions. The concentration of land by the gentry led to some

managerial landlords who employed hired labour (Heijdra, 1998: 524). However,

efficiently managed estates were the exception. They were in fact more widespread

during the Sung.

TOKUGAWA JAPAN

Free Labour

Peasants become differentiated into landlords, tenants, and employed labourers

during the Tokugawa Period (Tsuchiya, 1977: 159). Terms of labour employment ranged

from hereditary tenant to day labourer. Evidence suggests that the rnajority of non-

hereditary ag-ricultural workers worked for a season or several seasons for the sarne

landowner, but some were even shorter term (Tsuchiya, 1977: 160). These labourers

were free to work in response to dernand.

Increased free Iabour was in part a result of landholding arrangements, which

were altered near the beginning of the Tokugawa Penod. Large Landowners granted

small plots to fellow villagers who were previously landless and had worked on the plots

of the large landowners. They now had their own plots, but were stiil required to perform

agricultural labour as part of the agreement to acquire the plots granted to them. Many

abandoned or sold their plots due to an inability to maintain sustenance levels. These

practices increased during famines, whïch were cornrnon in the Tokugawa era. At other

times, rising wages for labour, due to the labour requirements of rnanufactunng and

comrnercial crops, led some to sel1 their land to seek wage work (Yamarnura, 1979: 295).

Land Market

Tokugawa laws were explicit about the non-dienation and non-divisibility of

land. However, these laws could be circumvented with terminology such as "permanent

mortgages"; the Bakr& dairnyo and sarntlrai were not particularly concemed about who

owned the land, so long as taxes were paid on it (Hall, 1978: 203). Restrictions on crops

instated near the beginning of the penod were also not enforced, which permitted

landowners to engage in commercial crops (Osarnu, 1982: 360). As mentioned above,

Iandowners were able to increase their holdings in periods of high wages (hence low land

pnces) and poor harvests.

In addition to the land market, reclaimed land could officially be made into large

holdings (Toshio, 1991: 499). These projects were actively supported by daimyo who

saw additional land as additionai tax revenue. Wealthy merchants and townsmen

eventually took part in large reclamation projects (Toshio, 199 1: 500).

Free Markets for Commodities

By the end of the Tokugawa period, as much as half "and probably nearer two

thirds of [agricultural] output was marketed in one form or another" (Crawcour in

Halliday, 1975: 9). Products from any part of Japan could be found in any large market

(Tsuchiya, 1977: 197). Transportation networks were greatly expanded during the

Tokugawa era; direct shipping routes were developed between Osaka and Edo, and the

daïmyo encouraged transportation with the development of port facilities and connections

between ports and castle towns (Nobuhiko, 1991: 543).

The heino-bunri system led to an interdependence between the feudal class and

the merchants. Stipends were paid in rice, and samurai were forbidden by custom to

engage in commerce, which made merchants necessary to commute rice stipends to cash.

Wholesaiers sold and often transported the daïmyo's rice to the national entrepots in Edo

and Osaka. Merchants were often involved in the transportation to the daïmyo's Edo

residence.

The econornic systern of Tokugawa Japan was more modern than the marketing

systems of the other cases. The Bakufu legalized the sale of futures, which was comrnon

prior to this time, in 1730. Some consider the Tokugawa rice exchange the first stock

exchange. In addition to the dependence of the feudal class on the merchants, the

inefficacy of econornic manipulation due to the complexity of the econornic system

further prevented widespread interference in the economic reaim.

Calculable Law

Chonin (town dwellers) had no rights; there was no conception of bourgeois law

in the Tokugawa Penod (Hdliday, 1975: 10). The peasantry had no politicai power.

Unlike the Ottoman Empire where the sultan defended the freedom of the peasants, the

shogun exercised central authority directly on the dairnyo, and Ieft the peasants to fend

for themselves. Merchants could be exposed to the arbitrary acts of authonties such as

the cancellation of debts, forced loans, and the sudden confiscation of property.

However, while daimyo had sovereignty over their han, they were required to

maintain law and order and run their han peacefully and efficiently. It was also in the

interests of the daimyo to not interfere with productive agriculturd projects. Their

revenue was derived directly from payment in agricultural products, yet they were not

permitted to engage in agriculture. Furtherrnore, the movement of daimyo from han to

han led to greater impartiality (Hall, 1978: 178).

