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Development and Assessment of Battlefield VisualizationTraining for Battalion Commanders

Scott B. Shadricl{u.s. Army Research Institute

Fort Koox, KV 40121Scott.shadricl{(@us.army.mil

James Bell, David ManningDynamic Research Corporation, Inc.

Fort Knox, KY 40121JbeIl3(mdrc.com, dmanning@drc.com

Dennis K. LeedomEvidence Based Research, Inc.

Vienna, VA 22182dkl-tex3s@suddenlink.net

Cnrl W. LickteigtJ .S. Army Research Institute

Fort Knox, KY 40121CarI.LickteigilVus.army.mil

Keywords: Visualization, battle command, training, human performance

ABSTRACT

Visualization-·the ali and science of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, andenvisioning how to move the force from its current state to the desired end state-is critical to successful battlecommand, Unfortunately, the most common method of training battle command in today's Army is not the mosteffective method for developing expert visualization skills, Recent research on expertise indicates that experiencealone, be it real or in simulated battle, is not adequate (Shadrick, Lussier, & Fultz, 2007), Instead, expertise is morelikely to be attained through a combination of education, training, practice, and experience, For those reasons, theU.S, Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) initiated an analysis to better understandhow expert battalion commanders visualize battlefields, and to develop a structured, theme~based training program.Results of that analysis revealed four distinct dimensions of visualization (Build, Synchronize, Assess, and Exploit)and seven associated skills, The dimensions and skills provide the framework for End State: CommanderVisualization at the Battalion Level, End S'tate is an interactive training program designed to provide field gradeofficers and battalion commanders with education, training, practice, and experience in battlefield visualization. Thetraining uses 3~dimensional animated coaches to relay the knowledge and perspectives of expert commanders and toprovide immediate performance evaluation and feedback. In this paper, we discuss an analysis that led to thevisualization framework and skills, the development of End State training, and the results of initial tests of End Statewith battalion commanders.

ABOUT TIlE AUTHORS

Dr. Scott B. Shadrick is a Team Leader and Senior Research Psychologist for U,S. Army Research Institute at FortKnox. He has conducted research on the acceleration of adaptive performance in tactical thinking skills,training/instructional systems design and evaluation, cognitive task analysis and knowledge elicitation techniques,performance assessment, and leader development. He is currently conducting research to understand and developtraining for visualization skills at the battalion level. I'le received a B.A. degree in Psychology from the Universityof South Florida, a M.A, in Industrial/Organizational Psychology from Western Kentucky University, and a PhD. inTechnology Management (Training) from Indiana State University.

Dr. Dennis K. Leedom is a Senior Scientist with Evidence Based Research (EBR). During his 36 year career withthe U.S. Department of Defense, Dr. Leedom has led numerous research projects and organizations dealing withmilitary command and control~~··~including serving as the Senior Science advisor to the U.S. Army's III Corps, Sincejoining EHR in 2001, his research on organizational sense making has focused on developing advanced knowledgemanagement theories and analytic tools for collaboratively maintaining operational awareness and understanding ofmodern adversaries in a complex and emergent battlefield environment

LTC (ret.) Jim Bell is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who served 22 years as an Armor Officer. He hasconducted extensive research and analysis on collective and individual training requirements for U.S. Army units at

2008 Paper No, 8236 Page 1 of 12

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brigade and below, He has also conducted extensive research on developing cognitive skills for trainingvisualization. He received his undergraduate degree from The Citadel and is a graduate of the Army's Command &General Staff College.

LTC (ret.) David Manning is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who served 22 years as an Armor Officer. Hehas conducted extensive research and analysis on collective and individual training requirements for U.S. Armyunits at brigade and below. He received his undergraduate degree from Texas A&M University and a Mastersdegree in Human Resources and Training Development from the University of Louisville.

01'. Cad W. Lickteig is a Team Leader and Research Psychologist for U,S. Army Research Institute at Fort Knox.Since receiving a Ph.D, in Experimental Psychology from the University of Louisville in 1984, his work has focusedon design, use, and application of digital technologies to complement human performance. His current workincludes developing a companion training program on Company Commander's Visualization and a researchprogram on unit training.

2008 Paper No. 8236 Page 2 of 12

Interservice/lndustry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) 2008

Development and Assessment of Battlefield VisualizationTraining for Battalion Commanders

Scott B. ShadrickU.S. Army Research Institute

Fort Knox, KY 40121Scott.shadrick@2us.army.mil

James Bell, David ManningDynamic Research Corporation, Inc.

