Development and crime in Africa: A test of modernization theory

Journal of Criminal Justice Vol. 19. pp. 499-513 (1991) All rights reserved. Printed in U.S.A.

0047-2352/91 $3.00 + .OO Copyright 01991 Pergamon Press plc

DEVELOPMENT AND CRIME IN AFRICA: A TEST OF MODERNIZATION THEORY

JOHN ARTHUR

Department of Sociology Augusta College

Augusta, Georgia 30910

ABSTRACT

In this report INTERPOL crime data from eleven countries in Africa were used to test the modernization theory of crime, which long has assumed that increased criminality is an unavoidable consequence of socioeconomic and industrial development. The report found substantial diflerences for the three offense types that were studied. Homicide rates were low in comparison to minor and major property offenses. The rates have remained stable and even decreased in some of the countries. Minor property offenses made the largest contribution to total crimes. The regression analysis revealed that homicide and major property crimes decreased during 1961-84. The impact of development on crime was positive only for minor property crimes. Theories of crime in Africa, beyond the modernization theory, should be modified to account for (I) the motivations for criminal conduct, using individual- level data and situational factors that can be more accurately specified and controlled, (2) the characteristics of criminal offenders, (3) prosecutorial decisionmaking, (4) the use of informal social control mechanisms to prevent and control crime, (5) the greater formalization of institutions of social control, and finally (6) the effects of political instability on the production of crime statistics.

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

Despite increasing recognition of the im- portance of studying crime in underdevel- oped countries, there is very little empirical research on crime in Africa. Several reasons can be suggested to account for the apparent lack of interest. First, the social sciences are not fully developed in Africa because higher education has been in full swing only since the attainment of political sovereignty, which began in the late 1950s. Second, higher education today is geared to providing the newly

independent nations of Africa with the teach- ers, doctors, lawyers, and other professionals needed for national economic reconstruction (Clifford, 1974: 13). Additionally, African countries lack national statistical data systems to provide the base for scientific research and planning. The study of crime and collection of crime statistics has to compete with other social and economic priorities, for which resources are meager. Finally, criminological research in Africa has not attained academic acceptance. Although criminology as a distinct discipline has been introduced in a few universities at the undergraduate and

499

500 JOHN ARTHUR

graduate levels, its development continues to be halting and uncoordinated, and it has not yet incorporated inputs from other disciplines (Igbinovia, 1989).

The pioneers of research on crime in Af-

rica have been Kayira ( 1978), Kayode and Alemika (1984), Brillion (1973; 1974; 1980), Wasikhongo ( 1976)) Mushanga ( 1974)) Ebbe (1985), lgbinovia (1984), Chang (1976), Opolot (1976; 1979; 1980; 1981), Clinard and Abbott (1973), Tanner ( 1970), Kercher

(1979), Shelley (1981), Clifford (1963; 1964; 1973; 1974), and, more recently, Archer and Gartner ( 1984) and Owomero ( 1987). These researchers have examined trends, amounts, and distribution of crime across various so-

cial groups in Africa, and they have at- tempted to formulate theoretical statements to explain trends and patterns of offending. Still other researchers have studied the effects of African social structure on criminal

behavior, as well as the development of modem criminal justice institutions (Opolot, 1981; Igbinovia, 1984; Arthur, 1989).

Since 1950, the countries of Africa have

embarked upon economic development and the social mobilization of their citizens. Modem African nations are approaching eco-

nomic development by using models bor- rowed from both western and eastern bloc countries. The most profound social change in post-independence Africa has been a con- certed effort to enhance the quality of life of

Africans (Kooperman, 1987; United Nations, 1989). Significant improvements are notice- able in the areas of health care, housing, education, increased consumer goods, agricul-

ture, and transportation. These changes ultimately impact on social interactions, institutions, values, and law and order. Given that these social changes are taking place, it is imperative to examine how these changes are shaping and influencing the nature of crime in Africa.

The goal of this article therefore is to examine the relationship between crime and de-

velopment using data from selected African countries. The primary objectives are to: (1) discuss trends and patterns for three offense types: homicide, major property, and minor

property and (2) assess the impact of economic development on crime rates to test the modernization theory of crime. The following countries were selected for study: Ni- geria, Sierra Leone, Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Swaziland, Ghana, Zaire, Zambia, Ivory Coast, and the Sudan. The countries were selected on the basis of availability of criminal statistical data. Comparing the crime rates of countries in Africa may produce a distorted and misleading picture of crime on the continent since the definition, classification, and societal reaction to the crime problem are varied and highly culture-specific. Data are needed that will capture the wide range of social structural variables influencing crime in Africa. Unfortunately, the IN- TERPOL data are inadequate for such an analysis. Therefore, the observations made here may or may not be equally applicable to the rest of Africa. In themselves, however, they have considerable significance. The pre- sentation of findings is as follows. The first section presents trends and patterns for three offense types: homicide, major property, and minor property. The second section presents the results of the multivariate analysis and a discussion of the findings.