The key to cdculability in the Tokugawa period was that the interests of the

producers coincided with the interests of the daimyo. Interfering with landholding

relationships was not beneficial to the daïmyo.

Entrepreneurid Organization of the Means of Production

Unlike the English case, the feudai class in Tokugawa Japan could not engage in

managerial landlordism due to the heino-burin system. Instead, the upper-class peasants

undertook managerial landlordism. Despite the relative lack of importance of economies

of scale in rice cultivation, economies of scale were important in cash crops, especially in

marketing and processing (Yarnarnura, 1979: 3 16). Wealthy landowners were able to

invest in fertilizer for Cotton, rapeseed, and tobacco, and could afford to rotate crops

(Yamamura, 1979: 294). Wealthy landowners were able to invest in agriculture because

of the tax system, operative at the beginning of the period, which took little account of

differences in wealth when assessing taxes (Toshio, 199 1: 498).

Labour, land, and free markets were available for entrepreneurid organization in

a context of calculable economic conditions. Managed estates becarne more widespread

during the Tokugawa period.

ENGLAND (1100-1348)

Free Labour

The cultivators in feudal England are known for their unfree status, not their

freedom. However, this perception obscures the variety statuses and landholding

arrangements that existed within England 1 100- 1348. Brime11 ( 199321: 368-369)

estimates that from one-fifth to one quarter of the population could be best described as

free. WhiIe large estates could rely on labour dues, smaller estates had fewer labour

requirements and were more dependent (sometimes alrnost entirely dependent) on wage

labour (Kosminski, 1956; Britnell, 1982). Postan estimates 45% of the population was

landiess or nearly landless during this period, and that many must have been. in part,

wage earners (Postan, 1966); srnallholders who had less than ten acres would have to

supplement their income, mostiy through agricultural work (Postan, 1972: 133-1 33).

Free Market for Land

Even arnong members of a manor, there was a land market for those of free status.

Large landowners gained land at the expense of srnaIl landowners who acquired debts to

moneylenders. Their land would be transferred through the moneylenders to the larger

landowners (Postan, 1972: 1 6 4 ) . Manoriai lords were able to expand their demense

through land purchase.

As Collins has indicated, monasteries were able to acquire land either through

purchase or donation. While 1 am ernphasizing the presence of the preconditions in the

wider society, this cannot be dismissed as an isolated development because the Church

owned about one third of the land in England.

Free Markets for Commodities

This period experienced a rapid growth of markets and cornmercialization (Miller

and Hatcher, 1978; Britnell, 1993a). Based on the fact that twenty percent of the

population was not engaged in agriculture and that almost al1 wooi produced was sold, it

has been estimated that approximately one third to one half of al1 labour was directed

towards the market (Britnell 1993b). Direct producers, lords, and kings were al1 involved

in the market. Irrational restrictions on trade were minimal; markets were r e l b e l y free

frorn political interference. They were privately owned and existed wherever owners

could make a profit from renting booths, supplying weights and measures, or imposing

other fees. International trade in luxuries, as well as mass cornmodities existed and was

supported by the king (Miller and Hatcher, 1995: 15).

Despite the ideology of a "just price", which would result in sufficient income for

the producer to maintain hisher social rank (Postan, 1972: 226), consistent trends or

fluctuations, especially in harvests and labour availability, resulted in pice variation

according to demand (Postan, 1972: 228).

Calculability

Britnell believes that calculability is an important element in the

cornrnercialization of England, and adds that the codification of customary law made

authority more predictable during this penod (Britnell, 1993b: 229). The period known

for the imposition of laws. For example, manorial court was held every three weeks

(Wilkinson, 1969: 6); kings, most notably Edward 1, were known for their concem for

law; and the Grand Assizes and Possessary Assizes stabilized and formalized land

ownership (Barlow, 1988: 3 14).

Law reforms extended to merchant activities: the Statute of Merchants of 1285

called for the imprisonment of a defaulting debtor until his debts had been paid

(Wilkinson, 1969: 104). In 1285 the barons demonstrated their concems for their

interests through parliamentary laws protecting lords against fraud by estate officers

(Girnpel, 1988: 38).