Fort Knox, KY 40121JheI13iii:ldrc.com, dmanningwJdrc.com

INTRODUCTION

U.S, Army doctrine describes battle command as theexercise of command in an operation against a hostile,thinking, and adaptive opponent (Department of theArmy [DA], 2008). Battle command encompassesassigning missions; prioritizing and allocatingresources; selecting the critical time and place to act;and knowing how and when to make adjustments in anon-going operation. In addition, battle commandincludes visualizing the current state and the desiredend state, then formulating concepts of operation to getfrom the current state to the end state. Visualizationresults when commanders understand the highercommander's intent, their assigned mission, theoperational environment, the enemy's intent andpurpose, and the friendly force's capabilities andlimitations. Battlefield visualization includes thecommander's view of what his forces will do and theresources needed to accomplish the mission.

Success in an operation can often be attributed to thecommander who has a better mental "picture" of theterrain, enemy, and friendly forces. The U.S. Army istrying to enhance a commander's ability to visualize anincreasingly more complex environment as it continuesto pursue advanced technologies and operationalconcepts. Network-enabled battle command systems,for example, will give future commanders aninformation advantage critical to successfulperformance. The new systems, tools, and automationinitiatives may enhance a commander's ability tovisualize the battleJield. Systems will not, however,replace the need for the commander to clearlyunderstand the situation and to visualize the operation.As General Wallace (2005) wrote, no matter howsophisticated the new netvvork-enabled battle commandsystems of the future might be:

there is no situational understanding until thecommander applies his skilled judgment, and that ofhis staff, to interpreting the display in the context of

2008 Paper No. 8236 Page 3 of 12

Dennis K. LeedomEvidence Based Research, Inc.

Vienna, VA 22182d Id-texas(iDsudden link.net

Carl W. LickteigU.S. Army Research Institute

Fort Knox, KY 40121CarI.Licl{teig@us.army.mil

the mission and visualization of the end state of theoperation. Because there are always gaps andinconsistencies in information, the commander mustuse his or her 'mind's eye' to determine whatdisplays mean. Inevitably, even with net-centricity,there is less information than one would like to have,Filling in gaps is a function of command, enabling anexperienced commander to navigate gaps using hisor her experience to identify feasible solutions in atime-critical environment. (p. 4)

New battle command systems, therefore, will notgreatly change the underlying cognitive behaviors acommander must perform to achieve mission success.The underlying human behaviors will remain relativelyconsistent. To improve a commander's ability tovisualize, our Army must pursue training and leaderdevelopment opportunities to improve the cognitivebehaviors associated with visualization skills. Toaddress the challenging visualization requirement, theU.S. Army Research Institute (ARJ) initiated researchto understand and train commander's visualization atthe battalion level. I

The paper begins with an overview of commander'svisualization, and a review of military and behavioralliterature. Next, practical guidance on commander'svisualization is reported from commanders deployed toAfghanistan and Iraq who participated in a cognitivetask analysis (CTA). The paper then examines how theresults of the CTA--an identified set of visualizationprinciples and skills-~were structured and integratedinto multi-media training products. Finally, anevaluation of the training is summarized.

Commander's Visualization

Commander's visualization is the guiding andindispensable force in military operations and the

I ARI is also developing training to support commander'svisualization al the company level

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cornerstone of a commander's expertise. Visualization,the ability to think and create in mental images, is thecore mental process commanders use to make decisions(DA, 2003a). It is the process by which commanders:develop a clear understanding of the current state;envision a desired end; and determine a sequence ofactivity to achieve the end state.

Army doctrine and command practice assert that thecommander's vision is framed by the factors ofMission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time, and Civilians(METT-TC). Commanders also draw on the principlesof war, the tenets of Army operations, and particularlytheir own experience and judgment to form anunderstanding of the situation and to visualize theoperations required. Commanders utilize otheroperational variables (political, military, economic,social, information, and infrastructure plus physicalenvironment and time [PMESII-PT]), to develop anunderstanding of each METT-TC factor. But, thatalone, is not sufficient for envisioning theirinteractions, in particular the interactions amongfriendly, enemy, and civilians within the environment.

Commander's visualization is a continuous process,which begins in planning and is repeatedly updateduntil the force accomplishes its mission, Visualizationis the commander's essential means of assessing andadjusting operations. By continually confirming ormodifying their vision, commanders determine whenand where to make a decision, as well as whatdecisions are needed (DA, 2003b).