THEORETICAL STATEMENT

There are two principal and at times com- peting theoretical perspectives upon which to base an understanding of crime in Africa. First is the modernization approach, which em- phasizes the influence of social structural changes (industrialization, rapid urbanization, breakdown in familial relations, increased socioeconomic development, and population growth) on criminal behavior. It rests on the assumption that increasing industrialization results in social disruption that produces alienation and, ultimately, criminal behavior. This point of view is well articulated in the writings of Clifford (1963; 1973), Clinard and Abbott (1973), Opolot (1976; 1979; 1980; 1981), Shelley (1981), Olurun- timehin (1973), Chang (1976), Krohn (1976), Owomero ( 1987), and Ebbe ( 1985). Accord- ing to Durkheim, dislocations in society

Development and Crime in Africa 501

brought about by increasing economic activity weaken the effectiveness of norms and rules, thus leading to anomie and deviant conduct (Durkheim, 195 1: 350).

Clinard and Abbott (1973) explicitly linked crime with progress, stating in their preface that one measure of the effective development of a country probably is its rising crime rate. They made an explicit comparison between crime in the Third World and crime in Europe during the early nineteenth century, at the beginning of industrialization. It has been said that just as Europe suffered large increases in crime at that time, so developing countries have suffered in the second half of the twentieth century (Rogers, 1989). In- creased criminality is an inevitable consequence of economic, social, and cultural development. Crime is thus the price a society pays for progress (Rogers, 1989). The ideas underlying this approach developed from a long-standing western intellectual concern about progress and social change that accom- panied the growth of science and technology and the spread of industrialization in western Europe from the eighteenth century (Ho- ogvelt, 1982; Dickens and Bonanno, 1988). Development has been conceptualized as gradual, qualitative passage from less to more differentiated social forms (Portes, 1976; Wallerstein, 1979; Smelser, 1966). The economic transformation of the newly independent nations of Africa and of other Third World nations came to be regarded as a necessary complement to the economic reconstruction of the war-ravaged industrial countries-to improve their capacity to produce and export crops and materials and to con- sume western industrial products and technology (Hoogvelt, 1982; Dickens and Bon- anno, 1988).

Support for the second theoretical perspective can be found in the writings of Althusser (1969), Althusser and Balibar (1970), Ben- dix (1967), Sumner (1982), Greenberg (1981), Snyder (1981), Bat-an (1967), Palma (1978), and, in particular, Frank (1967a; 1967b; 1972; 1979). Both Baran and Frank have explained underdevelopment, poverty, and the unequal distribution of wealth and resources in the Third World as logically and historically tied

to development in the industrialized countries. The exploitative economic ties between the advanced nations and the less developed nations left the latter with a narrowly spe- cialized export-oriented primary production system and a rigid social structure dominated by a small elite and their comprador allies.

Based on this theoretical framework, Greenberg (1981) and Sumner (1982) both stressed the role of the state in defining and creating crime. They explained crime within the context of colonization and the political economy of Third World poverty, underdevelopment, and structured inequality. These writers therefore have suggested that analysis of crime trends in Africa must be based on the influence of foreign colonization. They have maintained that colonization disrupted traditional African social structure and re- placed it with alien institutions, which even- tually weakened the traditional role of the Af- rican family as an agency of socialization and social control. The introduction of western economic and sociolegal institutions dis- placed peasant labor, destabilized the rural economy of Africa, and triggered the mas- sive rural to urban migration of labor. Ur- banization in turn created greater environ- mental opportunities for the violation of law. In this perspective, best articulated by Sum- ner, crime in Africa and other Third World countries is the outcome of structured global inequalities caused by the introduction of capitalist institutions and modes of economic production completely alien to the underde- veloped societies. The criminal law is seen as a tool of the colonial state and its allies and as an instrument for control of the less powerful segment of society (Sumner, 1982: 76); the criminal laws are specifically en- acted by the middle and upper classes to en- sure direct control of the poorer classes by the police.