Entrepreneurial Organization of Capital

Lords bought land to produce for the expanding town population (Miller 1978:

18 1- 182). The shift frorn military duty to payrnent in lieu of service (scutage) - due to the

kings' increasing reliance on his core household of knights (Wilkinson, 1969: 16-17) -

increased the incentive to increase production for sale, and allowed more freedom to

enterprising individuals (Wilkinson, 1969: 18- 19). Whiie Monastic Manors varied in

their land holding arrangements, the Cistercian Order's properties were almost entirely

demesne, and were organized to meet market demands (Collins, 1986: 52-58). Land

reclamation in marshes and fens increased in the 1200s.

Labour, land, and free markets were available for the entrepreneurial organization

in a context of calculable econornic conditions. By the late 1300s many lords had

increased their dernesne with the aim of profit through efficient management. Some of

the greater estates hired land stewards to administer properties (Britnell, 1983: 22).

Lords' were increasingly employing non-feudal, highly trained assistants in the 1300's

(Miller: 1978: 190). Small estates were often even more market-oriented than Iarger

estates because the owners had to be more concerned over revenues (Britnell, 1982;

Kosrninski, 1956: 276-277)-

Market Freedom in the Patrimonial Cases

Initially it was my intention to describe the differences in the level of capitalist

production between the patrimonial and feudal cases by explaining the presence of the

preconditions necessary for capitalism in the feudai cases in terms of feudalism, and

explaining the absence of the preconditions in the patrirnoniai cases in terms of

patrimonialism. However, it has been found that the preconditions are present within al1

four cases,

This finding is unusual given the image of the difference in market freedom and

caIculability between feudal and patrimonial societies. Patrimonid societies are known

for controlling commerce and making arbitrary extractions, while commerce in feudal

societies is seen to be comparatively free from interference. The reasoning is that

patrimonial States have the incentive and ability to control trade and make extractions,

while feudal governments lack either the incentive or ability.

One of the incentives patrimonial mlers have for interfering in the economy is to

develop a "welfare state", which provides subjects with an acceptable quaiity of life.

Weber argues that patrimonial rulers' authority rests on providing a certain quality of life

to its citizens, and that the ruler and the ruled share the belief that this is an important

responsibility.

The Ottoman Empire appears to conform to the image of a welfare state.

Production was monitored by the state; too Little was thought to result in unfair high

prices for consumers while too much resulted in unfair profits for producers (InaIcik,

1994: 52). The state was especially concemed with grain production and distribution.

Only state-sponsored agents could deal in cereals. The export of ga in was limited or

outlawed dunng penods of shortage. The Porte was especially concemed with the

supply of grain to Istanbul. Grain pnces were controlled to ensure availability, which

meant that prices also had to be controlled in the area of production (Inalcik, 1994: 496).

The Ming Dynasty also appean to conform to this image. Hucker claims that the

welfare state was of an "al1 encornpassing scope" (Hucker, 1970: 67). In addition to

religious ceremonies and legal enforcement, the government restricted industriai

exploitation and gentry landlord oppression of the worst forms (Hucker, 1970: 69). The

buying and selling of public ga in at appropriate times checked inflation. These stores of

public grain were distnbuted in relief, and tax exemptions were granted during times of

need. Local officiais controlled the price of non-agricultural products (Hucker, 1970: 67-

73). However, the state began to rely heavily on the often gain-oriented and oppressive

gentry class to manage local affairs; the Ming State's reluctance to repair imgation

systems - leaving this task to the local gentry - at the end of the Dynasty deviates greatly

from the welfare state model.

Furthemore, Tokugawa Japan engaged in "welfare" practices such as the

adjustment of prices and supply of rice to Edo to prevent riots due to shortages or high

prices (Takenaka, 1969: 149). A riot occurred in Edo in 1733 in response to a rise in rice

prices (believed to be due to the plot of rice merchants, but more likely due to a shortage

in supply). The supply of cities as large Edo, Peking (and Chinese provincial capitals), or

Istanbul could not be tmsted to market forces in pre-modem societies regardless of the

"political orientation" of the mlers.

Differences between markets have been attributed to the ability of patrimonial

governments to make arbitrary extractions. Both patrimonial and feudal rulers require

revenue, a requirement that increases as bureaucracy increases. The difficulties for a

feudal d e r to make economic extractions are famously dernonstrated in England by the

case of John I who, requiring revenue for the war against France. was forced to gant

enonrious concessions to the barons who were no longer interested in the continent

(Barlow, 1988: 397-398).

