Development in Zimbabwe: Strategy and Tactics

Development in Zimbabwe: Strategy and TacticsAuthor(s): Michael BrattonSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Sep., 1981), pp. 447-475Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/160754 .

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The Journal of Modern African Studies, 19, 3 (1981), pp. 447-475

Development in Zimbabwe: Strategy and Tactics

by MICHAEL BRATTON*

EVENTS in independent Zimbabwe have confounded pundits on the left and the right who assumed that African resistance to settler colonial rule was more revolutionary than nationalistic. How can the rather

unexpected direction of political and economic change in Zimbabwe since April I980 be understood? The Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) Government of Prime Minister Robert

Mugabe has committed itself to redress the severe social inequities of the past, but has decided, at least at the outset, to reach its goals through a prudent rather than a doctrinaire approach. What factors explain the current development strategy? Does the apparent accommodation of Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) with private capital signal a dangerous divergence from the stated goal of building socialism? Or does it represent an

awakening to the idea that economic production, even if organised on

capitalist lines, is a prerequisite of development in Africa? It is, of course, premature to come to clear and firm conclusions about

the shape that the Zimbabwean political economy will eventually take.

Comparisons drawn from the experience of other African countries do not necessarily apply nicely to Zimbabwe which underwent a settler form of colonialism, and an unusually late and violent decolonisation.

Moreover, at the time of writing, barely one year had passed since

independence day, a relatively short period in relation to the long historical spans needed to grapple with the hardships of national economic management. Nor is the conflict between settlers and African nationalists in Zimbabwe over, although it has entered a new and

unprecedented phase. Since independence the locus of political conflict has also shifted. Whereas disputes between blacks and whites were once

uppermost, the prospect for political stability now rests more on the resolution of rivalries among blacks themselves. All political rivalries in Zimbabwe are based on a combination of ethnic, class, and generational identities which are still in the process of forming and solidifying. The fact that struggles continue over key issues of state power and socio-

* Assistant Professor of Political Science and African Studies at Michigan State University, East Lansing.



economic development should counsel caution in predicting too firmly the strategy that will prevail in the future.

One possibility is that what looks like a long-run strategy of action

may in fact be development tactics - that is, a set of short-term considerations to buy time, to seize an opportunity, or to manoeuvre for stronger position. The Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) leadership set itself the dual task of winning political independence and restructuring the economy along egalitarian lines. Changes of such magnitude are unlikely to be achieved simultaneously, which suggests that attempts to transform

production arrangements will at minimum have to await the consolidation of newly won state power. One of the costs of tactical delay, however, is that compromises of principle, intended to be temporary, prove difficult to retract in the long term. Another possibility is that the Zimbabwean leaders have chosen their path to socialism and that it is not so much 'revolutionary' as 'democratic'. There are sound

objective reasons why any government might opt for peaceful, reformist alternatives at this juncture in Zimbabwean history. According to this

interpretation, the Government has made a careful and correct analysis of its situation, and is acting to make the most of a unique set of

opportunities and constraints. It is attempting to forge a type of

development strategy that has not been seen before in Africa, and which is based upon the complex inheritance derived from the country's past.

The analytical task is not to judge the actions of the Mugabe Government against foreign or abstract models of capitalism or socialism. It is rather to try to identify the political and economic forces, domestic and international, that are interacting to shape decisions about devel-

opment. In particular, the relationship between the state and the

economy needs to be explored with a view to understanding the terrain of policy choice and the range of instrumentalities available for

development intervention. In this article, a rough explanation of the current strategy is woven out of two threads: the mode of decolonisation and the structure of the settler economy. An argument is made that the industrialised nature of the economy and the terms of the political bargain struck at independence, together account for the initial policy positions taken by the Zimbabwe Government. A development strategy in which structural changes are minimised is one manifestation of the

politics of accommodation that have come to characterise the immediate

post-colonial period. The article then turns to an account of the main elements of the emerging development strategy, and to a discussion of the role of state power in its implementation.

448 MICHAEL BRATTON



DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE

THE MODE OF DECOLONISATION

A feature of decolonisation in Zimbabwe is that Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) did not come to power as a consequence of outright military victory but, in important part, as the result of negotiated settlement and election.

During the 1970 the armies of the nationalist parties were able to break the old regime's monopoly of coercion. The military situation at the end of I979, however, was a stalemate. The guerrilla forces controlled the 'African land', and the Rhodesian security forces controlled the

'European' half of the country, although both sides could selectively penetrate enemy territory for short periods. Even though the momentum in the long run was probably with the guerrillas, neither side could consummate a victory. Most importantly, both sides had an interest in

entering negotiations by the end of 1979. The Rhodesians were saddled with massive war expenses and an economy whose output was declining at an average of 3 per cent per year. The Z.A.N.U.-Z.A.P.U. Patriotic Front, along with their host governments, faced difficult conditions in

Mozambique and Zambia due to Rhodesian bombing raids, as well as

shortages of food and other essential commodities. To be sure, the approach of the African nationalists in Zimbabwe had

always been to supplement the armed struggle with negotiations, especially after I975 when the major nationalist leaders were released from detention. This is not to say, however, that the war did not play a vital part in the winning of independence. The former Rhodesian Prime Ministers Ian Smith and Abel Muzorewa would never have approached the negotiating table, or made significant concessions, without the constant pressure of the guerrilla armies. None the less, at the decisive moment Z.A.N.U.'s accession to power took a democratic route. They were offered an electoral opportunity and they took it. Indeed, the historical record will probably show that an all-party election was a central element in the demands made by Zimbabwe national liberation movements throughout the war.

The mode of decolonisation, by ballot as well as bullet, in part explains the post-colonial approach of Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) as a government. Instead of the politics of retribution, Mugabe has attempted to initiate the politics of accommodation.' With few exceptions he has resisted the temptations and pressures to treat his supporters as the 'victors', and other groups as the 'vanquished'. Instead he has granted Cabinet seats

1 A useful definition of this concept is provided in Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley, I 975), p. 103: 'The term accommodation is here used in the sense of the settlement of divisive issues and conflicts where only a minimal consensus exists. Pragmatic solutions are forged for all problems.'

449



MICHAEL BRATTON

and senior posts in the state apparatus to political adversaries, welcomed as Zimbabwean citizens all those who are economically productive and

willing to accept non-racial norms, and charted a development course in which a balance is struck among diverse and competing interests.

The necessity for balance and compromise is evident given the strong cross-cutting pressures that buffet the Government. On the one hand, rising expectations are expressed by the mass of the urban and rural

populations that basic standards of living will be improved. Indeed, the Government was swept to power with a mandate to do just that. On the other hand, ownership of economic assets and control of production is vested principally in the hands of settlers and international companies. The wherewithal to effect a redistribution of wealth is not presently in the hands of the state. Under these circumstances the Government is

attempting to reconcile rapid black advancement with the retention of the confidence of skilled whites and private investors. The effort hinges on whether the Government is able to broaden its political constituency beyond a Shona-speaking peasant base to embrace class and ethnic

groupings to which Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) was hostile in the past. The point here is that negotiation and compromise will continue to

play a part in policy formulation for development, just as they did in the process of decolonisation. An accommodating style of politics has been adopted both out of necessity and as a matter of choice. The Lancaster House agreement of early I980 provided mechanisms to ensure the embodiment of intergroup bargaining into the constitutional structure of the state. A generous proportion (one-fifth) of seats in the House of Assembly was set aside for white representation, while

property ownership and other advantages enjoyed by minorities were entrenched in a Declaration of Rights. A Joint High Command was established to administer the armed forces with equal representation from the elements that had fought the war.