In spite of its intuitive appeal, the colo- nialism hypothesis is flawed for several reasons. First, it fails to explain rising crime in the absence of colonization. Both the United States and Canada, the Caribbean Islands, South America, and some of the Asian countries, notably Indonesia and Thailand, all have experienced increases in crime rates even

502 JOHN ARTHUR

though these countries do not have a recent history of foreign colonization. Second, sociologists are in general agreement that the etiology of criminal behavior must be under- stood in terms of a multiplicity of variables. As it stands, the colonization hypothesis is unidimensional and fails to incorporate all the substantive issues that relate to crime in

Africa.

GENERAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT AND CRIME

Even though there is a dearth of studies on the impact of development on crime in Af- rica, the relationship between development and crime has received a great deal of theoretical and empirical attention in the developed countries since the time of Quetelet (183 1) and throughout the twentieth century (Bonger, 1916; Merton, 1957; Vold, 1958; Glaser and Rice, 1959; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Fleischer, 1966; Tobias, 1967; Wolf, 1971; Ehrlich, 1973; Danziger and Wheeler, 1975; Brenner, 1978; Zehr, 1976; Gramling et al., 1988. A review of the literature makes it clear that no discernible and consistent relationships between economic conditions and crime rates have been established. In an ex- haustive summary of the literature, Vold ( 1958) concluded:

assumptions involving either positive or negative relationships with economic conditions may be supported with some show of statistical significance, The obvious inference is that the general relations of economic conditions and criminality are so indefinite that no clear or definite conclusion can be drawn.

Albrecht (1978), for example, reported that periods of economic boom and economic failures both correlate with increased criminal activity as well as decreased criminality.

The great bulk of multivariate analyses of the effects of economic conditions on criminality have been conducted by economists or have utilized econometric statistical techniques. These studies have examined the statistical effects of labor market conditions, price

fluctuations, wages, business cycles, and fis- cal management policies on criminality. The statistical methods used vary, but they all reach similar conclusions: (1) that examination of

the relationship between economic development and criminal behavior consistently has yielded both negative and positive correla-

tions, (2) that there is need to continue research in this area at national and cross-national levels, (3) that there are methodological

and theoretical problems caused by lack of agreement about the indices and operation- alization of economic concepts and by the absence of any theory that encompasses economic indicators in a systematic fashion, and

(4) that the history and culture of communities and countries largely have been ignored.

Despite the inconclusiveness of findings at the global level, age-specific analyses have shown somewhat stronger and more consistent levels of association between economic variables and criminality, at least for young

adults. Glaser and Rice (1959), Gibbs (1966), and Steffensmeier and Allan (1989) are among the few to have employed age-specific analyses. They have reported positive correlations between economic conditions and crime for young adults in prime working ages, which supports the idea that people may turn to illegitimate activities when legitimate means

of livelihood are blocked. Negative correlations were reported among youths and among older adults. Although this finding may in part be an artifact of the methodology employed

(as observed by Guttentag, 1968 and by Glaser and Rice, 1959), it does reinforce the im-

portance of age-specific analysis. Fleischer (1966) applied multiple regression techniques to time-series analysis of age-specific data on employment and arrests for youths and young adults aged 15-24. His results showed positive coefficients for unemployment effects for all ages over 16.

For the developing countries of Africa, the study by Clinard and Abbott (1973) on the relationship between socioeconomic development and crime in the East African nations of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda is the most frequently cited. It found that measures of development such as gross national product


and rate of urbanization were positively cor- related with property crimes. Similar findings have been reported also by Kercher (1979). Additionally, studies by Opolot (1980) and Oluruntimehin (1973) reported positive correlation coefficients for minor larceny, major larceny, and currency violations. For Nigeria, studies conducted by Owomero (1987), Kayode (1978), and Ebbe (1985) have found that increases in property crimes are related to economic variables such as unemployment and rural-to-urban migration. In the Ivory Coast, Brillion (1973; 1974; 1980) found that property offenses have increased slightly since 1965. Moreover, studies by Shelley (198 1) and Clinard and Abbott (1973) have reported moderate increases in violent crimes such as rape, homicide, and aggravated assault in Africa. The explanation for the increase in crime rates with increasing economic activity is well summarized in the writings of Durkheim (195 1) on anomie and Cohen and Felson (1979) on the routine ac-

tivities theory.

DATA AND MEASURES

Data on criminal offenses for the period 1961-1984 were obtained from the Intema- tional Police Organization (INTERPOL). Means of arrest data were used for each country to minimize the effects of annual fluctuations in the arrest data. Like the Uni- form Crime Reports in the United States, the INTERPOL crime statistics record the number of offenses officially known to the police. The statistics are the only worldwide data that are available for comparative studies of crime in Africa and other Third World countries.