The Porte acquired hnds with greater ease. In contrat to rnaking concessions for

war requirements it made demands on producers during times of war to sel1 at fixed

prices, and demands on guilds to supply artisans for cûmpaigns. Instead of allowing war

efforts to stimulate the economy it employed slave labour or forced low-wage labour and

used arbitrary taxation to raise fünds (Inalcik, 1994: 466). The govemment couid also

raise money by reallocating fief land to tax farming. something very difficult for English

or Japanese rulers.

The Ming State had an equally easy time gaining revenue and also did not require

the expansion of commerce for revenue. Interestingly, they did not take advantage of this

situation. The state voluntarily reduced its tax incorne from many sources (Huang, 19691:

109).

This explanation does not fit the Tokugawa Era. The shogun found it relatively

easy to make extractions from the daïmyo. The Bakufic did have financial difficulties, but

this is true of the central governments of a11 of the cases. Furthemore, the central

govemments of al1 cases encouraged commerce. The Ottoman Empire had always been

dependent on commerce. The Ming State's use of salt certificates to encourage private

merchants to supply northem frontier zones greatly expanded trade. Trade in Ming China

is much greater than it was once thought to be. Dilton (1989) argues this may be in part

due to the wiiiingness of historians to accept government documents produced by

Confucian officiais who wished to downplay trade-

In fact, any large state will be compelled to allow commerce for the distribution

of essential comrnodities and luxuries for the elite. Revenue is derived from merchant

activity, not from the suppression of this activity. It is only in times of necessity that

patrimonial rulers interfere with the market beyond feudal mlers.

Furthermore, much of the merchant fieedom that existed in Tokugawa Japan was

the result of the heino-brinri system, which separated the samurai from the soi1 and led to

the dependence of the feudal class on the merchants to bbclose the rural-urban gap". This

system is not inherent to feudalism; it does not exist outside of Tokugawa feudalism.

Braudel agrees the role of commerce is important. To illustrate the ability of

rulers to stifle commerce he uses the exarnpte of the ability to manipulate currency, and

suggests this ability is related to the feudal-patrimonial distinction (Braudel, 1979: 588).

Braudel argues that the strength of centralized governments allows them to impose poor

currency while weaker govemments are required to provide a higher quality currency to

ensure its use. Higher quality currency encourages commerce while poor currency stifles

it. He points to the case of the Ming Dynasty, which initially outlawed specie in private

transactions at the beginning of the Ming to ensure the use of poorly backed paper

currency. Furthermore, bronze coins minted later in the dynasty were of a poor quality:

their value was reduced as the official stamp was worn off.

The Ottoman Empire was also known for its abuse of currency. Debasements

were not uncommon in times of need. Mohomrned II began a policy of recalling coins at

only five-sixths their value and replacing them with newly minted coins. This

innovation, duplicated by succeeding sultans, arnounted to a tax of one-sixth on al1

currency in the empire. This policy continued despite cornplaints by both locai and

foreign merchants.

This situation can be contrasted with England 1 100-1348 where coins were

supplied by the centrai govemment and debasements were the exception. Tokugawa

Japan is problematic. The governent debased the currency for revenue. Furthermore,

the shift from the kandaka (a system in which payment of dues were made in coins) to

the kokudaka (a system in which payment of dues were made in nce) at the beginning of

the unification process indicates that the mlers were neither required nor inclined to

supply a reliable currency.

Furthermore, the Chinese and Ottoman cases have been exaggerated. Paper

currency was a failure in China. It was devalued over 1000 times by 1450 and the policy

of considering governrnent paper currency as the only legd tender was had to be

abandoned in the 1430's (Huang, 1969: 106). The Ottoman Empire was curtailed in its

currency abuses by janissary reaction, which was demonstrated in 1589 when they rose

in revolt over their payment in debased currency. A shortage of silver was probably the

greatest problem of the Ottoman Empire, which was overcorne by the influx of siiver

around 1580. However important quality currency is, it appears to be related to the

willingness of the merchant community to accept it and the supply of precious metals,

neither of which appear to be closely related to the feudal-patrimonial distinction.

In a similar line of reasoning, the power of patrimonial states to monopolize

products or gant monopolies is also seen to stifle commerce. However, both feudal and

patrimonial cases held monopolies and pemiitted private monopolization.