Beyond the structural constraints inherited by his Government, Robert Mugabe has acted voluntarily to embrace rather than exclude his opponents. The governing party enjoys a clear electoral mandate

(57 out of I oo House of Assembly seats, 63 per cent of the popular vote) which permits it, if necessary, to govern alone. But an appraisal of

political currents within the country apparently led Mugabe to de-

emphasise the election result for purposes of forming a government. Acknowledgement has been made that the election was the culmination of an armed struggle, and that P.F. (Z.A.P.U.) had played an

important part. The allocation to the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (Z.I.P.R.A.) of a substantial number of battalion commands in

450



DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE 45I

the new national army is perhaps one indication of the realism and seriousness of the Government's quest for national unity. Other key policy decisions, such as the increase in the producer price of maize and the initial maintenance of the income tax structure, have had the effect of ameliorating potential opposition, even winning support, from commercial farmers and other whites. The prospect of a one-party state is also being appraised carefully in the light of the effect it might have on the attitudes and actions of minority groups.

This does not mean that the Government will entirely abandon

political ideology or political control in a search for a broad consensus on all development issues. A policy process is emerging in which Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) is clearly the main force. After a year of independence the new Parliament, the principal arena for the expression of minority viewpoints, enjoyed little influence on policy. The fact that Z.A.N.U.

(P.F.) and P.F. (Z.A.P.U.) convene a joint parliamentary caucus has not diminished the fact that policy decisions emanate almost exclusively from the Central Committee of the dominant party. Indeed, the initial reluctance of P.F. (Z.A.P.U.) M.P.s to support the Government's bid to secure a constitutional amendment to alter the qualifications of the Judicial Service Commission is attributable in part to a protest against their own powerlessness in the caucus.

It remains to be seen whether, as some politicians now suggest, a

merger of the two main nationalist parties is possible. In the absence of incorporation into Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) ranks, Ndebele and white

politicians are likely to remain peripheral to policy-making. The idea of a 'patriotic front', or an even broader coalition of group concerns, however, has never been completely dropped. The Government has

concretely expressed this idea by electing to walk a delicate path between directing development policy and taking account of views that moderate the impact of the party's substantial electoral victory.

The case of Zimbabwe suggests that the dissolution of the settler form of colonialism, even where violence is involved, does not always lead to an irreconcilable polarisation of political interests. On the contrary, where the transfer of power is internal - that is, among groups within a colony, rather than from metropole to colony - the politics of accommodation may even be expected. There is no necessary march of history that decrees that the later the decolonisation of an African

country the more radical the resultant regime. The contrasts with

Mozambique and Algeria are instructive. In each of these cases, a unified liberation movement fought a metropolitan army and negotiated directly with a colonial power. Moreover the Government was faced



452 MICHAEL BRATTON

immediately with a mass exodus of colonists and adopted a statist

development strategy partly in reaction to the flight of private capital. The fact that these conditions are not identical in Zimbabwe assists in

explaining the difference in initial outcomes among these otherwise

closely comparable countries. A second major aspect of the mode of decolonisation in Zimbabwe

is that the acquisition of state power by the new regime was still

incomplete after a year of independence. It has already been noted that in negotiating an end to hostilities, Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) had to accept a constitutional framework that was not of its own design. The Lancaster House agreement, as well as protecting minority rights, also entrenched

safeguards to ensure the continuity of the institutional apparatus of the state. The existing administrative machinery was protected by committing the Government to the payment of civil service pensions, and by setting up regular procedures for appointments through the Public Service Commission. Under the terms of the settlement, the new leaders were also bequeathed a fragmented military establishment

comprised of three volatile and antagonistic armies. This arrangement ran contrary to their own preferences for military integration before

independence. The immediate problem facing the Government, there-

fore, was to move beyond the acquisition of mere legislative power and to gain full control of the administrative and coercive instruments of state. As one theorist of revolution has stressed, political leaders must first and foremost be regarded as actors struggling to make good their claims to state sovereignty.1

At independence, the Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) leadership constituted a thin veneer lying atop a largely untransformed state apparatus. The Cabinet found itself in a fragile position because institutions wholly or partly controlled by groups of dubious loyalties were interposed between the

leadership and its popular base. White civil servants occupied the same

strategic posts as they had in the past, and several Ministers were quick to report the use of administrative discretion to oppose or delay the

implementation of new policies. Within the Defence Forces the integration of disparate armies got off to a tense and difficult start and, as the

Bulawayo incidents of November I980 and February I981 indicated, was not immune to violent expressions of political partisanship.

Under such conditions it is questionable whether an isolated revolu-

tionary elite has the tactical mobility to pursue policies of its own

choosing. Without unequivocal control of the armed forces it is difficult for any government to rely upon ultimate sanctions in the enforcement

1 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge, 1979), p. I64.



DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE 453 of policy. In addition, during a period of regime transition, the time and attention of the leadership can easily be diverted to a preoccupation with administrative detail, or the management of crises, at the expense of bold and consistent policy initiatives. At worst, military and civilian institutions are vulnerable to capture by opposition political interests for use against the achievement of political stability and development.

Despite such challenges, the new Government made considerable

progress in consolidating its hold on power during the first year in office.

Perhaps the most striking achievement was the re-establishment of relative peace throughout the country. At the end of 1979 the war was

claiming 50 victims killed a day; but within a year, violence had been contained to occasional incidents of manageable proportions. The minor nationalist parties were quickly neutralised with the absorption into the ranks of Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) of cadres formerly loyal to Reverend

Ndabaningi Sithole and, to a lesser extent, to Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Potential opposition both within Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) and from P.F.

(Z.A.P.U.) was respectively reduced with the demotion of Edgar Tekere and the removal ofJoshua Nkomo from control over the police. Indeed, since becoming Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe has continued to make

headway in his long personal quest for the uncontested leadership of Z.A.N.U. (P.F.)1

At the same time that Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) has been able to assert its dominance, the Cabinet and the Joint High Command have been held

together. On each occasion of military mutiny, the leadership was able to agree on a strong course of action and to implement it relatively decisively. The outcome was that the national army prevailed, the

fighting factions were separated, and disarmament was ultimately achieved. All this occurred without resort to an infusion of metropolitan troops, in contrast to the action taken by the Governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda when their armies mutinied shortly after

independence. As for the civilian arm of government, suspicion between Ministers and civil servants appears in some cases to be giving way to mutual respect. Political leaders are gaining an appreciation of the limits of government capacity in development matters, and admini- strators are beginning to comprehend and act upon the new policy instructions emanating from above.

These positive signs, however, do not mean that the state power issue is resolved. While the process of creating an integrated army has proceeded firmly and efficiently, the persistence of party political

1 For a summary of the Prime Minister's career, see Xan Smiley, 'Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and the Rise of Robert Mugabe', in Foreign Affairs (New York), 58, Summer 1980, pp. i062-4.