A major obstacle to the development of a comparative theory of crime and crime control is that criminal statistics suffer from several well-known and frequently discussed biases and problems that have discouraged social scientists from using them extensively. We make no attempt here to justify or eval- uate the accuracy and reliability of official criminal statistical data. Our purpose is to note some possible sources of bias and to caution readers that the findings reported here are

tentative and subject to methodological flaws. More sophisticated models that consider the structure of errors in crime statistics are needed but are not yet available.

The INTERPOL offense data on crime known to the police cannot reveal the com- plete extent of actual criminality. The vul- nerability of official crime statistical data to measurement errors is commonly acknowl- edged. It is a point which deserves attention. Skogan (1974), Vigderhous (1978). and Black (1970) conveniently have summarized three potential sources of error and bias: (1) an un- derstatement of the actual occurrence of crime, (2) an underreporting of crime over time, (3) a social-class bias reflected in the choice of indices (i.e., white-collar crimes are not in- cluded). While some authors argue that the bias toward street crimes is an advantage because the crimes represented are those that concern most citizens, that is, predatory crimes against innocent victims (Black, 1970), most agree that the exclusion of other types of il- legal activity is a serious limitation (Wolf- gang, 1967; Vigderhous, 1978; Archer and Gartner, 1984).

The INTERPOL crime data are affected by differences in (1) reporting practices, (2) legal definitions and classification of crime, (3) willingness of the public to report crime and participate in the criminal justice system, (4) culture and social organization, and (5) the efficiency and behavior of law enforcement personnel. In spite of the problems associated with the INTERPOL crime data, the data are valuable when used with cautions (Vigder- hous, 1978).

THE VARIABLES

Three broad categories of crime comprised the dependent variables. These were homicide, major property crimes (burglary, robbery), and minor property offenses (petty thefts and fraud). The following variables were used as measures of economic development: rate of unemployment (International Labor Or- ganization, 1970; 1975), gross national product per capita (United Nations, 1970; 1975), number of radios per capita (United Nations,

504 JOHN ARTHUR

1965; 1970; 1975), percent inflation (World Bank Report, 1970, 1975), political instabil-

ity (Kurian, 1979), kilowatt hours of energy

consumption per capita (Kurian, 1979), rate

of urbanization (Population Reference Bu-

reau, 1975, 1980; United Nations, 1970,

1975), and proportion of population in the

crime-prone age range of 15-29 (United Na-

tions, 1970; 1975). Selection of the indepen-

dent variables was limited by the availability

of data. In the absence of comparable cross-

national data on economic indicators, there

was little choice but to proceed with imper-

fect measures, recognizing some of the lim-

itations of the inferences that can be drawn.

More specifically, the findings should be

viewed as tentative for the following reasons.

First, the information is dated, and findings

cannot be generalized beyond the period cov-

ered by the data. Second, arrests cannot be

used to make inferences about the motiva-

tions for criminal behavior. Third, the find-

ings reported here are specific to the expe-

rience of eleven countries in Africa and reflect

the history and culture of the countries stud-

ied. Fourth, the indices for measuring socioeconomic and cultural aspects of African so-

cial structure are not as fully refined as those

of the developed countries. Finally, we be-

lieve that the broader range of offenses in-

cluded in our aggregated measure of crime

can obscure the findings. Similar observa-

tions can also be made about the independent

variables used in this report. The data were analyzed using a stepwise

multiple regression technique to estimate the

statistical effects of the independent variables

on the three dependent variables. A major problem encountered in multiple regression

analysis is the intercorrelation of the explan-

atory variables (Chatterjee and Price, 1977). Multicollinearity makes it particularly diffi-

cult to assess the contribution of each inde-

pendent variable to overall variance in the response variables. An examination of the

zero-order correlations for the independent

variables showed that the highest correlation

was .59, thus revealing no harmful multicol-

linearity in the independent variables.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Homicide

Homicide rates provide an insight into the extent of violence in any society. In general, the official homicide rates in Africa are low in comparison to major and minor property crimes. The mean homicide rates were relatively higher in Swaziland, Uganda, and Zaire compared to the other countries, where the rates over the 23-year period increased only modestly and for some countries at certain in- tervals they even decreased (Table 1). The data in Table 1 covering the period 1961-84 show that in the Ivory Coast the mean homicide rate for 1961-65 was 3.0 per 100,000 population, increasing slightly to an annual average rate of 3.3 for 1966-70 and to 4.7 per 100,000 population during the period 1980-84. In the East African nation of Ma- lawi, the mean homicide rate averaged about 4.2 for the period 1961-84. In Sierra Leone the rates averaged 5.0 per year per 100,000 (1961-65), 4.3 (1966-70), 4.4 (1971-74), 4.8 (1975-79), and 5.9 (1980-84). The highest mean homicide rates thus were to be found in Uganda, Zaire, and Swaziland.