The control of the markets in the Ottoman Empire and Ming China and the lack of

the ability to control markets in England have been exaggerated. It would seem that for

every exarnple indicating a significant difference between the two types of societies there

is counter-evidence suggesting that there is Iittle difference between them-

However, it must be added that market freedom and calculability are the most

problematic parts of the cornparison. One of the difficulties of comparative andysis is

comparing across cases on non-qrtantl9able variables. Despite the difficulties, an honest

atternpt is necessary to avoid preconceptions. Furthemore, it is not necessary to

demonstrate that markets were equally free in al1 cases, nor that the criteria of

calculabilty be met equally in al1 cases; instead, it need only be demonstrated that they

are not lirniting conditions in the development of managed estates.

Chapter 7:

Causes of the Differential Development

of Capitalist Agriculture

1s Patrimonialisrn a Deterrent to Managed Estates?

The conclusion that can be drawn from the cûmparison is that the feudd-

patrimonial distinction has not been valuable for explaining a difference in the

preconditions for capitalist agricultural production because the preconditions are present

in both the patrimonial cases and the feudd cases. What is different is not the presence

or absence of the preconditions, but the presence of capitalist agriculture itself. If the

preconditions are present in al1 cases what has caused the difference? Is the cause related

to the feudal-patrimonial distinction? The answers have already been outlined.

Capitalist agriculture was inherently limited in The Ottoman Empire. The Porte

maintained the autonomy of srnall cultivators against their possible dependency on local

notables. It supplied most cultivators with a plot, and required taxes to be paid directiy to

the government or to the sipahis who held the fief in which the plot was located. Even

after a period of population decline that allowed landhoiders to extend their holdings, the

Ottoman state's unwillingness to allow full dispossession of the peasants resulted in

various forms of rent by the landlords instead of managed estates (Faroqui, 1994: 448).

But is this related to patrimonialisrn? This policy is related to a strong centralized

govemment. This system was implernented to restrict the decentralization of power by

those who would control the labour of the cultivators. Brenner indicates that this

technique was used by the French monarchy to control the aristocracy while enhancinq

its own revenues by direct taxation (Brenner, 1985). As Brenner has argued for France, it

could similariy be argued for the Ottoman Empire that the strong centralized

govemment' s insistence on the freedorn of the cultivators restricted commercial

agriculture because the availability of land in the Ottoman Empire made it difficult to

secure labourers for managed estates.

However, the idea that patrimonial states discourage managed landlordism by

maintaining the autonomy of the cultivators is not supported by the Chinese case. The

central government relied heavily on gentry class involvernent in local &airs, and did

little to prevent the accumulation of land in the hands of the gentry.

Capitalist agriculture was inherently limited in China. Econornic decisions of the

landlords were responsible for the downturn in rnanaged estates. Intensity of cultivation

has a great effect on the productivity of wet rice cultivation, but intense cultivation

requires costly supervision. In addition, population pressure increased the rental value of

the land. These factors led landlords to shift away from managed estates to

sharecropping or, more cornmonly, fixed rental arrangements. This reduced the cost of

supervision by placing the benefits of intense cultivation on the cultivators. It would

appear that population pressure and the requirements of rice cultivation were responsible

for the absence of managed estates - not patrimonialism.

It could be argued that it was patrimonialism, not population pressure that

prevented the increase in managed estates in China. In other words, if China had been

feudal, and the cultivators serfs, labour costs would have been reduced thereby allowing

the development of managed estates. There are two problems with this line of reasoning.

The first is that it becarne unprofitable to have managed estates even if the workers were

paid subsistence wages. The second is that the argument relies on the enserfment of the

workers, not their freedom.

The Decision to Convert to Managed Estates

It was assumed if the preconditions for managed estates were present, then they

would emerge, and because of their comparative advantage in efficiency they would

become prevalent. However, economic factors other than labour efficiency bear on the

decision to develop managed estates.

Chayanov's theories on peasant decision making have been used to explain

landlord's decisions to use sharecroppers or fixed-rent tenants over wage labour.

Regarding labour input, sharecroppers and fixed rent tenants make different decisions

than wage earners because they make them based on different considerations." Wage

labour does not make as efficient use of labour as sharecropping or fixed rate tenantry in

an agricultural economy because wage labour does not put cultivators under decision

making conditions that encourage labour output. For example, it may become rational

for a sharecropper to work with greater diligence and for longer hours than a wage emer .

Furthemore, a sharecropper may use free farnily labour.