454 MICHAEL BRATTON

loyalties in the ranks remains one of the most pressing problems facing the Government. The reliance on the trouble-shooting capabilities of the colonial Rhodesian African Rifles is a sign of weakness on the part of political leaders vis-a-vis their own former guerrilla troops. In

addition, the Government still has to strike a balance in the military between demobilisation and integration. The latter policy was at first favoured, but the budgetary implications of a 65,000 strong army soon led to a reconsideration. A major challenge is the redeployment of former combatants into directly productive tasks in the private sector or civilian administration. Finally, until the Cabinet develops an

independent capacity for policy research and analysis, it will rely too

heavily on information and recommendations from civil servants with

policy preferences often different from its own. On balance, the Zimbabwe Government has passed tough early tests

of survival, but the acquisition of state power remains an item of unfinished business. This has an effect on development strategy. A distinction may be drawn here between economic power and state

power, between control of the means of production and control of the means of administration. The reasoning of the Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) leadership is probably that the consolidation of state power is a

prerequisite to substantial intervention in the economy. State power takes primacy precisely because the state is the instrument that Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) is likely to use if the politics of accommodation ever

gives way to confrontation with domestic and international capital. The new Government probably does not wish to tackle entrenched economic interests from a position of organisational weakness; reform and

reorganisation of administrative and military institutions are first

required. It is unlikely that the difficult task of restructuring economic

production can be achieved in the absence of a well-disciplined and

participatory administrative machinery. Whether the Zimbabwe Government has the inclination or the capacity to mould state power in this manner will be discussed further below.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SETTLER ECONOMY

It is almost trite to say that actual policy choices result from an interaction between preferences and objective conditions. In other

words, what is considered desirable in terms of development and what is found to be possible are often quite different. As a liberation

movement, Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) articulated a preference for a revolutionary transition to socialism: policy statements during the armed struggle



DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE 455

hinted at the collectivisation of agriculture, the nationalisation of the

'commanding heights' of the economy, and worker control of

production.1 As a Government, Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) has inherited, and must operate, an economy with a complex structure that is unique in Africa north of the Limpopo. Policy choices have been made slowly and

deliberately and, when announced, have proved to be moderate and flexible. This can be interpreted to mean that the margin of choice has been found to be limited, and that preferences for immediate structural transformation of the economy are seen to involve very high costs. It also means that the inherited economy has been found to have certain

strengths that can be harnessed in the drive for development and socialism.

During the first year of independence there was a debate under way, between and within the Cabinet and the Central Committee, over the

pace and nature of change in Zimbabwe. Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) has a mixed

leadership which includes guerrilla elements (with experience in

prosecuting a war, administering refugee camps, and mobilising a

peasantry), old-guard nationalist elements (with experience stretching back to the I950S and I9g6os of urban agitation and international

diplomacy), and technocratic elements (with professional training and

experience in academia or international development agencies). As

leader, Mugabe is well placed in so far as he appears to enjoy close ties to all three elements. Quite how their different emphases will be mixed is not yet fully clear, although Bernard Chidzero, Minister of Economic

Planning and Development, and pre-eminent within the technocratic

group, is chief claimant to the role of architect of development strategy. Because policy directions are taking time to crystallise, however, the

weight of the existing economic system and supporting political interests have made themselves felt. The structure of the inherited economy is critical to Zimbabwe's development prospects and needs to be reviewed in more detail.

The first notable characteristic about Zimbabwe is that it has a sound industrial base. It is not a 'typical' underdeveloped country having ceased to be a mono-commodity exporter almost half a century ago. A diversified range of raw materials is exported, including minerals

(gold, asbestos, copper, coal, nickel and chrome) and agricultural products (maize, tobacco, beef and sugar). The fact that exports are diversified means that the growth of the Zimbabwean economy and the

1 See, for example, Zimbabwe African National Union, Political Programme (Seattle, Washington, I977); and George Silundika, 'Establishing a Socialist Base', in Zimbabwe ZAPU 2 (Richmond, B.C., 1974).



size of the government budget are not entirely dependent on the price fluctuations of a single commodity on the world market. Indeed, like South Africa, Zimbabwe benefits from the counter-cyclical characteristic of gold, the price of which tends to rise with world recession and inflation. With the lifting of economic sanctions, the value of exports was expected to increase by at least 30 per cent during I980.

Zimbabwe is also set apart from its neighbours as a producer, and

exporter, of manufactured goods. Manufacturing accounts for 26 per cent of G.D.P., as compared with 9 per cent in Nigeria and 6 per cent in Mozambique, and was the fastest growing sector of the economy in

I98o.1 Zimbabwe's exports include processed foods, textiles, footwear, iron and steel products, and electronics, some of which are competitive in price and quality with South African goods. In short, Zimbabwe has a regional economic role; it enjoys a comparative advantage over most

surrounding countries in terms of the production of modern consumer and capital goods. Far from typifying peripheral underdevelopment, it is better characterised as an example of semi-peripheral capitalist development.2 Access to a regional economy means that Zimbabwe's

growth prospects are not limited by the size of the home market. By the same token, imports and exports from a landlocked economy are vulnerable to trade and transport restrictions by neighbouring states, in this case South Africa.

Compared with other black African countries the organisation of

production in Zimbabwe has advanced far along capitalist lines. There are just over one million people in wage employment, about 14 per cent of the population, a proportion almost double that of Zambia, the next most industrialised black African neighbour. Large-scale enterprises dominate agricultural production and provide over one-third of the

wage employment and up to one-half of export earnings by value. Inter-sectoral economic linkages are unusually numerous and strong. These were stimulated in part by economic sanctions, which imposed relative isolation from the world economy and promoted an indigenous process of capital formation. The country has an elite with experience in fiscal management and international business negotiations, and a vibrant capital market capable of mobilising investment resources, albeit so far only for the modern industrial sector. Capital ownership is divided about 9o: io between whites and blacks, and among whites about 70:30 between foreign and settler interests. Outside capital is

1 World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C., 1979), p. 14. 2 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (New York and Cambridge, I979), pp.

68-76.

456 MICHAEL BRATTON



DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE 457 dominant or substantial in every sector, particularly mining where

foreign operations account for about 95 per cent of output by value. Even radical economists come to sober assessments about economic transformation:

it is hard to find a (comparable) sub-Saharan African example in which the role of foreign investments has been so long established, as deeply integrated into the sectors producing the bulk of out-put, so strongly interconnected with settler capital and, in consequence, probably as difficult to foresee being quickly and successfully altered.'

A second, seldom stressed characteristic that makes for the specificity of the Zimbawean case is relative technological independence. Like other Third-World countries, Zimbabwe relies on the West for some

technology: mining equipment is imported from South Africa, and industrial machinery from Japan and West Germany. A science and

technology agreement has recently been concluded with the United States covering, among other things, remote sensing, meteorology, and

agriculture. But there is a local initiative in technology development that is unexpected. In the energy field, for example, Zimbabwe is second

only to Brazil in the adoption of ethanol as a substitute for fossil fuels. In I98I, 15 per cent of the gasoline sold in Zimbabwe was extracted from sugar cane - grown, it can be noted in passing, on sugar plantations over which the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa has

acquired control. Zimbabwe is also endowed with energy resources such as coal and hydro-electric power which, if further utilised, may well help to mitigate the problem currently faced by other African countries, namely the curtailment of economic growth due to petroleum dependence. Agricultural researchers have developed hybrid varieties of white maize and other cereals that are well suited to local conditions, and which can be exported to surrounding countries. Other local techno-

logies relevant to rural development include waterless pit latrines and solar water heaters. Self-reliance in important and appropriate technologies stands Zimbabwe in comparatively good stead for

grappling with development problems. The third characteristic of the settler economy is the entrenchment

of the settlers themselves. Although they are very few - 190,000 in mid- 1981, perhaps dwindling to about oo100,000ooo within five years - they occupy key positions in the state and the economy. The capital and skills of white Zimbabweans are important to the production of all major commodities and to the delivery of essential services. Five thousand

1 Duncan Clarke, Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe (London, Catholic Institute for International Relations, I980), p. I68.