Table 2 shows the contribution of homicide rates to total crime rates. From the available data, it is clear that the percentage contribution of homicide to total crime rates has ranged between a low of 1 .O percent of all crimes in Zambia (1960) to a high of about 2 1 .O percent in Zaire ( 1965). In the latter country, the high percentage contribution of homicide to total crimes is attributed to the civil wars and political instability that affected the country in 1965-75. Overall, the total contributions of homicide to total crimes reflect the fact that homicide is a relatively rare form of crime.

A multiple regression analysis to examine the effects of economic development variables on homicide rates with homicide rate as the dependent variable is illustrated in Ta- ble 3. The relative weights and directions of the standardized beta coefficients show that, with the exception of the variable political instability, all the independent variables revealed weak negative associations with the


TABLE 1

MEAN HOMICIDE RATES FOR SELECTED YEARS

Country 1961-65 % Change

1966-70 1971-74 1975-79 1980-84 (1961-84)

Ivory Coast 3.0 3.3 2.5 4.2 4.7 +57 Kenya 6.0 5.7 7.1 8.1 8.7 +45 Malawi 3.8 3.5 3.5 4.4 5.6 +47 Nigeria 1.7 1.6 6.1 10.2 12.8 +652 Sierra Leone 5.0 4.3 4.4 4.8 5.9 +18 Swaziland 34.3 41.5 42.0 43.3 45.8 +33 Tanzania 6.5 7.6 8.1 8.6 9.5 +46 Uganda 17.3 28.4 31.2 38.7 45.2 +165 Zambia 5.3 8.6 7.1 7.5 8.2 +55 Zaire 19.3 26.0 23.2 24.4 26.1 +35 Ghana 2.7 2.8 2.6 3.8 4.6 +70

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION OF HOMICIDE To TOTAL CRIMES

Country 1960 196.5 1970 1974 1979 1984

Ivory Coast Kenya Malawi Nigeria Sierra Leone Swaziland Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zaire Ghana

2.3 1.0 2.0 1.3 -

2.4 -

3.1 1.0

1.0

5.4 4.0 5.5 5.7 5.3 2.0 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.5 2.0 2.0 9.4 10.1 12.3 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.6 3.2 2.2 3.1 3.7 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.8 2.3 6.0 6.0 6.5 7.9 9.4 1.6 1.0 1.1 1.7 2.2

21.0 16.0 16.0 18.0 19.7 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.8 2.1

homicide rate. The results reported here in- dicate a decrease in homicide and are therefore inconsistent with previous studies con- cerning the effects of structural economic and sociocultural change on criminality reported by Shelley (1981), Clinard and Abbott (1973), and Clifford (1973). The analysis does not support those researchers’ claims of a positive relationship between homicide and the various socioeconomic and cultural changes implicit in the concept of modernization and development.

Shelley (1981: 49-50), a student of the modernization perspective, has suggested that

the level of crime in the developing countries of Africa is considerably below that of de-

veloped countries but as these nations move

towards modernization their crime rates are

approaching those of the more impersonal,

industrialized society. Crime rates are increasing rapidly for all offenses.

A study by Messner (1982) suggested that the greater economic inequality in develop-

ing countries tends to stratify the population, promoting in-group interactions (for exam-

ple, between members of the same class, the same race, the same ethnicity, or the same

506 JOHN ARTHUR

TABLE 3

REGRESSION RESULTS WITH HOMICIDE As DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Parameters

Standurdized

Beta

Multiple

R R” F-Ratio P-Values

Unemployment GNP/capita Radios Energy consumption Urbanization Percent inflation Political instability

Age

- .09

-.14

-.11 -.07

-.04

-.09

.18 -.12

,034 ,001 0.059 ,015

,314 ,099 5.414 .024 ,443 .I96 5.960 .018 ,481 .231 16.437 ,000 ,523 ,274 3.200 .079 .580 ,336 15.081 .ooo ,605 ,366 2.146 ,001 .640 .409 3.389 .072

age group), which in turn is likely to lead to homicides.