Martinez-Nier, in comparing the costs and benefits of wage labour and

sharecropping, reasons that wage labour results in the:

... underemployrnent of the Iabourers' family, and the underemployrnent in terms of the

effort and quality of work, which landowners are unable to profit from in a wage-labour

'' Unlike wage eamen. sharecroppers have to decide how much labour to input after subsistence needs and payments are met. After these are met, the sharecropper considers each additional input of labour more burdensome, while the output gained from each additional labour is Iess vdued. Therefore, there cornes a point where the peasant is unwilling to increase their labour output. This equilibrium point can be moved in the direction of greater work by decreasing the drudgery of the work or increasing the perceived benefits of additional output.

system .... Thus by tuming labourers into tenants, landowners are able to get extra returns

from the otherwise unemployed labour- (Martinez-Alier, 1977: 36)

He concludes that before mechanization that increased the advantages of

econornies of scale in agriculture:

.-.one would expect profit-rninded landowners to turn into rentier landlords, thus being able

to profit, at Ieast in part, from the increased labour effort of labourers turned into peasants

(cash tenants or sharecroppers). (Martinez-AIier, 1977: 38)

Bray (1983) contends that the decision to move to managed estates is highly

dependent on crop type. For example, wet nce cultivation gains far more from intensity

of cultivation than it does from an economy of scale. It has enormous potential for

increased land productivity, but these improvements are generalIy srnail-scale and labour

intensive: a skilled smallholder can increase productivity as easily as a rich landlord can

(Bray, 1983: 13). Rlustrating the supervision costs that would be associated with

managed estates she claims that "...inspecting an irrigated rice field for weeds is almost

as onerous as weeding it oneself' (Bray, 1983: 13).

Managed estates are not necessarily economically advantageous from a landlord's

point of view. As Martinez-Alier points out, prior to the mechanization of agriculture

sharecropping and fixed rate tenantry were often rational econornic decisions. As Bray

contends, the decision will be dependent on crop type. Managed estates cannot be

expected to emerge wherever the conditions allow the preconditions mode1 suggests.

Chapter 8:

Discussion

Concepts and Cornparison

One caveat cornes to rnind immediately to those opposed to historical

comparative approaches: if you set out with a goal finding something sirnilar in two

societies then you will find it in both of them. Exacerbating this problem is the perceived

assiduousness of comparative-onented researchers in aftirming their assumptions

regarding nomothetic explanations. In reading historicai comparative works I have found

two approaches to explanation that bear on this issue.

As 1 read Barrington Moore's The Social Origins of Democracy and Dicraturship

(1966) 1 found part of his approach unacceptable. He developed a list of social

conditions that should, when present, result in a specified outcome. However, as he

moved from case to case, some of his cases did not conform to his explanation. Some

cases did not have ail of the social conditions, but had the outcome that, supposedly,

could only arise from the specified conditions. Moore would explain why, despite their

apparent inconsistencies with the theory, they did not actually chdlenge it. 1 found this

to be unacceptable. If he was going to develop a list of conditions then he should not

require manipulation to make outliers fit. After al1 he only had six cases, shouldn't they

al1 fit his theory? It was designed inductively from them.

The approach of Stephen Sanderson's The Transition from Ferrdalism to

Capitnlism (1994) was aiso unsatisfactory, but for a different reason. Sanderson claims

that the difference between feudal and non-feudal societies, so far as the development of

capitalism is concemed, is that feudal societies allow merchants greater freedom. The

resulting increase in trade leads to a trading "critical mass", at which point capitalism

emerges. Unlike Moore, Sanderson does not rnodify his explanation to fit outliers. No

outliers exist. His explanation seems to fit al1 cases.

The ciifference, concerning us here, between Moore and Sanderson is that

Moore's explanation employs variables that are more narrowly defined than Sanderson's.

Moore primarily uses the strength possessed by commercializing tendencies favonng

capitaiist groups; the degree to which the foms of commercialized agriculture adopted by

the landholding elite depended on the backing of a repressive political apparatus; and the

degree to which the structure of peasant society faciiitated coordinated resistance to

exploitation. Sanderson primarily uses "merchant freedom". Actual cases do not always

confom to Moore's explanation, but with Sanderson's comparatively broad (and vague)

variable cases fit more easily.

The two authors have employed different approaches to the s m e underIying

problem of explaining sirnilarity in comparative histoncal research: different societies are

different. If you want to Say that societies are comparable the differences c m either 1) be

explained as being unimportant because the different contexts in which they operated Ied

to different results, or 2) be categorized under the sarne covenng term."