458 MICHAEL BRATTON

white farmers produce 75 per cent of total food crops, compared to 40 per cent in Zambia, a country widely considered to have an unaccep- tably high level of reliance on expatriate farming. About 30 per cent of the adult white population is employed by the civil service, and the

management personnel of the private sector are drawn overwhelmingly from settler ranks. An argument regularly heard from settlers before and after independence is that they are economically indispensible, that their skills cannot be easily and cheaply replaced, and that the economy will collapse in the event of an exodus. This vocal set of political interests is taken seriously by the new Government, particularly in the light that white emigration rates increased after April I980. Settlers do provide a ready alternative to the hiring of expatriates on short-term contracts

by providing experience of local conditions at salaries lower than inflated international rates. The Government requires five to ten years to institute manpower training programmes for blacks in all sectors, particularly where technical skills are concerned. The challenge for the state is to manage the exodus of skilled whites at a level that minimises economic damage yet maximises the creation of opportunities for blacks.

Apart from transport and foreign-exchange bottlenecks, the shortage of skilled manpower threatens to become one of the critical obstacles to the maintenance of economic growth.

Lastly, 90 years of settler colonialism resulted in a dislocation of

peasant populations and a disruption of rural social and economic life. In this respect Zimbabwe is not unlike other former colonial territories. But the break-up of traditional societies is particularly severe where large tracts of land are commandeered for alien settlement, and where labour

migration occurs for both plantation and mining employment. Over the last 20 years, land shortage and overpopulation have led to ecological deterioration and a decline in food production per capita in the former Tribal Trust Lands.

Disruption and dislocation, however, cannot be fully explained with reference only to the underlying requirements of capitalist production. In Zimbabwe, the peasant way of life has been further dismembered

by seven years of brutal civil strife. The war was essentially a rural

phenomenon and the peasantry was the portion of the population most

seriously affected. An estimated 1.3 million were displaced between

1972 and I979; 200,000 over international boundaries, 500,000 into

protected villages, and some 600,000 into towns. Agricultural production slumped to the point that peasants came to 'import' half of their food requirements from the commercial sector. As a result of pressures and exactions from both sides in the war a good proportion of the

peasantry was dependent on relief programmes for the provision of



DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE 459 basic needs until their crops were harvested in I98I. The condition of the rural areas is such that urgent measures are required to relieve

population pressures on the land, and to restore productive capacity to the families that choose farming as an occupation.

Zimbabwe's situation at independence was thus ironical: relatively low external reliance on the international economy was juxtaposed internally with high dependencies of some domestic socio-economic strata on others. Ironically too, the peasants lost their self-sufficiency in food during the early I96os at precisely the time that this was attained

nationally. The transformation of agrarian societies and the emergence of industrial capitalism is a harsh process in which peasants are usually victimised. By I980, Zimbabwe was relatively industrialised, and the costs of this transformation were already manifest in the marked

disparities between urban living standards and the sub-subsistence levels pertaining in certain rural areas. Because capital formation for

purposes of industrialisation was well advanced by the time of national

independence, the possibility exists, however remotely, that the worst may be over for rural dwellers. The question is whether the new Government will be able to use accumulated industrial wealth to redress unevenness in the economy, or whether, as in other African countries, it will be forced to continue to excavate the peasant sector as a source of surplus for public investment.

To summarise, the structure of the Zimbabwe economy is complex and sophisticated. It has the features not of peripheral underdevelopment but of semi-peripheral capitalist development. It resembles South Africa more than Mozambique or Tanzania. Independence was achieved two decades after most African countries, and the extra years of settler colonialism and international sanctions resulted in substantial structural changes to the economy. This presents an historically unprecedented challenge for transition in the form of unfamiliar

opportunities and constraints. The experiences of other African governments, except in so far as they point to pitfalls, offer few models relevant to the Zimbabwe case. The new leadership is faced with a

unique situation that requires a unique strategy. At a general level, the

challenge differs from other 'developmental revolutions' which are concerned with bringing about socialism without a capitalist stage.1 In Zimbabwe the immediate issue is how to redistribute opportunities for production and services, and thereby convert capitalism to the benefit of groups in society who have hitherto been excluded.

1 Elbakki Hermassi, 'Toward a Comparative Study of Revolutions', in Comparative Studies in Society and History (Cambridge), i8, 2, 1976, pp. 219-220.



MICHAEL BRATTON

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

A review of policy decisions made and documents released in the first

year of independence reveals several elements in the emerging development strategy of the Zimbabwe Government. The stated aim is to build a 'socialist, democratic and egalitarian' society. Three

principles can be discerned: (i) to preserve and expand production, (ii) to redistribute incomes and services, and (iii) to redistribute some assets in some sectors. Each element will be examined in turn.

I. Expanding Production

In order to quickly restore growth to the economy and provide surplus for redistributive measures, the Government has decided that

existing and new enterprises in all sectors are to be encouraged to boost

output. A major economic policy paper, Growth With Equity, states this

primary objective with clarity: to achieve 'a sustained high rate of economic growth', estimated for the next three years at about 8 per cent

per annum in real terms.1 The approach is both to capitalise on the

productive strengths and export-earning capacities of proven economic

activities, such as manufacturing and mining, while at the same time to redirect productive investments into neglected areas. The stance of the Government towards agriculture is a good example of this ambi- dextrous approach: commercial farmers are encouraged to increase the

production of food for national self-sufficiency and export, while

simultaneously plans are made and resources sought to improve the low

productivity and low income per capita of peasant farmers. Because investments in the rural areas will yield lower returns in the formative

years, the engine for rapid national growth in the immediate future is

likely to be the modern capitalist wage sector. As such, the Government has attempted to provide explicit signals

to foreign and domestic investors that there is a role for private capital in Zimbabwean development. The I980 budget provides for

repatriation of 50 per cent of declared profits annually, and of all new venture capital after two years. Two-thirds of public-sector capital requirements in the period I98I-4 are earmarked for 'national infrastructure and modern sector development'.2 This includes projects like

1 Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Growth with Equity: an economic policy statement (Salisbury, 1981), pp. 2-3.

2 Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, ZIMCORD: Let's Build Zimbabwe Together (sic) (Salisbury, 198I), p. 2. A similar emphasis can be found in Rhodesia. Proposals for a Five Year Programme of Development in the Public Sector (Salisbury, Ministry of Finance, 1979).

460




the expansion of electricity generating facilities and the electrification of the railways from which private industry can draw benefit.