Clinard and Abbott (1973) stated that among the poor, developing countries, the unusually high homicide rates can be attributed to a culture of violence. There may be some validity in this, as Swaziland, Uganda, and Zaire did indeed have high homicide rates during the period 1961-84. Table 1 shows, however, that this was not the case for all the developing nations studied. Despite the grim predictions of Shelley and Messner regarding the effect modernization would have on homicide rates, an examination of trends in Ghana for the 23- year period 1961-84 showed that homicide never exceeded an annual rate of 4.6 per 100,000 population. During 1961-84, the highest homicide rate in the former French colony of the Ivory Coast was 4.7 per 100,000 population, which it attained during 1980-84. The difference in homicide rates for 1961-65 and for 1980-84 was just 1.7 per 100,000 population. Though this represents an increase, the increase was insignificant. In Ni- geria, one of Africa’s most populous countries, with a mid- 1988 population of 1 15 million, the official homicide rates reported averaged about 4.5 per 100,000 population before independence from Britain in 1958 through 1984 (Arthur, 1988).

The relatively lower rates for homicide can be best explained by sociocultural and political factors. First, the proximate factors in most homicides in Africa-the frequent land disputes, warfare between different ethnic

groups, raiding parties, quarrels over women and property, and border disputes-have been curbed and brought under control with the attainment of political independence. The re- straint of aggressive impulses along with the acceptance of humanistic values and the norm of conduct that stresses nonviolent means of accomplishing goals must be credited for the apparent decrease in homicide in most parts of the continent.

Major and Minor Property Crimes

The property crimes analyzed were major and minor larceny. The former consists of robbery and burglary, and the latter refers to petty theft. An examination of INTERPOL crime data on Africa found in Tables 4 and 5 reveals that minor larceny or petty theft was the dominant form of criminality during this period, followed by major larceny or robbery and burglary (Arthur, 1988; Ebbe, 1985; Cli- nard and Abbott, 1973; and Shelley, 1981). Based on data available from 1961-84, the rates for both categories of property offenses decreased in the Ivory Coast, and there were periodic decreases in one or the other type in Malawi, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zaire, and Kenya (Tables 4 and 5). The great majority of thefts were carried out in rural and urban districts where there was organized stealing. In rural communities, theft of live- stock and agricultural produce predominated (Rogers, 1989).

The data in Table 6 show the percentage


Country

TABLE 4

MEAN MAJOR PROPERTY RATES (1961-84)

% Change 1961-65 1966-70 1971-74 1975-79 1980-84 (1961-84)

Ivory Coast 24.0 34.0

Kenya 25.0 24.0 Malawi 227.0 141.4 Nigeria 24.5 20.4

Sierra Leone 4.4 10.7

Swaziland 31.4 42.0 Tanzania 7.1 18.4

Uganda 122.0 246.0 Zambia 113.0 255.0 Zaire 40.0 18.0

Ghana 8.3 9.0

19.5 11.4 13.7 -43 31.2 38.7 54.8 +119

140.2 156.8 219.0 -3 15.5 44.5 87.6 +257

7.2 11.2 29.5 +570 35.0 50.4 73.9 +135 25.0 21.3 19.2 +170

236.1 274.1 314.5 +157 -

27.4 6.3

40.2 11.3

-

59.4 19.7

+48 +137

TABLE 5

MEAN MINOR PROPERTY RATES (1961-84)

Country % Change

1961-65 1966-70 1971-74 197.5-79 1980-84 (1961-84)

Ivory Coast 191.3 169.0

Kenya 90.5 71.1

Malawi 128.0 203.3

Nigeria 82.0 65.4

Sierra Leone 311.2 337.0 Swaziland 1 1319.0 1197.0 Tanzania 306.2 341 .o Uganda 196.2 183.0 Zambia 584.1 663.4 Zaire 103.1 74.5

Ghana 320.1 419.6

134.4 129.6 117.9 -38 57.0 69.4 80.7 -11

255.5 276.3 290.4 +126 123.0 99.3 121.5 +48 279.5 315.4 297.0 -4

1139.0 1120.3 1049.7 -20 287.4 312.5 278.4 -9 239.5 488.1 530.2 +170

79.4 86.3 394.0 418.3

- -

94.8 -8 386.6 +21

contributions of major and minor property rates a pre-independence constitutive assembly in to total crime rates during 1960-84. The data Ghana passed legislation allowing the use of suggest that the proportions of total crimes life imprisonment for offenses involving the involving minor property remained higher than use of weapons. This legislation was upheld the proportions of offenses that involved ma- and enforced by the Nkrumah administration jor property violations except in Uganda. The after political independence from England in observed differences between rates of major 1957. In light of the severity and certainty of and minor property offenses can be attributed punishment for major property offenses, most to the deterrent effects of tough legislation and criminal activities now consist of minor prop- sanctions to deal with violent crimes. Fun- erty violations, for which the punishment is ishment for violent offenses ranges from life a fine, public humiliation, restitution, or short- imprisonment in Ghana and the Ivory Coast term imprisonment. The petty thievery is to firing-squad in Nigeria and Zaire. In 1954 probably the result of the relative deprivation

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61 .O

20

.0

51.0

24

.0

49.3

22

.3

51.2

5.0

80.1

2.