On a more personal level, the commander's visionhelps lead and motivate the force. It convinces Soldierstheir commander sees and understands the enemy in amanner that strengthens and secures their course ofaction, As the visualization forms and evolves duringan operation, it is frequently described and shared torevise how ongoing actions and resources must bedirected to accomplish the mission. It is the process ofsharing and shaping visualizations that links collectivethought to collective action,

Visualization Challenges

Caveats abound on the many potential problems informing and communicating the commander'svisualization (DA, 2003b), Commanders base theirvisualizations not only on facts, but also on theirinterpretation of them; not only on their observations,but also on the observations and interpretations ofothers. Invariably, the higher the commander's level,the more removed the commander is from the situation,from direct observation,

2008 Paper .No. 8236 Page 4 of J2

A related problem is that while high-technologydisplays extend the commander's vision far beyondline-of-sight, the information and images displayedmay appear more reliable and timely than they are(Wallace, 2005), As the amount of informationexpands, and time to process it contracts, reports tendto lack significant details or contain hasty errors. Moredistortion and delay is added by the process of sharinginformation and visualizations across the many personsand echelons required for collective enterprise,

In myriad ways, commanders must counter these andmany additional problems in visualizing operations, Inparticular, expert commanders base their decisions oninformation fi'om as many sources as possible, Theyexploit all available assets to proactively gather theinformation and intelligence needed to best determinewhat the enemy will do, when and where. However,despite all resources available, commanders must relyultimately on their own visualization, Only thecommander makes the decisive "read" through fog andfriction that commits the force toward peril and the endstate, as Wallace (2000) stated:

My notion is just sit down and think. I tell myfolks that you must do that. The night before thefight, go sit in your vehicle with the map. Tell yourdriver to not let anyone bother you, Sit there with acup of coffee, and just kind of map out to yourself.Think about how you expect the enemy will come,and importantly, what you are going to do about it(p. 1I)

Challenges to training visualization today onlyintensify due to: unpredictable threats, a multitude ofinteragency and multinational considerations, anendless stream of technology insertions that result inmore complicated systems, and increased "turbulence"in personnel, organization, and doctrine, Unfortunately,current methods for training visualization skills are notsufficient Too often "training" equates to placingcommanders in a realistic situation and hoping they'~figure it out."

The commander's ability to visualize is a humanperformance requirement. Yet, research on thedevelopment of expertise clearly indicates that "train asyou 11ght" immersion in fully simulated and realisticbattles is neither the most effective nor efficientmethod of developing expertise (Ericsson, 1996). Inmost domains, expertise is not a happenstance; nor theresult of incidental, discovery, or experiential learning.The development of expertise generally requires highlystructured and focused learning methods thatprogressively mold and hone performance to matchexpeli models. To help train commander's

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HOW DO EXPERTS VISUALIZE?

Military Literature

To understand how expert commanders visualizeoperations, we conducted a cognitive task analysis ofvisualization skills and expertise at the battalion level(Leedom, et aI., 2007). Analysis included reviews ofmilitary and behavioral literature coupled withinterviews of military experts. The goal of the analysiswas to identify the underlying cognitive behaviorsexpert battle commanders exhibit during visualizationof dynamic battlefield environments.

Doctrinal literature identifies several characteristicsthat can serve as a guide for identifying and articulatingvisualization skills at different tactical levels ofcommand. These characteristics include:- Visualization purposefully frames actions and links

them with understanding and intent. Visualizationserves to frame and identify actions that can be takento move the battlefield toward a set of objectives,goals, or desired end states.

- Visualization is synchronized horizontally across thecommander and staff who each contribute to itsconstruction and maintenance.

- Visualization balances intuition with deliberatereasoning in response to operational constraints suchas time and commander's experience.

- Visualization is structurally framed by Armydoctrine to provide a common understanding thatspecifies and organizes the elements of knowledgethat traditionally comprise an effective operationalplan.

- Visualization is multifaceted and multilevel, matchedto the dimensions of operational complexity faced inmodern military operation that ranges from short­term combat and security operations to long-termstability and counterinsurgency operations withpolitical, economic, and social dimensions.

- Visualization is collaborative to achieve unity ofeffort across the multitude of units, teams, andagencies that impact the operation.

- Visualization is continuously dynamic, adjusted inresponse to friendly actions, unforeseen civilianconsiderations, and unpredictable enemies.

- Visualization is part of a larger mental process; itsupports a larger planning and execution process thatcombines visualization, description, direction, andassessment to translate understanding into action.