The Government stresses, however, that it is not willing to promote 'unbridled' capitalism; investment must be on Zimbabwean terms. This means a number of things: international companies are urged to offer equity and training opportunities in their local subsidiaries to

Zimbabweans; proposals for new investments, particularly in mining, will be appraised for possible joint-venture agreements; and the state will involve itself in strategic sectors such as banking, the press, and

energy production. A preference has also been announced for investments that assist in the reconstruction of the war-torn countryside, and multinational corporations have been served notice that they are

expected to pay decent wages and permit worker participation. In sum, the intention is that the form of the modern capitalist sector

will qualitatively differ to that which went before. It is to be 4restructured' by natiorialist, statist, and worker pressures so as to grow in a more equitable fashion. The hope is that it will provide the full

employment that is the key to social equity and political stability, as well as the economic surplus for public investments in the rural sector.

The prospects for growth in Zimbabwe are promising: the economy expanded by I4 per cent in real terms in I980. Although pre-war levels of output were expected to be attained in most sectors by the end of 1981, a lower rate of economic growth - perhaps 5 or 6 per cent - is

predicted. Employment has already been restored to 1974 levels, and real income per capita increased in 1980 for the first time in six years.

I. Redistributing Incomes and Services

A second major theme of Growth with Equity is the redress of imbalance within the economy with regard to the infrastructure of development and the distribution of incomes.2 The provision of economic and social services in the Tribal Trust Lands is a high priority, with particular emphasis on agricultural credit, inputs, and markets, as well as on education and health facilities. The interest of the Government in non-formal education, and preventive rather than curative approaches to health care, is one indication of a commitment to democratise the content and distribution of services.

The Government has shown itself willing to back up its philosophy with the use of the public budget as an instrument of resource redistribution. A great deal of progressive social legislation has been

1 Economic Review (Salisbury), September i981, p. i. 2 Growth with Equity, pp. 1-2.



462 MICHAEL BRATTON

rapidly introduced which has put concrete benefits in the hands of the

majority of the population. Minimum wages have been set for the first time in the sectors where the bulk of blacks are employed, namely agriculture, industry, and domestic service. Free health care for those

earning under Z$ I 50 per month - most of the people in the country - was introduced by the end of I980. Popular pressure for free universal education at all levels has led to the abolition of fees for primary schools and the expansion of the secondary-school system. In addition, the sales tax was repealed on basic commodities such as fish, milk, and paraffin, while a massive rehabilitation programme was undertaken for refugees and displaced persons. The reconstruction of rural social facilities

damaged in the war was one-third to one-half completed by the first

anniversary of independence. The full costs of new social programmes have still to be calculated

and met. Inflation jumped to 12 per cent for I980- a rate which

government planners project could rise over the next three years1 -

largely as a result of the redistribution of incomes through minimum

wage legislation. Another negative side effect is that commercial farmers are moving into mechanised farming operations and out of labour-intensive crops, thus reducing rural employment opportunities. The biggest concern, however, is the cumulative impact of the redistribution of services on recurrent expenditure. The I 980 budget deficit, partly inherited and partly created by the new Government, stood at almost Z$445 million. According to one estimate, the deficit will continue to rise over the next three years.2

The danger is that, like Zambia and Tanzania before, Zimbabwe

might invest heavily in the social trappings of modernisation at the

expense of projects that are more economically productive. The annual

public expenditure on health and education has doubled since inde-

pendence and now accounts for about 20 per cent of the total. Government subsidies for food will have to be reduced, unless controlled consumer prices for maize meal and other commodities are allowed to rise to match increases in producer prices. The decision to absorb most former guerrillas into the national army - with monthly allowances of Z$Ioo and full maintenance benefits - means that it will be difficult to reduce the present 20 per cent share of the public budget currently allocated to the military. Supplementary budgets ofZ$o05 million were

required to cover over-expenditures by April I981.

1 ZIMCORD, op. cit. p. 17, projects 15 per cent annually. 2 United States Agency for International Development, Zimbabwe: country development strategy

statement (Washington, D.C., I981), p. 37.



DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE 463 These statistics illustrate a major dilemma inherent in the politics of

accommodation, and they point to the difficulty of achieving a

development strategy that satisfies all interests. Mass demands necessi- tate an expensive public spending programme. At the same time, however, the capacity of the Government to raise revenue is curbed by the need to cultivate investor confidence in the economy. There are limits to which tax revenues can be levied from domestic and trans- national income earners without provoking a boycott of capital or an exodus of skills. To a certain extent, and for a limited period, the budget deficits of governments whose goals outreach their resources can be met from foreign assistance. Indeed, one apparent purpose of the successful donors conference held in Salisbury during March I98I was to raise funds to back up commitments made for rural income opportunities and services. Zimbabwe has an advantage over other African states in so far as increases in the ratio of the budget deficit to G.D.P. are eased by a healthy economic growth rate. Ultimately, however, all regimes face hard choices about who shall benefit from public spending and who shall pay for it. To this end announcements that the Government will alter policies on subsidies and taxation were not unexpected.'

3. Redistributing Assets

The Zimbabwe Government has cleared the ground for the redistribution of some assets in some sectors. In particular, resolution of 'the

problem of fair distribution of land and rural development' is declared to be 'central to the country's policy of national reconciliation'.2 State intervention in the rural areas is likely to be the cutting edge of ex-

periments in structural reform, and the success or failure of introducing communal or collective production units on resettled land could well determine prospects for more generalised attempts at socialist transformation. Acquisition of land has so far taken place on a willing seller-willing buyer basis, and with full compensation remittable outside the country in strict accordance with the terms of the constitution

agreed at Lancaster House. For the moment, too, private assets in the industrial sector have been assured against expropriation.3

The elements of development strategy that aim to restructure

ownership of the means of production are only formative. The blueprint for a socialist Zimbabwe was, as the time of writing, still on the drawing board. Three key planning documents provide further indicators of

1 Growth with Equity, p. I4. The July I981 budget increased taxes by Z$225 million to cover a projected 37 per cent rise in Government spending. 2 ZIMCORD, op. cit. p. 2.

3 Minister of Mines, Maurice Nyagumbo, in The Herald (Salisbury), 30 May I981.

16-2



strategy: the First National Development Plan which is the responsibility of Bernard Chidzero's Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (due for publication in late I98I); the report of the Commission on

Incomes, Prices, and Conditions of Service, chaired by Roger Riddell

(which favours higher wages and more land settlement); and the policy of land reform which is gradually emerging from the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rural Development under the guidance of Sydney Sekeramayi. Because land reform is the area in which asset redistribution has proceeded furthest, a brief assessment of early state initiatives is in order.

The Government's first moves were circumspect. In part this is because land reform, even under favourable conditions, invariably takes a long time. More importantly, land is as much a political as an economic issue, and policy initiatives are closely scrutinised and shaped by strong interests from both sides of the social class divide. In Zimbabwe the state has kept a relatively low profile, for example, both

by limiting official land acquisitions to a modest level, and by adopting a benign attitude towards spontaneous peasant land occupations. In

capitalist agriculture the bulk of marketed output comes from relatively few farm units, being derived in Zimbabwe from the settler mixed farms of Mashonaland and the company estates of the Lowveld. It is at least

theoretically possible that, by distributing abandoned and underused

land, the Government can achieve meaningful land reform at the same time as the maintenance of aggregate agricultural output. The initial reluctance of policy makers to take drastic land reform measures would

suggest that the opportunity to achieve both growth and equity in

agriculture is being fully explored. The intensive resettlement programme on which most attention is

focused, aims to reallocate two million hectares for dryland farming over a three-year period. Within the first year the Government purchased some 383,000 hectares of former white farmland and settled about

I5,000 people on eight schemes. Most purchases were in the east and north-east part of the country on land abutting peasant farming areas. Tenure and production arrangements are flexible. Of the various policy options available, the Government has rejected the two extremes,

namely full private or full state ownership and management. The

remaining options are classified into three 'models' for resettlement: (i) individual ownership of land, livestock, and equipment (usually by families on five hectare plots), with communal grazing land and social

services; (ii) collective ownership of assets and communal production (usually by young single people), organised by an elected committee

464 MICHAEL BRATTON




and trained manager; and (iii) mixed ownership, in which private fields stand side by side with a collective 'core estate'. The Government has announced a preference for the collective model for resettlement, but has promised that local opinions will be taken into account.