Relating to the problem of "finding what you are looking for", the above

discussion indicates the ease with which you find something has more to do with what

you are looking for than how much you want to find it. If you are looking for something

narrowly defined then you will have a difficult time finding it; if you are looking for

something to fit in a broadly defined category then you probably will find it. This raises

I 3 The use of a covering t e m is inherent in abstraction. and is therefore employed in any categorization. However, it is useful to compare the "level of abstraction" and the technique of explaining differences.

a possible problem with the preconditions for capitalism used here. How caiculable is

"calculability"? How free are "free markets"? These broadly defined attributes can

likely be found anywhere. Also, some form of free labour and some form of land

acquisition will be possible in most societies.

Here lies one of the keys to the use of the negative cases. Without them it could

have been concluded that there was an important connection between feudalism and the

development of the preconditions. By introducing negative cases, I have found that the

preconditions can be iocated in non-feudai societies as well. The Method of Difference

can demonstrate that an explanation is problematic because it fits both positive and

negative cases. not only because they may share specific processes and events, but also

because the explanation has employed variables that are so widely defined that they could

be found in almost anywhere.

The Introduction of "New" Cases

There is disagreement regarding the comparability of societies. "Historicism"

cornrnonly refers to the position that societies are not comparable because each society is

the result of a unique constdlation of events that have not occurred elsewhere.

Associated with this perspective is the belief that generalities do not apply to history;

ideographic detail and analysis of particular events and personalities properly explain

historical development. Comparïson may be employed, but for the purposes of showing

contrasts.

While in anthropology there has been ongoing debate on the comparability of

societies, sociology has embraced a comparative approach. Durkheim, Weber and Marx

were proponents of the comparative method in macro sociological analysis.

1 believe that the debate between historkism and cornparison cannot be resolved

with empincal data; the different positions are axioms of different approaches. This is

not to Say, however, that comparative-minded researchers think that anything goes. Most

comparative-oriented explanations are limited in their applicability to certain cases or

certain conditions. In sorne cases, however, I have rejected feudalism-to-capitalism

explanations developed for European feudaiism because they did not apply to the

Japanese case. Furthemore, I have used a revision of Weber's multi-causal explanation

for the development of capitalism on cases to which it was not intended to apply. I will

defend this approach by discussing the problems in restricting the applicability of

explanations.

Mono-causai explanations in history fail because a comparable society can always

be found that demonstrates the cause cannot, in itsel. account for the outcome of interest-

For example, if trade is put fonvard as the cause of capitalism, then a case c m always be

found in which there was extensive trade but in which capitalism did not develop. The

explanation could then be revised to include a cause that is present in the positive case,

but is absent in the negative case. This process can be continued until there is an

explanation that fits al1 positive cases and no negative cases. In other words, through the

process of control, historicai expIanations are made non-testable. Because d i cases have

been used to develop the explanation nothing is Ieft to test it with. 1 am not cornplainhg

- this is part of the process of induction. It is unreasonable to ask for an explanation to fit

al1 cases, yet leave some information unused to later test the explanation. However, the

problem is acute in historical sociology because of the unavailability of new

observations.

What does rernain, however, are cases left unconsidered during the development

of the exphnation. Unconsidered is an appropriate description because they certainly

were not unknown; instead, they were not considered to be appropriate cornparisons at

the time. New ways of thinking can make the applicability of unconsidered cases more

reasonable. For example, Japan has not always been thought of as having developed

capitdism endogenously because industrial techniques were imported; however, the

conceptualization of the industrial revolution as being possible only within the context of

an already capitalizing economy make it possible to include Japan as a case of

endogenously developed capitalism.

The point is that the applicability of "new" cases should rest, not on the exclusion

of cases by the original process of induction, but on the reasonableness of the

comparison, which may rely on unforeseen developments. Without the use of new cases,

inductively developed explanations are non-testable. Because explanations clairned

feudaiism was the cause, and Japan was feudd, 1 concluded they should apply to Japan-