Behavioral literature examined the visualizationprocess trom cognitive, social, and ecologicalperspectives. The cognitive level focused on theinternal mental structures and processes commanders

Behavioral Literature

The increased complexity and ambiguity of stabilityand counterinsurgency operations taxes thecommander's visualization process in countless ways.The commander may, for example, need to envision athree-block war that entails engaging insurgents in oneblock, quelling civilian protests in another, andconducting humanitarian assistance in a third (Krulak,1997). In addition, the Contemporary OperationalEnvironment (COE) is multidimensional (DA, 2003a).Threats may emerge suddenly (Kilcullen, 2006) andmay come from any direction (on the ground, on top orwithin structures, underground, or from the air). Thesecharacteristics suggest the need for commanders toconsider a number of additional factors in theirplanning and execution of stability operations.

Military literature contends that visualizing andconducting stability operations requires the samegeneral skills and processes as traditional offensive anddefensive operations (DA, 2001). However, doctrinealso stresses that there are unique characteristics ofstability operations that commanders must envision.They include:- Stability operations are political. Achieving the

desired political end state is often more challengingthan achieving the desired militmy end state.

- METT-TC applies differently in stability operationswhere the "enemy" is ambiguous and the "mission"may change rapidly from conducting lethal combatto non-lethal stability operations.

- Key "terrain" is often based on political and socialfactors, not physical features of the landscape.

-- "Troops" may include host nation police and armyelements, contracted interpreters and laborers, andmultinational partners versus an integrated force.

- Achieving goals in stability operations requiresperseverance, maybe years. Civilian considerationsand organizations are critical to achieving the goals.

Taken together, these eight characteristics ofvisualization provide a basic framework for examininghow visualization skills might be improved throughtraining. However, these characteristics are general innature and do not convey the complex challenges ofvisualization faced by tactical commanders inAfghanistan, Iraq, or other operational environments.To begin to understand these challenges at a deeperlevel, we must turn attention to the specifics of modernstability and counterinsurgency operations.

issues were examined.How do you train

visualization, two key researchHow do experts visualize?visualization?

2008 Paper No. 8236 Page 5 of 12

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Figure 1. Visualization as the Construction of FocalKnowledge.

use to develop a framework of understanding; thesocial level, mechanisms by which commandersidentify and use other sources of expertise to augmentand refine their understanding; and the ecological level,ways in which thought and action mutually influenceone another over time (L,eedom, et aL, 2007).

While Army doctrine can guide this mental processthrough mnemonics such as METT~TC and theelements of operational design, it cannot prescribe"cookbook" solutions for constructing and linking theset of mental constructs. Such devices merely serve todirect the commander's attention to different aspects ofthe problem space.

The data/frame model primarily deals with familiarsituations in which the individual possesses relevantexperience and expertise to deal with the problemspace. However, this is not always the case in manyreal world situations where a known problem calculuscannot be applied. To address this broader visualizationchallenge, the individual must first characterize thelevel and nature of disorder being faced. Then,depending upon the type of situation at hand, theindividual adjusts the framing cycle. Based on theinherent degree of order, Kurtz and Snowden (2003)offer a quadratic classification system of Known,Knowable, Complex, and Chaos situations. A key tenetis that each situation requires, or is best understood, byemploying different ways to form the commander'svisualization.

Arguably, military training and practice are notadequately geared toward more complex and chaoticsituations (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). KUl1z andSnowden relate a case in which a group of Marineswent to the New York Mercantile Exchange andcompeted against professional traders in a simulatedtrading environment. Of course, the traders alwayswon. But when the traders visited Quantico andcompeted in simulated war games against the Marines,they won again. One interpretation is that traders wereskilled at spotting and shaping patterns amid disorder,while Marines were trained to collect and analyze datain order to make rational decisions in an orderly world.

other pieces of information about the commander'sinformation environment. Available information is thenused to validate the activated mental models, fill inmissing features, or initiate a search for a more relevantmodel. Overall, this process is iterative in nature, withthe goal being to find a set of mental model fragmentsand information elements that cohere··..--that areconsistent and mutually reinforcing of one another. 1n amore formal manner, the so-called "data/i'fame" modelof Seick et aI., involves a number of different mentalprocesses that serve to maintain a consistentunderstanding of the current situation.

Known situations, for example, might be often repeatedCordon and Searches against a suspected terrorist safehouse. The process of visualizing the mission might bebound by a familiar set of tactics, techniques, andprocedures (TTPs) with an emphasis on obtainingactionable intelligence. Complex or novel situations,however, might require a focus on detecting andinterpreting meaningful patterns or links. Thecommander may need to probe the situation to discoverpatterns or links before being able to determine whatactions are needed to disrupt undesirable patterns andfoster favorable ones.