The immediate restraints on land reform in Zimbabwe are several. More than double the number of farms have been offered for sale than the state can currently afford. The shortage of funds for land purchase has been attributed by political leaders to the British and American

Governments, who appear not to have fully honoured commitments for such assistance made at Lancaster House.1 The Government argues that it is caught in the unpalatable position of having one of its major policy initiatives held hostage by western donors. Other factors are

important, too. The administrative capacity of the Ministry of Lands has been stretched thin by the demands of the settlement programme. Delays have arisen in effecting land transfers, planning the infrastructure of settlements, and importing equipment for land clearance and cultivation.2

Finally, mention must be made of peasant attitudes to state land- reform interventions. In most settlement areas, notably in Gutu, applicants for the schemes greatly outnumber the available places; in a few areas, like Umfurudzi, however, insufficient numbers of settlers at first came forward. Peasant reluctance appears to be based on such factors as distaste for settlement on a planned and regulated basis; wariness that settlements may be collectivised; fear of loss of traditional

rights in former Tribal Trust Lands; and insecurity of tenure provided by temporary settlement permits.3

The fact that the population-carrying capacity of the peasant farming areas of Zimbabwe is exceeded by two to three times makes a substantial asset redistribution in land an economic necessity. Political

promises of 'land to the tillers' made during the armed struggle also have to be honoured. The question that remains, however, is whether

adequate land reforms can be designed to meet mass needs and demands. The present programme, which distributed about 2 per cent of the commercial land to about 0-02 per cent of the peasant population in the first year, is clearly insufficient to take the steam out of the kettle. Even in the long run there is not enough land in Zimbabwe to satisfy

1 Sydney Sekeramayi, Minister of Lands, Resettlement, and Rural Development, 'Reply to the Presidential Speech: House of Assembly', Salisbury, i8 June 1980.

2 Interview with Sekeramayi conducted by Richard Carver, December 1980; interview conducted by the author with the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Lands, I4 January I981.

3 Nelson Moyo, report of initial research findings, 'Resettlement and Land Redistribution', University of Zimbabwe, School of Social Studies Research Project, 26 January 1981.

465



MICHAEL BRATTON

all needs. One economist has calculated, given a perfectly equal distribution of land and the existing annual population growth rate of

3-6 per cent, that the nationwide availability of land per capita by A.D.

2000 would be lower than the average found today in the Tribal Trust Lands.1 There are already as many blacks working as wage labourers on commercial farms as could be accommodated if all former white land was allocated to settlements at the same density as schemes begun in

I980. The Government recognises that the land problem cannot be solved

but only eased through asset redistribution. Other programmes will have to be devised and implemented - for example, to provide off-farm

employment, and to raise productivity on small peasant holdings by judicious applications of technology, marketing, and irrigation. Indeed, the Government regards land reform as only one component of a broader strategy for rural development.2 The thrust of early policy intentions is that the rural areas are to be constructed anew through resettlement and the extension of agricultural and social services. Forms of productive peasant organisation are sought that neither reproduce the harsh working conditions of existing capitalist agribusiness nor the frail and bare subsistence in the Tribal Trust Lands. The first test of this strategy will be whether, in contrast to what most African

governments have found possible, priority in actual public expenditure is given to the reform of rural institutions and the sustained transfer of resources to the peasant sector.

STATE POWER AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Analyses of development strategies are all too often restricted to the economic considerations just enumerated. Political factors, however, have an equally important influence on policy choice and development outcomes. The institutional arrangements for strategy formulation and

implementation, for example, perform autonomously to effect the direction and impact of development. Hence, earlier discussions must now be broadened. Consideration must be given not only to the

acquisition of state power, but also to the form of its application to

development tasks. The intervention of a 'reformed' state is an aspect of the overall strategy of most progressive governments. Whether in Zimbabwe the sustained political will exists for administrative reform, and the extent to which the institutions of state will prove malleable, are matters that are still being tested.

1 Ian Hume, A Preliminary Essay on Land Reform in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (Salisbury, Whitsun

Foundation, 1978), pp. 3-4. 2 ZIMCORD, op.cit. p. 3.

466



DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE 467 The following issues will continue to require resolution for the

foreseeable future: (i) the relationship of state authority to market forces, (ii) the tension between representatives and effectiveness in the

bureaucracy, and (iii) the mix between popular participation and state control in local development institutions. The analysis here will

necessarily be brief; the intention is merely to identify issues for further research as development strategy matures.

I. Authority and Market

The state apparatus inherited in Zimbabwe is already large and

strong, with a substantial record of authoritative intervention in the market.1 Recurrent government expenditures, including defence and

transfers, constitute 37 per cent of G.D.P., compared with between I 7 and 20 per cent in Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia.2 Public enterprises have been well established since the 1950S in the transport and energy

sectors, and in the production of capital and intermediate goods, such as iron and steel. The period of economic sanctions after 1966 produced a battery of state institutions for economic management, including import controls for industry, commerce, and manufacturing, as well as

price controls and production quotas in agriculture. One reason why state intervention has not been a prominent aspect

of initial development strategy is that the instruments for direction from the top already exist. Past patterns of state building have been associated with growth and diversification of production, and thus

probably will be retained as a basis for future policy action. For

example, the new Government has already used adjustments in maize

prices in I980 and tobacco quotas in I981 to stimulate production and to ensure quality control. The larger question is whether the institutions of state capitalism can be employed to serve a wider set of interests than commercial farmers and domestic industrialists alone.

The approach of the new Government is to make use of fiscal, monetary, and pricing mechanisms to reallocate resources within the

economy. Examples of actions taken are measures to raise interest rates to control the money supply, and regulations to ensure access to credit

by small farmers and black businesses. In time, the reach of state

authority may well be extended further into the market with the creation of new institutions, such as the proposed Zimbabwe Develop-

1 Michael Bratton, 'The Public Service in Zimbabwe', in Political Science Quarterly (New York), 95, 3, Fall 1980, pp. 445-50.

2 Calculated from Volker Bornshier and Peter Heintz, Compendium of Data for World-Systems Analysis (Zurich, Institute for Sociology, I979), pp. 37-9.



MICHAEL BRATTON

ment Bank (a lending organisation for joint ventures and parastatals) and the Zimbabwe Development Corportion (a holding company for state enterprises).1

The Government's intention to mould state power to developmental ends is evident in the reorganisation of central Ministries. The racially segregated framework of services is being dismantled, notably with the

breakup of the multifunctional Ministry of Home Affairs that served as a 'government within a government' for the peasant sector. In

practice, however, the reassignment of specialised functions to unified

departments does not mean that all services will be either quickly merged or evenly distributed. Indeed, duplication may persist. Two

agricultural extention services, for example, one for commercial farmers and one for peasants, are likely to continue to operate separately despite their legal merger in July 1981.