The Feudal-Patrimonial Distinction

The finding of the precondition comparison is that the cases are similar; where

they differ, political decentralization is not the cause. But it should not be concluded that

the feudal-patrimonial categorization itself should be discarded. Some claim that the

categorization does not capture "real" differences in societies. However, as 1 mentioned

in the discussion of Eisenstadt's typology, I believe that the evaluation of categorization

systerns should not be based on their ability to capture the real similarities and differences

in societies; they should be seen as heuristic tools, not attempts to get at reality. With

respect to the realism of the feudal concept 1 foilow Coulbom and Strayer who point out

feudalisrn is,

... an abstraction derived from some of the facts of early European history, but not in itself

one of those facts. No contemporary of William the Conqueror or Godfrey of Bouillon ever

used the tem; it was invented by scholars, chiefly scholars of the eighteenth century.. ..From

its very begïnning the idea of feudalism was a high level abstraction. (Coulbom and Strayer,

1965: 3)

A categorization system should be evaluated on its abiiity to separate societies in

a manner that is useful in dealing with a particular probIem. On this account 1 have found

the feudal-patrimonial distinction to be of little use; it has not helped to explain the

differentiai development of managed estates. The distinction, however, may be usefùl for

other applications. For exarnple, while not al1 feudal societies have developed dong

similar lines, it do not see how it is reasonable to explain the rise of parliamentary

democracy in England without refemng England's feudal structure. Those who argue

that the distinction should be discarded altogether seem to ignore its proven usefulness

and the possibility of its usehlness in hture applications.

Chapter 9:

Conclusions

Despite the traditional image of the differences between feudal and patrimonial

societies regarding conditions of economic calculability and market freedom, the

cornparison revealed that the preconditions for capitalism were present in al1 four cases.

Conceptions of the differences between the patrimonial and feudal societies seem to be

exaggerated. The Ming Dpasty was more cornmercidized, and merchants had greater

freedom than is generally thought; restrictions on trade and govemment interference in

commerce have been exaggerated in the case of The Ottoman Empire. Regarding the

case of Ming China, Dilton (1989) cornments that rnisconceptions may have arisen

because historians have uncritically accepted govemment documents that were written by

Confucian officiais who had an interest in downplaying commerce and exaggerating

conformity to Confucian ideals. 1 would add a further possibility: for the purposes of

explaining the lack of capitalism in China and the Ottoman Empire factors associated

with the rise of capitalism - such as market freedom - have been downplayed in reporting

their history while elements conceived as impediments to the rise of capitalism - such as

arbitrary confiscation - have been exaggerated.

This should not lead to the conclusion that the patrimonial-feudal distinction

should be discarded. While it may not have been valuable in explaining the differential

development of managed estates an assessrnent of its value cannot be based on the

findings of this study. Nor should an assessrnent of its value be based on the possible

ideological motives behind its development and use. Instead, its value as a heuristic tool

must be evaluated for particular applications based on its usefulness in explanation in

these applications. While it does not explain managed estates it may very well be

valuable else where.

Despite the presence of the necessary preconditions in both the feudd and the

patrimonial cases, managed estates were not present to an equal extent in al1 four cases.

The requirements of wet-rice agriculture and population pressure made rnanaged estates

economically irrational for landlords in ~Ming China. The unavailability of labour, due to

the Ottoman policy of supplying potential agicultural labourers with family plots, made

managed estates unfeasible in the Ottoman Empire.

One of the assurnptions made of the preconditions mode1 of the ernergence of

managed estates is that managed estates would emerge where the preconditions were met

because landowners prefer them to other landholding arrangements. This assumption,

however, does not seem to be warranted. As Martinez-Alier (1973) points out,

landowners will often find sharecropping and fixed-rate tenantry more profitable than

employing wage labourers prior to the mechanization of agriculture; Bray (1983) adds

that the decision to develop managed estates is highly dependent crop type.

A future approach to understanding the development of capitalism could combine

the approach taken here - the emphasis on managed estates and the preconditions that

make them possible - with greater consideration given to the conditions that make

managed estates economically rational for landowners.

The comparative method has proven to be useful. It has sbown that a plausible

hypothesis - that feudalism is causally related to the development of capitalist agriculture

- is problematic. It could be countered that the logic of the comparative method failed

because the Method of Difference and Method of Agreement appeared to support the

hypothesis. However, the logic of comparison is only the first step of the comparative

method as conceived here. It was the logic of the method in addition to the process of

examining the "internai mechanisms of change", a necessary component of the

comparative method, which led to the findings. An approach that takes full advantage of

the comparative method by systematically employing the logic of comparison - both the

Method of Agreement and the Method of Difference - and examines the mechanisms of

change is valuable in historicai research.

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