FRAGMENTARYMENTAL MODEls

rAc:rrKHQWtWGE

FOCAL KNOWLEDGECONSTRUCTf'D MeNTAL

MODEl. 01' srrVA TIONSELECTIVELYRETRIEVED

DATASITUATIONAL CV!i'S"

INFORMATION

•• ••••• • ••

How the commander constructs this framework hasbeen investigated by Sieck, Klein, Peluso, Smith, &Harris-Thompson (2004). Essentially, this processinvolves the activation of specific mental modelfragments-,~based upon the commander's experienceand expertise and the recognition of relevant triggeringcues from the operational environment. Once activated,mental model fragments provide a basis for interpreting

Cognitive PerspectiveVisualization is the mental process of linking intentwith action within a constructed problem space. Asshown in Figure 1, visualization involves the selectiveretrieval of data elements from the environment, theactivation of relevant tacit knowledge or mental modelsfrom the individual's experience, and the mentalintegration of these data and frameworks to form focalknowledge (Polanyi, J962). Here, focal knowledgerepresents the "current understanding" of the problemspace in terms of high-level objectives and operationalrealities. It is the framework used by the commander toenvision and commit to specific actions.

2008 Paper No, 8236 Page 6 of 12

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Regardless of how it is accomplished, the mental goalof visualization is to develop a set of conceptualpathways that link intent with action. As theoperational situation evolves, commanders are able tocontinually adjust execution decisions with reference tothe current and end state. The visualization serves as aroadmap or guide for maintaining unity of purpose andsynchronization across the various elements of theoperation. If this visualization space is not explicitlyexpressed and maintained, the commander runs the riskof myopic attention on moment-to-moment actionswhile losing sight of the "bigger picture" involved inachieving mission success.

Social PerspectiveTypically, visualization is regarded as a cognitiveprocess occurring within an individual. However,battalion success hinges on its ability to achieve sharedunderstanding and unity of purpose despite socialstructures, processes, and barriers that often curtailcollaboration. The commander and supporting staffplay unique and complementary roles in thevisualization process. The commander establishes aframework for this process and articulates his or hervision through commander's intent, planning guidance,and critical information requirements. Thc staffelaborates and translates this vision into causalmechanisms and pathways to the end state throughknowledge products such as Intelligence Preparation ofthe Battlefield (IPB), Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance (ISH.) Plan, Running Estimate, andCourse of Action Briefings. This more detailedknowledge is developed through collaboration acrossthe commander's personal, coordinating, and specialstaiTs. Each focuses on specific aspects of thecommander's visualization space. The effective abilityof these groups to create shared understanding andunity of purpose minimizes barriers to collaborationacross cognitive, social, organizational, and technicaldomains.

For visualization skill development, we looked beyondthe individual and address management skills needed toorganizc, maintain, and sustain this social process.Visualization synchronizes the knowledge elementsand associations internally across different levels ofthinking and assessment by the commander and staff.It synchronizes externally across different stakeholdersand players relevant to the operation. Within thecommander's immediate chain of command, thisincludes synchronization across warfighting functions.Beyond the immediate chain of command, this includessynchronization across the perspectives of otherJoint/Coalition military forces, other governmentagencies, and key civilian political and administrativeleaders with whom the commander must collaborate.

2008 Paper No. 8236 Page 7of 12

Ecological PerspectiveVisualization is not the passive process of fittingavailable information into an experience-basedframework of interpretation. Instead, organizationsactively engage their operational environment to both(I) shape real world events and states in conformancewith the organization's vision and (2) probe and revealadditional aspects of the opcrational environment forsubsequent advantage. An organization's activeengagement (i.e., enactment) of the operationalenvironment is a relevant strategy to pursue in thecomplex and chaotic disorder that permeates stabilityoperations (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003).

Shaping actions serve to conform the commander'soperational environment to the envisioned problemspace. They also help reduce the number of unknownsand risks. Probing actions are particularly useful incomplex operational environments where thecommander is unable to apply a known battle calculus,Probing actions illuminate additional elements andlinkages that can be exploited for an operationaladvantage. However, for probing actions to be effectiveand productive, they must be combined with deliberateanalysis. Thus, the ecological aspects of visualizationrequire the commander to establish meaningfulmeasures of effectiveness (MOE) that focus on resultsand consequences of unit actions. Measures assist indetermining if actions are appropriate, or if different oralternative actions are required, Measures also link theoutcome of actions with the operational purpose, focus,and system effects established by the commander.