Moreover, in keeping with the politics of accommodation the Government has attempted to achieve racial balance without dismissing white civil servants. One tactic has been to create new Ministries -

notably Manpower Planning and Development, and Community Development and Women's Affairs - where Africanisation has been the most rapid and most complete. This has had the side effect of blurring responsibility for development tasks between new and old organisations, for example, between Manpower Planning and the Public Service Commission. A burgeoning of bureaucracy - the governmental establishment expanded by o per cent between April I980 and April 1981 - has been one visible result.

Future levels of state intervention will depend heavily on the response of both private entrepreneurs and peasants to the relatively liberal

policies of the present period. If the opportunity is not taken by corporate business on a voluntary basis to share production decisions and social benefits with Zimbabweans, then firmer official action might be expected. Some local and multinational entrepreneurs have taken

advantage of government spending programmes - like those to rehabi- litate returning refugees, and to feed the guerrilla armies - to raise

prices and win contracts with excessive profit margins. Others have

placed obstacles before proposals, for example, to reopen the Feruka oil refinery or to establish a marketing board for minerals. Peasants, for their part, have not succumbed willingly in the past to the regulation of agriculture and extraction of taxes. The extent of their sustained

support for the new Government remains to be seen, and will hinge on the response to central attempts to mobilise local contributions to

1 Growth with Equity, p. 17.

468




development activities. The construction of a large bureaucratic

apparatus to instill peasant co-operation has not worked elsewhere in

Africa, and the present Government in Zimbabwe is seeking alternatives. For the politics of accommodation to survive, transactions between

authority and market institutions will have to involve, and be seen to

involve, mutual adjustment.

2. Representativeness and Efficiency

Within the state apparatus the Government is eager to gain control of the development process, and to open up top public employment to blacks. These concerns are balanced against the need to retain the effectiveness and efficiency of the extant bureaucracy. Capitalist production was bolstered in Rhodesia by a state machinery that made highly economical and innovative use of scarce public resouces. The settler state was also ruthlessly effective until the levels of coercion necessary to implement policies led to a regime that was politically unsustainable. The effectiveness of the bureaucracy was ultimately undercut by widespread peasant and guerrilla resistance to the presence of government projects and personnel in the rural areas.

Under a Presidential directive to achieve 'racial balance', the new Government has undertaken a programme of Africanisation in the

public service that is rapid by any standards. To date, the movement to acquire state power has far outpaced initiatives to transfer economic

ownership. In the first year of independence, the number of top public servants who were black was doubled to approximately 50 per cent of

occupied posts1- 14 of the 33 strategic positions at the level of Permanent Secretary or equivalent were Africanised. In the localities, party officials, in their capacity as local government councillors, began slowly but visibly to assume some of the functions of the colonial District Commissioners.

The achievement of representative bureaucracy through Africanisa- tion is quite compatible with policy effectiveness. Indeed, the capacity of the central state to operate in the rural areas was rapidly restored in I 980- I, in some areas for the first time in five years. Part of the reason is that effective ad hoc arrangements were struck between state officials and the leaders of the dominant party in each region. For example, the

1 Interview with a senior official, Public Service Commission, 30 January I98I. Estimates for the figure at independence vary from 15 to 25 per cent, according to whether the baseline for calculating the proportion of black representation is (i) all positions listed in the official Detailed Establishment Tables (Salisbury, 1975) or (ii) positions actually occupied at the time of independence.



party has been substituted for the state at the village level in administering such programmes as the distribution of refugee food and crop packs, the reconstruction of damaged social facilities, and the selection of

applicants for settlement schemes. Other government departments and

personnel - for instance, those concerned with district administration and marketing co-operatives - are finding the legacy of peasant suspicion of previous regimes difficult to overcome. There are also marked differences in the capacity of the state to penetrate and operate in different regions of the country. Some decisions were slow in the making, notably to undertake land settlement and other programmes, or to evict

'squatters' on commercial farms to the south and west. The

representativeness of the bureaucracy is partly at issue here, in so far as Ndebele speakers see themselves as severely under-represented in the

planned Africanisation of the civil service. While effectiveness is enhanced rather than impaired by Africanisa-

tion, the opposite may be true of efficiency. The leakage of technical and administrative skills from the public sector is gradual but incessant. The civil service has not been as hard hit by the mass resignations that characterised the military and police services after independence, but whites are induced to leave by higher private-sector salaries and a retirement scheme begun by the Muzorewa Government. The skills of the white group are not always up-to-date or relevant to Zimbabwe's

development direction, but their proficiency in organising for policy implementation is not easily replaced. Many of the new African

appointees are young and inexperienced, and the need to learn on the

job necessarily limits the contribution they can make at first. Moreover, senior white civil servants have become cautious in acting on policy matters. A wide range of decisions is now referred up to Ministerial, Cabinet, or Central Committee level, a procedure which makes for administrative delay. Many key officials are also diverted from routine work by a steady flow of consultations with development assistance

agencies and international visitors of all kinds. Under these circum-

stances, the restoration and achievement of levels of efficiency necessary for government effectiveness in Zimbabwe's sophisticated capitalist environment is likely to become one abiding aspect of the concern for the consolidation of state power.

3. Participation and Control

For a party organised for revolutionary armed struggle the transition to control of a ruling apparatus is rarely easy. Contradictions inherent

470 MICHAEL BRATTON




in 'democratic centralism' are brought to the fore. How, for example, are local popular institutions to be reconciled with central planning? As a liberation movement, Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) recorded a commitment to the 'democratisation of all institutions', and as a government has

proclaimed 'voluntary co-operative arrangements' as a principal mode of development administration.' In practice, however, the selection of

leadership and the making of policy in Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) in the past has been centralised, a tendency which the inheritance of a colonial

bureaucracy is helping to reinforce. The dialectic between participation and control was evident as Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) leaders began tojuggle their twin responsibilities as vanguard of a mass movement and as executors of an administrative state.

The holding of elections in February I980 before independence provided an impetus to participatory forms of government. Although strong pressures were placed on voters from every side, the fact remains that all political parties were able to field candidates and, for the first time in the country's history, a government emerged with a clear

popular mandate. Since then, local elections have been held throughout the country, and black majorities came to control municipal councils within a year of independence.2 By January I981, elected District Councils, which are intended to become the primary development institutions in each locality, were established in all 55 rural districts.