0 96

.0

1.8

85.0

4.

8 89

.3

6.2

82.7

5.

9 79

.7


faced by economically disadvantaged youths, who find themselves in an urban Africa that

increasingly is becoming sharply polarized into two recognizable groups, the urban elites and the urban poor.

An assessment was made of the impact of economic structural variables on major and minor property crime rates. Tables 7 and 8 display the regression results, with major and

minor property as the response variables. The standardized beta coefficients with major property as the dependent variable are negative for all the predictor variables except the proportion of the African population in the crime-prone age range of 15-29. Overall, the direction of the beta coefficients would sug-

gest that major property crimes have decreased with increased economic development (Table 7). The strongest predictors of major property crimes were the rate of un-

employment (beta -.59) and gross national

product per capita (beta -.42).

For minor property crimes, the beta coef-

ficients are all positive (Table 8). The largest

standardized beta coefficients are political in-

stability (beta .43), the rate of urbanization

(beta .32), and percent inflation (beta .30).

This finding is consistent with earlier studies

from developed and developing countries,

which have reported increments in minor

property offenses with increasing economic

and industrial development (Krohn, 1976;

Cohen and Felson, 1979; Ebbe, 1985). Eco-

nomic development increases the availability

of consumer commodities and, hence, increases opportunities for property-related offenses (Jeffrey, 197 1; Gould, 1969). Anomie theory has been the major theoretical perspective most often suggested to account for the direct and indirect effects of economic development upon criminal behavior. High levels of economic development, such as is taking place in most parts of Africa, can undermine normative structures and thus weaken the capacity of society both to regulate the behavior of its members and to mobilize it- self against crime. Increases in the level of development may undermine family stability, foster subcultural adaptations that promote deviant lifestyles, and alter patterns of criminal opportunity and routine activities (Stef- fensmeier and Allan, 1989; Clinard and Ab- bott, 1973; Toby, 1967; Cantor and Land, 1985).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The present study has taken an initial step to (1) examine crime trends and patterns in eleven African nations and (2) test the modernization theory of crime using data from Africa. The findings are intended to guide and organize efforts toward improving the understanding of crime in Africa. The observations made in this report are intended to provide background research for the testing of specific hypotheses.

Several important findings emerged. First,

TABLE 7

REGRESSION RESULTS WITH MAJOR PROPERTY As DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Parameters

Standardized

Beta Multiple

R R2 F-Ratio P-Values

Unemployment - .59 .237 .056 3.215 .078

GNP/capita - .42 .273 .074 1.051 .020

Radios -.21 ,312 .098 4.406 ,040

Energy consumption -.17 .329 .108 5.134 ,027

Urbanization -.ll .379 .143 2.199 ,031

Percent inflation -.26 .496 ,246 11.107 ,002

Political instability -.14 ,605 .365 17.939 ,000

Age .08 .615 .378 17.631 ,000

510 JOHN ARTHUR

TABLE 8

REGRESSION RESULTS WITH MINOR PROPERTY As DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Parameters

Standardized Multiple

Beta R F-Ratio P-Values

Unemployment .18 .159 .025 1.137 ,009 GNP/capita .12 ,161 .026 0.028 .091 Radios .27 .311 .097 3.399 .072 Energy consumption .28 ,351 ,123 6.184 ,017 Urbanization .32 ,372 ,138 0.749 ,056 Percent inflation .30 ,520 ,270 15.845 ,000 Political instability .43 .588 .346 17.675 ,000

Age .22 .609 .371 14.631 ,000

the data suggest different long-term trends and patterns for the three offenses of homicide, major property, and minor property. Homi- cide rates decreased during the period cov- ered by the data. Secondly, there was a sharp difference between major and minor property offenses, the latter comprising the bulk of arrest statistics in the eleven countries studied.

The results of the multivariate regression analysis suggested that homicide and major property crimes decreased with increased economic development. These findings are inconsistent with the modernization theory of crime, which assumes that increased criminality is an unavoidable consequence of socioeconomic development. The only category of crime that seemed to have increased with development was minor property crimes. The crimes falling under this category (petty theft and fraud) are less serious offenses compared to homicide and major property crimes. We found no conclusive empirical support that development has produced significant increases in crime rates in the countries that were studied.