Battlefield visualization is typically associated withoperational planning within the Military DecisionMaking Process (MDMP). However, visualization alsoserves an important role during execution. Duringexecution, effective visualization enables thecommander to track key problem elements and lines ofeffort over timc to identify meaningful patterns ortrends and to maintain unity of purpose for long-termmission objectives. This involves the development of aRunning Estimate, the staffs continuous assessment ofcurrent and future operations to determine (1) if thecurrent operation is proceeding according to theCommander's Intent and (2) if future operations aresUPP0l1able. It allows the commander to identify keyvariances with respect to forecasted events, and toappropriately adjust actions to maintain unity ofpurpose. Without steady reference to the content andstructure of thc visualization space, the commandermay become mentally absorbed in moment-to-momentoperations and lose sight of the bigger picture,

Expert Interviews

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HOW DO YOU TRAIN YISUALlZATlON?

We conducted Interviews with 25 brigade and battalioncommand and staff personnel followed by interviewswith instructors from the Command and General StaffCollege and Fellows Irom the U.S. Army's School forAdvanced Military Studies. The participants rangedfrom majors to colonels. All had recent experience inbattalion command or battalion/brigade staffs inAfghanistan or Iraq, They could deliberately reflect onthose experiences and their implications for leaderdevelopment. Participants received a read-aheadpackage that prompted them to think about the types ofskills required for battlefield visualization.

The "lessons learned" from the interviews focused onthe great challenges commanders face in visualizingmilitary operations in the COE, Almost unanimously,participants stated that understanding and visualizingstability and counterinsurgency operations inAfghanistan and Iraq was one of the most difficulttasks in their military careers, Some key challengeswere:~ Civilians are the center of gravity and visualization

must address the non-lethal lines of operation thatinfluence civilians,

- Stability operations have immediate and long-termtimelines that require commanders to visualize andreconcile often conflicting consequences,

~ The prolonged nature of stability operations makes itdifficult for commanders to maintain vigilance on thecurrent state and progress toward the end state.

- The MDMP is often abandoned in counterinsurgencyoperations in favor of more ad hoc planning.

~ The elements of operational design need to beextended down to the tactical level of visualization instability operations (current doctrine associates theseelements primarily with operational levelvisualization).

Similar lessons are increasingly documented in morerecent counterinsurgency literature and doctrine (DA,2007). However, many of the participants interviewedstated they did not have specific training oncounterinsurgency issues, They arrived in theaterwithout a solid mental model to visualize operations intheir area of operation and, therefore, learned to copewith unfolding events through "on the job training:'Participants also reported little use of some keyconceptual frameworks in Army doctrine such MDMP,PMESII-PT, and the elements of operational design.

2008 Paper No, 8236 Page 8 of I2

Based on the CTA findings, four skill domains andseven underlying visualization skills were identified, asshown in Figure 2. The four skill domains address theneed to Build, Synchronize, Assess, and Exploit thecommander's visualizations (Leedom, et al., 2007).

Build represents the ability to construct a coherent andcomprehensive visualization in accord with doctrinalguidance (DA, 2003a). Synchronize reflects the abilityto share and integrate visualizations internally andexternally. Assess reflects the ability to effectivelygauge execution progress and proactively refine thevisualization. Exploit rellects the ability to maintainoperational agility and momentum by advantagingemerging opportunities and deterring emerging threats.Each skill reflects the commander's ability to linkintent to action.

For each of the seven visualization skills, the CTAdeveloped target performance criteria to assess skillacquisition during training. For instance, two of the sixperformance criteria for Skill I, Identify tacticalproblems using the factors of METT-TC and Elementsof Operational Design, are:- Use factors of METT-TC and Elements of

Operational Design to interpret and frame theproblem elements across the unit's tactical andoperational environment.

- Develop and communicate Commander's Intent andPlanning Guidance.

As the eTA identified seven discrete skills, learningchunks tailored to each skill became a training designrequirement. Other design requirements were to specifythe tasks and learning objectives associated with eachskill. Different kinds of skills often require differentkinds of training, For example, for some perceptualtasks, the training might present very little theoreticalbackground, but create lots of practice exercises whereaccuracy and speed of performance are essential(Fadede,2006).

As tasks become more cognitive in nature, theinstruction requires more complex cognitive challenges(Cooke, 1994). As such, the visualization process thatis taught needs to help commanders learn and integratehigherworder cognitive skills, Therefore, exercises weredeveloped that required learners to review a complexset of data, consider complex processes, and makedecisions in complex situations.