Other indications are that popular mobilisation and participation will be embodied into the development process. Peasants, particularly those seeking to enter the market, have organised themselves into groups for bulk purchases and sales, and the Government has responded positively to these initiatives. Traditions of mushandira pamwe ('working together'), such as the sharing of collective labour on individual fields, have survived the social dislocations of the war, and provide a basis for the development of small-scale agriculture. The Government has accommodated popular views, for example, by promoting a variety of forms of production organisation in the peasant sector, rather than

producer co-operatives alone. On the other hand, the inclination to centralise and control has also

been firmly expressed. Indeed, the local government elections can be

interpreted as providing an opportunity for the state to consolidate

power rather than as an opportunity for open voter choice. In most cases candidates were returned unopposed, the selection have been made within the dominant party in each region. When elections were held

1 Growth with Equity, p. 5. 2 The Bulawayo municipal elections were delayed for security reasons until June 1981.

47I



MICHAEL BRATTON

they were by acclamation at a public meeting, or by the 'view system' whereby voters lined up behind candidates, rather than by secret ballot. Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) won control of about three-quarters of the District

Councils; in the midlands and south, the Districts and the City Council of Bulawayo came under the control of P.F. (Z.A.P.U.). The use of the existing state machinery for programmes in the rural areas has also tended to emphasise control above participation. Arrangements for

resettlement, for example, reserve extensive discretionary power to the

Minister, and require peasants to abide by numerous regulations on soil

conservation, stock management, pest control, and tax payment.1 Nor is it clear whether the District Councils will be able to achieve sufficient financial autonomy to effectively tackle development problems on their own. The appointment by the state of executive officers to serve

alongside elected councillors at the district level opens the way for bureaucratic control.

In the final analysis state power is moulded to serve political interests. As in other parts of Africa, a bourgeoisie has been the only class

technically and culturally capable of gaining and exercising political leadership.2 Zimbabwe is no exception, although a government has

emerged that is committed to exercising power on behalf of the lower classes. Many nationalist regimes in Africa have made a genuine effort to meet mass expectations for the material benefits at independence. What distinguishes a revolutionary regime is the willingness to perm- anently and meaningfully institutionalise a voice for the poor in

development decisions. It is doubtful that state power exercised from the top, in the absence of an assertive peasantry and working class, can alone effect this kind of change. No state enjoys autonomy from the socio-economic base to that large degree. In any event, the politics of accommodation in Zimbabwe may ultimately force the Government to choose between popular and more particular interests. It will be

exceptional if participatory institutions come to play more than a

secondary or symbolic role in Zimbabwean development.

CONCLUSIONS

Political activists and policy makers are able to make history, but they do not do so under conditions chosen by themselves. The actual

1 John Harbeson, 'Land and Rural Development in Independent Zimbabwe: a preliminary assessment', Washington, D.C., Office of Rural Development and Development Administration, U.S.A.I.D., I981, mimeographed.

2 Robert Martin, 'The Use of State Power to Overcome Underdevelopment', in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), i8, 2, June I980, p. 320.

472




outcomes of strategies for development depend on the interplay between policy preferences and prevailing conditions. In Zimbabwe, the structure of the settler-colonial economy and the mode of decolonisation combine to transmit from the past a set of constraints and

opportunities that frame current possibilities for action. The fact that forces of change and forces of resistance continue to interact, however, means that it is premature to arrive at conclusions about outcomes, confident or pessimistic. The Government is still searching for the

political and economic consensus that will provide both growth and

equity, and both stability and change. The emergence of a development strategy is a process, not an event.

None the less, certain limits and lineaments of strategy have become evident. The main threat to the peace and social tranquillity of the

country remains the existing gap in incomes and the unequal ownership of assets. Development strategists so far, however, have chosen to define the structural transformation of the economy as the redistribution of incomes rather than the redistribution of assets. As Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) leaders made clear before independence, a 'holding operation' would be required when power was first attained.1 The existing production arrangements would be preserved to forestall economic collapse, and to offer the opportunity for the new Government to lay a foundation for

planning. At the end of the first year of independence this prediction had been realised. The distinction was explicitly avoided between

controlling the spoils of a capitalist system and changing the system itself. As one theorist has noted, the politics of accommodation are only possible where competing blocs agree that 'the existing system ought to be maintained and not be allowed to distintegrate'.2

An unresolved issue one year after independence in Zimbabwe is whether the Government can build the capacity to transcend the

confining conditions against which it has asserted itself. Although Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) has been able to consolidate its political position with

great rapidity, the acquisition of state power is not yet complete. The Government appears for the moment to have decided to thoroughly Africanise political institutions and to allow much economic influence to remain with settlers and foreigners. Such a division of spoils may or may not be permanent, albeit likely to characterise a fairly long transition period. Whether or not more aggressive state intervention is ultimately undertaken depends, in part, on the capacity of the Govern- ment to create efficient and participatory public institutions, and

1 Patriotic Front, Zimbabwe Manpower Survey, Vol. I (Dar es Salaam, 1978), p. 3. 2 Lijphart, op.cit. p. I03.

473



whether these are used to buttress or confront capitalist interests in the

private sector. Early indications are that a far higher priority has been

given to the control of the means of administration and coercion than to the means of production. The full socialisation of the economy is not an immediate prospect.

Economic realities have required political compromise. Mugabe's politics of accommodation provide a symbolic, but also a real though small, share of power to ethnic and class blocs. The resultant development strategy is balanced and moderate, in the sense that it offers benefits to all major group interests. A question of general concern is whether the politics of accommodation are only feasible in industrialised societies with expanding economies where large surpluses are available for distribution. Even although Zimbabwe fits this description, the Government faces a major dilemma. The state will be unable to meet broad commitments to diverse groups without a large spending programme. The need to raise revenues for the public budget will

require the leadership to make hard choices which could undercut

attempts at accommodation. In the long run the state must extract the

necessary resources from international capital or domestic capital or urban consumers or peasant producers, all of whom it depends upon for political or economic support under the present strategy. The interests of at least one of these groups may one day have to be sacrificed. The only other alternative is to finance public deficits from foreign assistance or foreign borrowing, a course which will incur greater international dependence than the leaders of Zimbabwe will relish.

The present approach to development is innovative and carefully reasoned. In the first year of independence the Prime Minister made a subtle analysis of his situation and made few mistakes in balancing diverse political demands. It is difficult to conceive of an alternative

approach to development that would promise to yield as rich a blend of economic growth and social redistribution. Given judicious economic

policies and a non-aggressive stance by South Africa, Zimbabwe has considerable productive potential.

The difficulty of reconciling growth with equity, however, is likely to sharpen with time. On the one hand, the high mass consumption sought by the Zimbabwean people as an immediate reward of independence will overstimulate spending and divert resources from productive investment. On the other hand, the very advancement and attractiveness of the economy, as well as the need to guarantee future consumption, will continue to invite a rapprochement with settler and international

capital, and induce the government to provide investment incentives.

474 MICHAEL BRATTON




Whether further reproduction of capitalist forms by the private sector, even if accompanied by a reallocation of incomes and services by the

Government, is a mechanism adequate to the task of easing rural

poverty is a matter of considerable doubt. Conversely, experience elsewhere in Africa has yet to demonstrate that collectivisation of

agriculture and state management of industry constitute a viable

developmental alternative. The cautious approach that has been

adopted at least buys time for thorough consideration of the costs and benefits of various types ofintervention. The danger for the Government, however, is that actions that were intended to be merely tactical will amount, in the final analysis, to the sum total of development strategy itself.

While it results from a unique process of decolonisation in Africa, Zimbabwe's experiment with a symbiosis of state planning and private investment does not stand alone. Broadly speaking, Zimbabwe is

representative of a general problem in comparative political economy that applies in both developed and underdeveloped worlds. This

problem is best stated as a question: Is it possible to use the power of the state in a capitalist society to create an egalitarian and democratic

pattern of development?

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Documents

Development in Zimbabwe: Strategy and Tactics