It seems clear that the modernization approach to explaining crime in underdevel- oped societies has ignored the content of in- digenous African social structure. While this theory made important advancements in explaining crime in Euro-American culture, it fails to consider the ethnographic factors that are more germane to the explanation of crime in Africa. Several of the following factors have been suggested as causes of crime in Africa:

rapid urbanization, the relatively young population, political instability, changes in law enforcement and the administration of justice, and changes in the structure and role of the family. Two of these are particularly in- teresting: changes in family structure as they relate to the commission of crime and changes in law enforcement and administration of justice as they relate to the rates of officially reported crime. While this study used quan- titative measures, these two ethnographic factors warrant a brief discussion here.

The proposition has been advanced that there is currently taking place in Africa a series of changes in family patterns toward some type of individuated, nuclear family system, in which the keystone is the conjugal bond rather than ties of consanguinity. The family is the main agency responsible for the trans- mission of society’s cultural values as well as for providing the link between the individual and society at large. Throughout Africa today, the process of economic and industrial development is gradually weakening family bonds and relationships. The African family is no longer a closely knit extended group of persons united by a common purpose. First, the introduction of western systems of education has provided a means of social mobility apart from the traditional social standing of the family. Even though social status is still very much ascriptive, the possibility of achieving social mobility away from the family has lessened dependency on the family. Second, rapid rural-urban migration of


youths in search of economic opportunities has weakened the hold of the family on in- dividuals. Though migrant youths do not break ties with their extended families when they migrate, once in the cities, they are faced with an impersonal and formal system of social control regulated by agents of the state. In the absence of the family to serve as a social an- chor, the bond that youths have with society is weakened, thereby making it easier to form and join criminal subcultures. Sociologists are unanimous in their findings that a large proportion of crime is committed by persons who are young, usually between the ages of 1.5 and 35. Data on the age composition of the population of African countries show that all the countries have relatively young popula- tions due to the drastic reduction in infant mortality rates. According to U.N. data, about 60 percent of Africa’s population is aged 15 to 30, except in Gabon and South Africa (United Nations, 1980).

cases dealt with by the traditional courts were considered matters of offense against the individual or the family, rather than against the state, and they did not appear in national crime statistics. This may have concealed the actual or true level of crime. Yet, in the case of the countries studied, where homicide and major property crime rates appear to be low, large, formal law enforcement and judicial agencies may seek to justify their existence by more diligent arrests and convictions for minor property crimes. This justification is espe- cially necessary for the law enforcement agencies, since many of them amount to little more than standing armies to control the pop- ulace in case of political protests or upris- ings. The shift from the informality of law enforcement as a communal or collective re- sponsibility to modem systems of policing al- most certainly has had an effect on the officially reported crime rates.

Relevant to both the official crime rates and the weakening of family bonds and control are changes in the traditional methods of law enforcement and the administration of justice. The attainment of political independence in the late 1950s brought about gradual changes in the objectives, enforcement, and administration of justice in several African countries. The development of criminal justice systems is now considered an essential component of the task of nation-building. The process of development has led to the ration- alization, formalization, and bureaucratiza- tion of criminal justice institutions through the introduction and application of modem technological systems of crime detection.

Traditionally, law enforcement and social control were administered informally, by the village chief or elders. Crimes that came to the attention of these traditional authorities were arbitrated and settled amicably, usually through restitution. Yet, with the family being the first unit of control, an individual’s commission of a crime was seen as a bad mark against the family, often affecting its social standing or community place. This situation added pressure to conform, very likely keep- ing low the actual number of crimes committed. When crimes were committed, the

While the approach that we have taken is purely statistical, we remain convinced that a qualitative and ethnographic approach is also beneficial in unraveling the factors explaining crime in Africa. Topics of concern to traditional researchers such as urbanization, migration, and industrialization should continue to be the proper foci for the student of development-particularly the relationship between economic development and crime using time-series data from a single country. However, the development and modemiza- tion explanation of crime should be modified to account for (1) the motivations for criminal conduct, using individual-level data and situational factors that can be more accurately specified and controlled, (2) the characteristics of criminal offenders, (3) prose- tutorial decisionmaking, (4) the use of informal social control mechanisms to prevent and control crime, (5) the greater formalization of institutions of social control, and finally (6) the effects of political instability on the production of crime statistics.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This article is a revision of a paper presented at the 10th Third World Studies Conference in Omaha, Ne- braska in October 1987.

512 JOHN ARTHUR

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Development and crime in Africa: A test of modernization theory