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1, Identify taelical problems using the factors of METI-TC and Elements ofOperational Design

2. Synchronize visualizationinternally across commanderand staff

3, Synchronize visualizationexternally across relevantplayer interests

<1, Develop measures of effectiveness (MOE)

5, Colled infomlalion and identify pallerns and trends

Figure 2. Visualization Framework and Associated Skills

For training complex cognitive skills across realisticsituations, we used a set of instructional theories andapproaches based on a common theoretical viewpoint.One of these instructional approaches was deliberatepractice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Roemer, 1993;Ericsson, 1996), In a separate example of deliberatepractice training, learners were first provided theprinciples representing expert behaviors, and thengiven multiple practice opportunities to apply thebehaviors (Lussier, Shadrick, & Prevou, 2003).Initially, the practice sessions were short and focuseddrills, with clear and immediate feedback, followed bymore extended practice opportunities to overcomediagnosed skill deficiencies.

For End ,State, the instructional approach used thefollowing deliberate practice components:- Learners are provided the principles they need to

apply; they are not left to discover the principles ontheir own,

- Learners apply the principles to real-life situations,Initially, the practice sessions are focused on isolatedskills that are challenging but not overwhelming.

- Learners receive feedback, often by comparing thesolutions they develop with more expert solutions.

- After learners solve a problem, the next problem isdesigned to further progress skill development.

END STATE TRAINING PROGRAM

End State: Commander's Visualization at the BattalionLevel is a multi-media, interactive training program to

2008 Paper /v'o. 8236 Page 9 0112

improve the visualization skills of field grade officers,battalion commanders and staffs, The training issituated in Iraq and provides supporting materials suchas Introduction to Visualization, Road to War, Rules ofEngagement, and a Battalion Update Brief. The actualtraining package includes 14 scenario-based trainingand practice exercises in vignette format. End S'tatealso includes a pre-test and post-test in vignette format.Throughout the training, learners observe exemplarperformance of the seven expeli visualization skillsperformed by 3-dimensional animated role models (seeFigure 3) who convey the knowledge and perspectiveof expert commanders, Learners observe and thenapply visualization skills across a spectrum of stabilityand counterinsurgency vignettes during which theyreceive immediate and instructorless performancefeedback and evaluation,

Measurement is essential to training. Each trainingvignette provides training objectives and guidance,diagnoses performance difficulties and deficiencies,and assesses skill acquisition ba<;ed on specifiedperformance criteria. However, direct observation andobjective measurement of performance is oftendifficult in military settings, especially commander'scognitive performance. The unpredictable andasymmetric COE along with the expanse ofinformation and complexity in network-centricoperations further complicates commander'svisualization and its measurement. The training'sapproach to measurement helps to mitigate suchchallenges by exploiting the use of deliberate practice

JnterservicelJndustry Training, Simulation. and Education Conji;rence (JIITSEC) 2008

methods situated in highly structured vignettes. Thevignettes deliberately embed informational cues andtriggers of varying utilitY'·-,,~critical, useful, irrelevant,ambiguous, and misleading··--and then ask participantsto identify or assess the cues and triggers, or taskparticipants to respond to problems posed in thevignette.

Figure 3. Screenshot from End State Training

The expert guidance and feedback needed for thetraining is drawn from: the expertise obtained in theeTA interviews; the U.S. Army's extraordinary abilityto rapidly gather, structure, and distribute lessonslearned (e.g., Center for Army Lessons Learned); and,in~stride counsel and review of all training design anddevelopment phases by active duty and reservepersonnel and militmy instructors. The presentationformats used to convey expert guidance and feedbackemploy "authentic" mentors, instructors, and Soldierrole models.

END STATE TRAINING

Formative assessment of the End State trainingprogram by military subject matter experts addressedthe training approach, the visualization framework(Build, Synchronize, Assess, and Exploit), and theseven visualization skills. Training effectivenessassessment was conducted with an experienced groupof battalion commanders.

Method

For formative assessment, the group consisted of fourMajors from a brigade staff, three new battalioncommanders, and one new brigade commander. Theofficers evaluating the training materials wereinformally interviewed before, during, and after thetraining to provide feedback on the different aspects ofthe training package,

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For training effectiveness assessment, the groupconsisted of six battalion commanders and one brigadeexecutive officer. Prior to accessing any of the trainingmaterials, participants completed a pre-trainingVisualization Confidence Inventory. The confidenceinventory was part of a 360~degree assessment of thecommander's ability to visualize the battlefield andwas used to establish baseline performance measures.Next, the commanders completed the pre-testassessment vignette which addressed all sevenvisualization skills. After reviewing supportingmaterials, each participant completed at least fourvignettes encompassing two of the four expert skilldomains. For each visualization skill in the twodomains, the first vignette provided a detaileddemonstration of how to apply the skill in arepresentative situation. The second vignette requiredthe commander to apply the skill in a newenvironment. Once all the training vignettes werecompleted, the participants were given a post-trainingvignette and visualization post-test. The tests alsoassessed the commanders on all seven skills eventhough they may have only completed training on twoskill areas. Finally, participants completed a post­training Visualization Confidence Inventory and apost-training survey.

Results

Across assessments, Soldier comments, ratings, andvisualization performance supported the potential ofEnd State as a valuable tool for training visualization.Participants' comments in the formative assessmentstressed three main themes:- End State addresses an important Army training need

and it warrants refinement and implementation.~ The visualization framework (Build, Synchronize,

Assess, and Exploit) was supported and mostparticipants understood the skill dimensions andagreed with the training principles.

- The Road to War was on target and in many waysrepresented the environment experienced in Iraq.

Participants' ratings and· visualization performance inthe training effectiveness assessment were encouragingand informative. A comparison of participants' percentcorrect on pre-test (,11 ~ 79.6, Sf) ~ 4.6) versus post-test(,11 ~ 87.8, Sf) ~ 4.9) scores showed significantimprovement on visualization performance(Wilcoxon's Z ~ 2.533, P < .05). FUither analysis foundthat the pre- to post-test gains were largely in theassigned skill domains and associated skillsexperienced during training. That is, performancetended to improve on the skill domains trained butremained about stable on skills domains not trained.The results are encouraging considering the

lnterservice/lndustry Training, Simularion, and Education COl1(erence (I/lTSE'C) 2008

participants were experienced battalion commandersrather than individuals more in need of training prior totaking battalion command.

Results for the pre- and post-training VisualizationConfidence Inventory mirrored test results. Participantratings indicated more confidence in their visualizationabilities after their training, Table 1 presents the overallmeans for the pre- and posHest confidence ratings byskill domain. All ratings were on a five point scale,with 1 "Not confident" and 5 = "Extremelyconfident. "

Table 1. Visualization Confidence Ratings

Visualization ~~~___Me i3(lB"tingSkill Domain

~~

Pre-Trainina ' Post-TraininaBuild 3.89 3.92

Synchronize 396 4.05

Assess 3.37 3.76

Exploit 3.04 371

In the survey responses, the participant battalioncommanders stressed that End State training has strongpotential. One participant commented: "Scenarioswere well done and realistic, I was deployed for a yearin Kirkuk-you got it about right."

The training outcomes and participant feedbackprovide qualitative and quantitative support for thetarget performance criteria used to assess visualizationskills during training, However, participants felt thatthe End State assessment questions could be improvedby requiring the training participant to more directlyapply each of the skills. Thus, while the performancecriteria demonstrated face and content validity, theprocedures used to assess performance could beimproved.

CONCLUSIONS

U.S. Army doctrinal literature cites visualization as anessential part of battle command. Yet, despite thefrequent reference to this skill, the concept ofvisualization lacked meaningful definition from eithera cognitive, social, or ecological point of view. Lackingsuch a definition, it becomes difficult to characterize"good" visualization from that which is mediocre orinadequate. Without the ability to characterize specificperformance goals, training or developing this skill infuture commanders remains problematic,

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What was missing was a structured way to deliberatelytrain and measure the cognitive behaviors associatedwith commander's visualization skills, The results ofthe CTA made it clear that visualization by battalioncommanders and their staff is a very complex cognitiveprocess. Further, expert performance of battlefieldvisualization often involves vety complex data withautomatic processing that leads to quick analysis anddecisions. The visualization process that is taughtneeds to help commanders learn and integrate higherorder cognitive skills. Exercises must require thatlearners encounter a complex set of data, considercomplex processes, and make decisions in complexsituations.

The ability to visualize is an essential attribute that iscritical to mission accomplishment. Currently,visualization is learned through a trial~and~error

process with very few, if any, opportunities for formaltraining and instruction. That notion was confinned ininterviews with officers returning from Iraq andAfghanistan. Based on the results of the CTA, aninstructional process and exemplar training productswere developed. Results of the CTA underscore theneed for improved training to visualize the increasinglycomplex and unpredictable operations our Soldiersface, Results of the training effectiveness assessmentindicate that l-:'nd State's visualization framework andtraining approach are a solid foundation for improvingcommander's visualization,

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